Prof. J.E.

Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

THE LAW SCHOOL OF TANZANIA

LS 102: Professional Practice and Ethics Module
Lectures and Seminars for the Eighteenth Cohort

LECTURE 5

JUDICIAL ETHICS

[By Prof. John Eudes Ruhangisa (Phd), Judge of the High

Court Tanzania.]

Lecture delivered on 15th April, 2015 in the Multi-Purpose Hall, the

Law School of Tanzania, 1400-1600hrs

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

Introduction

Defining Ethics:

Ethics:
Ethics has been defined as the rules of behaviour pertaining to a
particular class of human action. They relate to moral principles that
control, influence or guide a person’s conduct or behaviour so as to gain
respect for him/herself.1

Ethics are normally connected with or related to virtue and pleasure.

Virtue. Virtue is generally taken to mean righteousness and goodness in
moral. When we say that a person is virtuous, we mean that his actions
are righteous, i.e they are morally commendable or praise-worthy. The
opposite of virtue is vice. A person whose actions are immoral, i.e against
the moral feeling of the community, is said to be a vicious person. By
pleasure we refer to something like good feeling, enjoyment or happiness.

Can a person’s natural appetite for pleasure be reconciled with his moral
desire for virtue? Is man naturally virtuous or even purely controlled by
his appetite for pleasure? These are some of the questions which express
the kind of practical ethical problems that face people in their social and
personal life.

In ethics there is much talk about right and wrong, good and bad, as well
as duty and obligation. These are known as ethical terms. Questions of
right, wrong, good, bad, duty and obligations sometimes bring to us a
problem of dilemmas in ethics. Hence rules of ethics. Knowledge of ethics
of respective professional is therefore essential.

Legal Ethics
Legal ethics on the other hand, is an area of ethics which involves the
legal profession and the practice of law. Various writers and literatures
have attempted to define legal ethics in a manner that brings
convergence and agreement in terms of its meaning.
It is defined to mean

‘the minimum standards of appropriate conduct within the

legal profession, involving the duties that its members owe
one another, their clients, and the courts’.2

1
See Ndika Gerald (2006), IJudicial Ethics in Tanzania: A Paper presented at a Primary Courts’
Magistrates’ Seminar, Institute of Judicial Administration, Lushoto.
2
See Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edn, Thomson West, St Paul, USA, 2004, p. 913

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

In other words legal ethics is

‘the ethical code governing those who practice law, and the
obligations they have to uphold the law, further justice, and
fully represent the interests of their clients’.3

Thus in one sense the term legal ethics ‘refers narrowly to the
system of professional regulations governing the conduct of
lawyers. In broader sense, however, legal ethics is simply a special
case of ethics in general, as ethics is understood in the central
traditions of philosophy and religion. From this broader
perspective, legal ethics cuts more deeply than the legal regulation:
it concerns the fundamentals of our moral lives as lawyers.’4

The point of convergence in all attempts is the common agreement that

legal ethics encompasses an ethical code governing the conduct of
persons engaged in the practice of law and persons more generally in
the legal profession.

Indeed, legal ethics like any other business ethics is distinguished from
personal ethics a category of philosophy that determines what an
individual believes about morality and right and wrong as opposed to
organisations/professional ethics.

Judicial Ethics
The term, “Judicial Ethics” refers to the set of norms and standards of
conduct to which every judicial officer is under obligation to conform.
Those norms and standards are essentially designed to ensure
maintenance of impartiality, integrity and independence in the discharge
of the judicial function and generally to ensure avoidance of impropriety
on the part of the judicial officers. For the judiciary to be effective, it
must command acceptability and respectability. It achieves this by living
up to the expectations of the society it serves. The fundamental
objective of judicial ethics therefore, is to provide guidance to the
judiciary towards attainment of that acceptability and
respectability.

It is a truism to say that for the discharge of its functions, the judiciary
depends on the individuals who are called to the bench to serve as
judicial officers in the diverse grades of Judges and Magistrates and also
depends on the quality of the members of the bar. In order to

3
See http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Legal_ethics
4
See Deborah L. Rhode and David Lubah, Legal Ethics, 1992, p.3

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

satisfactorily meet society’s expectations, the court as an institution, has

to rely, not only on the professional skills, but also heavily on the
characters and consciences of those individuals. It is the personal
qualities of those men and women that are the making of good court
officers, and in the result, of an acceptable, respected and effective
judiciary. Conversely, it is the personal weaknesses and shortcomings of
those individuals, which lead to the degeneration and failure of the
institution. However, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the qualities of
individual court officers, and to assume that they would necessarily
respond to all the issues of conduct in the same proper way. No society
can so rely on the goodness of its people that it does away with law and
regulations. The same is true of the Judiciary. There has to be in place,
objective and known ethical norms and standards by which a judicial
officer is guided, and according to which his/her conduct is measured.
This serves two purposes; namely : (a) to promote quality dispensation of
justice, and (b) to re-assure society that those entrusted with judging
others, are themselves beyond reproach, and are therefore, qualified to
administer justice. Because of that double purpose, therefore, judicial
ethics do not relate to the conduct of the judicial officer on the bench
only, but also to his/her conduct off the bench.

Every society has its own perceptions of what is ethically right, and what
is ethically wrong. This leads to diversities and variations in the detailed
norms and rules of judicial ethics in different jurisdictions. Nevertheless,
there is substantial, if not complete, unanimity on the following as the
core principles, around which judicial ethics revolve; namely:

(a) Impartiality
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It
applies not only to the making of judicial decision but also to the process
through which the decision is made. It is the king pin principle, so that
all other principles invoked in the administration of justice are applied
for ensuring and enhancing impartiality or the appearance of
impartiality. A judicial officer is therefore required to discharge her/his
judicial duties without favour, bias or prejudice and her/his conduct
both in and out of court should enhance the confidence of the public.
This conception of the task of judicial officer finds its finest expression in
the words of the judicial oath he/she takes before formally assuming
office which usually reads:
“I do swear by Almighty God that I will do right to all
manner of people after the laws and usages without
fear or favour, affection or ill-will”

It means therefore that to ensure a fair trial, a judicial officer must have
no interest him/herself in any matter that he/she has to try. He must be
impartial and should observe the principle that no person can be a judge

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

in his/her own cause. Such interests which bar a judicial officer from
sitting to try any related case include: monetary interest such as share
holding, where a judicial officer is a relative or personal friend of one of
the parties and where there is any ground on which anyone might think
that he might be biased in favour of one side or the other. In compliance
with this principle a judicial officer is therefore required to hear each
side, to act only on evidence formally presented to him, assign reasons
for his/her decisions and should discipline him/herself that he/she is
not him/herself a breaker of the law (i.e he/she should be beyond
reproach). The importance and consequence of impartiality by judicial
officers cannot be put in better words than the words of Sydney Smith
that:

“Nations fall when judges are unjust, because there is nothing

which the multitude think worth defending; but nations do not
fall which are treated as we are treated... And why? Because
this country is a country of the law; because a judge is a
judge for peasant as well as for the palace; because every
man’s happiness is safeguarded by fixed rules from tyranny
or caprice… The Christian patience you may witness, the
impartiality of the judgement-seat, the disrespect of persons,
the disregard of consequences”5

(b) Integrity
Integrity of individual judicial officers and the judiciary as an institution
is also central to the proper discharge of the judicial function. A judicial
officer therefore must in all activities, maintain integrity and encourage
other judicial officers to do likewise, [so as to enhance and sustain public
confidence in the judiciary]. He/she must ensure that his/her conduct is
above reproach in the view of reasonable, fair-minded and informed
persons. Justice therefore must not merely be done but be seen to be
done. The seriousness of this value is reflected in the observation by
Justice Fuad who is quoted saying:

“It is most important that a magistrate should be upright, that

he should be thought to be so. A reputation of honesty is as
important as honesty itself. In no other way can the courts
maintain the confidence of the public. Therefore a magistrate
should never get into debt. However, just the magistrate may
be, the people of his area will regard him with suspicion if he
owes money all over the place. If a magistrate cannot
maintain his integrity on the salary that he earns surely he

5
This statement is quoted in Odoki, B. J, 3rd Edn, An Introduction to Judicial Conduct and Practice, Law
Development Centre, 1990, Kampala, p. 46.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

should resign his office. It goes without saying that corruption

in the judiciary simply cannot be tolerated”6

Each time corruption by a judicial officer comes to light, the confidence

of the public to the court degenerates. Taking bribes by a judicial officer
for any reason cannot be tolerated for justice is not there for sale.

(c) Propriety
Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judicial officer. Under this principle a
judicial officer is required to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of his/her activities. Since a judicial officer is a subject
of constant public scrutiny, he must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, he should conduct himself or herself in
a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. For
example, he should avoid close personal association with individual
members of the legal profession, particularly those who practice in his
court, where such association might reasonably give rise to the suspicion
or appearance of favouritism or partiality.

(d) Judicial Independence

An independent judiciary is indispensable to impartial justice under law.
Every judicial officer should uphold and exemplify judicial independence
in both its individual and institutional aspects. It requires a judicial
officer to exercise judicial function independently on the basis of his/her
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences,
inducements, pressures, threats from any quarter or for any reason. It is
probably first of the most important principle that judicial officers should
be absolutely independent of the government, as they are regarded as
standing between the individual and the state, protecting the individual
from any interference with their freedom which is not justified by law.7
Any attempt to influence the judicial officer’s decision in any matter
before him/her for decision where such attempt arises outside the proper
performance of judicial duties should be rejected.
It is also important to note that judicial independence may also be
threatened by financial anxiety. If judicial officers are not
commensurately remunerated while the cost of living increases, it
becomes very difficult for them to maintain a way of life suited to the
gravity of the duties they have to discharge.

6
Quoted in Odoki, B. J, 3rd Edn, An Introduction to Judicial Conduct and Practice, Law Development
Centre, 1990, Kampala, p. 1.
7
See Denning, A, The Lord to Justice, Stevens and Sons, 1955, London p. 10

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

(e) Equality
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the court is essential to the
due performance of the judicial officer. It is important that a judicial
officer is aware of, and understands, the diversity in society and
differences arising from various sources, including but not limited to
race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, marital status,
social and economic status. Having taken cognisance of all these a
judicial officer is expected, in the performance of judicial duties, not to
manifest bias or bias.

(d) Code of Judicial Conduct

In many countries, the rules of judicial ethics are codified, but in others
they are passed on in unwritten traditional form. The Judiciary in each
of the East African Partner States has a different form of code adopted at
different times. The Tanzanian Judiciary adopted the “Code of Conduct
for Judicial Officers of Tanzania” at a Magistrates and Judges
Conference held at Arusha from 15th to 16th March 1984. Five years
later, on the 21st July 1989, the Judges of the Supreme Court and the
High Court of Uganda, adopted “The Code of Conduct for Judges,
Magistrates and other Judicial Officers, 1989”. On 28th October
2003, after extensive consultations among judicial officers of all grades,
the Uganda Judiciary formally launched a revised edition entitled “The
Uganda Code of Judicial Conduct.” The Judicial Service Commission
of Kenya has now made “Judicial Service Code of Conduct and
Ethics”. Under section 5 (1) of the Public Officers Ethics Act, 2003.

It is noteworthy that apart from the differences and variations in the

contents of the three codes, the first two are not in form of legislation, as
they were made by judicial officers to whom they apply without any
statutory sanction, while the latest was made under a statute. However,
that disparity is not peculiar to East Africa. It has global dimensions.
There are serious differences of opinion on whether or not such code
should have the force of law. The most commonly advanced arguments
against giving the code the force of law are two. First it is therefore,
likely to compromise the principle of judicial independence. Secondly, it
is contended that an attempt to model the rules of judicial ethics on the
format of the Penal Code, would be encumbered by the risk of leaving out
many scenarios and issues of conduct that confront judicial officers from
time to time resulting in grey areas of uncertainty. The following
statements, which preface the “Ethical Principles”, issued for guidance of
Canadian Federal Judges, fairly express that viewpoint:

1 “The Statements, Principles and Commentaries describe the very

high standards towards which all judges strive. They are
principles of reason to be applied in light of all the relevant

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

circumstances and consistently with the requirements of judicial

independence and the law. Setting out the very best in [them]
does not preclude reasonable disagreement about their
application or imply that departures from them warrant
disapproval.
2 [They] are advisory in nature. Their goals are to assist judges
with difficult ethical and professional issues, which confront then
and to assist members of public to better understand the judicial
role. They are not and shall not be used as a code or list of
prohibited behaviours. They do not set out standards defining
judicial misconduct.
3 An independent judiciary is the right of every Canadian. A judge
must be seen to be free to decide honestly and impartially on the
basis of the law and the evidence, without external pressure or
influence and without fear of interference from anyone. Nothing
in [them] can, or is intended to limit or restrict judicial
independence in any manner. To do so would be to deny the
very thing this document seeks to further: the rights of everyone
to equal and impartial justice administered by fair and
independent judges… [judges] have the duty to uphold and
defend judicial independence, not as a privilege of judicial office
but as the constitutionally guaranteed right of everyone to have
their disputes heard and decided by impartial judges.”8

These statements contrast sharply with an opinion expressed by Editor,

Laurance M. Hyde, Jr., who, referring to the American revised Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, wrote:

“…there must be not only judges of good conscience, but rules of

ethical judicial conduct which are mandatory, and sanctions for
violation of those rules”.9

Within the Commonwealth of Nations, there are still countries that do

not have any written code of judicial conduct, but a survey of those
which do, shows that the majority opted for the non-statutory form,
whereby the judicial officers or their governing organs, take the initiative
to compile and adopt the set of norms and standards judicial officers
should abide by. Overall, it is safe to say that the initiative, which has
gathered momentum of late, has resulted from the steady realization that
the Judiciary is accountable to the society it serves, and that in that
regard, it acquits itself better by promoting adherence to known norms

8
Ethical Principles for Federal Judges: Issued by the Canadian Judicial Council
9
Modern Judicial Ethics: The National Judicial College, University of Nevada, 1991.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

and standards of judicial ethics than by appearing to take refuge under

the often misunderstood umbrella of Independence of the Judiciary.

Recent Initiatives
Undoubtedly, the quest for adherence to unwritten as well as written
judicial ethics is as old as the judicial institution itself. Thus we find the
following admonition to the Israelities in the Holy Bible:

“You shall appoint judges and officials throughout your tribes

to administer true justice for the people in all the communities
which the Lord your God, is giving you. You shall not distort
justice; you must be impartial. You shall not take a bribe; for
a bribe blinds the eyes even of the wise and twists the words
even of the just.”10

And the great 16th century English Chancellor and Statesman, Sir
Thomas More, had this to say on impartiality:

“If the parties will at my hand call for justice, then were it my
father stood on the one side, and the devil on the other, his
cause being good, the devil should have right.”11

This lecture is not intended to present a review of the historical

development of judicial ethics or codes of judicial conduct but since
human life is shaped by history, we cannot meaningfully discuss this
topic if we are oblivious of its development. It suffices also to mention
that until the late 1990s there were, within the Commonwealth of
Nations, only a few judiciaries, including those of Tanzania, Nigeria,
Ghana and Uganda, which had written codes or other formal
instruments documenting the norms and standards of conduct expected
of judicial officers. Since then, however, there has been dramatic
increase in the adoption of written codes of judicial conduct in one form
or another. Among the recent converts are old Commonwealth
judiciaries like the Canadian and Australian judiciaries, which prefer to
refer to their instruments as “guide” rather than “codes”. The Canadian
Judicial Council issued the “Ethical Principles for Federal Judges” in
November 1998, and the Council of Chief Justice of Australia published
the “Guide to Judicial Conduct”, in June 2002. In the preface to the
latter documents the Hon. Chief Justice Murray Gleeson wrote:

“The members of the Australian judiciary aspire to high

standards of conduct. Maintaining such standards is
essential if the community is to have confidence in its

10
Deuteronomy 16: 18-19
11
Life of Sir Thomas More: Yale University Press 1962

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

judiciary. The Australian Chief Justices decided that it was

time to provide members of the judiciary with some practical
guidance about conduct expected of them as holders of
judicial office, and that such guidance should reflect the
changes that have occurred in community standards over the
years.”

The major impact however, has resulted from the initiative undertaken
by the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention. In April
2000, the Centre in conjunction with Transparency International
convened a Judicial Group, comprising Chief Justices and other senior
Judges from eight African and Asian countries “to consider means of
strengthening judicial institutions and procedures as part of
strengthening the national integrity systems…” Following several
meetings, the group evolved what has come to be called the “Bangalore
Principles,” which were subjected to further consultations and
discussions at wider conferences, until ultimately they were endorsed at
the 59th Session of the UN Human Rights Commission at Geneva in April
2003. Many judiciaries have since then adopted the Bangalore Principles
as basis of their own codes or guides on judicial conduct. Even the
“mother” of all judiciaries of the Commonwealth acknowledges the
influence this initiative had in making of the “Guide to Judicial
Conduct” for England and Wales. In the Foreword to the Guide, the
Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales wrote:

“We are justifiably proud of our existing standards of judicial

conduct. However, the recent adoption of written codes of
conduct throughout the world and the endorsement of
principles by the UN Human Rights Commission at Geneva in
April 2003, have indicated that a written guide for England
and Wales would now be desirable and in accord with
international practice”

The Guide incorporates the Bangalore Principles and elaborates on them

extensively. Many other judiciaries have modelled their own codes or
guides on the Bangalore Principles.

It is evident from the foregoing that there is an irreversible trend towards

written codes of judicial conduct, by whatever name it may be called. On
the East African, the desirability of such a code is no longer in issue,
since each of the three judiciaries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) has
one. The current issue must be the making and adoption of a Code of
Judicial Conduct for the East African Judiciaries. Given the other
irreversible and fast moving drive towards the total integration of the
East African Partner States, the time for making, and adopting the code
is now, and the body competent to undertake the exercise is the five East

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

African Judiciaries (Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania)

through Magistrates and Judges Association. In the same vein, I see the
need for formulation of one Code of Conduct for lawyers in East Africa
under the auspices of the East African Law Society, the professional
umbrella organisation for lawyers in East Africa.

Role of Code of Judicial Conduct

In as much as a Code of Judicial Conduct is a tool for strengthening
judicial integrity, it is critical in combating corruption not only within the
judiciary but also in the Community as a whole. A corrupt judiciary is a
very serious impediment to the success of any anti-corruption strategy,
because an ethically compromised judiciary cripples any legal
mechanism that may be put in place to curb corruption. Conversely, a
corrupt-free judicial system renders the success of such strategy more
attainable.
The degree to which the code strengthens integrity depends on the extent
to which the code is put in practical use. The objectives of strengthening
judicial integrity are to:

i) Design practical approaches that will result in better judicial

conduct and raise public confidence in the judiciary and the
rule of law;
ii) Devise way and means of promoting the concept of judicial
accountability, without compromising judicial independence;
iii) Expose judicial officers to tested practices for judicial reform,
management of change and strengthening the rule of law;
iv) Raise awareness regarding the level of corruption in the
judiciary and the role of judicial officers in combating
corruption.

A properly structured code of conduct is not a litany of prohibitions like

the Penal Code. It is essentially an educative document, defining the
accepted norms and standards of judicial conduct. Its targets therefore,
should be:

i) To guide judicial officers to know, with a reasonable

degree of certainty, what is expected to them in regard
to their respective conduct;
ii) To enlighten the public about the standards of conduct
to expect of the judicial officers serving them; and
iii) Where appropriate, to provide to the disciplinary
authority, a clear and uniform standard by which to
measure the behaviour and conduct of the judicial
officers in breach.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

With a view to achieving these objectives, in 2001 the Ugandan Judiciary

set up a Judicial Integrity Committee, which it gave the general mandate
of strengthening judicial integrity. The Committee presented a Plan of
Action, which included the revision of the existing code of conduct. The
revised code, which was modelled on the Bangalore Principles, was
extensively discussed and ultimately adopted by the Judges’ Annual
Conference and an extra-ordinary General Meeting of Uganda Judicial
Officers’ Association (UJOA). Following a deliberate high profile launch,
the code was widely disseminated not only among the judicial officers of
all grades but also to a cross section of the general public. The
dissemination exercise continues. Simultaneously, Peer Committees
were established for every level of the court system to assist in fostering
awareness, understanding and application of the code. In its overall
mandate as a standing committee, the Judicial Integrity Committee
continues to monitor the level of integrity and corruption within the
judiciary, both as experienced and perceived by court users in particular
and by other stakeholders in general. It is still too early to assess the
impact these measures have had on the combat against corruption in the
Ugandan Judiciary.

Bangalore Principles

The Commonwealth Judiciaries Group when met in Bangalore India

2001 recognized at the outset the need for a universally acceptable
statement of principles of judicial conduct. Such a statement would
explain the ethical aspects of appropriate conduct to judges, encourage
informed public understanding of the judicial system, and inspire public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Following the adoption of an
initial draft at a meeting held in Bangalore, and a twenty-month
consultation exercise in which over 80 chief justices and senior judges
participated, a Round-Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace
Palace at the Hague in November 2002 finally agreed on The Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct.

In April 2003, the Bangalore Principles were noted by the UN Commission

on Human Rights and brought “to the attention of Member States, the
relevant United Nations organs and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations for their consideration”. In July 2006, the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) adopted a
resolution recommended to it by the UN Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice in which it recognized the Bangalore
Principles as representing a further development of, and as being
complementary to, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary. Accordingly, ECOSOC invited Member States to encourage
their judiciaries to take into consideration the Bangalore Principles when

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reviewing or developing rules with respect to the professional and ethical

conduct of members of the judiciary.

The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) are intended to

establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to
provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for
regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist members of
the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the public in general,
to better understand and support the judiciary. These principles
presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate
institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are
themselves independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement
and not to derogate from existing rules of law and conduct which bind
the judge.

Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of Tanzania

As stated earlier in this presentation The Tanzanian Judiciary adopted
the “Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of Tanzania” at a Magistrates
and Judges Conference held at Arusha from 15th to 16th March 1984. It
is now almost twenty seven years since Tanzanian Judiciary adopted and
started testing this Code of Conduct containing ethical principles that
should guide judicial officers of Tanzania mainland in their conduct.
Violation of any of the rules contained in the Code constitutes judicial
misconduct or misbehaviour and may entail disciplinary action. It seems
to me, there is need for Tanzanian Judiciary to take deliberate steps to
update the Code in terms of structure and content so that it can
systematically play an effective guiding role to the judicial officers. Since
it is not the intention of this presentation to make a critical analysis of
the Code, I will not dwell much on its weaknesses but examine its
applicability. Generally, the said code reflects most of the above
mentioned basic values and principles around which judicial ethics
evolve.

The Code reflects the principle of propriety by requiring the Tanzanian

judicial officers to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities.12 It is incumbent upon a Tanzanian Judicial officer to
treat all people equally and not to permit court staff or lawyers to
manifest by words or conduct unjust differentiation of any person before
the court (for example accused persons, parties, witnesses, lawyers, etc).
This spirit aims at ensuring the principle and value of equality of
treatment to all before the court.13

12
Vide Rule 1 of the Code.
13
Vide Rule 2 A (3) and (4) of the Code.

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The main activity of a judicial officer is to adjudicate matters such that

his/her judicial duties take precedence over other activities. He is
required to devote his/her professional activity to judicial duties for
which he was employed. Such duties are broadly defined and include not
only of judicial duties in court and the making of decisions but other
tasks relevant to the court’s operations or to the judicial office.14 Delay in
determination of cases by the court can largely be attributed to non
adherence to this ethic value by some judicial officers who take their time
to report to work, and when they report to work they don’t start working
promptly but spare time to go for morning tea and taking soup.
Remember the famous saying that “justice delayed is justice denied”.
Lawyers, accused persons and litigants more often than not keep
complaining that they are kept waiting at the convenient of judicial
officers. Drunkenness has been pointed out as one of the reasons for late
coming to work by judicial officers in many jurisdictions as can be found
in the words of His Excellence the President of the Second Republic of
Uganda to the Acting Chief Justice:

“Mr. Acting Chief justice, you will have a big problem of

fighting drunkenness among some of the Magistrates. I have
reliably learnt that drink is affecting the efficiency of some of
the Magistrates so much that they are continually late in Court
and some are heavily in debt. I need hardly emphasise that
being drunk and being in debt are the most sure ways of
becoming corrupt.”15

It should be noted that punctuality is a very important conduct that a

judicial officer must cultivate. Whenever a judicial officer gets much
involved in extraneous activities without dedicating time to his judicial
work he/she consequently gets caught up as he/she cannot dispose of
promptly the business of the court. By so doing he contravenes and
violates the Code of Judicial conduct.16
The Code requires a judicial officer to disqualify himself/herself in a
proceeding in which might reasonably be questioned17 and to take
reasonable steps to maintain and enhance his/her knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial
duties.

14
Vide Rule 2 B (1) of the Code
15
Quoted in Odoki, B. J, 3rd Edn, An Introduction to Judicial Conduct and Practice, Law Development
Centre, 1990, Kampala, p. 87.
16
Vide Rule 2A (4) of the Code.
17
Rule 2 C of the Code

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Conclusion
The foregoing account has been an exposition of the importance of the
code of conduct and adherence to the legal ethics and etiquette by
magistrates and judges. We have seen that the principles governing legal
ethics are interrelated with few specific differences due to the specialised
nature of the respective legal profession.
It is therefore incumbent upon each member of the legal profession,
(advocates and judicial officers) to maintain a good image and should
always remind himself/herself that where the image is tarnished, it is
his/her duty to rectify it.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES

OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
2002

(The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001 adopted by the

Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round
Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague,
November 25-26, 2002) 2

Preamble

WHEREAS the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes as

fundamental the principle that everyone is entitled in full equality to a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of rights and obligations and of any criminal charge.

WHEREAS the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

guarantees that all persons shall be equal before the courts, and that in
the determination of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a
suit at law, everyone shall be entitled, without undue delay, to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.

WHEREAS the foregoing fundamental principles and rights are also

recognized or reflected in regional human rights instruments, in
domestic constitutional, statutory and common law, and in
judicial conventions and traditions.

WHEREAS the importance of a competent, independent and impartial

judiciary to the protection of human rights is given emphasis by the fact
that the implementation of all the other rights ultimately depends upon
the proper administration of justice.

WHEREAS a competent, independent and impartial judiciary is likewise

essential if the courts are to fulfil their role in upholding
constitutionalism and the rule of law.

WHEREAS public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral

authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost importance in a
modern democratic society.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

WHEREAS it is essential that judges, individually and collectively,

respect and honour judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance
and maintain confidence in the judicial system.

WHEREAS the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance

of high standards of judicial conduct lies with the judiciary in each
country.

AND WHEREAS the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence

of the Judiciary are designed to secure and promote the independence of
the judiciary, and are addressed primarily to States.

THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES are intended to establish standards for

ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide guidance to
judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial
conduct. They are also intended to assist members of the executive and
the legislature, and lawyers and the public in general, to better
understand and support the judiciary. These principles presuppose that
judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions
established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves
independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement and not to
derogate from existing rules of law and conduct which bind the judge.

Value 1:
INDEPENDENCE

Principle:
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and
exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.

Application:
1.1 A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the
basis of the judge's assessment of the facts and in accordance with
a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

1.2 A judge shall be independent in relation to society in general and

in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which the judge
has to adjudicate.

1.3 A judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with,
and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of

17
Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be

free therefrom.

1.4 In performing judicial duties, a judge shall be independent of

judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is
obliged to make independently.

1.5 A judge shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of
judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional
and operational independence of the judiciary.

Value 2:
IMPARTIALITY

Principle:
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It
applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the
decision is made.

Application:
2.1 A judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favour, bias
or prejudice.

2.2 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of
the judiciary.

2.3 A judge shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct himself or herself

as to minimise the occasions on which it will be necessary for the
judge to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

2.4 A judge shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could

come before, the judge, make any comment that might reasonably
be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall the judge make any
comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of
any person or issue.

2.5 A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any

proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that
the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

2.5.1 the judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings;

2.5.2 the judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness

in the matter in controversy; or
2.5.3 the judge, or a member of the judge's family, has an economic
interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy:

Provided that disqualification of a judge shall not be required if no

other tribunal can be constituted to deal with the case or, because
of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious
miscarriage of justice.

Value 3:
INTEGRITY

Principle:
Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.
Application:
3.1 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the
view of a reasonable observer.
3.2 The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people's
faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be
done but must also be seen to be done.

Value 4:
PROPRIETY

Principle:
Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the
performance of all of the activities of a judge.

Application:
4.1 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of the judge's activities.
4.2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
a judge shall conduct himself or herself in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.
4.3. A judge shall, in his or her personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practise regularly in the judge's
court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

4.4 A judge shall not participate in the determination of a case in which

any member of the judge's family represents a litigant or is
associated in any manner with the case.
4.5 A judge shall not allow the use of the judge's residence by a member
of the legal profession to receive clients or other members of the
legal profession.
4.6 A judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, a
judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.
4.7 A judge shall inform himself or herself about the judge's personal and
fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be
informed about the financial interests of members of the judge's
family.
4.8 A judge shall not allow the judge's family, social or other
relationships improperly to influence the judge's judicial conduct
and judgment as a judge.
4.9 A judge shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to
advance the private interests of the judge, a member of the judge's
family or of anyone else, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to
convey the impression that anyone is in a special position
improperly to influence the judge in the performance of judicial
duties.
4.10 Confidential information acquired by a judge in the judge's judicial
capacity shall not be used or disclosed by the judge for any other
purpose not related to the judge's judicial duties.
4.11 Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, a judge may:

4.11.1 write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the

law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related
matters;
4.11.2 appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with
matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration
of justice or related matters;
4.11.3 serve as a member of an official body, or other government
commission, committee or advisory body, if such membership is
not inconsistent with the perceived impartiality and political
neutrality of a judge; or
4.11.4 engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the
dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the
performance of judicial duties.
4.12 A judge shall not practise law whilst the holder of judicial office.
4.13 A judge may form or join associations of judges or participate in
other organisations representing the interests of judges.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

4.14 A judge and members of the judge's family, shall neither ask for,
nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done by the judge in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.
4.15 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to
the judge's influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept,
any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to
be done or omitted to be done in connection with his or her duties
or functions.
4.16 Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, a
judge may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to
the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or
benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence
the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give
rise to an appearance of partiality.

Value 5:
EQUALITY

Principle:
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the
due performance of the judicial office.

Application:
5.1 A judge shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and
differences arising from various sources, including but not limited to
race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age,
marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and
other like causes ("irrelevant grounds").
5.2 A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds.
5.3 A judge shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff
and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
5.4 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to
the judge's influence, direction or control to differentiate between
persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant
ground.
5.5 A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice
based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to
an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate
advocacy.
.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

Value 6:
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Principle:
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of
judicial office.

Application:
6.1 The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other
activities.
6.2 A judge shall devote the judge's professional activity to judicial
duties, which include not only the performance of judicial
functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the
court's operations.
6.3 A judge shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance the
judge's knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the
proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this
purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made
available, under judicial control, to judges.
6.4 A judge shall keep himself or herself informed about relevant
developments of international law, including international
conventions and other instruments establishing human rights
norms.
6.5 A judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness.
6.6 A judge shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. The judge shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
the judge's influence, direction or control.
6.7 A judge shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.

IMPLEMENTATION

By reason of the nature of judicial office, effective measures shall be

adopted by national judiciaries to provide mechanisms to implement
these principles if such mechanisms are not already in existence in their
jurisdictions.

DEFINITIONS
In this statement of principles, unless the context otherwise permits or
requires, the following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

"Court staff" includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.
"Judge" means any person exercising judicial power, however designated.
"Judge's family" includes a judge's spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, and any other close relative or person who is a
companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge's
household.
"Judge's spouse" includes a domestic partner of the judge or any other
person of either sex in a close personal relationship with the judge.

Explanatory Note
1. At its first meeting held in Vienna in April 2000 on the invitation of the
United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, and in
conjunction with the 10th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, the Judicial Group on
Strengthening Judicial Integrity (comprising Chief Justice Latifur
Rahman of Bangladesh, Chief Justice Bhaskar Rao of Karnataka State in
India, Justice Govind Bahadur Shrestha of Nepal, Chief Justice Uwais of
Nigeria, Deputy Vice-President Langa of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, Chief Justice Nyalali of Tanzania, and Justice Odoki of
Uganda, meeting under the chairmanship of Judge Christopher
Weeramantry, Vice-President of the International Courtof Justice, with
Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia as rapporteur, and
with the participation of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers) recognized the
need for a code against which the conduct of judicial officers may be
measured. Accordingly, the Judicial Group requested that codes of
judicial conduct which had been adopted in some jurisdictions be
analyzed, and a report be prepared by the Co-ordinator of the Judicial
Integrity Programme, Dr Nihal Jayawickrama, concerning:
(a) the core considerations which recur in such codes; and
(b) the optional or additional considerations which occur in some, but
not all, such codes and which may or may not be suitable for
adoption in particular countries.

2. In preparing a draft code of judicial conduct in accordance with the

directions set out above, reference was made to several existing codes
and international instruments including, in particular, the following:
(a) The Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association, August 1972.
(b) Declaration of Principles of Judicial Independence issued by the
Chief Justices of the Australian States and Territories, April 1997.
(c) Code of Conduct for the Judges of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh, prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Council in the
exercise of power under Article 96(4)(a) of the Constitution of the
People's Republic of Bangladesh, May 2000.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

(d) Ethical Principles for Judges, drafted with the cooperation of the
Canadian Judges Conference and endorsed by the Canadian
Judicial Council, 1998.
(e) The European Charter on the Statute for Judges, Council of Europe,
July 1998.
(f) The Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct 1976.
(g) Restatement of Values of Judicial Life adopted by the Chief Justices
Conference of India, 1999.
(h) The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.
(i) Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of Kenya, July 1999.
(j) The Judges' Code of Ethics of Malaysia, prescribed by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong on the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the
President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the High
Courts, in the exercise of powers conferred by Article 125(3A) of the
Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1994.
(k) The Code of Conduct for Magistrates in Namibia.
(l) Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, New York State, USA.
(m) Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria.
(n) Code of Conduct to be observed by Judges of the Supreme Court
and of the High Courts of Pakistan.
(o) The Code of Judicial Conduct of the Philippines, September 1989.
(p) The Canons of Judicial Ethics of the Philippines, proposed by the
Philippines Bar Association, approved by the Judges of First
Instance of Manila, and adopted for the guidance of and observance
by the judges under the administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court, including municipal judges and city judges.
(q) Yandina Statement: Principles of Independence of the Judiciary in
Solomon Islands, November 2000.
(r) Guidelines for Judges of South Africa, issued by the Chief Justice,
the President of the Constitutional Court, and the Presidents of High
Courts, the Labour Appeal Court, and the Land Claims Court,
March 2000.
(s) Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of Tanzania, adopted by the
Judges and Magistrates Conference, 1984.
(t) The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
(u) Code of Conduct for Judges, Magistrates and Other Judicial Officers
of Uganda, adopted by the Judges of the Supreme Court and the
High Court, July 1989.
(v) The Code of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
(w) The Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Commonwealth of Virginia,
adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court of Virginia, 1998.
(x) The Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington, USA, October 1995.
(y) The Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act, enacted by the Parliament of
Zambia, December 1999.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

(z) Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary ("Siracusa

Principles"), prepared by a committee of experts convened by the
International Association of Penal Law, the International
Commission of Jurists, and the Centre for the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers, 1981.
(aa) Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence adopted by the
International Bar Association, 1982.
(bb) United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, endorsed by the UN General Assembly, 1985.
(cc) Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice ("Singhvi
Declaration") prepared by Mr L.V. Singhvi, UN Special Rapporteur
on the Study on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1989.
(dd) The Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the
Judiciary in the Lawasia Region, adopted by the 6th Conference of
Chief Justices, August 1997.
(ee) The Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth on good
practice governing relations between the Executive, Parliament and
the Judiciary in the promotion of good governance, the rule of law
and human rights to ensure the effective implementation of the
Harare Principles, 1998.
(ff) The Policy Framework for Preventing and Eliminating Corruption
and Ensuring the Impartiality of the Judicial System, adopted by the
expert group convened by the Centre for the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers, February 2000.

At its second meeting held in Bangalore in February 2001, the Judicial

Group (comprising Chief Justice Mainur Reza Chowdhury of Bangladesh,
Justice Claire L'Heureux Dube of Canada, Chief Justice Reddi of
Karnataka State in India, Chief Justice Upadhyay of Nepal, Chief Justice
Uwais of Nigeria, Deputy Chief Justice Langa of South Africa, Chief
Justice Silva of Sri Lanka, Chief Justice Samatta of Tanzania, and Chief
Justice Odoki of Uganda, meeting under the chairmanship of Judge
Weeramantry, with Justice Kirby as rapporteur, and with the
participation of the UN Special Rapporteur and Justice Bhagwati,
Chairman of the UN Human Rights Committee, representing the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights) proceeding by way of examination of
the draft placed before it, identified the core values, formulated the
relevant principles, and agreed on the Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial
Conduct. The Judicial Group recognized, however, that since the
Bangalore Draft had been developed by judges drawn principally from
common law countries, it was essential that it be scrutinized by judges of
other legal traditions to enable it to assume the status of a duly
authenticated international code of judicial conduct.

The Bangalore Draft was widely disseminated among judges of both

common law and civil law systems and discussed at several judicial

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

conferences. In June 2002, it was reviewed by the Working Party of the

Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE-GT), comprising Vice-
President Reissner of the Austrian Association of Judges, Judge Fremr of
the High Court in the Czech Republic, President Lacabarats of the Cour
d'Appel de Paris in France, Judge Mallmann of the Federal
Administrative Court of Germany, Magistrate Sabato of Italy, Judge
Virgilijus of the Lithuanian Court of Appeal, Premier Conseiller Wiwinius
of the Cour d'Appel of Luxembourg, Juge Conseiller Afonso of the Court
of Appeal of Portugal, Justice Ogrizek of the Supreme Court of Slovenia,
President Hirschfeldt of the Svea Court of Appeal in Sweden, and Lord
Justice Mance of the United Kingdom. On the initiative of the American
Bar Association, the Bangalore Draft was translated into the national
languages, and reviewed by judges, of the Central and Eastern European
countries; in particular, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Kosovo, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia.

The Bangalore Draft was revised in the light of the comments received
from CCJE-GT and others referred to above; Opinion no.1 (2001) of
CCJE on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary; the
draft Opinion of CCJE on the principles and rules governing judges'
professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and
impartiality; and by reference to more recent codes of judicial conduct
including the Guide to Judicial Conduct published by the Council of
Chief Justices of Australia in June 2002, the Model Rules of Conduct for
Judges of the Baltic States, the Code of Judicial Ethics for Judges of the
People's Republic of China, and the Code of Judicial Ethics of the
Macedonian Judges Association.

The revised Bangalore Draft was placed before a Round-Table Meeting of

Chief Justices (or their representatives) from the civil law system, held in
the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, in November 2002, with
Judge Weeramantry presiding. Those participating were Judge Vladimir
de Freitas of the Federal Court of Appeal of Brazil, Chief Justice Iva
Brozova of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, Chief Justice
Mohammad Fathy Naguib of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt,
Conseillere Christine Chanet of the Cour de Cassation of France,
President Genaro David Gongora Pimentel of the Suprema Corte de
Justicia de la Nacion of Mexico, President Mario Mangaze of the Supreme
Court of Mozambique, President Pim Haak of the Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden, Justice Trond Dolva of the Supreme Court of Norway, and
Chief Justice Hilario Davide of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Also participating in one session were the following Judges of the
International Court of Justice:
Judge Ranjeva (Madagascar), Judge Herczegh (Hungary), Judge
Fleischhauer (Germany), Judge Koroma (Sierra Leone), Judge Higgins
(United Kingdom), Judge Rezek (Brazil), Judge Elaraby (Egypt), and Ad-

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

Hoc Judge Frank (USA). The UN Special Rapporteur was in attendance.

The"Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct" was the product of this
meeting.

ENFORCEMENT OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

In Tanzania various measures have been taken to enforce judicial ethics:

(a) Personal Initiatives

(b) Internal Measures:
Codification of Ethics for Judicial Officers of Tanzania to
form The Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of
Tanzania
Adoption of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct,
2002
Introducing a Course on Judicial Ethics at the Institute
for Judicial Administration Lushoto
Introducing Induction Course for newly appointed
Judges that includes Judicial Ethics
Annual Colloquium (Including an agenda on judicial ethics
for discussion among the Judges)

(c) External Measures (By the Government)

This was through various legislations

The Judiciary Administration Act, No. 4 of 2011,

The Judicial Service Act, 2005
o Judicial Service Commission
o Judges Ethics Committee
o Judicial Officers Ethics Committee
o Regional Judicial Officers Ethics Committee (RC, RAS,
RM i/c, 2 J/Officers by Judge i/c, 2 Prominent
persons by RC, State Attorney)
o District Judicial Officers Ethics Committee (DC, DM or
RM i/c, DAS, 2 People appointed by DC one of them
being religious leader, 2 J/officers appointed by Judge
i/c.
The Public Leaders Ethics Act, Cap 298 R.E. 2002
o Public Leaders Ethics Secretariat
o Public Leaders Ethics Committee

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB)

Act, Cap 329
o The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
(PCCB)

THE JUDGES ETHICS COMMITTEE

The Judges Ethics Committee is among the four Committees which have
been established by law, Section 36 of The Judiciary Administration Act,
No. 4 of 2011.

The Judicial Service Commission delegated to the Judges Ethics

Committee powers to make investigation and inquiries of complaints
against Judges regarding the ethical implications of their prospective or
on going conducts (Judges ethics).

Judges Ethics consist of the standards and norms that bear on judges
and cover such matters as how to maintain independency, impartiality
and avoid impropriety.

Composition

The Chief Justice appoints a Committee on Judges Ethics consisting of

seven members. (S.37 of the Act).

a. A Chairman who is a Justice of Appeal.

b. Three Justices of Appeal.
c. Three Judges of the High Court.

Members are appointed for three years term and may be reappointed to
the Committee but no more than two successive full three years terms.
Where a member is unavailable or has a conflict of interest there is no
replacement.

A Committee is not allowed to delegate the performance of its functions

and exercise its powers to any person. A member of a Committee whom a
complaint has been lodged against him is not allowed to participate in
the Committee’s sitting that determines the relevant complaint. The Chief
Registrar serves as a Secretary to the Committee. (Section 37 (4) of the
Act).
• Committee meets for transaction of business at least once every
three months.
• Upon request by a majority members in the office the Chairperson
may call a special meeting.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

• Quorum of the Committee is half of the members in office.

• The functions of the Committee are clearly stipulated under S.38 of
the Act.
• To receive and investigate complaints against Justices of Appeal,
the Jaji Kiongozi or a Judge.
• Serve complaints to the Justices of Appeal, the Jaji Kiongozi or a
Judge lodged direct from the complainants or from the Chief
Justice. Complainants can be a Judicial officer, a law officer, a
Government agency, an advocate, a person who has interest in the
matter and person who can produce adequate evidence on the
complaint.
• Complaints to the Committee should be on matters such as
handling of cases, allegation of corruption, non adherence to the
Code of Judicial Ethics and poor performance (Section 41 (3) of the
Act).
• Upon hearing the complaint the Committee have powers to take
any steps such as reprimanding or warning or such acts which
appear necessary to address the complaint.
Note: the Committee has no mandate to deal with a complaint
against the Chief Justice.
• Upon receipt of a Complaint in writing and signed by the
complainant or direction from the Chief Justice or remittance from
the commission;
a. A copy of complaint is served to the concerned judge and is
required to respond within twenty one days.
b. Where a Judge concerned admits the complaint the
Committee shall either reprimand, warn or take any
necessary step to address the complaint.
c. Where it is necessary investigation to be conducted In case
of grave complaints, the Committee shall make inquiries into
the matter. (S. 43 of the Act)
d. Where the Judge concerned does not admit the complaint
which the Committee considers to be of a grave nature, it
shall refer the matter to the Commission. (S. 44 of the Act)
• The Committee does not receive appeal from any authority and its
decision are not appealable. After the decision the Committee
refers the matter to the Commission.
• In case the Commission prefers removal of the Judge of the High
Court or Justice of Appeal they resort to the procedure as
prescribed under Articles 110A or 120A of the Constitution of the
United Republic of Tanzania.

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Prof. J.E. Ruhangisa: Judicial Ethics

References:
1. Twaib, F. The Legal Profession in Tanzania, Bayreuth African
Studies, Dar es Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam, 1997
2. Odoki, B. J, 3rd Edn, An Introduction to Judicial Conduct and
Practice, Law Development Centre, 1990, Kampala
3. Harvey, W. B., Introduction to the Legal Systems of East Africa,
1975
4. Hutchinson, Allan C., Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
in Canada, 1999
5. Dias, C. J. Et al (eds), Lawyers in the Third World: Comparative and
Developmental Perspectives, Uppsala, 1981
6. Lord Denning, A, The Road to Justice, Stevens and Sons, London,
1955
7. Deborah L. Rhode and David Lubah, Legal Ethics, 1992
8. Life of Sir Thomas More: Yale University Press 1962
9. The Holy Bible, Deuteronomy 16: 18-19
10. Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth judicial Colloquium on
Combating Corruption within the Judiciary – Conference Report,
Limassol, Cyprus, 25-27 June 2002.
11. Modern Judicial Ethics: The National Judicial College, University of
Nevada, 1991
12. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002
13. The Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of Tanzania
14. The Judiciary Administration Act, No. 4 of 2011,
15. Judicial Service Act, 2005
16. Public Leaders Ethics Act, Cap 298 R.E. 2002
17. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977

30