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"Act, 1955") I.E. 'Cruelty'. Summons Were Issued To Respondent SMT

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AFR

Court No. - 34

Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 479 of 2019

Appellant :- Shri Prateek Agarwal


Respondent :- Richa Garg
Counsel for Appellant :- Syed Irfan Ali

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.


Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
1. Heard Sri Syed Irfan Ali, learned counsel for appellant.

2. The appeal has been filed against order dated 08.5.2019 passed
by Sri Rajesh Narain Mani Tripathi, Additional Principal Judge,
Family Court No.04, Aligarh admitting written statement of defendant
and rejecting objection of appellant filed under Order VIII Rule 10 of
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”).

3. Appellant Prateek Agarwal filed Divorce Petition No.1243 of


2017 in the Court of Principal Judge/Family Court vide
petition/complaint on 16.11.2017. Divorce Petition founded on
Section 13(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as
“Act, 1955”) i.e. 'cruelty'. Summons were issued to respondent Smt.
Richa Garg for filing written statement and 12.02.2018 was fixed for
the said purpose.

4. Written statement was not filed and further dates fixed are
16.03.2018, 04.05.2018 and 12.07.2018. Appellant thereafter filed an
application No.12A/1 dated 10.07.2018 under Order VIII, Rule 10
C.P.C. requesting Family Court to decree suit in favour of appellant
under Order VIII, Rule 10 C.P.C. Family Court fixed 24.10.2018 for
disposal of aforesaid application. On 24.10.2018 Presiding Officer
was on leave and on the same date written statement was filed by
defendant-respondent. Objecting to the said filing of written
statement, appellant filed an objection (Paper No.15Ka) stating that
written statement has not been filed within time prescribed under
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Order VIII, Rule 1 C.P.C. hence it cannot be accepted particularly


when it has been filed without seeking any permission of Court below
and therefore, it should be rejected. Application 12Ka and objection
16Ka have been rejected by Sri Rajesh Narain Mani Tripathi,
Additional Principal Judge, Family Court No.4, Aligarh vide
judgment and order dated 08.05.2019 hence this appeal.

5. Trial Court has rejected aforesaid applications on the ground


that defendant-respondent appeared through counsel on 12.02.2018
and on the same date filed an application under Section 24 of Act,
1955 seeking payment of interim maintenance for herself and for
contesting the case, whereupon 16.03.2018 was fixed. Ultimately,
aforesaid application filed under Section 24 of Act, 1955 i.e. Paper
No.8Ka was allowed vide order dated 23.8.2018 and thereafter
29.9.2018 was fixed for disposal of application 12Ka, which was
adjourned to 24.10.2018 since Presiding Officer was on leave. On
24.10.2018 also Presiding Officer was on leave. Defendant-
respondent filed written statement on that date. In effect, written
statement was filed within 67 days from the date when application
under Section 24 of Act, 1955 was accepted i.e. 23.08.2018 and
hence it cannot be said that there is no compliance of Order VIII, Rule
10 C.P.C.

6. In our view, order dated 08.05.2019, which is under appeal, is in


the nature of interlocutory and therefore under Section 19 of Family
Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1984”), appeal is
not maintainable.

7. What an 'interlocutory order' is, has been considered by


Supreme Court in V.C.Shukla vs. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC
962 and following propositions have been laid down :

“(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the
parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an
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interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained
in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order
is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English
Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in
one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in
another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in
our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal
Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to
include even intermediate or quasi final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the
accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it
finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the
controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings
before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court
thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an
interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy
because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this
Court in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
even against an order framing charges against the accused.
Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against
an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the
accused.”
8. In Webster's New World Dictionary “interlocutory” has been
defined as “an order other than final decision”.

9. “Interlocutory” order in its common legal parlance means such


order which does not decide rights and liabilities of parties concerning
a particular aspect. Orders which are of purely interim or temporary
nature, do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of
parties are interlocutory orders.

10. In the context of Section 397(2) Cr.P.c., it has been held that
orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders on bail, calling
for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings, are all
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interlocutory orders.

11. In Central Bank of India vs. Gokul Chand AIR 1967 SC 799,
Court said that orders regarding summoning of witnesses, discovery,
production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for
examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of
hearing and admissibility of a document or relevancy of a question are
interlocutory orders.

12. In Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker vs. State of Gujarat 1968
CriLJ 876, Supreme Court held that finality of an order should not be
judged by correlating that order with the controversy in the complaint.
The fact that the controversy still remained alive was irrelevant. There
may be some interlocutory orders, which may have effect of becoming
final order and they are appellable.

13. In Amar Nath and others vs. State of Haryana and others
(1977) 4 SCC 137 an order for summoning accused persons was held
to be not an “interlocutory order” but an order whereagainst revision
under Section 397 Cr.P.C. was maintainable on the ground that it
affects valuable right of accused since he has been summoned for
facing the trial and it admittedly prejudiced his rights and therefore,
revision is maintainable.

14. An order passed under Sections 91 and 311 Cr.P.C. whether


'interlocutory' or not came up for consideration in Sethuraman vs.
Rajamanickam (2009) 5 SCC 153. Court held that such orders are
'interlocutory orders' and hence not revisable under Section 397(2)
Cr.P.C.

15. In the light of exposition of law discussed above, we find that in


the present case, written statement filed by defendant-respondent has
been accepted by Trial Court on the ground that though 12.02.2018
was fixed for filing written statement after issuing summons/notice to
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defendant-respondent but on that date defendant-respondent filed


application under Section 24 of Act, 1955 praying for grant of interim
maintenance showing that she was in financial scarcity for contesting
the case. Therefore, first it become necessary to decide whether
defendant-respondent was in the capacity of filing written statement
without providing any interim maintenance and for deciding this
aspect, various dates were fixed i.e. 16.03.2018, 04.05.2018,
12.07.2018 and 21.08.2018 and order was passed on 23.08.2018 when
application of defendant-respondent was accepted and plaintiff-
appellant was directed to provide interim maintenance to defendant-
respondent. From that date, when application of Section 24 of Act,
1955 was allowed, within 67 days, written statement was filed hence
it cannot be said that written statement filed by defendant-respondent
was not within the time prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C.

16. Court therefore accepted written statement of defendant-


respondent and this acceptance, in effect, only results in giving
opportunity to parties to contest the matter so that divorce petition
may be decided on merits after hearing both the parties.

17. In our view, this order of Court below accepting written


statement filed by defendant-respondent is in the nature of
'interlocutory order', and, order rejecting application of appellant
under Order VIII, Rule 10 C.P.C. is only consequential, therefore, we
are clearly of the view that appeal is not maintainable.

18. Even otherwise, on merits, we do not find that the view taken
by Court below is erroneous, inasmuch as, in family disputes, when
divorce petition is filed by husband and on the first date fixed for
written statement, wife comes with the complaint that she needs
financial assistance and seeks time to enforce her rights of interim
maintenance under Section 24 of Act, 1955, so long as this application
is not decided, it cannot be said that wife was under an obligation to
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file written statement even though had financial crisis to contest the
case. The view, therefore, taken by Court below that for the purpose of
Order VIII Rule 10 C.P.C., in the facts of this case, time lapsed
between the date when application under Section 24 of Act, 1955 was
allowed and date on which written statement was filed, should be
taken, which is only 67 days it cannot be said that there was non
compliance of filing written statement within time by respondent-
wife.

19. It is however contended that written statement was filed on


24.10.2018 without seeking permission of Court and therefore Order
VIII Rule 1 providing only 30 days' time will apply and not 90 days'
time.

20. In this regard we are of the view that no formal application for
this purpose is necessary. If Trial Court accepted written statement
when it is filed, it can be treated as if it has granted permission. Any
specific procedure for this purpose neither has been prescribed nor
need be introduced considering nature of proceedings. When a written
statement is accepted by Trial Court, it results in allowing parties to
contest the matter on merits instead of going to decide the matter ex
parte.

21. In Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal Kotah and others


AIR 1955 SC 425 Court said that procedure of trial is made for the
purpose of deciding a dispute in compliance of principles of natural
justice and no technical view should be taken for such procedure.

22. Therefore, whenever statutory provisions in respect of


procedure are to be considered, such view has to be taken which
advances an adjudication on merits after hearing both the parties
instead of ex parte decision. No person has a vested interest and right
to seek adjudication of a dispute ex parte by taking advantage of any
technical fault or issue. Courts must follow a procedure which, as
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much as possible, consistent with statutory provisions, principles of


natural justice and leans in favour of a decision on merits after contest
instead of ex parte decision.

23. In view of above discussion, appeal is dismissed as not


maintainable as well as on the ground of involving no arguable issue
at the stage of hearing under Order 41, Rule 11 C.P.C.

24. Interim order, granted on 26.6.2019, stands discharged.


Order Date :- 20.9.2019
KA

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