Bicol University

College of Social Sciences and Philosophy

POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

Daraga, Albay

SECURITY STUDIES

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Barasona, Aiza B.

Biolena, Girlie D.

Buesing, Jay C.

Etcobanez, Ma. Kiel Patricia R.

Manayoba, Meriam V.

AB Political Science III-B

I. INTRODUCTION
 Security matters. It is impossible to make sense of world politics without reference to it.

Every day, people somewhere in the world are killed, starved, tortured, raped, impoverished,

imprisoned, displaced, or denied education and health care in the name of security. The

concept saturates contemporary societies all around the world: it litters the speeches of

politicians and pundits; newspaper columns and radio waves are full of it; and images of

security and insecurity flash across our television screens and the internet almost constantly.

All this makes security a fascinating, often deadly, but always important topic.

Some analysts think security is like beauty: a subjective and elastic term, meaning

exactly what the subject in question says it means; neither more nor less. In the more

technical language of social science, security is often referred to as an essentially contested

concept for which, by definition, there can be no consensus as to its meaning. While in one

sense this is certainly true – security undoubtedly means different things to different people –

at an abstract level, most scholars within International Relations (IR) work with a definition of

security that involves the alleviation of threats to cherished values.

Defined in this way, security is unavoidably political; that is, it plays a vital role in

deciding who gets what, when, and how in world politics. Security studies can thus

never be solely an intellectual pursuit because it is stimulated in large part by the impulse to

achieve security for real people in real places. This involves interpreting the past,

understanding the present, and trying to influence the future. As such, the concept of

security has been compared to a trump-card in the struggle over the allocation of resources.

Not surprisingly, security has been studied and fought over for as long as there have

been human societies. As any study of the word’s etymology will show security has meant

very different things to people depending on their time and place in human history. But as

the subject of professional academic inquiry security studies is usually thought of as a

relatively recent and largely Anglo-American invention that came to prominence after the

Second World War.

the other areas usually being defined as international history, international theory,

international law, international political economy and area studies. Although it was given

different labels in different places, there was general agreement that IR was the subfield’s

rightful disciplinary home. According to some analysts, the field enjoyed its ‘golden age’

during the1950s and 1960s when civilian strategists enjoyed relatively close connections

with Western governments and their foreign and security policies. During this golden age, as

Lawrence Freedman noted, Western governments found that they could rely on academic

institutions for conceptual innovation, hard research, practical proposals, and, eventually,

willing recruits for the bureaucracy. Standards were set for relevance and influence that

would prove difficult to sustain. In particular, security analysts busied themselves devising

theories of nuclear deterrence, developing systems analysis related to the structure of armed

forces and resource allocation, and refining the tools of crisis management. Particularly as it

appeared during the Cold War, the dominant approach within security studies may be

crudely summarized as advocating political realism and being preoccupied with the four S’s

of states, strategy, science and the status quo.

It was focused on states in as much as they were considered (somewhat

tautologically) to be both the most important agents and referents of security in international

politics.

It was about strategy in as much as the core intellectual and practical concerns

revolved around devising the best means of employing the threat and use of military force.

It aspired to be scientific in as much as to count as authentic, objective knowledge,

as opposed to mere opinion, analysts were expected to adopt methods that aped the

natural, harder sciences such as physics and chemistry. Only by approaching the

study of security in a scientific manner could analysts hope to build a reliable bank of

knowledge about international politics on which to base specific policies.

Finally, traditional security studies reflected an implicit and conservative concern to

who worked within them understood security policies as preventing radical and revolutionary

change within international society.

EVOLUTON OF SECURITY STUDIES

There are 7 periods in the evolution of security studies.

First is the Inter-War Period (1919-1939). If security studies is defined as the study of

the nature, causes, effects, and prevention of war, the period between the First and Second

World Wars was not the intellectual vacuum it is often thought to be. During this period

international relations scholars believed that democracy, international understanding,

arbitration, national self-determination, disarmament, and collective security were the most

important ways to promote international peace and security. The study of military force as

an instrument of statecraft for promoting national security tended to be neglected. This was

the crucial difference between security studies before and after 1940. They therefore tended

to emphasize international law and organization rather than military force.

Second, is the First Post-War Decade (1945-1955). With the onset of World War II,

national security became a central concern of international relationists of widely different

persuasions. By 1941 a course on war and national policy, designed by Grayson Kirk, John

Herz, Bernard Brodie, Felix Gilbert, Alfred Vagts, and others was being taught at Columbia

University; and similar courses were developed during the war at Princeton, the University of

North Carolina, Northwestern, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale. It is more accurately

described as the most creative and exciting period in the entire history of security studies.

Numerous courses on international politics and foreign policy were added to college

curricula during this period. In addition, there were at least three strong research centers

established focusing on national security.

Golden Age of security studies. Unlike the previous decade, this period was dominated by

nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited war. Although

deterrence theory, one of the most impressive intellectual achievements in the history of the

study of international relations, was a product of the "golden age," the period also had its

many blind spots. Even scholars who define security studies in terms of military force have

noted the tendency during that period to overemphasize the military aspects of national

security at the expense of historical, psychological, cultural, organizational, and political

contexts.

Fourth, is the Third Post-War Period (1965-1980). If the cold war stimulated and

nourished security studies before 1965, the decreased salience of the cold war during the

next fifteen years contributed to a period of decline. As Americans turned their interest from

the cold war with the Soviet Union to the hot war in Vietnam, their interest in security studies

waned. The key issues during this period were the peasant movements in Asia, counter-

revolutionary war, the Third World poverty and economic interdependence.

Fifth, the Fourth Post-War Period (1980-1990). The breakdown of detente and the

renewal of cold war tensions in the late 1970s and 1980s once again stimulated interest in

security studies. Student interest was rekindled, foundation money poured in, and research

burgeoned, as the old national security studies was replaced by the new international

security studies. The new international security studies, however, looked much like the

version of national security studies that had evolved after 1955. The rejuvenation of security

studies in the 1980s was considered as the renaissance of the field.

Sixth, is the Post-Cold War Era (1990-2000). The end of the cold war, like its

beginning, raises the question of how important military security is in comparison with other

goals of public policy. Although security specialists have become accustomed to thinking in
terms of trade-offs within the military sphere, such as that between missiles and submarines,

they have been reluctant to extend that logic to trade-offs between military security and

nonmilitary policy goals. Instead, they have tended to assert the primacy of military security

over other goals.

Last, is the Post-9/11 Era. In this period, terrorism is one of the most dominant issues.

Non-traditional security and human security emerged as an important paradigm challenging

the traditional or military security paradigm in the study of International Relations.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY

The origin of the modern concept of national security as a philosophy of maintaining a

stable nation state can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia, wherein the concept of a

sovereign state, ruled by a sovereign, became the basis of a new international order of

nation states. It was Thomas Hobbes who mandated for national security.

Before analyzing different definitions of national security, it is important to understand

some of the concepts the term incorporates.

The first is the concept of power. It can best be defined as a nation’s possession of

control of its sovereignty and destiny. It implies some degree of control of the extent to which

outside forces can harm the country. Hard, or largely military, power is about control, while

soft power is mainly about influence—trying to persuade others, using methods short of war,

to do something.

Instruments of power exist along a spectrum, from using force on one end to diplomatic

means of persuasion on the other. Such instruments include the armed forces; law

enforcement and intelligence agencies; and various governmental agencies dedicated to

bilateral and public diplomacy, foreign aid, and international financial controls. Variables of

power include military strength, economic capacity, the will of the government and people to

use power, and the degree to which legitimacy—either in the eyes of the people or in the
eyes of other nations or international organizations—affects how power is wielded. The

measure of power depends not only on hard facts, but also on perceptions of will and

reputation.

Another term to understand properly is military strength. This term refers to military

capacity and the capabilities of the armed forces, and it is a capacity that may not actually be

used. It often is understood as a static measure of the power of a country, but in reality,

military strength is a variable that is subject to all sorts of factors, including the relative

strength of opponents, the degree to which it is used effectively, or whether it is even used at

all.

Force is the use of a military or law enforcement capacity to achieve some objective. It

is the actual use of strength and should not be equated with either strength or power per se.

Using force unwisely or unsuccessfully can diminish one’s power and strength. By the same

token, using it effectively can enhance power. Force is an instrument of power just as a tool

or some other device would be, but unlike institutional instruments like the armed forces, its

use in action is what distinguishes it from static instruments of strength like military capacity.

Thus, force should be understood narrowly as an applied instrument of coercion.

Finally, there is national defense. Strictly speaking, this refers to the ability of the

armed forces to defend the sovereignty of the nation and the lives of its people; however,

since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the mission of homeland security—using domestic

as well as military instruments to defend the nation from terrorist and other attacks either

inside or outside the country—has come to be understood as an element of national

defense.

National security is a concept that a government, along with its parliaments, should

protect the state and its citizens against all kind of "national" crises through a variety of

power projections, such as political power, diplomacy, economic power, military might, and
so on. Macmillan Dictionary defines the term as "the protection or the safety of a country’s

secrets and its citizens".

NON MILITARY IDEAS OF SECURITY

For most of the 20th century, national security was focused on military security, but as a

concept, it expanded over time beyond what armed forces could do (or not do as the case

may be). In 1947, the United States created the National Security Council to “advise the

President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to

the national security….”1 In the wake of total war, and at the dawn of the nuclear age, it was

well understood that the days of defining national security solely in terms of armies fighting it

out in set-piece battles were things of the past.

Since then, national security has come to mean different things to different people.

Today, there are all kinds of “national securities.” They include economic security; energy

security; environmental security; and even health, women’s, and food security. This

proliferation of definitions has not always been for the good. In some instances, for example,

it is merely a rebranding of domestic agendas to shift resources away from the Pentagon. In

other cases, it is adjusting to the complexities of a changing international environment.

The following list provides definitions of the major contending views of non-military

definitions of national security, with no analysis of their merits or deficiencies.

Political security refers to protecting the sovereignty of the government and political

system and the safety of society from unlawful internal threats and external threats or

pressures. It involves both national and homeland security and law enforcement.

Economic security involves not only protecting the capacity of the economy to provide

for the people, but also the degree to which the government and the people are free to

control their economic and financial decisions. It also entails the ability to protect a nation’s

wealth and economic freedom from outside threats and coercion. Thus, it comprises

economic policy and some law enforcement agencies but also international agreements on
commerce, finance, and trade. Recently, it has been defined by some in a human security

context to mean eradicating poverty and eliminating income inequality.

Energy and natural resources security is most often defined as the degree to which a

nation or people have access to such energy resources as oil, gas, water, and minerals. It

would be more accurate to describe it as access freely determined by the market without

interference from other nations or political or military entities for non-market, political

purposes.

Homeland security is a set of domestic security functions that since 9/11 have been

organized in a single agency, the Department of Homeland Security. It includes airport and

port security, border security, transportation security, immigration enforcement, and other

related matters.

Cybersecurity refers to protection of the government’s and the peoples’ computer and

data processing infrastructure and operating systems from harmful interference, whether

from outside or inside the country. It thus involves not only national defense and homeland

security, but also law enforcement.

Human security refers to a concept largely developed at the United Nations after the

end of the Cold War. It defines security broadly as encompassing peoples’ safety from

hunger, disease, and repression, including harmful disruptions of daily life. Over time, the

concept has expanded to include economic security, environmental security, food security,

health security, personal security, community security, political security, and the protection of

women and minorities. Its distinguishing characteristic is to avoid or downplay national

security as a military problem between nation-states, focusing instead on social and

economic causes and an assumed international “responsibility to protect” peoples from

violence. It is to be determined and administered by the United Nations.

Environmental security is an idea with multiple meanings. One is the more traditional

concept of responding to conflicts caused by environmental problems such as water

are “transnational” and thus can cause conflict between nations. The other, more recent

concept is that the environment and the “climate” should be protected as ends in and of

themselves; the assumption is that the environmental degradation caused by man is a threat

that must be addressed by treaties and international governance as if it were the moral

equivalent of a national security threat. In the past, natural disasters were not considered

threats to national security, but that presumption is changing as the ideology of “climate

change” and global warming takes hold in the national security community.

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF SECURITY

Understanding the major schools of thought on international security that have arisen

since the end of World War II will also help to explain the international context in which

national security is expected to operate. These schools of thought include:

Collective Defense. Collective defense is an official arrangement among nation-states to

offer some defense support to other member states if they are attacked. It is the basis of the

classic defense alliances like the Triple Entente among the United Kingdom, the French

Third Republic, and the Russian Empire before World War I and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization today. It is distinguished not only by geographical limitation, but also by its

focus on military commitments.

Collective Security. Collective security refers to various types of arrangements. Strictly

speaking, collective defense involving mutual commitments of member states could be

considered a form of collective security, albeit one limited geographically to military defense.

More often, however, collective security is thought of as a regional and global concept

represented by such international institutions as the League of Nations and the United

Nations. Often, such arrangements are buttressed by concepts of international law and

international aid and governance. Their distinguishing characteristic is their hybrid character
between collective action at the international level and the acceptance of nation-states being

ultimately responsible for their own security.

Global Security. Global security is a set of ideas, developed largely by the United Nations

since the end of the Cold War, that the world’s security is everybody’s business. It rests on

the premise that no single nation is secure unless all are secure. While lip service is given to

the idea of national defense, the far greater focus is on attempting to eliminate conflict

through international law, aid, confidence-building measures, and global governance. The

use of force should thus be reserved largely for international peacekeeping, peace

enforcement, and the protection of innocent citizens from violence and should be decided

upon and organized by the U.N.

International Law. To the American ear, the use of the term “law” in the phrase

“international law” conjures up the idea of binding rules enforced by judicial authorities and

law enforcement officials. However, what Americans understand as “law” in a domestic

context is often out of place in considering U.S. compliance with “international law.” The U.S.

government must comply with the supreme law of the land, which the U.S. Constitution

makes clear consists of the Constitution itself, laws made in pursuance thereof, and “all

Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States” (quoting

Article VI of the Constitution). The United States also makes a practice of following what is

known as “customary international law,” which “is comprised of those practices and customs

that States view as obligatory and that are engaged in or otherwise acceded to by a

preponderance of States in a uniform and consistent fashion” (quoting United States v.

Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 n. 24 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 993 (2003)).

III. SECURITY AND STRATEGY

Probably few concepts employed in statecraft and in the study of international politics

have as vague referents as do security or national security. The term have been used by
many government to justify external aggression and the stifling of internal relation.

Robespierre, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, Joseph Stalin and Sen. Joseph McCarthy and

some of his colleagues, to mention just a few, have justified purges; restraints on the

freedom of speech, press and assembly; character assassination; and even mass murder in

the name of national security.

One reason we can claim that the search for security is universal is that all states, with

only some exceptions (Costa Rica and Iceland) maintain military forces. All commit a

significant proportion of their total economic output (GNP) for arms dedicated to maintaining

internal and external security. These expenses may be used to deter or to cope with crime,

rebellion, secession, revolutions, and coups d’etat. Government also maintain armed forces

to deal with the eventuality that at some time in the future, some other state or no-nstate

actor such as a terrorist group will present a threat. That threat can be directed against the

lives of citizens or their private activities, against territorial integrity, against a country’s “way

of life”, or against the independence of the state and its institutions.

What kinds of threats are likely to evoke a military response? Barry Buzlan makes the

important distinction between threat and vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities derive largely but not

entirely from geographic characteristics. They are potential avenues for military invasion or

economic coercion, the mountain passes, narrow waterways, major transportation corridors,

and the like. Threats on the other hand, are those more immediate capabilities in the hand of

adversaries that may be used to exploit vulnerabilities. Threats are not always explicit and

self-evident, nor is there universal agreement that any particular vulnerability will be

exploited by others in a threatening manner. Threat may have receded, or perhaps even

disappeared, but one never knows about the future. As long as vulnerabilities remain , some

particular mixture of military forces will be necessary as a form of insurance against the

future.
 Governments can enhance their security by decreasing vulnerabilities and/or by

diminishing the perceived threat from one or more perceived adversaries.

Following are some common security strategies to emphasize threat reduction.

(1) Isolation

One way to avoid threats may be to remain uninvolved in the affairs of others and in

particular, to avoid military commitments to others. Noninvolvement makes one less likely to

be used as a pawn, particularly by the great powers. But there is another sense of the word

isolation; that is to make oneself sufficiently unattractive as not to invite the attention of

others. Reclusiveness preempts other actors’ interests in you.

In previous international systems, geographic remoteness and certain physical features

helped sustain strategies of isolation. Broad seas, high mountains and extensive deserts

made the costs of penetration or invasion too great to be worth the trouble. Bhutan close

itself off and existed as isolated society almost totally secure in its Himalayan redoubt, for

almost 1,000 years until the late 1950s, when India began to take an interest in Bhutan’s

affairs because of its proximity to China which was then India’s primary adversary. Japan

practiced a strict isolationism from the time of its first contacts with the Dutch and

Portuguese in the sixteenth century until 1854, when the United States coerced Japan to

open itself up for commercial and missionary activities.

(2) Self-Reliance

A variation on the theme of isolation is self-reliance. It has in common with isolation the

unwillingness to make military commitments to others or to accept their “assistance”. It

differs in the means of reducing threats: In isolation, it is done by making oneself unattractive

and by rigid exclusion of foreign presences. In self-reliance it is done essentially by

occasionally the pronouncement of those who would like the United States to adopt a

“fortress America” security strategy. That would mean terminating membership in all

alliances (on the ground that allies are unreliable and do not pay an adequate share of the

costs of defense) and concentrating all military capabilities on home base. American

commitments abroad would be significantly scaled back, on the assumption that wars and

instabilities in other regions of the world would not have direct security consequences for the

United States. During the early !960s, China practiced such strategy. It effectively terminated

its alliance with the Soviet Union, refused to redefine its relationships with western

countries , and loudly proclaimed its determination to protect both the revolution and China

by its own means.

(3) Neutrality and Nonalignment

States that pronounced vulnerabilities often because of geographic location and

potential threats may from their security strategy by obtaining formal recognition of their

wishes to remain uninvolved in the conflicts of their neighbors. In exchange they promise not

to make military alliances with other, or to allow their territory to be used in a manner

prejudicial to the interest of a neighbor or other power.

The term neutrality needs some clarification. In contemporary usage, it has several

formats. Technically, neutrality refers to the legal status of a state during armed hostilities.

Under the international laws of neutrality, a nonbelligerent in wartime has certain rights and

obligations not extended to the belligerents. These rules state, for example, that a neutral

may not permit use of its territory as a base for military operations by one of the belligerents;

may not furnish military assistance to the belligerents; and may enjoy freedom of passage of

its nonmilitary goods and passengers on the open seas and, under certain conditions,

through belligerent blockades. But in common parlance today, a neutral state has a special

status during peacetime as well. Its hallmarks are noninvolvement in others’ conflicts,
avoidance of all military alliances, and prohibiting the use of its territory by others for military

purposes.

What is nonalignment? It has been used to describe the policies of the new states,

mostly of the Third World, as distinct from the European neutrals (Finland, Sweden,

Switzerland, Ireland, Austria). The nonaligned movement encompasses a variety of states

with different kinds of security problems. Many, in fact, make military agreement with each

other or belong to multilateral organization that are in effect military alliances (for example,

the [Pesian] Gulf Cooperation Council. They are therefore not true neutrals. Nonalignment

in fact refers to a very loose coalition of states that agree, in principle if not often in fact, that

they should avoid military commitments to serve the interests of the great powers, and share

many of the attributes of underdevelopment and therefore have some common concerns on

international economic issues. Most nonaligned states are certainly not self-reliant in either

military or economic dimensions.

(4) Alliance Strategies

Perhaps the most common strategy for reducing vulnerabilities or diminishing threats

is to augment military power, not just building up one’s own capabilities but by enlisting the

aid of others. When two or more parties perceive a common threat, they are likely to engage

in various types of military collaborations which can range from the informal provision of

technical advisers, granting of arms, or exchange of information, to its most concrete form: a

formal alliance.

There a variety of alliance forms. The distinction between them are important, because they

have significant effects on military planning and deployments.

a. The Casus Foederis. Although partners to an alliance have similar or overlapping

foreign policy objectives, negotiators of the treaty are usually very cautious in defining the

casus foederis. Some treaties, particularly those in recent years that have been used for

offensive purposes, contain a very vague definition of the situation that will bring the alliance
into operation. Because of universal condemnation of outright aggressive military alliances,

offensive treaties seldom express their real purpose. Soviet mutual-assistance treaties with

Bulgarian and Romania (1948) also have such obscure definitions of the casus foederis

(“Drawn into military activities” was the phrased used) that it was difficult to predict when and

under what exact circumstances the Soviet, Romania, and Bulgarianarmies would begin

military operations. In contrast to the vague casus foederis are those that contain a very

precise definition of the situation in which the alliance is to be put into effect militarily.

b. Commitments Undertaken. Alliance treaties also differ according to the type

responses and responsibilities required once the situation calling for action develops. This

type of commitment is calle a “hair trigger” clause , because it automatically commits the

signatories to military action if the casus foederis occurs. A similar clause is found in the

Brussels pact among Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

Since the clause establishes automatic commitments, it leaves little leeway for decision

makers and diplomats to decide what to do once the casus foederis arises.

c. Integration of Forces. Alliance may also distinguish according to the degree of

integration of military forces. Alliance treaties in historic international system seldom

provided for more than casual coordination of military planning, while national forces

remained organizationally and administratively distinct. European alliances in the eighteenth

century typically required signatories to provide a specified number of men and/or funds for

the common effort, but otherwise set fourth no plans for coordinated military operations or

integrating forces or commands. Any coordination that did take place was the result of ad

hoc decisions made after hostilities began. Integration may be accomplished by establishing

a supreme commander of allied forces (such as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in

NATO); standardizing weapons systems for all national forces (barely begun in NATO);

integrating military personnel of different countries into one command structure; or permitting

one of the major alliance partners to organize , draft, and direct all strategic and tactical war

plans for the other partners.

coverage. Although this distinction relating to the forms and types of alliances may seem

quite technical, they are important because precise definition of scope, casus foederis, and

obligations lend predictability to the respinses alliances partners will make in crisis situation.

No generalizations can be offered as to whether defensive alliances successfully deter

aggression or provide stability for the international system. Presumably, a potential

aggressor faced with overwhelming coalition against it will not risk destruction of its society

when it possesses foreknowledge of certain defeat. This type of alliance is probably inject a

factor of caution among decision makers with aggressive design; defensive alliances

increase greatly the risks and costs to the aggressor, but do not necessarily prevent

organized violence.

(5) Contracting Out

Most states ultimately rely on themselves for security, and do so by deploying various

types of armed forces. But occasionally, some states are incapable of sustaining the costs of

maintaining such forces. In these circumstances they “contract out” to others to provide for

their protection. In the nineteenth century there were a number of ”protectorates” attached to

the British Empire. These were proto-states that had full internal autonomy, but were not

sovereign. The imperial power provided military forces for the protectorate, usually in

exchange for economic privileges. Today, there are few states that rely completely upon

others for their protection. In the 1980s the government of Sri Lanka asked India to send a

force to help it cope with an armed secessionist movement. This was a case of “contracting

out” for purposes of internal security.