84. LEVISTE VS.

CA Same; Judgments; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases;

Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious
G.R. No. 189122. March 17, 2010.* and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction—
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient.—It cannot be said that the Court of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One,
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
assuring the accused’s presence at trial.—Bail, the security given by an accused who expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail
is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting
court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is
question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals
in the “dubious interval,” often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? Bail had jurisdiction to hear and
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in 621
pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 621
Same; Same; An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed; Under what circumstances an resolve petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
accused may obtain bail pending appeal is a delicate balance between the interests Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of society and those of the accused; In the exercise  of discretion in the grant of bail of discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave
pending appeal, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious
the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion
fact convicted by the trial court.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to
_______________ evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
* THIRD DIVISION. at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari  to prosper,
620 there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED discretion.
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals Same; Same; Appeals; The extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to
accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.—Petitioner only
immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released on points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5,
bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will
proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or
debt to society he has never owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, fact. In this connection, Lee v. People, 393 SCRA 397 (2002) is apropos:
however, the accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending … Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent
judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are
hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse
itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable of discretion correctible by certiorari.
doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized societal Same; Same; Penalties; The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to
interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is
flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and imprisonment exceeding six years—the first scenario deals with the circumstances
the avoidance of delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may enumerated in the said paragraph, and the second scenario contemplates the
obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of existence of at least one of the said circumstances.—The third paragraph of Section
society and those of the accused. Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-
In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. 622

Page 1 of 16
 622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating
justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of
other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must
existence of at least one of the said circumstances. The implications of this distinction be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal
are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law: Under the present revised denied even without those conditions.
Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The development over time of the rules
rules: x x x x x x x x x e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal—
of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and
one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present only for strong reasons.—The development over time of these rules reveals an
and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a
Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
court (Sec. 5); x x x. discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
Same; Same; Judicial Discretion; Words and Phrases; Judicial discretion has death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment—pursuant to the “tough on bail
been defined as “choice”—choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among pending appeal” policy, the
a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, 624
with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker”; The establishment of a 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.—Petitioner’s theory therefore Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail
determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as
of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its “discretion” into merely filling conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.—A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified
instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual situations. More importantly, it reiterated the “tough on bail pending appeal”
issue—whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present. However, configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3
judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one matter of right before final conviction. Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail
623 pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 623 or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The present inclination of the rules on
bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in
the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail
renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of emanated.—The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.” original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. While this is of
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Laws and rules should not be course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail
interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences.— pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies. In our
Laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioner’s appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion—particularly with respect to

Page 2 of 16
extending bail—should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for unintentionally be suggestive of the outcome of the appealed decision of the lower
strong reasons. In fact, it has even been pointed out that “grave caution that must court.—The Philippine Constitution itself emphasizes the right of an accused to bail
attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best with the sole exception of those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Cases, like in the present case, when an
Section 5.”625 accused is charged with Murder but was convicted with Homicide, mean only one
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 625 thing, that the lower court found the evidence for the crime charged not strong, hence,
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals the accused’s conviction of a lesser offense. Therefore, the denial of the same
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The importance attached to accused’s application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his
conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it guilt for the crime charged is strong, would unintentionally be suggestive of the
is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that outcome of the appealed decision of the lower court. The discretion whether to grant
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit the application for bail or not is given to the CA in cases such as the present one, on
to bail.—This Court has been guided by the following: The importance attached to the reason that the same appellate court can review the factual findings of the lower
conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it court. However, this will no longer be the case if a Petition for Certiorari is filed with
is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that this Court as it is not a trier of facts. Hence, the existence of those queries brought
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit about by the majority opinion casts confusion rather than an enlightenment on the
to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of present case.
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the Same; Same; The set of circumstances succinctly provided in Section 5, Rule
burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point 114 of the Rules of Court has been provided as a guide for the exercise of the
of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so appellate court’s discretion in granting or denying the application for bail, pending the
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty imposed
if liberated on bail than before conviction. by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, otherwise, if it is intended
Same; Same; Same; Same; After conviction by the trial court, the presumption that the said discretion be absolute, no such set of circumstances would have been
of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends—from necessarily included in the Rules.—The CA should have applied the provisions of
then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.—After conviction by the trial Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, wherein the appellate court is given the
court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional discretion to grant bail to the petitioner after considering the enumerated circum-
right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the 627
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 627
only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent- stances, the penalty imposed by the trial court having exceeded six years.
standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and Although this Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering
Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court, the set of circumstances
accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his succinctly provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court should be
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially considered. The said set of circumstances has been provided as a guide for the
germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the exercise of the appellate court’s discretion in granting or denying the application for
trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused bail, pending the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the
faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. Otherwise,
bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of if it is intended that the said discretion be absolute, no such set of circumstances
conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals would have been necessarily included in the Rules. Thus, if the present ruling of the
626 CA is upheld, anyone who has been charged with a capital offense, or an offense
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment but convicted by the trial court
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals of a lesser offense, would no longer be able to apply for bail pending one’s appeal.
which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes. And by that premise, the discretion accorded to the appellate court in granting or
Peralta, J., Dissenting Opinion: denying applications for bail for those who have been convicted by the trial court with
Bail; Bail Pending Appeal; Cases when an accused is charged with Murder but imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as penalty would have to be rendered nugatory
was convicted with Homicide mean only one thing, that the lower court found the and the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
evidence for the crime charged not strong, hence, the accused’s conviction of a Procedure would also be rendered useless.
lesser offense—the denial of the same accused’s application for bail pending appeal SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
on the ground that the evidence of his guilt for the crime charged is strong, would    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Page 3 of 16
   Esguerra & Blanco for petitioner. punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that
  Capelan Law Firm  collaborating counsel for petitioner. discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that
  The Solicitor General for respondents. the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but
CORONA, J.: with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his been in fact convicted by the trial court.10
release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, 1 is the The Facts
answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
_______________ was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
1 Section 1, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT. homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
628 of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED maximum.11
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an
the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the “dubious interval,” often urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
years long, between arrest and final adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and part.
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.3 The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. 13 It invoked the
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by bedrock principle in the matter of bail
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced _______________
to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is 9  Keller, supra.
admitted to bail.4 An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate 10 Yap v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202; 358 SCRA 564, 573 (2001).
court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted 11 Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 07-179 penned by
accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never Judge Elmo M. Alameda. Rollo, pp. 198-235.
owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s 12 Notice of Appeal dated January 14, 2009. Id., at p. 238-241.
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity 13 Resolution dated April 8, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32159 penned by Associate
to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member
other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly 630
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime 630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
serious enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s flight from court pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Citing well-established
delay in punishment.8 Under what circumstances an jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a
_______________ prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner.
2 Verilli, Donald, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical “… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
Perspectives, 82 Columbia L.Rev. 328 (1982). confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x
3 Id. x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking
4 See Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court. medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended
5 Keller, Doug, Resolving A “Substantial Question”: Just Who Is Entitled to Bail by his personal physician.”14
Pending Appeal Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984?, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 825 (2008). For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be
6 Leibowitz, Debra, Release Pending Appeal: A Narrow Definition of ‘Substantial allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s
Question’ Under the Bail Reform Act, 54 FDMLR 1081 (1986). conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima
7 Keller, supra. facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the
8 Leibowitz, supra note 6. evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
629 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 629 Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s
interests of society and those of the accused.9 theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Page 4 of 16
_______________ bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than
of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and six years’ imprisonment should automatically be granted.
Normandie B. Pizarro of the third Division of the Court of Appeals. Id., at pp. 36-45. Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
14 Id., at p. 43. substantive rules.
15 Id., at p. 47. Basic Procedural Concerns
631 Forbid Grant of Petition
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 631 Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for
The Issue admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory
appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances Other than the sweeping averment that “[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114,
“Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution,” 17 however, petitioner
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life actually failed to establish
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be _______________
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided 16 See Section 1, Rule 65, RULES OF COURT.
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the 17 See Petition, p. 14. Rollo, p. 16.
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense 633
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 633
resolved by the appellate court. Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply
on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
to the consent of the bondsman. absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5,
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was
other similar circumstances: strong.
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or We disagree.
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
justification; imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the
conditional pardon;632 decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
flight if released on bail; or Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending
during the pendency of the appeal. appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.” jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion
(emphasis supplied) must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in reason of passion or personal hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for to evasion of posi-
_______________

Page 5 of 16
 18 Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 185401, years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
21 July 2009, 593 SCRA 316, 344. paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission
19 Id. of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from
634 legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on
tive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20 existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the
the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in
capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the remedial law:
appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed _______________
earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. 23 Id.
The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable 636
but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioner’s claim of ill health. By 636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it “Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a summarized in the following rules:
careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court. x x x  x x x  x x x
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one
However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
People22 is apropos: f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
“… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x”24 (emphasis supplied)
of discretion correctible by certiorari. Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial
_______________ law, is of the same thinking:
20 Id., at p. 345. “Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
21 Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461; 289 SCRA 624 (1998). offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
22 441 Phil. 705; 393 SCRA 397 (2002). On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
635 punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 635 of discretion.
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions. An circumstances under
interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown _______________
that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of 24 Regalado, Florenz, II REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 417 (Tenth Revised Edition
discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as [2004]).
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to Justice Regalado was Vice-Chairman and, later, Co-Chairman of the Committee
be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice on Revision of the Rules of Court which proposed the present (2000) rules on criminal
but will also unduly burden the courts.”23 (emphasis supplied) procedure (Rules 110-127 of the Rules of Court).
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section It should be noted, however, that Justice Regalado speaks of application for bail
5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s pending appeal in cases “wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but
Interpretation not more than 20 years is imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) A careful reading of the
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 does not impose the limit of “not more than 20
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.”

Page 6 of 16
637 provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 637 appeal.
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments  reveals that it interprets
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty
denied.”25 (emphasis supplied) imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to
none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is limited discretion, that is,
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for _______________
bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating 26 circumstances in the 27 Discretion implies that, in the absence of a positive law or fixed rule, the judge
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and
court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists justice.  (Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros
does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City  , G.R. No. 179878, 24 December 2008, 575
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more SCRA 575 and  Luna v. Arcenas, 34 Phil. 80 [1916] both citing Goodwin v. Prime [92
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated Me., 355]).
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny 639
or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 639
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed. Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will pending appeal.
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts
_______________ its “discretion” into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third
25 Herrera, Oscar, IV REMEDIAL LAW 455-456 (2007). paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the
Justice Herrera was Consultant to the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short,
Court which proposed the present (2000) rules on criminal procedure (Rules 110-127 petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by
of the Rules of Court). requiring it to determine a singular factual issue—whether any of the five bail-
26 These circumstances are herein referred to as “bail-negating” because the negating circumstances is present.
presence of any of them will negate the allowance of bail. However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.”28 Choice occurs where,
638 between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals decision maker.”29 On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of
case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the action is the end of discretion. 30 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s
appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on
justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively ren-
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the _______________
appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily 28 Rosenberg, Maurice, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above,
focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 659 (1971) cited in Painter, Mark and Welker, Paula, Abuse
that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of of Discretion: What Should It Mean in Ohio Law?, 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 209 (2002).
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a 29 Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, 2 Standards of Review § 15.8, at
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically 296 (1986) cited in Painter and Welker, supra.
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the 30 Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros
less stringent sound discretion approach. Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City, supra note 21.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different 640
situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, 640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said Leviste vs. Court of Appeals

Page 7 of 16
ders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an commanding respect that might possibly prevail.(Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct.
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission 349, 351 (1955) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
to bail is discretionary. See also United States v. Barbeau, 92 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. Alaska 1950), aff’d,
”The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this 193 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 968 (1952); Warring v. United
case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the States, 16 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Md. 1954); United States v. Goo, 10 F.R.D. 337, 338
exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable (D. Hawaii 1950).
latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its 36 Luna v. Arcenas, supra note 21 quoting 2 Encyclopedia of Pleading and
understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 31 In view of the grave caution Practice 416, 418.
required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the Thus, the general rule and one of the fundamental rules of appellate procedure is
accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. 32 It that decisions of a trial court which “lie in discretion” will not be reviewed on appeal,
should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the whether the case be civil or criminal, at law or in equity (Cuan v. Chiang Kai Shek
particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the College, Inc, G.R. No. 175936, 03 September 2007, 532 SCRA 172, 187-188).
applicant,33 among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine 37 Section 10, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very  
least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial 642
question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court.34 In other 642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable expressio unius est exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory construction. However, the
issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that
_______________ the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The
31 Morada v. Tayao, A.M. No. RTJ-93-978, 07 February 1994, 229 SCRA 723. provision categorically refers to “the following or other similar circumstances.”
32 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil. 658 (1949). Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third
33 Id. paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or
34 United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926) (Butler, Circuit Justice). revocation of bail pending appeal.
35 See D’Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (1959) (Douglas, Circuit Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
Justice). unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court, in his capacity as a Circuit adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
Justice, was one of the first judges to discuss the definition of “substantial question.” imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-
He equated the phrase with an negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the
641 penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 641 cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years’
the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present,
the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years
more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
lower court’s exercise of discretionary power was sound, 36 specially since the rules on Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending
criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those
Court of Appeals except for substantial error.37 convicted of less serious crimes?
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned _______________
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating 38 The express mention of one implies the exclusion of all others not mentioned.
circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the 643
_______________ VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 643
  issue that is “fairly debatable.” Later, he provided additional guidance to district Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
courts trying to determine whether a defendant’s appeal would raise a fairly debatable Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History and
issue: Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
[T]he first consideration is the soundness of the errors alleged. Are they, or any of Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and
them, likely to command the respect of the appellate judges? It is not enough that I evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
am unimpressed. I must decide whether there is a school of thought, a philosophical The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule
view, a technical argument, an analogy, an appeal to precedent or to reason 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Page 8 of 16
 “Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First 2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
Instance.—After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of under the law at the time of its commis-
First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right. 645
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance.— VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 645
After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
bailed at the discretion of the court. sion and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined.—A capital offense, as the term is used in this perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a
rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable.—No person in custody for the commission 3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under
of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.” the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the
the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows: be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
“Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody, shall before As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now
final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at following rules are laid down:
the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when 1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10)
evidence of guilt is strong.644 days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals ordered by this Court;
     Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined.—A capital offense, as the term is used in 2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of
this Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.” confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
(emphasis supplied) 3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this
2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows: Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8,
“The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his
Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which bail.” (emphasis supplied)
provides: Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody, shall before August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a “SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right.—All persons in custody shall: (a) before or
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial
the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
evidence of guilt is strong. Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital 646
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to 646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional
policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit: Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of
the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the the bondsman.
complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but
pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;

Page 9 of 16
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with 39 Regalado, Florenz, II Remedial Law Compendium 273 (Fifth Revised Edition
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: [1988]).
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual 648
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance 648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of reiteration; Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his situations. More importantly, it reiterated the “tough on bail pending appeal”
bail without valid justification; configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a
parole, under conditional pardon; matter of right before final conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
probability of flight if released on bail; or death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial
the accused may commit another crime. or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n) perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined.—A capital offense, as the term is used in Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail
these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the
(4)647 absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 647 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original
is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.” constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated.41 While
(emphasis supplied) _______________
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were 40 See Herrera, supra note 19, p. 457.
thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now. 41 In particular, in the United States, the history of bail pending appeal has been
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more divided by one scholar on the matter into four distinct periods: (1st period) 1879 to
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the 1934, (2nd period) 1934 to 1956, (third period) 1956 to 1984 and (post-1984 period)
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but 1984 to present. The first period, during which the rules on the matter were just being
with grave caution and only for strong reasons. developed, showed liberality in the grant of bail pending appeal. The second period
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non- produced a more restrictive rule, one which
capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) 469
discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 469
favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non- Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of
right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail
perpetua.39 pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion—particularly with
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail respect to extending bail—should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and
pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not only for strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that “grave caution that
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule
post-conviction grant of bail. 114, Section 5.”43
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
identifying which court has authority to act “The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
_______________ should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent,

Page 10 of 16
and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally 46 See Obosa v. Court of Appeals and Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra. See also
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is COMMENTARY, p. 492 (2009).
rebutted, and the burden is 651
_______________ VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 651
limited bail to defendants who could prove that their appeal would raise “a substantial Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
question which should be determined by the appellate court.” The third period saw the court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting
enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 establishing a standard wherein bail may the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays
delay. Under that standard, the court could deny bail if the defendant was a flight risk often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the
or a danger to the community. Hence, bail pending appeal was again favored. The post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be
post-1984 period is determined by the enactment and implementation of the Bail more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
Reform Act of 1984. The law was purposely designed to make restrictive the permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
allowance of bail pending appeal. As the Act’s legislative history explains, prior law appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
had “a presumption in favor of bail even after conviction” and Congress wanted to processes.
“eliminate” that presumption. (Keller, supra note 5.) WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
42 Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the
281. appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with
43 Id. dispatch.
650 Costs against petitioner.
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED SO ORDERED.
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur. 
upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it Peralta, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by Mendoza, J., I Join The Dissent For Reasons Stated.
the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated DISSENTING OPINION
on bail than before conviction.”44 (emphasis supplied) PERALTA, J.:
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, The denial of an application for bail pending appeal on a case where the accused
the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the was charged with Murder but was convicted with Homicide seriously poses some
present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter important questions.
of wise discretion.” By denying the application for bail pending appeal of an accused who was
A Final Word charged with the crime of Murder but was convicted of the crime of Homicide, is this
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides: Court, in effect, saying that the evidence of guilt for the crime of Murder is
“SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable 652
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
law. x x “ (emphasis supplied) strong despite the lower court’s finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, of Homicide, a bailable offense?
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is By denying the application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be evidence of guilt for the crime of Murder is strong, is this court, in a way, unknowingly
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the preempting the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to the main case?
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal In the event that the Court of Appeals sustains the conviction of the accused of
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds the crime of Homicide, a bailable offense and the accused decides to file a Petition
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of for Certiorari before this Court, will the denial of the application for bail of the accused
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial still be effective?
_______________ With due respect to the present ponencia, an affirmative response to the above
44 Id. See also Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10. questions would bring about some absurdities.
45 Id. Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides the following:
“Sec. 13. ALL PERSONS, EXCEPT THOSE CHARGED WITH OFFENSES
PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS

Page 11 of 16
STRONG, SHALL, BEFORE CONVICTION, BE BAILABLE BY SUFFICIENT “WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused Jose Antonio Leviste y
SURETIES, OR BE RELEASED ON RECOGNIZANCE AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY Casals is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and
LAW. THE RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN THE is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED. EXCESSIVE of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED.” temporal as maximum. Accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim,
The Philippine Constitution itself emphasizes the right of an accused to bail with Rafael de las Alas, the amount of Php50,000.00 as death indemnity and
the sole exception of those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Cases, like in the present case, when an Accused Jose Antonio Leviste y Casals shall be credited in the service of his
accused is charged with Murder but was convicted with Homicide, mean only one sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which he had
thing, that the lower court found the evidence for the crime charged not strong, hence, undergone preventive imprisonment at the Makati City Jail from February 7, 2007 up
the accused’s conviction of a lesser offense. Therefore, the denial of the same to May 22, 2007 up provided that he agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
accused’s application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
guilt for the crime charged is strong, would unintentionally be suggestive of the SO ORDERED.”
outcome of the Consequently, in its Order5 dated January 14, 2009, the trial court canceled
653 petitioner’s bail bond, ruling that:
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 653 “Accused Jose Antonio Leviste y Casals was charged with the crime of Murder, a
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at
appealed decision of the lower court. The discretion whether to grant the application the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
for bail or not is given to the CA in cases such as the present one, on the reason that accused is presently out on bail. After trial, the accused was however convicted of
the same appellate court can review the factual findings of the lower court. However, Homicide, a lesser offense than that charged in the Information. Accused was
this will no longer be the case if a Petition for Certiorari is filed with this Court as it is accordingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
not a trier of facts. Hence, the existence of those queries brought about by the day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
majority opinion casts confusion rather than an enlightenment on the present case. temporal as maximum.
The following discussion, in my opinion, should shed light on the matter: Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which is deemed to have
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of modified SC Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992, provides:
Civil Procedure which seeks to nullify and set aside the Resolutions 1 dated April 8, Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
2009 and July 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA). offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
The antecedent facts are the following: admission to bail is discretion-
Arising from a shooting incident that happened on January 12, 2007 at petitioner _______________
Jose Antonio Leviste’s office where Rafael de las Alas died of gunshot wounds, 5 Id., at pp. 236-237.
petitioner was charged with murder under the Amended Information dated March 15, 655
2007 in Criminal Case No. 07-179 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 655
Branch 150. Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner, on February 23, 2007, filed an Urgent Application for Admission to ary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela2 on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
not strong. The trial court, in its Order 3 dated May 21, 2007, granted petitioner’s original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
application for bail. convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
Subsequently, trial ensued and, on January 14, 2009, the trial court rendered its bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
Decision4 finding petitioner guilty appellate court.
_______________  In Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA
1 Rollo, pp. 36-45. 281, 78 SCAD 17, the Supreme Court, speaking thru the Third Division, stated:
2 Id., at pp. 150-154. x x x that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused,
3 Id., at pp. 164-197. who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital
4 Id., at pp. 198-235. crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail
654 considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED capital offense charged and that the risk attendant to jumping bail still
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, the dispositive portion of which after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged,
reads: to the appellate court’s sound discretion.

Page 12 of 16
 In view of the aforecited rules and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, the Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
bailbond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is deemed cancelled. bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
Accused being considered a national prisoner is ordered committed to the Makati City He points out that the records show that the trial court already granted him bail, since
Jail, Makati City, pending his transfer to the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City. it found that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that the evidence of his guilt
SO ORDERED.” for the crime of murder was strong; and this was further confirmed when the trial court
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal 6 dated January 14, 2009 and on January 15, convicted him of the crime of homicide instead of murder. Hence, petitioner insists
2009, filed with the CA an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Pending Appeal that the trial court’s determination that he is not guilty of a capital offense should
and an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Special Raffle and to Resolve the Attached subsist even on appeal.
Application for Admission to Bail. The CA, in its Resolution dated April 8, 2009, Anent the third issue, petitioner claims that the CA allowed Prosecutor Emmanuel
denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal, the disposition reading: Velasco to delay his application for bail by filing mere manifestations requesting the
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, “the Urgent Application for CA to provide him with copies of petitioner’s motions and written submissions.
Admission to Bail Pending Appeal” is hereby DENIED. In its Comment dated November 20, 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General
_______________ (OSG) contends that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
6 Id., at pp. 238-239. petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Although the grant of bail is
656 discretionary in non-capital offenses, if, as in this case, imprisonment has been
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED imposed on the petitioner in excess of six (6) years and circumstances point to a
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals considerable likelihood that he may flee if released on bail, then he must be denied
        SO ORDERED.” bail, or his bail previously granted should be canceled. The OSG also reiterates the
The CA also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated April 14, 2009 ruling in Obosa v. Court of Appeals,9 which was relied upon by the CA in denying the
in its Resolution7 dated July 14, 2009. application for bail, stating that after an accused has been tried and convicted, the
Hence, the present petition. presumption of innocence, which may be relied upon if prior application is rebutted,
Petitioner states the following arguments: the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. As to the claim of
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN petitioner that the CA gravely abused its discretion in allowing Prosecutor Velasco to
DENYING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR BAIL PENDING APPEAL DESPITE participate in the appellate proceedings, the OSG dismissed the said argument as
THE FACT THAT NONE OF THE CONDITIONS TO JUSTIFY THE DENIAL without merit.
THEREOF UNDER RULE 114, SECTION 5 ARE PRESENT, MUCH LESS PROVEN In his Manifestation and Motion dated December 9, 2009, petitioner contends that
BY THE PROSECUTION. the OSG’s arguments in its Comment
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT _______________
PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE, A BAILABLE OFFENSE, AND 9 334 Phil. 253; 266 SCRA 305 (1997).
THAT AS TWICE SHOWN IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, THE EVIDENCE THAT 658
PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIME OF MURDER IS NOT STRONG. THE 658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
COURT OF APPEALS UNJUSTLY PREJUDGED PETITIONER’S APPEAL BY Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT FOR MURDER IS STRONG, are a mere rehash of the baseless justifications and arguments made by the CA in
DESPITE THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT TO THE CONTRARY. denying his application for bail, arguments which have already been tackled and
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOWED UNJUST BIAS IN ALLOWING refuted by him in the present petition.
PROSECUTOR VELASCO TO PARTICIPATE IN THE APPELLATE Petitioner, in a Manifestation dated November 25, 2009, notified this Court that he
PROCEEDINGS.8 had filed a Very Urgent Motion for a Medical Pass before the CA, as he had to
According to petitioner, the CA should have granted bail in view of the absence of undergo medical treatment at the soonest possible time.
any of the circumstances enumerated under paragraphs (a) to (e), Section 5, Rule In his December 21, 2009 Reply [to Respondent People of the Philippines’
114. He adds that he is neither a recidivist, a quasi-recidivist or habitual delinquent, Comment dated 20 November 2009], petitioner reiterated the arguments he raised in
nor a flight risk; and there is no undue risk that he would commit another crime during his petition.
the pendency of his appeal. In a letter dated November 25, 2009, which was received by the Office of the
Petitioner further argues that the CA committed a grave error and prejudged the Chief Justice on December 7, 2009, Mrs. Teresita C. de las Alas (wife), Ms. Dinna de
appeal by denying his application for las Alas-Sanchez (daughter), and Ms. Nazareth H. de las Alas (daughter) expressed
_______________ consent to the grant of bail to the petitioner.
7 Id., at p. 47. The petition is impressed with merit.
8 Id., at p. 16. Sections 5 and 7, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
657 amended, provide that:
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 657

Page 13 of 16
 “Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court       x x x x
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, SEC. 5. Bail, When Discretionary.—Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the the bondsman.
appellate court. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously
on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject granted shall be canceled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
to the consent of the bondsman. accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be canceled upon a delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
showing by the prosecu- reiteration;
659 (b)  That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 659 confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals without valid justification;
tion, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole,
circumstances: or under conditional pardon;
(a)  That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; probability if flight of released on bail; or
(b)  That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; accused may commit another crime.
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on
pardon; motion and with notice to the adverse party.”
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released As can be gleaned above, the set of circumstances appearing in Section 5, Rule
on bail; or 114 of the Rules of Court brought about by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 has
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the been retained in the present Rules. Notably, it was after the ruling of this Court
pendency of the appeal. in  Obosa v. Court of Appeals11 that the present provisions of Secs. 5 and 7, Rule 114
The appellate court may, motu propio or on motion of any party, review the of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective.
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. _______________
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life 11 Supra note 9.
imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an 661
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 661
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
criminal prosecution.”     In canceling petitioner’s bail bond and denying his application for bail pending
Prior to the affectivity of the above provisions, the governing rule in the granting or appeal, the trial court and the CA, as well as the OSG in its Comment to the petition,
cancellation of bail was encapsulated in Administrative Circular No. 12-94, 10 stating relied on Obosa v.  CA,12 where this Court ruled that bail cannot be granted as a
that: matter of right even after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals
“Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody shall, before his conviction for a non-capital crime. The said case, however, is not applicable.
final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a In Obosa, the petitioner therein was convicted and applied for bail pending appeal
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at prior to the affectivity of the amendments brought about by Administrative Circular No.
the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when 12-94; thus, the set of circumstances, as now seen in the present Rules, was yet to
evidence of guilt is strong. be present. Granting arguendo that the present provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 can
_______________ be made applicable to petitioner Obosa, this Court, in that same case, still deemed
10 Dated October 1, 1994, amending the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. him to be disqualified from the grant of bail on the basic reason that, aside from
660 Obosa being convicted of two counts of homicide, circumstances a, b, d and e of
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court were present. In the present case, as will be
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals

Page 14 of 16
discussed later, not one of the circumstances that would warrant the denial of bail is VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 663
present. Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
Incidentally, magnified in the denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending apparently placed in his hand; appellant’s conduct in refusing to be subjected to
appeal was the reliance of the CA on the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial paraffin test is not the natural tendency of a person claiming self-defense; and neither
court. According to the CA, the evidence of guilt of the petitioner, as found by the trial was appellant threatened or intimidated by the victim’s averred pugnacious,
court, was strong, therefore, the provisions of Section 7 of Rule 114 of the 2000 quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the victim. And even
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were applicable, the crime charged being assuming arguendo  that there was unlawful aggression, the trial court found that the
murder. five (5) gunshot wounds (four) [4] shots even aimed at head, a vital organ) were not
However, it must be remembered that although petitioner was charged with the reasonable means to repel the same, and the evidence demonstrated a determined
crime of murder, he was convicted of the crime of homicide. Prior to the said effort on the part of the appellant to kill the victim and not just to defend
conviction, the trial court, after bail hearing, granted bail to petitioner, thus: himself. However, appellant was convicted of the lesser offense (homicide)
“Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to demonstrate that the evidence since the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
of guilt of the accused Jose Antonio J. Leviste for the crime of Murder is cruelty or ignominy, alleged in the Amended Information, were not duly proven
strong to foreclose his right at the trial.”15
_______________ The above observation of the CA serves nothing but to bolster the earlier finding
12 Id. of the trial court that the prosecution was not able to present evidence that would
662 prove that the guilt of the petitioner as to the crime charged (murder) was strong.
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, clearly mandates that no
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
to bail, the court hereby grants the motion and, allows the accused to post bail in the perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
amount of P300,000.00 for his provisional liberty. Accused shall be discharged or strong. The provision distinctly refers to the crime charged and not the crime proven.
released only upon the approval of his bail by the Court. The failure then of the prosecution to prove the existence of the circumstances to
SO ORDERED.”13 qualify the crime committed to murder, the crime charged, necessarily means that the
Ultimately, after the trial of the case, the trial court found petitioner guilty beyond evidence of his guilt of the said crime is not strong.
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, not murder as originally charged, Ideally, what the CA should have done was to consolidate the application for bail
demonstrating the consistency of the trial court’s findings in the bail hearing and in the with the petition filed before it because it is only in that manner by which the appellate
actual trial of the said case. Nevertheless, the CA, in denying petitioner’s application court may ascertain whether the evidence of guilt of the accused for the crime
for bail, relied on Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court insisting that the evidence charged is indeed strong, or in reverse, whether the lower court was right in
of guilt of the petitioner was strong. By ruling thus, the CA has not accorded respect convicting the accused of a lesser offense.
to the factual findings of the trial court. It is a time-honored legal precept, in this _______________
regard that the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect by 15 Rollo, p. 44. (Emphasis supplied.)
appellate courts and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has 664
overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or 664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
significance which, if considered, would alter the situation. 14 Moreover, there seems to Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
be a disparity between the pronouncement of the CA that the trial court found the Above all else, the CA should have applied the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114
evidence of guilt of the petitioner strong and the explanation of why the former of the Rules of Court, wherein the appellate court is given the discretion to grant bail
considered it to be so. The CA ruled that: to the petitioner after considering the enumerated circumstances, the penalty
“From the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, the prosecution imposed by the trial court having exceeded six years. Although this Court has held
had demonstrated that appellant’s guilt is strong, after finding that accused that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised
failed to satisfy the requirements of self-defense to justify the shooting of the with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in
victim. Said court carefully and meticulously evaluated the evidence on record and fact convicted by the trial court,16 the set of circumstances succinctly provided in
ruled that the claim of appellant that the victim was the agressor deserves disbelief Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court should be considered.
considering that evidence at the scene of the crime indicated that the victim could not The said set of circumstances has been provided as a guide for the exercise of
have fired the gun the appellate court’s discretion in granting or denying the application for bail, pending
_______________ the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty
13 Rollo, p. 197. (Emphasis supplied.) imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. Otherwise, if it is
14 People v. Dizon, 329 Phil. 685, 695; 260 SCRA 851, 858 (1996), citing People intended that the said discretion be absolute, no such set of circumstances would
v. Gomez, 229 SCRA 138 (1994). have been necessarily included in the Rules. Thus, if the present ruling of the CA is
663 upheld, anyone who has been charged with a capital offense, or an offense

Page 15 of 16
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment but convicted by the trial court
of a lesser offense, would no longer be able to apply for bail pending one’s appeal.
And by that premise, the discretion accorded to the appellate court in granting or
denying applications for bail for those who have been convicted by the trial court with
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as penalty would have to be rendered nugatory
and the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure would also be rendered useless.
Therefore, applying the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and after a careful perusal of the records and a learned
consideration of
_______________
16 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202; 358 SCRA 564, 573 (2001),
citing Obosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9.
665
VOL. 615, March 17, 2010 665
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals
the arguments of the parties, this Court finds no reason to deny petitioner his
application for bail pending appeal. Petitioner is indisputably not a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has he committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration. He has also not previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification. He did not commit the offense charged while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon. Lastly, as shown by his previous records and pointed out by
petitioner,17 considering his conduct while out on bail during the trial of his case, his
advanced age,18 and his current health condition, 19 the probability of flight is nil and
there is no risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Also noted by this Court is the letter of the heirs of Rafael de las Alas giving their
consent and stating that they have no objection to petitioner’s application for bail.
Although the said letter or consent can never be a basis for the grant of the
application for bail, it serves as a reference for the petitioner’s improbability to evade
whatever negative result the grant of his appeal might bring. Nonetheless, what
governs in this case is the discretion of the appellate court as guided by the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Necessarily, due to the above discussion, I humbly dissent.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the
constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails. (Trillanes IV vs.
Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471 [2008]) 

Page 16 of 16