Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, Feb.
5, 2010
Crim Pro - Rule 110
Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin,
Filipino were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, who
was born on September 21, 1995.
On June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit
Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois court dissolved the
marriage of the two and awarded the respondent sole custody of Stephanie. It also
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On January 28, 2002, both the petitioner and respondent executed a contract for
joint custody over Stephanie in Manila. Later, on 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon
alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over Stephanie contrary to their
agreement. Sharon sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of
jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce
decree.
On March 1, 2005, the trial court sustained the respondent's motion and dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking
cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality
rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening
Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree
obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that
unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the
laws of his nationality. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit
and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties' child.
Held: Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his
suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific
performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
belongs to this species of actions.
Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court. Indeed, the trial court’s refusal
to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion
is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.”
Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce
decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies
beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called “retained jurisdiction.”
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody
agreement for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo
Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one
daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and
obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois
court) a divorce decree against petitioner. 3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the
marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie
and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement4 ) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as
exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent
undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to
Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60
(trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the
Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction
because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded
from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the
"nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code 6 prohibiting compromise
agreements on jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree
obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike
in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his
nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to
justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce
decree, modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint; 8 or (2) the
Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s
suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the
Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the
dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of
Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the
trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for specific performance,
such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this
species of actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack
of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
"jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of
[its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the
"various provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint
child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called
"retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is
contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement
subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed
"inexistent and void from the beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the
Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default
parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September
1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the
United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody
for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother
is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject only to a narrow
exception not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish
a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been
repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The
Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. 21 However, upon
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is
below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends
the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced
spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical
reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of
the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents
cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of
children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons
deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime
under the second paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise." To limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned
agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double
standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents.
This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the
courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her
children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn away from her."23 This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the
deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over
the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental
custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the
separated parents.25 However, these are objections which question the law’s wisdom not
its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the
legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is
tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as
granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of
Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of
the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is
limited in duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until
the child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual
contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even
supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement
for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of
the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois
court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability.
The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees
is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo 27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse
of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. 28 There, we dismissed the
alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property
and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is
not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 29 to dismiss criminal complaints for
adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his
former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to
file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that
a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who
obtained the divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of
action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of
the default standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child. 30 As the
question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing
the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift
and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s
jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s
interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the
settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the
child’s best interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
