supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of

appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs

that towed it. In the ordinary course of events, such a thing
does not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American
Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the
“res ipsa loquitur” rule.

VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 279 Same; Meaning of “caso fortuito” or “force majeure”. —
Caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in
Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition
are extra-ordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
No. L-21749. September 29, 1967. “events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable” (Art. 1174, Civil Code). It is, therefore, not
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, enough that the event could not have been foreseen or
vs. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
defendant-appellant. impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same: “un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por la sola
Remedial law; Appeals; Effect of direct appeal to
circunstancia de que su existencia haga mas dificil o mas
Supreme Court,—The established rule in this jurisdiction is
onerosa la accion diligente del presento ofensor.”
that when a party appeals directly to the Supreme Court,
and submits his case there for decision, he is deemed to have Evidence; Reception of additional evidence is
waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the discretionary with trial judge.—Whether or not further
trial court. The only questions that may be raised are those evidence will be allowed after a party offering the evidence
of law. has rested his case lies within the sound discretion of the
trial Judge, and this discretion will not be reviewed except in
Same; Effect of appeal to Court of Appeals; Reason for the
clear case of abuse.
rule.—A party who resorts to the Court of Appeals, and
submits his case for decision there, is barred from contending
280
later that his claim was beyond the jurisdiction of the
aforesaid Court. The reason is that a contrary rule would
encourage the undesirable practice of appellants' submitting 280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
their cases for decision to either court in expectation of Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its
jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance
Civil law; Damages; Presumption of negligence; Case at of Manila.
bar—Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
provided with adequate openings for the passage of water      Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
craft, including barges like those of appellant's, it is           H. San Luis and L.V. Simbulan for defendant-
undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, appellant.
exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge
REYES, J.B.L., J.: VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 281
Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
The present case comes by direct appeal from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case
No. 44572) adjudging the defendant-appellant, Luzon Defendant appealed directly to this Court assigning
Stevedoring Corporation, liable in damages to the the following errors allegedly committed by the court a
plaintiffappellee Republic of the Philippines. quo, to wit:
In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-
I —The lower court erred in not holding that the
1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
herein defendant-appellant had exercised the
was being towed down 1 the Pasig river by tugboats
diligence required of it in the selection and
“Bangus” and “Barbero” also belonging to the same
supervision of its personnel to prevent damage
corporation, when the barge rammed against one of the
or injury to others.
wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing
the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at II —The lower court erred in not holding that the
the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account ramming of the Nagtahan bailey bridge by
of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding barge L-1892 was caused by force majeure.
provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960. III —The lower court erred in not holding that the
Sued by the Republic of the Philippines for actual Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction, if not
and consequential damage caused by its employees, a menace, to navigation in the Pasig river.
amounting to P200,000 (Civil Case No. 44562, CFI of IV —The lower court erred in not blaming the
Manila), defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation damage sustained by the Nagtahan bailey
disclaimed liability therefor, on the grounds that it had bridge to the improper placement of the
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision dolphins.
of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were V —The lower court erred in granting plaintiff's
caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity motion to adduce further evidence in chief after
to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an it has rested its case.
obstruction to navigation.
VI —The lower court erred in finding the plaintiff
After due trial, the court rendered judgment on
entitled to the amount of P192.561.72 for
June 11, 1963, holding the defendant liable for the
damages which is clearly exorbitant and
damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay
without any factual basis.
to plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the
Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to
However, it must be recalled that the established rule
P192,561.72, with legal interest thereon from the date
in this jurisdiction is that when a party appeals
of the filing of the complaint.
directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case
there for decision, he is deemed to have waived the
_______________
right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial
1 The lead-tugboat “Bangus” was pulling the barge, while the Court. The only questions that may be raised are those
tugboat “Barbero” was holding or restraining it at the back. of law (Savellano vs. Diaz L-17441, July 31, 1963;
Aballe vs. Santiago, L16307, April 30, 1963; G.S.I.S.
281 vs. Cloribel, L-22236, June 22, 1965). A converso, a
party who resorts to the Court of Appeals, and submits manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the
his case for decision there, is barred from contending ordinary course of events, such a thing does not
later that his claim was beyond the jurisdiction of the happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American
aforesaid Court. The reason is that a contrary rule Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known
would encourage the undesirable practice of as the “res ipsa loquitur’’ rule (Scott vs. London Docks
appellants' submitting their cases for decision to either Co., 2 H & C 596; San Juan Light & Transit Co. vs.
court in expectation of favorable judgment, but with Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. Ed., 680; Whitwell vs.
intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision Wolf, 127 Minn. 529, 149 N.W. 299; Bryne vs. Great
be unfavorable (Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 269 Mass. 130; 168 N.E.
Compania de Seguros) et al., L-10096, Res. on Motion 540; Gribsby vs. Smith, 146 S.W. 2d 719).
to Reconsider, March 23, 1966). Consequently, we are The appellant strongly stresses the precautions
limited in this appeal to the issues of law raised in the taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned two
appellant's brief. of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its
barge L1892; that it assigned to the task the more
282
competent and experienced among its patrons, had the
towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED inspected; that it instructed its patrons to take extra
precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was
Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be
held due to force majeure or fortuitous event.
Taking the aforesaid rules into account, it can be seen These very precautions, however, completely
that the only reviewable issues in this appeal are destroy the appellant’s defense. For caso fortuito or
reduced to two : force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as
2
they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition,
1) Whether or not the collision of appellant's
are extraordinary
barge with the supports or piers of the
Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure, and ________________

2) Whether or not it was error for the Court to 2 Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 661.
have permitted the plaintiff-appellee to
introduce additional evidence of damages after 283
said party had rested its case.
VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 283
As to the first question, considering that the Nagtahan
bridge was an immovable and stationary object and Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for
the passage of water craft, including barges like of events not foreseeable or avoidable, “events that could
appellant’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, inevitable” (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It
rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of is, therefore, not enough that the event should not
negligence on the part of appellant or its employees have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is 284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
not impossibility to foresee the same: “un hecho no
constituye caso fortuito por la sola eircunstancia de Philippine Amusement Enterprises, Inc. vs. Natividad
que su existencia haga mas dificil o mas onerosa la
accion diligente del presento ofensor” (Peirano Facio, the evidence has rested his case, lies within the sound
Responsabilidad Extra-contractual, p. 465; Mazeaud, discretion of the trial Judge, and this discretion
3
will
Trait de la Responsabilite Civil, Vol. 2, see. 1569), The not be reviewed except in clear case of abuse.
very measures adopted by appellant prove that the In the present case, no abuse of that discretion is
possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but shown. What was allowed to be introduced, after
actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito. plaintiff had rested its evidence in chief, were vouchers
Otherwise stated, the appellant, Luzon Stevedoring and papers to support an item of Pl,558.00 allegedly
Corporation, knowing and appreciating the perils spent for the reinforcement of the panel of the bailey
posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, bridge, and which item already appeared in Exhibit
voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious GG. Appellant, in fact, has no reason to charge the
danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed trial court of being unfair, because it was also able to
responsibility merely because the precautions it secure, upon written motion, a similar order dated
adopted turned out to be insufficient. Hence, the lower November 24, 1962, allowing reception 4of additional
Court committed no error in holding it negligent in not evidence for the said defendant-appellant.
suspending operations and in holding it liable for the WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of
damages caused. the lower Court appealed from, the same is hereby
It avails the appellant naught to argue that the affirmed. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
dolphins, like the bridge, were improperly located.
Even if true, these circumstances would merely      Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
emphasize the need of even higher degree of care on Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
appellant’s part in the situation involved in the present      Bengzon, J.P. J., on leave, did not take part.
case. The appellant, whose barges and tugs travel up
Order affirmed.
and down the river everyday, could not safely ignore
the danger posed by these allegedly improper Note.—On the question of abuse of discretion, see
constructions that had been erected and, in place, for Chieng Hung v. Tam Teng, L-21209, September 27,
years. 1961, ante, and the notes thereunder.
On the second point: appellant charges the lower
court with having abused its discretion in the __________________
admission of plaintiff’s additional evidence after the
latter had rested its case. There is an insinuation that
the delay was deliberate to enable the manipulation of
evidence to prejudice defendant-appellant.
We find no merit in the contention. Whether or not
further evidence will be allowed after a party offering
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284