TOGUAY, Paul Jeffrey U.

2019-80129
Block 4
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated
2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
Citation G.R. No. 45815

Date May 18, 1990

Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondent LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY

PRINCIPLES/ 1. Subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the

DOCTRINES authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the
applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information.

2. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is

not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but
by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor,
crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the
complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show
that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that
court must assume jurisdiction.

3. It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance

of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a
penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a
municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant.

4. It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a

court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at
the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law
in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
 In July 1976, a CRIMINAL INFORMATION was filed with the City Court of Roxas City, charging
private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of ESTAFA under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code which perpetrated in April 1975. The information charged that the accused had
allegedly issued a check in the amount of PhP 4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise
purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore
subsequently bounced.

The City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge held that the
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense
was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed,
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty
imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's
authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being
refiled in the proper court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the City Court of Roxas has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case would result in also
applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity
of penal laws.

RULING:

1. NO. The City Court of Roxas has no jurisdiction over the case as the penalty imposed on the offense
charged is prision mayor in its medium period.

It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction

of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the
law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal
action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the
commission of the offense charged.
Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction
of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976:

"[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts
shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense
within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding
P6,000.00 or both . . . ."

It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty
imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the
first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the
jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.

At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable
for the offense charged had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor
in its medium period.

In the case at bar, since the filing of the Criminal action/Information happened in July 1976,
P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) increased the penalty of the offense for ESTAFA to prision
mayor from arresto mayor, and the City Court could only hear cases not exceeding prision
correctional, the City Court of Rozas is bereft of jurisdiction to try and hear the case as it is only
mandated to entertain cases/issues with imposable penalty of not exceeding prision correctional.

2. NO. The application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case would NOT result in also
applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity
of penal laws because the issue here is that of jurisdiction and not the criminal prosecution.

Subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the

court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the
allegations of a criminal information.

In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not

determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the
penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in
the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for
 by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has
jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.

It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a

criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is
proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as
the evidence would warrant.

In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged by P.D. No. 818 (prison
mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense
originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to prision
correccional in its minimum period).

CONCLUSION:

Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial
Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon
(assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the
Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subjectmatter jurisdiction to try and decide the
(refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the
offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas
City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case
would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling
back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.