EN BANC
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIO CAPALAC,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. L-38297
October 23, 1982
FERNANDO, C.J.:
FACTS
On September 20, 1970 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon at a licensed cockpit in the City
of Iligan. The aggressor, Mag-agso attempted to escape, was confronted by two brothers of
Moises, Jesus Capalac and appellant Mario Capalac. The attempt of Mag-aso to board a jeep
was unsuccessful, he having alighted after two shots were fired in succession.
Knowing that he was completely at the mercy of the two brothers, he raised his hands as a sign
of surrender, but they were not to be appeased. He was pistol-whipped by appellant Mario
Capalac, being dealt several blows on the head and the face. After he had fallen to the ground,
Jesus Capalac stabbed the deceased on the chest three or four times. He was brought to the
hospital where he died, the cause, according to the coroner's report, being "hemorrhagic shock
due to a wound of the heart."
After trial duly held, Mario Capalac was convicted of murder. The lower court found that the
crime was committed with evident premeditation and treachery. The lower court also held that
appellant took advantage of his position as a police officer and employed means or brought about
circumstances which added ignominy to the natural effects of his act. It sentenced him to suffer
the death penalty. Hence, this case is before this Tribunal for automatic review.
ISSUE
Whether or not there the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of position
as a police officer, and a means employed or brought about to add ignominy to the natural effects
of the act are present? (NO)
RULING
The lower court erred, however, in finding the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, of means being employed or circumstances brought about to add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act, and of the crime being committed with the offender taking advantage of
his official position as having attended the commission of the crime. As early as 1903, Justice
Mapa, in United States v. Alvarez, made clear that an aggravating circumstance must be "as fully
proven as the crime itself." He added: "Without clear and evident proof of their presence, the
penalty fixed by the law for the punishment of the crime cannot be increased." Moreover,
insofar as evident premeditation is concerned, there is this relevant excerpt from the same
opinion: "The record contains no evidence showing that the defendant had, prior to the moment
of its execution, resolved to commit the crime, nor is there proof that this resolution was the
result of meditation, calculation and persistence. In People v. Mendova, it was emphasized that
it should not be "premeditation" merely; it is "evident" premeditation. A recent decision, People
v. Anin, ruled that the perpetration of a criminal act "evidently made in the heat of anger" did not
call for a finding that there was evident premeditation. What is required is that the offense was
"the result of cool and serene reflection." What was done by the brothers of Capalac cannot be
categorized as falling within the norm of means being employed or circumstances being brought
about to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. It is well to stress that they were
prompted by their desire to avenge their brother. They went after Mag-aso, the victim. They
assaulted him, relying on the weapons they carried with them. Jesus stabbed him and appellant
Mario pistol-whipped him. They did what they felt they had to do to redress a grievance. It
cannot be said, therefore, that they deliberately employed means to add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act. It is quite apparent that all they were interested in was to assure that there be
retribution for what was done to their brother. The mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is
a member of the police force certainly did not of itself justify that the aggravating
circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of his public position be considered as
present. He acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious
assault on his kin that could cause the death of a loved one. It would be an affront to reason to
state that at a time like that and reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a policeman
to commit the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his pistol with him. It came
in handy and he acted accordingly. That he was a policeman is of no relevance in assessing his
criminal responsibility.
