Notes on Realism in the subject International relations

1. Realism and International Relations, Jack Donnelly, 2000

1.1 'Realism' aka political realism is the same as realpolitik, power politics

This is an old explanation of the behaviour of govts in intl politics. Realism was the basis of Thucydides in
'The Peloponnesian Wars'.

Realism had a great effect on the development of theory before and after WW1 by scholars. Then
before and after WW2 Realism was reshaped by self confessed realists e.g. E.H. Carr and Hans
Morgenthau at the beginning and early stages in the development the academic subject Intl relns.

Some scholar -practitioners of relns between states based their approach on realism e.g. George Kennan
and Henry Kissinger.

Post WW2, realism was the dominant theoretical approach in Western Europe and North America
during the Cold War and after though less dominant after.

Its long history as an accepted explanation is evidence that the problems or behaviour of states to which
it is used to explain and to make policy recurred often and that it provided at least some benefits to its
users. Accepting that every behaviour has a positive intent and that every behaviour is useful in some
context then realism has both a positive intent and is useful in some context.

What is 'political realism' or realpolitik or power politics?

1. It is more an approach or a method of explaining the political behaviour of govts to one another.

2. Some of its main assumptions are:

- states are the only actors in the intl system

- states have an ineradicable tendency to do evil

-states do not recognise any authority over them

-individual persons and states pursue power at all times

-states calculate their interests in terms of military power

- states at all times seek to maximise their own military power

-the behaviour of states is mainly based on the 'drive' to survival

- the nature of the international system causes states to behave in the way they do i.e. the way one
state behaves is determined by the behaviour of the other states

- domestic morals do not apply to the behaviour of states

-Any behaviour required for the survival of a state is justified for that state

Donnelly gives 4 ways to identify political realism in intl relns

(A) by definition

Realist theorists differ in what aspects of the approach they emphasise and they all base their common
interpretation of human nature. They believe that the human being is evil by nature. In domestic society
their institutions and powers available internally to a govt restrain that evil. In intl relns there is no over
arching authority which regulates the behaviour of states and that condition they term 'anarchy'. They
assert that anarchy provides the opportunity for states to indulge in evil because there is no restraining
power.

The proponents of this interpretation include Thucydides, Machiavelli (Politics and The prince), Hans
Morgenthau (1949), Treitschke (1916), Butterfield (1949), Reinhold Niebuhr (1944), E. H. Carr,
Schwarzenberger (1951), Waltz (1979)

(B) Six realist paradigms

(i) Hobbesian, from The Leviathan

"....in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarell. First, Competition, Secondly,
Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory." He concludes, "And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."

Human nature, according to Hobbes, cannot be changed. The only way to restrain these behaviours is by
creating fear in people by having superior power i.e. to create the anticipation that certain behaviours
will lead to pain in the perpetrator.

(ii) The 'biological' realism of Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1954) [Morgenthau was a Jew
who was a refugee from Nazi Germany and went to the USA)

Morgenthau was the leading realist of the 1950s and 1960s. He had great influence on the study of intl
relns in the USA.

Morgenthau position was that political realism believes that politics , like society in general, is governed
by objective laws that have their roots in human nature (what is human nature?). That moral principles
cannot be applied to the action of states.

(iii) Kenneth waltz, Theory of International relations (1979)

"....There is striking sameness in the quality of international life through millennia" These similarities
arise from a persistent structure of international anarchy.

"Each state is separate, autonomous and formally equal political unit that must count ultimately on its
own resources to achieve its own interests."

(iv) Realism as Prisoners' Dilemma

PD analysis shows that the central characteristics of intl relns are: insecurity, competition, and conflict
even where there are strong incentives to cooperate.

There is no insurance scheme to reward potential losing states for risking cooperation.

There is no procedure to get agreement to share benefits of cooperation.

(v) Thucydides' Athenian Envoys

This refers to the Melian dialogue in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens
and Sparta @ the end of the 5th C BC

The rulers of Athens wanted to add the island of Melos to their empire. The Melians wanted to remain
independent and to rule themselves. The rulers of Athens sent envoys to the rulers of Melos to convince
the Melians that resistance was futile and that the Melians should surrender thereby avoiding war, the
human loss because the Melians would lose, and having the same outcome i.e. losing the war.

The envoys restricted the discussion with the Melians to only power and interest. They said, "For you
know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is in question only between equals in power, while
the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

The Athenians argued that freedom was the fruit of power. For Melos to hold out would be for them to
misjudge the situation with tragic consequences, "the contest not being an equal one, with honour as
the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of self preservation."

"Expediency goes with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger." This the
envoys contend is the way the world works.

The Melians decided to fight for their independence no matter the cost. The Athenians set siege to
Melos, it succeeds. The men are killed, the women and children are sold into slavery. The Athenians
send some of their own people to populate Melos.

The Athenians showed that from their view the relations between states contain a conflict between
justice and military power and that the power wins. They also argue that that is the way the world works
and that the world works demonstrable law - like regularities.

(Vi) Machiavelli, The Prince and Politics

Machiavelli portrayed that humans were by nature, "insatiable, arrogant, crafty, and shifting and above
all else, malignant, iniquitous, violent and savage."

"Men never do good unless necessity drives them to it."

For Machiavelli, at the core, humans were evil and egoistic and these could only be repressed by force
and at times by ferocious cruelty.
Political Realism in International Relations

First published Mon Jul 26, 2010

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical
perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that
stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism,
which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international
arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own
national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists' emphasis on power
and self-interest is their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among
states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they
sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among
states.

Not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The distinction
should be drawn between classical realism—represented by such twentieth-century theorists as
Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau—and radical or extreme realism. While classical
realism emphasizes the concept of national interest, it is not the Machiavellian doctrine “that
anything is justified by reason of state” (Bull 1995 189). Nor does it involve the glorification of
war or conflict. The classical realists do not reject the possibility of moral judgment in
international politics. Rather, they are critical of moralism—abstract moral discourse that does
not take into account political realities. They assign supreme value to successful political action
based on prudence: the ability to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible
alternatives on the basis of its likely political consequences.

Realism encompasses a variety of approaches and claims a long theoretical tradition. Among its
founding fathers, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are the names most usually mentioned.
Twentieth-century classical realism has today been largely replaced by neorealism, which is an
attempt to construct a more scientific approach to the study of international relations. Both
classical realism and neorealism have been subjected to criticism from IR theorists representing
liberal, critical, and post-modern perspectives.

 1. The Roots of the Realist Tradition

o 1.1 Thucydides and the Importance of Power
o 1.2 Machiavelli's Critique of the Moral Tradition
o 1.3 Hobbes's Anarchic State of Nature
 2. Twentieth Century Classical Realism
o 2.1 E. H. Carr's Challenge of Utopian Idealism
o 2.2 Hans Morgenthau's Realist Principles
 3. Neorealism
o 3.1 Kenneth Waltz's International System
o 3.2 Objections to Neorealism
 4. Conclusion: The Cautionary and Positive Character of Realism
 Bibliography
  Other Internet Resources
 Related Entries

1. The Roots of the Realist Tradition

1.1 Thucydides and the Importance of Power

Like other classical political theorists, Thucydides (460–411 B.C.) saw politics as involving
moral questions. Most importantly, he asks whether relations among states to which power is
crucial can also be guided by the norms of justice. His History of the Peloponnesian War is in
fact neither a work of political philosophy nor a sustained theory of international relations. Much
of this work, which presents a partial account of the armed conflict between Athens and Sparta
that took place from 431 to 404 B.C., consists of paired speeches by personages who argue
opposing sides of an issue. Nevertheless, if the History is described as the only acknowledged
classical text in international relations, and if it inspires theorists from Hobbes to contemporary
international relations scholars, this is because it is more than a chronicle of events, and a
theoretical position can be extrapolated from it. Realism is expressed in the very first speech of
the Athenians recorded in the History—a speech given at the debate that took place in Sparta just
before the war. Moreover, a realist perspective is implied in the way Thucydides explains the
cause of the Peloponnesian War, and also in the famous “Melian Dialogue,” in the statements
made by the Athenian envoys.

1.1.1 General Features of Realism in International Relations

International relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of
human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government.
Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in which
the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in which there
is little place for morality. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power,
security, and morality that define the realist tradition are all present in Thucydides.

(1) Human nature is a starting point for realism in international relations. Realists view human
beings as inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral
principles. At the debate in Sparta, described in Book I of Thucydides' History, the Athenians
affirm the priority of self-interest over morality. They say that considerations of right and wrong
have “never turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior
strength” (chap. 1 par. 76).

(2) Realists, and especially today's neorealists, consider the absence of government, literally
anarchy, to be the primary determinant of international political outcomes. The lack of a
common rule-making and enforcing authority means, they argue, that the international arena is
essentially a self-help system. Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define
its own interests and to pursue power. Anarchy thus leads to a situation in which power has the
overriding role in shaping interstate relations. In the words of the Athenian envoys at Melos,
without any common authority that can enforce order, “the independent states survive [only]
when they are powerful” (5.97).

(3) Insofar as realists envision the world of states as anarchic, they likewise view security as a
central issue. To attain security, states try to increase their power and engage in power-balancing
for the purpose of deterring potential aggressors. Wars are fought to prevent competing nations
from becoming militarily stronger. Thucydides, while distinguishing between the immediate and
underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, does not see its real cause in any of the particular
events that immediately preceded its outbreak. He instead locates the cause of the war in the
changing distribution of power between the two blocs of Greek city-states: the Delian League,
under the leadership of Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, under the leadership of Sparta.
According to him, the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security, and
thus propelled them into war (1.23).

(4) Realists are generally skeptical about the relevance of morality to international politics. This
can lead them to claim that there is no place for morality in international relations, or that there is
a tension between demands of morality and requirements of successful political action, or that
states have their own morality that is different from customary morality, or that morality, if any,
is merely used instrumentally to justify states' conduct. A clear case of the rejection of ethical
norms in relations among states can be found in the “Melian Dialogue” (5.85–113). This
dialogue relates to the events of 416 B.C., when Athens invaded the island of Melos. The
Athenian envoys presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or surrender, and from the
outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to think only about their survival. In the envoys'
words, “We both know that the decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when
both sides are under equal compulsion, but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can,
and the weak must accept that” (5.89). To be “under equal compulsion” means to be under the
force of law, and thus to be subjected to a common lawgiving authority (Korab-Karpowicz 234).
Since such an authority above states does not exist, the Athenians argue that in this lawless
condition of international anarchy, the only right is the right of the stronger to dominate the
weaker. They explicitly equate right with might, and exclude considerations of justice from
foreign affairs.

1.1.2 The “Melian Dialogue”—The First Realist-Idealist Debate

We can thus find strong support for a realist perspective in the statements of the Athenians. The
question remains, however, to what extent their realism coincides with Thucydides' own
viewpoint. Although substantial passages of the “Melian Dialogue,” as well as other parts of the
History support a realistic reading, Thucydides' position cannot be deduced from such selected
fragments, but rather must be assessed on the basis of the wider context of his book. In fact, even
the “Melian Dialogue” itself provides us with a number of contending views.

Political realism is usually contrasted by IR scholars with idealism or liberalism, a theoretical

perspective that emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states, and international
cooperation. The “Melian Dialogue,” which is one of the most frequently commented-upon parts
of Thucydides' History, presents the classic debate between the idealist and realist views: Can
international politics be based on a moral order derived from the principles of justice, or will it
forever remain the arena of conflicting national interests and power?

For the Melians, who employ idealistic arguments, the choice is between war and subjection
(5.86). They are courageous and love their country. They do not wish to lose their freedom, and
in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are prepared to defend
themselves (5.100; 5.112). They base their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they
associate with fairness, and regard the Athenians as unjust (5.90; 5.104). They are pious,
believing that gods will support their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and trust in
alliances, thinking that their allies, the Spartans, who are also related to them, will help them
(5.104; 5.112). Hence, one can identify in the speech of the Melians elements of the idealistic or
liberal world view: the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, that
they have mutual obligations to one another and will carry out such obligations, and that a war of
aggression is unjust. What the Melians nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In their
decision to defend themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand
or by prudent calculations.

The Athenian argument is based on key realist concepts such as security and power, and is
informed not by what the world should be, but by what it is. The Athenians disregard any moral
talk and urge the Melians to look at the facts—that is, to recognize their military inferiority, to
consider the potential consequences of their decision, and to think about their own survival (5.87;
5.101). There appears to be a powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their
position, based on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on rationality,
intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination, their logic proves to be seriously
flawed. Melos, a relatively weak state, does not pose any real security threat to them. The
eventual destruction of Melos does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which
Athens will lose a few years later.

In the History, Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of
justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power. There are no logical limits to the
size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and gain after conquering Melos, the
Athenians engaged in war against Sicily. They paid no attention to the Melian argument that
considerations of justice are useful to all in the longer run (5.90). And, as the Athenians
overestimate their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves to be
very shortsighted indeed.

It is utopian to ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely
on power alone. Thucydides appears to support neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the
cynicism of their Athenian opponents. He teaches us to be on guard “against naïve-dreaming on
international politics,” on the one hand, and “against the other pernicious extreme: unrestrained
cynicism,” on the other (Donnelly 193). If he can be regarded as a political realist, his realism is
nonetheless not a prefiguring of either realpolitik, in which traditional ethics is denied, or today's
scientific neorealism, in which moral questions are largely ignored. Thucydides' realism, neither
immoral nor amoral, can rather be compared to that of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and
other twentieth-century classical realists, who, although sensible to the demands of national
interest, would not deny that political actors on the international scene are subject to moral
judgment.

1.2 Machiavelli's Critique of the Moral Tradition

Idealism in international relations, like realism, can lay claim to a long tradition. Unsatisfied with
the world as they have found it, idealists have always tried to answer the question of “what ought
to be” in politics. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political idealists who believed that there
were some universal moral values on which political life could be based. Building on the work of
his predecessors, Cicero developed the idea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both
domestic and international politics. His ideas concerning righteousness in war were carried
further in the writings of the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In the late
fifteenth century, when Niccolò Machiavelli was born, the idea that politics, including the
relations among states, should be virtuous, and that the methods of warfare should remain
subordinated to ethical standards, still predominated in political literature.

Machiavelli (1469–1527) challenged this well-established moral tradition, thus positioning

himself as a political innovator. The novelty of his approach lies in his critique of classical
Western political thought as unrealistic, and in his separation of politics from ethics. He thereby
lays the foundations for modern politics. In chapter XV of The Prince, Machiavelli announces
that in departing from the teachings of earlier thinkers, he seeks “the effectual truth of the matter
rather than the imagined one.” The “effectual truth” is for him the only truth worth seeking. It
represents the sum of the practical conditions that he believes are required to make both the
individual and the country prosperous and strong. Machiavelli replaces the ancient virtue (a
moral quality of the individual, such as justice or self-restraint) with virtù, ability or vigor. As a
prophet of virtù, he promises to lead both nations and individuals to earthly glory and power.

Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism that is applied to both domestic and
international affairs. It is a doctrine which denies the relevance of morality in politics, and claims
that all means (moral and immoral) are justified to achieve certain political ends. Although
Machiavelli never uses the phrase ragione di stato or its French equivalent, raison d'état, what
ultimately counts for him is precisely that: whatever is good for the state and not ethical scruples
or norms

Machiavelli justified immoral actions in politics, but never refused to admit that they are evil. He
operated within the single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific task of his
nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of a double ethics: one public and one
private, to push Machiavellian realism to even further extremes, and to apply it to international
relations. By asserting that “the state has no higher duty than of maintaining itself,” Hegel gave
an ethical sanction to the state's promotion of its own interest and advantage against other states
(Meinecke 357). Thus he overturned the traditional morality. The good of the state was
perversely interpreted as the highest moral value, with the extension of national power regarded
as a nation's right and duty. Referring to Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the
state was power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers,
and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster this power. He considered international
agreements to be binding only insofar as it was expedient for the state. The idea of an
autonomous ethics of state behavior and the concept of realpolitik were thus introduced.
Traditional ethics was denied and power politics was associated with a “higher” type of morality.
These concepts, along with the belief in the superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons
with which German statesmen, from the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War,
justified their policies of conquest and extermination.

Machiavelli is often praised for his prudential advice to leaders (which has caused him to be
regarded as a founding master of modern political strategy) and for his defense of the republican
form of government. There are certainly many aspects of his thought that merit such praise.
Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as the thinker who bears foremost responsibility for
demoralization of Europe. The argument of the Athenian envoys presented in Thucydides'
“Melian Dialogue,” that of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, or that of Carneades, to whom
Cicero refers—all of these challenge the ancient and Christian views of the unity of politics and
ethics. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral mode of thinking had never
prevailed in the mainstream of Western political thought. It was the force and timeliness of his
justification of resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving political ends that persuaded
so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who followed him. The effects of
Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the employment of all possible means was
permissible in war, would be seen on the battlefields of modern Europe, as mass citizen armies
fought against each other to the deadly end without regard for the rules of justice. The tension
between expediency and morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of a
double ethics, private and public, that created a further damage to traditional, customary ethics
was invented. The doctrine of raison d'état ultimately led to the politics of Lebensraum, two
world wars, and the Holocaust.

Perhaps the greatest problem with realism in international relations is that it has a tendency to
slip into its extreme version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the state at the expense of
other states, no matter how morally problematic the policy is. Even if they do not explicitly raise
ethical questions, in the works of Waltz and of many other of today's neorealists, a double ethics
is presupposed and words such realpolitik no longer have the negative connotations that they had
for classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau.

1.3 Hobbes's Anarchic State of Nature

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1683) was part of an intellectual movement whose goal was to free the
emerging modern science from the constraints of the classical and scholastic heritage. According
to classical political philosophy, on which the idealist perspective is based, human beings can
control their desires through reason and can work for the benefit of others, even at the expense of
their own benefit. They are thus both rational and moral agents, capable of distinguishing
between right and wrong, and of making moral choices. They are also naturally social. With
great skill Hobbes attacks these views. His human beings, extremely individualistic rather than
moral or social, are subject to “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases
only in death” (Leviathan XI 2). They therefore inevitably struggle for power. In setting out such
ideas, Hobbes contributes to some of the basic conceptions fundamental to the realist tradition in
international relations, and especially to neorealism. These include the characterization of human
nature as egoistic, the concept of international anarchy, and the view that politics, rooted in the
struggle for power, can be rationalized and studied scientifically.

One of the most widely known Hobbesian concepts is that of the anarchic state of nature, seen as
entailing a state of war—and “such a war as is of every man against every man” (XII 8). He
derives his notion of the state of war from his views of both human nature and the condition in
which individuals exist. Since in the state of nature there is no government and everyone enjoys
equal status, every individual has a right to everything; that is, there are no constraints on an
individual's behavior. Anyone may at any time use force, and all must constantly be ready to
counter such force with force. Hence, driven by acquisitiveness, having no moral restraints, and
motivated to compete for scarce goods, individuals are apt to “invade” one another for gain.
Being suspicious of one another and driven by fear, they are also likely to engage in preemptive
actions and invade one another to ensure their own safety. Finally, individuals are also driven by
pride and a desire for glory. Whether for gain, safety, or reputation, power-seeking individuals
will thus “endeavor to destroy or subdue one another” (XIII 3). In such uncertain conditions
where everyone is a potential aggressor, making war on others is a more advantageous strategy
than peaceable behavior, and one needs to learn that domination over others is necessary for
one's own continued survival.

Hobbes is primarily concerned with the relationship between individuals and the state, and his
comments about relations among states are scarce. Nevertheless, what he says about the lives of
individuals in the state of nature can often also be interpreted as a description of how states exist
in relation to one another. Once states are established, the individual drive for power becomes
the basis for the states' behavior, which often manifests itself in their efforts to dominate other
states and peoples. States, “for their own security,” writes Hobbes, “enlarge their dominions
upon all pretences of danger and fear of invasion or assistance that may be given to invaders,
[and] endeavour as much as they can, to subdue and weaken their neighbors” (XIX 4).
Accordingly, the quest and struggle for power lies at the core of the Hobbesian vision of
relations among states. The same would later be true of the model of international relations
developed by Hans Morgenthau, who was deeply influenced by Hobbes and adopted the same
view of human nature. Similarly, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz would follow Hobbes' lead
regarding international anarchy (the fact that sovereign states are not subject to any higher
common sovereign) as the essential element of international relations.

By subjecting themselves to a sovereign, individuals escape the war of all against all which
Hobbes associates with the state of nature; however, this war continues to dominate relations
among states. This does not mean that states are always fighting, but rather that they have a
disposition to fight (XIII 8). With each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war
may break out at any time. The achievement of domestic security through the creation of a state
is then paralleled by a condition of inter-state insecurity. One can argue that if Hobbes were fully
consistent, he would agree with the notion that, to escape this condition, states should also enter
into a contract and submit themselves to a world sovereign. Although the idea of a world state
would find support among some of today's realists, this is not a position taken by Hobbes
himself. He does not propose that a social contract among nations be implemented to bring
international anarchy to an end. This is because the condition of insecurity in which states are
placed does not necessarily lead to insecurity for individuals. As long as an armed conflict or
other type of hostility between states does not actually break out, individuals within a state can
feel relatively secure. He does not expect that war could ever be removed from the face of earth
or banned.

The denial of the existence of universal moral principles in the relations among states brings
Hobbes close to the Machiavellians and the followers of the doctrine of raison d'état. His theory
of international relations, which assumes that independent states, like independent individuals,
are enemies by nature, asocial and selfish, and that there is no moral limitation on their behavior,
is a great challenge to the idealist political vision based on human sociability and to the concept
of the international jurisprudence that is built on this vision. However, what separates Hobbes
from Machiavelli and associates him more with classical realism is his insistence on the
defensive character of foreign policy. His political theory does not put forward the invitation to
do whatever may be advantageous for the state. His approach to international relations is
prudential and pacific: sovereign states, like individuals, should be disposed towards peace
which is commended by reason.

What Waltz and other neorealist readers of Hobbes's works sometimes overlook is that he does
not perceive international anarchy as an environment without any rules. By suggesting that
certain dictates of reason apply even in the state of nature, he affirms that more peaceful and
cooperative international relations are possible. Neither does he deny the existence of
international law. Sovereign states can sign treaties with one another to provide a legal basis for
their relations. At the same time, however, Hobbes seems aware that international rules will
often prove ineffective in restraining the struggle for power. States will interpret them to their
own advantage, and so international law will be obeyed or ignored according to the interests of
the states affected. Hence, international relations will always tend to be a precarious affair. This
grim view of global politics lies at the core of Hobbes's realism.

2. Twentieth Century Classical Realism

Twentieth-century realism was born in response to the idealist perspective that dominated
international relations scholarship in the aftermath of the First World War. The idealists of the
1920s and 1930s (also called liberal internationalists or utopians) had the goal of building peace
in order to prevent another world conflict. They saw the solution to inter-state problems as being
the creation of a respected system of international law, backed by international organizations.
This interwar idealism resulted in the founding of the League of Nations in 1920 and in the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing war and providing for the peaceful settlements of
disputes. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, scholars such as Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern,
and Reymond D. Fosdick, and other prominent idealists of the era, gave their intellectual support
to the League of Nations. Instead of focusing on what some might see as the inevitability of
conflict between states and peoples, they chose to emphasize the common interests that could
unite humanity, and attempted to appeal to rationality and morality. For them, war did not
originate in an egoistic human nature, but rather in imperfect social conditions and political
arrangements, which could be improved. Yet their ideas were already being criticized in the early
1930s by Reinhold Niebuhr and within a few years by E. H. Carr. The League of Nations, which
the United States never joined, and from which Japan and Germany withdrew, could not prevent
the outbreak of the Second World War. This fact, perhaps more than any theoretical argument,
produced a strong realist reaction. Although the United Nations, founded in 1945, can still be
regarded as a product of idealist political thinking, the discipline of international relations was
profoundly influenced in the initial years of the post-war period by the works of “classical”
realists such as John H. Herz, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron. Then,
during the 1950s and 1960s, classical realism came under challenge of scholars who tried to
introduce a more scientific approach to the study of international politics. During the 1980s it
gave way to another trend in international relations theory—neorealism.

Since it is impossible within the scope of this article to introduce all of the thinkers who
contributed to the development of twentieth-century classical realism, E. H. Carr and Hans
Morgenthau, as perhaps the most influential among them, have been selected for discussion here.

2.1 E. H. Carr's Challenge of Utopian Idealism

In his main work on international relations, The Twenty Years' Crisis, first published in July
1939, Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) attacks the idealist position, which he describes as
“utopianism.” He characterizes this position as encompassing faith in reason, confidence in
progress, a sense of moral rectitude, and a belief in an underlying harmony of interests.
According to the idealists, war is an aberration in the course of normal life and the way to
prevent it is to educate people for peace, and to build systems of collective security such as the
League of Nations or today's United Nations. Carr challenges idealism by questioning its claim
to moral universalism and its idea of the harmony of interests. He declares that “morality can
only be relative, not universal” (19), and states that the doctrine of the harmony of interests is
invoked by privileged groups “to justify and maintain their dominant position” (75).

Carr uses the concept of the relativity of thought, which he traces to Marx and other modern
theorists, to show that standards by which policies are judged are the products of circumstances
and interests. His central idea is that the interests of a given party always determine what this
party regards as moral principles, and hence, these principles are not universal. Carr observes
that politicians, for example, often use the language of justice to cloak the particular interests of
their own countries, or to create negative images of other people to justify acts of aggression.
The existence of such instances of morally discrediting a potential enemy or morally justifying
one's own position shows, he argues, that moral ideas are derived from actual policies. Policies
are not, as the idealists would have it, based on some universal norms, independent of interests of
the parties involved.

If specific moral standards are de facto founded on interests, Carr's argument goes, there are also
interests underlying what are regarded as absolute principles or universal moral values. While the
idealists tend to regard such values, such as peace or justice, as universal and claim that
upholding them is in the interest of all, Carr argues against this view. According to him, there are
neither universal values nor universal interests. He says those who refer to universal interests are
in fact acting in their own interests (71). They claim that what is best for them is best for
everyone, and identify their own interests with the universal interest of the world at large.

The idealist concept of the harmony of interests is based on the notion that human beings can
rationally recognize that they have some interests in common, and that cooperation is therefore
possible. Carr contrasts this idea with the reality of conflict of interests. According to him, the
world is torn apart by the particular interests of different individuals and groups. In such a
conflictual environment, order is based on power, not on morality. Further, morality itself is the
product of power (61). Like Hobbes, Carr regards morality as constructed by the particular legal
system that is enforced by a coercive power. International moral norms are imposed on other
countries by dominant nations or groups of nations that present themselves as the international
community as a whole. They are invented to perpetuate those nations' dominance.

Values that idealists view as good for all, such as peace, social justice, prosperity, and
international order, are regarded by Carr as mere status quo notions. The powers that are
satisfied with the status quo regard the arrangement in place as just and therefore preach peace.
They try to rally everyone around their idea of what is good. “Just as the ruling class in a
community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, …
so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant powers” (76). On the
other hand, the unsatisfied powers consider the same arrangement as unjust, and so prepare for
war. Hence, the way to obtain peace, if it cannot be simply enforced, is to satisfy the unsatisfied
powers. “Those who profit most by [international] order can in the longer run only hope to
maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least”
(152). The logical conclusion to be drawn by the reader of Carr's book is the policy of
appeasement.

Carr was a sophisticated thinker. He recognized himself that the logic of “pure realism can offer
nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society
impossible” (87). Although he demolishes what he calls “the current utopia” of idealism, he at
the same time attempts to build “a new utopia,” a realist world order (ibid.). Thus, he
acknowledges that human beings need certain fundamental, universally acknowledged norms
and values, and contradicts his own argument by which he tries to deny universality to any
norms or values. To make further objections, the fact that the language of universal moral values
can be misused in politics for the benefit of one party or another, and that such values can only
be imperfectly implemented in political institutions, does not mean that such values do not exist.
There is a deep yearning in many human beings, both privileged and unprivileged, for peace,
order, prosperity, and justice. The legitimacy of idealism consists in the constant attempt to
reflect upon and uphold these values. Idealists fail if in their attempt they do not pay enough
attention to the reality of power. On the other hand, in the world of pure realism, in which all
values are made relative to interests, life turns into nothing more than a power game and is
unbearable.

The Twenty Years' Crisis touches on a number of universal ideas, but it also reflects the spirit of
its time. While we can fault the interwar idealists for their inability to construct international
institutions strong enough to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, this book indicates
that interwar realists were likewise unprepared to meet the challenge. Carr frequently refers to
Germany under Nazi rule as if it were a country like any other. He says that should Germany
cease to be an unsatisfied power and “become supreme in Europe,” it would adopt a language of
international solidarity similar to that of other Western powers (79). The inability of Carr and
other realists to recognize the perilous nature of Nazism, and their belief that Germany could be
satisfied by territorial concessions, helped to foster a political environment in which the latter
was to grow in power, annex Czechoslovakia at will, and be militarily opposed in September
1939 by Poland alone.

A theory of international relations is not just an intellectual enterprise; it has practical

consequences. It influences our thinking and political practice. On the practical side, the realists
of the 1930s, to whom Carr gave intellectual support, were people opposed to the system of
collective security embodied in the League of Nations. Working within the foreign policy
establishments of the day, they contributed to its weakness. Once they had weakened the League,
they pursued a policy of appeasement and accommodation with Germany as an alternative to
collective security (Ashworth 46). After the annexation of Czechoslovakia, when the failure of
the anti-League realist conservatives gathered around Neville Chamberlain and of this policy
became clear, they tried to rebuild the very security system they had earlier demolished. Those
who supported collective security were labeled idealists.

2.2 Hans Morgenthau's Realist Principles

Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) developed realism into a comprehensive international relations

theory. Influenced by the Protestant theologian and political writer Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as
by Hobbes, he places selfishness and power-lust at the center of his picture of human existence.
The insatiable human lust for power, timeless and universal, which he identifies with animus
dominandi, the desire to dominate, is for him the main cause of conflict. As he asserts in his
main work, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948,
“international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”(25).

Morgenthau systematizes realism in international relations on the basis of six principles that he
includes in the second edition of Politics among Nations. Although he is a traditionalist and
opposes the so-called scientists (the scholars who, especially in the 1950s, tried to reduce the
discipline of international relations to a branch of behavioral science), in the first principle he
states that realism is based on objective laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature
(4). He wants to develop realism into both a theory of international politics and a political art, a
useful tool of foreign policy.

The keystone of Morgenthau's realist theory is the concept of power or “of interest defined in
terms of power,” which informs his second principle: the assumption that political leaders “think
and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5). This concept defines the autonomy of politics,
and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives, preferences, and
intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians. Furthermore, it is the foundation of a
rational picture of politics.

Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as power is a

universally valid category, and indeed an essential element of politics, various things can be
associated with interest or power at different times and in different circumstances. Its content and
the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.

In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He
says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware
of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action. “Universal
moral principles,” he asserts, “cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal
formulation, but …they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place”
(9). These principles must be accompanied by prudence for as he cautions “there can be no
political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences
of seemingly moral action” (ibid.).

Prudence, and not conviction of one's own moral or ideological superiority, should guide
political action. This is stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the
idea that all state actors, including our own, must be looked at solely as political entities pursuing
their respective interests defined in terms of power. By taking this point of view vis-à-vis its
counterparts and thus avoiding ideological confrontation, a state would then be able to pursue
policies that respected the interests of other states, while protecting and promoting its own.

Insofar as power or interest defined as power is the concept that defines politics, politics is an
autonomous sphere, as Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be
subordinated to ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in politics. “A man who was
nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral
restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely
lacking in prudence”(12). Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power
and morality, be taken into consideration.

While Morgenthau's six principles of realism contain repetitions and inconsistencies, we can
nonetheless obtain from them the following picture: Power or interest is the central concept that
makes politics into an autonomous discipline. Rational state actors pursue their national interests.
Therefore, a rational theory of international politics can be constructed. Such a theory is not
concerned with the morality, religious beliefs, motives or ideological preferences of individual
political leaders. It also indicates that in order to avoid conflicts, states should avoid moral
crusades or ideological confrontations, and look for compromise on the basis of satisfaction of
their mutual interests alone.

Although he defines politics as an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau does not follow the
Machiavellian route of completely removing ethics from politics. He suggests that, although
human beings are political animals, who pursue their interests, they are moral animals. Deprived
of any morality, they would descend to the level of beasts or sub-humans. Even if it is not guided
by universal moral principles, political action thus has for Morgenthau a moral significance.
Ultimately directed toward the objective of national survival, it also involves prudence. The
effective protection of citizens' lives from harm is not merely a forceful physical action; it has
prudential and moral dimensions.

Morgenthau regards realism as a way of thinking about international relations and a useful tool
for devising policies. However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory, and especially the
idea of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as the concept of power itself, have
provoked criticism.
International politics, like all politics, is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the
basic human lust for power. But regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest
for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a questionable premise. Human nature is an
unobservable. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only imposed on us as a matter
of belief and inculcated by education.

Morgenthau himself reinforces this belief by introducing a normative aspect of his theory, which
is rationality. A rational foreign policy is considered “to be a good foreign policy”(7). But he
defines rationality as a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in
order to determine their relative utility, i.e. their ability to maximize power. Statesmen “think and
act in terms of interest defined as power”(5). Only intellectual weakness of policy makers can
result in foreign policies that deviate from a rational course aimed at minimizing risks and
maximizing benefits. Rather than presenting an actual portrait of human affairs, Morgenthau
emphasizes the pursuit of power and sets it up as a norm.

As Raymond Aron and other scholars have noticed, power, the fundamental concept of
Morgenthau's realism, is ambiguous. It can be either a means or an end in politics. But if power
is only a means for gaining something else, it does not define the nature of international politics
in the way Morgenthau claims. It does not allow us to understand the actions of states
independently from the motives and ideological preferences of their political leaders. It cannot
serve as the basis for defining politics as an autonomous sphere. Morgenthau's principles of
realism are thus open to doubt. “Is this true,” Aron asks, “that states, whatever their regime,
pursue the same kind of foreign policy” (597) and that the foreign policies of Napoleon or Stalin
are essentially identical to those of Hitler, Louis XVI or Nicholas II, amounting to no more than
the struggle for power? “If one answers yes, then the proposition is incontestable, but not very
instructive”(598). Accordingly, it is useless to define actions of states by exclusive reference to
power, security or national interest. International politics cannot be studied independently of the
wider historical and cultural context.

Although Carr and Morgenthau concentrate primarily on international relations, their realism can
also be applied to domestic politics. To be a classical realist is in general to perceive politics a
conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and to seek peace by trying to recognize common
group and individual interests rather than by moralizing.

3. Neorealism
In spite of its ambiguities and weaknesses, Morgenthau's Politics among Nations became a
standard textbook and influenced thinking about international politics for a generation or so. At
the same time, as mentioned above, there was an attempt to develop a more methodologically
rigorous approach to theorizing about international affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s a large influx
of scientists from different fields entered the discipline of International Relations and attempted
to replace the “wisdom literature” of classical realists with scientific concepts and reasoning
(Brown 35). This in turn provoked a counterattack by Morgenthau and scholars associated with
the so-called English School, especially Hedley Bull, who defended a traditional approach.
Nevertheless, the scientists had established a strong presence in the field, especially in the area of
methodology. By the mid-1960s, the majority of American students in international relations
were trained in quantitative research, game theory, and other new research techniques of the
social sciences. This, along with the changing international environment, had a significant effect
on the discipline.

The realist assumption was that the state is the key actor in international politics, and that
relations among states are the core of actual international relations. However, with the receding
of the Cold War during the 1970s, one could witness the growing importance of international and
non-governmental organizations, as well as of multinational corporations. This development led
to a revival of idealist thinking, which became known as neoliberalism or pluralism. While
accepting some basic assumptions of realism, the leading pluralists, Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye, have proposed the concept of complex interdependence to describe this more sophisticated
picture of global politics. They would argue that there can be progress in international relations
and that the future does not need to look like the past.

3.1 Kenneth Waltz's International System

The realist response came most prominently from Kenneth N. Waltz, who reformulated realism
in international relations in a new and distinctive way. In his book Theory of International
Politics, first published in 1979, he responds to the liberal challenge and attempts to cure the
defects of the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau with his more scientific approach, which has
became known as structural realism or neorealism. Whereas Morgenthau rooted his theory in the
struggle for power, which he related to human nature, Waltz made an effort to avoid any
philosophical discussion of human nature, and set out instead to build a theory of international
politics analogous to microeconomics. He argues that states in the international system are like
firms in a domestic economy and have the same fundamental interest: to survive.
“Internationally, the environment of states' actions, or the structure of their system, is set by the
fact that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with
relative efficiency to achieve that end” (93).

Waltz maintains that by paying attention to the individual state, and to ideological, moral and
economic issues, both traditional liberals and classical realists make the same mistake. They fail
to develop a serious account of the international system—one that can be abstracted from the
wider socio-political domain. Waltz acknowledges that such an abstraction distorts reality and
omits many of the factors that were important for classical realism. It does not allow for the
analysis of the development of specific foreign policies. However, it also has utility. Notably, it
assists in understanding the primary determinants of international politics. Waltz's neorealist
theory cannot be applied to domestic politics. It cannot serve to develop policies of states
concerning their international or domestic affairs. His theory helps only to explain why states
behave in similar ways despite their different forms of government and diverse political
ideologies, and why, despite of their growing interdependence, the overall picture of
international relations is unlikely to change.

According to Waltz, the uniform behavior of states over centuries can be explained by the
constraints on their behavior that are imposed by the structure of the international system. A
system's structure is defined first by the principle by which it is organized, then by the
differentiation of its units, and finally by the distribution of capabilities (power) across units.
Anarchy, or the absence of central authority, is for Waltz the ordering principle of the
international system. The units of the international system are states. Waltz recognizes the
existence of non-state actors, but dismisses them as relatively unimportant. Since all states want
to survive, and anarchy presupposes a self-help system in which each state has to take care of
itself, there is no division of labor or functional differentiation among them. While functionally
similar, they are nonetheless distinguished by their relative capabilities (the power each of them
represents) to perform the same function.

Consequently, Waltz sees power and state behavior in a different way from the classical realists.
For Morgenthau power was both a means and an end, and rational state behavior was understood
as simply the course of action that would accumulate the most power. In contrast, neorealists
assume that the fundamental interest of each state is security and would therefore concentrate on
the distribution of power. What also sets neorealism apart from classical realism is
methodological rigor and scientific self-conception (Guzinni 127-128). Waltz insists on
empirical testability of knowledge and on falsificationism as a methodological ideal, which, as
he himself admits, can have only a limited application in international relations.

The distribution of capabilities among states can vary; however, anarchy, the ordering principle
of international relations, remains unchanged. This has a lasting effect on the behavior of states
that become socialized into the logic of self-help. Trying to refute neoliberal ideas concerning
the effects of interdependence, Waltz identifies two reasons why the anarchic international
system limits cooperation: insecurity and unequal gains. In the context of anarchy, each state is
uncertain about the intentions of others and is afraid that the possible gains resulting from
cooperation may favor other states more than itself, and thus lead it to dependence on others.
“States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help
system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.” (Waltz 107).

Because of its theoretical elegance and methodological rigor, neorealism has become very
influential within the discipline of international relations. However, it has also provoked strong
critiques on a number of fronts.

3.2 Objections to Neorealism

In 1979 Waltz wrote that in the nuclear age the international bipolar system, based on two
superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—was not only stable but likely to persist
(176–7). With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR this
prediction was proven wrong. The bipolar world turned out to have been more precarious than
most realist analysts had supposed. Its end opened new possibilities and challenges related to
globalization. This has led many critics to argue that neorealism, like classical realism, cannot
adequately account for changes in world politics.

The new debate between international (neo)realists and (neo)liberals is no longer concerned with
the questions of morality and human nature, but with the extent to which state behavior is
influenced by anarchic structure rather than by institutions, learning, and other factors that are
conductive to cooperation. In his 1989 book International Institutions and State Power, Robert
Keohane accepts Waltz's emphasis on system-level theory and his general assumption that states
are self-interested actors that rationally pursue their goals. However, by employing game theory
he shows that states can widen the perception of their self-interest through economic cooperation
and involvement in international institutions. Patterns of interdependence can thus affect world
politics. Keohane calls for systemic theories that would be able to deal better with factors
affecting state interaction, and with change.

Critical theorists, such as Robert W. Cox, also focus on the alleged inability of neorealism to
deal with change. In their view, both classical realists and neorealists take a particular,
historically determined state-based structure of international relations and assume it to be
universally valid. In contrast, critical theorists believe that by analyzing the interplay of ideas,
material factors, and social forces, one can understand how this structure has come about, and
how it may eventually change. They contend that neorealism ignores both the historical process
during which identities and interests are formed, and the diverse methodological possibilities. It
legitimates the existing status quo of strategic relations among states and considers the scientific
method as the only way of obtaining knowledge. It represents an exclusionary practice, an
interest in domination and control.

While realists are concerned with relations among states, the focus for critical theorists is social
emancipation. Despite their differences, critical theory, postmodernism and feminism all take
issue with the notion of state sovereignty and envision new political communities that would be
less exclusionary vis-à-vis marginal and disenfranchised groups. Critical theory argues against
state-based exclusion and denies that the interests of a country's citizens take precedence over
those of outsiders. It insists that politicians should give as much weight to the interests of
foreigners are they give to those of their compatriots and envisions political structures beyond
the “fortress” nation-state. Postmodernism questions the state's claim to be a legitimate focus of
human loyalties and its right to impose social and political boundaries. It supports cultural
diversity and stresses the interests of minorities. Feminism argues that the realist theory exhibits
a masculine bias and advocates the inclusion of woman and alternative values into public life.

The critical theory and other alternative perspectives, sometimes called “reflectivist,” (Weaver
165) represent a radical departure from the neorealist and neoliberal “rationalist” international
relations theories. Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, try to build a bridge between these
two approaches by on the one hand, taking the present state system and anarchy seriously, and on
the other hand, by focusing on the formation of identities and interests. Countering neorealist
ideas Wendt argues that self-help does not follow logically or casually from the principle of
anarchy. It is socially constructed. Wendt's idea that states' identities and interests are socially
constructed has earned his position the label “constructivism”. Consequently, in his view, “self-
help and power politics are institutions, and not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what
states make of it” (Wendt 1987 395). There is no single logic of anarchy but rather several,
depending on the roles with which states identify themselves and each other. Power and interests
are constituted by ideas and norms. Wendt claims that neorealism cannot account for change in
world politics, but his norm-based constructivism can.

A similar conclusion, although derived in a traditional way, comes from the theorists of the
English school (International Society approach) who emphasize both systemic and normative
constraints on the behavior of states. Referring to the classical view of the human being as an
individual that is basically social and rational, capable of cooperating and learning from past
experiences, these theorists emphasize that states, like individuals, have legitimate interests that
others can recognize and respect, and that they can recognize the general advantages of
observing a principle of reciprocity in their mutual relations (Jackson and Sørensen 167).
Therefore, states can bind themselves to other states by treaties and develop some common
values with other states. Hence, the structure of the international system is not unchangeable as
the neorealists claim. It is not a permanent Hobbesian anarchy, permeated by the danger of war.
An anarchic international system based on pure power relations among actors can evolve into a
more cooperative and peaceful international society, in which state behavior is shaped by
commonly shared values and norms. A practical expression of international society are
international organizations that uphold the rule of law in international relations, especially the
UN.

4. Conclusion: The Cautionary and Positive Character of

Realism
An unintended and unfortunate consequence of the debate about neorealism is that neorealism
and a large part of its critique (a notable exception is the English School), expressed in abstract
scientific and philosophical terms, have made the theory of international politics almost
inaccessible to a layperson and have divided the discipline of international relations into
incompatible parts. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed at supporting diplomatic
practice and provided a guide to be followed by those seeking to understand and deal with
potential threats, today's theories, concerned with various grand pictures and projects, are ill-
suited to perform this task.

Nevertheless, whatever its weakness may be—including those that have been indicated
throughout the text—the realist tradition in international relations continues to perform a useful
role. Realism warns us against progressivism, moralism, legalism, and other orientations that
lose touch with the reality of self-interest and power. The neorealist revival of the 1970s can also
be interpreted as a necessary corrective to an overoptimistic liberal belief in international
cooperation and change resulting from interdependence. However, as Donnelly rightly notices,
once that correction has been made, the time of realism “as a fruitful dominant mode of thinking
has passed” (194). By denying any progress in interstate relations, realism turns into an ideology.
Its emphasis on power politics and national interest can be misused to justify aggression. It has to
be supplanted by theories that take better account of the cooperation and changing picture of
global politics. To its merely negative, cautionary function, positive norms must be added. These
norms extend from the rationality and prudence stressed by classical realists, through the vision
of multilateralism, international law, and an international society emphasized by liberals and
members of the English School, to the cosmopolitanism and global solidarity advocated by many
of today's writers.

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Other Internet Resources

 Political Realism, entry the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 Political Realism, entry in Wikipedia.
 Melian Dialogue, by Thucydides.
 The Prince, by Machiavelli.
 Leviathan (Chapters 13–14), by Hobbes.
 The Twenty Years' Crisis (Chapter 4: The Harmony of Interests), by E.H. Carr.
 Principles of Realism, by H. Morgenthau.
 Peace and War, by Raymond Aron.
 Globalization and Governance, by Kenneth Waltz.

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