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Pasagui vs. Villablanca
*
No. L-21998. November 10, 1975.
CALIXTO PASAGUI and FAUSTA MOSAR, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. ESTER T. VILLABLANCA, ZOSIMO
VILLABLANCA, EUSTAQUIA BOCAR and CATALINA
BOCAR, defendants-appellees.
Civil law; Sales; Presumptive delivery by execution of public
instrument can be negated by failure of vendee to take actual
possession, of land sold.—It is true that the execution of the deed
of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of
the land subject of the sale. This presumptive delivery only holds
true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing
of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the
vendee. It can be negated by the reality that the vendees actually
failed to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale.
Same; Forcible entry and detainer; To constitute an action for
forcible entry, complaint must allege not only plaintiff’s prior
physical possession, but also his deprivation thereof by any of the
means provided in Section 1, Rule 70.—In order that an action
may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is not only
necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior physical
possession of the property but also that he was deprived of his
possession by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Revised Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats,
strategy and stealth. For, if the dispossession did not take place
by any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the
municipal courts, have jurisdiction.
Same: Bare allegation that plaintiff was “deprived” of which
he is and has been the legal owner is insufficient to make the
action one for forcible entry.—The bare allegation in the complaint
that the plaintiff has been “deprived” of the land of which he is
and has been the legal owner for a long period has been held to be
insufficient. It is true that the mere act of a trespasser in
unlawfully entering the land,
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* SECOND DIVISION.
19
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 10, 1975 19
Pasagui vs. Villablanca
x x x would imply the use of force. In the case at bar, no such
inference could be made as plaintiffs-appellants had not claimed
that they were in actual physical possession of the property prior
to the entry of the Villablancas. Moreover, it is evident that
plaintiffs-appellants are not only seeking to get the possession of
the property, but as an alternative cause of action, they seek the
return of the price and payment of damages by the vendors “in
case of eviction or loss of ownership” of the property. It is,
therefore, not the summary action of forcible entry within the
context of the Rules.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte. Elias B. Asuncion, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Julio Siayngco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Filomeno Arteche, Jr. for defendants-appellees.
ANTONIO, J.:
The only issue posed by this appeal is whether or not, from
the nature of the action pleaded as appears in the
allegations of the complaint, the aforesaid action is one of
forcible entry, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
municipal court.
On February 4, 1963, appellants Calixto Pasagui and
Fausta Mosar filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance at Tacloban City, alleging that on November 15,
1962, for and in consideration of Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Pesos (P2,800.00), they bought from appellees
Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar a parcel of
agricultural land with an area of 2.6814 hectares, situated
in Hamindangon, Pastrana, Leyte; that the corresponding
document of sale was executed, notarized on the same date,
and recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Tacloban, Leyte on
November 16, 1962; that during the first week of February,
1963, defendant spouses Ester T. Villablanca and Zosimo
Villablanca, “illegally and without any right, whatsoever,
took possession of the above property harvesting coconuts
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from the coconut plantation thereon, thus depriving
plaintiffs” of its possession; that despite demands made by
the plaintiffs upon the above-mentioned defendants “to
surrender to them the above-described property and its
possession” the latter failed or refused to return said parcel
of land to the former, causing them damage; and that
Eustaquia and Catalina Bocar, vendors of the property, are
included defendants in the complaint by virtue of the
warranty clause
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20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pasagui vs. Villablanca
contained in the document of sale. Plaintiffs prayed for a
decision ordering defendants to surrender the possession of
the parcel of land above-described to them and to pay
damages in the amounts specified.
On February 21, 1963, appellees moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the Court of First Instance
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action
being one of forcible entry. Appellants opposed the Motion
to Dismiss asserting that the action is not one for forcible
entry inasmuch as in the complaint, there is no allegation
that the deprivation of possession was effected through
“force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.”
On May 13, 1963, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it
appearing from the allegations in the complaint that the
case is one for forcible entry, which belongs to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal
Court) of Pastrana, Leyte. The first Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on May 27, 1963 and the
second was likewise denied on July 5, 1963. From the
aforementioned orders, appeal on a pure question of law
was interposed to this Court.
It is well-settled that what determines the jurisdiction of
the municipal court in a forcible entry case is the nature of
the action pleaded as appears from the allegations in the
complaint. In ascertaining whether or not the action is one
of forcible entry within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
the municipal court, the averments of the complaint and
the character
1
of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
In the case at bar, the complaint does not allege that the
plaintiffs were in physical possession of the land and have
been deprived of that possession through force,
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intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It simply avers
that plaintiffs-appellants bought on November 12, 1962
from defendants-appellees Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina
Bocar the parcel of land in question for the amount of
P2,800.00; that a deed of sale was executed, notarized and
registered; that “during this first week of February, 1963,
defendants Ester T. Villablanca and her husband, Zosimo
Villablanca, illegally and without any right whatsoever,
took possession of the above described property, harvesting
coconuts from the coconut plantation therein, thus
_______________
1 Cananay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36.
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VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 10, 1975 21
Pasagui vs. Villablanca
depriving of its possession herein plaintiffs, and causing
them damages for the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED
PESOS (P800.00)”; that for the purpose of enforcing the
vendors’ warranty in case of eviction, Eustaquia Bocar and
Catalina Bocar were also included as defendants; and,
therefore, plaintiffs-appellants pray that a decision be
rendered, ordering (a) defendants Ester T. Villablanca and
her husband, Zosimo Villablanca, “to surrender the
possession of the above described property to said
plaintiffs”; (b) defendants Ester T. Villablanca and her
husband, Zosimo Villablanca, “to pay to said plaintiffs the
amount of EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P800.00) as
damages for the usurpation by them of said property”; and
(c) defendants Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar “to pay
the plaintiffs the amount of P2,800.00, plus incidental
expenses, as provided for by Art. 1555 of the Civil Code, in
case of eviction or loss of ownership to said above described
property on the part of plaintiffs.”
It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute sale
in a public instrument2
is equivalent to delivery of the land
subject of the sale. This presumptive delivery only holds
true when there is no impediment that may prevent the
passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into
those of the vendee. It can be negated by the reality that
the vendees actually failed to 3
obtain material possession of
the land subject of the sale. It appears from the records of
the case at bar that plaintiffs-appellants had not acquired
physical possession of the land since its purchase on
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November 12, 1962. As a matter of fact, their purpose in
filing the complaint in Civil Case No.
4
3285 is precisely to
“get the possession of the property.” In order that an action
may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is not only
necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior physical
possession of the property but also that he was deprived of
his possession by any of the means provided in section 1,
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely: force,
intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. For, if the
dispossession did not take place by any of these means, the
courts of first
5
instance, not the municipal courts, have
jurisdiction. The bare allegation
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2 Article 1498, Civil Code of the Philippines.
3 Montenegro v. Roxas de Gomez, 58 Phil. 723; Masallo v. Cesar, 39
Phil. 134; Addison, v. Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil 404.
4 p. 21, Record on Appeal; p. 9, Brief of Appellants.
5 Valderama Lumber Manufacturer’s Co., Inc. v. L. S. Sarmiento, 5
SCRA 287, 291.
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22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pasagui vs. Villablanca
in the complaint that the plaintiff has been “deprived” of
the land of which he is and has been the legal
6
owner for a
long period has been held to be insufficient. It is true that
the mere act of a trespasser in unlawfully entering the
land, planting himself on the ground and excluding
therefrom the prior possessor would imply the use of force.
In the case at bar, no such inference could be made as
plaintiffs-appellants had not claimed that they were in
actual physical possession of the property prior to the entry
of the Villablancas. Moreover, it is evident that plaintiffs-
appellants are not only seeking to get the possession of the
property, but as an alternative cause of action, they seek
the return of the price and payment of damages by the
_______________
“In the present case the allegation in the complaint is simply that the
plaintiff has been ‘deprived’ of the land of which he is and has been the
legal owner for a long period. This allegation is not sufficient to show that
the action is based upon the provisions of said section 80. Moreover, upon
an examination of the prayer of the complaint, it is seen that the plaintiff
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is not only seeking to be repossessed of the land but desires also a
declaration that he is the owner of the same. It is quite clear, from an
examination of the complaint, that, had the same been presented in the
court of the justice of the peace, it would have been demurrable, for the
reason that the facts alleged fail to show that the plaintiff had been
dispossessed by any of the methods mentioned in said section 80.
“It is a general rule of pleading and practice that in all pleadings filed
in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court
jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Unless these special
jurisdictional facts are alleged, the complaint is demurrable. The
complaint in the present case not containing allegations showing the
special jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, the same would have been
demurrable had it been filed in the court of a justice of the peace.
“Said section 80 does not cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands.
Whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those
mentioned in said section, he may maintain his action in a Court of First
Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the expiration of
twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed and to be
declared to be the owner of said land. The summary action before a justice
of the peace is given only for the special circumstances mentioned in said
section (80). In all other cases Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction,
even though the twelve months have not elapsed. (Alonzo vs. Municipality
of Placer, 5 Phil. Rep., 71; Roman Catholic Church vs. Familiar, 11 Phil.
Rep., 310; Gutierrez vs. Rosario, 15 Phil. Rep., 116.).” (Gumiran v.
Gumiran, 21 Phil. 174, 178-179.)
6 Gumiran v. Gumiran, Ibid.
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VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 10, 1975 23
Pasagui vs. Villablanca
vendors “in case of eviction or loss of ownership” of the said
property. It is, therefore, not the summary action of forcible
entry within the context of the Rules.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is hereby set
aside, and the case remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. Costs against defendants-appellees.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.
and Martin. JJ., concur.
Fernando (Chairman), J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second
Division.
Order set aside, and case ramanded to court a quo for
further proceedings.
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Notes.—A defective allegation in the ejectment
complaint is deemed ipso facto cured by the admission of
evidence without objection on the part of the defendants.
(City of Manila vs. Bacay,10 SCRA 629).
An apparent conflict in the description of the disputed
land in forcible entry cases does not change the nature of
the original complaint for ejectment into a different action.
The case must be tried and the identity of the land alleged
in the complaint established to determine whether or not
plaintiffs right have been violated. (Dizon vs. Concina, 30
SCRA 897).
Where it was not shown that the appellants have filed
homestead applications with the Bureau of Lands for the
portions of the land occupied by them, and there is no proof
that such applications have been filed, much less approved,
by competent authority, the reference to them as
“homesteaders” in the stipulation of facts does not legalize
their illegal possession of the land or convert them from
usurpers into lawful possessors. Their naked claim of being
homesteaders cannot set at naught the judgment of ouster
rendered against them by a competent court. (Realiza vs.
Duarte, 20 SCRA 1265)
A violation by a party of any of the stipulations of a
contract on agreement to sell real property would entitle
the other party to resolve or rescind it. An allegation of
such violation in a detainer suit may be proved by
competent evidence. And if proved a justice of the peace
court might make a finding to that effect, but it cannot
declare and hold that the contract is resolved or rescinded.
It is beyond its power so to do. And as the illegality of the
possession of realty by a party to a contract to sell is
premised upon the resolution of the contract, it follows
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24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rosensons, Inc. vs. Jimenez
that an allegation and proof of such violation, a condition
precedent to such resolution or rescission, to render
unlawful the possession of the land or building erected
thereon by the party who has violated the contract, cannot
be taken cognizance of by a municipal court. (Nera vs.
Vacante, 3 SCRA 511).
A stipulation entitling one party to take possession of
the land and building if the other party violates the
contract does not ex proprio vigore confer upon the former
the right to take possession thereof if objected to without
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judicial intervention and determination. (Nera vs. Vacante,
3 SCRA 511).
Prior physical possession in the plaintiff is not an
indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case
brought by a vendee or other person against whom the
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of a right to hold possession and
therefore the allegation of the same in the complaint is not
necessary. (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136).
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