Supreme Court of the Philippines

2 Phil. 682

G.R. No. 1299, November 10, 1903

VICENTE PEREZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
EUGENIO POMAR, AGENT OF THE COMPANIA
GENERAL DE TABACOS, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.
DECISION
TORRES, J.:

In a decision dated February 9, 1903, the judge of the Sixth Judicial District,
deciding a case brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for the recovery
of wages due and unpaid, gave judgment against the latter for the sum of $600
and the costs of suit, less the sum of $50, Mexican.

On August 27,11)02, Don Vicente Perez filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna a complaint, which was amended on the 17th of January of this year,
asking that the court determine the amount due the plaintiff, at the customary
rate of compensation for interpreting in these Islands, for services rendered the
Tabacalera Company, and that, in view of the circumstances of the case,
judgment be rendered in his favor for such sum. The complaint also asked that
the defendant be condemned to the payment of damages in the sum of $3,200,
gold, together with the costs of suit. In this complaint it was alleged that Don
Eugenio Pomar, as general agent of the Compana General de Tabacos in the
said province1, verbally requested the plaintiff on the 8th of December, 1901,
to act as interpreter between himself and the military authorities; that after the
date mentioned the plaintiff continued to render such services up to and
including Hay 31, 1002; that he had accompanied the defendant, Pomar, during
that time at conferences between the latter and the colonel commanding the
local garrison, and with various officers and doctors residing in the capital, and
at conferences with Captain Lemen in the town of Pilar, and with the. major in
command at the town of Pagsanjan,. concerning the shipment of goods from
Manila, and with respect to goods shipped from the towns of Santa Cruz, Pilar,
and Pagsanjan to this city; that the plaintiff during this period of time was at
the disposal of the defendant, Pomar, and held himself in readiness to render
services whenever required; that on this account his private business, and
especially a soap factory established in the capital, was entirely abandoned; that
to the end that such services might be punctually rendered, the agent, Pomar,
assured him that the Tabacalera Company ahvays generously repaid services
rendered it, and that he therefore did not trouble himself about his inability to
devote the necessary amount of time to his business, the defendant going so far
as to make him flattering promises of employment with the company, which he
did not accept; that these statements were made in the absence of witnesses
and that therefore his only proof as to the same was Mr. Pomar's word as a
gentleman; that the employees of the company did not understand English, and
by reason of the plaintiff's mediation between the agent and the military
authorities large profits were obtained, as would appear from the account and
letterpress books of the agency corresponding to those dates. In the amended
complaint it was added that the defendant, on behalf of the company, offered
to remunerate the plaintiff for the services rendered in the most advantageous
manner in which such services are compensated, in view of the circumstances
under which they were requested; and that the plaintiff, by rendering the
company such services, was obliged to abandon his own business, the
manufacture of soap, and thereby suffered damages in the sum of $3,200,
United States currency.

The defendant, on the 25th of September, 1902, filed an answer asking for the
dismissal of the complaint, with costs to the plaintiff. In his answer the
defendant denied the allegation in the first paragraph of the complaint, stating
that it was wholly untrue that the company, and the1 defendant as its agent, had
solicited the services of thv, plaintiff as interpreter before the military
authorities for the period stated, or for any other period, or that the plaintiff
had accompanied Pomar at the conferences mentioned, concerning shipments
from Manila and exports from some of the towns of the province to this
capital. He stated that he; especially denied paragraph 2 of the complaint, as it
was absolutely untrue that the plaintiff had been at the disposal of the
defendant for the purpose of rendering such services; that he therefore had not
been obliged to abandon his occupation or his soap factory, and that the
statement that an offer of employment with the company had been made to
him was false. The defendant also denied that through the mediation of the
plaintiff the company and himself had obtained large profits. The statements in
paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint were also denied. The defendant
stated that, on account of the friendly relations which sprang up between the
plaintiff and himself, the former borrowed from him from time to time money
amounting to $175 for the purposes of his business, and that he had also
delivered to the plaintiff 36 arrobas of oil worth $106, and three packages of
resin for use in coloring his soap; that the plaintiff accompanied the defendant
to Pagsanjan, Pilar, and other towns when the latter made business trips to them
for the purpose of extending his business and mercantile relations therein; that
on these excursions, as well as on private and official visits which he had to
make, the plaintiff occasionally accompanied him through motives of
friendship, and especially because of the free transportation given him, and not
on behalf of the company of which he was never interpreter and for which he
rendered no services ; that the plaintiff in these conferences acted as interpreter
of his own free will, without being requested to do so by the defendant and
without any offer of payment or compensation; that therefore there existed no
legal relation whatever between the company and the plaintiff, and that the
defendant, when accepting the spontaneous, voluntary, and officious services
of the plaintiff, did so in his private capacity and not as agent of the company,
and that it was for this reason that he refused to enter into negotiations with the
plaintiff, he being in no way indebted to the latter. The defendant concluded by
saying that he answered in his individual capacity.
A complaint having been filed against the Compania General de Tabacos and
Don Eugenio Pomar, its agent in the Province of Laguna, the latter, having
been duly summoned, replied to the complaint, which was subsequently
amended, and stated that he made such reply in his individual capacity and not
as agent of the company, with which the plaintiff had had no legal relations.
The suit was instituted between the plaintiff and Pomar, who, as such, accepted
the issue and entered into the controversy without objection, opposed the claim
of the plaintiff, and concluded by asking that the complaint be dismissed, with
the costs to the plaintiff. Under these circumstances and construing the statutes
liberally, we think it proper to decide the case pending between both parties in
accord- ance with law and the strict principles of justice.

From the oral testimony introduced at the trial, it appears that the plaintiff,
Perez, did on various occasions render Don Eugenio Pomar services as
interpreter of English; and that he obtained passes and accompanied the
defendant upon his journeys to some of the towns in the Province of Laguna.
It does not appear from the evidence, however, that the plaintiff was constantly
at the disposal of the defendant during the period of six months, or that he
rendered services as such interpreter continuously and daily during that period
of time.

It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the
parties for the employment of the plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other
innominate contract was entered into; but whether the plaintiff's services were
solicited or whether they were offered to the defendant for his assistance,
inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we
must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of
the services. Tin's gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the
services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render
service as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services
rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code).
The supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1889, holds, among
other things, "that not only is there an express and tacit consent which
produces real contracts but there is also a presumptive consent which is the
basis of quasi contracts, this giving rise to the multiple juridical relations which
result in obligations for the delivery of a thing or the rendition of a service."

Notwithstanding the denial of the defendant, it is unquestionable that it Avas

with his consent that the plaintiff rendered him services as interpreter, thus
aiding him at a time when, owing to the existence of an insurrection in the
province1, the most disturbed conditions prevailed. It follows, hence, that there
was consent on the part of both in the rendition of such services as interpreter.
Such service1 not being contrary to law or to good custom, it was a perfectly
licit object of contract, and such a contract must necessarily have existed
between the parties, as alleged by the plaintiff. (Art. 1271, Civil Code.)

The consideration for the contract is also evident, it being clear that a mutual
benefit was derived in consequence of the service rendered. It is to be
supposed that the defendant accepted these services and that the plaintiff in
turn rendered them with the expectation that the benefit would be reciprocal.
This shows the concurrence of the three elements necessary under article 1261
of the Civil Code to constitute a contract of lease of service, or other
innominate contract, from which an obligation has arisen and whose fulfillment
is now demanded.

Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides that a contract exists the moment that
one or more persons consent to be bound, with respect to another or others, to
deliver some thing or to render some service. Article 1255 provides that the
contracting parties may establish such covenants, terms, and conditions as they
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, or public
policy. Whether the service was solicited or offered, the fact remains that Perez
rendered to Pomar services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he did this
gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, he having accepted the
benefit of the sendee, to pay a just compensation therefor, by virtue of the
innominate contract of facio ut dex implicitly established.

The obligations arising from this contract are reciprocal, and, apart from the
general provisions with respect to contracts and obligations, the special
provisions concerning contracts for lease of services are applicable by analogy.

In this special contract, as determined by article 1544 of the Civil Code, one of
the parties undertakes to render the other a service for a price certain. The tacit
agreement and consent of both parties with respect to the service rendered by
the plaintiff, and the reciprocal benefits accruing to each, are the best evidence
of the fact that there was an implied contract sufficient to create a legal bond,
from which arose enforceable rights and obligations of a bilateral character.

In contracts the will of the contracting parties is law, this being a legal doctrine
based upon the provisions of articles 1254, 1258, 1262, 1278, 1281, 1282, and
1289 of the Civil Code. If it is a fact sufficiently proven that the defendant,
Pomar, on various occasions consented to accept an interpreter's services,
rendered in his behalf and not gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a
reasonable remuneration therefor, because it is a well-known principle of law
that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.

With respect to the value of the services rendered on different occasions, the
most important of which was the first, as it does not appear that any salary was
fixed upon by the parties at the time the services were accepted, it devolves
upon the court to determine, upon the evidence presented, the value of such
services, taking into consideration the few occasions on which they were
rendered. The fact that no fixed or determined consideration for the rendition
of the services was agreed upon does not necessarily involve a violation of the
provisions of article 1544 of the Civil Code, because at the time of the
agreement this consideration was capable of being made certain. The
discretionary power of the court, conferred upon it by the law, in also
supported by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain, among which may
be cited that of October 18, 1899, which holds as follows: "That as stated in the
article of the Code cited, which follows the provisions of law 1, title 8, of the
fifth partida, the contract for lease of services is one in which one of the
parties undertakes to make some thing or to render some service to the other
for a certain price, the existence of such a price being understood, as this court
has held not only when the price has been expressly agreed upon but also when
it may be determined by the custom and frequent use of the place in which
such services were rendered."

No exception was taken to the judgment below by the plaintiff on account of

the rejection of his claim for damages. The decision upon this point is,
furthermore, correct.

Upon the supposition that the recovery of the plaintiff should not exceed 200
Mexican pesos, owing to the inconsiderable number of times he acted as
interpreter, it is evident that the contract thus implicitly entered into was not
required to be in writing and that therefore it does not fall within article 1280
of the Civil Code; nor is it included Within the provisions of section 335 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as this innominate contract is not covered by that
section. The contract of lease of services is not included in any of the. cases
expressly designated by that section of the procedural law, as affirmed by the
appellant. The interpretation of the other articles of the Code alleged to have
been infringed has also been stated fully in this opinion.

For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that judgment should be rendered
against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200
Mexican pesos, from which will be deducted the sum of 50 pesos due the
defendant by the plaintiff. No special declaration is made as to the costs of this
instance. The judgment below is accordingly affirmed in so far as it agrees with
this opinion, and reversed in so far as it may be in conflict therewith. Judgment
will be entered accordingly twenty days after this decision is filed.

Arellano, C. J., Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur.

MCDONOUGH, J., with whom concurs COOPER, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion of the majority. In my opinion there is no legal

evidence in the case from which the court may conclude that the recovery
should be 200 Mexican pesos. I am therefore in favor of affirming the
judgment.

Johnson, J., did not sit in this case.

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