Bonsubre, Jr. v.

Yerro
G.R. No. 205952 February 11, 2015

Facts:

This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for estafa filed by petitioner

against respondents before the RTC. In the course of the proceedings, the
counsel on record, private prosecutor Atty. Luna, manifested that there was an
on-going settlement between petitioner and respondents, and that they would file
the necessary motion relative thereto. Thus, in an Order dated September 12,
2000, the prosecution was given 10 days from said date to submit such motion
and directed the prosecution to furnish the accused’s counsel a copy of the
same for their comment; after which, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. As a result, the RTC, in an Order dated September 18, 2001,
dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to comply with the court’s
directive, as well as to take any further step to prosecute the case, in view of the
accused’s (i.e., respondents’) constitutional right to speedy trial. More than 2
years from the issuance of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order, petitioner,
through a new collaborating counsel, Atty. Malabago, filed a motion for
reconsideration, claiming that he learned of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal
Order only on June 7, 2004,and that he believed in good faith that the case was
merely archived in accordance with the terms of the Compromise
Agreement. Several hearings were conducted on petitioner’s pending motions,
including an amended motion for reconsideration and second amended motion
for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent’s Right to Speedy Trial has been violated?
NO.

Ruling:

In this case, no such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the

RTC in dismissing the case for denial of the respondents’ right to speedy trial.
Aside from the lapse of two (2) years and nine (9) months from the time the case
was dismissed to the time petitioner sought for a reconsideration of the same, it
is also not disputed that it was petitioner who caused the inordinate delay. As
culled from the records, it was the private prosecutor who sought for a temporary
suspension of the case during the September 12, 2000 hearing with a
manifestation that they would file the necessary motion relative to the settlement.
Despite having executed a Compromise Agreement – which this Court notes
was not notarized – petitioner and his counsel failed to furnish the RTC a copy of
the same or comply with the directive to submit the necessary motion. Even
when the respondents reneged on their obligation under the Compromise
Agreement having failed to pay not only the first two (2) installments, which was
already a ground to revive the criminal case under paragraph 3 (d) thereof, but
rather all 36 monthly installments, still, petitioner and his counsel failed to lift a
finger to prosecute the case. Such inordinate and unjustified delay on the part of
the prosecution clearly prejudiced the respondents. Hence, there can be no
gainsaying that their right to speedy trial had been violated.
 Tan v. People
586 SCRA 139

Facts:
Two separate information were filed against respondent Tan for violation
of the Revised Securities Act, when he failed to file with SEC the amount of all
BWRC (Best World Resources Corporation) shares of which he is the beneficial
owner within 10 days after he became such beneficial owner.

During the trial, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. RTC admitted
the pieces of evidence, but denied admission of all other exhibits. Tan filed
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioner filed its Opposition to
which Tan filed a Reply. In the end, RTC issued an order granting Tan’s
Demurrer to Evidence.

Petitioner filed a petition before the CA assailing the order of RTC which
granted Tan’s motion. CA denied, ruling that the dismissal of a criminal action by
the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an
acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.

Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in granting Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence.

Held:
No. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is
“filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it
calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.”
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not
be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The
verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which is not present in this case. RTC did not violate petitioner’s right
to due process as the petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to
present its case which led to grant of Tan’s demurrer. RTC never prevented
petitioner from presenting its case. In fact, one of the main reasons for the RTCs
decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes
of shares that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into,
whether there are preferred shares as well as common shares, or even which
type of shares respondent had acquired,

Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to
grant respondents demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed a
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence and
The Prosecution’s Opposition Thereto. Petitioner contends that instead of acting
on the motion, the RTC peremptorily granted Tan’s demurrer to evidence which
prevented petitioner from its intention to file a petition to question the orders.
 While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the
resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it
mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as
an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute an error of
procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued
by petitioner.

As such RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the
proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to
evidence.

Perez v. People
544 SCRA 532

Facts:
Petitioner, Zenon Perez was then the acting municipal treasurer of
Tubigon, Bohol, was found to be guilty of malversation of public funds. That upon
the examination of the Provincial Auditor’s Office to the account of the petitioner,
it was found out that instead of the supposed cash on hand amounting to 94k,
there was only 21k, thus incurring a shortage of 73k. (estimated)

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of

public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code on
1989,

When asked by the auditing team, as to the location of the missing funds,
the petitioner explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his
late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for
his medicine.

Petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol the

amounts of 10k and 15k until the full restitution of the missing money on April
1989. However, the accused was still convicted.
On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to invoke his right to speedy trial.

Issue: Whether or not the accused has waived his right to speedy trial.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken
a different dimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs
of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some
overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not
waiving that right.
 Privilege against self-incrimination

People v. Besonia
422 SCRA 210

Facts:

Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, emanates the fiat sentencing
appellant Jonathan Besonia to two counts of the most severe penalty of death
for having committed two counts of murder. The decision leaves much to be
desired. More than half of it was devoted to the narration about Besonia’s plea of
guilty and the consequent searching inquiry conducted by the trial court. Before
the start of the trial, Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez, manifested
that he would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide after a
medical operation on his gall bladder. 5 Thereafter, the trial court ordered the
prosecution to begin presenting its evidence. The prosecution thereupon
presented as witnesses Dr. Tito Doromal and SPO1 Ricardo Clarete. RTC finds
Besonia guilty, thus, Bsonia argues that the trial court based mainly on his
confession, which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of
his constitytional right against self-incrimination.

Issue:

Whether or not Besonia’s Right Against Self-Incrimination has been

violated? NO.

Ruling:

We cannot subscribe to Besonia’s claim that his confession and

admissions during the searching inquiry were elicited in violation of his
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. The right
against self-incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all its coercive
powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him and to
avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own
protection. It does not apply where, as in these cases, the testimony was freely
and voluntarily given by the accused himself without any compulsion from the
agents of the State. There is nothing in the records that would indicate that
Besonia was forced, intimidated, or compelled by the trial court or by anybody
into admitting the crimes. At any rate, his plea of guilty and confession or
admissions during the searching inquiry cannot be the sole basis for his
conviction.

Chavez v. CA
24 SCRA 663

Facts:
Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor
vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed
against the accused together with other accused, that they conspired, with intent
to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the
vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia
(prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused
opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an
ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only
incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.

Issue: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination

had been violated.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of
his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived
his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did
not offer himself as a witness.

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to,

make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission,
defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege,
we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty

People v. Olvis
G.R. No. 71092 September 30, 1987

Facts:
On September 9, 1975, authorities from the Integrated National Police
station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, received a report that a
certain Deosdedit Bagon is missing. Bagon had been in fact missing since two
days before.

An unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was last
seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein. The authorities
then thereafter picked up Sorela for interrogation. Sorela bore several scratches
on his face, neck and arms when the police found him. Sorela made extrajudicial
confession for his participation together with Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo
Cademas for the killing of Bagon.

The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela,
they were turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo the Polanco Station
Commander. The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime.

Issue: Whether or not re-enactment of the crime is a violation to the right

accused against self-incrimination.

Held:
Yes. Forced re-enactments, like uncounseled and coerced confessions
come within the ban against self- incrimination. Evidence based on such re-
enactment is a violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.

Here, accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical

characteristics; by and large, he is likewise made to admit criminal responsibility
against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounseled
confession. The lack of counsel makes statement in contemplation of law,
'involuntary' even if it were otherwise voluntary.

Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan
302 SCRA 102

Facts:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati
Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a
group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those
mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as
a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail
sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the
National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group responsible for mail
pilferage in the Makati Post Office.

On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI

agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of
mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed
of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car.

At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was
parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted
from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St.,
Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie
Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the
mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon
seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started
towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the
mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela
arrested the two accused. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep,
overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.

The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their

headquarters. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the
members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people
transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they
required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same
letters confiscated from them.
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the
accused were declared guilty.

Issue: Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as
evidence.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is known
that during custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the
right to an attorney. Any admission or confession made in the absence of
counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner
was asked to sign the letters, the letters are still admissible as evidence because
the accused was convicted not only by means of these letters but also by
testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the
letters were validly seized as an incident of a valid arrest and therefore can stand
on their own. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

People v. Ayson
175 SCRA 216

Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned
at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in
the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation
to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's
Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to
which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to
settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him,
and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was
prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this
did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos.
Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’
written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer.
Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as

evidence the admission and statement of accused.

Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-
incrimination. This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or
should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of

the accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.

Mapa v. Sandiganbayan
231 SCRA 783

Facts:

On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara,

together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat, Ramon Aviado, Jr.,
Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019).
However he was granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the
previous charges against him, provided that he will testify as witness against the
Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos,
during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were
being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered
by the PCCG when they flew  to New York to testify against the Marcoses.
During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor
dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since
Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of
Mapa took without force and effect. However, the record shows that the
petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the
RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect
and force?

Ruling:

Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity
to any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions
provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or
criminal case where he is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the
expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify implying that Mapa was
able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by
him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the
petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the
PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law
and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were not able
to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity

granted by the PCGG, which under the law has the power to grant immunity.

Kastigar v. US
406 U.S 441

Facts:
Subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury, the petitioners refused
to answer questions in asserting the Fifth Amendment, despite the government
having granted them immunity. The immunity was based on a part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 stating that neither the testimony nor any
other information from the testimony could be used against the witnesses.
Petitioners argued that the scope of the immunity they were given was not as
broad as the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and were
unsuccessful in the District Court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the order, and the petitioners were granted certiorari.

Issue: Can the government compel immunized testimony even if the

subpoenaed persons have invoked the privilege versus self-incrimination?

Held:
Yes. Affirm the lower court’s decision allowing the compulsion of
testimony.
The total proscription on use found in this federal statute, that is, from both use
and derivative use, provides enough of a safeguard against Fifth Amendment
rights being infringed on by barring the testimony from even being used as an
investigatory lead.

The petitioners’ concern that the bar against derivative use could not be
enforced effectively is overcome by subsequent prosecuting authorities having
the burden of showing that their evidence comes from an independent source.

Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 141675 – 96 November 25, 2005

Facts:
Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator from 1972 to 1986, during the
presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson (Lacson) was
the Deputy Administrator of the NFA when he was the Administrator.

On 6 May 1988, Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into a Cooperation

Agreement, occasioned by the desire of Tanchanco to cooperate with the
Philippine government in connection with the latter’s efforts in the location and
pursuit of government properties purloined by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
their agents and others who hold property on their behalf. In the Cooperation
Agreement, the one of the stipulation was the Philippines hereby represents and
agrees as follows:
 1) At a time to be mutually agreed upon between Tanchanco and the
Philippines, the Philippines shall move to dismiss all actions that are
presently pending against Tanchanco before the Sandiganbayan and
any such other courts;

2) The Philippines shall lift any sequestration orders against Tanchanco's

properties, if any, and rescind hold orders it may have issued against
his/her actions;

3)The Philippines shall not bring any additional civil or criminal charges
against Tanchanco, arising from:

(A) Service in or for the Marcos government;

(B) Any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her
cooperation as defined in this Agreement.

Tanchanco was called as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in the
case filed against Imelda Marcos in New York for violation of the so-called RICO
Act. A criminal case was filed in 1991 against Tanchanco with the
Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds in the amount of
P10,000,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank.

Tanchanco filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, wherein he argued that the

case should be dismissed as he had been granted immunity from the said suit by
the PCGG.

Issue: Whether or not Jesus T. Tanchanco can be granted immunity under the
Cooperation Agreement.

Held:
Tanchanco is entitled to immunity.

The court hold that Cooperation Agreement, validly undertaken between

the PCGG and Tanchanco as it was, precludes the prosecution of Tanchanco
under the subject changes. The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to dismiss the charges despite its lack of jurisdiction to
continue hearing the case against Tanchanco.

The present petition, in so far as it relates to Tanchanco, must be granted.

It goes without saying though that this ruling does not shield all grantees under
section 5 of E.O No.14-A from all kinds of criminal prosecution. The extent of
immunity available to each particular grantee depends on their respective
immunity agreements with the PCGG and the surrounding facts.

Right to defend, be heard, confront witnesses against him and be present

People v. Ortillas
428 SCRA 659

Facts:
Appellant, Marlon Ortillas y Gamlanga (Ortillas), was charged for the crime
of Murder. His case was raffled to Branch 225 (Las Piñas) presided over by
Judge Florentino M. Alumbres.
 After arraignment of appellant who pleaded not guilty to the offense with
which he is charged, the trial court dispensed with the pre-trial and proceeded to
trial on the merits.

On June 8, 1995, the prosecution presented Russel Guiraldo, an alleged

eyewitness. After Russel's direct examination, Atty. Jose G. de Leon, the then
counsel for Ortillas moved for postponement as he had a very important
appointment to keep which Judge Alumbres granted. Subsequently, Atty. de
Leon had to withdraw as counsel because of eye ailment which the trial court
approved.

The only other hearing that took place after the testimony of Russel on
June 8, 1995, was on September 5, 1995 when NBI Medico-Legal Officer
Roberto Garcia testified for the prosecution.

All in all, the continuation of the hearing was postponed thirteen times from
June 8, 1995 until May 8, 1996 when the prosecution finally rested its case with
the submission of its documentary evidence.

Judge Alumbres refused to give opportunity for Atty. Teresita Carandang-

Pantua of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the new counsel for appellant, to
cross-examine prosecution witness Russel on the ground that the prosecution
had already rested its case.

Witness Russel was never presented for cross-examination. The last time
he was subpoenaed was for the hearing set on November 6, 1995, but records
do not show that he appeared on said date. Although several hearings were
scheduled thereafter, Russel was not subpoenaed anymore.

On the basis of the testimonies of Russel and Dr. Garcia, Judge Alumbres
rendered a decision finding Ortillas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.

Appellant Ortillas contended that the judgment of the trial court has unduly
deprived him of his constitutional right to meet the witness face to face which
includes the right to cross-examine the witness.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Alumbres erred in refusing to allow the defense
counsel to cross-examine the prosecution’s witness.

Held:
YES. Section 6, Rule 132 of the then prevailing Rules on Evidence
provides:

SEC. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the

termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.

As the Court held in People vs. Rivera, to wit:

 The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, Sec.
14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have the right to
meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, Sec. 1(f) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him. The
cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination
testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in
substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him.

Equitable PCI Bank v. RCBC

433 SCRA 562
Facts:
On May 24, 2000, petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the
individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as sellers, and respondent RCBC
Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a Share Purchase Agreement5
(SPA) for the purchase of petitioners' interests in Bankard, To expedite the
purchase, RCBC agreed to dispense with the conduct of a due diligence audit on
the financial status of Bankard.

Under the SPA, RCBC undertakes, on the date of contract execution, to

deposit, as downpayment, 20% of the purchase price, in an escrow account. The
escrowed amount, the SPA stated, should be released to petitioners on an
agreed-upon release date and the balance of the purchase price shall be
delivered to the share buyers upon the fulfillment of certain conditions agreed
upon, in the form of a manager's check.

On June 2, 2000, RCBC deposited the stipulated downpayment amount in

an escrow account after which it was given full management and operational
control of Bankard. June 2, 2000 is also considered by the parties as the Closing
Date referred to in the SPA.

On December 28, 2000, RCBC paid the balance of the contract price. The
corresponding deeds of sale for the shares in question were executed in January
2001.

Thereafter, in a letter of May 5, 2003, RCBC informed petitioners of its

having overpaid the purchase price of the subject shares, claiming that there
was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478 million,
resulting in the overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC claimed that
petitioners violated their warranty, as sellers, embodied in Sec. 5(g) of the SPA
(Sec. 5[g] hereinafter).

Following unsuccessful attempts at settlement, RCBC, in accordance with

Sec. 10 of the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration dated May 12, 20048 with the
ICC-ICA. In the request, RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from,
contravening and not following generally accepted accounting principles and
practices in maintaining their books. Due to these improper accounting practices,
RCBC alleged that both the audited and unaudited financial statements of
Bankard prior to the stock purchase were far from fair and accurate and, hence,
violated the representations and warranties of petitioners in the SPA.
Issue: Whether petitioners was denied of due process when they were allegedly
denied the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by RCBC.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held in Velez v. De Vera, the Court En Banc
expounded that in administrative proceedings, cross-examination is not
indispensable, thus:

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial

process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not
technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a
notice or hearing [is] not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be
had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and
tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such
determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that
due process requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the functions
of the administrative bodies differ.

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.

Clearly, the right to cross-examine a witness, although a fundamental right

of a party, may be waived. Petitioners themselves admit having had the
opportunity to cross-examine RCBC's witnesses during the hearings before the
tribunal, but declined to do so by reserving such right at a later time. Having had
the opportunity to cross-examine RCBC's witnesses, petitioners were not denied
their right to due process.

Right to appeal

Hilario v. People
551 SCRA 191
Facts:
Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two
counts of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City to
which petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.

During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
counsel of Alijid, took over representing petitioner in view of the death of the
latter's counsel.

On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioner

and his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.
 On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the
RTC a Petition for Relief from the Decision dated December 5, 2001 together
with an affidavit of merit.

The Assistant City Prosecutor filed his Comment on the Petition for Relief
where he contended that the petition should no longer be entertained; and that
perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law was
not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal rendered
the judgment final and executory.

RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for relief and it was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to appeal was violated.

Held:
Yes. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
appeal in the manner prescribed by law. The importance and real purpose of the
remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals where we
ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are
advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal
and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the
constraints of technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law,
however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, a right guaranteed
by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss
of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all
attributed to petitioner.

Guy v. People
582 SCRA 108
Facts:
These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Cases No. 26508-101
which found petitioners guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(R.A. No. 3019).

It appears that an audit investigation was conducted by the Commission

on Audit (COA) in response to a letter-complaint of one Alfredo Alberca
regarding the three projects.5 The audit team found that the Sangguniang
Barangay of Barangay 36, acting as the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) accepted bid proposals from Amago Construction and
General Services (Amago Construction) without issuing the proper plans and
specifications for the basketball court and day care projects and that the work
programs for the day care center and the elevated path walk were prepared long
after the construction had been completed. Likewise, Guy and Grefiel reported
the construction of the projects to the City Engineer’s Office only after they had
already been completed; thus, petitioner employees inspected the projects only
after they had already been accomplished. Petitioner employees approved the
accomplishment of the projects despite the absence of material documents,
according to the audit team’s report. Finally, the audit team found material
defects in the projects and discovered that the contract cost for the basketball
court and elevated path walk was overpriced.
 The Ombudsman Prosecutor (Ombudsman-Visayas) filed the
corresponding information for the offenses, essentially charging petitioners with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows: Considering that all the elements of

R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) were without doubt established in these cases and the
allegation of conspiracy shown, a moral certainty is achieved to find the accused
liable for the acts they committed.

Issue: Whether the right to appeal was violated.

Held:
No. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even reverse the trial
court’s decision on grounds other than those that the parties raise as errors. We
have examined the records of the case and find no cogent reason to disturb the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. We find that the evidence on record
amply supports the findings and conclusions of the respondent court. The
elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by the
prosecution.

People v. Tambis
560 SCRA 343
Facts:
Cerilo Tambis was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
with Murder. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June 12, 1998, as
Luzviminda was at her neighbor's house to fetch her husband-the victim who
was drinking with a group, Tambis arrived. He suddenly stabbed the victim on
the left abdomen and attempted to stab him a second time but Luzviminda
pushed Tambis away as the victim repaired to hide inside the neighbor's house.
The victim died of the stab wound at a hospital the following day.

Upon the other hand, Tambis, admitting that he stabbed the victim,
claimed self-defense, averring that when the victim saw him, the latter got mad
and attacked him with a knife to thus draw him to grab the knife with which he
stabbed the victim.

The trial court thus convicted Tambis of Murder. Tambis lodged an appeal
which it forwarded to the Court of Appeals following People v. Mateo which
directs the intermediate review of decisions imposing the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.

Issue: Whether the petitioner’s appeal will prosper.

Held:
Appellant's appeal thus fails.

As it is well-established that an appeal in criminal proceedings throws the whole

case open for review of all aspects, including those not raised by the parties, the
Court, after combing through the documentary evidence for the prosecution,
finds that a modification of the decision respecting the civil aspect of the case is
in order.

People v. Sison
555 SCRA 156

Facts:

This is an appeal by Renante Sison alias Dante from the Decision of

Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region
convicting him of the crime of murder. Both accused were arraigned on
September 10, 1993. Renante pled not guilty. Jessie was not arraigned as the
trial judge found him mentally unfit. He was ordered to be treated at the Baguio
General Hospital. His trial was suspended. In due time, he recovered. Hence, on
May 11, 1994, the trial judge directed his return to jail to face trial. On June 16,
1994 the prosecution moved to discharge him as a state witness. The motion
was granted despite the opposition of the accused-appellant.

Issue:

Whether or not questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered
on appeal? YES.

Ruling:

The records will show that it is only now that the accused-appellant is
assailing the discharge of Jessie Sison as a state witness. This is too late in the
day. In the early case of US v. Inductivo, where it was only on appeal that
counsel for the accused first argued against the competence of one Obdulio as a
state witness, we held that ". . . it is almost universal rule . . . that aside from
matters jurisdictional, which can only be raised for the first time on appeal, and
aside from a few other exceptions which need not be noticed, questions not
raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."

Arraignment and Plea

People v. Alicando
251 SCRA 293

Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of a four-year
old girl. He was arrested and during the interrogation, he verbally confessed his
guilt without the assistance of a counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled verbal
confession, the police came to know where to find the evidence to support a
case against him. He pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was tried,
convicted then sentenced to death.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly convicted the appellant and
sentence him with death penalty.

Held:
NO. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed
to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 that the accused must be arraigned before
the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial.
The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing
the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the
trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information."

In this case, the records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. In addition, the plea
of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated
section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without
conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf. The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a
free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must
be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension
of the consequences of the plea.

The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea
of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any
information about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The
age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were
not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is
no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted
too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential
elements of the crime of rape with homicide.

People v. Estomaca
256 SCRA 421

Facts:
The accused, an illiterate laborer, was charged guilty of five instances of
rape of her daughter. When he was arraigned, he pleaded guilty to all of the
complaints against him. Eventually however, he informed the court that he was
only guilty of two counts of rape that the other three might have been done by
the victim’s boyfriend and he was merely blamed for it.

Issue: Whether or not the arraignment was valid.

Held:
No. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be
made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the
accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated
therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him,
and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading
be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and known is a
mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly
followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of
an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him
and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary
defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause
under the Constitution.

In the case at hand, there is no showing that the rule above has been
followed or adopted in the arraignment of the accused. What it appears is only a
bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically reported in the
transcript. Moreover, the court found out that the complaint or information was
not read to the accused in the language known to him, as his local dialect was
kinaray-a and the lower court conducted the arraignment in Ilonggo. The bottom
line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed
judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1)
the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions
demonstrate appellants full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the
appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational
background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court.

People v. Gutierrez
91 Phil 876 (1952)

Facts:
Gutierrez, a Japanese collaborator, was charged with treason. Counsel alleged
the information did not plead specific acts constituting treason and moved to
quash but Motion to quash was denied. Instead of moving for specifications or
bill of particulars, counsel objected to the introduction of evidence showing
specific acts constituting the crime.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the counsel will prosper.

Held:
No. Section 2, Rule 113, points out the way to object to a defective or
insufficient information. It must be by a motion to quash.
A defendant in a criminal case who believes or feels that he is not sufficiently
informed of the crime with which he is charged and not in a position to defend
himself properly and adequately could move for specifications. Failure to move
for specifications or for the quashing of the information on any of the grounds
provided for in the Rules of Court (section 2, Rule 113) deprives him of the right
to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the
defendant with a definite crime.

People v. Abad Santos

76 Phil 744 (1946)

Facts:
Joseph ARCACHE was accused of the crime of treason before the
People's Court in an information specifying the different kinds of properties
alleged to have been sold by him to the Japanese imperial forces during the
enemy occupation. Also added in the accusatory charge is the phrase "and other
similar equipments".
ARCACHE was duly arraigned before herein respondent-judges of the People's
Court, and entered a plea of not guilty.

At the very start of trial, counsel for ARCACHE verbally petitioned to

herein respondent-judges (Judges Abad Santos, Nepumuceno and Veluz) that
the prosecution should make more specific the phrase "and other similar
equipments" set forth in the information or have it stricken therefrom, unless the
prosecution should furnish a bill of particulars specifying what those "other
similar equipments" were. The special prosecutor objected to said petition, on
the ground that it was out of time, since ARCACHE had already been arraigned.
Respondent-judges granted ARCACHE’s petition on the ground that the phrase
objected to was indeed too broad and too indefinite to enable the accused to
properly defend himself.

Issue: Whether or not the order for a bill of particulars is legal and valid.

Held:
YES. The orders complained of are legal and valid and they were issued
by herein respondent-judges, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, for the
protection of the rights and interests of the accused.

The filing of specifications or bills of particulars may be ordered in criminal

cases in accordance with existing (American) jurisprudence. In the first place, all
the accused wanted was to know specifically what the alleged "other similar
equipments" were, without demanding amendment (in substance) of the
information, which would require him to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty.
In any case, to order the filing of a bill of particulars is purely discretionary on the
part of the lower court. Hence, any ambiguous phrases should not be permitted
in criminal complaints or informations if any such phrase has been included
therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the
court should order either, (1) its elimination as surplusage; or (2) the filing of
specification or bill of particulars, which is but an amendment in mere matters of
form not substance.

People v. Arlegui
128 SCRA 556 (1984)

Facts:

William ESPAÑOLA was charged in an information1 for violating PD 381

in relation to Sec 4-B of PD 189 as amended for building/operating a beach
resort (in Nasugbu, Batangas) without prior approval from the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA).

ESPAÑOLA sought dismissal of the case via a motion to quash

(information), accordingly, for its failure to state a criminal offense.
ESPAÑOLA argued that the accusation against him is not a penal offense, but,
more administrative in nature since the cited PD 381 in relation to PD 189 (under
Sec 4-b thereof) do not impose any criminal liability against the offender.
 In fine, there are two sections numbered almost identically, one with a
capitalized "B" and the other with a non-capitalized "b", ("Section 4-B" and
"Section 4(b)") and both these sections of the same PD caused the confusion
encountered by the respondent-judge in the misreading and misapplication of
the law.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case was warranted.

Held:
No. Respondent-judge ARLEGUI should have ordered a bill of particulars
instead of dismissing the case.

The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have

been an order from the lower court for a bill of particulars and subsequent
direction to the Fiscal to amend the information on account of the defect, if there
ever was one, as it is curable by the simplest of (formal) amendments or
clarifications.