G.R. No.

L-21450             April 15, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

Facts:

The spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of
P1,908.00. the case was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But
about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00.

As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants'
properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.(Surety)

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after
the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond

the Surety filed a written opposition and prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution
against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding
company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question"

The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the
Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon
failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against
the counterbond

Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding
writ was issued. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial
and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration

Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither
directly nor indirectly.

Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided
the case affirming the orders appealed from.

Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was
filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00
only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does
not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of
Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case

Court of Appeals resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to SC.

Issue: WON Surety can raise the question of lack of jurisdiction

Held:

No.

True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the
Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948,
that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the
rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on
the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.