91. ANTONIO V. NUEVA ESPAÑA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine:
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) a civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases

Facts:

Petitioner Nueva España was driving a passenger bus owned by Vallacar Transit, Inc. While negotiating a
curve, the passenger bus collided with a northbound Honda motorcycle. As a result, Reynard So, the
driver of the motorcycle, and Nilo Castro, the person riding in tandem with him, were killed. An information
for reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide was filed against petitioner who was also accused of
failing to extend aid or assistance to the victims.

The father of So testified that his son was 30 years old at the time of his death and he was engaged in the
buying and selling of copra. He was likewise a sugar cane planter and maintained a sari-sari store. So’s
father claimed that his son was earning ₱30,000 a month from his copra business and sari-sari store, and
₱50,000 a month from selling sugar cane. He added that his family spent ₱87,2002 for the wake and
funeral. He also demanded payment of attorney’s fees of ₱30,000.

The mother of Castro, on the other hand, testified that her son was 26 years old when he died. He worked
as welder in Manila and earned ₱8,000 a month. She allegedly spent ₱30,000 for her son’s wake and
burial.

Trial court: gave no credence to the defense witnesses and convicted petitioner of the crime charged

CA: modified the assailed judgment: indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correcional, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioner should be held liable

Ruling:
1. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be
disturbed. In the case at bar, we see no reason to deviate from the rule. The Court is in full
agreement with the trial court and with the Court of Appeals regarding petitioner’s liability for the
crime charged against him.

2. We deem it necessary to modify the award of damages given by the lower courts.When death
occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) a civil indemnity ex delicto
for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper
cases.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the
victims. The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of civil
indemnity ex delicto of ₱50,000 each for the heirs of both So and Castro is in order.

ACTUAL DAMAGES: INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF EARNING

The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence if there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed, earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice is taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.

In this case, the earnings of So and Castro were both above the minimum wage set by labor laws in their
respective workplaces at the time of their death. This being the case, the general rule of requiring
documentary evidence of their earning capacities finds application. Unfortunately for their heirs, no such
proof was presented at all. It was therefore erroneous for both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to
award compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity on the basis alone of the oral testimonies of
So’s father and Castro’s mother.

The lack of documentary evidence notwithstanding, since loss was actually established in this case,
temperate damages may be awarded to the heirs of So and Castro, respectively. Under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages (which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages) may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered
but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.

With respect to other compensatory damages, competent evidence must likewise be presented to support
the claim for such damages. In the case at bar, the father of So claimed that he spent ₱87,20020 for the
wake and burial of his son but all he was able to support with receipts were the payment to the funeral
parlor of ₱20,000 and the cost of the burial site of ₱53,000.21

Regarding the claim for reimbursement of the actual expense allegedly incurred by the mother of Castro,
the Court opts to award her temperate damages, in lieu of actual or compensatory damages, because
she failed to submit any evidence in support thereof.

MORAL DAMAGES

The award for moral damages by the court a quo, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, should be adjusted
for being excessive. While courts have a wide latitude in ascertaining the proper award for moral
damages, the award should not be to such an extent that it inflicts injustice on the accused.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may also be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Here, petitioner failed to render aid or assistance
to his victims after the collision.

We adopt the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals regarding the subsidiary liability of petitioner’s
employer, Vallacar Transit Inc., under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

Lastly, we are also constrained to amend the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, petitioner should suffer the penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 6 years of prision correcional, as maximum.
 92. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AGRIPINO GUEVARRA y MULINGTAPANG alias "BOY
DUNGGOL,
G.R. No. 182192 October 29, 2008 THIRD DIVISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J

Doctrine:

For damages in case of death, the heirs of the victim should also be indemnified for loss of
earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code.

Facts:

That on or about August 24, 2002, the above-named accused, while armed with a caliber .45 pistol, a
deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and repeatedly shot with said firearm suddenly and
without warning one P/Chief Inspector Marcos Barte y Paz while the latter was unarmed and completely
defenseless, thereby hitting him on different parts of his body which directly caused the victim’s death.

The testimonies of the witnesses are summarized as follows:

Anacleto, cousin of herein deceased victim Police Chief Inspector Marcos P. Barte (Inspector Barte) of
the Batangas City Police Station, testified that Inspector Barte, accompanied by a certain Roberto Godoy
(Godoy) and Ronnie Valiente (Valiente), arrived at his house. He, Inspector Barte, Godoy, Valiente, and
Anacleto’s father-in-law, Nicasio Resurreccion (Nicasio), talked and drank gin inside the house.

Subsequently, the group, with the exception of Godoy, left the house and went to a videoke bar.
Thereafter, at about 9:15 p.m., the group went out of the videoke bar. He saw his wife, Antonette, outside
the videoke bar. Antonette approached and talked to him. When Anacleto was about to board the jeep,
appellant suddenly appeared and approached Inspector Barte. Appellant asked Inspector Barte if he was
"Major Barte." Thereupon, he saw appellant shoot Inspector Barte several times with a short firearm. He
was then one arm’s length from Inspector Barte and one meter away from appellant. Inspector Barte
slumped on his seat bloodied while Godoy shouted that he was also hit. Appellant immediately fled the
scene. Subsequently, Anacleto drove the jeep and brought Inspector Barte to the Batangas Regional
Hospital. Inspector Barte was pronounced dead on arrival. Godoy was also brought to the said hospital
for treatment of his wounds.

Mrs. Barte, wife of Inspector Barte, testified on the civil aspect of the case. She presented a list of
expenses incurred for the wake and burial of Inspector Barte which amounted to ₱183,425.00. She also
submitted official receipts pertaining to the funeral expenses (₱46,250.00), burial lot (₱53,000.00), and
interment fee (₱10,000.00). She claimed that at the time of Inspector Barte’s death, the latter was
receiving a monthly income of ₱30,982.00.

RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant of murder. Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
He was also ordered to pay the heirs of Inspector Barte the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as compensatory
damages, ₱109,250.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
₱4,212,312.72 for loss of earning capacity, and cost of suit.

CA: promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It held that an additional
amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages should also imposed on appellant because the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing of Inspector Barte.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the award of damages were proper

Ruling:
Yes.
We agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm attended the killing of Inspector Barte.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. The essence of
treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend
himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential elements are required in
order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution
that would ensure the offender’s safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party who has,
thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means,
methods or manner of execution.

Pertinent provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, 54 states
that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant’s use of an unlicensed firearm in
killing Inspector Barte was alleged in the information as a special aggravating circumstance.

Appellant’s assertion that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
meritorious. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) that the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) that the surrender was voluntary.

We stated earlier that the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder is a special aggravating circumstance
and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance. As such, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance such as voluntary surrender. Thus, the only modifying circumstance remaining in the
present case is the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. Article 63(1) of the
Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in this case, and there is
present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. Consequently, the
penalty imposable on appellant is death. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 , the
imposition of the capital punishment of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the
penalty to be meted to appellant shall be reclusion perpetua.

As to damages, both courts acted accordingly in awarding civil indemnity to the heirs of Inspector Barte
since the award of this damage is mandatory in murder cases. Even if the penalty of death is not to be
imposed on accused because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is still proper as the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. In the instant case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm attended the killing of Inspector Barte. These
circumstances were duly alleged in the information and proven during the trial.

The award of moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is proper in view of the violent death of
Inspector Barte and the resultant grief to his family. Likewise, the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00 is in order because the killing of Inspector Barte was committed with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and use of an unlicensed firearm. Also, the award of ₱109,250.00
as actual damages is appropriate since these were supported by official receipts attached on records.

The heirs of Inspector Barte should also be indemnified for loss of earning capacity pursuant to Article
2206 of the New Civil Code.