1.

Laurel v Desierto  Senator Coseteng’s speech was referred to the Committee on

Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The
Topic: The Concept of Public Office
Blue Ribbon Committee) for investigation.
DOCTRINE: Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of
 President Estrada created an independent citizens’
some of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most
committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public
surrounding the Philippine centennial projects.
office or not.
4) Among the Committee's recommendations was the prosecution
FACTS:
by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Laurel for:
1) President Corazon Aquino issued (June 1991) AO No. 223
 violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award
"constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National
of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
Centennial Celebration in 1998."
Development Corp.);
 The Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide
 for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
(Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and
Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused
the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress
material injury to government and
 This was later renamed by Pres. Ramos as the National
 for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of
Centennial Commission (NCC)
the funds infused by the government for the
 Petitioner VP Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of implementation of the said contracts all in violation . . . of
the NCC the anti-graft law."
2) Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial 5) The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Saguisag
Expo '98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Petitioner was committee both recommended filing a complaint with the
among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its Ombudsman against Laurel, former EXPOCORP President
first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Teodoro Q. Peña and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles
Executive Officer
 for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as
3) Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and
in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction Regulations
and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark
6) Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the
Special Economic Zone.
ground that he is not a public officer
1
ISSUE: W/N Laurel was a public officer - YES ○ Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of
some of the sovereign functions of government as
HELD: YES
"[t]he most important characteristic" in determining
○ The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his whether a position is a public office or not.
Deputies as "protectors of the people," who "shall act
○ We hold that the NCC performs executive functions.
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
The executive power "is generally defined as the
against public officials or employees of the
power to enforce and administer the laws.
government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned ○ The NCC was precisely created to execute the
or controlled corporations foregoing policies and objectives, - to carry them
into effect.
○ In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate
any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a ○ It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive
public officer or employee of the government, or of power is vested, created the NCC by executive order
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
○ That petitioner allegedly did not receive any
including government-owned or controlled
compensation during his tenure is of little
corporations.
consequence.
○ Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of
○ A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
1989, however, defines who public officers are.
determining the nature of the position. It is not
○ A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on part of the office.
the subject:
○ Neither does the fact that it was an adhoc body make it
■ A public office is the right, authority and any less of a public office
duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
■ this element of continuance cannot be
for a given period, either fixed by law or
considered as indispensable, for, if the other
enduring at the pleasure of the creating
elements are present "it can make no
power, an individual is invested with some
difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there
portion of the sovereign functions of the
be but one act or a series of acts to be done, —
government, to be exercised by him for the
whether the office expires as soon as the one
benefit of the public. The individual so invested
is a public officer
2
 act is done, or is to be held for years or ○ This was denied by the Undersecretary in a letter dated 4
during good behavior September 2002 on the ground that a specific timeframe
had been set for the activity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary
injunction issued in the Court's Resolution dated September 24, 2001 4) VFP argued that it is a private non-government organization.
is hereby LIFTED.
5) To support its argument, it contended:
SO ORDERED.
○ (1) that it does not possess the elements of a public office,
Definition: Committee formed for a specific task or objective, and particularly the possession/delegation of a portion of
dissolved after the completion of the task or achievement of the sovereign power of government
objective.
○ (2) that its funds are not public funds because it receives
Veterans Federation of the Philippines v Reyes no government funds as its funds come from
membership dues, and the lease rentals;
Topic: Concept of Public Office
○ (3) that it retains its essential character as a private,
FACTS:
civilian federation of veterans voluntarily formed by the
1) The Veterans Federation of the Philippines was created under veterans themselves where membership is voluntary and
Rep. Act No. 2640. is governed by the Labor Code and SSS law;
2) Sometime in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from ○ (4) that the Administrative Code of 1987 does not provide
Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) that the VFP is an attached agency
3) The DND assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 entitled, ○ (5) that the Department of Budget and Management
"Further Implementing the Provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of declared that the VFP is a non-government organization
Republic Act No. 2640. and issued a certificate that the VFP has not been a
○ Pursuant to the said Circular, the DND sought to audit direct recipient of any funds released by the DBM.
VFP. 6) Petitioner thus filed this Petition for Certiorari w/ Prohibition
○ The VFP complained about the alleged broadness of the under Rule 65, praying for the following reliefs:
scope of the management audit and requested its 1. For this Court to issue a TRO and a writ of preliminary
suspension. prohibitory and mandatory injunction to enjoin respondent
Secretary and all those acting under his discretion and
authority from:
a. implementing DND Department Circular No. 04; and
3
 b. continuing with the ongoing management audit of power to conduct an extensive management audit of
petitioner’s books of account; VFP.
2. After hearing the issues on notice –
o Under Executive Order No. 37 dated 2 December 1992,
a. Declare DND Department Circular No. 04 as null and
the VFP was listed as among the government-owned and
void for being ultra vires;
controlled corporations that will not be privatized.
b. Convert the writ of prohibition, preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction into a permanent one. o In Ang Bagong Bayani — OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, 21 this Court held in a minute resolution
ISSUE:
that the "VFP is an adjunct of the government, as it is
Main Issue: W/N the Veterans Federation of the Philippines is a merely an incarnation of the Veterans Federation of the
private corporation? - NO Philippines.
Sub Issues: The functions of the VFP are executive functions
● W/N the challenged department circular passed in the valid ● The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
exercise of the respondent Secretary’s "control and of government is "[t]he most important characteristic" in
supervision."-YES determining whether a position is a public office or not.
● W/N the challenged department circular validly lay standards ● In several cases, the Court has dealt with this issue which deals
classifying the VFP, an essentially civilian organization, within with activities not immediately apparent to be sovereign
the ambit of statutes only applying to government entities. functions.
● W/N the department circular unduly encroached on the ● It upheld the public sovereign nature of operations needed
prerogatives of VFP’s governing body. - NO either to promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic
HELD/RATIO: sentiments and love of country

● The Court ruled the following: ● IN THE CASE AT BAR: the functions of the VFP fall within
the category of sovereign functions. The protection of the
o Assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 does not interests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social
supplant nor modify and is, on the contrary, perfectly in justice, but is also intended to reward patriotism.
consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640;
● The functions of the VFP are executive functions to provide
o That VFP is a public corporation. As such, it can be immediate and adequate care , benefits and other forms of
placed under the control and supervision of the assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns,
Secretary of National Defense, who consequently has the their surviving spouses and orphans.
4
 - Hence, placing it under the control and
supervision of DND is proper
The Administrative Code did not repeal or modify RA 2640
VFP funds are public funds
● The Administrative Code, by giving definitions of the various
● The fact that no budgetary appropriations have been released to the entities covered by it, acknowledges that its enumeration is not
VFP by the DBM does not prove that it is a private corporation. exclusive.
o Assuming that the DBM believed that the VFP is a private ● The Administrative Code could not be said to have repealed nor
corporation, it is an accepted principle that the enormously modified RA 2640 by implication, as such repeal or
erroneous application of the law by public officers does enormous modification by implication is not favored in statutory
not bar a subsequent correct application of the law. construction.

● The funds in the hands of the VFP from whatever source are
public funds and can be used only for public purposes.
DBM opinion is not persuasive
● As the Court ruled in Republic v. COCO FED, "(e)ven if the
● VFP’s claim that the supposed declaration of the DBM that
money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special
petitioner is a non-government organization is not
means, it is still public in character." There is nothing wrong,
persuasive since DBM is not a quasi-judicial agency. The
whether legally or morally, from raising revenues through
persuasiveness of the DBM opinion has, however, been
non-traditional methods.
overcome by all the previous explanations we have laid so far.
Membership of the VFP is not the individual membership of the
The fate of Department Circular No. 04
affiliate organizations
● The Court has defined the power of control as "the power of
● VFP claims that the Secretary of National Defense "historically
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
did not indulge in the direct or ‘micromanagement’ of the VFP.
subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to
This reliance of petitioner on what has "historically" been done is
substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter." 
erroneous, since laws are not repealed by disuse, custom, or
practice to the contrary. (1st sub issue) ● The power of supervision, on the other hand, means
"overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that
● Neither is the civilian nature of VFP relevant because the
subordinate officers perform their duties."
Constitution does not contain any prohibition against the grant
of control and/or supervision to the Secretary of National ● Since the Court has also previously determined that VFP funds
Defense over a civilian organization. are public funds, there is likewise no reason to declare this
provision invalid.
5
 o Having in their possession public funds, the officers of 4) Santos’s demand for the revocation of respondent Tionco's
the VFP, especially its fiscal officers, must indeed appointment and payment to him of salary differentials was
share in the fiscal responsibility to the greatest extent. rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor.
5) From the foregoing events, stemmed the present petition for
mandamus three days before Santos actually retired from
service.
6) The petition prays, that respondents (Tiongco & Secretary of
3. SANTOS v SEC OF LABOR Labor)
Topic: Characteristics of Public Office  be commanded to nullify the appointment of Tiongco,
and
FACTS:
 to uphold as legal and existing Santos’s appointment as
1) Santos was employed as Labor Conciliator I of Regional Office
Labor Conciliator II from September 1, 1960
No. 4 of the Department of Labor.
 and that the salary differentials aforesaid be paid Santos.
 His monthly pay was P3,108 per annum.
7) Before the case could be tried on the merits, Santos died.
2) Santos was promoted as Labor Conciliator II at Regional
Office No. 3, Manila  A motion to substitute the "Estate of Segundo Santos,
deceased" represented by Rodolfo Santos, one of the heirs,
 with compensation per annum of P3,493, substituting the
was filed.
resigned Juan Mendoza, Jr.
8) This triggered a move on respondents' part to seek dismissal of
 This appointment, effective September 1, 1960, was
the case.
approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May
14, 1962, and released to the Department of Labor on 9) RTC: dismissed the petition without costs. Hence, this appeal on
May 25, 1962. purely questions of law.
3) In June of 1962, the Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo ISSUE: W/N Segundo Santos may be substituted by The Estate of
Tiongco, one of the respondents, to the same position of Labor the deceased Segundo Santos?
Conciliator II.
YES. However, the general rule is no.
HELD:

6
● GR: Public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent Service on May 14, 1962, and released to the Department
or appointee. of Labor on May 25, 1962.
 In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. ● Santos’s right to salary differentials and the duty to pay him are both
None of the heirs may replace him in that position. clear and vested
● It is in this general rule that we say that the Estate of the deceased ● Civil Service approval completed Santos’s appointment.
Segundo Santos may not press Santos' claim that he be allowed
to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II because Actio
personalis moritur cum persona (a personal right of action dies
with the person).
● HOWEVER the EXCEPTION is that, the jurisdiction of the court
had attached before the death of Santos.
 That jurisdiction CONTINUES until the termination of
the suit.
 It is true that what is left is a money claim for salary
differentials but death will not dislodge jurisdiction on
that money claim — it subsists. 4. ABEJA V. TAÑADA
 The resolution of this question depends upon the right of Topic: CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC OFFICE
Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II.
DOCTRINE: A deceased contestant in an election protest cannot be
● The Supreme Court rule that the Estate of the deceased Segundo substituted by his/her surviving spouse. The heirs may no longer
Santos may be substituted for him in the present proceedings. prosecute the deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages against
 The withdrawal of Santos appointment is not a proven the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated his
fact. right to occupy the contested office.
 What the record clearly discloses is that the original FACTS:
appointment of Santos as Labor Conciliator II was not taken
out of the Civil Service Commission; 1) This petition for certiorari seeks the annulment of the orders
issued by Judge Federico,
 That his appointment on record was effective September
1, 1960, was approved by the Commissioner of Civil  w/c decreed, the revision of 36 voting precincts
contained in the counter-protest filed by Radovan

7
2) Abeja and Radovan were contenders for the office of municipal 10) Judge Lopez issued an order (before being reassigned to RTC
mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon in the 1992 national elections. Kalookan) which contained his ruling in each of the contested
ballots in the 22 contested precincts and the reasons therefor
3) Based on the official returns of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers:  but this ruling did not contain a summation of the exact
number of votes to be credited to each of the parties, or
 Radovan was credited w/ 6,215 votes while
 a declaration of the winner in the election protest.
 Abeja garnered 5,951 votes.
11) Abeja filed a "Motion to Determine Votes, To Proclaim
4) After the proclamation of Radovan
Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" considering that
 Abeja filed an election contest. The protest covered 22 based on her own computation of revised ballot ruled upon by
voting precincts. Judge Lopez, that she led Radovan by a margin of 281 votes.
5) Radovan filed an Answer w/ a Counter-Protest of the results in 12) Respondent Judge Tanada (who succeeded Judge Lopez) denied
36 voting precincts. the motion.
6) Abeja moved that the counter-protest of Radovan be considered 13) Judge Tanada ruled that Abeja’s motion was indeed premature
withdrawn. on the ground that until after the 36 counter-protested
7) Abeja filed another manifestation and motion praying that: precincts have been revised, the court could not render a valid
decision.
 the counter-protest be considered withdrawn from the
time the final report of the Board of Revisors is 14) Hence the petition
submitted to the court for approval. ISSUE & RULING:
8) The then presiding Judge, Hon. Ludovico Lopez, did not rule on 1. W/N the wife of the deceased Radovan in an election
the aforementioned motions but, according to Abeja: protest substitute the Radovan? – NO
 Judge Lopez declared during a hearing that once a  The Supreme Court also find as erroneous the
ruling is made on the contested ballots of the 22 protested substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow,
precincts, he will not allow further revision of ballots. Ediltrudes Radovan, on the ground that private
9) On June 1993, Radovan died. respondent had a counter-claim for damages.
 The Supreme Court Cited Santos v Secretary of Labor:
 He was SUBSTITUTED by Vice Mayor Conrado de
Rama & surprisingly by his surviving spouse Ediltrudes "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a
Radovan. property which passes to his heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of
8
 Labor , 22 SCRA 848 [1968]; De la Victoria vs. Comelec, ● Respondent Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first
199 SCRA 561 [1991]). grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of
Deeds VII under permanent status.
 The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased
protestee's (contestant Radovan) counter-claim for  later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III, to
damages against the protestant (Abeja) for that was which she was also appointed under permanent status
extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy up to September 1984
the contested office.
 for two years, Respondent Garcia was designated as
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
of respondent judge as well as the results of the revision of the 11 Bulacan
ballot boxes subject of the counter-protest are SET ASIDE.
● Executive Order No. 649, which took effect on February 9, 1981:
Respondent judge is further ordered to DISMISS the counter-protest in
Election Code No. 92-1 and to resolve the "Motion to Determine  authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration
Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" filed Commission (LRC) to National Land Titles and Deeds
by petitioner conformably with this decision within a non-extendible Registration Administration (NALTDRA)
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof. This decision is
 regionalized the Offices of the Registers
immediately executory. Costs against respondent Ediltrudes Radovan.
SO ORDERED. ● Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds
II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a
member of the Philippine Bar
 appeal to the Secretary of Justice – denied
5. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration V.
 motion for reconsideration – remained unacted
CSC
● Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial
Topic: THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE; CHARACTERISTICS
to the Best Interest of the Service.
DOCTRINE: Abolition of a position does not involve or mean
 While case was pending, her temporary appointment
removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and
was renewed in 1985.
that one is merely separated therefrom. After abolition, there is in law
no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. ● Secretary of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of her
services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she
FACTS:
was "receiving bribe money"

9
● Garcia appealed to the Inter-Agency Review Committee  Executive Order No. 649 applies to Garcia, and not
(IARC) being a member of the Bar thus cannot be reinstated
to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds
 IARC referred the appeal to the Merit Systems
II.
Protection Board (MSPB)
ISSUE:
● MSPB dropped the appeal on the ground that her
separation is in order, since the termination of her services W/N Garcia should be reinstated to her former position as Deputy
was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment Register of Deeds II – NO.
 motion for reconsideration – denied RULING:
● Civil Service Commission STATED IN ITS RESOLUTION Not being a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to
that Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointment
of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. as Deputy Register of Deeds II
 Garcia had been holding the position of Deputy  Garcia cannot be reinstated to her former position
Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984 without violating the express mandate of the law.
 CSC qualified that "under the vested right theory, The position which Garcia would like to occupy anew was
the new requirement of BAR membership would not abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization
apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant measure.
lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the
 Sec. 8. Abolition of Existing Positions in the Land
date Executive Order No. 649 took effect”
Registration Commission . . . All structural units in the
Land Registration Commission and in the registries of
deeds, and all Positions therein shall cease to exist from
● NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of
the date specified in the implementing order to be issued
the above Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
by the President pursuant to the preceding paragraph…
 contends that Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No.
 the ABOLITION OF AN OFFICE WITHIN THE
649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and
COMPETENCE OF A LEGITIMATE BODY, if done
transferred their functions to the appropriate new
in good faith, suffers from no infirmity.
offices created
- There is no dispute over the authority to carry
 newly created offices required the issuance of new
out a valid reorganization in any branch or
appointments to qualified office holders
10
 agency of the Government under Section 9,
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution: “All
officials and employees in the existing
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by law or decreed by the incumbent President of
the Philippines…”
- Executive Order No. 649 was enacted in good
faith to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land
Registration Commission: the requirement of
Bar membership to qualify for key positions in
the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the
changing circumstances and new development of
the times.
● There is no vested right in an office or its salary.
 Except constitutional offices which provide for special
6. Francisco v. House of Representatives
immunity as regards salary and tenure
Topic: Public accountability
None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case.
Petitioners: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
and SET ASIDE the questioned Resolution of the Civil Service MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II
Commission reinstating private respondent to her former position as VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. petitioner-in-intervention
Respondents: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.

11
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, - Ten days later, on October 23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella
respondents, 1 JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, filed a second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the
JDF. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
FACTS:
a “resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
 In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress one-third of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
adopted its Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings.  Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar,
- The new rules superseded impeachment Rules of the 11th members of the House of Representatives, as well as private
Congress. Secs. 16 and 17 of these Rules state that individuals, all asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers to
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment
Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in proceedings against the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that
substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution bars the filing of
findings of the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the second impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision
the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR states that “(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House. the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
 A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the
ISSUE:
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by 1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates
Chief Justice Davide of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution—YES
 In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment 2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7 Associate Justices of Impeachment Proceedings approved by the HoR are unconstitutional –
SC for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public YES
trust and other high crimes.”
- The complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice RULING:
on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:
XI of the Constitution.
 On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the 1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given
first impeachment complaint “sufficient in form.” However, it also their ordinary meaning (verbal egis);
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being 2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according
insufficient in substance. to the intent of the framers; and
3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
12
Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation
means simply to begin. The records of the debates by the framers
affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the
Constitutional Convention and the amicus curiae briefs of its two
members (Maambong and Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5),
Art. XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the
complaint.
By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the
complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or
overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the
substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the
HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.
In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for
Impeachment are unconstitutional because the rules clearly contravene
Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a different
meaning from filing and referral.
Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and
Fuentebella violates the constitutional one-year ban.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the O?
ce of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution. SO ORDERED.

13
 Topic: PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
Petitioners: MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ
Respondents: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,
DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN
MANANZAN, COCHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO
RAMOS, SECRETARYGENERAL OF KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA,
ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION
OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE,
CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondentintervenor.
FACTS:
● 2 impeachment complaints were filed against petitioner Ombudsman
Ma. Mercedita Gutierrez (Gutierrez) by private respondents for
betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
o The HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. Both
complaints were simultaneously referred by the HOR to
the HOR Committee on Justice (COJ).
o After hearing, the COJ by Resolution dated Sept. 1,
2010 found both complaints sufficient in form.

7. GUTIERREZ v. HOR COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

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● Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of ● Gutierrez adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will
the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. After confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers
hearing, COJ by Resolution of Sept. 7, 2010 found the 2 complaints, of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute
which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of
of public trust, sufficient in substance. official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent COJ from
completing its report within the deadline.
● 6 days following her receipt of the notice to file answer, Gutierrez
filed the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. ● COJ counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an
impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature
● The following day, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the
of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said
issuance of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to
Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined
comment on the petition in 10 days.
with the same precision required in defining crimes.
o The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September
21, 2010, directed the OSG to file in 10 days its
Comment on the petition. All the respondents filed their
respective Comments.
● Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
● Gutierrez argues that COJ gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the
Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as
practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."
o Gutierrez invokes the application of Section 13, Rule Issue #1: W/N the SC has the power to determine whether public
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of
per complaint rule. To petitioner, the two impeachment its discretion relating to impeachment proceedings. – YES.
complaints are insufficient in form and substance since Ruling: Under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The
each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially

15
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be Issue #3: W/N the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance. –
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of YES.
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of Ruling: Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the Impeachment Rules are
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the
Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting
Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will. the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee.
Issue #2: W/N the petition is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication. – NO.
Ruling: In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is
on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that
interpretation. a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process,
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely
when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one Issue #4: W/N the SC may look into the narration of facts constitutive
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable of the offenses vis-à-vis petitioner’s submissions disclaiming the
officer within a period of one year. allegations in the complaints. – NO.
Ruling: This issue would "require the Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a

16
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms
discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of Representatives.)  "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
Issue #5: W/N Gutierrez was denied due process because of the delay
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. – NO.
Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these rules
Ruling: The Supreme Court discussed the difference between for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
publication and promulgation. To recall, days after the 15th Congress however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to
opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent the clerk of court for filing and publication.
provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
understood—that is, to make known. Since the Constitutional
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in
Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the
two newspapers of general circulation.
former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It
is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, Gutierrez contends that she was deprived of promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the
due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision
September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of
contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution.
COJ counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication
of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation." Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is
a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)
is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses
the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances involves Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does
the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-
well as other constitutional offices. executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where
impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
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mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for
would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the the punishment of the offender.
15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the
Issue #6: W/N an impeachment complaint needs to allege only one
Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the
impeachable offense. – NO.
Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints
pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like Ruling: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
what happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
the 15th Congress open its first session) impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the
need not allege only one impeachable offense. Petitioner’s claim
rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the
deserves scant consideration.
purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse
of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of
the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant
in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective" constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the
other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial
Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its determination of which must be made by the House which has yet to
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose. pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of
that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers
state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
need not allege only one impeachable offense.
that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In
to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner fails rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution
to allege any impairment of vested rights. allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation
depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation
18
may come today or may come later on after determination of the
sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of
NOTES:
consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
consolidate, and if, indeed, we need to consolidate." Petitioner’s When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?
petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the
"contemplated." filing of the impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint
not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment
determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one
anticipatory. year period.

Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?
impeachment complaints were deemedconsolidated, her claim that Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first
consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory obviously impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
already brushed aside. that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and SC: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the
September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
LIFTED. within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is
reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice.

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