G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 in Bacolod City.

in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees
MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
DAVIDE, JR., J.: and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
the Civil Code of the Philippines. respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her
The antecedents of this case are not complicated: to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they upon, to wit:
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then 1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic)
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a the present;
virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live (sic) high school graduate;
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision,
plaintiff on August 3, 1986. digested by the respondent Court as follows:

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads: and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20,
1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages. family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs. proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
3. All other claims are denied.6 stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they
were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and
a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant,
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of
pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first
the forthcoming wedding. 8 proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City.
following analysis: First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be
not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising,
a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to
to satisfy his lust on her.
trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
and then concluded:
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise
the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and
plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to
the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13 overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case.
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for the result of the case.
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim
Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and
concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he xxx xxx xxx
does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial
"common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
actionable. contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
the trial and appellate courts must be respected. been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age.
And now to the legal issue.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Civil Code, from which We quote:
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in statutes.
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
of the American states. . . . 19 negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
punish in the statute books. 20 aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common
law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence
of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
the latter for the damage.
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo- . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
American law on torts. seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner,
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good in the said case:
customs or public policy.
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
the seduction. some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied And in American Jurisprudence we find:
recovery of damages to the woman because:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
insufficient to warrant a recovery. damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses
desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662) notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
xxx xxx xxx
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the complaint. We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him,
who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
recovered:
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any
due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own
doing, 33 for:
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988)
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN,
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
fraud.
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It
is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into Phil. 209).
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent,
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be higher values of morality and dignity.
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
his rights and in the performance of his obligations. SO ORDERED.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal