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PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
The fact that parties entered into a Compromise Agreement does not warrant the lifting of an
order of attachment. While the parties have entered into a compromise agreement, the
obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the
total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains
unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have continued to subsist.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence
dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution
issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or
vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper. Records indicate that while the parties have
entered into a compromise agreement, the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied
with – particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given
that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have
continued to subsist. In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject of
this case should be restored and its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim,
Jr. his preferential lien over the properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation
of the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an attachment even
before judgment, is in the nature of a vested interest which affords specific security for the
satisfaction of the debt put in suit. Lim vs. Spouses Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, July 03, 2013, J.
Perlas-Bernabe
The Supreme Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure,
deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme
Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so
doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making
authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs
created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong
exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define,
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and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right since it
only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened
to be violated during the course of a pending litigation.
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not
oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well
as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure,
deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme
Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the
authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were
merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9
(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 case. Carpio- Morales vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015,
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility
of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites,
namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said
right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an
injunction. In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply
with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local
government unit where his business is situated. A governor’s permit is a pre-requisite before one
can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records, however, reveal that Lara admittedly
failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying operations within the
Permit Area. Consequently, he is not entitled to any injunction. Province of Cagayan vs. Joseph
Lasam Lara, G.R. No. 188500, July 24, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe
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In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and
complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for.
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction.
First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their
ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive
their source of livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the execution of the
RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC
judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual. Novecio vs. Hon. R. Lim, GR No. 193809,
March 23, 2015
Preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control
of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed. After
all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual,
peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
While it is a general rule that a trial court's discretion in issuing injunctive writs should not be
interfered with, the Court finds the CA's lifting of the WPI issued by the RTC in this case to be
proper, considering that the foregoing parameters were not observed. As aptly pointed out by
the CA, although petitioners appear to be the registered owners of the subject properties, they
nonetheless failed to establish that they were in actual physical possession of the same at the
time the incidents transpired. In fact, a cursory perusal of the complaint readily shows that
petitioners never alleged that they were in prior possession of the subject properties. Hence, for
these reasons, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the WPI involved herein. Apouses
Laus vs. Optimum Security Services, G.R. No. 208343, February 03, 2016 Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Although Rule 59, Sec. 1(d) is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing
instances not covered by the other grounds enumerated under the said section, courts must
remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the property
sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the
risk of being impaired, and only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save
plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.
Based on the allegations in her application, it appears that Dominalda sought receivership mainly
because she considers this the best remedy to ensure that she would receive her share in the
income of the disputed properties. Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that she needed
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this income for her medical expenses and daily sustenance. But it can be gleaned from her
application that, aside from her bare assertion that petitioner Mila solely appropriated the fruits
and rentals earned from the disputed properties in connivance with some of her siblings,
Dominalda has not presented or alleged anything else to prove that the disputed properties were
in danger of being wasted or materially injured and that the appointment of a receiver was the
most convenient and feasible means to preserve their integrity.
Further, there is nothing in the RTC’s February 8 and July 19, 2010 Resolutions that says why the
disputed properties might be in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured while in the
hands of the defendants a quo. Neither did the RTC explain the reasons which compelled it to
have them placed under receivership. The RTC simply declared that placing the disputed
properties under receivership was urgent and merely anchored its approval on the fact that
Dominalda was an elderly in need of funds for her medication and sustenance. The RTC plainly
concluded that since the purpose of the receivership is to procure money from the proceeds of
these properties to spend for medicines and other needs of the Dominalda, who is old and sickly,
this circumstance falls within the purview of Sec. 1(d), that is, "Whenever in other cases it appears
that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible means of preserving,
administering, or disposing of the property in litigation."
Verily, the RTC’s purported determination that the appointment of a receiver is the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering or disposing of the properties is
nothing but a hollow conclusion drawn from inexistent factual considerations. Caboverde -
Tantano vs. Caboverde, GR No. 203585, July 29, 2013
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
When the COA, having no knowledge of a prior dismissal, fixes the reckoning point of the period
of disallowance at an erroneous date, it does not tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion.
Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent
or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
COA in fixing the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are
bereft of any showing that it had any knowledge of Labrador’s prior dismissal on May 2, 1997. To
hold otherwise would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of discretion, much
less countenance a speculative endeavor.
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In this relation, the Constitution vests the COA with the primary responsibility to ensure that any
irregularity in the disbursement of the same is cleared, or any attendant illegality be proscribed.
Yet, when a significant fact which would impact this process is missed – as in this case, the May
2, 1997 dismissal of Labrador – the public nature of the abovementioned interests impels the
Court to judiciously mind the COA of such fact if only to aid the latter to fulfill its constitutional
mandate as well as to avert any loss on the part of the government. The COA must correct its
previous issuances in this case in order to reflect the actual date of Labrador’s dismissal which
would also be the proper reckoning point of the period of disallowance. Rosalinda Dimapilis-
Baldoz vs. COA, G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013 J. Perlas-Bernabe
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office. Quo Warranto Petition may be filed in order
to oust an impeachable officer.
In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition
against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto
petition filed against respondent therein who, at the time of the filing of the petition, had taken
an oath and assumed the Office of the President. Petitioner therein prayed for judgment
confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity. In fact, in the said cases, there was
not even a claim that respondent therein was disqualified from holding office and accordingly
challenged respondent's status as de jure 14th President of the Republic. By entertaining the quo
warranto petition, the Court in fact determined whether then President Estrada has put an end
to his official status by his alleged act of resignation.
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision reads: Section 2. The President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)
It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, for its interpretation.
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The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. We have consistently held that
the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of
that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option
to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution
of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is
predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of
a public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses
without questioning his title to the office he holds.
Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that
the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from
office. Shartel, above cited, eloquently incites as follows: x x x. There is no indication in the
debates of the Convention that the framers of the Constitution intended at this point to make a
complete statement of causes of removal from office. The emphasis was on the causes for which
Congress might remove executive and judicial officers, not on causes of removal as such. x x x
How then can the causes of removal by impeachment be construed as a recital of the causes for
which judges may be removed? It is especially hard to see why the express provision for
impeachment - a limited legislative method of removing all civil officers for serious misconduct -
should be construed to forbid removal of judges by judicial action on account of disability or any
reasonable cause not a proper ground for action by the Houses of Congress. Republic vs. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
If what is assailed relates to “acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person,” the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition or Mandamus must be filed “in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Court.
The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of Castaño vs.
Lobingier, that the power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional Trial
Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be exercised within the limits of their
respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. Applying previous
legislation similar to [Section 21] of BP 129 and its complementary provision, i.e., Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case that the CFI of Leyte had no power to issue writs of
injunction and certiorari against the Justice of Peace of Manila, as the same was outside the
territorial boundaries of the issuing court.
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Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and pronouncements to the instant case,
the writ of prohibition issued by the RTC of Manila in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds
of the territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Atlanta Industries, G.R. No. 193796, July 2, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Mandamus does not lie to compel the production of a holographic will, there being a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private
duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted
that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76,
Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee named
in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the
original holographic will. Thus—
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty
(20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having
jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a will
shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20)
days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of
the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the
court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall
be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
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SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after the
death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered
so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he
delivers the will. Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010
Mandamus will not lie to compel the RTC to issue writ of execution where sheriff has reported
that it has been fully implemented. The writ of execution has already been implemented. The
proper remedy is to cite the disobedient party in contempt.
A writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation
of law. It is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty which, as
opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
As acknowledged by Martinez through his signature on the Deputy Sheriff’s Certificate of Delivery
of Possession, the subject lots had already been delivered to him and his co-parties. The Court
held that the CA correctly opined that his remedy was to have Natalia Realty cited for contempt.
The proper procedure if the losing party refuses to deliver possession of the lands is not for the
court to cite them for contempt but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the premises and deliver
the possession thereof to the winning party. However, if subsequent to such dispossession, the
losing party enters into or upon the properties for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession or in any manner disturb the possession of the winning party, then and only then may
the losing party be charged with and punished for c contempt. Martinez vs. Natalia Realty Co.,
G.R. No. 203022, December 03, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Mandamus does not lie to mandate the JBC to accept/count votes cast by the Chairman of the
HR Committee on Justice on the ground that the reconstitution of the JBC is defective, flawed,
and unconstitutional.
As an extraordinary writ, it lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one. A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. A purely
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ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. On the other hand, if the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall
be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the judiciary may
only be considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by its rightful members
and not by someone, like the petitioner, who is not considered a member during the En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. For during the questioned period, the lawful
representative of Congress to the JBC is a member of the Senate and not of the House of
Representatives as per their agreed rotational scheme. Considering that a member of the Senate
already cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full discretion not to count the votes of the
petitioner for it is mandated by both the Constitution and jurisprudence to maintain that
Congress will only have one representative in the JBC. As the act of the JBC involves a
discretionary one, accordingly, mandamus will not lie. Umali vs. JBC, July 25, 2017, G.R. No.
228628
Direct resort to the Supreme Court in a Quo Warranto Petition is justified if the action questions
the qualification of no less than a Member of the Supreme Court. The issue of whether a person
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter of public
concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an
intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo
warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City
of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is
justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than
a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
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or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special
interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position. Republic
vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary ordinary proceeding under the
Family Code and not a Special Proceeding under the Rules of Court. Thus, a remedy against the
adverse decision of the Family Court does not require the filing of notice of appeal and a record
on appeal.
Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court, which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected, does not include
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse.
A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding since Article 41 of the
Family Code provides that such Petition, for the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
is a summary proceeding.
Not being a special proceeding, the petition therefore does not need a record of appeal to perfect
the appeal. Rule 41, Section 2 subsection (a) of the Revised Rules of Court provide that a record
of appeal is only needed in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. Republic vs. Madrona, G.R 163604, May 6, 2005
Certiorari lies even if the respondent does not exercise quasi-judicial power
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph
of Section 1, Article 8 of the Constitution.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
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Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby
entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has
become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising
our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on
the Chief Executive’s spending power. Araullo vs. Aquino G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
The authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory
orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution
as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
While there is no express grant power to entertain petitions for Certiorari with respect to the
CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power
of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order
in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that
the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these
cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered
as partial, not total.
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A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise
it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to
the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and
to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient
and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or
restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it. City of Manila vs. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723,
February 4, 2014
A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment
case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the
property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property.
Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a
non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary
dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case.
The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property
claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited
to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such
possession under any contract, express or implied.
The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff
and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. Manalang vs. Bacani, G.R. No. 156995,
January 12, 2015
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