"Act, 1955") I.E. 'Cruelty'. Summons Were Issued To Respondent SMT
"Act, 1955") I.E. 'Cruelty'. Summons Were Issued To Respondent SMT
"Act, 1955") I.E. 'Cruelty'. Summons Were Issued To Respondent SMT
Court No. - 34
2. The appeal has been filed against order dated 08.5.2019 passed
by Sri Rajesh Narain Mani Tripathi, Additional Principal Judge,
Family Court No.04, Aligarh admitting written statement of defendant
and rejecting objection of appellant filed under Order VIII Rule 10 of
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”).
4. Written statement was not filed and further dates fixed are
16.03.2018, 04.05.2018 and 12.07.2018. Appellant thereafter filed an
application No.12A/1 dated 10.07.2018 under Order VIII, Rule 10
C.P.C. requesting Family Court to decree suit in favour of appellant
under Order VIII, Rule 10 C.P.C. Family Court fixed 24.10.2018 for
disposal of aforesaid application. On 24.10.2018 Presiding Officer
was on leave and on the same date written statement was filed by
defendant-respondent. Objecting to the said filing of written
statement, appellant filed an objection (Paper No.15Ka) stating that
written statement has not been filed within time prescribed under
2
“(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the
parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an
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interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained
in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order
is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English
Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in
one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in
another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in
our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal
Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to
include even intermediate or quasi final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the
accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it
finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the
controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings
before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court
thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an
interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy
because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this
Court in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
even against an order framing charges against the accused.
Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against
an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the
accused.”
8. In Webster's New World Dictionary “interlocutory” has been
defined as “an order other than final decision”.
10. In the context of Section 397(2) Cr.P.c., it has been held that
orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders on bail, calling
for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings, are all
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interlocutory orders.
11. In Central Bank of India vs. Gokul Chand AIR 1967 SC 799,
Court said that orders regarding summoning of witnesses, discovery,
production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for
examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of
hearing and admissibility of a document or relevancy of a question are
interlocutory orders.
12. In Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker vs. State of Gujarat 1968
CriLJ 876, Supreme Court held that finality of an order should not be
judged by correlating that order with the controversy in the complaint.
The fact that the controversy still remained alive was irrelevant. There
may be some interlocutory orders, which may have effect of becoming
final order and they are appellable.
13. In Amar Nath and others vs. State of Haryana and others
(1977) 4 SCC 137 an order for summoning accused persons was held
to be not an “interlocutory order” but an order whereagainst revision
under Section 397 Cr.P.C. was maintainable on the ground that it
affects valuable right of accused since he has been summoned for
facing the trial and it admittedly prejudiced his rights and therefore,
revision is maintainable.
18. Even otherwise, on merits, we do not find that the view taken
by Court below is erroneous, inasmuch as, in family disputes, when
divorce petition is filed by husband and on the first date fixed for
written statement, wife comes with the complaint that she needs
financial assistance and seeks time to enforce her rights of interim
maintenance under Section 24 of Act, 1955, so long as this application
is not decided, it cannot be said that wife was under an obligation to
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file written statement even though had financial crisis to contest the
case. The view, therefore, taken by Court below that for the purpose of
Order VIII Rule 10 C.P.C., in the facts of this case, time lapsed
between the date when application under Section 24 of Act, 1955 was
allowed and date on which written statement was filed, should be
taken, which is only 67 days it cannot be said that there was non
compliance of filing written statement within time by respondent-
wife.
20. In this regard we are of the view that no formal application for
this purpose is necessary. If Trial Court accepted written statement
when it is filed, it can be treated as if it has granted permission. Any
specific procedure for this purpose neither has been prescribed nor
need be introduced considering nature of proceedings. When a written
statement is accepted by Trial Court, it results in allowing parties to
contest the matter on merits instead of going to decide the matter ex
parte.