G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995 Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila.

They are impleaded as alternative

defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer of defendant
BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by
children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant
Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the
Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84,
incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents. 3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while
he was on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang
BIDIN, J.:
Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or
of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as
the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, Annex A);
and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
motion for reconsideration.
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the
duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. injury.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon xxx xxx xxx
Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on
February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein (Rollo, pp. 117-118)
private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged
and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch
employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge
Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
Teodoro Regino.
1. . . .
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of
(Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was
(Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting
accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers
was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp.
64 and 98).
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno
Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages
and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the
one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting
applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as
In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts
complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that
liability (Rollo, p. 55-59). the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge
ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as
(private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such
defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its
negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge
employees (Rollo, p. 96).
also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion
New Civil Code, which provides: of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law
is responsible. on the matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the
complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security
xxx xxx xxx Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners'
though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry. motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.
xxx xxx xxx Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-
(Emphasis supplied) delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are
intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus,
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes
under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified
by the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely
selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of
the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks,
action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of the the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
We find for petitioners.
Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of
respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for
trial. the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also
actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit: Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
action prior to the criminal action.
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Emphasis supplied) Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
which provides:
(Emphasis supplied)
Rule 111. . . . .
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In the cases prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what
brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict
supplied) and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence.
What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to
the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243
2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show
that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate
damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis
Chapter.
supplied
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill
the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
(77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages
[1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
(Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra),
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration
was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action
of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
based on Article 33 lies.
may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint
Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant
beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough
established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay
directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was
the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private
[1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the
(Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in
their employee. mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are
done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA,
intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial
supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by
court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust
sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that the allegations in a Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27
action exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or evidence of such injury.
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v.
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar,
trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
218 SCRA 118 [1993])
SO ORDERED.