101. Concepcion v. De la Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb.

3, 2015;

Facts:

Spouses Henry and Blesilda Concepcion filed an administrative case

against Atty. Elmer Dela Rosa, their retained lawyer and counsel
from 1997 until August 2008.

On March 23, 2006, respondent borrowed P2,500,000.00 which he

promised to returned with interest after 5 days. Blesilda issued three
(3) Eastwest Bank Checks in respondent’s name. Upon receiving the
checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing photocopies
of the checks acknowledging that he received the originals of the
checks and agreed to return the P2.5M plus monthly interest of 5%
within 5 days. The said checks were personally encashed by
respondent on the same day.

The respondent failed to pay. The complainants began demanding

payment but respondent merely made repeated promises to pay
soon. On August 2008, complainants, through their new counsel,
Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter to
respondent. In his Reply, he denied borrowing any money and
instead claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault, one of his other
clients, was the real debtor. Complainant brought the matter to the
Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Brgy. Balulang, Cagayan De
Oro City. However, they failed to reach a settlement.

On January 2010, IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received

complainants’ letter-complaint charging respondent with violation of
Rule 16.04 of the CPR (Code of Professional Responsibility). The IBP-
Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La

Rama, Jr., issued his Report finding respondent guilty of violating: (a)
Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow
money from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7
which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP.
(Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences
further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD); and (c) Canon 16
which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
disbarred and that he be ordered to return the ₱2,500,000.00 to
complainants, with stipulated interest.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating

Commissioner’s Report but reduced the penalty against the
respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and
ordered the return of the ₱2,500,000.00 to the complainants with
legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for

violating the CPR.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its
recommended penalty and its directive to return the amount of
₱2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.

Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is

amply supported by substantial evidence. Annex "E” of the Verified
Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the
checks. The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that respondent
personally encashed the checks on the day they were issued.

Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied

knowing the complainants and incurring the same obligation.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be

illogical for them to extend a ₱2,500,000.00 loan without any
collateral or security to a person they do not even know.

Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from

borrowing money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his clients that may come into his possession.

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client."

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between

a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And
as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is
prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer
from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the
client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.

In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon
7 of the CPR which reads: CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.

In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly

refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he
should be equally held administratively liable on this score.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise

of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.

In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for
two (2) years after borrowing ₱900,000.00 from her client, refusing
to pay the same despite court order, and representing conflicting
interests. Considering the greater amount involved in this case and
respondent's continuous refusal to pay his debt, the Court deems it
apt to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years,
instead of the IBP's recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.

The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution

insofar as it orders respondent to return to complainants the amount
of ₱2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. In such cases, the Court's only concern is the
determination of respondent's administrative liability; it should not
involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a
transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement. In this case, respondent received the
₱2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not in consideration
of his professional services. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of
the aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this administrative
case, and thus cannot be sustained.
102. Yu v. De la Cruz, A.C. No. 10912, Jan. 19, 2016;

Facts:

Respondent lawyer, Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz, agreed to represent

Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received
various amounts as acceptance fees.

On November 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was

subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from
complainant and pledged the same with Citystate Savings Bank, Inc.
for the amount of P29,945.50. The respondent issued to complainant
a check in the amount of P35,500.00. Upon presentment, the check
was dishonored for the reason, “Account Closed.”

The complainant demanded for payment of the value of the jewelry,

and the refund of the acceptance fees received by the respondent
lawyer prior to the “abandonment” of the cases, but to no avail. In
another letter, represented by another lawyer, Atty. Francisco C.
Miralles, complainant again demanded the redemption of the check,
refund of the paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no service
was rendered, the payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in the
amount of P100,000.00 to avoid the interest due and possible
foreclosure of the pledge, and moral damages of P300,000.00

For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was file against him. And, on
June 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), where complainant prayed for the
disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct,
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts in violation
of the lawyer’s oath. Despite having been duly served with a copy of
the complaint and the order to file his answer and notified of the
scheduled mandatory conference/hearing, respondent failed to file an
answer or appear on the mandatory conference/hearing.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of

respondent lawyer from the practice of law. Based on the evidence
on record, respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the
borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests were
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in
violation of law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR
stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct."

The IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation. Neither a motion for

reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review was filed.
Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the
case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely
recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to
par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

Whether or not IBP committed errors in their findings.

Ruling:

No. After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason
to deviate from the findings of the Investigating Commissioner with
respect to respondent lawyer's violation of Canons 1, 16, 17, and
Rules 1.01, 16.04, of the CPR.

In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by

respondent lawyer of his client's property. Complainant's
acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial
considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from
borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter's
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. That he might have intended to subsequently
pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. The Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. The
borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid
down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.

As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the

Court takes heed of the guidepost provided by
jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine,
would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering
the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the
erring person." Hence, caution is called for amidst the Court's plenary
power to discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of
three-year suspension against respondent lawyer, with a stem
warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in
this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty.

Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court

reiterates the rule that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court is not
concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for money received
from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order
respondent lawyer to make the payment for the subject jewelry he
pawned, the value of which is yet to be determined in the
appropriate proceeding.

As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The

Investigating Commissioner erred in referring to them as "attorney's
fees"-

There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is

well-settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and
extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to
the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal
services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's
fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by
the losing party as indemnity for damages. On the other hand,
acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely
accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to
represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus,
this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the
client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance
fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer
for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent
of the legal services rendered.

Despite this oversight of the Investigating Commissioner, the Court

affirms the finding that aside from her bare allegations, complainant
failed to present any evidence showing that respondent lawyer
committed abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of cases.
Hence, the Court sees no legal basis for the return of the subject
acceptance fees.
103. Ramos v. Mandagan, A.C. No. 11128, Apr. 6, 2016;

Facts:

In his Complaint, Pedro Ramos alleged that Atty. Maria Nympha C.

Mandagan demanded from him the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) in connection with the criminal case
filed against him for murder before the Sandiganbayan. According to
Ramos, the P300,000.00 shall be used as bail bond in the event that
his petition for bail in the said criminal case is granted. Also, Atty.
Mandagan collected an additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) for operating expenses. In both instances, an
Acknowledgment Receipt was issued in his favor as proof of
payment.

However, Ramos’ petition for bail was denied. Moreover, Atty.

Mandagan withdrew as his counsel without returning the amount of
₱300,000.00 despite the demand sent by Ramos’ counsel.

On December 19, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued an Order directing
Atty. Mandagan to submit her Answer to Ramos’ complaint within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.

In her Answer, Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount of

₱300,000.00 was not intended for payment of bail, but as
mobilization expenses for preparation of witnesses, defenses, and
other documentary exhibits for both Ramos and his co-accused Gary
Silawon. Atty. Mandagan likewise alleged that Ramos never paid her
for acceptance, appearance fees, and legal services rendered in the
entire course of the proceedings until her withdrawal as counsel.

The IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, finding Atty.

Mandagan liable for gross misconduct and for failure to render an
accounting of funds, and recommended that Atty. Mandagan be
suspended for a period of one (1) year. The Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD was adopted and approved by the
IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Mandagan failed to act in accordance with rule

state in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:

Yes. Under Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.

In the present case, Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the

amount of ₱300,000.00 from Ramos. This court cannot give credence
to Atty. Mandagan’s defense that the amount she received from
Ramos was not for bail but merely for mobilization expenses. Records
show that Atty. Mandagan failed to substantiate her claim.

Atty. Mandagan’s failure to make an accounting or to return the

money to Ramos is a violation of the trust reposed on her. As a
lawyer, Atty. Mandagan should be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to her in her professional capacity because the CPR
exacts a high degree of fidelity and trust from members of the bar.
104. Malangas v. Zaide, A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016

Facts:

Complainant, Datu Ismael Malangas, figured in an accident which left

him crippled and bed ridden. He engaged respondent lawyer’s
professional services to prosecute his complaint for damages against
Paul Alfeche and NEMA Electrical and Industrial Sales, Inc. That he
gave P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as filing fee to
commence a P5 million damage suit.

Respondent lawyer furnished him copy of received complaint.

However, he later discovered that his Complaint had been dismissed
by the RTC because of “failure to prosecute,” because the
respondent lawyer did not attend two hearing, and also because he
did not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by NEMA.
He asked respondent lawyer to file a Motion for Reconsideration,
instead, respondent lawyer filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as
counsel leaving him without counsel to prosecute his case. He further
discovered that the amount of damages sought in the Complaint filed
by respondent lawyer was only P250,000.00 and not P5 million, as
stated in the copy of the Complaint given to him.

Complainant instituted verified complaint for disbarment of

respondent lawyer for committing acts of dishonesty, breach of trust,
and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Respondent lawyer
challenged the allegations and denied that he received an acceptance
fee of P20,000.00. That complainant was already an established
client of the law office he was working for. That the complaint which
embodied a prayer for P5 million in damages was maneuvered to
create an impression that he defrauded the complainant. That they
initially agreed that they will not continue the case against NEMA
after the respondent lawyer discovered that NEMA’s car did not in
fact hit complainant.

The IBP Board of Governors approved the recommendation of the

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to suspend Atty. Zaide from
practice of law for 2 years.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of committing dishonesty, breach

of trust and confidence.
Ruling:

Yes. The court finds respondent lawyer guilty of professional

misconduct and of violating Canons 1, 16, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him,

especially his refusal to return the amount paid in excess of what was
required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the
CPR. The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys
entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. Any
lawyer who does not live up to this duty must be prepared to take
the consequences of his waywardness.

Respondent lawyer also violated Rules 18.03 and18.04 of the CPR for
failing to appear at hearings and filing the appropriate pleadings
causing the delay of the case.

The court approved the suspension of Atty. Zaide from practice of

law for 2 years and ordered to return the acceptance fee and docket
fees in the amount of P70,000.0, from which should be deducted the
amount of P2,623.60 paid as docketing fees.
105. Cadavedo v. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, Jan. 15, 2014;

Facts:

Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo acquired a

homestead grant over a 230,765 sq.m. parcel of land in Zamboanga
del Norte in 1953. On 1955, they sold the subject lot to spouses
Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez. Spouses Ames failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price, spoused Cadavedo filed an action
before the RTC and initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo
Bandal, who for health reason was substituted by Atty. Victorino
Lacaya.

The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired

Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis and if they become the
prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of
₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.

The RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The
CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Spouses Ames filed a petition
for review on certiorari to the SC, but it was dismissed for lack of
merit.

On 1981, The RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, and the spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of
the subject lot. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as
attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two
equal portions, and selected the more valuable and productive half
for himself. Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law
entered the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them.
The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before
the Municipal Trial Court.

Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement

(compromise agreement), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained
by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the
agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreement in a
decision dated June 10, 1982.

On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an

action against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved
compromise agreement. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among
others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of
the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an accounting of the
produce of this one-half portion from 1981; and that the RTC fix the
attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of
the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil
cases.

The RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as

excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to
5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore
the remaining 5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo. The CA
reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and maintained the
partition and distribution of the subject lot under the compromise
agreement.

Issues:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting the attorney’s fee consisting

of one-half of the subject lot instead of confirming the agreed
contingent attorney’s fee.

Ruling:

Yes. The agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the

subject lot is void; the petitioners are entitled to recover possession
based on the following reasons:

a. The written agreement providing for a contingent fee of

₱2,000.00 should prevail over the oral agreement providing for
one-half of the subject lot
b. The contingent fee agreement between the spouses Cadavedo
and Atty. Lacaya, awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous
c. The attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is
excessive and unconscionable
d. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
e. The compromise agreement could not validate the void oral
contingent fee agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis. "Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—
is used as basis for determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the
absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors in
fixing the amount of legal fees." "Its essential requisite is the
acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the
services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him
that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid
compensation" for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.

The SC grant the petition with the modification that the respondents,
the spouses, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-
tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The fruits that the
respondents previously received from the disputed one-half portion
shall also form part of the attorney’s fees. The respondents to return
to the petitioners the remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of
the subject lot that Atty. Lacaya acquired pursuant to the
compromise agreement.
106. Dalupan v. Gacott, A.C. No. 5067, Jun. 29, 2015

Facts:

The complainant, Corazon M. Dalupan, claimed that she was a

defendant in a criminal case for grave slander pending before the
MTC of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. That she engaged the legal
services of the respondent, Atty. Glenn C. Gacott, who then charged
the acceptance fee of P10,000.00. That on August 20, 1996, she
gave to the respondent P5,000.00 as initial payment for his
acceptance fee, and the remaining balance was paid on January 31,
1997. That the respondent refuse to issue receipt upon full payment
of his acceptance fee.

Thereafter, the complainant alleged to that the respondent neglected

his duties as counsel and failed to attend any of the hearings before
the MTC. The MTC Judge issued an Order which appointed a counsel
de oficio to represent the complainant.

Aggrieved, the complainant filed the instant complaint for disbarment

against the respondent.

In his comment, the respondent allege that the complainant

approached him and represent herself and her son as an indigent
party in five (5) criminal cases. The respondent agreed to represent
the complainant in the said cases subject to the payment of an
acceptance fee of P5,000.00 per case and an appearance fee of
P500.00 for each court appearance. That the complainant paid
P5,000.00 for his acceptance fee on August 20, 1996. That on August
27, 1996 the complainant threaten to replace the respondent when
he refuse her demand that he negotiate with the MTC Judge to
ensure the grant of the Motion of Bail. That he failed to attend a
scheduled hearing as he allegedly failed to receive a copy of the
Notice of Hearing. That on October 10, 1997, the complainant
terminated the latter’s service on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.

On January 29, 1998, the MTC of Puerto Princesa issued an Order

which relieved the respondent of any responsibility in Criminal cases
of the complainant.
In view of the above Order, the respondent argued that he was not
guilty of abandonment or neglect of duty because it was the
complainant who willfully terminated his services even without fault
or negligence on his part.

The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the complaint for disbarment against the respondent. At
the same time, he recommended that the respondent return the
payment of the attorney’s fee to the complainant in the amount of
P5,000.00. The IBP Board of Governors passes Resolution which
adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondent should return the payment of the

attorney’s fee to the complainant in the amount of ₱5,000.00

Ruling:

No. The Investigating Commissioner seriously erred in referring to

the amount to be returned by the respondent as attorney’s fee.
Relevantly, we agree with the respondent that there is a distinction
between attorney’s fee and acceptance fee.

It is well-settled that attorney’s fee is understood both in its ordinary

and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fee refers
to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for
legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, attorney’s fee is
awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the
losing party as indemnity for damages.

On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by

the lawyer for merely accepting the case. Once the lawyer agrees to
represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Since
the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost
opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal
services rendered. And the respondent did not commit any fault or
negligence which would entail the return of the acceptance fee.
107. Penilla v. Alcid, A.C. No. 9149, Sep 4, 2013;

Facts:

Complainant, Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses

Rey and Evelyn Garin for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile.
Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation. The
complainant decided to file a case against the spouses and he
engaged the services of respondent, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., as
counsel.

Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses for the refund of

complainant’s payment. When the spouses failed to return the
payment, respondent advised complainant that he would file a
criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged
₱30,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as filing fees. Respondent
then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose
C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
estafa case against the spouses was dismissed. The motion was
denied for lack of merit.

Respondent presented the option of filing a civil case for specific

performance against the spouses for the refund of the money plus
damages. Complainant paid an additional ₱10,000 to respondent
which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant
signed the complaint, he claims that respondent never gave him any
update thereafter.

Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful

attempts to follow-up the status of the case and meet with
respondent at his office. He even sought the assistance of the radion
program “Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga” to solve his predicament.

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant
administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of gross
misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative
sanctions to be imposed.

In an Answer filed, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for

lack of merit. He denied charging complainant ₱10,000 as filing fees
for the estafa case and claimed that he charged and received only
₱2,000. He also countered that the payment of ₱30,000 made by the
complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil
case. Respondent likewise denied the other allegations of
complainant.

Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his

part when he failed to inform petitioner of the status of the case. In
fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of
complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating with
complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his office
during days and times that he would be attending his daily court
hearings.

In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD recommended the

suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months "for
negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP-BOG issued
resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Ruling:

Yes. The court sustained the findings of the IBP that respondent
committed professional negligence under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that
they also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03
of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.

A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar

shows that respondent violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly
alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to "serve
his client with competence and diligence" when respondent filed a
criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have
warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. After the
complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another
similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and
damages before the RTC. The complaint should have been filed with
the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over complainant’s
claim which amounts to only ₱36,000.

After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was
plainly negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and
progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention
and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite repeated
follow-ups. Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in
handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with
complainant is also gross and inexcusable.
108. Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, Feb. 17, 2014;

Facts:

The court expressed its alarm that the case is the fifth suit to reach
the Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto
respecting four real properties that had belonged to Filemon’s estate.

The first case (Matilde S. Palicte v. Hon. Jose O. Ramolete, et al.)

held that herein respondent Matilde S. Palicte, one of four declared
heirs of Filemon, had validly redeemed the four properties pursuant
to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the title
over the four properties transferred to her name, subject to the right
of the three other declared heirs to join her in the redemption of the
four properties within a period of six months.

The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde to
annul the former's waiver of rights, and to restore her as a co-
redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four properties.

The third was the suit brought by the heirs of Carmen Rallos against
the Estate of Sotto, wherein the heirs of Miguel belatedly filed a
motion for reconsideration praying that they be still included as
Matilde's co-redemptioners.

The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto, represented by

its duly designated Administrator, Sixto Sotto Pahang, Jr. v. Matilde
S. Palicte, et al. whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling
rendered by the probate court in Cebu City in Special Proceedings
entitled Intestate Estate of the Deceased Don Filemon Sotto denying
the administrator's motion to require Matilde to turn over the four
real properties to the Estate of Sotto.

The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the
previous cases did not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their
being the successors-in-interest of two of the declared heirs of
Filemon who had been parties in the previous cases either directly or
in privity. They now pray that the Court undo the decision
promulgated on November 29, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) declared their action for the partition of the four properties as
already barred by the judgments previously rendered, and the
resolution promulgated denying their motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mahinay submitted a so-called Compliance (With Humble Motion
for Reconsideration) containing his explanations, praying that he not
be sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping, 

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay,

committed forum shopping.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the

actions was the return of the properties to the Estate in order that
such properties would be partitioned among the heirs. In the other
cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because Palicte’s
right in the properties had been declared exclusive. The Court saw
through the petitioners’ “ploy to countermand the previous decisions’
sustaining Palicte’s rights over the properties.”

Atty. Mahinay asserts good faith in the filing of cases and he points
out that an associate lawyer in his law office prepared and filed the
complaint without his law firm being yet familiar with the incidents in
the intestate proceedings involving the Estate.

Even assuming that Atty. Mahinay did not himself prepare the
complaint, it remains that he subsequently personally handled the
case. In so doing, he had sufficient time to still become fully
acquainted with the previous cases and thereby learn in due course
that the complaint was nothing but a replication of the other cases
and bound to have his clients desist from pursuing the case. Instaed,
he opted to re-litigate the same issues all the way up to Supreme
Court.

The Court finds and pronounces Atty. Mahinay guilty of forum

shopping and order him to pay a fine of P2,000.00.
109. Figueras v. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116, Mar. 12, 2014;

Facts:

Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit against

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. for building a
concrete wall which abutted their property. The Law Firm of Gonzales
Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the
Association, with respondent Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez, as the
counsel of record and handling lawyer. RTC ruled in favor of the
Spouses Santander. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that
the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days
even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief
was filed.

Eight years later, complainants Nestor B. Figueras and Bienvenido

Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline for violation of the CPR for his negligence in handling the
appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer, respondent denied administrative liability. He

claimed that the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer,
and as the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general
supervision and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling
lawyer. That the disbarment case was filed to harass him as he
defeated complainant Figueras in election for President of the
homeowner’s association. That the complainants have no personality
to file the complaint as they were not his clients.

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent

liable for violation of the CPR, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12;
Canon 17; and Rule 18.08, Canon 18, and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

The Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution adoping the

recommendation with modifications that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six months, the warning
imposed against respondent is deleted.
Issues:

Whether or not the IBP correctly found the respondent

administratively liable for violation of the CPR.

Ruling:

Yes. The court finds that the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law is proper.

The court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainats

have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they
were not his clients. The procedural requirement observed in
ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must
initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. The right to
institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public
interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in
the performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village
Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed
the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days
after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus
causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the

responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence.
In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case
and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the same Code also states that:

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos the Court considered a lawyer’s

failure to file brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable
negligence.

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney

should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. The penalties for a lawyer’s
failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand, warning
with fine, suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment. In the present
case, the court finds the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six months too harsh. Under the circumstances, they
deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice of
law to be more commensurate with the extent of respondent’s
violation, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
violation shall be dealt with more severely.
110. Baens v. Sempio, A.C. No. 10378, Jun. 9, 2014;

Facts:

A complaint seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Jonathan T.

Sempio for violation of Canons 15, 17, 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR), commenced thru a complaint-
affidavit filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by complainant Jose Francisco T. Baens.

Complainant engaged the services of respondent to represent him

and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife.
In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant alleged, among others,
that the respondent: (1) despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to
cover for the expenses in the said case, failed to file the
corresponding petition, and it was the complainant’s wife who
successfully instituted the Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage; (2) belatedly filed an Answer in the Summons; (3) failed to
make an objection on the petition on the ground of improper venue;
(4) never bothered to check the status of the case and thus failed to
discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as a
result, the Civil Case was decided without the complainant being able
to present his evidence.

In his Answer, the respondent denied the allegations in the

complaint, and explained that: (1) after a meeting with the
complainant, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and asked the complainant to go over said draft after which
he proceeded to file the same with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon City; (2) the complainant was aware that said petition will
be filed in Malabon City as the latter had signed the verification and
certification of the petition; (3) the case became pending and was
later on withdrawn because of the complainant’s refusal to testify;
(4) what contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the fact
that he still had to let the complainant go over the same and sign the
verification thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for
the case because he did not receive any notice from the trial court.

The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and

Recommendation, finding the respondent guilty of violation of the
Code and recommended that the respondent be suspended for six
(6) months from the practice of law. Specifically, the Investigating
Commissioner found that the respondent failed to diligently attend to
the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his responsibilities
considering the fact that he has already been fully compensated.

The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the

Investigating Commissioner’s report but deemed it proper to increase
the recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to one
(1) year. The IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of the resolution and
the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent is liable for violation of Canon 15, 17, 18

and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

Yes. Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his

lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty to his client as embodied in
Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession.

In this case, the respondent’s reckless and inexcusable negligence

deprived his client of due process and his actions were evidently
prejudicial to his clients’ interests. A lawyer’s duty of competence and
diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his
care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending
scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch,
and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or
the court.

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17,

and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that
"a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle
the complainant’s case, he became duty-bound to serve his client
with competence and diligence, and to champion his cause with
whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy
and defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell short of
what is expected of him as an officer of the Court.

The Court affirms with modification the Resolution of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD. The Court
suspends Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for six
(6) months.
111. Foronda v. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9976, Jun. 25, 2014;

Facts:

Complainant Almira C. Foronda is an overseas Filipino worker in

Dubai. In May 2008, she returned to the Philippines to institute a
case for the nullification of her marriage. The respondent Atty. Jose
L. Alvarez, Jr., was referred to her and the complainant agreed to
engage his services for a fee of ₱195,000.00. The complainant
averred that the respondent promised to file the petition after he
received the full payment of his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008.
Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition
and found out that it was filed only on July 16, 2009.

The complainant further alleged that the respondent invited her to

invest ₱200,000.00 in a lending business which he said can earn five
percent (5%) interest per month. The complainant agreed on the
condition that the respondent shall issue post-dated checks in her
favor representing the five percent (5%) interest that the
complainant’s money shall earn. According to the complainant, upon
presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank honored the first two
(2) checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn against a
closed account. The respondent paid her certain amounts in cash
instead through her representative. Thereafter, the respondent
issued eight (8) Banco de Oro (BDO)checks as replacement for the
dishonored UCPB checks. However, the BDO checks were likewise
dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.

In his answer, the respondent admitted that he filed the petition for
annulment only in July 2009 but this was not due to his own fault.
The delay was caused by the complainant herself who allegedly
instructed him to hold the filing of the said petition as she and her
husband were discussing a possible reconciliation. The respondent
also admitted that he invited the complainant to be a partner in a
lending business. He stated that prior to the presentment and
dishonor of the rest of the UCPB checks, he advised the complainant
that the third check should not be deposited just yet due to losses in
their lending business caused by the failure of some borrowers to
settle their obligations.

The Investigating Commissioner reported that there was basis to hold

the respondent guilty of violating Canons 15, 17, Rule 18.04, and
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby,
recommended the penalty of two years suspension from the practice
of law with a warning that a repetition of the offenses shall merit a
heavier penalty. The BOG of the IBP adopted and approved with
modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It
directed the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law
for one year with warning that repetition of the similar conduct shall
be dealt with more severely.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent is liable for violation of Canon Canons

15, 17, Rule 18.04, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

Ruling:

Yes. The respondent gave out different reasons for the delay in an
attempt to exculpate himself show his lack of candor in his dealings
with the complainant is a violation of Canon 15 and Rule 18.04.

Anent the ₱200,000.00 which was received by the respondent from

the complainant, the respondent argued that it was a loan and not
really meant to be the latter’s investment in any money-lending
business. Violation of Rule 16.04.

The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule

1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." "[T]he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action," violation of Canon 17.

The Court finds that the respondent is liable for violation of Canons
15, 17, Rule 18.04, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Likewise, he is also liable under Rule 1.01.

In the instant case, the respondent was able to file, albeit belatedly,
the complainant's petition. In addition, he returned in full the money
he received as attorney's fee in spite of having gone through all the
trouble of preparing the required petition and in filing the same - not
to mention the cost he incurred for the purpose. The Court finds that
the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is
commensurate, with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the
infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall
merit a heavier penalty.
112. Layos v. Villanueva, A.C. No. 8085, Dec. 1, 2014;

Facts:

Complainant Felipe Layos charged respondent Atty. Marlito I.

Villanueva of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the lawyer's oath for neglecting the interests of his client.

In the Sumbong, it was alleged that respondent is complainant's

counsel of record in Criminal Case pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24 (RTC), wherein the former's
constant failure to appear during court hearings resulted in the RTC's
issuance of an Order waiving the defense’s right to cross-examine a
prosecution witness. Respondent remained absent and, complainant
was only able to move for reconsideration, thru respondent, only four
(4) years later, which was. Complainant, also thru respondent, filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).The CA
dismissed the petition on the merits. The CA likewise chastised
respondent for his "lack of candidness and fervor on [his part] to
champion the cause" of his client, considering that, inter alia: (a)
respondent never bothered to know the outcome of the hearings
where he was absent from; (b) it took respondent a long amount of
time before moving to reconsider the RTC’s Order; and (c)
respondent never questioned the appearances of other lawyers as
complainant’s counsel during his absence.

In a Report and Recommendation, the (IBP) Commissioner found

respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. The IBP Commissioner found that respondent failed in his
duty as counsel to serve complainant’s interests with competence
and diligence by neglecting the latter’s criminal case which was
pending before the RTC. In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
(IBP Board) unanimously adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, and hence, upheld
respondent’s recommended penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months for negligence in the
performance of his legal duty to complainant.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for

the acts complained of.
Ruling:

Yes. Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to serve his client’s interest with utmost
zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast of all the
developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the
same, as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence.

In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002
hearing due to car trouble, respondent no longer kept track of
complainant’s criminal case and merely assumed that the same was
already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when
respondent finally knew that the case was still on-going, he attended
the hearing, and discovered the RTC’s issuance of Order which is
prejudicial to complainant’s cause. Despite such alarming
developments, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to
further the interests of his client. The RTC and the CA denied the
motion for being filed way beyond the reglementary period, to the
detriment of complainant. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment.

While the Court agrees that respondent should be held

administratively liable for the foregoing acts and thus, must be
suspended from the practice of law, it nevertheless deems that the
IBP’s recommended period of suspension of six (6) months is too
harsh a penalty. Accordingly, he is suspended from the practice of
law for three (3) months, and is sternly that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
113. Tejano v. Baterina, A.C. No. 8235, Jan. 27, 2015;

Facts:

Complainant, Joselito F. Tejano filed a Complaint against his counsel,

Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina, at the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) of the Supreme Court. The case stems from a suit for recovery
of possession and damages filed by Tejano against the Province of
Ilocos Sur for construction an access road in their property without
instituting the proper expropriation proceedings.

Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina miserably failed to advance his

cause. That Atty. Baterina (1) ) failed to object when the trial court
pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had waived their right to
present evidence; (2) failed to file a motion for; (3) declared in open
court that they would not be presenting any witnesses without
consulting his clients; and (4) failed to comply with the trial court’s
order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.

Atty. Baterina failed to file a Comment on the complaint, was ordred

to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with.

In his compliance, Atty Baterina explained that he had been

recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received the
complaint. He also denied the allegations of bad faith and negligence,
that he could not attend to the case because he was suspended from
the practice of law for two years.

The Court in its Resolution, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not

satisfactory ,” and referred the case to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. The IBP adopt and approve the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
Respondent is guilty of gross negligence and is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Baterina is guilty of gross negligence.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with
modification as to the penalty.

The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of

lawyers states:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a

commitment to exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.
He is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend
to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly
stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the
case becomes final and executory.”

Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his
suspension. At the very least, such suspension gave him a
concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be
unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another
counsel.

His failure to file the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf

constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and renders him subject to disciplinary action.

Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives

of the courts is unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has
shown that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even
for the Court’s disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow the
trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded court
orders in his own disciplinary proceedings.

Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple

explanation to the Court would have sufficed. Instead, however, he
simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly
called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves
officers of the court.” As such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which
should be complied with promptly and completely.”

The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for
two years after being found guilty of gross misconduct.

The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina’s “repeated

failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court requiring him to
comment on the complaint [which] indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility tantamount to willful disobedience to the lawful orders
of the Supreme Court.”

These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of

neglecting his duty to his clients, as well as a propensity for
disrespecting the authority of the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is
unacceptable and will not be tolerated among the members of the
Bar. For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty.
Baterina a longer suspension period of five (5) years.

He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a

similar offense will be dealt with more severely.