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o v. Far East Bank & Trust Co. 2/7/2020 G.R. No. 150134 | Del Rosario v. Far East Bank & Trust Co.

Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the latter applied

to interest, service fees and penalty charges. This left petitioners, by
PDCP's computation, with an outstanding balance on the principal of more
than P10 million as of May 15, 1983.
SECOND DIVISION By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for violation of the
[G.R. No. 150134. October 31, 2007.] Usury Law, annulment of contract and damages. The case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 82-8088, was dismissed by the CFI. HAEDCT

ERNESTO C. DEL ROSARIO and DAVAO TIMBER

On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) set aside the
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST
CFI's dismissal of the complaint and declared void and of no effect the
COMPANY 1 and PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION stipulation of interest in the loan agreement between DATICOR and PDCP.
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PDCP appealed the IAC's decision to this Court where it was
docketed as G.R. No. 73198.
DECISION In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from
petitioners (the receivables) to its co-respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC) under a Deed of Assignment dated April 10, 1987 5 for
CARPIO-MORALES, J : p
a consideration of P5,435,000. The Deed of Assignment was later
amended by two Supplements. 6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch "65" (sic) 2
FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners later
having, by Decision 3 of July 10, 2001, dismissed petitioners' complaint in
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 8, 1988
Civil Case No. 00-540 on the ground of res judicata and splitting of a cause
whereby petitioners agreed to, as they did pay FEBTC 7 the amount of P6.4
of action, and by Order of September 24, 2001 4 denied their motion for
million as full settlement of the receivables.
reconsideration thereof, petitioners filed the present petition for review on
certiorari. On September 2, 1992, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R.
No. 73198 8 affirming in toto the decision of the IAC. It determined that after
From the rather lengthy history of the present controversy, a recital of
the following material facts culled from the records is in order. deducting the P3 million earlier paid by petitioners to PDCP, their remaining
balance on the principal loan was only P1.4 million.
On May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR)
and respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines Petitioners thus filed on April 25, 1994 a Complaint 9 for sum of
(PDCP) entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP extended to money against PDCP and FEBTC before the RTC of Makati, mainly to
DATICOR a foreign currency loan of US $265,000 and a peso loan of P2.5 recover the excess payment which they computed to be P5.3 million 10 —
million or a total amount of approximately P4.4 million, computed at the P4.335 million from PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC. The case, Civil
then prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar with the peso. Case No. 94-1610, was raffled to Branch 132 of the Makati RTC.
The loan agreement provided, among other things, that DATICOR On May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of the Makati RTC rendered a
shall pay: (1) a service fee of one percent (1%) per annum (later increased decision 11 in Civil Case No. 94-1610 ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the
to six percent [6%] per annum) on the outstanding balance of the peso sum of P4.035 million, 12 to bear interest at 12% per annum from April 25,
loan; (2) 12 percent (12%) per annum interest on the peso loan; and (3) 1994 until fully paid; to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages
penalty charges of two percent (2%) per month in case of default. on the five parcels of land in Mati, Davao Oriental and on the pieces of
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of machinery and equipment and to return the corresponding titles to
land — one situated in Manila (the Otis property) which was registered in petitioners; and to pay the costs of the suit.
the name of petitioner Ernesto C. Del Rosario, and five in Mati, Davao As for the complaint of petitioners against respondent FEBTC, the
Oriental — and chattel mortgages over pieces of machinery and trial court dismissed it for lack of cause of action, ratiocinating that the MOA
equipment. between petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to this Court's Decision in
G.R. No. 73198, FEBTC not being a party thereto.
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From the trial court's decision, petitioners and respondent PDCP and since petitioners failed to claim the said whole amount in their original
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal was docketed as CA- complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1610 as they were merely claiming the
G.R. CV No. 50591. amount of P965,000 from it, they were barred from claiming it.
On May 22, 1998, the CA rendered a decision 13 in CA-G.R. CV No. FEBTC later filed a Third Party Complaint 20 against PDCP praying
50591, holding that petitioners' outstanding obligation, which this Court had that the latter be made to pay the P965,000 and the interests adjudged by
determined in G.R. No. 73198 to be P1.4 million, could not be increased or the CA in favor of petitioners, as well as the P4.335 million and interests
decreased by any act of the creditor PDCP. that petitioners were claiming from it. It posited that PDCP should be held
liable because it received a consideration of P5.435 million when it
The CA held that when PDCP assigned its receivables, the amount
assigned the receivables.
payable to it by DATICOR was the same amount payable to assignee
FEBTC, irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have Answering 21 the Third Party Complaint, PDCP contended that since
provided in the Deed of Assignment, DATICOR not having been a party petitioners were not seeking the recovery of the amount of P965,000, the
thereto, hence, not bound by its terms. cASEDC same cannot be recovered via the third party complaint.
Citing Articles 2154 and 2163 15 of the Civil Code which embody
14 PDCP went on to contend that since the final and executory decision
the principle of solutio indebiti, the CA held that the party bound to refund in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 had held that DATICOR has no cause of action
the excess payment of P5 million 16 was FEBTC as it received the against it for the refund of any part of the excess payment, FEBTC can no
overpayment; and that FEBTC could recover from PDCP the amount of longer re-litigate the same issue.
P4.035 million representing its overpayment for the assigned receivables Moreover, PDCP contended that it was not privy to the MOA which
based on the terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the general principle explicitly excluded the receivables from the effect of the Supreme Court
of equity. decision, and that the amount of P6.4 million paid by petitioners to FEBTC
Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its complaint only the was clearly intended as consideration for the release and cancellation of
amount of P965,000 from FEBTC, the CA held that it could not grant a the lien on the Otis property. cDEHIC

relief different from or in excess of that prayed for. Replying, 22 FEBTC pointed out that PDCP cannot deny that it
Finally, the CA held that the claim of PDCP against DATICOR for the benefited from the assignment of its rights over the receivables from
payment of P1.4 million had no basis, DATICOR's obligation having petitioners. It added that the third party claim being founded on a valid and
already been paid in full, overpaid in fact, when it paid assignee FEBTC the justified cause, PDCP's counterclaims lacked factual and legal basis.
amount of P6.4 million.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 23 to
Accordingly, the CA ordered PDCP to execute a release or which FEBTC filed its opposition. 24
cancellation of the mortgages it was holding over the Mati real properties
By Order of March 5, 2001, the trial court denied the motion for
and the machinery and equipment, and to return the corresponding
certificates of title to petitioners. And it ordered FEBTC to pay petitioners summary judgment for lack of merit. 25
the amount of P965,000 with legal interest from the date of the On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the assailed Decision
promulgation of its judgment. dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting
FEBTC's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied, of cause of action. It recalled that petitioners had filed Civil Case No. 94-
and so was its subsequent appeal to this Court. 1610 to recover the alleged overpayment both from PDCP and FEBTC and
to secure the cancellation and release of their mortgages on real
On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC of Makati a properties, machinery and equipment; that when said case was appealed,
Complaint 17 against FEBTC to recover the balance of the excess payment the CA, in its Decision, ordered PDCP to release and cancel the mortgages
of P4.335 million. 18 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-540, the and FEBTC to pay P965,000 with interest, which Decision became final
precursor of the present case and raffled to Branch 143 of the RTC. and executory on November 23, 1999; and that a Notice of Satisfaction of
Judgment between petitioners and FEBTC was in fact submitted on August
In its Answer, 19 FEBTC denied responsibility, it submitting that
8, 2000, hence, the issue between them was finally settled under the
nowhere in the dispositive portion of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
doctrine of res judicata.
50591 was it held liable to return the whole amount of P5.435 million
representing the consideration for the assignment to it of the receivables,
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The trial court moreover noted that the MOA between petitioners and (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
FEBTC clearly stated that the "pending litigation before the Supreme Court respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
of the Philippines with respect to the Loan exclusive of the Receivables could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
assigned to FEBTC shall prevail up to the extent not covered by this parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
Agreement." That statement in the MOA, the trial court ruled, categorically commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
made only the loan subject to this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
hence, it was with the parties' full knowledge and consent that petitioners (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
agreed to pay P6.4 million to FEBTC as consideration for the settlement. successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in
The parties cannot thus be allowed to welsh on their contractual a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have
obligations, the trial court concluded. been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto. (Underscoring supplied)
Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the trial court held that
FEBTC's payment of the amount of P1,224,906.67 (P965,000 plus interest) The above-quoted provision lays down two main rules. Section 49
to petitioners was in compliance with the final judgment of the CA, hence, it (b) * enunciates the first rule of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment" or
could not entertain such claim because the Complaint filed by petitioners "estoppel by judgment," which states that the judgment or decree of a court of
merely sought to recover from FEBTC the alleged overpayment of P4.335 competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
million and attorney's fees of P200,000. litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action either before the same or any other tribunal. 29
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 26 of the July 10, 2001
decision of the trial court was denied by Order of September 24, 2001. Stated otherwise, "bar by former judgment" makes the judgment
rendered in the first case an absolute bar to the subsequent action since
Hence, the present petition.
that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received
In their Memorandum, 27 petitioners proffer that, aside from the issue to sustain it but also as to any other matter which might have been offered
of whether their complaint is dismissible on the ground of res judicata and for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein. 30 It is in this
splitting of cause of action, the issues of 1) whether FEBTC can be held concept that the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used as
liable for the balance of the overpayment of P4.335 million plus interest a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases. 31
which petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in Civil Case No. 94-
1610, and 2) whether PDCP can interpose as defense the provision in the The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47 (c), Rule 39
Deed of Assignment and the MOA that the assignment of the receivables is "conclusiveness of judgment." This rule provides that any right, fact, or
shall not be affected by this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, be matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
considered. determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or
decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
Stripped of the verbiage, the only issue for this Court's consideration therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-540 upon the grounds whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
stated by the trial court. This should be so because a Rule 45 petition, like suits is the same. 32 It refers to a situation where the judgment in the prior
the one at bar, can raise only questions of law (and that justifies petitioners' action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined
elevation of the case from the trial court directly to this Court) which must
or which were necessarily included therein. 33
be distinctly set forth. 28 DHSCEc

The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior
The petition is bereft of merit. judgment," viz:
Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on the doctrine of res (a) finality of the former judgment;
judicata, reads:
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect matter and the parties;
of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and cHaCAS

as follows:
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity
xxx xxx xxx of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 34

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There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil Case submitted in Civil Case No. 00-540.
No. 94-1610 (that rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final Notably, the same facts were also pleaded by the parties in support
judgment. Not only did it dispose of the case on the merits; it also became of their allegations for, and defenses against, the recovery of the P4.335
executory as a consequence of the denial of FEBTC's motion for million. Petitioners, of course, plead the CA Decision as basis for their
reconsideration and appeal. 35 subsequent claim for the remainder of their overpayment. It is well
Neither is there room to doubt that the judgment in Civil Case No. established, however, that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or
94-1610 was on the merits for it determined the rights and liabilities of the adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading
parties. 36 To recall, it was ruled that: (1) DATICOR overpaid by P5.3 justifiable circumstances as herein petitioners are doing, escape the
million; (2) FEBTC was bound to refund the excess payment but because operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
DATICOR's claim against FEBTC was only P965,000, the court could only be twice litigated. 40 ITScHa

grant so much as the relief prayed for; and (3) PDCP has no further claim In fact, authorities tend to widen rather than restrict the doctrine of
against DATICOR because its obligation had already been paid in full. res judicata on the ground that public as well as private interest demands
Right or wrong, that judgment bars another case based upon the same the ending of suits by requiring the parties to sue once and for all in the
cause of action. 37 same case all the special proceedings and remedies to which they are
As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter and causes of entitled. 41
action, it cannot be gainsaid that the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, This Court finds well-taken then the pronouncement of the court a
was brought by petitioners to recover an alleged overpayment of P5.3 quo that to allow the re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled as
million — P965,000 from FEBTC and P4.335 million from PDCP. between petitioners and FEBTC in the prior case is to allow the splitting of
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed by the same a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4 of Rule 2 of the
petitioners, was for the recovery of P4.335 million which is admittedly part Rules of Court reading:
of the P5.3 million earlier sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. 94- SEC. 4. Splitting of a single cause of action; effect of. — If
1610. This time, the action was brought solely against FEBTC which in turn two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
impleaded PDCP as a third party defendant. action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one
In determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
application of the rule of res judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would This rule proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of
suffice to authorize a recovery in the first even in cases in which the forms action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based
or nature of the two actions are different. 38 Simply stated, if the same facts on it. 42 Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for recovery, he is
or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he
within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent claims to exist and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely
action. upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same
It bears remembering that a cause of action is the delict or the wrong or injury. 43
wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the Clearly then, the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 operated as a
primary rights of the plaintiff. 39 bar to Civil Case No. 00-540, following the above-quoted Section 4, Rule 2
In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same alleged of the Rules of Court.
wrongful act of mistakenly receiving and refusing to return an amount in A final word. Petitioners are sternly reminded that both the rules on
excess of what was due it in violation of their right to a refund. The same res judicata and splitting of causes of action are based on the salutary
facts and evidence presented in the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits — interest reipublicae
were the very same facts and evidence that petitioners presented in Civil ut sit finis litium. 44 Re-litigation of matters already settled by a court's final
Case No. 00-540. judgment merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness
Thus, the same Deed of Assignment between PDCP and FEBTC, and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted
the first and second supplements to the Deed, the MOA between to worthier cases. 45
petitioners and FEBTC, and this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198 were
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WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the 15. Art. 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if
RTC, Branch 143, Makati dismissing petitioners' complaint in Civil Case something which had never been due or had already been paid was
No. 00-540 is AFFIRMED. delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the
delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just cause.
Costs against petitioners.
16. This amount represents the difference between the P6.4 million paid by
SO ORDERED.
petitioners under the MOA and the outstanding obligation of P1.4 million.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
17. Records, pp. 1-7.
18. This amount was later corrected by the trial court to be P4.035million
Footnotes on the basis of the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioners on January
5, 2001; Order dated February 28, 2001. Records, p. 173.
1. Now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
19. Id. at 49-52.
2. The indication in the decision of the RTC Branch number as 65 is clearly
erroneous. The records of the case show that the complaint was raffled to, 20. Id. at 55-60. FEBTC's Third Party Complaint was admitted by the trial
and heard before Branch 143 presided by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos. court in an Order dated July 14, 2000; id. at 101.
3. Rollo, pp. 27-30; penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos. 21. Id. at 117-120.
4. Records, p. 277. 22. Id. at 128-129; dated September 19, 2000.
5. Rollo, pp. 148-154. aSEDHC 23. Id. at 174-181; dated February 16, 2001.

6. Id. at 157-161. The First and Second Supplements were dated June 21, 24. Id. at 183-186; Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated
1988 and September 1, 1988, respectively (cited in the 5th and 6th Whereas February 26, 2001.
Clauses of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between petitioners and 25. Id. at 187; dated March 5, 2001.
FEBTC dated December 9, 1988).
26. Id. at 259-263.
7. The payment of P6.4 million was made on December 9, 1988, a day
after the MOA was executed by the parties. 27. Rollo, pp. 111-147.

8. Private Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate 28. Section 1 of Rule 45 provides:
Appellate Court, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 282. SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to
9. Records, pp. 8-15. appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
10. Petitioners contended that the correct amount of this outstanding whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
obligation was P1.1 million as they claimed that the Supreme Court made an petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
error in computation; and since they had paid a total of P6.4 million, they which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)
were claiming a refund of P5.3 million. Rollo, p. 13.
29. Orendain v. BF Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 146313, October 31, 2006, 506
11. Records, pp. 16-21; penned by Judge Herminio I. Benito. SCRA 348, 365; Equitable Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
12. According to the trial court, this was the amount by which the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143556, March 16, 2004, 425 SCRA 544, 553;
consideration for the assignment of the receivables exceeded the unpaid Development Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, 409 Phil. 717, 727
balance of P1.4 million. (2001); Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59692, October
11, 1990, 190 SCRA 362, 370 citing Vda. De Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., G.R.
13. Records, pp. 23-31; penned by Justice Hilarion L. Aquino and Nos. 75109-10, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 330, 338-339.
concurred in by Justices Emeterio C. Cui (then, chairman of the CA Second
Division) and Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr. 30. Heirs of Rolando N. Abadilla v. Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12,
2006, 494 SCRA 675, 687; Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September
14. Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 179, 196; Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied
and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it Banking Corp., 441 Phil. 551, 564 (2002). CHDAEc

arises.
31. Vda. De Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., supra note 29 at 339.
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32. Aromin v. Floresca, G.R. No. 160994, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 785,
806-807; Vda. De Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., supra, p. 338.
33. Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 104, 124 (2003); Camara v.
Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 858, 866 (1999); Ybañez v. Court of Appeals,
323 Phil. 643, 655 (1996); Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992, 208 SCRA 215, 224.
34. Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA
336, 343-344; Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005,
464 SCRA 89, 106-107; Sps. Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239 (2004); Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development Corporation v. Cabrigas, 411 Phil. 369, 386
(2001).
35. Vide Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108089,
January 10, 1994, 229 SCRA 252, 259-260.
36. Nabus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91670, February 7, 1991, 193
SCRA 732,740.
37. Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at 107.
38. Mallion v. Alcantara, supra note 32 at 345-346; Perez v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 34 at 108.
39. Heirs of Abadilla v. Galarosa, supra note 30 at 687. Vide RULES OF
COURT, Rule 2, Sec. 2.
40. Phil. Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 454 Phil. 338,
366 (2003); Esperas v. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 803, 811 (2000); Ybañez
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31 at 654; Allied Banking Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 35 at 260.
41. Valencia v. RTC of Quezon City, Br. 90, G.R. No. 82112, April 3, 1990,
184 SCRA 80, 92, citing Vda. De Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., supra note 29 at
341-342.
42. Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at 104.
43. Supra at 114.
44. Camara v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33 at 865; Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 36 at 738; Aguila, et al. v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et
al., 130 Phil. 715, 720 (1968).
45. Ibid.

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