Title:

FLOATING OPERATIONS
MANUAL

Revision Status:
Manual Number: HQS-OPS-004
Issue Number: 02
Revision Number: 03
Effective Date: MARCH 1, 2003

Transocean
Houston
 HQS-OPS-004
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1 ........................................................................................................... GENERAL

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION
SUBSECTION 2 THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT FUNCTION
SUBSECTION 3 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION, ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
SUBSECTION 4 EXEMPTIONS
SUBSECTION 5 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
SUBSECTION 6 POLICY STATEMENTS

SECTION 2 ...............................................................................................WELL PLANNING

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION
SUBSECTION 2 WELL PLANNING INFORMATION CHECK LISTS
SUBSECTION 3 SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION
SUBSECTION 4 DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
SUBSECTION 5 TENSIONER RING OPERATION
SUBSECTION 6 METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
SUBSECTION 7 FIELD MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN THE WATER
SUBSECTION 8 HYDRATES
SUBSECTION 9 DRILLING FLUIDS
SUBSECTION 10 SHALLOW WATER FLOW
SUBSECTION 11 DEEPWATER CEMENTING

SECTION 3 ............................................................... MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 OIM / MASTER’S AUTHORITY

SUBSECTION 2 OPERATING GUIDELINES
SUBSECTION 3 BRIDGE OPERATIONS (self propelled installations)
SUBSECTION 4 OFFICIAL LOG BOOKS
SUBSECTION 5 OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS
SUBSECTION 6 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
SUBSECTION 7 STANDING ORDERS
SUBSECTION 8 SELF ELEVATING INSTALLATION SITE ASSESSMENT
SUBSECTION 9 SELF ELEVATING INSTALLATIONS – IN FIELD MOVES
SUBSECTION 10 SELF ELEVATING INSTALLATION MOVER CERTIFICATION

REVISION NO: 03 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 4 .................................................... DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION
SUBSECTION 2 WELL PLANNING INFORMATION
SUBSECTION 3 DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES
SUBSECTION 4 DP WATCH KEEPING
SUBSECTION 5 DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING
SUBSECTION 6 COMMUNICATION & ALARMS
SUBSECTION 7 OPERATING GUIDELINES
SUBSECTION 8 DYNAMIC POSITIONING WATCH CIRCLES
SUBSECTION 9 WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
SUBSECTION 10 DP TECHNICAL OPERATIONS CRITERIA
SUBSECTION 11 CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

SECTION 5 ..................................................................MOORING GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

SUBSECTION 2 REQUIRED LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
SUBSECTION 3 OPERATOR FURNISHED DATA
SUBSECTION 4 INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS
SUBSECTION 5 MOORING SYSTEM ANALYSIS
SUBSECTION 6 PRE-MOORED LOCATIONS
SUBSECTION 7 USE OF DIFFERENT ANCHOR TYPES
SUBSECTION 8 FLOATING OPERATIONS OVER TEMPLATES
SUBSECTION 9 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS
SUBSECTION 10 MIN. ANCHOR HANDLING VESSEL REQUIREMENTS

SECTION 6 ............................................. RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

SUBSECTION 2 RISER SPACEOUT
SUBSECTION 3 RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL
SUBSECTION 4 RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS
SUBSECTION 5 RISER STORM HANG OFF
SUBSECTION 6 CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

SECTION 7 ............................................. DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION
SUBSECTION 2 DST PLANNING INFORMATION CHECK LIST
REVISION NO: 03 PAGE OF
REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBSECTION 3 DRILL STEM TEST HAZID

SUBSECTION 4 DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS
SUBSECTION 5 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT
SUBSECTION 6 DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

SECTION 8 ...............Deleted - See HQS-OPS-005 Surface BOP Operations Guidelines

SECTION 9 .............................................................................. OPERATIONS ADVISORIES

SUBSECTION 1 DP OPERATIONAL INFORMATION DOCUMENTS (OPDOCS)

SECTION 10 .............................................................................................................. ANNEX

SUBSECTION 1 ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS
SUBSECTION 2 DEFINITIONS

SECTION 11 ................ REGION / DISTRICT / INSTALLATION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES

REVISION NO: 03 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1 ........................................................................................................... GENERAL

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION –
management, operations manager,

SUBSECTION 2 THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT FUNCTION

Opeations Department,

SUBSECTION 3 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION,

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES –
Responsibilities, roles, Supervisors, OIM, Rig
Manager, District manager,Operations Manager,
Regional manager,

SUBSECTION 4 EXEMPTIONS - Exemptions

SUBSECTION 5 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE – change, management

of change,

SUBSECTION 6 POLICIEY STATEMENTS – Transocean Policies,

Policy Statements

SECTION 2 ...............................................................................................WELL PLANNING

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION - Well Planning

SUBSECTION 2 WELL PLANNING INFORMATION CHECK LISTS

checklist, check list,

SUBSECTION 3 SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION –

Operator, Metocean, Soil, shallow hazards, seafloor
hazards, shallow water flows, gas,
SUBSECTION 4 DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS –
Well head, BOP , angle, BOP, wellhead bending,

SUBSECTION 5 TENSIONER RING OPERATION – KT Ring, Tensioner

Ring, torque, well head torque,

SUBSECTION 6 METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS -

metocean, weather, wave, wind, hang off, survival,
ice,

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 1 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBSECTION 7 FIELD MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN THE

WATER –
BOP, rig move, bop suspended, field move

SUBSECTION 8 HYDRATES – hydrates, gas,

SUBSECTION 9 DRILLING FLUIDS –
mud, drilling fluid, shallow hazards, hydrates,

SUBSECTION 10 SHALLOW WATER FLOW –

shallow water flow,

SUBSECTION 11 DEEPWATER CEMENTING –

cement, cementing, foam, foam cementing

SECTION 3............................................................... MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 MARINE OPERATIONS –

OIM, Master, person in charge, bridge, manning,
weather, pilot, transit, log, marine, marine operations,
supply vessel, supply boat, emergency, stability,
lightship, ballast, damage, logs, records, record
keeping

SECTION 4.........................................................................DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION –
DP, IMO, STCW,

SUBSECTION 2 WELL PLANNING INFORMATION – checklist,

SUBSECTION 3 DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES –

personnel, OIM, Master, DPO, Mate, toolpusher,
driller, chief engineer, assistant engineer, VMS,
Operator, ET, Electrical, Training,

SUBSECTION 4 DP WATCH KEEPING –

DP, Watchkeeping, manning, DPO, DP Operator,
VMS, Engineer, procedures,

SUBSECTION 5 DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING –

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 2 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reports, documentation, logs, checklist, FEMA, I

MCA, publications

SUBSECTION 6 COMMUNICATION & ALARMS –

Alarms, communications, DPO, Driller, DP alert, red,
yellow, green, advisory

SUBSECTION 7 OPERATING GUIDELINES –

guidelines, DP, trials, permit to work

SUBSECTION 8 DYNAMIC POSITIONING WATCH CIRCLES -

drift off, drive off, watch circle

SUBSECTION 9 WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES –

WSOG, DP, watch circles, riser, red, yellow, green,
drive off, drift off, FEMA,

SUBSECTION 10 DP TECHNICAL OPERATIONS CRITERIA –

Bus tie, breakers, consequense analysis, software,

SUBSECTION 11 CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS -

risk, DP, supply boats, close proximity,

SECTION 5 .................................................................................... MOORING GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY –

Mooring,

SUBSECTION 2 REQUIRED LEVEL OF ANALYSIS -

mooring analysis

SUBSECTION 3 OPERATOR FURNISHED DATA –

Operator, mooring data,

SUBSECTION 4 INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS –

mooring, mooring analysis,

SUBSECTION 5 MOORING SYSTEM ANALYSIS –

mooring, mooring analysis

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 3 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBSECTION 6 PRE-MOORED LOCATIONS –

pre moor, pre-moor, mooring

SUBSECTION 7 USE OF DIFFERENT ANCHOR TYPES –

anchors,

SUBSECTION 8 FLOATING OPERATIONS OVER TEMPLATES –

templates,

SUBSECTION 9 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS –

mooring, standards, mooring standards

SUBSECTION 10 MINIMUM ANCHOR HANDLING VESSEL

REQUIREMENTS –
anchor boats, anchor handling, anchor handling
vessels, horsepower, bollard pull, mooring

SECTION 6................................................................ RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND –

riser

SUBSECTION 2 RISER SPACEOUT –

riser space out, API 16Q, OIM, riser tension, riser collapse

SUBSECTION 3 RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL –

riser, riser running, riser loads, BOP, hook load,

SUBSECTION 4 RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS –

riser tension, angle, flex joint angle, slip joint,
telescoping joint, bending, well head, casing, VIV,
vortex,

SUBSECTION 5 RISER STORM HANG OFF -

hang off, riser,

SECTION 7................................................................ DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION -
DST, Well test, hazid, hazop

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 4 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: TOC
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBSECTION 2 DST PLANNING INFORMATION CHECK LIST –

checklist, DST, well test, testing

SUBSECTION 3 DRILL STEM TEST HAZID –

DST, hazid, coil tubing, testing

SUBSECTION 4 DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS –

WSOG, DP DST, Drive off, watch circle,

SUBSECTION 5 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT –

EDS, DST, DP

SUBSECTION 6 DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES –

DST, procedures,

SECTION 8 – DELETED, SEE HQS-OPS-005 SURFACE BOP OPERATIONS

GUIDELINES

SECTION 9 ..............................................................................OPERATIONS ADVISORIES

SUBSECTION 1 DP OPERATIONAL INFORMATION DOCUMENTS

(OPDOCS) –
Advisories, OPDOCS, information,

SECTION 10 ..............................................................................................................ANNEX

SUBSECTION 1 ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS –
acronyms, abbreviations, definitions

SUBSECTION 2 DEFINITIONS –
definitions

SECTION 11 ................ REGION / DISTRICT / INSTALLATION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 5 5
 page 1
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

The arrangement of the files on TSF Docs is broken down by Section. This is inconvienent
and would be better to have the manual down load as a single document. Alternatively, a
YleM / The files are broken down by section so to reduce download time on TSF docs. Other Manuals are
1 1 0 0 method to download the document as a single document when saving offline might No Change to FOM. AW
Osterman adopting this format to make TSF docs more user friendly.
accomplish the same thing. The difficulty is when a change is made that effects the
complete manual there are multiple notices to open which is redundant and agrivating.

Just to let you know that there is a Typo error in the Audit Checklist that refers to Exceptions
2 1 4 0 N. Fournier as per A as per A AW
(Exemptions).

Hyperlinks from within the manual to an external

Have a hyper-link to the Ememption Request Form so it can be opened and filled in file are not currently possible on the platform
3 1 4 0 Spirt AW
electronically. eDocs has been constructed on. This is a future
requirement of any new system.

No Change to FOM. DLF - Disagree with

Region. Well head or surface casing damage
Tensioner Ring Operation requires the Master and DPO's to understand the wellhead loads
resulting from rig operations is unacceptable and
and limits. Measuring devices are not provided on the equipment to obtain this information
preventable through planning and resulting Well
accurately. Exemption: Maximum turn allowed is 180 degrees to prevent disconnect or
4 2 5 0 D Spirit REGION: Use present visual monitoring. Investigate strain gauges. Specific Operating Guidelines. Understanding none/dlf
separation. Management to provide accurate information to Subsea Engineer on actual
well head strength and the forces imposed upon
forces needed to turn slip ring. The Subsea Engineer will then develop maximum turning
the well head by change of rig offset, heading,
allowed and advise OIM/Master.
riser tension, hydraulic pressure on tensioner
ring is the responsibility of each Installation.

EXEMPTION: Marathon and TSF engineers have reviewed this move. Studying the B/charts
provided by MOC/TFE the shallowest water we should encounter is 6900'. We will have 6582' of
riser below the water line which will give us 318' clearance. The new well is in 6997' of water. The
This section discourages moving the ship with riser suspended. The pre agreed well plan for
5 2 7 0 D Spirit flex joint will be monitored by DP ops and we do not anticipate it to exceed 2.5deg. Weather and No Change to FOM. none/dlf
the Canyon Express Project calls for moving the ship between wels with the risr suspended.
current has been studied and are attached to exemption request. the majority of the hazards stated
in the manual are the same as running riser. DLF - GOOD WORK, THINK PROCESS FOLLOWED
WITH MANAGEMENT APPROVED EXEMPTION.

A lot of areas not covered in the Floating Operations Manual. Nothing about an engineering
watch as in STCW95; nothing on GMDSS other than keeping a log book; What about
NAVTEX?; Why do you want your 3cm radar on at all times? (it is the one that picks up the
6 3 0 0 JOIDES good comment for future revision. no change at this time. DLF
SART Signals and Racon Buoys); Nothing about Local laws that might supercede marine law
including International rules for collision Avoidance (such as US Inland rules which we come
into when going into US Ports).

Agreed. The OIM is the senior onboard manager who reports directly to the shore based Rig
Statement of Authority - This has been going on forever and I have a feeling it always will.
Manager. The OIM's role is to manage the overall operation and administration of the installation.
We are a drilling contractor and in this Company the OIM is in charge. This of course doesn't
For Self Propelled Installations, the Company designates the Unlimited Marine Master as the
sit too well with some Masters but that's the way it is. Putting someone in charge during an
"Person in Charge" to whom all personnel on board are responsible in an emergency. The Master
7 3 1 1 S707 emergency incident while having someone else in charge at nearly all other times seems As per B DLF
is responsible for the Installations emergency organization and action, for conducting emergency
odd. It works as long as the guys are professional and work for a common goal. It has
drills and training and for keeping records of such drills. This designation satisfys IMO, ISM, SOLAS
worked well for years. I have never had a problem in this area because I value the
and STCW regulations applicable to Self Propelled Installations. For Non-Self Propelled Installations
experience of the guys I have worked with over the years.
the Company designates the OIM as the "Person in Charge" in an emergency.
 page 2
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

8 3 2 1.2 S710 Navigational Standards - add to the last line "and/or local Notices and similar information" Agreed as per A DLF

Navigational Standards - this must apply only to the Gulf of Mexico. We sail around the world
and are required to use Local Charts and Notice to Mariners from other countries also.
9 3 2 1.2 JOIDES Agreed As per A DLF
Advise anyone not to pull into several Major countries without having their latest Notice of
Mariners from that country on board.

References to USCG Standards and British Standards are not within the parameters allowed
by International Conventions and Flag State Authority. To maintain certification the Flag In the absence of Flag State navigational
State Regulations and International Conventions must be adhered to along withthe standards, USCG or British Admiralty standards
Classification Society Regulations. Specific Publication references that may or may not be should be used with procedures and formalities
Agreed in part. Wording to be changed to recognize precedence of Flag State requirements.
10 3 2 1.3 D Spirit compliant with IMO and SOLAS codes should be removed, IE Nautical Institute. as outlined by the Nautical Institute or equivalent ME
Nautical Institute Publications are to be used a a guide.
EXEMPTION: Maintain Inspection Program as per International, Flag State and Class Society professional maritime body. Recognised
Regulations. Shore Management to determine standards by choosing Class Society and industry publications that cover good practice
Flag State. If specific publications are required, shore base must ensure they have ready and are more than acceptable to ISM standards.
stock at All rig warehouses. D Spirit will stay DnV and Follow DnV.

All the reerence material under IMO is already mandatory under Flag States and should not
be in here since thy don't include all the IMO mandatory manuals. Also we need all the latest
ammendments on board, MARPOL, SOLAS. In addition to the (4) Nautical books that are in
this section, other references neded in this section for any ship include: American Merchant
11 3 2 1.3 JOIDES Agreed As per A DLF
Seaman manual; Merchant Marine Officer's guide; Weather for Mariners; A Mariners Guide
to Radio Facsimile Weather charts; Pilot Service, Vessel Traffic Service and Port Operations;
American Practical Navigator Vol 1&2; The Mariner's Handbook; Peril at Sea and Salvage;
Pirates and Armed Robbers (a Master's guide); Guide to Port Entry.

Third Party/Person in charge - states that the person in the position of OIM or Master,
12 3 2 1.4 S707 dependent upon the type of unit and current operational mode. If you're a DP vessel when is See 3.1.1 above. As per B DLF/ME
the hat changed from one guy to the other?

1.4 Towmaster responsibility. The OIM shall always be responsible for the safety of the
installation and the personel. The Towmaster should only be responsible for correct conduct
13 3 2 1.4 J.Meling of the move and deployment of mooring equipment. He should also direct all vessels and Agreed. Section 3.2.1.4 has bee reworded accordingly As per A DLF
anchor movement. WE CAN NOT GIVE THE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY TO A NON TSF
EMPLOYE:
 page 3
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

Bad Company advise here. The master has no say over a pilot in the Panama Canal or
when going into drydock. In addition to this local laws on pilots supercede marine law such
as San Diego where armed Marshals were on the bridge to insure no one interfered with the
pilot due to passing of a large number of nuclear naval ships. The statement about taking
14 3 2 1.4 JOIDES Agreed As per A DLF
over from a pilot should be removed as Pilots can be held responsible by local law and have
been in the past. The Master is held responsible for a competent bridge team and this is the
area the defense will go for at Court defending a Pilot. If the Pilot service is not mandatory
for the area, and the Company hires one for advice only, then the pilot has no libility.

Page 1 of 5 :When the Manual is referring to self propelled and non-propelled Units, is it the Flag State, SOLAS, STCW. TSF Installations include all Drillships and Semi-submersibles that
15 3 3 1 Arild Oanes As per B - no change to FOM DLF/ME
definition from Flag state or IMO modu code that have been utilised. navigate independently (self propelled) between locations without tug assistance.

Page 1 of 5 :It is referred to moored nonself propelled. It have to be clear that is not required
16 3 3 1 Arild Oanes This section has been reworded for clarity. As per B DLF
with lookout when the Unit is moored and carrying out Petroleum activities.

ME: The section is intended to provide guidance and standards under which those operations
17 3 3 1 Piersma Define Bridge Operations No change to FOM ME
undertaken within the confines of the navigational control bridge are undertaken,

SOLAS Ch 5 Reg13(b) requires Flag States to establish Safe Manning levels in accordance with the
priciples adoped by IMO resolution A.481(XII). Each Installation has a Minimum Safe Manning
Bridge Manning - the manual states that a licensed competent person who must hold an Certificate issued by the Flag State indicating the number of Marine Licensed and Certificated
unlimited license under the STCW95 IMO convention must man the bridge when the vessel personnel to be on board the Installation during different modes of operation. Comment from ME;
18 3 3 1.1 S707 is underway. Since many of our vessels operate in a DP mode while drilling and while IMO have not expreessed any comment regarding a "non requirement"… In some places Coastal No Change to FOM. ME
utilizing personnel with no license or no unlimited license does this mean that the IMO has State have indicated a requirement for ompliance with STCW…GOM and Brazil. Given the speed
stated that it is not a requirement because the vessel is not considered to be underway? with which a disconnect can be completed , there is always a possibility that a vessel could be
deemed "underway" at a moments notice for whatever reason. Hence the declaration that such a
licence is required.

I know the USCG would not give personnel on a DP drilling vessel sea time because they Not Correct. REF: USCG NMC-4C Letter 16721 dated May 2, 2000 to IADC Mr. Alan Spackman.
19 3 3 1.1 S707 no Change to FOM. none/dlf
didn't consider the vessel to be underway. "Service shall be credited w/o restriction for both deck and engine licenses."
 page 4
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

see #14 and #15 above. Comments from ME; In worse situation ie, colision irrespective of the
I also know the definition of the term "vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver" means a signals being shown, the onus of blame would always be apportioned upon the action take by BOTH
vessel which from the nature of her work is restricted in her ability to maneuver as required units to avoid collision. With the availability of a riser disconnect system, the Master / owner would
by the Collision Regulations and is therefore unable to keep out of the way of another vessel. be found wanting if the system was not used to avoid collision. Note the master of vessels at anchor
The term "vessels restricted in their ability to maneuver shall include but not be limited to; have been found to contribute to damages by failing to take action in time to avoid collision....failure
20 3 3 1.1 S707 No Change to FOM. ME
then it goes on to list several different forms of work and one of them is a "vessel engaged in to keep a lookout etc. AS yet there is no ruling on the modfe of operation of a DP drilling unit.
dredging, surveying or underwater operations". I would have thought that is how we would Therefore the lack of any decision must be seen as a cause of a legal discussion and any
be seen. Legally I guess we're not considered underway not making way since we have contrubutory factor, ie the lack of any action for any commercial reason would be seen as a
vessels operating as we do, it that what the Company has been told by the authorities? contributory factor in any such legal discussion. Therefore the FOM standard is designed to
safeguard bothe the vessel and the owners.

Personally I feel that some of our very best personnel are those without unlimited licenses
Agreed, However to maximize transfer of personnel, "grow our own", provide a career path from
and only want clarification on this issue. I think in our business it's important to have a
21 3 3 1.1 S707 DPO to Captain, unlicensed employees are encouraged to obtain unlimited licenses. Employment of No Change to FOM. none/dlf
combinition of assets that compliment on another. We have a lot of guys without unlimited
Unlimited Licensed Personnel is encouraged.
llicenses but they're great in pressure situations, running the decks and operating the DP.

22 3 3 1.1 Piersma Define on station "underway but not making way" ME; Underway is "not connected to the ground" and making way is actual moving through the water. See #14, 15, 16 - No change to FOM ME

The manual states the master should not be left alone while maneuvering or conning the
Wording changed to exclude DP watchkeeping by the Master. Intent of statement is when using the
vessel. Another licensed officer should be present. "The Master stands a navigational watch
23 3 3 1.1 Spirit services of a Pilot or entering port or underway in fog with traffic, two licensed officers will be in As per B ME
on the Spirt. This requirement means that an additional Officer will have to be brought on
attendance on the Bridge. One of these Officers will be the Master.
board for rig moves.

The statements in this section that a licensed deck rating will be incommunication distance of
the bridge puts 2 licensed people on watch at all times. The statement about the Master
never being left alone while conning the vessel is not a good statement. Regulation V111/2
24 3 3 1.1 JOIDES of STCW95 defines very well the requirements of watchkeeping arrangements fo a vessel. Agreed, changed wording to reflect STCW 95. As per B ME
Why is the company trying to change or reword regulations that are an International
Standard? any Statements that exceed the International Standards will have to be complied
with under the ISM Code.

Amver is mentioned. What about other reporting systems such as AUSREP and REEFREP
25 3 3 1.12 JOIDES good comment Section modified per A DLF
at Australia, that other countries have and some are mandatory.

They mention 5 days a contingency of fuel is normally acceptable on Long International

voyages. I hope they don't have to alter course and run from a bad storm. We need to have
26 3 3 1.13 JOIDES at least 1/3 in contingency which is about 20 dayss in case of bad weather, or having to take good comment Section modified per A ME
someone to a medivac area or whatever. Fuel is not available in some of these places. Bad
statement for any ship.
 page 5
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

Why do they want this statement. If the ship is complying with the STCW95 code then this
27 3 3 1.2 JOIDES statement is not needed. A Statement about a proper engineering watch and Radio Watch To empahsize the Company's position to Non Marine personnel. no change at this time. ME
would be a lot more meaningfull.

Policy was not written correctly. Typo on the second line gives a wrong meaning to the policy
guide. "In addition, by day when on passage, there should also be available a licensed deck
"While self-propelled installations are underway, the Navigation Bridge or Control Bridge must at all
rating." Deck ratings are unlicensed individuals. By reading the entire paragraph, you are
times be manned by a licensed competent person, who must hold an unlimited license under the
required to man the bridge at all times with a licensed competent person. In addition a
STCW 95 IMO convention. In addition, by day when on passage, there should also be available a
second licensed person must be available at times within communications distance from the
licensed Deck rating, who may be located within communication distance from the bridge. By night,
bridge...for what purpose? It does not specify. Accepted marine practice and required by the
an additional unlicensed deck rating (AB) is required to be in attendance on the bridge undertaking
28 3 3 1.3 Enterprise Collision Regulations is to have the bridge manned by a licensed competent person and an As per A - Wording per B DLF/ME
lookout duties." ME comments; The policy was written in line with STCW requirements. A deck
unlicensed deck rating to act as a lookout when needed by the bridge watch. EXEMPTION:
rating is licensed as he has the requisit STCW qualifications. If Class and flag state have given a
the D Enterprise is manned by a licensed and qualified competent person as per our Safe
requirememnt to provide lookout when underway, then this must be followed by the Master or risk
Manning Certificate when underway in transit between loctions. In addition, class and flag
prosecution if as a result of keeping a poor lookout a collision results. Note that these lookouts must
state have stipulated that due to our restricted bridge visibility that additional lookouts will be
be STCW qualified.
posted to port and starboard of the bridge. Additional lookouts will be posted at the
descretion of the bridge watch or Master as condition dictate.

At times whether on location or on passage or at anchor an efficient lookout must be kept to ensure
the safety of the vessel from collision by another installation. In particular during times of reduced
visibility the Master may decide to position additional lookouts due to the nature of the local area
No Change to FOM. At all time the
marine environment, traffic density etc. Both 3cm and 10 cm radars will be used at all times to
Bridge Lookout - this will require more personnel. Do we really want to do this? At present requirements of the International Rules for
29 3 3 1.3 DSS ensure maximum warning of the close approach by any surface vessel. Comment from ME: There is ME
DP personnel have cameras to monitor what is going on. Collision Avoidance shall be met, without
an onus upon the master that he must maintain a good lookout. "the lookout does not need formal
exception.
training. Hence the master may decide how the lookout requirement is maintained, and who
maintains it, as long as it is maintained. Hence a second man in the Bridge/DP control area could be
deemed as the lookout, or as completing the duties of the lookout.

Why do we need this Statement if the ship is complying with Rule 5 of the International
30 3 3 1.3 JOIDES To empahsize the Company's position to Non Marine personnel. As per B DLF
regulations for preventing collisions at sea and STCW95?

Open Water Navigation - Line 4 remove the words "Despite the nature of the area of transit"
31 3 3 1.4 S710 and after "…kept at all times". "All means available should always be used to establish the ME comments; Sentence to me amended; An efficient lookout is to be maintained at all times. As per A ME
vessel's position as accurately as is possible".

Open Water Navigation. There are some mis-statements here and depending solely on the
Tidal Atlas is not recommended. Some meaningful information here would be that several
places have a 50 mile security where you ned to send a report 72 hours in advance before
entry. Another is several Coastal States claim a 200mile EEZ sone off shoure. the coastal
32 3 3 1.4 JOIDES good comment As per A DLF
States claiming the zones can be found in the Admiralty annual notice to Mariners No 12 and
a lot of them have a mandatory reporting system that you are to report into and a lot of them
have laws you have to comply with while in these waters even during transit, such as flying
the coastal states Flag. Some have navigational rules that supercede International rules.

Coastal Navigation - replace "depending upon the scale of the Navigational chart" with
33 3 3 1.5 S710 ME; Agreed. As per A ME
depending on the prevailing environmental conditions"
 page 6
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

ADD "GPS and /or satellilte navigation systems must not be relied upon to the exclustion of
radar and visual fixes of position relative to the Coast. When navigating in oilfields or
crowded locations the positions of installations nearby should be checked with published
34 3 3 1.5 S710 ME; Agreed. As per A ME
information and charts but must not be relied upon for position fixing to the exclusion of GPS
and other means. The officer of the watch should always be aware of the possibility of
objects moving at very slow or unpredictable speeds and directions.

When entering an area of activity it is necessary to inform installations nearby of the vessel's
35 3 3 1.5 S710 ME Agreed. As per A ME
intentions and to be informed of other movements which may be in conflict.

Coastal Navigation - this section is misleading. Here we would be looking for areas on the
Chart that had symbols that we would want to stay away from such as Submarine exercise
36 3 3 1.5 JOIDES areas, fish havens, historic wreck. We would also be paying close attention to the depth good comment Section modified per A DLF
finder. Some Coastal States claim also a contiguous zone of 24 which gives them customs
rights. They can be found in Notice of Mariners No. 12.

This is standard Marine practice for self propelled vessels under pilotage. No change to manual
37 3 3 1.6 Arild Oanes Pager 3 of 5 :ref.: Bell book/Time book. Propose to add. Official logbook or Deck Log Book. required as applicability in 3.3.1 has been clarified to include only self propelled Installations. ME; As per B ME
Not sure what is being reqwuested!

Voyage daily transit reports aboard the Discover Enterprise are filled out for days end at
midnight and not at noon as dictated in the Marine Ops Guideline page 6 of Section 3
subsection 1part 3.10. This is in line with the daily operation report that is given to the Client
representative and transmitted to town. This report schedule has been established by the
Rig Manager. EXEMPTION: Vessel complies in essence of this policy in that it does
Agreed. Sentence to be deleted. ME comments; No problem with a regular daily report being filed at
transmit a transit report when necessary. The difference is that the report is for Midnight
38 3 3 1.10 Enterprise midnight rather than midday. In ffact recommend that all reports are for this daily period rather than As per B DLF/ME
rather than Noon so that all individuals involved do not have to do double reporting of the
the marine standard of noon/noon!
figures at two different times for both the underway transit report and the daily operational
report. Fuel, Water, Lubes ar all calculated at 2400hrs daily, not noon for both TSF
operational reports and for client operational reports. These reports are transmitted at 0600
after review by the OIM/Master for completeness and the addition of any other comments of
events that happened between 0000 and 0600.

GMDSS Logbook that is in use aboard the vessel is not the British (MSA) logbook. Book in
use is the US GMDSS log and is fully compliant with chapter IV SOLAS, 1974 amended in
Unless the Flag State Administration provides a
1988. EXEMPTION: Vessel is fully compliant with Flag State regulations and SOLAS
39 3 4 1.5 Enterprise Agreed. US GMDSS log is acceptable. Wording to be changed. ME comments; Complies GMDSS logbook, the TSF standard shall be ME
requirements to maintain a GMDSS Logbook. As stated above, the logbook is fully compliant
either the USA or British (MSA) logbook.
with chapter IV SOLAS, 1974 amended in 1988 and with US 47CFR80 standards. This
logbook is readily in US and Foreign ports.

Engine Log Book - There are no Duty Engineer's assigned or required by the Minimum
"A suitable Machinery Log should be used on all installations irrespective of the degree of
Manning or needed for Operations. Log of rounds is kept and reviewed by Senior Mechanic
automation on onboard. The log should be used to confirm equipment and plant status at minimum
and items requiring entry into Planned Maintenance System are entered into EMPAC.
40 3 4 1.6 D Spirit intervals of 12 hours. The duty WATCHSTANDER and Chief Engineer or Maintenance Supervisor As per B ME
EXEMPTION: Current rounds made and information entered into vessel provided planned
should formally sign the document." ME comments; It is possible that the rounds log may
maintenance system. Senior management to determine if current vessel manning / licensure
encapsulate the requirements of the Log book system.
is adeuate for Company desired requirements.

Supply Vessels - "All vessels approaching a TSF installation will advise their ETA at least one
41 3 5 1.1 S707 hour before arrival:. This will have to be reinforced by personnel in town so that the vessel This is good practice. Wording will be changed to "should" so to make requirement less prescriptive. As per B DLF
starts to comply.
 page 7
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

The vessel should comply with the IMCA

publications, M103 “Guidelines for the Design
Page 3 of 5 and 4 of 5 :The supply ship in the Norwegian Continental Shelf are using DP ME Comments; Activity in the North Sea, UK/Norwegian sectors was taken as a basis for what
and Operation of DP Vessels”, third party
most of the time doing cargo transfer, permission are given by the Platform Manager. Do I standards should be sought after. Hence although speculating I would suspect tha such DP
42 3 5 1.2 Arild Oanes audited to an approved standard and confirmed ME
understand right that it is required additional permission from TSF DP Marine Superintendent operations meet all the necessary requirements and hence authority for the TSF marine
acceptable for close approach DP operations by
? superintendent is superfluous.
the Master with support from the TSF DP Marine
Superintendent and Rig Manager as necessary.

DP Supply Vessels - Operations of Class 2 vessels has been addressed in other Exemptions.
Vessels not made fast to the Instalation may need to operate closer than 20 meters
depending upon crane lifts, and bulk hose lengths and material type being delivered. 2
trained DPO on the Bridge at all times is not verifiable from the installation. DP vessels used
by our clients Marathon and Unocal have longterm contracts. I do not believe that our
43 3 5 1.2 D Spirit REGION: Follow present controls. see #32 ME
relationship witht he client should be damaged by refusing supply vessels (that have been
alaongside for the past year). EXEMPTION: DP vessels should operate on the Lee Side only
while on DP. Management to contractually decide with Client on the type and capability of
DP supply vessel to be used. It is not effective to have installation attempt this after a rig
contract has been signed.

EXEMPTION: The operations involved utilizing a DP supply vessel at the Enterprise is to allow him
on the lee side of the vessel for operations when not in well flowing conditions. this way when there
ME comments; Would appear that the
is a failure of any part of his system, he will drift away from our vessel. As such, there are times
Enterprise has actively pursued the risk
when a critical lift has to be made on the windward side of the vessel due to confliction with the flare
Policy restricts the use of DP Supply vessel of DP Class 1. The standard operations of DP mitigation issues and has gone as far as it can
boom extended on the starboard side (lee side). It is safer to have him operate utilizing his DP
supply boats in the Gulf is DP Class 1. These vessels are under contract to the client at at this time. RESOLUTION: For safety reasons
system on our reflectors and/or DGPS than to have him live boating / crew boating where he could
44 3 5 1.2 Enterprise higher dayrates than non-DP boats. Contractural agreements with the client will be it is not acceptable for a DP supply vessel to ME/DLF
make a mistake more rapidly. Anytime a hazardous/oily substance/or noxious chemical is
hampered when it comes to our dictating the type and use of their supply vessels alongside work on the windward side of a TSF Installation
transferred, positive mooring of the supply boat along side is done to reduce the risk of a hose
our assets. closer than 20 meters while using DP only. DP
breakage and possible spill in the water. The vessel has a list of the client supply boats with DP and
supply vessels should not approach a TSF
their class, number of trained operators aboard and certifications/courses that they have.
Installation when flowing a well.
Management will need to resolve this issue with the clients under contractural agreements as to the
allowability of DP supply boat operations and Class Type re types of ref. system allowed.

Mike Easton is the DP Marine Supt based out of Houston. The purpose of this statement is to have
45 3 5 1.2 DSS Does TSF have Marine Superintendents" Who are they? someone intimately familiar with DP systems & operations review "Close Approach" operations Wording to be modified. DLF
ahead of time.

Have the supply boats been informed of the data in this manual and had a chance to
46 3 5 1.2 DSS No. Point taken however with regards to TSF's ability to control boat selection. Wording to be modified. DLF
respond?

Petrobras will need to supply us a list of class 2 vessels. I doubt this is going to go over with Coments from ME; To my knowledge as yet Petrobras have no supply boats that are able to operate
47 3 5 1.2 DSS them. I also think the 20m standoff is too much. This will put an extra strain on our take on on DP. Certainly in discussions with DPPS, they are very much aware of the risk posed by DP supply No change to FOM ME
hoses. vessels and to operate on DP they would have to fullfill the usual DP acceptance trials .

Exemption: While in DP mode the vessels are given a lee when working along side. In case of a
failure the supply vessel would drift away from the DWM. Extensive fendering is on the port side of
the DWM. The Bridge Team is in constant communication with the supply bessel and visually
DP Supply Vessels - may need to operate closer than 20 meters depending upon crane lifts, checks on it often. Comment from ME; Prolonged close proximity work using single system DP
48 3 5 1.5 Millennium Wording to be modified. DLF
and bulk hose lengths, 10-15meters when pumping bulks poses a high risk due to possibility of system failure. Some companies are now opting for dual
system and are undertaking full FMEA and system tests, in the realisation that such risk exist. It is
therefore at the masters discretion whether he accepts a DP supply boat alongside to work within
what are normally termed unacceptably close limits.

Will anchor handling activities, including multiple vessels, within the 500 meter safety zone
49 3 5 2 Dag H Lid Yes, 3.5.2.1 Applicability will be modified to exclude normal Anchor Handling activities As per B DLF
be classified as a routine supply vessel activity? Ref. 3.5.2.1
 page 8
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

Typically for large installations with azimuth thruster a minimum underkeel clearance of 5 meters is
acceptable. This will depend upon the nature of the bottom and anticipated usage of the thruster,
and the possible ingress of sand into the thruster bearings, cooling water pumps, etc.
Underkeel Clearance - Underkeel clearance of 5 meters may limit operations, vessel load out
In the case of a dead ship approach into shallow waters particular attention shall be paid to route
50 3 6 1.2 D Spirit at a safe anchorage, repairs in sheltered waters. A 10 foot clearance when entering port is No Change to Floating Operations Manual DLF
planning and equipment operations when the underkeel clearance is less than 3 meters (10 feet).
unacceptable. This rules out all ports in the Gulf of Mexico as a Safe Haven if needed.
Exemption: THINK Plan to be developed before entering port or proceedin to an anchorage by
Master and reviewed with OIM. REGION: Follow present controls. No blanket exemption to be
granted. Vessels requiring to transit inshore will submit route plan prior to the actual rig move and
will request exemption to minimum under water keel clearance at that time.

51 3 6 1.2 S710 Replace "narrow" with "shallow" after "squat" and add "trim and heel" As per A DLF

ADVERSE WEATHER - a Policy is required that all personnel must be made aware of the
This is required to be in each rigs Emergency Response Manual refer to HQS-HSE-001 Section
52 3 6 1.3 Piersma hazards and determine the controls to be put in place when adverse weather conditions are No Change to FOM. none/dlf
4.3.5.4.1 (Extreme Weather)
anticipated or experienced, including hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons.

I have never seen a Lloyds Open Form salvage agreement. I think some of the OIM's will
53 3 6 1.6 DSS Section modified to add additional information. As per B ME
need some training on all of these new procedures.

This seems to go against a requirement in the ISM Code that "the Master has the overiding
authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution
prevention." From what I recall the Amoco Cadiz incident was partically due to the Master's Section modified to add additional information. ME Comments; Agreed, perhaps a suitable rider that
54 3 6 1.6 Seillean unwillingness to sign a Lloyds salvage agreement until he had permission from his owners. under certain circumstances and in order to save life or protect the environment the Master will take As per B ME
Whilst agreeing that a Master should inform his owners as soon as practicable, obtaining such action as he deems necessary without the explicit authority of his onshore management.
permission should not be his primary concern. Clarification of the intent of this paragraph
would be appreciated.

Salvage - Rewrite the last paragraph: "Where the Master/OIM deems it necessary to engage
the assistance of a Salvor, he should inform the TSF Management before the agreement is
entered into. However if this is not possible the Master / OIM has the authority to enter into a
Lloyds Open Form agreement which can be made verbally by VHF or other means and is
binding, subject to arbitration. No other form of agreement is authorized without reference to
Section modified to add additional information. ME comments; Agree that the Lloyds form should be
Management. An entry must be made in the Deck Log, Radio Log or other Official Document
55 3 6 1.6 S710 agreed only when TSF management cannot be contacted. See comments above. It is implicit that all As per B DLF
(IADC) of the Time and Position, Condition of the installation and Perils when the agreement
communications and details must be logged with all names and details entered etc.
is entered into. This entry must also contain the name of the TSF representative (Master /
OIM) making the agreement, the name of the Salvage Vessel, Owners and Master. These
details should be transmitted to the TSF Management as soon as is practical by whatever
means available. All additional relevant information should be meticulously logged to assist
in making practical decisions and in the arbitration."

56 3 6 1.6 S710 Recommend adding a short precis of Lloyd's open form as follows: Agreed. ME ; suggest actually reproduce a lloyds form within the manual. As per B DLF

Lloysd's Open Form (summarized) Standard Form of Salvage Agreement. (NO CURE - NO
57 3 6 1.6 S710 Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
PAY)

This is an agreement between the Master of the Distressed Vessel on behalf of his Owners
and the Master of a vessel capable of rendering a salvage service on behalf of his Owners
58 3 6 1.6 S710 (the Contractor). Both Masters have the authority to make this contract and once done it is Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
legally binding. It may be oral (by Radio) or written or made by any available means (email,
fax, etc.) The mention of Lloyd's open form implies all the clauses apply.
 page 9
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

The essence of the contract is NO CURE - NO PAY. The contract is ablut Porperty only and
59 3 6 1.6 S710 Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
does not include LIFE which must be saved at all cost except the jeopardy of other lilves.

The contract is concerned with saving the Distressed Vessel and all the valuable property
60 3 6 1.6 S710 Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
aboard whoever the owners may be.

The Master of the Distressed Vessel should leave blank the VALUE in paragraph 1 as this
61 3 6 1.6 S710 Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
will ve settled in arbitration.

The Contractor may make reasonable use of any equipement on board the Distressed Vessel
62 3 6 1.6 S710 Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
to aid in the Salvage.

It is in the Owner's (Master's) interest to help the Contractor to salve the vessel as this effort
will be taken into account at arbitration as it reduces the general peril. Likewise any delays or
non-cooperation caused by the distressed vessel's Master or Owner may add to the peril and
63 3 6 1.6 S710 so to the award. Unwarranted Delays caused by the Salvor to increase the peril will count Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
heavily against the award and should be noted by the Master of the Distressed Vessel. there
is an allowance for the partial salvage of the vessel, all valuable items saved to be taken into
account at arbitration.

There is an allowance for arbiters other than the committee of Lloyd's to be chosen. Other
clauses deal with the general administration of the final award, objections, arbitration, etc.
Lloyd's acts as the final arbiter in cases where there are objectors to an arbitration of the
64 3 6 1.6 S710 salvage award being made by other arbitrators. Objectors may, in general terms, be any Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
major part with an interest in the property salved or the effort to save it. However the
Committee may itself many be an objector in which case it cannot act as arbiter and the case
must go to a Court.

TSF Management and the nearest Lloyd's Agent must be informed as soon as possible
giving details of this agreement. Masters should use this form before connecting a salvage
tug (not reconnecting a contracted tug), in cases where the vessel is in danger of stranding
65 3 6 1.6 S710 Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
due to insufficient or complete loss of power. Where the vessel has had a fire and is in
danger of foundering or needs assistance to control a fire, or need to be pumped to stay
afloat and is unable to pump out using own equipment.

This contract does not generally apply to tugs contracted to the same client, tugs already
contracted to TSF for any purpose where special clauses already apply to salvage or
redeployment. This contract does not apply to vessels under the same management. This
66 3 6 1.6 S710 Section modified to add additional information. As per B DLF
contract should not be used in any circumstance where there is sufficient time for
Management to negotiate a towage contract; e.g. vessel adrift in a safe condition and in no
danger.

Floating operations manual states that "the receipt of Any distress message in the official ME comments; Admittedly distress messages may be received fom all over the world. With regard
log". This is only required if the vessel is asked to respond to a distressed vessel and to responding see #57 above. Receipt of a distress must be acknowledged and formally recorded. If
67 3 6 1.7 Spirit chooses not to. Messages can be from all over the world but only those with a certain travel not attending tha reason must also be recorded in the Official log book. Commercial considerations see #57 ME
time need to be responded to. EXEMPTION: We will continue to follow Normal Standards must play no part in the decision, as distance may seem excessive but if there is still a possibility of
as mentioned. being the foirst vessel on scene there could still be a need to attend.

There is no international legal differentiation between a DP or non DP vessel. IN terms of safety at

This needs to be defined for DP vessels responsibility. I don't feel we should be under
68 3 6 1.7 DSS sea, commercial considerations never play any part, and should they do so the owner/master would See #57 ME
LEGAL OBLIGATION to assist when in a BOP connected mode.
be liable to very heavy condemnation
 page 10
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

Responding to a Distress Call - Recommend wording closer to Chapter V, Regulation 10 of

SOLAS: Replace with:"The master of a vessel or installation at sea which is in a position to
be able to provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source that persons are in
distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing
them or the search and rescue service, that the ship is doing so. If the Master decides that ME Comments; the current wording was intended to be brief; All Masters should be aware of the
69 3 6 1.7 S710 As per A ME
his vessel is unable to render reasonable assistance he must enter the decision and reasons onus upon them and the actual practicalities and demands such an operation may incur.
in the log book and inform rescue services accordingly. If several vessels answer a call the
Distressed Vessel may requisition the most appropriate vessels answering and release
others from their duty to assist. Such release must be noted in the Log Book with the time
and position.

The Master of a drilling rig may be able to offer Safe Haven, Helicopter Land and Medical
Facilties even if moving the vessel to the scene is unreasonable or impossible. This
70 3 6 1.7 S710 ME comments; Agreed. As per A ME
obligation is legal and binding by International convention on Salvage 1982, article 10 and
article 98(1) of UN convention for the Law of the Sea, UNCOLS, 1982.

Platform Manager, Offshore Installation Manager and Master definitions are provided in Section 1
Propose to have an definition in the Manual for categories as : Platform Manager, Platform Subsection 3.2.. A Platform Installation Manager is not applicable to "floating" operations. Barge
71 3 7 0 Arild Oanes No Change to FOM. DLF
Installation Manager, Offshore Installation Manager, Barge Captain and Master. Captain, Barge Engineer, Control Room Operator, Ballast Control Operator and undefined positions
in this manual.

Standing Orders - Someone needs to look at this. What does the company define as a
Standing Order. In the rest of the world a standing order is long term order to be posted on
board for everyone to view and remains in effect until taken down or re-written. In this
company. they are using as much as every 12 hours, Standing Orders to Drillers, Crane
The title of this section is open for suggestion for the next revision of the manual. No change at this
72 3 7 0 JOIDES Operators, etc. Flag States require the Master's Standing Orders to be signed and Posted as As per B
time.
should be. The company wants them signed and put in Standing Order Book, which I've
never heard of in the Marine world. It is a night order book that is required by Flag States for
instructions to personal on watch. A Standing Order shoudl be posted. A Standing
Procedure can be in a book.

Propose to include statement on Notification of planned move to authorities as appropriate in

73 3 7 2.1 Dag H Lid As per A DLF
present Region, in 3.7.2.1

Typical AMERICAN INSTITUTE TRADE WARRANTIES Location geographical location

74 3 7 3.2 Betsy Kelly limitations. Locations which approach these areas to be specifically identified in Rig Move See Betsy Kelley email 3/4/02 for text. Included in 3.7.3.2 DLF
Notification.

It is the policy of the Company that the insurance manager be notified of all wet tows of Self
Yes, Regional Administrative Manual to be changed. DISCUSS - Risk Manager to be notified of ALL
75 3 7 3.2 Brooks Elevating Installations and ALL DRY TRANSPORTS of all types of Installations. (REF As per B DLF
moves.
Regional Administration Manual 2.7.4.5)

Refer to Administrative manual - It is the policy of the Company that the Insurance Manager
76 3 7 3.2 DLF Same as above AS Per B DLF
be notified of all wet tows of JU's and ALL Dry Tows. REF Regional Admin Manual 2.7.4.5

EXEMPTION: Daily Stability Calculations using the provided stability program. Clear up the Section.
Continue with Rig computer. " Stability calculations should be carried out AT LEAST weekly using
Stability Checks using the stability computer should be made Daily not weekly. The the computer program and a secondary system check using another method should be completed at
requirement for daily checks of the VDL is redundant if the statbility is not verified at that time. regular intervals not exceeding two weeks.
77 3 7 7 D Spirit As per B DLF
The secondary calculation is not accurate and does not provide stress information that is
more desired than actual stability information. A comprehensive verification of all variable weights must be completed daily to facilitate the
completion of accurate stability calculations."
 page 11
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

STABILITY - Add a paragraph regarding special precautions to be taken immediately prior to

drydocking. For example: It is criical that all tanks should be sounded and kept on record
throughout the drydock period so that the tanks are in the same condition when the vessel is
78 3 7 7 DWN refloated. It is also very important to note locations of weights (variable load) for similar Agree. As per A DLF
reasons. Other details that should be noted regarding drydocking would be to verify that all
tank bottom drain plugs have been securely replaced prior to refloating. There are may more
items that relate to the very critical operation.

Many of the Jack Ups and semi's continue to use a spread sheet program to verify stability. The
intent is to keep the stability programs from being tampered with without Engineering approval.
I was a CRO on the "Zane Barnes" and have worked on 5 semi's. The "Bates" (now) uses an
Engineering is to be kept in the loop. ME comments; The use of unauthorized such spreadsheets
Excel spreadsheet (the original I made in 1987 - 1988, and the subsequent CRO's have really
79 3 7 7 Mueller poses a liability. Upon the Zane Barnes arriving in Europe and new Barge engineers taking over this No Change to FOM DLF
done a great job turning it into an even better tool) for stability calculations. Will the company
particular spread sheet was found to have excessive free surface conservancy built into it which in
now contract for a non-spreadsheet approach?
fact compromised deck load in the transit condition. Therefore authorzied calculation stability
systems should only be used, which may be verified against a secondary system on a regular basis.

We use the ability to adjust the trim / heel of the rig for tripping purposes and for cleaning.
Would we be out of compliance if we put the rig 1/2 - 1 degree over for this purpose? I
believe the operating manuals say about the same thing as the quotation, and, we interpret
that our actions are not out of bounds. I'm sure you know also that we have recommended
80 3 7 7 Mueller (years ago at R&B) that when ballasting and de-ballasting through the transition zone and All Installations should be kept with a minimum number of slack tanks and near even keel. As per B DLF
onto the pontoons we keep the rig at a trim (usually to the stern) of +/- 1/2 degree. quote: In
all cases any installation should be kept on even keel with minimum slack tanks and sufficient
contingency to bring it to survival draft should environmental or operating conditions
dictate.:unquote

As per A. At the end of each quarter the

summary reports for each individual installation
Lightship - requirement for computer spreadsheet in Excell format is redundant to the Exemption: Manual compiliation of added weights in Logbook. Continue with rigs logbook system. shall be forwarded via the Regions Technical
requirement for keeping a written log book of added weights. Submission should be annually Agreed. ME Comment; The use of a single system to verify stability is not acceptable, albeit this Support Group to the Houston Engineering
81 3 7 7.1 D Spirit DLF
of a photocopy of the log. If the company desires to update the stability program at this time vessel is a monohull. Every unit must use an a totally differing Stability calculation system to verify Department, Marine and Structural Engineering
then an Engineer will be required to transfer the information into the program anyway. the principle system at least twice a month. group for the purpose of maintaining updated
information on each installation for technical,
operations, and marketing support tasks.

Alterations to Lightship - "An official lightship alterations logbook…" What is Official? Note
82 3 7 7.1 "Official" has been deleted. Light ship Log Book / Register is appropriate As per B DLF
also HQS-HSE-001 Section 4.4 regarding project completion - "updating Lightship Register".

ALTERATIONS TO LIGHTSHIP - "At the end of each quarter the summary reports for each At the end of each quarter the summary reports for each individual installation shall be forwarded
individual installation shall be submitted to the Marine Operations Supt for review and shall via the Regions Technical Support Group to the Houston Engineering Department, Marine and
83 3 7 7.1 As per B DLF
be entered into Central Eng'n Records." Need to better define where these summary's go ie Structural Engineering group for the purpose of maintaining updated information on each installation
Who and Where? for technical, operations, and marketing support tasks.

ALTERATIONS TO LIGHTSHIP - "At the end of each quarter the summary reports for each
individual installation shall be submitted to the Marine Operations Supt for review and shall Comment from ME; The reporting has become a marine issue as it is something that falls in line Direct quarterly report to Eng'n with copy to
be entered into Central Eng'n Records. Min Ops Man 4.14.4.1.5 states "All weight additions / with the general stability consideration of the unit and is a requirement by Class etc. It is therefore local Field Support. Marine Supt to audit log has
84 3 7 7.1 Cleaver DLF/ME
deletions will be documented and recorded and applied to the lightship wieght by the Captain, something that must be captured by audit/reporting, hence the reporting to the Marine Ops Supt, been kept and Engineering updated as
OIM or B. Engr." Corp HSE Manual 4.3.3.4.4 Project Completion "...Updating the lightship who is likely to visit the units or have correspondence with the persons involved on a regular basis. required? Already included in audit checklist.
register".
 page 12
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

Requirement for Emergency Ballast Drills Every 30days should be changed to every 60 days.
85 3 7 8 D Spirit Exemption: Drill to be conducted every 60 days per HS&E standards. as per B DLF
This will align these drill with all others drills as every 60 days per HS&E manual.

Floating Operations Manual states that "All installations will carry out a full function test of on
all aspects of the bilge and ballast system including bilge alarms at intervals of not more than
2 weeks" is not practical due to the design of 1) Bilge alarms / system on the D Spirit 2)
manual operation of valves is not possible without securing hydraulic system 3) Manual
checks of draft gauges are impractical due to locations and sea conditions 4) Emergency
86 3 7 8 Spirit systems are SW Service Pumps. Opening the emergency valves would disrupt wate flow and Agree that section as written is too perscriptive. Section to be re-written. As per B DLF
create mess in Machinery Space. 5) Defects such as mnor repairs/limit switches / lightbulbs
need not be reported to Rig manager 6) Tests to be recorded in Marine Log - tests and
maintenance is recorded in EMPAC. ADDED CONTROLS: 1)Tour of Machinery spaces by
mechanics and Motormen as required 2) None 3) None 4)None 5) Report conditions that may
lead to or directly affect vessel stability 6) Record in EMPAC.

1. Vessel does not carry Ballast Control Operators or have a centralized manual emergency
valve station. 2. Ballast Control Drills are not held monthly as specified in this policy. 3.
Vessel is not manned with a Barge Supervisor / Barge Engineer to make decisions on major
ballast changes. ***This section needs to be rewritten to reflect the design and manning
differences between a semi-submersible and ship. EXEMPTION: All ballasting operations
are handled by the DPO/VMS operators. 2. Ballast control drills are held at 60 day intervals Agree that section as written is too perscriptive. Section to be re-written. ME comments; Would
87 3 7 8 Enterprise As per B DLF/ME
in line with the HSE manual section 4 sub 3.5. This exercise involves the Alert team appear to be vessel class specific.
personnel and includes the operation of the local manual feature of the valves. Vessel is not
fitted with a centralized emergency valve station like a semi-submersible. 3. The Captain or
Chief Mate will make all decisions on major ballast changes after consulting the stability
computer that the required stability stress and bending moments are within normal
tolerances.

In order to satisfy the US authorities regarding US Invasive species act of 1996, we intend Agreed. Edited Section 3 Subsection 7.4 ME Comments; Agreed this must be highlighted for all
88 3 7 8 Capt PIII As per B DLF/ME
to change the Ballast water onboard. units, as it should be undetaken on any international voyage.

Water tight Integrity - the third paragraph states that "watertight and weathertight closures
remain closed except for the usual functions of access and egress". Weather tight closures Exemption: Keep doors / hatches affecting watertight integrity closed. Weather tight should be
89 3 7 9.1 D Spirit are not required to be kept closed by Class Society. They are to keep weather away and do removed from manual. Rig will operate as is. Agreed, section to be reworded to delete reference to As per B DLF
not have an effect on the vessels watertight integrity. Sack room, Weld shop and other misc. weathertight enclosures.
spaces have doors normally open.

Propose to add subsection on "minimum" main towing, emergency towing and narrow water
90 3 7 10 Dag H Lid Section 3 Subsection 7.10 has been added to Rev 1 edition As per B DLF
towing systems / equipment in section 3.

Towing Bridle - change wording to the following: "Each towed Semi-submersible shall have a
main and secondary tow bridle connected at the lower hulls for ocean voyages. Tow bridles
91 3 7 10.1 Piersma shall be fitted with a deployment / recovery system. When multiple tugs are used in parallel, As per A DLF
the main tow bridle can be split or additional tow lines connected at each pontoon (eg for a 2
or 3 tug towing arrangement).
 page 13
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

EXEMPTION: the designated VMS operators aboard this vessel are the same qualified DPO's that
man the Central Control Room during DP Operations. They are tasked with all power management,
No change. The Guidelines recommend that
cargo system, ballast operations and fire and gas sysem operations in addition to monitoring all
Vessel is not manned by Assistant Engineers when the vessel is on drilling location. As the VMS system be monitored by a licensed marine
machinery and ship system alarms. The Maintenance Duty Personnel, to include the mechanics,
vessel is classed as an Unattended Engine Room, there is no licensed Assistant Engineer to engineer. The issue of bringing on licensed
motormen, electricians and ETs are trained in the operation of the VMS system to perform their
92 4 3 2.11 Enterprise whom this policy applies as prescribed in the vessel's Safe Manning Certificate when engineers only during mobilization drills around DLF/ME
normal work or to take local control of systems as needed with permission of the DPO/VMS
performing DP operations on a drilling location. Vessel cannot comply with the dictate of this the Min. Safe Manning Certificate requirements.
operator. Licensed Engineers that are required to be aboard as per the safe manning certifice
policy that the VMS operator will be a licensed Assistant Engineer. The goal is to provide a career path for licensed
during transits of a specified duration are oversaw by the normal ships complement until such time
personnel.
as they become conversant in the operations of the systems to the satisfaction of the Master and
Maintenance Supervisor / Chief Engineer.

Exemption: Management to determine if this company will provide trained, experienced and certified No Change. The Guidelines recommend a path
DP operators always or if the vessels will train and develop their own personnel. The Chief Mates forward is for new hire DPO / VMS operators to
The Chief Mate should be in possession of a DP certificate and the supporting logbook. The
93 4 3 2.3 D Spirit are working towards a DP Certification. I and several of the DPO's have just received certification. hold unlimited mate / engineer licenses. Senior DLF
Chief mates do not have a DP certificate at this time.
This policy will limit the employment and training of some capable personnel. REGION: Stay as is. Marine Personnel without DP Certification
Continue to train existing personnel. should be working towards same.

ME Rig Visit should clear this issue up. The intent is for the DPO to hold an unlimited mates license
preferably 2nd mate. This section was written with a view towards the new drillships where 2 DPO's
Sr. DPO / 2nd Mate - on 709 these jobs are distinct and separate, and not combined or
94 4 3 2.4 S709 would be on the bridge at all times. As a concession to the junior DPO not holding an unlimited No Change ME
carried out by one person.
mates license (perhaps holding an engineering license) the Sr. DPO/2nd Mate position description
was used in the manual.

No Change. The on tour Driller and on desk DP

Operator both hold the authority to initiate
The "on tour driller and the on desk DP operator hold the authority to initiate emergency
Exemption: Follow Emergency Contingency manual and Spirt Procedures. REGION: Leave as is emergency disconnect activities and RED
95 4 3 2.4 D Spirit disconnect activities. This is not applicable on the D Spirt. It is the duty of the DPO to inform DLF
until conflict resolved. ALERT alarms respectively in the event of a
the Driller and activate alarms. It is the Driller''s duty to initiate Disconnect Proceedings.
deteriorating situation, without immediate
reference to their superiors.

DPO - the distinction between DPO and Sr. DPO, is the level of experience, and knowledge
96 4 3 2.5 S709 of systems. Not running a 2 man watch there is no senior or junior watchkeeper, only the DP ME Rig Visit will discuss this issue. The intent was the Sr. DPO would hold a 2nd mates license. No Change ME
watchkeeper.

Driller shall inform DPO when BHA or casing is in the stack that cannot be sheared, should
97 4 3 2.7 S709 As per A As per A DLF
read "before it enters the stack and when it is clear".

The Floating Operations Manual has numerous references to the Master developing Training
In accordance with his responsibilities, the Master shall develop an installation specific DP
requirements for DPO's, Crane Operator's, Engineers and Drilling Personnel. This is a
shipboard familiarization course for all new hire marine, engineering and drilling staff. These
98 4 3 3.4 Spirit function of the Training Department and OJT Modules. Specific vessel training is No Change DLF
personnel will receive an induction upon joining an installation for the first time that emphasizes their
accomplished with mentoring. Exemption: Follow existing Company systems. Alert team
specified duties. Checklist Goby and training material are discussed in 3.5 and 3.6.
training and mentoring cover this vessel.

I am concerned that we are expected to be in 100% compliance with the policys in this
99 4 4 0 S709 ME Rig Visit As per B ME
manual by year end byt that this will be an impossibility in lots of areas.

No Change at this time. Comment to be

Exemption: Shore Based Management to provide adequate personnel on Strength Report to man
100 4 4 1 D Spirit It is not possible to man VMS, DP and Driller's chair at all times with current manning level. expanded upon so to clarify how intent of Policy ME
these three areas at ALL times. REGION: Leave manning as is.
is impossible to meet.
 page 14
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

As with the request for exemption for Section 4 subsection 3 parts 2.1/2.2, the designated VMS
operators this vessel are the same qualified DPO's that man the Central Control Room during DP
Section 4 Subsection 4 part 4.2.2 states that the VMS will be manned by a VMS Operator / Operations. They are tasked with all power management, cargo system, ballast operations and fire
Assitant Engineer at all times when attached to the sea floor. As this vessel is not manned and gas system operations in addition to monitoring all machinery and ship system alarms. The
by Assistant Engineers when the vessel is on drilling location, we cannot comply with this Maintenance Duty Personnel, to include the mechanics, motormen, electricians and ETS are trained
section of the policy. As the vessel is classed as an "Unattended Engine Room" there is no in the operation of the VMS system to perform their normal work or to take local control of systems
101 4 4 4.2 Enterprise No change - See 4.3.2.3 above DLF/ME
licensed Assistant Engineer to whom this policy applies as prescribved in the vessel's Safe as needed with permission of the DPO/ VMS operator. Licensed Engineers that are required to be
Manning Certificate when performing DP operations on a drilling location. Vessel cannot aboard as per the safe manning certificate during transits of a specified duration are oversaw by the
comply with the dictate of this policy that the VMS operator will be a lilcensed Assistant normal ships compliment until such time as they become conversant in the operations of the
Engineer. systems to the satisfaction of the Master and Maintenance Supervisor / Chief Engineer. The vessel
will be manned this way until such time that the compay restructures the manning scales and
requires licensed assistant engineers at all times aboard.

One hour rotation on DP desk is not possible on single handed watches. It is also not
ME comments; It is a matter of how the risk is managed and what cover is available and also the
102 4 4 5.1 S709 necessary on 709. If constant attention is required on the desk then mate on deck or master No change to FOM ME
speed of the cover.
can be called to assist with ballast operations etc.

Exemption: The DP system on the Spirit is specifically designed to be monitored from one central
location. Two DP Operators monitoring the overall system is more practical and efficient than one
operator in front of a particular console. On Dec 31, 2001 a third party auditor hired by Marathon
DP Operators must sit in front of one of the DP or VMS stations in one hour rotations. This commented positively on the design of the room layout. See attached WEST Job#1204 electrical
103 4 4 5.1 D Spirit defeats the design purpose of the Enterprise Class DP room. One person can monitor all Daily Report #4 page 2of3. REGION: Rig to Keep present manning level. DLF - The West third See #106 ME
functions in this room party was Lew Weingarth ex Sr. Elec. DP Supervisor Sedco 471 1984-1997 / Electrical Engr Global
Marine new construction 1997-2001. ME comments; How is the risk controlled and managed in the
event of a DP or VMS emergency. It is accepted there are other ways of managing the risk, provided
the risk is recognised and the mitigation properly controlled.

EXEMPTION: The DPO currently make checks of the DP system and Power Management at 3 hor
intervals in line with normal marine practices. These are kept on a tour log that covers the entire
Section r sub 4 part 5.1 bullet 5 states that hourly check sheets of the DP system will be
tour. This tour log also becomes part of the turnover between tours and is filed for historical No change - The intent is when you write
completed. By the amount of information that the author of this policy would like to see on
purposes. Tey are used as a backup to the history station and DP logger. The Marine Deck Log is something down you understand / recognize
these hourly checks, the DPO will be spending most of his time doing them instead of paying
104 4 4 5.1 Enterprise also filled out at 3 hour intervals for normal opeations and at lesser intervals as dictated by the what is going on. This does not happen when DLF/ME
attention to what is happening around him. These checks are redundant of the DP logger
Master for adverse environmental conditions. Additional engine and machinery data is logged by the relying on electronic recording and looking after
and History station. Individual hourly check sheets are a waste of resources and not in
maintenance duty person in the Engine Room log as an additional record of the power management the fact.
compliance with our core value of financial dicipline.
and propulsion systems. Additional, any adverse or DP anomolies are captured in the various other
required reports such as the DP anomoly Report and the Tour log.

2. When the installation is engaged in DP Operations in close proximity to another installation or

S709 has one DP Watchstander on shift. The Captain sits in for lunch breaks, etc.
structure, or when attached to the sea floor by means of a riser or similar rigid system, the DP desk
105 4 4 4.2.1 S709 According to the Manual we should have two DP Operators on shift and at the control panel As per B DLF
will be manned by a competent DP watch keeper. A second competent DP operator will be available
at all times so unless we hire another Watchstander we are not in compliance with this.
in or near the DP Control center.

709 has successfully operated single handed DP watch for 20 odd years. There is no reason ME; as identified the intent of the manual is to suggest ways of risk mitigation. The desk manning
No Change to FOM. Mike Easton rig visit
106 4 4 4.2.1 S709 to change this, but if the manual sttes minimum manning is for 2 people, then we should issue is best resolved during a visit when a better understanding of the FOM intent and the vessel's ME
scheduled.
have 2 people on shift. operation will be gained by all, and a suitable and prcatical solution agreed.

In the event of a major problem with DP system or exceptional operational circumstances

107 4 4 4.2.1 S709 See #105, #106 No change to FOM. ME
requiring two DPO's then the offshift operator can assist.

Compliance with the minimum manning requirements for the DP room stated in these
108 4 4 4.2.1 D Spirit sections would require hiring and training 4 more DP Operators. This must be addressed by See #105, 106, 107 No change to FOM. ME
upper management. Rig based management cannot adjust strength levels.

Client's time - ME rig visit; ME comments; Various units have found that the pre location trials can
be completed during the arrival on location very successfully. The trials achieve training and
familliarization wfor the DP and ET crew with their equipment which otherwise remains untested. If
109 4 5 2.1 S709 Pre-location trials, performed in clients time or rig's time? As per B, no change to FOM ME
only part of the trials are completed then the outstanding items can be repeated during the next
move. NB.. Clients are becomming more agreeable to such trials given the assurance they provide
on DP system operation.
 page 15
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

2 man watches per 4.3.1. On watch DPO should concentrate on DP duties but should
respond to other problems without putting DP stationkeeping in jepordy, ie respond to fire See #95 ME comments; Hourly check sheets are also reminders of system status and indicate
alarms, excess trim, etc. Hourly check sheets are excessive. We currently complete a 2 trends etc, which will not otherwise be apparent. 2 Hourly chgeck lists are acceptable provide the As per B, FOM reworded allowing 2hr recording
110 4 5 2.2 S709 ME
hourly log, all data is recorded to strip chart and stored for several days, so if a particular item ongoing operation is not high risk, ie Non Sherables or extended scinytillation etc. Accurate weather operation and environment dependent.
of information is required in between the 2 hourly log, it can be retrieved. Weather forcasts data is available and has been used by other units and found accurate from several suppliers.
obtained where possible, some areas (eg Nigeria) there are none that are revelent.

111 4 5 2.2 S709 Hourly log requirement, S709 2hourly log ref 4.5.1 See #93 ME comments.. See No 93 As per B ME

Exemption: The 6 hour bridge relief checklist, combined with a verbal hourly DP handover, two
person watch , written rough log, DP status board and proper Bridge Team Management suffice to
Requires an hourly DP Desk log. DWM bridge watchstanders stand a two person 12 hour
both ensure adequate communication and documentation of DP operations in lieu of an hourly log.
watch with the DPO and SR DPO watches staggered 6 hours. This system provides
ME Comments; The six hour check list is a hand over chect list, and identifies the system status at
continuity of the watch while ensuring fresh relief every six hours. An extensive 6 hour
that time. The Hourly or (2 Hourly) log clearly provides evidence that the DPO is monitoring critical
112 4 5 2.2 Millennium checklist is used to facillitate each watch relief. The bridge is continuously manned by both See 4.5 2.2 ME
items and system trends, which can be critical in indicating a progressively deteriorating situation.
the Sr. DPO and DPO. While the person at the console is relieved every hour, both of the
the use of historical printouts collected from the Data logger or strip chart fail to provide any
watchstanders are continuously aware of systems and operational status as required by
evidence that the DPO has actually taken onboard the ongoing changes in the information displayed
proper Bridge Team Management.
by the DP or associated systems. Such a log should take a maximum of 10 minutes to record and
simply identifies the dynamics of the vessel and the environment.

Exemption:Conditions are logged every 6 hours (correlating to the morning report) to provide an
overview of the day's weather. During rough weather conditions are logged as dictated by the
Conditions should be logged hourly in the DP Log. Manual hourly logging is redundant. The
113 4 5 2.2 D Spirit master/OIM. The DP logger records information in a more efficient manner. We will continue with See 4.5 2.2 ME
vessel system logs numerous bits of information on a continuous basis.
currently Maritime policy. REGION: Continue with present system. ME Comments; This is not
acceptable for the reason given in 96

114 4 5 2.3 S709 Helio-ops not part of DP log. HLO logs this in marine deck log. ME comments; Vessel specific No change to FOM ME

This information should be desplayed, no real need for how far the beacon was away from
115 4 5 2.6 S709 the BOP at Wonka 8 to be recorded, as long as you knew where it was whilst you were at ME comments; Vessel specific No change to FOM ME
Wonka 8.

Weather forcasts, already discussed 4.5.1, would like them if they were available, but don't
116 4 5 2.7 S709 ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM DLF
seem to get anything other than generalized, same weather with possibility of squalls.

The TSF DP incident GRS reporting form is taken as an item that is the base case report
form. I copied the format agreed onto the OPDOC referencing DP Reporting and presumed
that it reflected what was written in the as issued DP guidelines. However the Floating Ops
117 4 5 2.9 Easton/TLL TSF DP Incident form on GRS to be incorporated into FOM. As per B ME
manual can be changed at the next revision which will be forthcoming later in the year. I can't
see a reason at the moment to digress from what was covered in the OPDOC which covered
the issues to everyone's satisfaction.

118 4 5 3 S709 DP documentation referred to should be available to the rig. ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM ME

119 4 5 3.1 S709 DP capability study, do not have one but capability plot built into the ASK ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM ME

FMEA, would like one, need time off contract to perform trail and then implement
120 4 5 3.2 S709 ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM DLF/ME
recommendations that would follow.

Riser performance analysis report. Have never actually seen one of these. If this is a
121 4 5 3.8 S709 requirement then they should be placed on board and copies of pertinent parts placed in DP ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM DLF/ME
information file.
 page 16
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

122 4 5 3.9 S709 Environmental Operational Limits. Need to have these specified. ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM DLF/ME

The Well Specific Operational Guidelines (WSOG) (Refer to Section 6, subsection 8)

document will clearly and systematically identify significant limiting criteria that impact upon
the station keeping ability of the installation. The document will quantify the minimum
availability of these criteria for the various stages of degrading operational status, i.e.,
123 4 5 4.2 Mueler through the deteriorating operational conditions:GREEN ADVISORY YELLOW RED:endquote Reference changed to Section 4 Subsection 9. As per B DLF
Dan, In the "Floating Operations Manual", there is no section 6, subsection 8. I have looked
farther in the "Floating Operations Manual", and have found Well Specific Operational
Guidelines (WSOG) in section 4, subsection 9 - is this the correct section or is it a reference
to something / somewhere else?

Exemption: Vessel submits Morning Report daily and equipment status reports weekly. REGION:
This issue should be incorporated into GRS / EMPAC? ME Coments; the DP monthly report is
designed to briefly capture the current operational status of the DP and relevant systems onboard
0600 report is okay. DP Monthly report to be
Reporting Requirements: daily reports are submitted at 0600 not at time specified in manual. the unit. The report purpose is to ensure that the relevant persons, Engineering and Operational are
124 4 5 3.10. D Spirit incorporated into GRS. Manual report to be ME
Monthly report summary is redundant and not time sensitive. kept informed of the situation and with their experience may be able to identify corporate trends or
submitted in the interim.
lessons learnt, or even equipment status relevant to that vessel. Agreed eventually a GRS report
may be more suitable however the format should also be circulated onboard to ensure all interested
partries are aware of the current equipment functionality.

Maintenance Supv, or Elec Supv should sign permits that allow work on systems that could Agreed but approval cannot stop at this level. The Master must be aware of any DP limitations
125 4 6 1.1 S709 as per B ME
effect DP equipment. imposed by system maintenance, thus his approval is required.

126 4 6 1.2 S709 We do not have status lights in ROV. Do we need them? ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM ME

Worst single point failure, 709 without split power bus / switchboard etc, would be
127 4 6 4.2 S709 ME Rig Visit No change to FOM ME
permanently on advisory.

Definition of yellow I feel is wrong. Yellow is a situation where if something else happens
then we could be in trouble, not purely an indication that we are at the DP limit. Example,
ship on collision course, water spout on collision course with rig, fire alarm, unexplained
excessive trimming / change in draft. The list of when a rig is on a yellow concludes with any Good Comment ME comments; Agreed good comment, tend to forget that the Yellow alert has
128 4 6 4.2 S709 As per A, wording changed ME
situation that the DPO feels warrants a yellow alert, but then the definition specifies a purely other uses, but could be identified in the WSOG
DP oriented problem. DP operators should not hesitate to use the yellow alert, and stating
that "it is an indication that the DP is approaching the limit of it's capability" may cause an
operator to delay changing status to yellow when he should.

We also need to identify drill floor response to different levels, what should the drill floor do
129 4 6 4.2 S709 ME comments; vessel specific. No change to FOM ME
when we go to advisory?

On the DP side of things I think the manual reflects what we have on our new build rigs and
130 4 7 1 S709 is not representative of what we have for the older generation DP vessels. How are we going ME Rig Visit As per B ME
to get 100% compliance with rigs like the S709.

We are supposed to have two DP systems operational, indifferent mediums at all times to
operate in DP mode. We lose the DGPS signal day for a certain length of time due to
atmospheric problems with scintillation. Should we go to the added expense of getting
131 4 7 1.4 S709 ME Rig Visit As per B ME
another DGPS System from another Vendor to minimize this problem or have the rig og to
Yellow Alert every time it occurts? I think not, but again the policies are there in black and
white.
 page 17
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

What is a non hazardous operation. We regularly lose DGPS. Is this scintillation? How do
132 4 7 1.4 S709 we know? If we lose DGPS due to electrical problems is this different to losing it due to ME Rig visit No change to FOM ME
scintillation? The secion on Position reference systems is contradictory and ambiguous.

"During scintillation only non-hazardous operations should continue if DGPS drops out. Use
of dual accoustic systems during scintillation is acceptable". Does this mean that we can do
133 4 7 1.4 S709 ME Rig visit No change to FOM ME
hazardous ops without DGPS as long as it is scintillation causing the loss of DGPS? What
are the operations we class as non hazardous?

134 4 7 1.5 S709 Trials - We need to be given time to do these, either on company or clients time. See #96 No change to FOM ME

Operational Emergency Trials - these are a good idea, are they to be none on rig time or See#96. ME comments; Emergency trials could be as table top exercises bringing tigether parts of
135 4 7 2 S709 No change to FOM ME
clients time? How often? the WSOG

Standard Operational Procedures. - reference the comments on ERA, does this mean that if
we lose the acoustics we should not use ERA in the desk? Company requires 3 independent ME Rig Visit, See #107, 108, 126 ME Comments; ERA should not be used as a reference unless in
136 4 7 4 S709 No change to FOM ME
PME. S709 has spent several day drilling with ERA as a referene. Do we accept downtime if very exceptional circumstances, due to the non linearity of the riser performance in deep water.
only ERA and either DGPA or accoustics are non-functioning?

On board riser advisory program. Are we going to be sent this automatically or do we need ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. DLF - this program is in development by
137 4 8 1 S709 No change to FOM DLF
to order it and the PC to run it? Engineering. Some DP installations have a preliminary rig specific program on board.

Drift off curves. Are these going to be sent to the rigs or are we going to have to make them
138 4 8 1 S709 ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM DLF
up ourselves?

Exemption: Disconnect Criteria is set by Emergency Contingency manual. Setting dual disconnect
The RED Disconnect watch circle is an ever changing limit. Watch circles on the Spirt are points is confusing and in NOT in compliane with regulations. Management to determine disconnect No Change to Manual. Tranining to be
139 4 8 1 D Spirit DLF
dictated by the Emergency Contingency Manual Section 12 paragraph 1.3. criteria. Emergency Contingency Manual (a controlled document) will be followed until this is discussed
resolved. REGION: Stay as is until Manual conflicts are resolved.

Policy stipulates that the red disconnect circle will be an ever changing value. An ever
changing watch circle leaves tremendous room for error on the part of the persons involved
as to whether the last entered watch circle figure was correctly calculated. Also as conditions
may change rapidly the person who should be calculating a watch circle change may be
involved with other more pressing problems that have resulted from a change of weather,
DLF - I don’t want to think, just tell me what to do and when so I do not have to be responsible =>
machinery problems, well control situation, well testing, etc. EXEMPTION: Disconnect No Change to Manual. Tranining to be
140 4 8 1 Enterprise Minimum wage personnel can do this thus TSF does not need professionsl personnel that ME
criteria for the Enterprise has been determined by TSF Engineering and the Rig Management discussed
understand the capability and limitations of their rig and the well. ME; no further comment.
team and has been established as written in our Emergency Contingency Manual (Section
12) and will be followed until this issue is resolved between the author of this policy and
Operations. The present watch circles were determined with driftoff data that was sent from
the rig to TSF Engineering and developed specific for this rig in various conditions of drilling
and well test conditions.

141 4 9 4 S709 Reference material - are we going to be sent this stuff or are we expected to order it? ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM ME

142 4 9 5.2 S709 Provide definition of Advisory. ME commen ts; See section 4 Subsection 9 para 5.2 Advisory No change to FOM ME
 page 18
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

Loss of a single thruster or generator, S709 is nearly always one thruster or generator down.
143 4 9 5.2 S709 ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM ME
Surely this should be less than one available spare or similar.

ME Rig Visit. Should be specified in Marine Ops Manual ME Comments; to be discussed during rig
144 4 9 6.4 S709 Need to get environmental limits quantified. Does the rig do this or the DP system supplier? No change to FOM ME
visit.

Throughout the chapter, reference is made to FMEA. We should get one of these
145 4 9 8 S709 ME Rig Visit No Change to FOM. ME
regardless of classification.

DP capability plots - use of plots provided as part of ASK has limitations. How do we go
146 4 9 8 S709 ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. No change to FOM ME
about getting capability plots as described in the manual.

Close proximity operations - banning of DP class 1 vessels from 500m zone. What is more
likely to fail, a DP system or a tired boat driver. How can we be so critical of class 1 systems
147 4 11 3.1 S709 ME Comments; to be discussed during rig visit. Wording changed to be less perscriptive DLF
when several of our rigs do not have any classification? Today's class 1 units are more
reliable than the first DP dive vessels.

Exemption: while in DP mode the vessels are given a lee when working along side. In case of a
Close proximity operations - banning of DP class 1 vessels from 500m zone. Most
failure the supply vessel would drift away from the DWM. Management to determine if the Clients
148 4 11 3.1 D Spirit work/supply vessels in the GOM are Class 1. The vessels assigned to the Spirt by Marathon See #134 ME
will revise the type of vessels they hire to be in compliance with this policy. REGION: Stay as is,
and Unocal have been Class 1.
cannot enforce this requirement.

ME Comments; the risk is that if something goes wrong when in close there is a good likelihood of
Standing off distance of 100m is excessive. Supply vessels with no DP system close to
149 4 11 4.2 S709 vessel contact and dammage. Why have a risk at hand if it can be controlled by having it stand off As per B. "Must not" changed to "Should not" ME
within 10m, so why does uning DP mean he has to stay further away?
the vessel when not required.

Dual reference system requirement, this is excessive. What is the reason? Switching from
ME Comments; In an emergency the simpicity of the change over is arguable. Particularly if the
DP to manual or joystick is simple on a supply vessel. Should a problem develop it is simple
control position changes from the aft to the forward end of the bridge. On some units the DP is seen
150 4 11 4.4 S709 for the class 1 vessel to assume manual control and either move clear or continue with As per B. "Must" changed to "Should" ME
as the main control system and manual or joystick control is the exception. Hence the safeguard of
operation. Personnel on Supply vessels are familiar with and comfortable handling their
requiring a high standard of DP redundancy.
vessels in manual control. DP is only an Aid.

Exemption: DP Workboats use one relative position reference system (Fannbeam). They have
DGPS but the use of this is not allowed by TSF DP management (Pete Fougere). This system
(DGPS) should not be used in close proximity due t satellite shading and position fix jumps.
DP vessels operating within the 500m zone of our vessel must have two dissimmilar Management to determine fi TSF will specify minimum standards for supply vessels to clients before
151 4 11 4.4 D Spirit No Change ME
reference systems actively selected into their DP System. chartering rig to client. DP supply vessels will continue to be allowed along the Lee side until this
policy is determined by shore management. REGION: Stay as is. This cannot be enforced. Only a
warning should be printed. ME comments; Agreed that TSF should pursue a higher level of DP
class vessels.the reason for not allowing DP supply vessels in close proximity has been reinforced.

Sect 4 sub 11 parts 4.4 and 6 states that DP supply vessels must have at least two reference
systems selected to their DP systems. EXEMPTION: Most of the class 1 DP supply vessels
in the gulf use the Fan Beam system and are also fitted with DGPS. We have had directives
from TSF Engineering - DP Ops that stated that the use of their DGPS for close proximity ME comments, TSF need to pursue this discussion with their clients particularly as some supply
152 4 11 4.4 Enterprise operations should not be used due to possible shadowing and frequent position jumps. Untin boat operators have recognized the risk and have commissioned third parties to undertake formal No Change ME
sometime that TSF specifies and gets agreements with clients and their supply boat FMEAS, and system trials and have raised the competency issue of their personnel.
operators or we install additional base reference station such as "artemis" for their use,
continued use of these vessels are asked to be allowed with all the necessary precautions
that have normally been taken.
 page 19
DW Ops Manual Rev00 - Comments
A B C D
# Section Subsection Paragraph Commenter Comment Discussion Resolution Action

This is a bit daft. If someone who is not the authorized person informs you that there is a
ME comments; On some units, construction support, Pipelay etc, there may be several groups of
problem do you ignore him or initiate the response to an emergency? When things go wrong,
153 4 11 7.1 S709 persons on the bridge, ie survey, construction mngmnt etc, hence the need to ensure that Clarification added. DLF
it is likely that the authorized person is a little bit busy and liable to shout to someone to tell
communication is correctly routed during dual vessel operations.
the rig rather than leave the DP desk co call himself.

1. Those items noted in Checklist 3 2.1 plus the DST section of the Well Control Manual
(HQS-OPS-002) must be checked. :endquote I'm pretty sure the idea here is for the
154 7 2 1 Mueler gentlemen to look at the checklist '7.2.1' in this section (7.2) of the (Floating Operations) The Checklist reference changed to 7 2.1 As per B DLF
manual. There is no checklist in section 3.2 of the Well Control Manual or the Floating
Operations Manual.

8. The pressure in the BOP needs to be evaluated before a well test. BOP's are not designed to
8. Pressure regime in the BOP needs to be evaluated before a well test. BOP are not
resist hydrostatic pressure from outside. External pressure can lead to collapse of components
designed to resist hydrostatic pressure from outside and can lead to collapse of components
155 7 2 3 Mueler inside the BOP (Various industry references are available). Potential for severe down time and As per B, wording changed DLF
inside the BOP. Various industry references are available. This can lead to sever down time
operational risks (loss BOP integrity and control of well bore pressures) exists if BOP internal
and operational risks (loss BOP integrity and potential no control of well bore pressures).
pressure is less than external hydrostatic pressure.

The item referenced above appears to have some requirements which are not in line with
other TSF docs. Can this be a Schlumberger document? I'm not trying to stir up any trouble,
but, as I read through this stuff I see stuff like-quote: 2. Contractors drillpipe will not be used
156 7 2 4 Mueler TSF's position when writing this document is TSF drillpipe is not used for DST No change to FOM DLF
for DST.:endquote The TSF documentation, i.e., Minimum Operating Standards (4.3) and the
Well Control manual (7.1.2.2) forbid the use of drillpipe in a DST if H2S is known to exist, but,
otherwise does not forbid it's use.

I think the position "Houston Discipline Manager DP/Controls/IT" should read "Houston
157 9 1 4.1 Van Winkle Engineering Discipline Manager DP/Controls/IT" In section 4.3 it refers to "HQS Discipline Agreed As per A DLF
Manager..." instead of "Houston Discipline Manager..."

I think the link to the DP Operations Documents on the Engr Intranet site should go directly to
158 9 1 5 Van Winkle the site here; http://hqs.eng.tsfnetlink.com/DP_Operations_Page.htm instead of to the Engr Agreed As per A DLF
Standards page here; http://hqs.eng.tsfnetlink.com/Engineering_Standards.htm
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
HQS-OPS-004

DOCUMENT CONTROL PAGE

APPROVALS
VP Operations
Approved by:
Mike Hall Technical Support
Signature Name Position

Approved by:
NA NA NA
Signature Name Position

TABLE OF REVISIONS

Revision Effective Reviewed

Description of Change Prepared By Position Position
No. Date By
Issue: 01 December First Issue D. Farr Project Bob Scott VP Ops.
Revision: 00 31, 2001 Coordinator Support
Issue: 01 February 7 Exemption Section 1.4 revised to A. Whitmore QA Bob Scott VP Ops
Revision: 01 2002 standardize format with HSE Administrator Support
Corporate Ops
Issue: 02 July 1 Major review of all section, section 3 D. Farr Project Bob Scott VP
Revision: 00 2002 added – see “comments” page in Coordinator Operations
manual for details of changes made.
Issue: 02 October 1 Revisions to sections 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, D. Farr Project Bob Scott VP
Revision: 01 2002 3.7 & 9.1 – Section 8 Removed, Coordinator Operations
Reference to HQS-OPS-005 Added
Issue: 02 November 1 Section 1.6 added – Policy D. Farr Project Mike Hall VP
Revision: 02 2002 Statements, Section 3.1 minor Coordinator Operations
revision to text. Technical
Support
Issue: 02 March 1 Section 4.3 sub sections re- D. Farr Project Mike Hall VP
Revision: 03 2003 numbered, section 9.1 revised Coordinator Operations
Technical
Support
Issue:
Revision
Issue:
Revision
Issue:
Revision
Issue:
Revision
Issue:
Revision

This controlled document has been produced by Operations Department, Houston.

Questions relating to this document should be referred to Operations Manager, Worldwide Deepwater Fleet, Houston.

This document is the property of Transocean Sedco Forex and shall not be copied or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the
express written authority of Transocean Sedco Forex.
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: POLICIES
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: N/A

POLICY STATEMENTS

Transocean policies are stated within this manual as follows:

SECTION 2 ...............................................................................................WELL PLANNING

SUBSECTION 4 DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

SUBSECTION 5 TENSIONER RING OPERATION
SUBSECTION 6 METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
SUBSECTION 7 FIELD MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN THE
WATER

SECTION 4 ........................................................................ DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 4 DP WATCH KEEPING

SECTION 6 ................................................................RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 2 RISER SPACEOUT

SUBSECTION 3 RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL
SUBSECTION 4 RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS
SUBSECTION 5 RISER STORM HANG OFF
SUBSECTION 6 CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

SECTION 7 ................................................................DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION
SUBSECTION 2 DST PLANNING INFORMATION CHECK LIST
SUBSECTION 3 DRILL STEM TEST HAZID
SUBSECTION 4 DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS
SUBSECTION 5 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

SECTION 8 ........................................................................... SURFACE BOP GUIDELINES

SUBSECTION 1 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

SECTION 9 ..............................................................................OPERATIONS ADVISORIES

SUBSECTION 1 DP OPERATIONAL INFORMATION DOCUMENTS

(OPDOCS)

SECTION 11 .........................REGION / DISTRICT / INSTALLATION SPECIFIC POLICIES

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: Foreword
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: NA

PREAMBLE

To continuously improve our operational performance, we must concentrate on achieving

operational excellence. This Floating Operations Manual prescribes and communicates an
acceptable level of performance to be applied to floating drilling operations – both offshore
and onshore. It is expected that individual regions, districts and installations will implement
specific procedures that reflect their day-to-day management of floating operations.

Many of these policies and guidelines are based on lessons hard learned as we have
moved into deeper and deeper water depths. As such this Floating Operations Manual
presents methods that may be new to some but common practice to others. All
employees are encouraged to communicate improvement opportunities identified while
putting this manual into practice.

The policies and guidelines in this manual do not and will never be able to cover all
possible operating situations. Its intent is to assist and encourage individuals and teams to
think for themselves and make judgement calls based on their experience, training,
education and adherence to Company policies.

Bob Scott

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 MANUAL MAINTENANCE

(Please Read Immediately upon Receipt of the Manual)

Revisions to this Manual

It should be fully understood that this manual is issued as an “UNCONTROLLED” manual

that will not be updated by the issuing department when revisions are released and posted
on EDocs. To facilitate this manual being maintained to the latest revision it is essential that
the holder subscribe to the Operations document set on EDocs. This action will ensure that
when revisions are posted on EDocs, the manual holder will automatically receive email
notification of the revision with a “hot link” direct to the revised document. The manual holder
will then be able to print a copy of the revised document and update this manual accordingly.
To subscribe to EDocs please complete the following actions:

• Open TSFNetLink at http://www.tsfnetlink.com/TSFNet

• Click on the EDocs icon located at the top/center of the page
• Click on “Regular Access to EDocs”
• Click on “Subscription” located in the “Tools Navigator” section at the top/right of the
page
• Enter your personal email address in the identified field, remembering to delete the word
“Anonymous”
• Click on the box next to the word “Operations” in the categories vertical listing, a “Tick”
should appear
• Click on “Save Subscription” located at the top/left of the page

You will now see a profile with your email address as “Subscriber” and Operations in the
“Categories” section.

You may now close the EDocs application.

Obviously, if you are already subscribed to the Operations document set, the above actions
are not necessary.

Feedback

To facilitate continuous improvement of this manual, it is essential that you, the end user,
feedback any useful information that will help HQS Operations Support Department provide
and accurate, practical user friendly manual. Please document all feedback and email it to
mailto:dfarr@houston.deepwater.com for action.

References: Revisions To HQS Operations Department Level 1 Documents “HQS-OPS-

001 Section 2 Subsection 12”.

HQS Operations Support Department

 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 1

GENERAL
INTRODUCTION

The Company has a documented Management System, which is an essential tool that
enables us to meet or exceed standards, improve efficiency and continuously deliver a high
quality of service to our customers.

The management system documents what we do, how we do it, the standards we set, and
how we measure and improve our performance to ensure that we achieve our business
objectives.

This manual forms a constituent part of the Management System. Its purpose is to
prescribe and communicate the controls to be applied specifically to floating operations.
This manual establishes company policies, minimum standards and provides guidance on
how to achieve compliance. Adherence to the requirements documented in this manual
will ensure an acceptable level of operational performance however; every employee
should strive to exceed these minimum standards. References may be made to other
sources of information. Personnel should become familiar with these references and be
able to relate one to the other.

The Vice President, Operations Technical Support is the designated owner of this
document and is responsible for it’s content and implementation.

The content of this manual can be changed at any time. The procedure to make a change
is available from Quality Services, Houston and EDocs under “Document Control”. All
users are actively encouraged to submit change proposals in line with the Company’s
philosophy of continuous improvement.

NOTE: The only version of this manual that can be assured of being up-to-date is the
one residing in EDocs. All other sources, e.g., CD, paper, E-Manuals, and the like, cannot
be assured to be at the most recent revision level.

The relationship between this manual and the other Management System documents is
illustrated in the Management System Manual (HQS-QUA-001).

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: Oct 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

GENERAL
THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT FUNCTION

The Operations Department forms part of the company’s combined management

organization providing a service to operations and other regional support functions on
matters relating to the Company’s documented Management System in general, and
offshore operations matters in particular.

The Regional Administration Manual (HQS-OPS-003), Section 1, Subsection 3 contains

details of Operations Department roles and responsibilities.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
b SUBSECTION: 3

GENERAL
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Note: This section has been developed to supplement the Regional

Administration Manual Section 1, Subsection 3

1 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

The overall responsibility for operations in Transocean rests with the Executive Vice
President, Chief Operating Officer. The control of operations is delegated to the
Senior Vice President of Operations who is the Management Representative of the
organization and has organizational freedom to identify operational deficiencies and
facilitate corrective actions resulting in solutions to identified problems.

This organizational structure defines the authority and responsibilities of personnel

regarding floating installation operations.

2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 All Company Personnel

All personnel have the responsibility of fostering a safe and efficient working
environment and developing positive attitudes and practices in operations. All
personnel are as a minimum responsible for the following operations considerations:

• Become familiar with all-applicable floating operating policies and procedures.

• Report suggestions for improving the efficiencies of floating operations.

All personnel report to their immediate supervisor.

2.2 Installation / Facility

2.2.1 Supervisors

Supervisors have the responsibility of creating a safe and efficient working

environment and developing positive operations attitudes and practices among
crewmembers. Supervisors are responsible for the following operations
considerations:

• Crew compliance with floating operating policies and procedures.

Supervisors report to their next in-line Supervisor.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

GENERAL
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.2.2 Offshore Installation Manager / Master

(Platform Manager - Norway)

The term Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) or Master pertains to the key
installation based individual employed by the Company who has the overall
responsibility and overriding authority in emergency situations. The OIM/Master is the
highest authority onboard. On non-self propelled and bottom supported installations
the OIM/Master may be the same person. Designated OIMs/ Masters have overall
responsibility for ensuring that operations are conducted safely, efficiently and in
accordance with sound marine and drilling practices. During the discharge of his
responsibilities, the OIM/Master shall rely on the advice of his supervisors.

Note: The OIM is the senior onboard manager, who reports directly to the shore-
based Rig Manager. It is his role to manage the overall operation and administration
of the installation. The OIM will ensure that Company policies are followed,
contractual obligations to our client are met and day-to-day operations are carried out
in accordance with good oilfield practice as well as the client’s and Rig Manager’s
instructions. The OIM is responsible for interface with Transocean shore based
management and the onboard client representative during an emergency.

The Master is responsible for DP station keeping, safe navigation and collision
avoidance, general safety and pollution prevention, Installation stability, regulatory
compliance, ISM/MODU Code compliance and implementation of emergency
response training.

Under Section 14.8 of the MODU Code, the Company designates the “Person in
Charge” during an emergency as specified on the Station Bill. During an emergency
“Person in Charge” determines from available situation reports, written procedures,
acceptable safe working practices and advice from the onboard management team if
there is a threat to personnel or installation or the environment, then coordinates the
appropriate response action. A “Controlled Well” is not an “emergency” event within
the scope of this paragraph.

The “Person in Charge” is assigned the legal requirement to hold overriding authority
in situations involving safety and pollution prevention based upon written procedures,
policies, recognized industry safe working practice, relevant codes and standards.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

GENERAL
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.3 Regions

The Regional Administration Manual (HQS-OPS-003) Section 1, Subsection 3

contains Regional Operational Management Positions and responsibility definitions.

2.4 Corporate

The Regional Administration Manual (HQS-OPS-003) Section 1, Subsection 3

contains Corporate Operational Management Positions and responsibility definitions.

3 COMPANY ORGANIZATION

The Management System Manual (HQS-QUA-001) Section 3, Subsection 1

contains the Corporate Management Organization Chart that defines the reporting
lines of communication within the Company.

The Operations Department Organization Charts can be found in the Operations

section of TSFNet. They define the reporting lines of communication between
headquarters based personnel.

Reference: Minimum Operating Standards Manual (HQS-OPS-001), Section

1, subsection 3.

Regional Administration Manual (HQS-OPS-003), Section 1,

Subsection 3

Management System Manual (HQS-QUA-001), Section 3,

Subsection 1

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

GENERAL
EXEMPTIONS

1 EXEMPTIONS

It is understood that there will be occasions, due to exceptional circumstances, when

it is not possible to comply with a particular Company policy or procedure. The intent
of a formal exemption process is to ensure that when this occasion arises it is
properly managed by ensuring that the appropriate level of management is aware of
the increased hazard of not complying with the Company policy or procedure. This
allows management to ensure that resources are allocated to adequately address the
risk that would normally be addressed by the Company policy or procedure, prior to
the operation proceeding.

If a Company policy or procedure can not be complied with, operations may proceed
only if the Region Manager or designee has approved a “Request for Exemption”
prior to the commencement of the work.

It is the responsibility of the approving Region Manager or designee to ensure that all
possible avenues have been given the fullest consideration prior to authorizing a
request for exemption to a specific Company policy or procedure. Once it is
determined that it is not possible to comply with the Company policy or procedure,
controls must be put in place to address the risk normally covered by this particular
Company policy or procedure.

The request for exemption will progress through line management (e.g., Department
Head, OIM, Rig Manager, District Manager to Region Manager). During this
progression, should any level disagree with the need for exemption from the
Company policy or procedure, the exemption process will cease and the Company
policy or procedure will be complied with or the operation will not be carried out.

All approved exemptions will have a set validity, which will be a maximum of 12
months.

All past and current approved “Request for Exemption” forms will be retained in a
dedicated file and kept in the OIM’s office.

Authorization may be granted verbally in urgent situations but must be followed up

with a formal hard copy approval within seven days.

Periodically the number of requests for exemption from a particular Company policy
or procedure will be reviewed on a worldwide basis. If there are more than five
requests for exemption to a particular Company policy or procedure, this Company
policy or procedure will be reviewed for validity.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

GENERAL
EXEMPTIONS

2 DOCUMENTATION

The Exemption Form (Figure 1) included in this manual is an example of the latest
revision at the time of publishing, the current latest revision can be located in EDocs,
Quality, HQS, HQS Quality Services, Forms Folder and is not to be modified from its
original format. This is a required document to be used for all exemptions. This form
will be reproduced and made available to all installations/facilities by their
District/Region offices.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

GENERAL
EXEMPTIONS

Figure 1, Example Exemption Form

Tracking No.

REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION For Office Use Only

REQUESTED BY: DATE: 31/01/02

MANUAL TITLE: DOCUMENT NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE: POLICY/PROCEDURE NO.:

REGION: DISTRICT: INSTALLTION/FACILITY:

1. REASONS FOR NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE COMPANY POLICY/PROCEDURE (Attach drawing or pictures if necessary for clarification)

2. WHAT CONTROLS ARE PROPOSED TO ADDRESS THE RISK FORMALLY COVERED BY THIS POLICY/PROCEDURE?

AUTHORIZATION
3. CONDITIONS OF EXEMPTION:

4. DEPARTMENT HEAD AUTHORIZATION

Period of validity of exemption (12 month max):

OIM/Facility Manager (signature): Date:

District Manager (signature): Date:

Region Manager (signature): Date

REV 01 JANUARY 2002 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM13

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

GENERAL
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the company that all installations and facilities will maintain
procedures for initiating, planning and controlling change both permanent and
temporary.

2 PURPOSE

To prevent incidents occurring when change takes place.

3 SCOPE

This Policy covers all installations, facilities and employees of the Company.

4 PROCEDURE

4.1 General

Changes to the way operations are carried out during floating drilling may occur due
to the implementation of the procedures and guidelines detailed in this manual.

The area of operation (regional), the capability of an installation, crew and equipment
and/or technical considerations may influence the way these procedures and
guidelines are implemented. Minor changes may be handled by using the THINK
Planning Process. More complex change will require a more detailed written plan,
procedure and checklists. Risk assessments are required while these plans are being
developed and implemented.

It is necessary for resulting change to be properly assessed in a consistent way in

order that:

• Unnecessary or counterproductive changes are prevented

• Changes do not adversely affect safety, the environment, operations or service to
the client
• No changes are made by individuals without knowledge of relevant personnel and
approval by management
• Interfaces with all relevant parties are taken into account before committing to the
change
• A record of the process of change is maintained

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: DECEMBER 31, 2001 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

GENERAL
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

4.2 Emergency Changes

The intent of this Management of Change procedure is not to prevent anyone from
taking immediate measures when necessary to protect the health and safety of
personnel, protect the environment or the safety of the installation. In the event an
unplanned change is identified, operations should be suspended until processes to
control that change are in place.

4.3 Initiation, Review and Approval of Change

Proposals for change resulting from the implementation of these floating operating
policies will be handled in accordance with Regional procedures.

Management review will be carried out in accordance with Regional procedures. This
review should consider:

• The necessity of the change

• Its value to the installation and company
• Potential operational impact
• Cost benefit analysis
• Engineering and technical details
• Revision to existing operating procedures
• Associated risk

The OIM and Rig Manager should receive, evaluate and approve installation
recommended change(s).

The Regional Operations Manager and Regional Manager will evaluate and approve
the change(s).

Change proposals should be forwarded to the Regional Field Support Group where
technical aspects of equipment or installation are involved.

Note: Feedback from operating personnel is considered to be a key element to

ensuring that change proposals and their implementation are professionally
carried out.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: DECEMBER 31, 2001 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

GENERAL
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

4.4 Implementation of Changes

The complete implementation of changes will be ensured following Regional

procedures. The implementation of approved changes will be managed from proposal
to conclusion.

Records will be maintained in accordance with Regional procedures.

5 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy or Procedure

however; other reference sources may have documentation requirements.

Reference: HS&E Manual (HQS-HSE-001) – Management of Change

Minimum Operating Standards Manual (HQS-OPS-001) – Request

for Engineering Action (REA)

Minimum Operating Standards Manual (HQS-OPS-001) –

Modifications, Upgrades and Certification of Equipment

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: DECEMBER 31, 2001 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

POLICY STATEMENTS

TRANSOCEAN POLICIES WITHIN THIS MANUAL

POLICY 2.4 – Deepwater Wellheads Design Considerations

It is a Policy of the Company that BOP equipment shall not be run on wellheads at an
angle greater than 1.0 degree to avoid key seating damage unless the Client accepts
responsibility for any and all damage that might occur. This acceptance shall be
obtained in writing.

POLICY 2.5 – Tensioner Ring Operations

It is a policy of the Company that all DP installations will evaluate torque transmitted
from the riser system into the wellhead caused by heading changes during the well
planning period and prior to a change in heading so as to avoid possible damage or
spin of the wellhead.

POLICY 2.6 – Metocean Environmental Considerations

It is a policy of the Company that all personnel must be made aware of the hazards
and determine the controls to be put in place when adverse weather conditions are
anticipated or experienced.

POLICY 2.7 – Field Moves with BOP Suspended in the Water

It is a Policy of the Company that the running and retrieval of the BOP while drifting
with a current to/from location with a net ZERO force on the riser is discouraged. If
such an operation is proposed, Regional Manager approval is required in view of the
commercial impact of a dropped BOP that cannot be located or recovered.

POLICY 4.4 – DP Watchkeeping

It is a Policy of the Company that three key areas be manned at all times. These
areas must maintain regular communication with each other on any change of status
that may effect the overall safety of the operation:

• DP Control Desk
• Driller’s Console
• Vessel Management System Control Center

It is a Policy of the Company that manning levels for key locations should not be
compromised.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 1 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

POLICY STATEMENTS

POLICY 6.2 – Riser Spaceout

It is a policy of the Company that all Installations will prepare a drilling riser
spaceout for each well that meets Company and API RP 16Q minimum standards
for performance and safety in the site-specific environment of operation.

POLICY 6.3 – Riser Running and Retrieval

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will prepare a riser running and
retrieval plan that outlines the limiting environmental parameters of the operation,
the required duration of the operation, and the forecasted weather during the
operation.

POLICY 6.4 – Riser Connected Mode Operations

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will establish safe operating riser
tensions according to API recommendations, safe excursion limits to provide
optimum drilling performance, and maximum excursion limits to establish point of
disconnect and watch circle limits.

POLICY 6.5 – Riser Storm Hang Off

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will establish for each well an
upper limit environment condition for which safe riser hang off operations are
achieved. The method of riser hang off and a procedure to safely disconnect the
riser from the wellhead and secure it in the hang off method shall be available
throughout the well.

POLICY 6.6 – Calculating Station Keeping Limits

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will establish for each well station
keeping warnings based on riser offset limitations, environmental conditions at the
drilling location, and necessary crew response times to safely react to loss in
station keeping.

POLICY 7.1 - Drill Stem Testing (DST)

It is the policy of the company that each installation shall prepare well specific Drill
Stem Test (DST) procedures.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 2 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

POLICY STATEMENTS

POLICY 7.2 – DST Planning Information

It is the Policy of the Company that:

• Well testing is carried out in a manner, which ensures safety of personnel, the
environment and equipment.
• A detailed review of the relevant test program will be first carried out between the
Rig Manager and Client representatives onshore, after which a full risk
assessment of the test program. An agreed upon plan by all participants, will be
carried out on the installation before commencing operations to assess the risks
involved.
• When conducting DST’s from a dynamically positioned installation, roles and
responsibilities of the DPO and Driller will be reviewed with respect to DP
stationkeeping.

• Each installation have written standing safety procedures during DST’s. These
procedures will be reviewed during the pre-DST risk assessment to ensure they
remain relevant for the DST operation being planned.

• To shut in DST operations from floating installations when rig motions exceed 5-
foot total (double amplitude) heave.

• A detailed engineered Hazop with the Operator and 3rd party personnel be carried
out at least one month prior to well testing.

• The surface SSTT control station will be manned at all times.

POLICY 7.3 – DST HAZID

It is the policy of the Company that each installation conducts a Hazard Identification
Exercise HAZID’s prior to performing drill stem tests or completion operations.
Dynamic positioned installations must expand the scope of HAZID to incorporate
stationkeeping issues particular to dynamic positioning.

It is the policy of the Company that a passive compensated lift frame be used during a
DST on those floating installations where a passive motion compensator system is not
installed.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 3 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 1
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

POLICY STATEMENTS

POLICY 7.4 – DST Dynamic Positioning Considerations

It is a policy of the Company that a Well Specific Operations Guidelines (WSOG) is

to be developed by each DP installation as part of DST planning.

POLICY 7.5 – DST Emergency Disconnect

It is a policy of the Company that installation heave shall not exceed 5 feet total
(double amplitude) as indicated by movement on the drill floor while flowing the
well during a DST.

POLICY 9.1 – DP Operational Information Documents (OPDOCS)

It is a Policy of the Company that information relating to DP operational and

technical issues will be made readily available and communicated in a controlled
manner at all personnel involved in DP.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 4 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 1

WELL PLANNING
INTRODUCTION

1 INTRODUCTION and BACKGROUND

As wells progress into more challenging environments, health, safety and

environmental concerns become more sensitive due to utilization of new technologies,
new applications of existing technologies as well as lack of historical president.
Unique features of deepwater wells such as tight tolerances, low fracture gradients,
extensive use of liners, and large changes in annular size (casing to riser transition)
require specialized equipment and/or procedures to maintain a high level of drilling
performance.

Well Planning is one of the most important tasks to be accomplished prior to

embarking on any project, task or work assignment. (Refer to Minimum Operations
Manual HQS-OPS-001) All levels of operational management shall identify and plan
activities and resources needed to achieve the Company’s Mission Statement and
Core Values in consideration of the following:

• Needs and expectations of the Client and other interested parties

• Performance of the work
• Learning from previous experiences
• Risk identification and analysis

The results of Well Planning should include identification of:

• Responsibility and authority for execution of the plans

• Skills and knowledge needed
• Opportunities for operational improvement
• Requirement for resources

Established Well Plans should be regularly reviewed and revised when necessary to
reflect feedback from the Client, Transocean personnel or other interested parties.

Prior to the well being spudded, every effort will be made by the Rig Manager to
receive and review the drilling program. The drilling program will be reviewed for safe
drilling practices, violations of Company policies and the ability of the Installation to
perform drilling operations within the environment and water depth of the location.
Pre-spud meetings should be held with the client onshore and on the installation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 1

WELL PLANNING
INTRODUCTION

Floating drilling operations conducted from either semisubmersibles or drillships must

consider a number of factors to insure a successful and efficient operation including:

• Water Depth
• Metocean Conditions/Rig Operability
• Location Remoteness
• Resupply Requirements
• Infrastructure Support (workboats, anchor boats, docks, helicopters)
• Prior Well and Post Well Locations
• Rig Equipment
• Stationkeeping
• Safety Experience
• Shallow hazards
• Hydrates
• Drilling Riser Capabilities
• Well Head Capabilities
• Medical Evacuations

Successful drilling services anticipate the most effective solutions to address the
shallow hazard, low fracture gradient, low temperature and other hole parameters,
stationkeeping, and logistic issues that are typically encountered in floating drilling
operations.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

WELL PLANNING
WELL PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLISTS

1 GENERAL

The purpose of a well planning information checklist is to provide the Rig Manager
and other relevant persons (onshore as well as offshore) with a well planning
management tool. It is recommended that a checklist be used from the time of
contract review through to the pre-spud meeting to identify client and contractor
issues and responsibilities.

Non-conformances may be avoided if the checklist is conscientiously used. The

checklist provided in this subsection is an example and may not be all-inclusive. Rig
Managers should use the provided checklist as a “starting point” but make necessary
modifications as may be required.

2 RECORDING, FILING AND RETENTION

A checklist should be completed by the Rig Manager or his designate prior to every
commencement of a drilling program. Problems that may arise must be brought to the
attention of the Rig Manager for resolution prior to commencement of operations. The
checklist should be completed and made part of every pre-spud meeting.

Completed checklists should be made part of the specific well files and retained in
accordance with Regional policy.

References:

Minimum Operating Standards Manual (HQS-OPS-001), Section 3, subsection 1

Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002), Section 2

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

WELL PLANNING
WELL PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

Yes No N/A
ADMINISTRATION
1a Navigation restrictions – Restrictions are listed on the Insurance –
Risk Management website
1b War risk – Purchase additional coverage if warranted
1c Reactivation survey – Rig has been stacked over 180 days
1d Approved contractor – A data base of all Transocean approved
contractors can be found on the Insurance Risk Management
website
1e Special insurance requirements required by contractor or local
legislation
1f Certificate of Financial Responsibility if rig is in USA waters
1g Emergency contact numbers in the event of an injury or incident
1h Importation permit – Rig equipment list / Support documentation
1I Working visas for all personnel going overseas
1j Rig classification documentation
1k Ensure Transocean is in compliance with all local and country
environmental regulations
1l Ensure the operator has the APD ( Application for permit to drill)
1m Drilling Contract issues, Review the Transocean Marketing Manual
1n Ensure all MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet) are available on the
rig.
GEOLOGY
2a Surface location ( Co-ordinates) of the well
2b Bottom hole location ( Co-ordinates) & TVD
2c Location map within the block / field
2d Seismic map showing surface and bottom hole locations
2e Seismic sections with the main reflectors to show the structure of
the trap
2f Offset wells and hazards (faulting) delineated
2g Lithology and Stratigraphy column with depth uncertainty
2h Pore pressure profile
2I Formation fracture profile
2j Temperature profile
SITE CONDITIONS
3a Metocean data: Winds, currents, waves
3b Soil conditions
3c Site survey & hazards e.g. scouring
3d Proximity of any nearby pipelines
3e Shallow gas assessment

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

WELL PLANNING
WELL PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

3f Nearby subsea facilities / suspended wells

3g Proximity to shipping lanes and / or MOD range
3h Mooring analysis
3I Operating envelope for the rig
3j Environmental impact assessment
3k Impact on fishing activity
3l Water depth and rotary elevation
3m Riser analysis and conductor tension for the location
3n Potential diving operations at the location
POTENTIAL HAZARDS
4a Faults
4b Sand lenses
4c Sea floor hazards: Unconsolidated sediment, Geological features,
Gas seepage, Chemo-synthetic Communities, man made features
4d Below mud line hazards: Shallow gas reservoirs, Shallow water
flows, Gas hydrates, Buried faults or channels, Chaotic zones
4e Low fracture pressures
4f Overpressure zones
4g H2S
4h CO2
4I Lost circulation
4j Salt domes
4k Formation: Differential sticking, Well bore ballooning, Well bore
instability
DIRECTIONAL DRILLING PROGRAM
5a Well trajectory profile and plan view
5b Target criteria
5c Collision risk / clearance:
Spider plot
Anti-collision scan listing
Summary of close approach wells detailing F1 & F2 distances
Possible requirements for plugging adjacent wells
5d Surveying requirements
Tools planned for the well
Radius of error achieved at target and TD
MUD PROGRAM
6a Mud type: riserless drilling operations , riser attached drilling
operations
6b COSHH requirements
6c Environmental requirements, seabed sampling, oil on cuttings, etc
6d Rheological & fluid loss properties for each hole section

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

WELL PLANNING
WELL PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

6e Need for lab/field testing of mud system (HPHT well)

6f Mud weight for each hole section
6g Hydrates, Cold ocean temperature mud formulations
CASING DESIGN
7a Wellhead design – Low pressure wellhead housing, High pressure
wellhead housing, wellhead torque considerations, liners, wear
bushings, tools, annular shut off, rigid lock down, ROV intervntion.
Wellhead configuration
7b Riser tension / Conductor tension, Riser tensioner support ring-
Slip ring / KT ring
7c Comprehensive basis of casing design
7d Casing design similar to offset wells?
7e Design safety factors
7f Pressure testing requirements for casing string
7g Kick tolerance for casing strings
7h Leak off / formation integrity test for each section
7I Maximum wellhead pressures expected for each section
7j Effects of casing wear
7k Contingency liner or other contingency plan
CEMENTING PROGRAM
8a Foam cement: Placement techniques, annular control, foam
cement safety, tools and accessories.
8b Top of cement for every casing string, and the S.G. of the cement
slurrys
8c Thickening time vs. planned mixing and displacement time
8d ECD vs. leak off test and fractures gradient
8e Cement placement method – inner string, one plug or two, subsea
or surface launch
8f Additional considerations – gas migration, salt formations,
temperature, etc
8g Conductor cement jobs
Maximum angle for PGB after cementing
Contingency plan for top up job
WELL CONTROL PROGRAM
9a Well control equipment pressure rating for each hole section
9b Well control equipment pressure testing requirements
9c Well control equipment temperature limitations
9d Ram configuration for each hole section
9e Kill and choke line configurations
9f Shallow gas plan
9g Diverter system equipment

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

WELL PLANNING
WELL PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

9h Wellhead pressure testing

9I Wellhead pressure and temperature rating
9j Additional training requirements
9k Mud gas separator capacity / instrumentation
9l Controlled blowout study
WELL TESTING / DST
10a Programs
10b Likely reservoir fluids
10c Maximum formation pressure / temperature
10d Maximum wellhead shut in pressure
10e Maximum wellhead flowing temperature
10f Maximum anticipated flow rate for the well test / production
10g H2S, CO2, H2O, Cl content, GOR, density of fluid
WELL CONTROL
11a Bop ram size and configuration
11b Bop pressure and temperature rating
11c Bop pressure testing requirements
11d Completion fluid (type, S.G., inhibition)
11e Packer fluid (type, S.G., inhibition)
XMAS TREE
12a Tree metallurgy
12b Tree, tubing bonnet and tubing spool pressure and temperature
rating
12c Tree, tubing bonnet and tubing spool pressure testing requirements
12d Tree and tubing spool valve configuration
12e Fire safe envelope
TUBING DESIGN
13a Design safety factors
13b Pressure testing requirements ( tubing, annulus, safety system)
13c Pressure, temperature and mechanical rating of tubing, tubing
hanger and downhole components
13d Tubing and tubing hanger downhole component metallurgies

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

1 SCOPE

This document is intended to provide guidance for the safe and effective operation,
planning and performance of drilling activities on board moored and dynamically
positioned (DP) vessels.

2 PURPOSE

This procedure covers all installations, facilities and employees of the Company.

3 OPERATOR DATA

The Operator shall provide the following data:

3.1 Type of Operation

Exploratory or developmental drilling, floating production, tender assisted drilling

(TAD), subsea installation, scheduling and seasonal information, as applicable, shall
be specified.

3.2 Location

The coastal country, geographic co-ordinates of the well, oil field name, well name,
etc. shall be specified.

3.3 Bathymetry

Water depth at the proposed well center and field bathymetry is preferred similar to
that shown in figure 1. The water depth at the well, seabed slope, and confirmation of
the conditions on the ocean floor is an absolute minimum.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

Figure 1 – Bathymetry Chart

3.4 Metocean Data

Data required is dependent on the acceptance criteria used, such as DNV

POSMOOR, UK POSMOOR or API RP 2SK. Return periods of monthly extreme, 1
year, 5 year, 10 year, 50 year and 100 year shall be provided based on the
acceptance criteria and analysis type used. Environmental components should
include 1-min and 1-hr mean speeds.

3.4.1 Wind – Specified at 10m above mean water level. Omni-directional, non-
seasonal data is a minimum. Seasonal and directional data should be
provided to optimize the system.

3.4.2 Current – Should be specified from the surface to a depth well below the
bottom of the vessel for mooring analysis purposes. Omni-directional, non-
seasonal data is a minimum. Seasonal and directional data should be
provided to optimize the system. Since riser analysis is nearly always required,
speed and directional profiles to the bottom should be available with an
associated wave spectrum

3.4.3 Wave – Significant wave height and peak or zero crossing wave period. Omni-
directional, non-seasonal data is a minimum. Seasonal and directional data
should be provided to optimize the system. If the region is prone to swell and
severe seas (wind waves), data should provide individual extremes of each
component.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

In areas with known occurrences of typhoons/hurricanes, both data with and without
hurricane/typhoon shall be provided since the timing of the operation may affect their
inclusion. It is extremely important that the sources for the environmental data be
specified to ensure all parties are confident in its accuracy.

3.5 Field Layout

Platforms, pipelines, flow lines, umbilicals, templates, subsea wellheads, other

moored vessels and structures, traffic lanes, etc. and stand off requirements at the
location shall be specified. Chemo-synthetics and other bottom anomaly information
shall be provided.
1,895,000

1,895,500

1,896,000

1,896,500

1,897,000

1,897,500

1,898,000

1,898,500

1,899,000

1,899,500
2,048,500

0 500 ft. 1000 ft. 1500 ft.

2,048,000

#8

#7 2,047,500

#1
2,047,000

Pipelines
2,046,500

#6
2,046,000

#2
2,045,500

2,045,000

io n
ns
xte
0
ft.
E #3
75 2,044,500
#5
Pipelines Pipeline
750 ft. Ext

2,044,000
ension

2,043,500

#4 200 ft. (Min.) Extension &

Piggy-back Anchor
2,043,000

Figure 2 – Field Layout

3.6 Installation Position

Every Transocean DP installation is equipped with position reference systems that are
capable of globally positioning the installation within the tolerances required by most
drilling contracts. It is the Operator’s responsibility to verify spud location (generally
through independent survey). The contracted surveyors may use the installation’s
positioning equipment to verify location, provided their requirements do not require

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

any hardware modifications to the existing system, and provided the installation's
equipment meets the relevant performance standards.

Required or preferred installation heading shall be specified. Predominant weather,

helicopter and supply vessel operations, communications, etc. may limit heading.

3.7 Soil Conditions

Surface and shallow sub-surface type of soil, density, undrained shear strength and/or
friction coefficient should be provided (not mandatory) by the Operator. If soil
properties are unknown, API RP2SK anchor holding power will be assumed for
mooring analysis. Note that actual anchor holding capacity may be less than
assumed, resulting in the need for piggy-back anchors.

3.8 Special Circumstances

Special requirements, such as iceberg avoidance, surface stack operation, large

vessel shifts between wells without mooring system redeployment, fishing grounds,
cetacea activity, etc. shall be specified.

3.9 Shallow Hazards

Shallow hazards can be divided into two categories: (1) seafloor hazards and (2)
below mud line hazards.

3.9.1 Seafloor hazards may consist of:

• soft seafloor conditions

• geological features
• chemo-synthetic communities
• man-made objects
• Landslides

These hazards are mapped with combinations of data from echo sounder, side-scan
sonar, very high resolution seismic, ROV video, sonar and sampling of surface and
near surface material.

3.9.2 Below mud line hazards may consist of:

• shallow gas reservoirs

• shallow water flows
• gas hydrates

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

• buried faulting or channels

• low fracture pressures
• overpressured zones
• chaotic zones

These hazards are typically mapped using reprocessed 3-D seismic. Other data
collection devices include air gun, water gun, sparker or other high resolution sources.
A high resolution 3-D survey can be acquired if the geology or stratigraphy requires it.

4 SEAFLOOR HAZARDS

4.1 Unconsolidated Sediment

An ideal drilling site would be reasonably level and would have competent sediment
for wellhead stability and good anchoring. Rapid deposition of sediment in some
areas can develop a soft, jelly-like soil. These soft sediments can affect wellhead
stability by shifting the point of support from the surface to the depth where the
formation firms up.

Bending forces on deepwater conductor and casing will increase due to the longer
moment arm. Special reinforcement may be necessary to stabilize the wellhead
equipment. This may require larger diameter, thicker wall, or higher grade conductor
pipe. The shear strength of the soil may be so low that conventional anchors will not
hold when tension is applied. In this case, specially designed “mud” anchors can be
used. Use of piggyback anchors could also be considered.

4.2 Geologic Features

Geologic features can affect the suitability of a location for drilling a well. Diapiric
ridges created by salt flows can interfere with the placement of anchors. Subsurface
faults can extend to the seafloor. Some of the features result from movement of
poorly consolidated material on the ocean floor. Slumps and debris flows can be
created from unstable slopes. Channels can be created from underwater currents.
Rapid sedimentation can trap water until the overburden is great enough to cause
expulsion of the fluid in the form of mud volcanoes and craters.

4.3 Gas Seepage

Many seafloor features are manifestations of the presence of hydrocarbon gas near
the surface. The gas can be generated in situ by local biogenic activity, or it may
migrate from deeper areas where biogenic or thermogenic generation has occurred.
In a deepwater setting, temperatures are low enough and there is sufficient pressure

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

from the water column to form solid hydrates from gas and water. The hydrates,
having a gradient lighter than water, can migrate to the seafloor and build a stable
mound. Gas seepage from depth along fault planes may be blocked by mud or
hydrates until there is sufficient pressure buildup to exceed the low fracture gradient
of the near surface material. When gas forcibly escapes, blowouts, craters and mud
volcanoes can form at the surface.

4.4 Chemo-synthetic Communities

Seafloor gas vents can generate outcrops of carbonate rock in place and can also be
the site of chemo-synthetic communities of tube worms, clams, mussels and bacterial
mats. Tube worms take up the dissolved gases from the water that are needed by
their symbiotic bacteria. Coral colonies have also been found in the Gulf of Mexico at
depths of up to 1500'.

4.5 Man-made Features

Man-made features can pose hazards that would prevent the development of drilling
sites. These can include pipelines (existing and planned), wellheads, shipwrecks,
platforms, debris, etc. For example, the MMS (Minerals Management Survey)
requests a 150-meter (490') clearance around well sites and anchors from identified
features, whether natural or man-made. At greater water depths, this can require that
surveys be conducted for up to 16,000' around a proposed well site.

5 BELOW MUD LINE HAZARDS

5.1 Shallow Gas Reservoirs

Shallow gas accumulations have been the source of severe accidents in some
offshore wells. As water depths increase, the difference between the pore pressure
and the fracture gradient becomes smaller. The reservoir pore pressure may be
abnormally high due to the length of the gas column. Shallow gas accumulations will
always be overpressured due to the lighter gradient of the gas column. The amount of
overpressure at the top of the gas accumulation is dependent on the vertical thickness
of the gas column.

In deep water, shallow gas reservoirs are best mapped with high resolution 3-D
seismic. The second choice would be a combination of seismic data from a mini air
gun or mini water gun and either high resolution 2-D or conventional 3-D seismic. In
an area with near horizontal bedding and small structural closure, the gas column
height and the corresponding overpressure will be low. Where there is significant

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

structural relief, even small stringers of gas saturated pay that are too small to show
up on shallow seismic can contain high overpressure.

To minimize the risk of encountering shallow gas reservoirs, drilling locations should
be selected outside seismic bright spots and mapped closed formation structures.
Drilling experience from offset wells can provide information on possible shallow gas
reservoirs. If possible, casing should be set above shallow gas zones to provide
maximum integrity of the wellbore so that pressure control equipment may be used.
When drilling riserless, weighted mud must be available to control the well when
penetrating shallow gas sands. If a riser is used, a diverter system must be installed
to ensure gas is vented away from the drill floor and cellar deck. The diverter system
is a safety system, not a primary control device. The system will provide only enough
time to keep well flow from the rig floor until the well is brought under control, the
pressure bleeds down, the well bridges, personnel are evacuated, or the rig is moved
off location.

In areas where there has not been prior drilling, it is sometimes desirable to drill a pilot
hole to surface casing depth to provide information on possible shallow gas
reservoirs. This makes it easier to dynamically control the well if flow occurs. The size
of the pilot hole is dependent on many factors such as water depth, depth to the
flowing formation, reservoir characteristics and the wellbore configuration. Typically a
9 7 /8" or 12 ¼" hole is drilled. The pilot hole is usually drilled riserless. The pump rate
is held constant and the pump pressure is used as an indicator of flow, or a Pressure
While Drilling (PWD) tool can be run. If a decrease in pressure is observed, drilling is
halted and an ROV is used to look for flow. If there is flow, mud can be pumped to
dynamically kill the well as drilling continues, or the well can be displaced with mud
heavy enough to prevent flow under static conditions. Although the smaller hole
enhances dynamic control, standard hole sizes and the shallow subsea depths
typically do not allow significant friction pressure to develop while pumping at rates
obtainable with rig equipment. If excessive backpressure is applied to the formation, it
may lead to fracturing and lost circulation. In addition, the soft sediments are prone to
eroding quickly, even at relatively low pump rates.

5.2 Shallow Water Flows

Shallow Water Flow (SWF) has been a major problem for deepwater wells drilled in
the Gulf of Mexico. A study of 123 wells (1998 OTC Paper No. 8301) indicated that
71 percent had SWF, with 25 percent failing to achieve full drilling objectives.
Geopressured sands found below cap rock seals are the most hazardous and difficult
to control. These sands are typically clean, with high permeability, and are capable of
sustained high flow rates. Unconsolidated sand is produced, enlarging the hole size

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

and making it difficult to properly cement the next string of casing to contain the flow.
Some common precautions used when drilling through possible SWF intervals are:

• Kill fluids available

• Flow check
• PWD tool

If possible, drilling sites should be moved from areas where shallow water flows
occur. Seismic surveys can be used to track the continuity of sands and cap rock
seals from areas of known water flows to the proposed well site. Surface features,
such as mud volcanoes and craters, can be indicators of breaches in the cap rock
seal. The sedimentation rate in the area can be an indicator of potential shallow water
flow areas as well. Faster sedimentation will trap more water, and the soil will tend to
have differential compaction, leading to geopressured accumulations.

Refer to Section 2, subsection 10 – Shallow Water Flow

5.3 Gas Hydrates

Hydrates are ice-like solids of combined hydrocarbon gas mixtures with free water.
The water molecules in the hydrates form a cage that entraps the gas molecules
under certain conditions of temperature and pressure. Methane, ethane, propane, n-
butane, i-butane, carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and nitrogen are known hydrate-
forming components. The solid/gas ratio can be as high as 1:170 when it
decomposes. (One cubic foot of hydrate can generate 170 cubic feet of gas.) The
maximum sub-bottom depth for gas hydrate at a given water depth is determined by
the sea bottom temperature and the geothermal gradient. The base of gas hydrates
can also be detected with seismic BSR (Bottom Simulating Reflectors) if there is high-
resolution seismic data available for the shallow section.

Hydrates are usually confined to the edges of underwater basins and are not typically
found at drill sites in the GOM. Even if present, hydrates should not be a significant
problem for drilling the upper section of the hole because the use of seawater and the
limited drilling depth will maintain cooling of the borehole. This tends to stabilize,
rather than degrade, the hydrates. This section of the hole should be isolated by
casing before fluid circulation from deeper warm formations has an opportunity to melt
the hydrates.

When drilling with a riser with circulation returned to surface, the cuttings will degrade
when exposed to the air, and they will release hydrocarbons. If free gas is
encountered in the shallow section of the hole, it can form hydrates in the riser, BOP
or surface lines under certain conditions (e.g., a choke or flow restriction). This could

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

WELL PLANNING
SITE SPECIFIC REQUIRED INFORMATION

present problems with maintaining well control. Methanol is used for the removal of
hydrates that have formed. The injection of glycol can prevent hydrates.

Below the gas hydrate zone, the risk for potential gas occurrence should be judged
from usual accumulation criteria (migration route, trap and seal). Although there is
little evidence that hydrates form an adequate seal, the possibility should not be ruled
out. If the bottom of the hydrate zone can be mapped, it should be considered a
potential reservoir trap. The well location should be moved away from this position, if
possible.

Reference: Well Control Manual, Section 8

Floating Operations Manual, Section 2, subsection 8

5.4 Buried Faults or Channels

Buried faults and channels provide a path for migration of water and hydrocarbons.
The fluids may overpressure zones and make them difficult to control while drilling.
Because of the low fracture gradient of near surface sediments, the pressure buildup
may approach and even exceed the fracture pressure. This can lead to surface
features (e.g., craters, mud volcanoes) that may be found in surface surveys. The
faults and channels could also provide a recharging capability that would reduce long-
term stability of the formation. In the case of shallow water flows, this could contribute
to the continued washing out of the wellbore, resulting in poor cement integrity or loss
of the hole.

5.5 Chaotic Zones

Chaotic zones are characterized by highly disturbed bedding in the near surface
interval below mud line (BML). The term was coined in the days of 2-D seismic,
which didn’t have adequate resolution to discern details in these steeply dipping
structures. The evolution of 3-D seismic has made it possible to interpret many of
these intervals. Features that are often characterized as chaotic zones include
rotational slides, channel complexes, slump and debris flow. In shallow intervals
above 4000' BML in deepwater wells, high water content makes seismic interpretation
very difficult. Regional stratigraphic studies are often needed to identify potential
problem areas in these intervals. An exception is that gas charged sands will show as
high amplitude signals in the seismic evaluation. Chaotic zones have been known to
exhibit hole instability when sands are penetrated. This can require the setting of
several strings of casing to get through the zone and/or result in the loss of significant
amounts of mud if the well is controlled with mud while drilling riserless. These
intervals often cover a very large area and cannot be avoided although knowledge of
the stratigraphy can help place the well location to minimize problem intervals.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

1 POLICY

It is a Policy of the Company that BOP equipment shall not be run on wellheads
at an angle greater than 1.0 degree to avoid key seating damage unless the
Client accepts responsibility for any and all damage that might occur. This
acceptance shall be obtained in writing.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that personnel are adequately informed regarding operational issues that
will assist in improving operational awareness and performance.

3 SCOPE

This Policy covers all installations, facilities and employees of the Company.

4 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Minimum differential angles are to be actively maintained at all time, with less than ½
degree average being considered optimum and acceptable. With ½ -1 degree
average differential angles, corrective action is recommended by repositioning and/or
increasing riser tension to reduce angle (Minimum Operating Standards HQS-OPS-
001, Section 3, subsection 9).
.
With average differential angles between 1-2 degrees, corrective action is required for
rotation operations.

Regardless of the wellhead structure inclination, all rotating operations shall cease
when the average differential angle between the flex joint and wellhead structure
cannot be managed to 2 degrees or less at which time corrective action including
RESPUDDING THE WELL shall be determined.

The Rig Manager shall define responsibilities for monitoring the differential angle
throughout the drilling program. This monitoring responsibility should also include
monitoring the LMRP flex joint angle.

The BOP stack is one of the primary safeguards present during drilling and
completions. Given a loss of station keeping event, an Emergency Disconnect
Sequence (EDS) is initiated which automatically activates the BOP so as to safely
shut-in the well and disconnect the LMRP without damage. EDS watch circles are

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

calculated to ensure the EDS sequence is completed before the installation has
traveled to the point where mechanical damage may occur.

High capacity design of the well head connector and BOP connector are an integral
part of the plan to minimize an environmental release given a DP or mooring failure
event. The strengthened design provides protection against a failure of the LMRP to
disconnect on demand and is key in maintaining wellhead integrity during such an
event. The nature of this issue implies that for non-high capacity well head systems,
an additional review (including soil strength analysis) may be advisable to ensure that
a failure to disconnect would not result in the potential loss of well containment at the
sea floor. If a horizontal tree is atop the wellhead consideration of the additional loads
must be taken.

Riser analysis can identify the worst case loads in the event of a drive off / drift off /
mooring failure event combined with the inability to disconnect at the LMRP during
drilling and completion operations. Well foundation equipment (BOP, Connector,
Wellhead and Conductor Pipe) design should consider bending and tensile forces for
a catastrophic load case at a specified water depth, mud weight range and soil
support condition. In some cases equipment upgrades might include high strength
bolting on the BOP Flanges, High Capacity Well Head Connector, High Capacity HP
Well head system and 38” conductor pipe for operations on deepwater wells.

Upgraded well foundation equipment is a critical part of the environmental safeguards.

Despite the very low probability of this event occurring, the design is a major
safeguard or barrier against a potential large release if there is a failure of the LMRP
to disconnect. Without this design, the well foundation system could be exposed to
loads exceeding the design limits and fail or lose integrity. Depending on the failure
within the well foundation, this could result in a potential environmental release
without a clear ability to mitigate the event.

5 WELLHEAD BENDING MOMENT AND BOTTOM LOADS

Forces at the lower flex joint impose shear loads and bending moments into the
wellhead structure at the sea floor. These moments must be carefully monitored in
deepwater riser system due to the large amount of installed riser tension on most
vessels and the high current loads on the riser string. Figure 1 shows a typical BOP
and wellhead system with forces drawn to describe the loading seen at the base of
the riser and BOP. Bottom loads are calculated from common riser software output
as follows:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

1) The maximum bending moments and shear are given at the LFJ (lower flex-joint)
elevation. Shear at the mudline is equal to shear at the LFJ. The wellhead
bending moment is calculated as follows:

BMWellhead = BM LFJ + ShearLFJ x (Distance from LFJ to Wellhead)

2) The design wellhead tension should be calculated as follows:

TWellhead = Tactual (at flex-joint) – LMRP & BOP Stack Weight in Water
Where
Tactual = TSR - Steel Wet Weight + Buoyancy Module Lift

This calculation assumes that the BOP is fixed at the seabed. In reality, the lateral
forces are supported by soil reactions that allow the BOP to lean over under high
loading conditions. This “leaning” of the BOP causes smaller differential LFJ angles
than predicted and a reduced bending moment in the wellhead by some 10 to 20%,
even 30%. As each well location has a different soil makeup with some uncertainty in
composition and must be assessed on a site by site basis.

Tension at LFJ

Bending Moment
at LFJ

Shear at LFJ

Elevation

Shear at Wellhead =
Shear at LFJ

Bending Moment at Wellhead =

Bending Moment at LFJ +
(Shear at LFJ x Elevation LFJ from Wellhead)

Figure 1 - Riser Bottom Loads and Wellhead Bending Moment

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Wellhead and LMRP Connectors and Clamp connections are designed to be

preloaded once made up properly. Subsea connectors should be tested per the
manufacturer’s recommended procedure to verify that the preload is within the
acceptable limits and that the components have not worn beyond acceptable
limits.

As with subsea connectors, clamp connections must be verified that they are
made up properly, to the required torque, and the torque is to be checked on a
frequent basis. Please refer to API Specification 16A for clamp connections.
Transocean’s policy is to try to eliminate the use of this type of connection for
deepwater applications.

In the event that connectors and clamp connections, are suspected to be turning,
operations should cease. Verification of suspected rotation should be confirmed.
If rotational failure is confirmed, it is recommended that the connection in
question be retrieved and repaired.

Typical limits are outlined in Table 1 for common ABB Vetco and Dril-Quip
wellhead connectors. The table shows variations from 2500 kip-ft to 8500 kip-ft
of allowable bending moment based on the particular wellhead system in use.
This limit is an important factor in determining the DP or mooring system
allowable offset prior to unlatching the LMRP or starting the Emergency
Disconnect Sequence (EDS). At no time can the design bending moment be
exceeded in a drift-off situation. When operating on a 16-3/4 inch system in
deepwater, one will likely find that the wellhead bending moment limit will
determine the maximum allowable vessel excursion prior to initiation of the EDS
sequence.

Each BOP will have a specified bending moment limitation based on the well
head connector in use for a given well. The equipment manual should be
consulted for the limiting loads for various tension and internal pressures.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Table 1 - Typical Subsea Well Head Bending Moment Limitations

Allowable Bending
Internal Pressure Axial Tension
Connector Moment
(psi) (kips)
(kip-ft)

ABB Vetco
16-3/4 in DHD H-4 15000 --- 2500

18-3/4 in HD H-4 15000 1500 3200

15000 0 4000
18-3/4 in SHD H-4 15000 1500 7000

Drill-Quip
DX-10 0 0 3250
0 1000 2800
10000 0 1650
10000 1000 1200

DX-15 0 0 4400
0 1500 3600
10000 0 2900
10000 1500 2200
15000 0 2150
15000 1500 1400

DX DW -15 0 0 8500
0 1500 7800
10000 0 7000
10000 1500 6200
15000 0 6200
15000 1500 5500

Note: Allowable loads summarized above are approximate, equipment manual on board are to be used in
place of values provided here.

6 WELLHEADS

6.1 Overview

The components of a wellhead system include the low pressure and high pressure
housing, casing hangers and seal assemblies, assorted running tools, wear bushings
and test plugs. In addition, equipment such as mud mats and permanent and
temporary guide bases are provided by wellhead manufactures for use with the
selected wellhead.

Designs are generally based on an industry standard 18 ¾" high-pressure subsea

wellhead with a 21" marine drilling riser system. The 18 ¾" wellhead housing is
designed to hold three casing tubing strings which are hung from mandrel hangers. A
typical exploratory casing configuration might include:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

• 36” Structural Pipe with Low Pressure Wellhead Housing (30” structural pipe may
also be used)
• Optional 26” Conductor - This is run as a liner or with a second low pressure
wellhead housing, depending on the presence/severity of a shallow water flow
zone and the ultimate TD of the well
• 20” Surface Casing with 18 ¾” Wellhead Housing
• 16” Liner
• 13-3/8” Protective Casing
• 9-5/8” Protective Casing

Because the small differences between pore pressure and fracture gradient often
require additional casing strings, the 18 ¾" wellhead imposes a limitation on
deepwater wells. The need for additional casing strings is usually addressed with one
of the following solutions:

• Extensive use of liner strings

• Use of slim line (reduced OD) or flush casing connectors to run larger diameter
casing
• Dual gradient drilling
• Expandable casing

Other riser and wellhead systems are available in some locations. For instance, an
18.625" OD riser with a 16 ¾" wellhead system was commonly used in the past due
to the reduced riser tension loads on the vessel and the fact that early subsea BOPs
were 16 ¾". Today most vessels have been converted to the more versatile 18 ¾"
wellhead system. However, the 16 ¾" system is still in use in some parts of the world,
notably by Petrobras in Brazil.

When operating a 18 ¾” system on a 16 ¾” wellhead with a conversation kit, the

maximum allowed installation excursion will be reduced from normal operations.
Bridge/control room personnel should be made aware of the situation to adjust watch
circles or mooring excursions as necessary.

6.2 Components

6.2.1 Low Pressure Wellhead Housing

A low-pressure wellhead housing is welded to the top of the structural casing. It lands
in, and is run with, the guide structure that has been selected. The low pressure
housing and structural casing protects the mud line from erosion, provides a reentry

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

point for the well prior to running the riser, and supports the high pressure wellhead
housing and surface casing string until they are cemented in place. Low pressure
housings are designed for 38" or 30" structural casing; the larger being used when
greater bending strength or additional casing strings are required.

The low pressure wellhead housing features:

• An external locking mechanism that engages and locks the guide structure of
choice (RGB or GRA) to the housing
• A butt weld bottom preparation of 1-1½ inch wall thickness for shop installation to
the conductor
• An internal profile to accept the housing running tool
• A load shoulder for landing the high pressure housing
• A lock-down profile for locking the high pressure housing to the low pressure
housing
• Large circulation ports to take returns through while cementing surface casing

In the GOM, the structural casing and low-pressure wellhead housing are jetted into
position using an inner string and mud motor. The wellhead housing is usually landed
approximately 10' above the mud line to ensure ROV access and camera visibility
even with some cuttings buildup. The final angle of the wellhead housing should not
exceed one-half degree from vertical to minimize wear on the wellhead, BOP and
riser components. Higher angles can make it more difficult to stab the wellhead
connector. Relying on a calibrated bull’s-eye level indicator alone may not be
sufficient to insure minimal angle therefore, placing an MWD tool above the running
tool to monitor angle while jetting is advised. The housing running tool should be cam
actuated. A cam-actuated tool eliminates water depth effects by rotating only the tool
stem that has a cam profile. As the drill pipe is rotated, the cam moves from behind
spring-energized dogs enabling the dogs to retract from the engaging profile in the
wellhead, thereby releasing it. To verify cam position, the running tool should
incorporate a lock/unlock indicator that can be observed by the ROV.

An alternative running tool, the drill-ahead tool, allows the center portion of the
running tool and drill pipe to be un-J’d from the outer portion such that the next hole
interval can be drilled immediately after having landed the structural casing. The low-
pressure housing should be designed with an adequate number of circulation ports
that are large enough to cement the surface casing. The circulation ports should
provide minimal backpressure, which could contribute to lost circulation while
cementing. The low-pressure housing designs in use today include from 4-12 ports
with diameters ranging from 2-3½ inches. An ROV can be used to visually monitor the
cement returns to establish that the cement reaches the seabed. This procedure is
important in ensuring the integrity of the conductor/surface casing strings.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Low-pressure wellhead housings should be designed to effectively seal against

the selected guide structure to prevent the migration of gas into the wellhead
connector. Migrating gas may form hydrates and prevent connector release.
Other preventative measures include installing a solid plate below the base of
the guide structure or fitting the wellhead housing with a funnel to divert gas
away from the wellhead connector and BOPs. The wellhead connector should
also have a hydrate seal to prevent gas migration into the connector. The
hydrate seal provides a barrier between the wellhead connector and high-
pressure wellhead.

6.2.2. High Pressure Wellhead Housing

The 18 ¾'' pressure wellhead housing is the interface from the 20" casing to the
BOPs and riser. This housing lands in the low-pressure housing. The high
pressure housing features:

• A 10,000 psi or 15,000 psi service rating

• An external locking mechanism that engages and locks to the low pressure
housing
• A butt weld bottom preparation for shop installation to the 20" surface casing
• An internal profile that accepts the housing running tool
• A 17 ½" drift ID
• A single, high strength load shoulder for landing the 13 3/8" casing hanger
(upon which the remaining hangers will land)
• Capacity for landing a minimum of 3 hangers
• A mandrel or flange-type connection for mating to the hydraulic connector of
the BOPs . A mandrel or flange-type wellhead connector profile is located
at the top of the high-pressure housing. This connection mates with the well
connector profile at the bottom of the BOPs. A metal ring gasket seated in a
seal profile on top of the housing provides metal-to-metal seal integrity to
10,000 or 15,000 psi. The seal profile should provide for a second metal-to-
metal seal surface in case the primary one is damaged.

Typically, the seal profile is coated with a stainless steel inlay for corrosion
resistance. A 20" multi-start threaded connector can be shop welded to the
bottom of the high-pressure housing. However, the relative difference in stiffness
between the thick-walled wellhead housing and the thin-walled 20'' casing
results in low fatigue resistance. Therefore, installing a 3-5 foot intermediate wall
thickness casing joint immediately below the housing will provide a better
transition. The lower bore of the housing body incorporates an internal load

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

support shoulder, also referred to as the nominal seat, which supports all of the
subsequently installed casing hangers. This shoulder may include a high
strength inlay to increase load capacity. The configuration may consist of all
casing hangers, or it may include two casing hangers and a tubing hanger.

6.2.3 16” Liner

16” liners are often run below 20" surface casing on deepwater wells. All
wellhead manufacturers can provide a mechanism for hanging a 16" liner from a
sub welded into the 20" casing string. The 16" hanger may be set using either a
positive stop load shoulder or a mud line suspension-type profile. If the positive
stop shoulder is used, the ID will be reduced to less than 17 ½". In either case, a
seal assembly is used to isolate the 16" x 20" annulus. As with the high pressure
housing hanger and seal assemblies, the 16" hanger and seal assembly are run
in one trip.

6.2.4 Wear Bushings

Nominal bore/seat protectors and wear bushings are used to protect the ID of
the high pressure housing from wear caused by drill string tripping and rotation
or wireline work. In order to eliminate a trip, the nominal bore/seat protector is
typically run with the high pressure housing when casing is run. The protector
sits on the nominal housing seat and is used prior to the installation of the first
casing hanger. The bore protector has an internal profile that permits retrieval
with a running/retrieving tool. It also has external O-rings to prevent solids from
migrating into the area between the bore protector and the housing, causing the
protector to become stuck. The bore protector should be run with the wellhead in
order to protect the sealing area while POOH with the stinger. To ensure the
angle of the high-pressure wellhead, a slope indicator can be run on the landing
string above the running tool. Additionally, the wellhead should be monitored
with the ROV while POOH to indicate problems. The bore protector can be held
in position by the friction of the O-rings or by the incorporation of integral shear
pins. These pins latch into the 18 ¾" housing and must be sheared to retrieve
the protector. The ID of the bore protector must be greater than 17 ½" and
should be large enough to pass the 16" liner hanger, if used.

Wear bushings are required to protect the high pressure housing after each
casing string is landed. They have the same features as the nominal bore
protector and serve the same purpose. Wear bushings are run with a
running/retrieving tool and are landed on the top of the casing hanger. The
running tools should have washing/jetting attachments to permit washing of the
wear-bushing seat prior to releasing the wear bushing. These tools should also

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

permit cleaning of the wear bushing and sealing area as it is pulled, prior to
running casing. The bore protector and wear bushings should be examined for
signs of wear after retrieval. If it has been established that the wellhead is not
vertical, it may be necessary to retrieve the wear bushing more frequently to
inspect for signs of wear. BOP testing may be performed with the bore protector
and wear bushings in position using a test tool. Options are provided for testing
the BOPs without the seal assemblies seeing pressure and for testing the BOPs
with the use of a cup tester extension. This extension seats in the casing and
allows the seal assemblies to see pressure.

6.2.5 Miscellaneous Tools

The drill pipe hang-off tool is useful in cases of planned riser disconnect. This
tool is made up to the drill pipe and is landed on the wear bushing. The drill pipe
above the tool is then backed off, leaving the hang-off tool in position. The length
should be such that upper pipe rams can close on the tool and the blind/shear
ram can close without contacting the tool.

6.3 Wellhead Features

6.3.1 Annular Shut Off

A 26" conductor may be installed before penetrating a shallow flow sand. The
conductor is cemented in place to provide a sound structural foundation for the
well before drilling into the flow zone. In a shallow water flow situation with the
20" casing set through the hazard zone, a SWF-type wellhead system will allow
annular shut off of the 26" x 20" annulus by means of a seal assembly.

For mild shallow flow situations, a non-retrievable annulus seal can be used. A
retrievable and testable seal would be required for more severe flow zones. The
need for annular shut off is driven by the likelihood of encountering a shallow
hazard (water flow, gas, hydrates) and whether a backup to mud weight and
cement is considered necessary to provide an increased safety factor (justifying
the extra cost). The annular shut-off seal is intended to ensure that flow does not
occur during the transition period, while cement is setting or after cement has set
due to cement channeling. Because the seal is hydraulically activated, it does
not increase rig time, as no additional tripping is required.

6.3.2 Rigid Lock-Down

In deepwater drilling applications, a rigid lock-down mechanism preloads the 18

¾" and 36" housing to provide resistance to the cyclic stresses that are
generated from the platform motions down through the riser. Currents can also

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER WELL HEAD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

cause vortex shedding on the riser which, in turn, can cause cyclic loading.
Preloading provides torsional resistance as well, which may be generated by a
moment at the wellhead due to DP operations. Visual ports in the guide funnel
and clearly marked references are monitored by ROV for correct positioning of
the 18 ¾" and 36" housings to allow activation of the lock-down mechanism.

6.3.3 ROV Intervention

The wellhead should be designed for quick and easy ROV intervention when
performing primary and secondary tasks, such as installation and retrieval of the
guide base, bit guide, temporary abandonment (TA) cap, guideposts and
wellhead connector ring gasket. To save valuable rig time, ROV interface
operations should be designed offline when possible. It should also be possible
to inject corrosion-inhibiting fluids through the corrosion cap in the wellhead.

7 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy however; other

reference sources may have documentation requirements.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

WELL PLANNING
TENSIONER RING OPERATION

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that all DP installations will evaluate torque

transmitted from the riser system into the wellhead caused by heading changes
during the well planning period and prior to a change in heading so as to avoid
possible damage or spin of the wellhead.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that personnel are adequately informed regarding operational issues that
will improve awareness, safety, and performance.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all installations of the Company as well as employees of any
operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore installation owned,
operated and/or managed by the Company.

4 RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of the Master, DPO, Subsea Supervisor, and OIM to understand
wellhead torque limits and loads applied at the time of heading changes so as not to
damage the wellhead and sub-mudline casing.

5 PROCEDURE

Prior to each well the following information should be made available to the crew
concerning wellhead torque and break out torque estimates:

• Installation specific tension ring break out torque versus tension setting
• Wellhead torque limits (if necessary as a function of set down weight) shall be
obtained from the operator.
• Limiting heading change allowed without ring rotation

The allowed heading change with out tension ring rotation (referenced to heading at
time of landing the BOP) shall be provided to the marine crew to assist in heading
change decisions.

The drilling crew will be made aware of the approximate heading rotation required to
generate the necessary breakout torque at the prevailing operating tension. The

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

WELL PLANNING
TENSIONER RING OPERATION

breakout torque will be compared to the allowed wellhead torque to verify adequate
safety margin during a heading change maneuver. It should be kept in mind that a
tension ring that has not been functioned / rotated for a period of time may require an
additional 15% breakout torque compared to theoretical calculated values to
overcome additional frictional resistance.

During a heading change, a person should be stationed in the moonpool to monitor

relative tension ring to riser rotation. The relative angle can be monitored visually by
means of a paint marking or the like on the tension ring/outer barrel for those
installations where the ring is out of the water.

Should the wellhead and/or casing be suspected of rotating, all turning operations
should cease, providing the safety of the rig is not impaired. The angle of the
wellhead/BOP should be checked and compared to the original readings. Should the
wellhead average angle still be within acceptable limits, it is recommended that the
casing be tested to verify the integrity of the system. Corrective action should be
considered prior to continuing normal operations. Such actions could include a
cement squeeze job or running an internal liner.

6 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION / BACKGROUND

6.1 Tensioner Support Ring Function/Design

The tensioner ring serves the following functions in a riser system:

• Point if attachment for riser tensioners (wireline or direct acting)

• Rotating seal to allow installation heading changes without developing
exceedingly high torque on the wellhead

In addition to the above, some tension rings, such as the KT ring, also are the
termination point for auxiliary line goosenecks.

Riser tensioner rings come in many different configurations. The support ring can be
a permanently fixed, solid ring; a removable hinged, rotating split ring; or a
removable solid ring with retractable load shoulders which permits running the riser
through. Removable tensioning rings are usually stored hanging below the diverter.
The rings can be stored with all tensioner lines attached, providing a significant
timesaving when running the riser. Some tensioning rings (KT rings) are capable of
leaving the auxiliary lines attached as well.

Typically where 49-1/2 “ rotary tables are installed a Teflon bearing was utilized for
low friction support ring interface with a maximum tension capacity of 1000 kips.
With the introduction of 60-1/2” rotary tables support ring diameters and riser

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

WELL PLANNING
TENSIONER RING OPERATION

tensioner capacity became significantly larger and Teflon bearings became

impractical. Fluid assist bearings were introduced to keep breakout torque (torque
that is required to break seal friction and allow the ring to rotate relative to the BOP
heading) to acceptable levels.

6.2 Generation of Breakout Torque

Dynamically positioned installations are periodically required to make heading

changes to minimize environmental force on the installation. During a heading
change, if the tensioner ring does not rotate with the installation (stays latched to the
riser) a large amount of torque could develop in the riser and at the wellhead. The
amount of torque depends on several factors:

• Riser length
• Joint wall thickness
• Type and number of tensioner connected to the ring
• Amount of heading change

In general, the following holds true when turning an installation’s heading without the
tension ring rotating freely with the installation:

• As the heading change increases from the initial BOP landing heading, the
torque will increase in the riser.
• As water depth increases torque generated by a 180-deg turn will decrease in
the riser.
• Wire line tensioners delay the build up of torque by acting as springs (i.e. the
rather than turning the riser with a crescent wrench the installation is turning the
riser with a strap wrench that has to build up its own torque before transmitting
any to the riser).

What these trends show is that torque buildup for shallower water depths (<3000 ft)
can be rather quick while an ultra-deep water site up may require a larger initial
heading change to reach breakout torque levels to start the tension ring rotation.
Additionally, several degrees of rotation may occur before the tensioners begin to
transmit a significant amount of torque to the riser due to the spring effect they
generate.

6.3 Comparison of Breakout Torque versus Allowed Well Head Torque

The introduction of high capacity riser tensioner rings raises the issue of ring torque
versus wellhead torque. This issue is particularly pronounced on the smaller 16-3/4”
wellheads where allowed torque can be a function of BOP set down weight. For

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

WELL PLANNING
TENSIONER RING OPERATION

these types of wellheads, if no weight is set down the torque capacity of the system
is near 0 kip-ft. All DP installations should estimate torque values prior to a change
in heading to avoid damage to the wellhead.

It is important to recognize that some subsea wellhead systems require BOP weight
down upon the well head to obtain torsional capacity. For each location a riser
analysis can determine the torque developed during a heading change.

A generic example of breakout torque versus wellhead torque is provided in Figure

1. The upper chart provides the specific break out torque for the tension ring on the
installation as provided by the manufacturer. For this condition, 700 kips tension at
the slip ring will require approximately 45 kip-ft of breakout torque. The lower chart
in the figure provides the comparison of torque build up in the riser as a function of
heading change to the 45 kip-ft of breakout torque just estimated. Note the following
from the figure:

• For the specific wellhead, the maximum allowed torque is 59 kip-ft, which is
greater than the breakout torque of the tension ring. Therefore, under this
condition, it would be OK to turn the installation without adjusting tension to lower
the ring breakout torque.

• The heading change where the tension ring is estimated to start turning is
between 23 to 28 degrees (wire line tensioners require additional 5 degrees of
heading rotation due to spring effect).

• If the ring does not rotate, the heading change where the wellhead torque limit is
exceeded is approximately 30 to 35 degrees (again, tensioner spring effect adds
about 5 degrees to the chart results).

Following a procedure similar to the above will allow safer heading changes by
advising the drilling and marine crews of maximum allowed turning angles that can
cause well head damage.

It should be kept in mind that once the ring breaks free and starts rotating, the vessel
should (if possible to the extent it does not degrade station keeping) maintain
rotation until the ring aligns with the desired installation heading. Once the ring is
aligned, the installation can then turn back to the desired heading.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

WELL PLANNING
TENSIONER RING OPERATION

Tension Ring Breakout Torque vs Tension / Manufactuer Test Data or Calculations

120

100

80

60

45.2
40

20 700.0

0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Tension (kips)

Wellhead Torque versus Rotation and Required Tension Ring Breakout Torque for 700 kips
Tension

100

90

80

70

60 59.2

50
Tension Ring Breakout Torque LESS
than Wellhead Allowed Torque
45.2
40

30
Torque on Wellhead

20 Applied Tension Breakout Torque

10 Allowed Torque

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Rotation Angle (deg)

Figure 1 - Example of Riser Torque versus Rotation and Wellhead Torque Capacity

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

WELL PLANNING
TENSIONER RING OPERATION

7 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy however; supporting

documentation is currently under development.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that all personnel must be made aware of the
hazards and determine the controls to be put in place when adverse weather
conditions are anticipated or experienced.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that personnel are adequately informed regarding operational issues that
will assist in improving operational awareness and performance.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all installations of the Company as well as employees of any
operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore installation owned,
operated and/or managed by the Company.

4 GENERAL

Personnel must be protected from adverse weather by best means available as

determined by the OIM or his delegates.

Full use must be made of weather forecasts to give accurate warning of adverse
weather.

Work shall be planned to avoid exposing personnel and the installation to the effects
of adverse weather.

Personnel movements should be restricted during adverse weather.

Limiting weather parameters when work should be suspended or contingency plans

actioned should be defined.

5 DEFINITIONS OF ADVERSE WEATHER

Adverse weather is environmental conditions which may effect people, equipment or

installations to such an extent that precautionary measures must be taken to
safeguard the installation or to maintain a safe system of work.

Adverse weather includes snow, ice, fog, hail, heavy rain, high winds, severe sea
states and strong currents. No wind, Low wind can be adverse in view of dissipation

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

of combustible and toxic gases. Weather conditions can change quickly and the
effects of short-term variations such as wind gusts and squalls should be considered.

6 PROCEDURES

Reference should be made to the Installation’s Operations/Operating Manual and the

Installation’s Contingency/Emergency Response Manual.

6.1 Weather Forecasting.

It is absolutely essential that personnel responsible for the safe operation of

installations are conversant with the causes of different weather patterns, how these
are forecast and the potential effects of adverse weather on their specific installation.
They should be able to interpret information presented in weather forecasts to enable
them to take appropriate action in adequate time.

6.2 Weather Forecasts and Equipment

The ability to take action to minimize the risks associated with adverse weather is
dependent upon the accuracy of weather forecasts. It is therefore critical that
attention is given to these weather forecasts, and that adequate instrumentation is
available on each installation in order that decisions on precautions and controls can
be based on accurate information. It may be necessary to require operation specific
forecasts with updates received from the forecast provider should forecasted
conditions develop outside of operating parameters. A duty forecaster should be
available on a 24-hour basis.

There shall be provided on every installation, suitable means for ascertaining and
recording at any time:

1) Wind speed and direction

2) Air temperature
3) Barometric pressure
4) Roll, pitch and heave
5) Sea state Usually done by personal estimation
6) Visibility
7) Cloud base and cover}
8) Installation heading

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.3 Beaufort Scale

In certain areas around the world forecasts provided for shipping and other purposes
may include a "Beaufort Scale" rating of expected conditions. The description of the
Beaufort Scale is obtainable from nautical publications kept on board.

6.4 Glossary of Meteorological Terms

The following glossary contains definitions of some of the most commonly used
meteorological terms:

6.4.1 Waves

(1) Significant Wave Height (Hs)

The standard sea state height parameter equivalent to the average of the highest one
third of the waves in a 20-minute sample.

(2) Maximum Wave Height

The highest wave likely to occur in a 20 minute sample equivalent to about 1.7* Hs.

(3) Extreme Wave Height

The highest individual crest to trough wave in a sample equivalent to between 1.9 and
2.3* Hs.

(4) Mean Wave Period

The average period in seconds between succeeding waves.

(5) Mean Wave Direction

The principal direction from which waves approach.

6.4.2 Winds

(1) Mean Wind Speed

The average speed calculated from a 10-minute sample.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

(2) Gust Wind Speed

The highest gust speed over 3 seconds. On average the gust wind speed is
approximately 1.3 X Mean Wind Speed.

(3) Standard Height (10 meters)

Wind measurements over the sea are usually made at heights a long way from the
standard 10 meters.

6.5 Action to be Taken on Receipt of an Unfavorable Forecast or When

Adverse Weather is Experienced That Has Not Been Forecast.

6.5.1 Hang off procedures

When operational limitations are approached an installation specific hang off

procedure will be executed to prepare for a riser disconnect. If the weather
deteriorates further, the LMRP will be disconnected from the BOP, and the installation
may be moved off location to a safe zone if necessary.

Factors to be considered when deciding to suspend operations are:

• Safety of personnel when working with large rig movements during the preparation
for ‘hang off’ phase.
• Weather forecast – is the weather going to get worse? Likely effects of wind
forecast, wind shifts and effects on sea state.
• Anchor tensions – dependent on location and water depth. These may be a
deciding factor in deciding to ‘unlatch’ and allow the installation to move off
location.
• Time required. The decision to unlatch must not be left too late. Allow plenty of
time for the Driller to pull back inside the casing shoe.

Other factors that may also dictate a hang-off to be implemented are:

• Mooring failure
• Deteriorating sea-worthiness
• Damage to the unit
• A well control situation
• Impending collision

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

In an emergency situation such as a mooring system failure and installation drift-

off, blowout or other incident requiring immediate release of LMRP, the
Emergency Disconnect Procedure will be executed as indicated in the
installation’s Emergency Response/Contingency Manual.

When evaluating the weather situation, extra time needed to pull out of the hole
due to possible back reaming will be taken into account.

Hang-off drills will be performed to ensure that crew is adequately trained.

Specific hang off procedures dependent on wellhead systems will be set out in
the Client's well program.

Ensure that the Installation movement is not of sufficient amplitude so as to

allow the LMRP to come into contact with the top of the BOP. (Move to the
predetermined Safe Handling Zone (SHZ) and deballast to survival draft, if
required or if this has not already been carried out).

If movement of the Installation dictates that it must be moved off location,

particular attention must be paid to guidelines while moving.

6.5.2 Survival Draft (Semisubmersibles)

Survival draft is a condition to be prepared for whenever extreme weather

conditions are expected. It is a mean draft chosen to provide an adequate air
gap together with sufficient submergence of pontoons and lower cross-braces.

At Operating Draft the installation is able to withstand all but the most extreme
weather conditions. The main reason for deballasting to survival draft is to
achieve an increased air gap at this reduced draft.

At the survival draft the Installation should be able to withstand a 100-knot

wind provided that the metacentric height is not less than that specified in the
stability manual curves for this condition, satisfying the relevant Classification
Society intact and damage stability requirements and design criteria for derrick
loads.

The normal ballasting sequence is to be used when changing to or from survival

draft. Alternative ballast water distributions may be used if these can be shown
to give more favorable stress levels in the hull structure, together with adequate
stability.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.5.3 Survival Condition

This includes:

• Securing of all watertight closures, doors, hatches, port deadlights, scuppers,

spurling pipe closures, vents, covers of penetrations used to pass temporary
electric cables through bulkheads and any other openings.
• Securing of all loose equipment throughout the installation, on the deck, drill
floor, moonpool (BOP if on surface), storerooms, workshops, machinery
spaces, propulsion rooms and the accommodations.
• Laying down tubulars and equipment from the drill floor to that amount
permitted by the Installations Operations Manual.
• Recover ROV to surface.
• Cease supply vessel operations and stand supply vessels off to a safe
distance.
• Ensuring that adequate stability is available for the survival draft condition.
• Slack ballast tanks to be kept to a minimum and mud pits emptied if
necessary.
• Unlatching the LMRP and move the installation away from the well head a
safe distance (to the predetermined SHZ) if BOP remains suspended.
• Issue instructions for control of personnel movements.
• Ensuring that cranes are operated within their limits of wind speed and
motion.

6.5.4 Changing to Survival Draft from Transit Condition

(Semisubmersibles)

Severe weather causes greater stresses and motions when the installation is de-
ballasted for transit condition than in a submerged operational condition or a
survival draft.

As a general rule installations should be ballasted down from transit draft to

survival draft when wave heights greater than 6 meters are expected. This may
vary depending on an individual installation’s design criteria.

It is important to be aware of the need to protect horizontal truss members from

undue forces and vibration due to repeated pounding of waves. The installation
must be ballasted down to protect these members.

Lower stresses will be induced in the main truss members by heading the
installation bow or stern into prevailing seas.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.5.5 Changing to Survival Draft from the Operating Condition

(Semisubmersibles)

Failure to take the necessary action at the appropriate time may result in waves
striking the upper structure of the installation thereby putting personnel at risk
and causing major damage to the installation and equipment.

In accordance with the Operating/Operations Manual and/or current operations,

severe weather may require the installation to deballast to survival conditions.

The survival condition will require disconnection from the well and securing of
the riser, and may require removal of setback load. All of these actions shall be
carried out as soon as possible if worse weather is expected.

Weight redistribution is not an alternative to deballasting but is supplementary to

it in cases where high maximum wind speeds are expected and the installation
has a heavy deck load. It is normally limited to the dumping of easily removable
deck loads e.g. main deck salt water, fresh water and liquid mud.

Anchor chain tensions shall be monitored during the deballasting operation to

reach survival draft.

6.6 Monitoring of Mooring Line Tensions During Strong Wind/Severe Sea

Conditions

Written instructions shall be given to the Ballast Control Operator (BCO)

detailing which action he must take when specific wind speeds and line tensions
are observed. e.g. at what wind strength and/or line tension readings he should
alert the OIM and Barge Supervisor. In order to allow early appropriate action to
be taken maximum readings should be used to initiate response not averages.

Mooring line tensions shall be monitored continuously during adverse weather

when high wind speeds and severe sea states are experienced. Remote
monitoring can be carried out in the control room and pilothouse (equipment
varies depending on Installation).

On some installations it may be considered necessary to post personnel in

winch cabs to monitor anchor chain tensions if suitable remote reading
equipment is not available. However this practice should not be permitted in
severe weather conditions for reasons of personnel safety.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.7 Action to be Taken to Limit the Effect of Severe Weather

The success of action taken depends on it being positive, made in ample time and it
being of the correct nature based on all the information available e.g. weather
forecasts, reports from the BCO and the accuracy of the installation’s instrumentation
which is used to assist in decision making.

Mooring line tensions shall be frequently checked during normal operational

conditions to ensure that there are no tensions above the working tensions required
in the location anchoring plan and that all tensions are acceptably equal. This is to
ensure that with the onset of adverse weather there is a good margin before high
tensions are caused which will require action to be taken.

On receipt of an adverse weather forecast the installation’s anchor winches and

propulsion equipment shall be function tested.

If high line tensions are experienced during adverse weather the opposite side
anchor lines to those with high tensions shall be slackened off sufficiently to cause a
decrease in high tensions to a safe margin less than the proof/pre-load tension. 85%
of the proof tension is an acceptable figure, which allows a good margin for peak
tensions, which may occur.

Slacking of lines on the weather side of the installation during adverse weather
should be avoided as this may cause unacceptably high tensions on adjacent anchor
lines and result in failure.

The installation’s propulsion system will be effective in reducing high line tensions
and high-tension peaks depending on the type of propulsion installed. Azimuth
thrusters will be effective for all wind and weather directions. For Installations with
conventional propulsion maximum effect is only possible when the weather is from
ahead or astern.

6.8 Icing load considerations

When significant ice accumulation takes place on a floating installation it is necessary

to make allowance for the additional weight by reducing the deckload. Information on
ice load calculations detailing the effect on deckload are found in the Installations
Operations/Operating Manual.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

WELL PLANNING
METOCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.9 Effects of fog and restricted visibility conditions

The risk of collision with passing vessels or vessels working in the vicinity to the
installation is increased. The prescribed audible fog signal should be sounded and the
standby vessel shall keep an efficient radar watch to warn the installation of the close
approach of any vessel.

Fog prevents anchor handling operations if visibility is sufficiently restricted so as to

prevent a AHV’s close approach to an Installation or if visual range finding of AHVs or
adjacent installations is being employed to position anchors and check on location
position.

All types of supply vessel operations will be prevented by reduced visibility. The OIM
should not allow the close approach of a supply vessel to the Installation unless
visibility is sufficient to allow for collision avoidance.

Overside work will not be permitted if reduced visibility prevents a good prospect of
recovery of persons who fall into the sea.

Helicopter operations and their availability for SAR, medivac and evacuation will be
limited.

7 METOCEAN CRITERIA

Metocean criteria for a given drilling location shall be provided by the Operator and
should be requested prior to feasibility analysis work or detailed analysis work that
estimated operational limitations.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

WELL PLANNING
FIELD MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN THE WATER

1 POLICY

It is a Policy of the Company that the running and retrieval of the BOP while
drifting with a current to/from location with a net ZERO force on the riser is
discouraged. If such an operation is proposed, Regional Manager approval is
required in view of the commercial impact of a dropped BOP that cannot be
located or recovered.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that personnel are adequately informed regarding moving an installation

with the BOP suspended in the water.

3 SCOPE

This Policy covers all installations, facilities and employees of the Company.

4 RESPONSIBILITY

Compliance is the responsibility of the OIM.

5 PROCEDURE

Note: For the purpose of this procedure, heavy weather is considered as any
environmental condition that could have an adverse effect on equipment,
normal operations of the installation or safety of the installation and/or
personnel.

Submit through the Rig Manager a move specific plan of action including:

• Distance of rig move

• Amount of riser proposed to be suspended
• Operating Procedures
• Transit conditions
! Maximum transit speed not to exceed 0.3 knot.
! Maximum environmental conditions and installation motions shall allow for riser
recovery operations at all times.
! The Current Profile shall be taken into consideration.
• Riser hang off method using specifically designed riser hang off joint, flex joint,
riser capture system, etc.
• Bathymetry along proposed transit route from sonar scan.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

WELL PLANNING
FIELD MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN THE WATER

All sea bed survey and weather information will be provided by client and shall
be carefully reviewed when requesting an exemption to this policy.

Engineering to review and approve rig moves with riser suspended where
distance extends beyond a drilling template.

Pre-installation move meeting shall be held prior to move and attended by all
essential personnel, client representative and crews involved in this operation.
Potential hazards to be discussed include but are not limited to the following:

• Raised sea bed

• Object / Structures e.g. wellhead, wreck, mooring lines
• Excessive current
• Excessive rig velocity
• Power blackout
• GPS failure (DP installations)
• Failure in MUX riser Unlatch system
• Method to maintain pressure on control system.
• BOP Control system items including LMRP connector unlock, stab retrack
and riser recoil system switched off and safety tag installed on the panel.
• All crews involved in this operation are to have clearly defined
responsibilities, defined observations to be reported and plan of action.

During installation move the maximum upper flex joint angle shall not exceed 2.5
degrees or the upper limit where contact with hull/diverter housing/moonpool
occurs, whichever is less.

Keep one person in the moon pool and on the rig floor at all times (with radio) to
ensure the riser remains in safe and secured position. Maintain communication
with bridge. Watch carefully for the riser angle or any riser movement/vibration
or any increase/decrease of string weight. Stop the installation move if any
strange riser movement or vibration is observed.

An installation specific THINK procedure is required prior to making any move

with the BOP suspended. The Subsea Supervisor shall verify the BOP
accumulator pre-charges are suitable for the next location and there is no
requirement to pull the BOP to charge them.

In any condition, the riser must not come into contact with anything that results
in a lateral restraint such as the rotary table, the moonpool or the BOP frame
bumper. Speed will be adjusted as per observations at moonpool, drillfloor and
riser angle.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

WELL PLANNING
FIELD MOVES WITH BOP SUSPENDED IN THE WATER

Keep communication contact at all times between moonpool – drill floor – control
room – ROV.

All on-tour drilling crews shall standby on rig floor during the rig move.

6 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy however; other

reference sources may have documentation requirements.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 8

WELL PLANNING
HYDRATES

1 PLANNING

All available technology and resources should be utilize to avoid and/or minimize the
formation of hydrates and to attempt it’s removal in a safe manner to protect
personnel and company equipment.

Reference Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002), Section 8 and Floating

Operations Manual (HQS-OPS-004), Section 2, subsection 3.

2 GUIDELINES

2.1 General

Gas hydrates are crystalline structures formed when water and the components of
natural gas (methane, ethane, propane, butane), CO2, N2, H2S and their mixtures
combine under high pressure / low temperature conditions.

The gas molecules are trapped inside a cage like structure formed by hydrogen
bonded water lattices.

Low temperature, high pressure, water and natural gas are the necessary elements to
promote hydrate formation and stabilization. Solidification occurs as temperature
decreases and/or pressure increases. The lower molecular weight of the natural gas
the greater the resistance to hydrate formation. Thus the hydrate formation is
decreased in the following order: Methane < Ethane < Propane < Butane

Gas hydrates formation in deepwater drilling creates a highly dangerous situation.

Hydrates will form in the annulus near the mud line and in the choke and kill lines
plugging and preventing circulation of the mud system. Over time hydrates can
accumulate in the BOP cavity making the well control operations dangerous and
difficult. When hydrates form externally outside of the BOP stack and drilling riser,
disconnecting the LMRP (Lower Marine Riser Package) or BOP may become a
problem.

Remediation of hydrate plugs in the drilling circuit will involve costly installation time
and can be highly dangerous.

Caution: When hydrates decompose due to reduced pressure and / or increased

temperature, they can produce a large volume of gas (1 cu ft will equal approx. 170
scf gas) therefore, due consideration needs to be taken when circulated or brought

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 8

WELL PLANNING
HYDRATES

back to surface in a confined volume. A potentially hazardous situation arises should

the riser and / or BOPs be disconnected and pulled back due to hydrate blockage.

2.2 Hydrate Formation in Drilling Fluids

In deepwater wells under favorable conditions of high pressure low temperature the
most probable location for hydrates formation are the cold subsea – seafloor section
where chokes, choke lines, kill lines, BOP stack and connectors are installed.

Formations being drilled could provide the natural gas phase and the water phase,
water base drilling fluids are also another source of water. The pressure is a function
of the mud weight, the water depth and circulating rates through the annular space
and choke line. The temperature is a function of the water depth and ocean
conditions.

In general, conditions for hydrate formation almost always exist in wells drilled in more
than 820-ft (250 m) of water.

Hydrate formation may be accelerated during drilling operations as a result of a gas

influx (kick). Critical situations may arise during well control operations when the well
is shut in. Although the kick fluid leaves the formation at a high temperature, with an
extended shut-in period it can cool to seabed temperature. With high enough mud
hydrostatic pressure at the mudline, and the presence of water the four necessary
elements will be preset and hydrates will likely form.

Hydrates and Paraffin form under similar pressure, temperature and chemical
properties, careful field data interpretation should be necessary during the well
planning stage, particularly on DST operations, to establish the likelihood of hydrates
or paraffin formation.

2.3 Hydrate Inhibition

The three inhibitive mechanisms are known as:

• Thermodynamic inhibition
• Kinetic inhibition
• Prevention of hydrates agglomeration

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 8

WELL PLANNING
HYDRATES

2.3.1 Thermodynamic Inhibition

In drilling fluids, thermodynamic inhibition is the principal method for hydrates

inhibition. These inhibitors, when added to the drilling fluid, lower the chemical
potential of the aqueous phase. Thus the inhibitor effectively reduces the
temperature and increases the pressure at which hydrates will formed.

The primary and most effective drilling fluid additive for thermodynamic inhibition
is Sodium Chloride (NaCl).

Calcium Chloride (CaCl2) is effective at high concentrations, but a fluid with

above 18 Wt % CaCl2 concentration will not pass environmental tests.

Secondary thermodynamic inhibitors such as Glycols can be added to the mud.

The strongest Glycol inhibitor is ethylene glycol but this product also introduces
toxicity problems. Di-ethylene glycol (DEG) can be used in place of ethylene
glycol. One of the most common water base mud formulations for gas hydrates
prevention is 20 to 30 wt% NaCl with 3 to 5 vol% DEG.

In water depths greater than 4,000 ft it is almost impossible to

thermodynamically inhibit a water base mud (WBM) against gas hydrates
formation, because not enough salt can be added to the fluid due to density
limitations. For this reason a synthetic oil-base mud system is recommended
once the drilling riser has been attached to the wellhead.

When drilling in ultra-deepwater with WBM that is not thermodynamically

inhibited it is standard practice to have a brine-glycol blend on stand by at the
installation site. This fluid is displaced into the choke and kill lines as well as the
BOP stack whenever the drill string is to be out of the hole for extended periods
of time or when well control operations are occurring.

The current industry standard for modeling gas hydrate formation is the
Westport Hydrate Prediction Program – WhyP.

2.3.2 Kinetic Inhibitors and Anti-Agglomerates

If fluids cannot be thermodynamically inhibited against hydrate formation it is

possible to use either kinetic inhibitors or anti-agglomerates. While these
materials do not stop the hydrate crystals from forming, they either alter the

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 8

WELL PLANNING
HYDRATES

crystal structure to inhibit crystal growth or prevent individual crystal nuclei from
agglomerating into hydrate plugs.

Kinetic inhibitors have been used in production systems but both kinetic
inhibitors and anti-agglomerates are not routinely used in drilling systems.

2.3.3 External Hydrate Formation

Gas hydrates can form inside the riser and wellhead connector which can lead
to problems unlatching the connectors. Therefore, it is important to take
measures to mitigate hydrate formation within these components.

• Mud mats or a diverter cone should be utilized to divert any seepage gas
away from the BOP stack and its wellhead connector.
• Ports for injecting glycol into the BOP and LMRP connector, using the ROV
should also be considered. Alternatively, the hotline can be used for glycol
injection.
• The wellhead connector should have a hydrate seal installed to prevent the
migration of gas and eventual hydrate formation within the components of the
connector.
• Slots or ports should be cut into a downward facing wellhead guide funnel in
order to divert gas that may channel up from around the casing.

2.3.4 Hydrate Removal

Since hydrates are “Pressure / Gas concentrators” care should be taken

whenever any removal attempt is in place.

The following practices or their combination could be use for hydrates removal:

• Applied Drilling Practices: The solid / plug hydrate is drilled with bits and / or
mills, treated mud with hydrate inhibitors is used to avoid further hydrates
formation.

• Pressure Reduction: Reducing the pressure exerted over the hydrate plug
below the hydrate pressure equilibrium at the current temperature.

• Temperature Increment: Increasing the temperature above the hydrate

temperature equilibrium, heated mud is circulated while drilling the solid/plug
hydrate.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 8

WELL PLANNING
HYDRATES

If hydrates have formed, consider injection using ROV or hotline trying to

remove the hydrate.

References:

Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002), Section 8.

Floating Operations Manual (HQS-OPS-004), Section 2, subsection 3.

Baker Hughes – Inteq “Deepwater Drilling Fluids Programs”.

SPE 18638 “Inhibition of Gas Hydrates in Deepwater Drilling”.

SPE/IADC “Hydrate Plug Remediation: Options and Applications for Deepwater

Drilling Operations”.

MI Deepwater Fluids Manual.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

WELL PLANNING
DRILLING FLUIDS

1 PLANNING

Drilling fluids will be designed following the best drilling fluids practices. Formation
pressure control, borehole stability, environmental protection and downhole surface
equipment preservation are the focal points (Refer to Well Control Manual HQS-
OPS-002 - Section 1.1.1.1).

2 GENERAL

4.1 Background

Floating drilling operations are conducted either riserless or with riser attached. From
the drilling fluids standpoint drilling riserless is performed using seawater assisted with
high viscosity sweeps. Drilling with the riser in place is performed typically with
synthetic based invert emulsion fluids that deliver high level drilling performance. Due
to either environmental restrictions or operator concerns regarding lost circulation,
water-based drilling fluids systems may be preferred. For wildcat exploration, water-
base mud is typically preferred due to the lack of pore pressure and fracture gradient
data. When drilling in regions with extensive offset data a synthetic based mud is
sometimes considered feasible.

Drilling deepwater wells requires engineered drilling fluid solutions for the following
specific environments:

• Shallow hazards, riserless drilling

• Gas hydrates
• Reduced pore pressure – fracture gradient margins: Equivalent Static Density /
Equivalent Circulating Density (ESD / ECD)
• Cold ocean temperature profiles
• Top Hole – riser cleaning capacity
• Environmental Impact – Riser disconnect

4.2 Shallow Hazards, Riserless Drilling

Three options are available for drilling riserless:

1. Drill with sea water supplemented with high viscosity sweeps

2. Drill with weighted mud, cut back with sea water
3. Drill with weighted mud, cut back with sea water and CaCl2 brine

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

WELL PLANNING
DRILLING FLUIDS

The option selected will be dependent on the potential for a Shallow Water Flow
(SWF) and/or Shallow Gas Flow (SGF) to occur, the stability of the wellbore or for the
inhibition of reactive shale. The potential for a SWF or SGF is determined prior to
spudding. It is recommended that an annular pressure, MWD tool be utilized and ROV
monitoring be used whenever drilling riserless to ensure rapid detection of any SWF
or SGF.

The option to drill with weighted mud is taken when the risk of the well flowing due to
a shallow hazard is high (water or gas flow), or if there is a desire to push the
conductor casing to a depth where there is adequate shoe strength.

Drilling with weighted mud typically involves dilution “on the fly” of 16 ppg fluid with
seawater. Spreadsheet programs are used to determine the mixing ratio of weighted
mud and seawater (Refer to Figure 1). The volume of weighted mud required on the
rig is based on the required weight of the cut mud, the rate of penetration and flow
rate. Higher flow rates and lower ROP’s will require more volume of 16 ppg fluid. An
example of the spreadsheet output for an specific set of drilling parameters is given
below. Assuming a hole OD 26”, pumping rate 1000 gpm, initial MW 16 ppg, final MW
10.5 ppg, cutback mud weight 8.55 ppg, 50 ft/hr rate of penetration, interval length
700 ft, the initial 16 ppg weighted mud volume is 5000 bbls, the cutback seawater
volume reading is 20,000 bbls which means that a total of 25000 bbls of 10.5 ppg will
be used to drill 700 ft of formation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

WELL PLANNING
DRILLING FLUIDS

Riserless Drilling Mud Volumes

60,000
BBLS of liquid mud

Initial MW = 16.0 ppg

50,000
Final MW = 10.5 ppg
CutBack MW = 8.55 ppg
40,000
Pump Rate = 1000 gpm
Interval Length = 700 ft
30,000 Hole OD = 26"

20,000

10,000

0
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Rate of Penetration (ft/hr)

Total Volume Initial Volume

Figure 1 – Riserless Drilling Mud Volumes

The density of the mud is selected such that the combined ocean gradient and mud-
weight balance the expected pressure in the flowing zone.

To ensure good mixing between the weighted fluid and seawater it is strongly
recommended that a high shear mixing device be used (i.e. Vortex Mixing Head or
Mixing Manifold).

When gumbo shale (sticky, swelling shale – bit balling) is likely to be an issue, CaCl2
brine and seawater can be used to cut back the weighted mud. When blending three
fluid streams continuously, greater emphasis is placed on logistics and coordination of
mud pits and storage tanks.

4.3 Gas Hydrates

The gas hydrates formation in deepwater drilling create a highly dangerous situation.
Hydrates will form in the annulus near the mud line, in the choke and kill lines

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

WELL PLANNING
DRILLING FLUIDS

plugging and preventing circulation of the mud system, over time it can be
accumulated in the BOP cavity making the well control operations dangerous and
difficult. When hydrates form externally outside of the BOP stack and drilling riser,
disconnecting the LMRP (Lower Marine Riser Package) will be a problem.

Deepwater drilling fluid programs should have in their formulations additives to

promote the drilling fluid hydrate inhibition.

Reference: Section 7, subsection 8.

4.4 Reduced Pore Pressure – Fracture Gradient Margins; ESD / ECD

Reduced pore pressure – fracture gradient margins, leads to induced fluid losses
through the formation. Drilling fluids should have the appropriate effective downhole
mud weight to overcome this unique deepwater well characteristics.

Mud weight prediction, appropriate mud viscosity, mud carrying capacity, optimum
hydraulics, good drilling practices and real time tools (PWD Pressure While Drilling)
are recommended to ensure that the ESD and ECD applied against the formation do
not induce fluids loss of fluid circulation.

4.5 Cold Ocean Temperature Profiles

Drilling in deepwater and ultra deepwater environments exposes the drilling fluid to
very cold temperatures. In the Gulf of Mexico (Fig 2), offshore Brazil and offshore
West Africa the ocean temperature is less than 40 F at depths greater than 3,000 ft. In
regions such as the UK and Norway ocean temperatures can be lower.

Depending on the size of the riser and the water depth, over 3,000 bbls of mud can be
stored in the riser alone, exposing a large portion of the active fluid system to cold
temperatures.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

WELL PLANNING
DRILLING FLUIDS

Mud Line Temperatures for Gulf of Mexico

(based on 1977 NOAA Study)

Degree F
35 40 45 50 55 60
0

1000

2000

3000
Water Depth (feet)

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

10000

Figure 2: Gulf of Mexico Ocean Temperature Profile

The cold temperature increases the viscosity and gel strengths of the drilling fluids,
which then increases the equivalent circulating density (ECD), and surge pressure in
the annulus.

Another often overlooked effect of the cold temperatures on the drilling fluid is the
increase in equivalent static density (ESD), particularly for synthetic based oil
systems. As the temperature decreases the density of the fluids increases. Combined
with the hydrostatic pressure in the annulus, the ESD can actually be significantly
higher than the surface density.

Care must be taken to correctly formulate the fluid so that the rheology is not
excessive, while at the same time maintaining good mud properties at static bottom
hole temperatures. Correct selection of the oil (low kinematic viscosity as possible) for
a synthetic mud system is critical.

A chiller unit should be placed on location to allow monitoring of the low temperature
rheology for data acquisition to make hydraulics calculations to monitor the ESD, ECD
and surge pressures. It is a good practice when running into the hole to break
circulation at regular depths and rotate the drilling string. This helps to reduce the
surge pressures and minimize the ECD when back on bottom. Annular pressure while
drilling data (APWD) can greatly help to control drilling practices and down-hole

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

WELL PLANNING
DRILLING FLUIDS

pressures. The Fann 70 rheometer generates fluid rheology data over a wide range of
pressures and temperatures. This provides down-hole fluid performance data to use
for hydraulic modeling.

Accurate ocean temperature profile data are required for equivalent static and
circulating density profiles. Hydraulic programs utilize the ocean temperature profile
together with the formation temperature profile to determine the temperature profiles
in the drill string and annulus under static and circulating conditions. These
temperatures are then used to determine the down-hole density profile and rheology.
With this information, accurate modeling of the ESD and ECD can be used to prevent
exceeding the fracture gradient.

4.6 Top Hole – Riser Cleaning Capacity

Deepwater operations have long, larger diameter riser sections and larger diameter
top hole sections where top-hole casing are set across reduced pore pressure-
fracture gradient margins.

Excessive drilled solids / cuttings around the annular space will increase the ESD /
ECD leading to induced loss of circulation across the reduced fracture gradients.

To overcome the higher ESD / ECD promoted by excessive drilled solids / cuttings is
required a controlled rate of penetration, optimum borehole hydraulics and sufficient
drilling fluids carry capacity. Booster pumps should be use when necessary to clean –
circulate the riser and efficient solids control equipment is recommended as well.

4.7 Environmental Impact – Riser Disconnect

Drilling fluids being utilized should be in compliance with applicable local

environmental protection regulations in the event drilling fluids are discharged during
riser disconnect.

3 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy or Procedure

however; other reference sources may have documentation requirements.

Reference: MI Deepwater Fluids Manual

Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002), Section 3, subsection 8

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 10

WELL PLANNING
SHALLOW WATER FLOW

1 PLANNING

Shallow water flows will be properly isolated.

Water flow severity, the maximum allowable drilling fluid hydrostatic pressure and the
casing-setting points should be taken into account during the well design phase. The
well design, drilling fluids and casing points are a third party / operator responsibility.
Transocean will ensure the operator’s shallow water flows policy is respected.

2 GUIDELINES

2.1 General

Shallow water flows occur in wells when a shallow over pressured / permeable sand
is drilled without enough hydrostatic pressure. Reduced pore pressure fracture
gradient margins in the upper sediments contribute to greater difficulty controlling the
shallow water flows.

Shallow water flows, if not properly controlled and isolated, will affect the well
foundation stability and will lead to the well failure. In locations where development /
template projects are conducted, the entire template will be at risk.

2.2 Techniques to Manage Shallow Water Flows

• Identification of shallow aquifers

• Well location
• Casing program
• Cement job quality

2.2.1 Identification of Shallow Aquifers

The identification of potential shallow water flows is probably one of the most
important issues in the well planning process.

Offset data from previous wells drilled in the area to evaluate mud weight, leak-off
test, pore pressure, wirleline logs, temperature logs, stratigraphy information, as well
as area high resolution 3-D and 4-D seismic surveys and reprocessed conventional 3-
D surveys are tools that should be utilized in identifying the potential of a water flow.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 10

WELL PLANNING
SHALLOW WATER FLOW

2.2.2 Well location

The identification of the potential for shallow hazards/shallow water flow will provide
for better well site selection. The best action is to avoid drilling in potential shallow
water flow areas, unfortunately not all shallow water flow hazards are possible to
identify.

2.2.3 Casing Program

Wells with risk of shallow water flow should have a different casing program
approach. The primary objective is to provide a strong well foundation through a good
cemented conductor and/or surface casing. Isolation of the potential flowing zones
through good casing point selection and cementing practices is important.

The following casing program options are to be used:

• Set 20” surface casing above flow sand, the BOP and riser can be installed and
the flow zone drilled with the required mud weight. Deep wells that require a
deeply set 20” casing do not use this option.
• Set 26” or 24” conductor above the flow sand an drill riserless
• Set 26” or 24” conductor above the flow sand and drill with 21” riser system

This option is applicable when the 20” casing is required to set below the shallow
water flow zone, the formation to be drilled will not fracture with the increased
hydrostatic pressure imposed by the fluid back to the surface.

2.2.4 Cementing Job Quality

The quality of the conductor casing and/or the surface casing cementing job will
dictate the competence of the foundation of the well which in turn will dictate the
success of the subsequent drilling phases.

The mud line through top hole section temperature, the reduced pore pressure
fracture gradient margins and shallow water flows and/or shallow gas influx should be
considered when the cement formulation is being designed.

Setting the casing shoe across a competent formation and the use of foam cement
slurries will help to perform cementing jobs without loss of circulation and allowing
cement from the shoe to the mud line level.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 10

WELL PLANNING
SHALLOW WATER FLOW

References:

Transocean Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002), Section 8

Shell Inc., Deepwater Drilling Notebook

SPE 59019 “The Top 10 Mud-Related Concerns in Deepwater Drilling Operations”

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 11

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER CEMENTING

1 PLANNING

Casing cementing operations should be conducted to ensure hydraulic seal and pipe
structural support. Precautions to safeguard personnel and equipment during
cementing operations is mandatory.

The design, preparation of cement slurries and the cementing jobs are a third party /
client responsibility. Transocean as a contractor will ensure the cementing program is
being adhered to.

2 PROCEDURE

2.1 General

Cementing issues in deepwater wells are dominated by the shallow hole intervals.
These intervals have near freezing temperatures at the mud line and may experience
such problems as flowing sands, washouts, and lost circulation. Since the structural,
conductor and surface casing strings are the foundation upon which the rest of the
well depends, obtaining a quality cement job is a critical factor in successfully drilling
the well to TD.

Temperature: Achieving good slurry performance at relatively low temperatures is

critical to slurry design. The seafloor temperature may be as low as 35 deg F,
although the dynamic circulating bottom hole temperature will be in the range of 70-75
deg. F at the shallow string casing points. If lower temperatures are assumed,
premature setting of the cement becomes a risk. Thickening time of a cement slurry
is designed based on cement placement time and temperature regime. The
temperature differential between mixing, placement and static formation temperatures
presents significant technical challenges.

Cementing issues in the deeper hole intervals are focused on avoiding lost circulation
and effective use of cementing equipment.

2.2 Foam Cement

Foam cement is generally the preferred option for cementing shallow casing strings in
deep water. Foam cement is a mixture of cement slurry, foam agents and gas
(usually Nitrogen). It is a low-density cement matrix with outstanding physical
properties during placement and after setting time.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 11

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER CEMENTING

Foam cement provides additional slurry characteristics that enhance the first
cemented casing string, which provides the critical foundation required for the
anticipated well loads. Some of the key slurry design problematic issues are resolved
by utilizing foam cement such as:

• Fluid Flow of any Fluid

Foam cement can control high-volume water flow in weak formations, when mixed as
a quick-set formula which prevents migration up the annulas after cementing.

• Lost Circulation

Foam cement provides a means of preparing 4 to 15lb/gal cementing slurries that

develop relatively high compressive strengths in a minimum period of time, even at
low temperatures. Properties can be easily altered late in the design and “on the fly” if
necessary and the thixotropic nature of foam can reduce losses.

2.2.1 Foam Cement Placement Techniques

Foam cement can be placed by three methods such as:

• Conventional placement - preferred

Down casing, returns from the annulas

• Reverse placement

Down annulas, returns up from casing

• Tack and squeeze

Place cement from the shoe up to the lost zone and squeeze the top through
perforations, DV collar, top of liner, etc.

2.2.2 Annular Control

Foam cement slurries are mixed at adequate densities to control flow but due to
uncontrolled expansion while setting and over estimating the amount of hole washout,
annular flow may exist after placement. Due to these phenomena an annular sealing
mechanism (BOP) must be tested and rated before the job. Also a leak-off test of the

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 11

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER CEMENTING

conductor or surface casing must be performed prior to job to establish pressure

limitations.

2.2.3 Foam Cementing Safety

Using nitrogen adds new challenges and safety concerns to the cementing process. Below
are listed some of the differences of foam cement concept and safety concerns:

• Density is controlled by the amount of nitrogen injected

• Fluid becomes energized with the compressible gas and maintaining control of the
fluid is a critical safety concern
• Fluid is designed for placement in the well at a specific depth
• Nitrogen is stored and pumped as a cryogenic
• Nitrogen is inert and nonflammable, but is capable of displacing oxygen and can
cause asphyxiation
• Drip pans should be used at any point where liquid nitrogen may drip onto the
installation deck or other structure
• Nitrogen operations generate considerable noise levels

2.3 Tools and Accessories

2.3.1 Casing Auto – Fill Equipment

Due to the narrow pore pressure/fracture gradient margins and the small clearances
involved in deepwater operations, we commonly use auto-fill or differential float
equipment for the 13 3/8” casing and below to reduce annular pressure surges and
mud losses.

Auto-fill devices allow flow up the casing and drill pipe until the device is activated.
Once activated, the equipment becomes normal float equipment, allowing flow down
the drill pipe and casing only.

2.3.2 Precautions to Keep in Mind When Using Casing Auto-fill Equipment

Casing should be monitored to ensure it is filling up when running in the hole. Weight
should be monitored carefully and a rag placed on top of the pipe when running in to
verify flowing/blowing.

It should be recognized that from a well control point view, auto-fill equipment is a
potential weak point if the casing does not fill properly.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 2
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 11

WELL PLANNING
DEEPWATER CEMENTING

Casing should be circulated regularly to clean cuttings which will have entered the
shoe and started to accumulate. Even before the casing shoe has reached the open
hole, it may be necessary to circulate, as cuttings and gumbo will typically have
settled in the riser and the previous casing string(s).

Casing should be filled in case losses are encountered when running in the hole.

Casing should be run in the hole slowly enough to allow the fluid level to equalize.

The pipe should be carefully lifted out of the slips, as the rush of fluid back out of the
shoe could cause the differential tabs of the hydraulic fill-up device to leave position
and result in premature conversion to normal float equipment.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 1
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OIM / MASTER’S AUTHORITY

1 OIM / MASTER’S AUTHORITY

1.1 OIM / Master Statement of Authority

The OIM is the senior onboard manager, who reports directly to the shore-based Rig
Manager. It is his role to manage the overall operation and administration of the
installation. The OIM will ensure contractual obligations to our client are met and
day-to-day operations are carried out in accordance with best industry standards as
well as the client’s and Rig Manager’s instructions. The OIM is responsible for
interface with Transocean shore based management and the onboard client
representative during an emergency.

1.1.1 Self Propelled Installations

The Master is responsible for DP station keeping, safe navigation and collision
avoidance, general safety and pollution prevention, Installation stability, regulatory
compliance, ISM/MODU Code compliance, implementation of emergency response
training and all marine operations issues.

Under Section 14.8 of the MODU Code, the Company designates the “Person in
Charge” during an emergency as specified on the Station Bill. During an emergency
the “Person in Charge” determines from available situation reports, written
procedures, acceptable safe working practices and advice from the onboard
management team if there is a threat to personnel, the installation or the
environment, then coordinates the appropriate response action.

Well Control operations are not an emergency within the scope of this paragraph.

Reference: Section 4, subsection 3

1.1.2 Non Self Propelled or Bottom Supported Installations

The OIM / Master may be the same person.

Under Section 14.8 of the MODU Code, the Person in Charge during an emergency
is as specified on the Station Bill.

REVISION NO: 02 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: November 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 2
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

1 OPERATING GUIDELINES

1.1 Masters Standing Orders

The Master of every Transocean self propelled installation will issue written
instructions on the conduct of a navigational watch to be followed by all relevant
persons at all times. A copy of these standing orders will be placed in the front of the
Masters Standing Order Book, and they will be endorsed by all masters and signed off
as read by all watch keeping personnel.

The Master may use the standing order book at his discretion to leave specific
instructions with the duty watch keeper during periods of his absence from the
Navigational Bridge. These instructions will be signed off as read by the duty
watchkeeper.

In addition the OIM or person in charge of all non self propelled installations should
issue similar standing orders to be followed by the control room or bridge personnel
during both routine and non routine activities, i.e. the use of collision lights and fog
horns in reduced visibility, use of radar for anti collision, and orders covering standing
watch keeping procedures when the installation is under towage.

1.2 Navigational Standards

All Transocean installations will be navigated in accordance with the highest marine
professional standards, by competent and suitably licensed Marine Personnel.

In the absence of Flag State navigational standards, USCG or British Admiralty

standards should be used with procedures and formalities as outlined by the Nautical
Institute or equivalent professional maritime body.

At all times a suitable Navigational library and chart folio will be maintained to allow
the installation to be navigated to the nearest port of refuge or safe haven in the event
of any emergency. All relevant documentation effecting this eventuality must be kept
up to date. Chart corrections will be made using information from either USA or British
Admiralty or Coastal State Notice to Mariners and/or other similar information.

When arriving into port the Latest Notice of Mariners from that country on shall be
onboard.

1.3 References

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 2
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

All IMO documents required by the Flag and Coastal States must be on board. In the
absence of Flag State requirements, it shall be a Transocean requirement that the
following publications be utilized as a guide to safe navigation, protection of the
environment, and the practice of good seamanship. The list of IMO documents below
is limited and may not satisfy Flag / Coastal State requirements.

• IMO - International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (2001 consolidated
edition) with latest ammendments
• IMO - MARPOL 73/78 (consolidated edition 1997) with latest ammendments.
• IMO - International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (1990
edition)
• IMO - Ship’s Routing (sixth edition 1991) & Amendments (1993 Ed)
• International Conventions on Standards of Training, certification and watchkeeping
(1995 edition.)
• ICS - Bridge Procedures Guide (3rd edition 1998)
• Nautical Institute - Bridge Team Management (1993 edition)
• Nautical Institute - Passage Planning 1994
• Nautical Institute - Bridge Watchkeeping 1994
• Nautical Institute - The Master’s Role in Collecting Evidence (1997 edition)
• American Merchant Seaman Manual
• Merchant Marine Officers Guide
• Weather for Mariners
• A Mariners Guide to Radio Facsimile Weather Charts
• Pilot Service, Vessel Trafic Service and Port Operations
• American Practical Navigator Vol. 1&2
• The Mariners Handbook
• Peril at Sea and Salvage
• Pirates and Armed robbers (A Master's Guide Line)
• Guide to Port Entry.

1.4 Third Party Relationships

Person in Charge
At all times Transocean will appoint a person to be in charge of their Installations. This
person may be the position of OIM or Master dependant upon the type of unit and
current operational mode. The person in charge will carry the responsibility for the
safety of the installation and persons onboard in accordance with Section 14.8 of the
IMO MODU Code.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 2
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

Tow Master

When a non-self propelled unit is being towed a third party Tow Master may be
contracted by Transocean. The Tow Master is responsible for correct conduct of the
move and deployment of mooring equipment. He may also direct all vessels and
anchor movement.

The Transocean OIM / Master / Rig Mover shall always be responsible for the safety
of the installation and the personel.

Pilot

Where the services of a local Pilot are employed for the transit of an area of
navigational concern, i.e. controlled area, or inshore passage etc, the OIM, Master or
Tow Master must at all times ensure that the Pilot’s guidance is monitored.

Typically Pilots provide advice only and have no liability in the event of a navigational
error leading to a subsequent incident or loss.

Warranty Surveyor

The Warranty Surveyor, if present, is appointed by Transocean to satisfy

requirements of the Installation’s insurance underwriters. The Warranty Surveyor is
not the underwriter and does not represent insurers. The Warranty Surveyor's
responsibility is to independently observe and report that move operations are being
conducted within the unit's marine operations manual and generally acceptable
marine practices. The Warranty Surveyor may offer expert advice on marine related
issues similar to a Harbor Pilot’s function. Use of Warranty Surveyors in an active role
is discouraged in order to minimize risks associated with conflict of interest. The
Warranty Surveyor has no direct authority or veto powers regarding Installation
mobilization as ultimate responsibility for the Installation remains with the OIM and the
Installation's owners at all times.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 3
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
BRIDGE OPERATIONS (self propelled installations)

1 BRIDGE OPERATIONS

These requirements shall apply to all Drillships and Semi-submersibles that navigate
independently (self - propelled) between locations and are certified by to do so by the
respective Flag State and Class.

1.1 Bridge Manning

While self-propelled installations are underway, the Navigation Bridge or Control

Bridge must at all times be manned by a licensed competent person, who must hold
an unlimited license under the STCW 95 IMO convention. Bridge lookout
requirements shall be in compliance with STCW 95 section VIII.

During any period of maneuvering or at any time when the Master is conning the
installation (excluding DP watchkeeping) he will not under any circumstances be left
alone on the bridge of the installation. Another competent deck officer shall always
be in attendance during these close in navigation periods.

1.2 Bridge Team Management

The Master shall ensure that the personnel comprising the Bridge Team are fully
aware of their responsibilities in that team to ensure the safe and effective operation
of the installation at all times. The skills of the individual members must be suitably
deployed during the various operations whether they be on passage, on location, or
during abnormal conditions, i.e. emergency or heavy weather. It is expected that
bridge personnel will work as a team under the control of the master at all times.

1.3 Bridge Lookout /Anti Collision Watch

At times whether on location or on passage or at anchor an efficient lookout must be

kept to ensure the safety of the vessel from collision by another installation. In
particular during times of reduced visibility the Master may decide to position
additional lookouts due to the nature of the local area marine environment, traffic
density etc. Both 3cm and 10 cm radars will be used at all times to ensure maximum
warning of the close approach by any surface vessel.

At the onset of periods of reduced visibility the Master will be called to the bridge to
assess the situation and decide upon the need for any additional lookouts or
precautions. At all time the requirements of the International Rules for Collision
Avoidance shall be met, without exception.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 3
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
BRIDGE OPERATIONS (self propelled installations)

1.4 Open Water Navigation

The term “Open Water Navigation” describes any transit area more than 20 miles
from the nearest landfall or area free of marine traffic control and any underwater
obstructions. During such transits the installation’s positions will be plotted on the
chart at hourly intervals. An efficient lookout must be kept at all times. When
approaching a landfall position all means available should be used to verify the
vessel’s position as accurately as is possible. If landmarks are not sighted when
expected, close approach to the land should be made with the greatest caution. At a
minimum Tidal Atlases and Pilot books for the area must be consulted.

Some Coastal States have a 50 mile security zone where notification is required 72
hours in advance before entry. Similarly some Coastal States claim a 200mile EEZ
zone off shore. Coastal States claiming these zones can be found in the Admiralty
Annual Notice to Mariners No 12. Coastal State mandatory reporting requirements,
local laws effective in Territorial waters (such as flying the coastal states Flag), and
navigational rules that supercede International rules are to be recognized as
applicable.

1.5 Coastal Navigation

Coastal Navigation is to be considered when within 20 miles of the land or within an

area of extensive underwater obstructions or areas of shallow water or when
particular caution is required. Passage planning should avoid such areas indicated
on the Charts including Submarine exercise areas, fish havens and historic wrecks.

Some Coastal States claim also a contiguous zone that gives them customs rights
and can be identified in Notice of Mariners No. 12.

During such passages position fixes will be undertaken at frequent intervals typically
not more than 20 minutes, and depending upon the prevailing environmental
conditions as frequent as every 6 minutes. Close attention should be paid to the
depth finder.

GPS and/or satellite navigation systems must not be relied upon to the exclusion of
radar and visual fixes of position relative to the Coast. When navigating in oilfields or
crowded locations the positions of installations nearby should be checked with the
published information and charts but must not be relied upon for position fixing to the
exclusion of GPS and other means. The officer of the watch should always be aware
of the possibility of objects moving at very slow or unpredictable speeds and
directions.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 3
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
BRIDGE OPERATIONS (self propelled installations)

When entering an area of activity it is necessary to inform installations nearby of the

vessel's intentions and to be informed of other movements which may be in conflict.

During inshore navigation, the following information must be available to the Bridge
team who will familiarize themselves with it.

• Tidal Stream information

• Pilot Book information
• List of Lights
• Weather forecasts

1.6 Pilotage

When entering any restricted or advisory Pilotage area, all company installations will
take a local Pilot whether it be mandatory or not.

It must at all times be noted that the maneuvering of the vessel is to the Pilots Advice
and Master’s orders, hence there is no liability upon the Pilot for any incident in an
area of Pilotage. At all times the Bridge Team must monitor the Pilot’s activities and
plot the position of the vessel on a suitable scale chart. The Senior watchkeeper
should be prepared to take over from the Pilot and call the Master if he is concerned
at any of the Pilot’s advice.

At all times during a Pilotage or any transit of narrow waters, the anchors should be
available for deployment in an emergency.

All drafts must take into account the lowest point of the installations structure, and in
the case of a vessel equipped with azimuthing thrusters, the draft will take into
account this additional depth of water required.

During a period of Pilotage a Bell Book/Time Book will be maintained from the time
the Pilot vessel approaches to the time the vessel is secured or has cleared any port
area. This “Bell Book” will be used to note the time, date and description or names of
suitable landmarks that the installation passes during it’s passage. The document will
form a legal record in the event of any incident during the passage.

1.7 Weather Reports

The Bridge team will at all times ensure there is a current weather report available
and that it’s contents have been taken into account in the planning of any activity.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 3
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
BRIDGE OPERATIONS (self propelled installations)

All installations whether on location or on passage or off-contract must have access to

a weather forecasting service to ensure they have access to a forecaster in the event
of any critical activity coinciding with an abnormal weather condition.

1.8 Records and Reports

All records or Reports must carry the signature of a person in authority, i.e. OIM or
Master. All such documents should be retained onboard for a period of at least 2
years.

1.9 Passage Planning

Before undertaking any transit between locations every installation will prepare a
suitable passage plan, in accordance with the nautical Institute publication “Passage
Planning” (also refer to section 3 subsection 7.4 “Voyage Plans”). Upon completion of
the plan and prior to commencement of the voyage that plan will be submitted to the
Rig Manager for final approval. The Rig Manager should approve any subsequent
diversion from the plan.

1.10 Reporting in Transit

The Master of every installation in transit between locations will undertake a daily
passage report to the Rig Manager.

The report will contain the following details:

• Time of Departure from location

• Current position (Latitude & Longitude)
• Average speed for the day
• General average speed
• Fuel consumed last 24 Hours
• Total fuel consumed to date
• ETA next location and identity of next location.
• Any Navigational Equipment malfunction
• Any propulsion equipment malfunction
• Any power generation equipment malfunction
• Anticipated weather for next 24 hours.
• Any urgent requirements.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 3
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
BRIDGE OPERATIONS (self propelled installations)

1.11 Weather Routing

Any installation when undertaking an international voyage will contract a Weather

routing service which will ensure the installation is able to plan the voyage around any
local weather disturbances. The frequency of the information transmission will be at
the Master’s/OIM’s discretion but under no circumstances at intervals of more than 48
hours.

1.12 AMVER

All Transocean installations will engage in the voluntary AMVER reporting scheme,
which is designed to enhance the safety of any installation upon the high seas. It is
the responsibility of the Master/OIM to ensure that regular reports are submitted to the
scheme.

Some Coastal States such as Australia have reporting systems such as AUSREP and
REEFREP. In some cases participation in Coastal State systems is mandatory.

1.13 Bunker/Fuel Reserves

It is critical that voyage planning takes into account a contingency fuel reserve.

Installations engaged upon voyages of 1 week should allow for a reserve of 3 days
fuel. On long international voyages an additional reserve of 5 days fuel is the
minimum amount acceptable for contingencies. This figure should be usable fuel and
not total fuel remaining in the bunker tanks. A larger fuel contingency may be
necessary in view of voyage planning and time of year.

1.14 Near Hit Report

In the event of any Transocean installation being involved in a near hit or close
approach situation with another vessel the Master will complete a full report on the
circumstances and forwarded that report to the Rig Manager (Refer to HSE Manual,
HQS-HSE-001, Section 4). The report must contain a factual account of the incident,
together with the name of the other vessel involved, Port of Registry, owners and if
possible name of captain.

1.15 Maneuvering Card

Every self-propelled installation will have a “Bridge Maneuvering Card” immediately

available in accordance with the IMO standard giving pictorial information as to the

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 3
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
BRIDGE OPERATIONS (self propelled installations)

maneuverability of the installation, and the speeds attainable at various power or pitch
settings.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 4
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OFFICIAL LOG BOOKS

1 OFFICIAL LOG BOOKS

On all Transocean installations the OIM will be responsible for the maintenance of
the official logbooks, except such installations where there is a Transocean
appointed Master onboard. In this case it is part of the Masters responsibility under
Flag State and statutory requirements to oversee the suitable entries in those
logbooks and reports.

1.1 Marine or Deck Log Book

All installations will maintain a Bridge logbook in which, as a minimum, records of the
installation’s course, speed, fuel consumption and environmental details will be
recorded at a minimum of every 6 hours. In addition details of the daily stability
status, deck loads, vessel draft, and various consumables will also be recorded. The
details of any daily marine operations will also be recorded. In addition, details of
emergency exercises will be recorded. Visits by Class surveyors or P&I club officials
must also be noted.

The daily sheet will be signed by both the Master and Chief Officer or OIM.

1.2 Flag State Official Log

The Master will maintain the Flag State Official Log book at all times. It will be used
to record all details of Master’s/OIM’s inspections, Personnel details, and any details
required by the Flag State. The book will be kept up-to-date and ready for inspection
by any Flag or Coastal state representative.

1.3 Oil Record Book (MODUs)

This document (normally titled Oil Record Book Part 1) will be maintained up to date
at all times. It is the responsibility of the Master/OIM to ensure the accuracy of the
contents.

1.4 Oil Record Book (FPSO’s)

This document (normally titled Oil Record Book Part 2) will be maintained up to date
at all times. It is the responsibility of the Master to ensure the accuracy of the
contents.

1.5 GMDSS Log Book (floating installations)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 4
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OFFICIAL LOG BOOKS

Unless the Flag State Administration provides a GMDSS logbook, the Transocean
standard shall be either the USA or British (MSA) logbook.

The Master/OIM will ensure that the logbook is completed as per instructions and
that all the designated daily, weekly and monthly checks are completed. Emergency
Transmissions, storm warnings must be logged and a hard copy retained on file.
Unless the installation is UK registered, the duplicate page facility is not required.

1.6 Machinery Space Log

A suitable Machinery Log should be used on all installations irrespective of the

degree of automation on onboard. The log should be used to confirm equipment and
plant status at minimum intervals of 12 hours. The duty watchstander and Chief
Engineer or Maintenance Supervisor should formally sign the document.

1.7 Chart Correction Log (self propelled installations)

A log indicating the status of the navigational charts corrections will be maintained
by the senior licensed bridge watchkeeper.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

1 OPERATIONS WITH SUPPORT VESSELS

1.1 Supply Vessels

All vessels approaching a Transocean installation should advise their ETA at least 1
hour before arrival and may require the following information.

• Installation Heading and anchor pattern

• Weather information
• Name of Standby Vessel
• Installation operations (ROV ops., overside work, flaring etc.)
• Control room and crane VHF working channels
• Whether the supply vessel will be worked on arrival or not.

The following points should be taken into consideration when planning supply vessel
operations:

• The type of load; heavy lifts; dangerous cargo

• Any requirement for a particular order of loading / offloading
• Operating limits and weather conditions

Time limitations and rest periods may apply. If supply vessels must operate along side
the installation for extended periods, Master/OIM should confirm that the supply
vessel has sufficient watch keeping officers capable of maneuvering the vessel.

Before any supply vessel closes within the 500-meter zone the status of the following
must be confirmed and defects reported to the Transocean Master/OIM:

• All propulsion and maneuvering control equipment

• Internal and external communication equipment
• Cargo handling equipment.

In marginal conditions a supply vessel should be asked to approach to a stand-off

position at least one ships length from the Transocean installation to assess the
conditions and the vessel’s ability to carry out cargo operations.

The following points should be taken into consideration before commencing any
supply vessel operations. In marginal weather conditions it is imperative for the safety
of both the supply vessel and Transocean installation that the items below are
complied with:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

• Visibility should be sufficient to allow the supply vessel Master a clear view of the
Installation throughout the cargo operation.

• Wind and current direction. Operations should be carried out down wind and
down current of the Installation whenever possible. This is to minimize the risk of
contact in the event of a failure in the supply vessel propulsion or steering. An
exception to this would be essential work on a potential shallow gas operation,
when the vessel should be kept upwind.

• The station keeping ability of the vessel including the type and power of the
propulsion and the experience of the personnel.

• The nature of the cargo and the expected duration of the operation.

The Master of a supply vessel always retains the right to refuse to come alongside or
to cease operations and move clear of the Installation on the grounds of the safety of
the vessel and its crew.

Once inside the 500-meter safety zone any change in the operational status of the
vessel equipment must be reported to the installation and a decision taken to continue
or abort the cargo operation.

Should the vessel or any member of the crew be involved in an incident/accident

whilst inside the 500-meter zone it must be reported to the unit Master/OIM.

Supply vessels are prohibited from anchoring within the 500-meter zone of any
Transocean installation unless under exceptional circumstances and then only with
the express permission of the Transocean Master/OIM.

Any supply vessel losing an anchor, piece of cargo or equipment over the side within
the 500-meter zone must report this loss to the installation Master/OIM.

1.2 Supply Vessels in DP Mode Operation

All supply vessels operating Dynamically Positioned operating in or near the 500-
meter zone of a Transocean installation should be Class2 rated.

Class 2 basically means that the DP control system is a fully redundant duplex
system.

The vessel should comply with the IMCA publications, M103 “Guidelines for the
Design and Operation of DP Vessels”, third party audited to an approved standard

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

and confirmed acceptable for close approach DP operations by the Master with
support from the Transocean DP Marine Superintendent and Rig Manager as
necessary.

For safety reasons it is not acceptable for a DP supply vessel using DP only to work
on the windward side of a Transocean Installation closer than 20 meters without a risk
assessment.

DP supply vessels should not approach a Trtansocean Installation when flowing a

well.

The use of DP during actual cargo transfer operations is only acceptable with the
express permission of the Master/OIM. Such permission will only be given provided it
can be verified that the DP Supply vessel conforms to the highest standard of DP
operational criteria and has a verifiable DP management system in place.

Information regarding the capabilities of the vessel and the state of readiness of her
equipment will be confirmed to the Master/OIM of the Transocean installation before
operations commence and the installation should pass similar information to the
supply vessel.

In weather conditions nearing DP supply vessel DP station keeping capabilities, the

Master/OIM of a Transocean installation should receive confirmation there will be 2
trained DP operators on the bridge at all times the supply vessel is operating on DP
within the 500-meter zone.

1.3 Seismic Vessels

The presence of a seismic vessel is normally coordinated through the client. The
close approach of a seismic vessel to any Transocean installation will impact both
upon drilling and DP operations. Seismic activity will generate subsurface sound
waves that will impinge upon both acoustic positioning systems and possibly critical
well operations, i.e. logging perforation.

1.4 Standby Vessels

Every Transocean installation that has an attendant Standby Vessel must develop a
suitable working relationship with that vessel to enhance the safety of the Transocean
personnel. In such activities the Standby Vessel must be fully aware of the day- to-
day operations and status of the Transocean installation and be familiar with the
installation’s Emergency procedures.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

The main functions of standby vessels are:

• Act as a place of safety

• Rescue people from the water
• Provide medical aid for rescued people
• Monitor the installation’s safety zone for anti-collision
• Provide on scene command in accordance with the installation’s Emergency
Response Plan
• Monitor the performance of the installation’s navigation lights & fog signals
• In normal operations the standby vessel will remain outside the 500-meter zone in
order to provide a speedy response to any incident that may take place onboard
the installation.

Whenever the vessel is required to perform close standby duties the vessel must
confirm to the installation that it is fully functional in all respects to carry out the
required duties and that all rescue equipment is ready for use.

1.5 Operations with Other DP vessels

Only DP class 2 vessels will be accepted by Transocean for close approach

operations within the 500-meter zone of a Transocean installation.

All DP vessels working within 500-meters of a Transocean installation will have to be

approved for operation by the Transocean DP Marine Superintendent who will require
suitable documentation from the contractor to verify the suitability of that vessel. In
general the DP vessel will be require to comply with the IMO guidelines and the
various standards issued by the International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA),
which will identify both equipment and operational standards and levels of personnel
competency.

Approved DP vessels will at all times maintain a minimum close approach to the
Transocean installation of 20 meters.

2 MULTIPLE VESSEL ACTIVITIES INSIDE 500 METER SAFETY ZONE

2.1 APPLICABILITY (Dynamic Positioned, Moored and Self Elevating units)

This section is not applicable to routine supply vessel, anchor handling or standby
vessel activities.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

This section is applicable to all multiple activities within an Installations 500 metre
safety zone and within an Installation’s anchor pattern.

2.2 Purpose

The purpose of this section is to provide guidance regarding multiple vessel marine
activity within an Installations 500 metre Safety Zone.

2.3 Risk assessment

Simultaneous vessel activities are subject to a risk assessment to insure operations

are conducted safely and properly co-ordinated.

2.4 Permit to work

To minimise risk to the Installation and the Vessel(s) involved it is recommended

operations be conducted under the Company’s Permit to Work system. No vessel
shall enter the safety zone unless it is fully operational.

The OIM has the authority to request vessels to leave the 500 safety zone at
any time. Unless agreed by onshore management no vessel shall approach an
Installation within 50 meters.

2.5 Information transfer

2.5.1 Transocean to Vessel(s)

Transocean Installations shall pass on the following information to the vessel prior to
vessel(s) entering the Installation’s 500 metre safety zone:

• The operation(s) taking place on the installation and those planned

• Any hazardous well features e.g. H2S, HPHT, or other relevant information
• Any Diving or ROV operations underway or planned
• The working VHF channel
• Warning if any acoustic logging programme is taking place or planned
• Status of Installations mooring system (if applicable) including:
! Rigs anchor pattern (bearings and distances)
! Catenary and touch down points
! Anchor jewellery

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

• Any propulsion systems active

• Standby Vessel name
• Emergency Alarms signals
• Acoustic transponder channels in use

2.5.2 Vessel to Transocean Installation

Vessel(s) shall pass the following information to Transocean Installations prior to

entering the Installation’s 500 metre safety zone:

• Method of maintaining station

• Back up system in event of failure of (1)
• Functional checks which have been completed

2.5.3 DP Vessels to Transocean Installation

When DP support vessels (ie pipe lay vessels, well intervention vessels, construction
vessels, etc) operations are planned within the 500 meter safety zone, the OIM of the
Installation shall receive the DP operational details and contingency procedures of the
specific vessel(s) including the most recent DP trial results. This information will
provide the basis of a HAZOP risk assessment prior to commencement of operations.

The OIM may refuse all or part of support vessel DP operations and or contingency
procedures and defer to Regional / District Management.

2.6 Guidelines for vessel activities

When vessel(s) are planned to be operating within an Installation’s 500 metre safety
zone the following guidelines are recommended:

2.6.1 Risk Assessment

Conduct a risk assessment.

! The level of assessment shall be dependent upon the complexity of the

operations / level of risk. The assessment may take the form of an onshore
HAZOP.

• A risk assessment of conventionally moored vessels should include allowable

excursion limits in the event of a mooring line failure of either vessel so to avoid

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

the risk of collision. A minimum safe clearance distance of 15m in the event of
line failure is recommended.

• Clear guidance shall be given on limiting weather conditions for continuing

simultaneous operations. Procedures to obtain suitable stand-off positions
should be established if the limiting weather criteria is exceeded.

• If an onshore HAZOP is conducted the Installation shall provide input (preferably

by attendance) prior to the HAZOP being signed off by interested parties, e.g. the
vessel owners, Clients and Rig Manager.

• All parties to ensure methods of control and communications are clearly defined.

2.6.2 Permit to Work

To avoid conflict of operations, it is recommended a Transocean Permit to Work for

vessel(s) activities be issued.

Signitures are necessary due to possible legal conflict in case of collisions /

accidents.
The following signatures are recommended on the Permit to Work :
• The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)
• The Client’s Representative
• The Barge Supervisor – (Responsible Person)
• The Client’s Marine Advisor – (if applicable)
• The Ship’s Master
• ROV / Diving Superintendent – (if applicable)

A copy of the completed PTW shall be faxed or otherwise delivered to the

ships Master for his signature.

If it is impossible to get actual signatures between Masters of adjacent vessels and

the OIM, verbal confirmation may be used and the Work Permit endorsed
accordingly by the Transocean OIM. This should be backed up by an official entry in
the Installation’s log book confirming the intent of the understanding. The Master of
the adjacent vessel should be asked to make a similar entry into his vessel’s log
book.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER VESSELS

MULTIPLE VESSEL ACTIVITY FLOW CHART

Conduct Risk
Assessment e.g.
HAZOP, RAT

Review Risk
Assessment, ensure
controls in place

OIM issue PTW signed OIM suspends any

by appropriate parties conflicting PTW

Work Commences

Situation Changes e.g.

Situation constant
Adverse Weather

OIM issues new PTW

OIM suspends PTW
every 24 hours

Job completed, PTW

cancelled

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 6
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

1.1 Mooring at a Non-Drilling Location

Any Transocean installation proceeding to a non-operational location, i.e. stand-

down/stacking area must ensure that the proposed location is indeed suitable. In the
case of a port location or alongside a jetty or wharf the suitability of the mooring
facilities should be confirmed by accredited personnel, and if necessary agreed with
the vessel’s underwriters.

1.2 Minimum Under-Keel Clearance

When verifying under-keel clearances Masters/OIMs must always take into account
the localized effects of any areas of fresh water, or in the event of a transit in a
narrow channel the effects of “squat”.

The term “underkeel” refers to the lowest part of the installation i.e. the
underside of the azimuth thruster.

Typically for large installations with azimuth thruster a minimum underkeel clearance
of 5 meters is acceptable. This will depend upon the nature of the bottom and
anticipated usage of the thruster, and the possible ingress of sand into the thruster
bearings, cooling water pumps, etc.

In the case of a dead ship approach into shallow waters particular attention shall be
paid to route planning and equipment operations when the underkeel clearance is
less than 3 meters (10 feet).

1.3 Severe Weather

If severe weather is forecasted every /OIMMaster must ensure that the installation is
suitably prepared with particular reference to the watertight integrity and safety of
personnel.

Typically winds in excess of 60 Knots should be deemed to be excessive and may

threaten the safe movement of personnel on exposed decks.

For Self-elevating Installations afloat, typically when 9 to 10second plus period

swells in combination with 3m+ sea states are forecast, preparations shall be made
for increased motions .

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 6
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The OIM/Master should monitor the approach of the weather system and use the
onboard equipment to assist in this matter. In addition he should also contact the
forecasting bureau direct to obtain the latest information on the approaching
weather.

In particular, decisions will have to be made regarding:

• Cessation of drilling Operations

• Evacuation of non essential personnel
• Verifying installation stability
• Deballasting to survival draft
• Adjusting any mooring systems
• Securing deck loads
• Ensuring all internal and external watertight closures are secure.
• Limiting access to external decks to personnel
• Rigging safety lines where necessary

Every Transocean installation should develop suitable contingency procedures to

cover such a situation and determine a realistic time frame for the securing of the
installation to a suitable status and the evacuation of non-essential personnel (Refer
to installation specific Emergency Response/Contingency Manual).

It is essential that an evacuation procedure is developed and maintained in line with

the local area resources.

Upon the passing of severe weather the OIM/Master must ensure a suitable damage
inspection is completed to verify the structural status.

1.4 Actions on Loss of Power

Every Transocean installation will develop specific procedures to cover the activities
that will be initiated upon the total loss of power. Such procedures will cover
activities to secure the installation and bring it back under-control at the earliest
opportunity. Such a procedure should be exercised on a frequent basis to ensure all
personnel are familiar with their duties.

It is likely that Dynamically Positioned self propelled vessels will be tested by the
client for a black out recovery and any lessons learnt from such an exercise must be
appended to the original procedure.

1.5 Towing Equipment

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 6
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The Master/OIM must ensure they are fully familiar with the rigging, operation and
maintenance of the emergency towing system. The system must be regularly
checked and it is critical that the surrounding deck area is kept clear of any
obstructions that will impair deployment.

Dedicated Emergency Towage equipment should not be used for routine harbor
towage operations. Where conventional towage pendants are used as part of an
emergency towage package their condition must be regularly checked to ensure
they have not been subjected to any friction sources and possible degradation of
strength.

1.6 Salvage

Where the Master/OIM deems it necessary to engage the assistance of a Salvor, he

should inform Transocean Management before the agreement is entered into.
However, if this is not possible the Master / OIM has the authority to enter into a
Lloyds Open Form agreement which can be made verbally by VHF or other means
and is binding, subject to arbitration. No other form of agreement is authorized
without reference to Management.

This contract should not be used in any circumstance where there is sufficient
time for Management to negotiate a towage contract; e.g. vessel adrift in a safe
condition and in no danger.

An entry must be made in the Deck Log, Radio Log or other Official Document (IADC)
of the Time and Position, Condition of the installation and Perils when the agreement
is entered into. This entry must also contain the name of the Transocean
representative (Master / OIM) making the agreement, the name of the Salvage
Vessel, Owners and Master. These details should be transmitted to the Transocean
Management as soon as is practical by whatever means available. All additional
relevant information should be meticulously logged to assist in making practical
decisions and in the arbitration."

Lloyd's Open Form (summarized) Standard Form of Salvage Agreement.

(NO CURE - NO PAY)

This is an agreement between the Master of the Distressed Vessel on behalf of

his Owners and the Master of a vessel capable of rendering a salvage service
on behalf of his Owners (the Contractor). Both Masters have the authority to
make this contract and once done it is legally binding. It may be oral (by Radio)
or written or made by any available means (email, fax, etc.)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 6
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The mention of Lloyd's open form implies all the clauses apply. The essence of
the contract is NO CURE - NO PAY. The contract is about Property only and
does not include LIFE which must be saved at all cost except the jeopardy of
other lives. The contract is concerned with saving the Distressed Vessel and all
the valuable property aboard whoever the owners may be. The Master of the
Distressed Vessel should leave blank the VALUE in paragraph 1 as this will be
settled in arbitration.

The Contractor may make reasonable use of any equipment on board the
Distressed Vessel to aid in the Salvage. It is in the Owner's (Master's) interest
to help the Contractor to salve the vessel as this effort will be taken into account
at arbitration as it reduces the general peril. Likewise any delays or non-
cooperation caused by the distressed vessel's Master or Owner may add to the
peril and so to the award. Unwarranted Delays caused by the Salvor to increase
the peril will count heavily against the award and should be noted by the Master
of the Distressed Vessel.

There is an allowance for the partial salvage of the vessel, all valuable items
saved to be taken into account at arbitration. Other clauses deal with the
general administration of the final award, objections, arbitration, etc.

Lloyd’s open form is generally used:

! Before connecting a salvage tug (not reconnecting a contracted tug);
! When a vessel is in danger of stranding due to insufficient or complete loss
of power;
! When a vesssel has had a fire and is in danger of foundering or needs
assistance to control a fire;
! When a vessel needs to be pumped to stay afloat and is unable to pump out
using its own equipment.

This contract does not generally apply to tugs contracted to the same client or tugs
already contracted to Transocean for any purpose where special clauses already
apply to salvage or redeployment. This contract does not apply to vessels under the
same management (Transocean).

1.7 Responding to a Distress

Upon receiving a signal from any source that persons are in distress at sea, the
Master of a vessel at sea, that is in a position to provide assistance, is bound to
proceed with all speed to their assistance. If possible the Master shall inform them or
the search and rescue service the vessel is doing so. If the Master decides that his

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 6
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

vessel is unable to render reasonable assistance he must enter the decision and
reasons in the log book and inform Rescue Services accordingly. If several vessels
answer a call, the Distressed Vessel may requisition the most appropriate vessels
answering and release others from their duty to assist. Such release must be noted
in the Log Book with the time and position.

The Master of a drilling rig may be able to offer Safe Haven, Helicopter Landing and
Medical Facilties even if moving the vessel to the scene is unreasonable or
impossible. This obligation is legal and binding by International convention on
Salvage 1982, article 10 and article 98(1) of UN convention for the Law of the Sea,
UNCOLS, 1982.

In the event of a Master deciding to respond to a distress, he must inform both the
Rig Manager and Transocean DP Marine Superintendent.

In responding to a distress the Master will have to ensure that by undertaking such
action he is not placing his own installation, and crew at an unacceptable level of
risk.

1.8 Picking Up Survivors

When involved in international operations it is always possible that a Transocean

installation may be involved in a distress operation and find itself in a position of
having to receive survivors. In many cases this operation may be very
straightforward and only involve a small number of personnel.

In some parts of the world there is a possibility that small boats laden with personnel
looking for relocation in other countries may be involved and may deliberately place
their vessel in a state of jeopardy to entice a larger vessel to their aid. In all cases
Masters will have to respond to save life. The legitimacy of personnel in such a
situation must be confirmed to the extent practical or possible. A close search of any
items brought onboard should be made for any concealed arms, contraband etc. It is
critical that in such a situation the Master must communicate the situation at the
earliest opportunity to the Rig Manager. The Rig Manager is responsible for making
further necessary contacts and notifications.

Upon picking up survivors, refugees, asylum seekers (“boat people”) the installation,
if underway self-propelled, may have to deviate to a suitable port to discharge these
persons ashore.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

1 INSTALLATION MOVE NOTIFICATION, APPROVALS, REPORTS

As part of Installation move preparations, Installation Managers are to provide the

information outlined in this Section to Regional Management and Underwriters Warranty
Surveyors for the purpose of planning, approving and reporting rig move operations.

2 NOTIFICATION

2.1 Advance Notification of Installation Movement (All Installations)

Notification shall be provided at least 72 hours prior to a planned rig move. For
“difficult” locations where Engineering analysis is necessary Technical information
should be provided as far in advance as practicable.

Coastal State Authorities should be notified as appropriate in the Region of

operation.

2.2 Notification Format and Distribution

The following personnel are to be notified of rig movements and requests for location
approvals.

• Region Operations Manager

• Region Marine Support
• Risk Management, Houston
• Underwriters Warranty Surveyor (Self Elevating & Moored Installations)

Example rig move notification forms are shown in Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 for Non
Self Propelled and Dynamic Positioned Installations respectively.

3 APPROVALS

3.1 Location Approval

Site assessment is required for all drilling locations for ALL types of installations to
insure the installation’s suitability.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 1 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Not all locations require specific review and/or APPROVAL from Engineering
however each location must be evaluated to insure minimum safety, operational and
equipment standards are met.

Site assessment guidelines contained within this manual are as follows:

Section 3.8 – Self-elevating Installations – Site Assessment

Section 5 – Mooring Guidelines

3.2 Voyage Approval

Non-Self Propelled Installations shall obtain voyage plan approvals from a Transocean
approved Underwriter’s Warranty Surveyor for International voyages and Ocean tows
exceeding 300 nautical miles.

All dry transport voyages shall obtain voyage approval from a Transocean approved
Underwriter’s Warranty Surveyor.

Surveyor recommendations shall be complied with including those voyages where a

Surveyor is not present.

Transocean approved warranty houses by specific regions are shown in Figure 3.2.1.

Underwriters require Specific Approval for areas excluded by “AMERICAN INSTITUTE

TRADE WARRANTIES” shown in Figure 3.2.2.

3.3 Installation Mover Approval (self elevating installations)

All rig move operations are to be conducted under full control of a Transocean
authorized person. Typically this is the OIM or Barge Supervisor who is approved by
the Underwriter’s Warranty Surveyor (self-elevating installations) and Transocean
Regional Management for the type of Installation being moved.

In cases where the assigned O.I.M. or Barge Supervisor is not “approved” for the
type of installation being moved, a Transocean qualified rig mover or warranty
surveyor should be in attendance.

In all cases the personnel requirements prescribed by the Installation’s Minimum

Manning Certificate shall be met.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 2 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

4 VOYAGE PLANS (ALL INSTALLATIONS)

The Master / Tow Master shall prepare a voyage plan for each field move, ocean
tow, dry-transport and self propelled voyage. All personnel involved in the transit to
be briefed on the Voyage Plan.

The Voyage Plan shall include but not be limited to the following items as applicable:
• Routing, confirmed waypoints for the voyage
• Identified navigation dangers for the voyage
• Route charts and pilots
• Weather forecasting
• Historic weather data for the voyage and time of year
• Safe havens / shelter (contingency planning)
• Bunker ports
• Ballast water change out (Invasive species regulations)
• Medivac facilities along the route
• Propulsion output versus fuel consumption
• Fuel / lube oil safety margins
• Marine vessel support along the route (assist tugs etc)
• Communications
• Piracy
• Stowaways
• Damage control
• Salvage
• Tug selection and control
• Dry tow transport motion calculations
• Wet tow, maximum allowable motions
(what to do when motions reach maximum, change course, etc.)

Towing equipment (main and emergency) to be inspected and any defects rectified.

As far as practicable, all transits shall be planned to avoid close proximity to land,
other installations or any fixed object. Due regard shall be taken with regard to the
water depths along the proposed route and any hazards to navigation. Allowance
must be made for protrusions beneath the hull such as thrusters, spud cans, etc.

Stability and deck loads are to be within the limits defined in the Installation’s marine
operations manual.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 3 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Deck load items shall be suitably secured for transit. Movements of deck load shall
be kept to a minimum during transit. Cranes shall be stowed and crane movements
shall be authorised by the Barge Engineer or Chief Officer.

All navigational equipment (lights and shapes) including charts of the area of the
transit shall be onboard and checked for operation.

The weather forecast provider shall be advised of the transit route to insure accurate
forecasts.
References: Minimum Operating Standards (HQS-OPS-001),
Section 2 – MOU Operating Manual
Section 5 – Marine
Regional Managers Manual (HQS-OPS-003),
Section 7 – Indemnity

5 INSTALLATION MOVE REPORTS

5.1 Self Elevating Installations

Upon completion of each location move an Installation Move Report shall be

completed and submitted to the distribution indicated in Section 2.2. Figure 5.1.1
illustrates an Installation Move Report for self elevating installations. This example
report represents the minimum information to be recorded for each installation move.

5.2 Moored Semi Submersible / Tenders / Posted Barges

Upon completion of each location move an Installation Move Report shall be

completed and submitted to the distribution indicated in Section 2.2. Figure 5.2.2
illustrates an Installation Move Report for moored semi-submersible installations.
This example report represents the minimum information to be recorded for each
installation move.

6 MARINE SUPPORT

Technical support is available through Transocean Engineering. Procedural and

practical marine support and clarification is available through Houston Operations
Support and the Regional Marine Operations Engineers located in and Paris and
Singapore.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 4 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS
Figure 2.1.1 Rig Move Notification
Non Self Propelled Installations
INSTALLATION MOVE NOTIFICATION
Non-Self Propelled Installations page 1 of 2
Rev 0, January 2002

Vessel Name:
Type of Unit: (semi sub or drillship)
Region of Operation: (Brazil, GOM, West Africa, etc.)
Estimated Move Date:

Person in Charge / Title (OIM or Barge Supervisor)

Name of Operator:
New Location Name:
Coordinates:
Water Depth:

Name of Operator:
Departing Location Name:
Coordinates:
Water Depth:

Distance between Locations:

REA No.:

Marine Operations Information

1) Tug Boats
a) Number of Tug Boats 1 2 3 4
b) Names: 1
2
3
4

c) BHP of boats / / /
d) Continuous Bollard Pull of Boats / / /
e) Special Move or Mooring requirements? (describe) yes / no

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 5 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

INSTALLATION MOVE
NOTIFICATION
Non-Self Propelled Installations page 2 of 2
Rev 0, January 2002

Site Specific Information (All Installations) (if yes, attach or advise where information is located)

1) Environmental Data
a) Has the operator supplied environment yes / no
d t ?

2) Site Survey Data

a) Has the operator supplied site survey yes / no
d b)
t ?Bathymetry yes / no
b) Site clearance / side scan sonar survey yes / no
c) Sub- bottom profiling & shallow gas yes / no
d) Drop cores, grab samples yes / no
e) other, list

Self Elevating Installations

3) Geotechnical Data
a) Has the operator supplied Geotechnical yes / no
d b)
t ?Borehole data yes / no
c) Source of borehole data
d) Is coring proposed from the unit prior to pre-load yes / no
ti
e) other? ?

Semi-Submersibles / Moored Tenders

4) Mooring Information
a) Is the unit moored conventionally? yes / no
b) Is the unit moored on pre-set yes / no
i a? site specific mooring and riser analysis been
c) Has yes / no
f mooring
d) Is d? within the scope of the approved Operations yes / no
Me) Anchor
l? scope?
f) Pretension / hold time?

Posted Barges

5) Additional Information
a) Inland Mobilization? yes / no
b) Coastal Mobilization? yes / no
c) Mast position raised / lowered
d) Site bottom special preparations?
e) Special situations or support barge
t ?

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 6 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Figure 2.1.2 Rig Move Notification

Dynamic Positioned Installations
INSTALLATION MOVE NOTIFICATION
Dynamic Positioned Installation page 1 of 2
Rev 0, January 2002

Vessel Name:
Type of Unit: (semi sub or drillship)
Region of Operation: (Brazil, GOM, West Africa, etc.)
Estimated Move Date:

Name of Operator:
New Location Name:
Coordinates:

Name of Operator:
Departing Location Name:
Coordinates:
Distance between Locations:

REA No.:

1) Site/Well Specific Information

a) Estimated water depth m 0 ft
b) Maximum required mud weight ppg
c) Duration of well days
d) Estimated spud date
e) Maximum expected shut-in pressure psi

2) Environmental Data
a) Has the operator supplied environment data?
(if yes, attach with this form)

3) Riser & Tensioners Available for Well

Joint Type Description No. Available
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Total: 0
Comments on preferred running order based on deck arrangement:

Tensioners:
Number of Tensioners online
Number down for repair
Is there a restriction on maximum operating pressure?
if yes, what is max % allowed?

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 7 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

INSTALLATION MOVE NOTIFICATION

Dynamic Positioned Installation page 2 of 2
Rev 0, January 2002
4) Operator Supplied Equipment/Information
a) Type of Well head
Bending capacity at max pressure kip-ft
Bending capacity at 0 psi pressure kip-ft
What is torque resistance (max kip-ft allowed)? kip-ft
is the torque resistance a function of BOP set down weight?

b) Surface Structural Casing (describe casing to ~150 ft BML)

From To OD Wall Yield BM Rating
[ft BML] [ft BML] [in] [in] [ksi] [kip-ft]
Casing 1
Casing 2

c) Are soil properties provided for the location?

(if yes, please attach with form)

5) Level of Analysis Requested (1 - 5)

[place cursor here for description of analysis levels]-----------> x

6) Special Requirements for Well

Is a DST planned for the well?
Is a subsea tree in the spaceout?
if yes, height = ft air wt. = kips
Any other comments or requirements (changing standard rig equipment, etc.):

7) Dynamic Positioning Information

List any down equipment that would affect the overall positioning performance of the rig:

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 8 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Figure 3.2.1 Transocean Approved Warranty

Area of Operations Rig Type Warranty Surveyor

Australia All London Offshore Consultants Australia Pty

PO Box 513
Perth, Western Australia
Capt. John Cranswick
Phone +61 (08) 9322 7943 or 9321 6676
Fax +61 (08) 9322 1543
E-mail loca@cocmac.it.net.au

Falconer Bryan & Associates Pte Ltd

Far East All Falconer Bryan & Associates Pte. Ltd.

All All John Lebourhis & Associates Inc.

1505 Highway 6 South, Suite 120
Houston, TX 77077
Capt. John LeBourhis
Phone +1 281 589 1999
Fax +1 281 589 8115
E-mail JLAserv@aol.com

All All Noble Denton & Associates

All All Matthews – Daniel Group

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 9 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Figure 3.2.2. - AMERICAN INSTITUTE TRADE WARRANTIES

1. Warranted no port or place on the Eastern Coast of North America, its rivers or adjacent islands
(a) north of 52 W. Long.
(b) in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, its connecting waters and the St. Lawrence River, in the area
bounded by lines drawn between Battle Harbour/Pistolet Bay; Cape Ray/Cape North; Port
Hawkesbury/Port Mulgrave; and Baie Comeau/Matane, between December 21st and April 30th,
both days inclusive.
(c) west of Baie Comeau, but not West of Montreal, between December 1st and April 30th, both
days inclusive.

2. Warranted no Great Lakes or St. Lawrence seaway or St. Lawrence River west of Montreal.

3. Warranted no port or place in Greenland or its adjacent waters.

4. Warranted no port or place on the Western Coast of North America, its rivers or adjacent island, north of
54 30' N. Lat. or west of 130 50' W. Long.; except the port of Ketchikan, Alaska, provided,
(a) that a qualified pilot having knowledge of local waters be on duty while the Vessel is in waters
north of 54 30' N. Lat. and east of 132 50' W. Long.’ and
(b) that the Vessel be equipped with operating Gyro Compass, Radio Direction Finder, Fathometer
and Radar.

5. Warranted no Baltic sea (or adjacent waters east of 15 E. Long.);

(a) north of a lone between Mo and Vaasa between November 15th and May 5th, both days
inclusive.
(b) east of a line between Vilpuri (Vyborg) and Narva between November 21st and May 5th, both
days inclusive.
(c) north of a line between Stockholm and Tallinn between December 15th and April 15th, both days
inclusive.
(d) east of 22 E. Long. and south of 59 N. Lat. between December 15th and April 15th, both days
inclusive.

6. Warranted not north of 70 N. Lat. except when proceeding directly to or from any port or place in Norway
or Kola Bay.

7. Warranted no Bering Sea, no East Asian waters north of 46 N. Lat. and no port or place in Siberia except
Vladivostok and/or Nakhodka.

8. Warranted no Kerguelen or Croset Islands, nor water south of 50 S. Lat., except ports or places in
Patagonia, Chile and Falkland Islands, but liberty is given to enter waters south of 50 S. Lat. if
proceeding to or from ports or places not excluded by this warranty.

9. Warranted not to sail with Indian Coal as cargo:

(a) between March 1st and June 30th, both days inclusive.
(b) between July 1st and September 30th, both days inclusive, except to ports in Asia, not west of
Aden nor east of or beyond Singapore.

CL.A210

AMENDMENTS:

American Institute Trading Warranties attached hereto, extended to allow operations/navigations along the
east coast of North America and/or Newfoundland to not north of 60 deg. North and not west of 170 deg.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 10 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

west, and along the west coast of North America to not north of 60 deg. north and not west of 70 deg. west.
Such operations/ navigations outside of these navigating limits is subject to the approval of Underwriters’
surveyor and additional premium payable if and as required by underwriters.

Extended to allow operations/navigations in the Barents, subject to underwriters’ prior advice and terms to be
agreed.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 11 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Figure 5.2.1 – Installation Move Report

Self Elevating Installations
INSTALLATION MOVE REPORT
Non-Self Propelled Installations page 1 of 3
Rev 0, January 2002
1. GENERAL INFORMATION
Vessel Name: Move Number:
Installation Move Date:

Location Arriving:
Latitude: degrees minutes seconds
Coordinates:
Longitude: degrees minutes seconds

Water Depth: Bow: feet Stbd: feet Port: feet

Leg Penetration: Bow: feet Stbd: feet Port: feet
Leg Reserve: (above upper guide) Bow: feet Stbd: feet Port: feet
Heading: degrees true
Air Gap: feet
Distance and Bearing (Open Location): feet/mtrs at bearing degrees
Distances (Platform Location) feet/mtrs port/stbd from center of well center

Departing Location Name:

Latitude: degrees minutes seconds
Coordinates:
Longitude: degrees minutes seconds
Water Depth: feet
Leg Penetration: Bow: feet Stbd: feet Port: feet
Air Gap: feet
Heading: degrees true

REA No.:

2) Marine Operations Information

Tug Boats
Vessel Name Owners BHP Bollard Pull Function

Total
Special Move or Mooring requirements? (describe) yes / no

3) Supervisory Personnel
Tow Master
Installation Manager
OIM
Barge Master
Chief Mechanic
Chief Electrician
Marine Warranty Surveyor

Company Representative Operator

Supervisory 3rd Party Company
Company
Company

Total Persons on Board during move

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 12 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

INSTALLATION MOVE REPORT

Non-Self Propelled Installations page 2 of 3
Rev 0, January 2002
4) Time Break Down
Total Time for Move:
from start lowering hull to hull at final airgap

Weather Forecast: Source:

Actual Weather Experienced:

Waiting on Weather: hours

Waiting on Daylight: hours
Time for Repairs: hours
Time for Other: (Platform shut down) hours
Time for Other: hours
Time for Tow: In field passage hours
Distance of Tow:
Average Speed

Method of Preload:

Time for Preload including static test: hours

Location Approval: hours

5) Stability Information

Spud Can Position During Move: Bow: feet Stbd: feet Port:
Observed Hull Draft: Bow: feet Stbd: feet Port:
Corresponding Displacement: kips
Calculated Hull Draft: Bow: feet Stbd: feet Port:
Calculated Displacement: kips
Load Line Draft: feet Displacement kips
Displacement Margin: kips
Difference in Actual vs Calc. Drafts: feet
Reason:

Afloat Variable Load: kips

Allowable Afloat Variable Load: kips
Variable Load margin: kips

KG / VCG feet
Free Surface Correction: feet
Adjusted KG: feet
Allowable KG - field transit 70kts: feet
KG margin: feet
LCG: feet
TCG feet
Trim: degrees
Heel degrees
Spud Cans Full or Empty? Full / Empty
Spud Can Dump Valves Open / Closed
Preload Required: kips
Preload applied: kips
Static Test: hours

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 13 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

INSTALLATION MOVE REPORT

Non-Self Propelled Installations page 3 of 3
Rev 0, January 2002
6) Additional Sections on Separate Pages
6.1 Move Summary
6.2 Damage to Installation
6.3 Recommendations
6.4 Time Log
6.5 Attending Tug Inspection Reports
6.6 Stability Calculations Afloat and Preloading
6.7 Weather Reports
6.9 Other Revelant Details

Submit to the following:

1) Regional Operations Manager
Origional 2) Rig Manager
3) Rig Move File - Regional Office
4) Assigned Marine Warranty Surveyor

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 14 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS
Figure 5.2.2 – Installation Move Report
Moored Semi-Submersible Installations
INSTALLATION MOVE REPORT
Moored Semi-submersible Installations page 1 of 3
Rev 0, January 2002

Vessel Name: Move Number:

Installation Move Date:

1) GENERAL INFORMATION
Location Arriving:
Latitude: degrees minutes seconds
Coordinates:
Longitude: degrees minutes seconds

Water Depth: feet

Seabed Data:
Mooring Arrangement:
Heading: degrees true

Departing Location Name:

Latitude: degrees minutes seconds
Coordinates:
Longitude: degrees minutes seconds
Water Depth: feet
Seabed Data:
Mooring Arrangement:
Heading: degrees true

REA No.:

2) Marine Operations Information

Tug Boats
Vessel Name Owners BHP Bollard Pull Function
1
2
3
4
Total

Consummables Vsl 1 on Vsl 1 off Vsl 2 on Vsl 2 off Vsl 3 on Vsl 3 off Vsl 4 on Vsl 4 off
Date & Time
Fuel Oil
Lube Oil
Water
Special Move or Mooring requirements? (describe) yes / no

Anchor Positioning Proposed (initial)

Northing Easting Distance Bearing Test Work
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Anchor Positioning Achieved

Northing Easting Distance Bearing Test Work
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 15 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

INSTALLATION MOVE REPORT

Moored Semi-submersible Installations page 3 of 3
Rev 0, January 2002

Vessel Name: Move Number:

Installation Move Date:

Positioning Equipment Details

1
2
3
4
5

3) Supervisory Personnel
Tow Master
Marine Superintendent
Rig Manager
OIM
Barge Master
Ballast Control Operator
Ballast Control Operator

Company Representative Operator

Marine Warranty Surveyor Company
Surveyor / Technition Company
Surveyor / Technition Company

Total Persons on Board during move

4) Move Summary
Source:
Weather Forecast:

Actual Weather Experienced: Maximum recorded wind speed: Maximum combined sea and swell:

Total Time for Move:

from pulling first anchor thru final test loads
Time Date
Commenced de-ballasting hours
Completed de-ballasting hours
Unit inspected for boyage preparation hours
Certificate of Approval issued hours
Commence retrieving anchors hours
Completed retrieving anchors hours
Towing vessel connected hours
Commence Sea passage hours
Completed Sea passage hours
Distance covered hours
Time Underway hours
Average Speed hours
Commenced running anchors hours
Completed running anchors hours
Total time to run anchors hours
Disconnected towing Vessel hours
Commence ballasting - W,O,W, hours
Completed ballasting - W.O.W. hours
Commence ballasting - hours
Completed ballasting @ draft hours
Commenced pretension anchors hours
Completed pretension anchors hours
Anchors slacked to work tension hours
Distance & Bearing of target location

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 16 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

INSTALLATION MOVE REPORT

Moored Semi-submersible Installations page 3 of 3
Rev 0, January 2002

Vessel Name: Move Number:

Installation Move Date:

5) Stability Information

Lightship including fixed variable loads

Ballast
Anchors & Chain
Liquid Variable Load
Dry Variable Load
Total Displacement

Calculated Draft
Actual Draft
Difference
LCG
TCG

Max. Variable Load

Actual Variable Load
Variable Load Margin

Allowable KG
Free Surface Longitudinal
Free Surface Transverse
Correction
Corrected KG
KG margin
Longitudinal GM
Transverse GM

6) Additional Sections on Separate Pages

6.1 Anchor Recovery Details
6.2 Anchor Running Details
6.3 Weather Operational Delays
6.4 Damage Reports
6.5 Stability Calculations
6.6 Weather Reports
6.7 Recommendations
6.9 Other Revelant Details

Submit to the following:

1) Regional Operations Manager
Origional 2) Rig Manager
3) Rig Move File - Regional Office
4) Assigned Marine Warranty Surveyor

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 17 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

7 STABILITY

All Transocean Installations shall have a computer program for the calculation of
stability. Amendments to stability software shall to be made under supervision of
Transocean Engineering via the REA system (Engineering work scope can be
limited to a verification for a software bought outside or Engineering can proceed to
the modification for in-house software). The use of Excel spreadsheet is not
recommended unless no other option is available.

Stability calculations should be carried out at least weekly using the computer
program and a secondary system check using another method should be completed
at regular intervals not exceeding two weeks.

A comprehensive verification of all variable weights must be completed daily to

facilitate the completion of accurate stability calculations.

A comparison of the mean draft obtained using the calculated displacement and the
observed mean draft should be made daily when sea state conditions allow.

The Installation’s marine operations manual shall be consulted and Installation

stability maintained within the constraints of that manual so the installation is at all
times maintained within the approved criteria.

All monohulls Installations shall ensure vessel is loaded such that longitudinal
stresses are kept within the limiting criteria.

When a major weight change is programmed e.g. the arrival of a casing load- out, a
pre-load stability calculation must be completed and a ballast / draft change plan
drawn up to ensure the installation’s stability margin remains within prescribed limits.
A torsion or stress calculation should also be completed.

All Installations should be kept with a minimum number of slack tanks and near even
keel. Contingency plans shall be in place to bring an Installation to survival draft
(where applicable) when environmental or operating conditions dictate.

Immediately prior to drydocking all tanks should be sounded and the locations of
variable load recorded. The records shall be kept throughout the drydock period so
that tanks and variable loads are in the same condition when the vessel is refloated.
Verify that all tank bottom drain plugs have been securely replaced prior to
refloating.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 18 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

The Rig Manager and Regional Field Support Manager should be advised
of any actual or envisaged stability problems or of any significant
deviation between results obtained when checking the accredited stability
program with the alternative check calculation.

7.1 Alterations to Lightship

It is essential that all installations record all alterations to the lightship weight since
the last inclining test or dead-weight survey. The objective is to ensure that all
alterations of a permanent nature are recorded and included in stability calculations.

The position of all additional weights in excess of 100Kgs will be recorded

A lightship alteration logbook (register) will be maintained on every Transocean unit.

The basis and first entry into each specific unit's log book shall be the original as
build approved lightship weight and centres of gravity, additional approved light ship
alterations shall be listed in order of ascending date and after an approved alteration
has been completed.

An updated lightship report for each individual installation shall be forwarded

Annually via the Regions Technical Support Group to the Engineering Department,
Marine and Structural Engineering group for the purpose of maintaining information
on each installation for technical, operations, and marketing support tasks.

The lightweight corrections shall be entered into the Stability programme as variable
loads until the Lightship weight changes are formally submitted to the Classification
society. Subsequent to approval by Class the Marine Operations Manual/ Approved
Rig Stability Manual shall be updated and the new light ship weight and centres of
gravity revised in the installations stability program.

For larger up-grade or modification projects it shall become the designated project
managers responsibility to maintain all lightship alteration records and submittal to
class society for review and modified lightship weight approval, inclusive of Marine
Operations Manual updates.

Major modifications to the unit will have been subject to both Transocean and
Certifying Authority approval but those of a minor nature which do not require
approval from the certifying authority must still be approved via the Transocean
modification and repair procedure.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 19 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

References - HS&E Manual (HQS-HSE-001),

Section 4 – Engineering, Installation Modification and Projects

Minimum Operating Standards Manual 9HQS-OPS-001),

Section 4 – Modifications, Upgrades and Certification

8 BILGE AND BALLAST SYSTEM

All Installations must ensure the ballast system pumps and remotely operated valves
are function tested at regular intervals and the results recorded. Malfunction or
defects in the system must be reported without delay to the Rig Manager giving full
details of the problem and measures taken to return the system to a fully functional
condition.

Function tests shall be specific to each installation and shall include, but not be
limited to, the following as applicable:
• All valves in both bilge and ballast systems to be tested from the normal and
secondary control stations.
• Manual operation of valves
• Checks on leak indication system
• Manual sounding of all tanks to check remote readout indication
• Checks of draft gauges against actual draft
• Condition of valve operation indicator lamps
• Ballast control emergency system should also be tested
• Watertight door status indicators

Floating Installations shall conduct Emergency ballast exercises at intervals not to

exceed 60 days. These should include ”desk top problem solving” type scenarios as
well as the physical operation of emergency systems.

Emergency ballast exercise reports, inclusive of scenario, actions, problems and

overall exercise rating shall be submitted to the Rig Manager and Regional Technical
Support Manager if any significant problems have been noted.

Refererence: HS&E Manual, HQS-HSE-001,

Section 4 – Emergency Response).

Coastal States may have regulations regarding invasive species contained

within ballast water. When changing operating regions it may be prudent to

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 20 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

change ballast water while at sea. A record of such change should be kept
noting the position where ballasting commenced and completed.

8.1 Ballast Operations (floating installations)

All ballast operations must be conducted in accordance with the instructions

contained within the Installation’s Marine Operations or Stability and Ballast
Control Manual. Particular note should be taken concerning Installation
structural loadings and the effect of free surface on stability.

All major ballasting operations shall be carried out under the supervision of a
competent person. On semi-submersible installations, the ballast control
room must be manned at all times.

Installation stability will be calculated for all stages of a major ballasting operation
prior to the operation being commenced. Limitations on minimum stability status are
to be complied with at all times.

On monohull installations (drillships) pre-planning of major ballast operations will

confirm the installations longitudinal strength and hull shear bending moments are
within the established limits.

A full function check should be carried out on the ballast system; this should include
pumps, valves, tank content gauges and draft gauges. Any defects should be noted
and made known to all personnel involved in the operation.

The Installation’s draft must not exceed the maximum allowable operational draft for
the intact condition as detailed in the Load Line Certificate and Marine Operations or
Operating Manual.

All loading, unloading, bulk transfers and ballasting operations must be immediately
suspended in the event of a ballast system failure. The on tour Tool Pusher,
Master/Barge Supervisor/Engineer and the OIM should be notified immediately.
Ballasting operations must not be resumed until approval is obtained from the OIM in
conjunction with the Master/Barge Supervisor/Engineer and the Maintenance
Supervisor/Chief Engineer.

Prior to any major changes in ballast or variable load, the Barge

Supervisor/Engineer should check the ballast plan and stability calculations to
ensure that acceptable stability margins are maintained throughout the operation.
Free surface effect must be considered in the ballast plan.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 21 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Slack tanks should be kept to a minimum during ballasting / de-ballasting operations

to avoid excessive free surface effect. This is particularly important when passing
through the critical draft range.

The Control Room Operator (CRO) must inform the on tour Tool Pusher and crane
operator prior to the installation passing through the critical draft zone. A general PA
announcement should be made to advise all personnel. All major load changes
should be suspended until the installation is clear of the critical range and cranes
lowered into the boom rests.

The Control Room Operator must notify the Barge Supervisor/Engineer and
Master/OIM immediately of any unexplained change in trim, draft or ballast tank
levels.

9 DAMAGE CONTROL

The Marine Operations Manual and Emergency Response/Contingency Manual for

the Installation should contain details of damage control procedures.

All Installations shalll assess the possible areas that are liable to create a stability
risk and prepare a damage control scenario for the containment of such damage and
the resumption of the unit to a satisfactory stability state.

The following scenarios should be considered and procedures written dealing with
such events:

• Flooding of void spaces

• Flooding of pump rooms
• Flooding of tubular bracing

In the event that structural damage is incurred posing a severe threat to

the integrity of the installation, the operation will become an issue of
saving life. The OIM/Master may at a later stage be required to make a
decision with regard to salvage and as such he should be familiar with the
use of the Lloyds Open Form Agreement.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 22 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

9.1 Watertight Integrity

Every installation has a maximum operational draft assigned by it’s Classification

society. The safety of the Installation at this draft is dependent upon the watertight
integrity of the Installation.

It is implicit upon the OIM/Master that the watertight integrity is not breached. If this
should happen, and the Installation is subjected to flooding and subsequent loss, a
claim will be based upon the watertight integrity of the installation being intact and
hence any claim for loss may be rejected.

The OIM/Master will ensure that all watertight closures remain closed except for the
usual functions of access and egress. Other watertight closures (i.e. ventilation duct
remote operated valves) shall be operated on a monthly basis and so logged.

Control room personnel must be advised of any obstructions preventing the closure
of any closure devices and such obstructions must be readily removable should a
closure be activated.

In the case of Semi-submersible Installations the positioning of supply vessel

alongside the unit shall not be permitted on any side where there is an inability to
totally close the watertight closures.

In the case of Self-elevating Installations the positioning of a vessel alongside the

unit shall not be permitted while the unit is afloat.

When tank or enclosed space entry is required, i.e. maintenance or inspection, pre
planning must consider the worst case flooding and free surface effect of the loss of
that space and suitable contingency plans must be made.

In ship-side spaces containing single valve separation between the sea and the
space, the operability of all bilge alarms must be verified at daily intervals. As part of
the contingency planning the loss of that compartment due to flooding and counter
effects must be considered.

Any breach of the watertight integrity of the installation resulting in the flooding of a
compartment must be reported to the Rig and Region Managers immediately.

The physical checking of all void spaces for water ingress must be completed at
regular intervals dependent upon the size of the space and it’s potential for reducing
the installation’s stability.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 23 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

10 TOWING OF SEMI-SUBMERSIBLES

10.1 Towing Bridle

"Each towed Semi-submersible shall have a main and secondary tow bridle
connected at the lower hulls for ocean voyages. Tow bridles shall be fitted with a
deployment / recovery system. When multiple tugs are used in parallel, the main
tow bridle can be split or additional tow lines connected at each pontoon (eg for a 2
or 3 tug towing arrangement).

10.2 Towing on Anchor Chains / Pendants

Towing a semi-submersible on the forward anchors is not an acceptable method of

towing. In extraordinary circumstances and with prior approval from District
Management exemptions might be granted on a case by case basis for very short
field transits, (generally 10 nautical miles or less)

In the case of emergency however this method provides a quick means of connecting
and getting control of an Installation while adrift or otherwise impaired.

It is not acceptable to tow a vessel on any anchor permanent chaser pendants.

10.3 Towing & Anchor Handling Vessels

Towing and Anchor Handling Vessel(s) engaged in towing and or anchor handling a
Transocean installation are subject to survey at the discretion of the OIM to ensure
fitness for purpose prior to commencement of towing or anchor handling operations.

Towing vessels shall have a secondary means of connecting the tow, should
the tow wire fail. This may be a second tow drum, a work drum or a second tow
vessel. A secondary wire not available for immediate deployment. e.g. wire
stowed on a spare reel separate from a work / tow drum is not acceptable.

Bollard pull requirements for towing vessels are discussed in the Mooring Guidelines
section of this manual.

Towing vessels shall be equipped with multi-engine propulsion and steering, suitable
sized anchor handling winches and mechanical wire/chain stopper system such as
Triplex Jaws, Karm Forks or similar. Pelican hook arrangements for deepwater
anchor handling are prohibited.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 24 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
STANDING ORDERS

Note.
Towing vessels are in service with increasingly larger bollard pull capabilities.
It is possible an attending towing / anchor handling vessel may have a bollard pull in
excess of the strength of the Installations towing bridle and fittings. Because of this it
is essential that the towing vessel Master is made aware of the towing bridle
capabilities and limitations. The maximum percentage of the towing vessel bollard pull
that is to be used shall be agreed on before commencing towing operations.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: October 1, 2002 25 25
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

1 SUMMARY

It is the policy of Transocean that site assessment will be performed for all Self
Elevating Installations.

This document provides Transocean Management and Rig Personnel a method for site
evaluation and guidance regarding safe Installation moving operations. This document is
also intended to provide Transocean’s Clients guidance regarding Transocean’s
Underwriter’s requirements for site approval and installation move operations.

Figures 6.1 through 6.5 summarize the evaluation process.

Site survey and geo-technical Information is to be forwarded to the Houston

Engineering Dept or Regional Marine Department (where established) for review and
approval. When a full structural analysis by Transocean Engineering is deemed
necessary, a Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) is to be raised by Regional /
District Management prior to final commitment of the rig to the client.

2 APPLICABILITY

This document applies to Installations as follows:

• 3 Independent Leg Unit - Electric / Mechanical rack and pinion elevating system
• 4 Independent Leg Unit - Hydraulic/Mechanical pin and yoke elevating system

This document applies to Sites / Locations as follows:

• New drilling locations within known areas or fields of operations,
• Existing drilling locations within known areas or fields of operations,
• New drilling areas where environmental and soil characteristics differ from
specific rig design criteria or from previous operating conditions.

3 REQUIRED CLIENT FURNISHED DATA

3.1 SITE SURVEY INFORMATION

The Client shall provide the data detailed below as far in advance of a planned
location move as practically possible so to allow sufficient review time by
Transocean Engineering and underwriters approving bodies.

• Type of operation: exploration well or over platform

• Location Designation
• Geographical Coordinates

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

• Water Depth
• Identify platform, pipelines, cables, well heads, floating or fixed vessels or any other
relevant objects within a 3mile radius of the proposed location.

• Platform as built drawings:

As Built platform drawings are required to determine hull / platform clearance,

required air-gap limitations, required skid out distance and if platform leg batter
interferes with unit's spud-cans. The position of production risers, pipelines or power
cables that could compromise unit placement must be identified.

• Previous jack-up history at the location including penetration and applied leg loading.

• Bathymetric survey:

Close-grid survey over one square kilometer and centered over the proposed
location. Water depths shall be corrected for L.A.T., such surveys shall include
seabed features. (See Appendix A for preferred line spacing)

• Side Scan Sonar:

To ascertain the location is free from obstructions on the ocean bottom. A divers
survey or alternative R.O.V. survey can be considered providing the surveyed area
is at least 50 meters beyond the extreme perimeter of the rig footprint.

• Shallow seismic (Boomer) data of 1 to 10 kHz frequency:

To identify shallow hazards and near surface channeling which may affect rig
emplacement.

• Magnetometer survey

To identify any metal objects that might interfere with unit placement. Any
interference shall be clearly marked.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

3.2 GEO-TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Bore-hole information shall be made available including spud-can penetration curves

on the proposed location. Where possible bore hole data shall be correlated to cone
penetrometer data.

Data contained in fixed structure leg pile records or platform soil bearing information
is not suitable for penetration curve assessment. Drop core samples are
unacceptable.

In the event that geo-technical bore hole information is not available, information
from within a 1 mile radius of the proposed location may be considered if supported
by an unobstructed shallow seismic tie back line to the known bore hole. Such
information may be deemed unacceptable if the tie back line shows the existence of
channeling, variation of geophysical or acoustic properties or other discontinuities.

In absence of site specific bore-hole data or in known areas of potential rapid

penetrations / punch through, it shall be expressly understood that a core shall be
taken from the specific drilling unit on location. Core samples shall be taken at no
greater than 3 to 5 foot intervals. Core samples shall extend to a point where the
load penetration curve indicates the continuous presence of soils capable of
supporting the lesser of:

• 1.5 times the required bearing capacity of the unit for a depth of 8 meters
below the expected maximum penetration, OR

• The estimated penetration plus 1.5 spud can diameters, whichever is less.

Recovered soil samples are to be analyzed on board by a qualified geo-technical

engineer. The analysis of bore-hole samples including penetration curves is to be
forwarded to the Houston Engineering Dept or Regional Marine Department (where
established) and Underwriters certifying bodies for review and approval prior to
commencing pre-loading or pre-driving operations.

In cases where installation difficulties or uncontrolled settlements are predicted,

Transocean Engineering (in conjunction with Underwriters approving bodies and
Regional / District management) may recommend site-specific pre-loading or pre-
driving operations which are to be applied. These recommendations are intended to
minimize risk during pre-load or pre-drive operations, and may include individual leg
pre-loading, extended holding times, crust degradation or a combination thereof.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

Transocean will consider suitably calibrated geophysical modeling of specific fields

when geo-technical bore hole information, jack-up leg penetration and geophysical
tie lines conservatively justify this path of action. This method of site review is
acceptable only on a case by case basis and is subject to prior Transocean
Engineering approval. Decisions to waive geo-technical bore hole analysis by
utilizing analytical models will be based upon a pre-agreed risk assessment matrix.
It is unlikely that locations located beyond 4kms from a location with quantified soil
properties will be considered acceptable.

3.3 METOCEAN DATA

Metocean data, including references to data sources, shall be provided as indicated

below:

• Extreme environmental weather conditions

1 year and 50 year return period data for the proposed rig location or the immediate
vicinity to be provided. If such return periods are not available the more stringent
100year return condition shall be used for location approval purposes.

• Wind speed - one minute mean at 10 meter above sea level

• Wave height - significant and maximum
• Wave period - significant and maximum wave energy associated
• Tidal range, tidal streams and currents at 50% of water depth and bottom
currents
• Maximum storm surge
• Directional information on each item above
• Predominant swell conditions
• Hurricane, Monsoon Typhoon or Ice information

4 VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS

Regional / District management shall provide updated details of the rig characteristics
and any modifications that may have affected the rig’s configuration when submitting a
Request for Engineering Assistance. Modifications may include leg length, weights,
structural capacity or jacking capability, wind areas or pre-load tank capacities.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

5 LOCATION APPROVALS

Transocean has adopted a policy that each location for Self Elevating Installations shall
have specific Location Approval prior to placing the unit on such location. Types of
Location Approval are as follows:

5.1 UN-RESTRICTED LOCATION:

This is the standard type of location approval. The Installation is deemed capable of
operating within its approved load ratings and the Location Certificate of Approval
restricts operations as specified in the Installation’s operations manual.

5.2 RESTRICTED LOCATION:

For locations where the approved operating criteria is marginally exceeded and
where agreed restrictions and/or added precautions are part of the Location
Certificate of Approval. This type location approval authorized after review by
Transocean engineering and underwriters approving authority.

5.3 DIFFICULT LOCATION:

An Engineering analysis shall be conducted for locations where there is little

operating experience for a specific type of Installation or when Regional
Management questions an Installation’s operational suitability.

Preferably, the analysis will be conducted by Transocean Engineering requested

through the REA process. In some cases a third party consultant may conduct the
analysis in which case the results are reviewed by Transocean engineering. The
analytical results are further reviewed on behalf of Underwriters by their authorized
approval authority.

Difficult locations include, but are not limited to the following considerations:
• Punch Through Potential
• Pre-existing Footprints / Sliding potential
• Scouring Potential
• Ultra Deep Penetrations
• Ultra Shallow Penetrations (coral)
• Physical Obstructions
• Ultra Shallow Water or Approach Area's
• Harsh Environment Conditions
• High Current Areas
• Designated minefields

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

• Ice Conditions
• Hurricane or Cyclone Conditions
• Locations In or Near Major Shipping Lanes
• SIMOPS with other floating structures, pipe-lay barges, DP intervention /
maintenance vessels, floating accommodation units
• Production Platforms that can not be shut in during arrival and departure of a
specific unit

6 SITE ASSESSMENT FLOW CHARTS

The site assessment flow charts are provided for general guidance and are intended to
serve as a reminder of issues needing attention, technical verification or clarification.
Due to the nature of individual locations, these charts are unlikely to cover all possible
combinations of issues that may arise. Clarification is to be sought from Houston
Engineering or Regional Marine Operations (where established) in cases where the
charts indicate unresolved queries or the need for Engineering contact.

REA for location site assessment shall be routed through the Regional Field Support
Group in accordance with standing instructions.

Flowcharts:

6.1 Stage 1 General information, physical properties and geometry

6.2 Stage 2 Debris Clearance and Sonar survey

6.3 Stage 3 Geo-technical bore-hole information, leg penetration estimate and

Installation behavior.

6.4 Stage 4 Shallow seismic assessment and shallow gas risk to 2nd casing
shoe.

6.5 Stage 5- Marine Operations (Note: Marine Operation issues are

geographically specific and therefore herein only representative in
nature.)

APPENDIX “A” - Preferred site survey line spacing

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

6.1 - SELF ELEVATING DRILLING UNITS LOCATION SUITABILITY REVIEW

Location Suitability Geophysical Geo-Technical Marine Operations

• Check Coordinates • Location Side Scan • Bore hole information • Proposed Towing
• Check Water Depth Sonar details at location Vessels / inspection
• Check Tidal Range • Magnetometer • Bore hole information • Proposed Support
• Check Bathymetry details in vicinity / tie in Vessels / inspection
• Open location or • Bathymetry • Bore hole to be taken • Rig Move Procedure
Platform • Shallow Seismic from rig / procedure Review
• Has rig been on Identify hazards • Pile Driving Records / • Pre-load Procedure
location before • Sub Bottom Profile platform Normal / single leg
• Old Foot Prints • Survey Summary or other
• Pipelines or other • Survey Charts • Stability Calculations
Obstructions • Pre-load
• Divers or ROV Calculations
inspection • Warranty Surveyor
• Clearance of Debris

Water Depth < 25 feet • Check Tidal Range

• Check Approach Channel
• Check area for Sand Banks / Coral outcrops
• Check Tow Vessel draft in approach/positioning path
NO

Water Depth Plus Penetration > 25 ft AND • Check Required Minimum Airgap
> max design operating water depth AND • Check Leg Reserve, Penetration & Water Depth
Open Location • Check Pipeline Positions, mark or confirm set in Positioning
Equipment
• Check Site Survey

NO • Check Platform Height

• Check Required Airgap (include platform crane/equipment height)
Platform ? • Check Leg Reserve
• Check Proximity against platform decks / rig drawings
• Will desired platform slots fit within cantilever drilling envelope?
• Check batter of platform legs (interfering with rig footprint)

NO • What penetration was achieved?

• Position of prints / can it be avoided / will rig slide off position?
• Previous rig design / heavier – lighter?
Platform Previous
• Will pipelines interfere with leg positions?
Foot Prints / Pipelines • Special preacutions for lowering legs during approach?
• Is there adequate clearance to allow legs to be pulled on
departure?

NO
• Divers walk, ROV or side scan survey 100meter from center of rig
Divers or ROV check location in past 12 months or following recent construction or lay barge
activity?
• Remove debris and provide clearance report

GO TO STAGE 2 – DEBRIS CLEARANCE AND SONAR SURVEY

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

6.2 Stage 2 – Survey & Debris Clearance

Is side scan sonar, bathymetry including sub bottom profile and

No
magnetometer data available and all relevant charts?

Yes

Have pipellines been identified which may

Is divers walk or ROV Is the location clear and within
Yes Yes interfere with rig approach final position or No
Survey Available? acceptable sea bed slope?
anchor position as applicable?

No No

Refer to Client for obtaining the Shift Location Approach or change anchor
Has debris been identified? Yes
minimum required information pattern

No Yes

In pre-approved cases, TSF to

arrange for minimum required
Can debris be removed? Yes Provide Clearance Report Yes
surveys and paid for under agreed
contract terms.

No

Operator to confrim new location, re-run stage

No Shift Location Yes Yes
2

No

COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION, GO TO
NO INFORMATION PROVIDED REJECT LOCATION
STAGE 3

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

6.3 Stage 3 – Geo-technical Review

Borehole Log & Soil Previous Soil History

Send all relevant information to
Description for Specific NO within 1 mile of Yes Borehole Yes
Engineering for final review
Location? proposed location?

YES NO Known Field Tie back No known

Yes Seismic Info Yes rapid
YES NO Satisfactory penetration
Penetration Curve Indicates Contact cases
Perform Soil Boring prior to MODU
increasing bearing capacity? Engineering
arrival or perform coring from MODU
prior to pre-loading
Proceed No No No

YES NO
Samples taken at 3 to 5ft Contact REFER BOREHOLE OR CORING
intervals? Engineering INFORMATION TO ENGINEERING

Proceed
Suitable by all Re-evaluate Refer to Reject
Unsuitable
Cognizant 3rd party Client Location
Absent? Present Parties asses risk
Sand over clay or shallow Contact
interbed layers? Engineering

Proceed
Accept Location

Absent? Present
Ensure all feedback is obtained and verified advise
Coral deposits, Shells or Contact
results to MODU personnel and or develop special
fragments, Cemented Sands? Engineering
pre-loading procedures; Secure location approval

Proceed
PROCEED WITH REGULAR PRE-LOAD

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

6.4 Stage 4 – Shallow seismic assessment and shallow gas risk

No
Is Shallow Seismic Data
available?

No Yes
Is the location in a
known field or area?

RELAY ALL INFORMATION TO RIG

Client to provide shallow Is shallow channeling Is the proposed location
Yes MANAGEMENT TO SECURE
seismic information present within the free of shallow gas?
LOCATION APPROVAL
expected penetration
No
depth?
Yes
RELAY ALL INFORMATION TO RIG
Is the proposed location
Yes MANAGEMENT TO SECURE
clear of gas anomalies?
LOCATION APPROVAL
Detailed review of shallow Yes
seismic data by TSF No
Engineering

Can the proposed location OPERATOR TO ADVISE NEW

Yes
be shifted to clear area? COORDINATES

No No

Are there Pilot hole procedures or

shallow gas drilling procedures in place PROCEDURES TO BE MADE
REJECT LOCATION No Yes
acceptable to TSF and Underwriters for AVAILABLE
location approval?

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

SELF ELEVATING DRILLING UNITS MINIMUM MARINE VESSEL

REQUIREMENTS FOR FIELD MOVES, ASIA OPERATIONS

6.5 STAGE 5 – Marine Operations

Departure, In Field Tow and Positioning

Type of Location Operating Area Bollard Pull Number of Vessels

Open Location with no Indian Region 120 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with Indian Region 150 ton continuous 2 vessels of 75 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with Indian Region 150 ton continuous 3 vessels of 50 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with no Vietnam, Malaysia 120 ton continuous 1
obstructions (Monsoon) Thailand
South China Sea
Open Location with Vietnam, Malaysia 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform Thailand combined
locations (Monsoon) South China Sea
Open Location with Vietnam, Malaysia 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform Thailand combined
locations (Monsoon) South China Sea
Open Location with no Indonesia 100 ton continuous 1
obstructions Brunei
Open Location with Indonesia 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform Brunei combined
locations
Open Location with Indonesia 135 ton continuous 3 vessels of 45 ton
obstructions or platform Brunei combined
locations
Open Location with no Australia 120 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with Australia 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with Australia 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with no Philippines 120 ton continuous 1
obstructions China, Korea
Open Location with Philippines 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform China, Korea combined
locations
Open Location with Philippines 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform China, Korea combined
locations

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

SELF ELEVATING DRILLING UNITS MINIMUM MARINE VESSEL

REQUIREMENTS FOR FIELD MOVES, WORLD WIDE OPERATIONS

Departure, In Field Tow and Positioning

Type of Location Operating Area Bollard Pull Number of Vessels

Open Location with no West Africa 100 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with West Africa 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with West Africa 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with no Mediterranean 120 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with Mediterranean 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with Mediterranean 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with no Caspian Sea 120 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with Caspian Sea 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with Caspian Sea 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with no Gulf of Suez 100 ton continuous 1
obstructions Red Sea
Open Location with Gulf of Suez 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform Red Sea combined
locations
Open Location with Gulf of Suez 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
obstructions or platform Red Sea combined
locations
Open Location with no Arabian Gulf 100 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with Arabian Gulf 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with Arabian Gulf 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 12 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

SELF ELEVATING DRILLING UNITS MINIMUM MARINE VESSEL

REQUIREMENTS FOR FIELD MOVES, WORLD WIDE OPERATIONS

Departure, In Field Tow and Positioning

Open Location with no Brazil 120 ton continuous 1

obstructions Argentina
Peru
Open Location with Brazil 160 ton continuous 2 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform Argentina combined
locations Peru
Open Location with Brazil 180 ton continuous 3 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform Argentina combined
locations Peru
Open Location with no Gulf of Mexico 100 ton continuous 1
obstructions Venezuela
Caribbean
Open Location with Gulf of Mexico 120 ton continuous 2 vessels of 60 ton
obstructions or platform Venezuela combined
locations Caribbean
Open Location with Gulf of Mexico 120 ton continuous 3 vessels of 40 ton
obstructions or platform Venezuela combined
locations Caribbean
Open Location with no Eastern Canada 160 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with Eastern Canada 200 ton continuous 2 vessels of 100
obstructions or platform combined ton
locations
Open Location with Eastern Canada 240 ton continuous 3 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations
Open Location with no North Sea 160 ton continuous 1
obstructions
Open Location with North Sea 200 ton continuous 2 vessels of 100
obstructions or platform combined ton
locations
Open Location with North Sea 240 ton continuous 3 vessels of 80 ton
obstructions or platform combined
locations

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 13 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 8
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installation Site Assessment

APPENDIX “A”

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 14 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

1 SUMMARY

This section provides guidance to OIM’s and Barge Supervisor’s to prepare Self
Elevating Installations for moving operations. The guidelines herein describe
minimum marine operations practices to ensure each location move is planned,
prepared and conducted in the safest and most economical manner. These
guidelines are to be read in conjunction with the Check Lists contained in Section 5.1.

2 GENERAL INFORMATION

2.1 Distance

Confirm distance between locations and calculate the estimated transit time. Ensure
that the estimated transit time correlates to available weather forecasting service.
Allowance to be made for deviations around obstructions, shipping lanes or shallow
areas.

2.2 Open Locations

Positioning equipment shall be supplied by the operator and shall include at a

minimum of a DGPS system stabilized by a gyrocompass. One master DGPS unit
and one back up DGPS unit shall be required. In cases where seabed obstructions
such as wellheads, pipelines or footprints are in the vicinity of the proposed location,
such obstructions shall be displayed on the master DGPS screen and may also be
marked with suitable buoys. As a general rule it is not required to mark the location
with a buoy.

2.3 Platform Locations

Prior to the move, confirm pipelines are marked with suitable buoys. In cases where a
platform approach is to be made on anchors, operators are to supply DGPS positioning
system on board the Installation and on board the anchor handling vessel(s). The
DGPS system requirements are the same as for Open Locations above. The proposed
anchor pattern must be specified and agreed to ensure adequate clearance is allowed
between anchor line positions and pipelines / other obstructions. A platform visit should
be made in advance of the move to verify the geometry of the platform is as expected,
no cranes, overhangs or additions which might cause interference exist, the proposed
drilling slots are accessible and no production risers are fitted externally to the platform
docking face.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Prior to commencing final positioning or departure at a platform, agree and confirm

operational limitations including, but not limited to, daylight and status of production
wells and flow-lines.

Fields containing unlit structures should not be entered in hours of darkness.

Non-daylight near platform Installation moving operations that may be considered

on a case by case basis are limited to:
• departure from a location with a clear and unobstructed exit path
• moving onto a lighted platform with anchors from a preposition location in the
immediate vicinity.

If the platform is to remain live, Installation positioning is strictly limited to daylight

hours only. The reasons for the platform remaining live during an Installation move
are to be provided by the Operator. A site specific HAZOP / RISK assessment is
required to evaluate the risk of contact between the Installation and the Platform
during Installation positioning.

2.4 Attending Marine Vessels

All attending marine vessels for towing / anchor handling operations shall be
inspected. The minimum inspection requirement is presented in Check List 3.XX.xx.
The inspection shall be conducted by the Barge Supervisor or OIM and may be
witnessed by the attending warranty surveyor if present. Such inspections shall
confirm that each inspected vessel meets minimum criteria.

2.5 Move Plan and Meeting

The Installation Manager is responsible for the preparation of an Installation move

plan that addresses the operational and logistical aspects of the move. The move
plan will identify the responsibilities of Transocean, Clients and subcontractors and
identify any site-specific procedures necessary. The move plan should also include
contingency plans as appropriate. Where it is customary for Transocean Clients to
hold a shore based office meeting attended by all affected parties to discuss
preparations for forthcoming Installation move, the formal minutes of such a
meeting will be acceptable as a substitute to the rig move plan.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

3 RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1 Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)

The installation Manager (OIM) is the person in charge and has overall responsibility
for all personnel and the unit's safety. The OIM has the right to veto any operation
conducted on board and any operation effecting the safety of the unit. The OIM may
delegate the marine operations responsibility to a suitably qualified Marine
Superintendent / Rig Mover.

3.2 Barge Supervisor

The Barge Supervisor is the on board marine authority and as such is fully
responsible to the OIM to prepare the unit for moving operations. This includes, but
is not limited to, preparation of calculations for jacking and afloat conditions to
ensure the load line draft, variable loads and VCG are in compliance with the
Installation’s marine operating manual. The Barge Supervisor is to ensure the
Installation and all equipment is secured in accordance with good marine practice,
all ballast systems have been tested and the Installation is in seaworthy condition
prior to commencing move operations.

3.3 Warranty Surveyor

The Warranty Surveyor, if present, is appointed by Transocean to satisfy requirements

of the Installation’s insurance underwriters. The Warranty Surveyor is not the
underwriter and does not represent insurers. The Warranty Surveyor's responsibility is
to independently observe and report that move operations are being conducted within
the unit's marine operations manual and generally acceptable marine practices. The
Warranty Surveyor may offer expert advice on marine related issues similar to a Harbor
Pilot’s function. Use of Warranty Surveyors in an active role is discouraged in order to
minimize risks associated with conflict of interest. The Warranty Surveyor has no direct
authority or veto powers regarding Installation mobilization as ultimate responsibility for
the Installation remains with the OIM and the Installation's owners at all times.

3.4 Marine Superintendent / Installation Mover

The Transocean Marine Superintendent / Rig Mover, if present, is the principal

Company marine authority and will have been involved in the move planning. The
Transocean Marine Superintendent / Installation Mover shall liase closely with the OIM
and Barge Supervisor and is directly responsible for Installation towing, anchoring and

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

positioning operations. The Marine Superintendent / Installation Mover has the

authority to veto
any part of the marine operations he believes to be inconsistent to established
procedures or constituting an unsafe marine practice.

3.5 Rig Manager

The Rig Manager’s function (or other shore based managerial or supervisory staff)
when attending an Installation move is strictly to support the OIM. The Rig Manager
may assist with liaison with the client and shore management and act as delegated
by the OIM. The Rig Manager is not to assume command of the Installation move
operation, which is to remain with the permanent rig crew, unless formally acting as
the Installation Mover.

4 PRE-MOVE MEETING

A pre-move meeting shall be conducted prior to commencement of jacking and

moving operations.

4.1 Attendees

The following attendees shall as a minimum attend the pre-move meeting:

• Offshore Installation Manager

• Barge Supervisor
• Marine Warranty Surveyor (if present)
• Transocean Marine Superintendent / Installation Mover (if present)
• Platform Installation Manager (for manned installations)
• Operators Representatives
• Masters of attending marine vessels
• Rig crew members with key responsibilities.

4.2 Agenda

An agreed written Installation mobilization plan including site specific procedures

is the expected result of the pre-move meeting. The following topics shall be
discussed as a minimum:

• Maximum weather criteria for moving off and on location.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

As general rule for open locations wind speed will not to exceed 20-25 knots with a
maximum 5 feet sea state and a 1knot current. For platform locations wind speeds
not to exceed 15 - 18 knots with a maximum 4 feet sea state and 1 knot current
(preference during slack tide). Particular care is required in areas where there are
natural long swell periods, tidal ranges and current.

• A passage window shall be agreed.

Departure from the old location shall not occur without determining with certainty that
a "weather window" of sufficient duration exists to allow the Installation to depart,
move and jack up at the new location or at a safe and sheltered stand-by refuge
location. The "weather window" determination shall be supported by area weather
forecast from a recognized weather forecasting service. Where weather patterns do
not conform to predictions, additional weather information should be sought or the
situation discussed directly with duty forecasters

• Communications,

Clear VHF / UHF channels and lines of communications between the unit and
attending vessels as well as with unit's key personnel to be agreed.

• Proposed towing route and navigation procedures.

• Proposed Heading at the arrival location

Consideration of risks associated with hazardous gas, flaring operations, prevailing

current, prevailing wind directions, supply vessel and helicopter operations, etc.

• Available fuel and water on the Installation and attending vessels

A 25 percent fuel contingency is optimal.

• Allowable Installation motions during departure, tow and arrival.

• Towing arrangements including contingencies and emergencies.

• Tug connection points based on Installation layout, prevailing weather and heading
required

• Anchor handling procedures (where required)

• Assignment of key personnel for jacking and winch operations

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

• Acceptance criteria for position and heading tolerances on open locations

• Watch keeping

• Watertight integrity and tank sounding.

5 PRE-MOVE PREPARATIONS

5.1 Check List

The OIM shall use a pre-move checklist detailing pre-move tasks and those
responsible for ensuring that tasks have been completed. A example pre-move
check list is presented in Figure 5.1.1.

Figure 5.1.1
Example Pre-Move Checklist #1

No Task To Be Completed Initial

1 Close mud pit dump valves and secure

2 Stow BOP's and secure

3 Secure rig floor, tongs and other loose equipment

4 Remove stern handrails, remove and secure mud and cmt lines

5 Skid substructure in moving position

6 Secure substructure beams with clamps, chains, wedges as required

7 Replace handrails as required

8 Reconnect salt water and airlines

9 Secure top drive and block

10 Close and secure all mud pit and master dump valves

11 Secure the mud pump room

12 Driller instructs crew for jacking operations at designated leg

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 5.1.1
Example Pre-Move Checklist #2

No Task To Be Completed Initial

1 Pre -grease jacking motors if required

2 Secure all loose gear in the machinery spaces and work shops

3 Check operation of mooring winches

4 Disconnect the deep well pumps and raise & secure tower as required

5 Check all water tight doors to machinery spaces are properly closed
and secured
6 Assign power to the jacking system

7 Check oil in primary gear boxes

8 Check oil in secondary gear boxes

9 Pre-grease all main bearing on jacking system

10 Check oil level in skidder unit

11 Electrician to stand by in SCR room during jacking

12 Ensure that minimal required personnel is below decks during aflo

operations and pre-loading

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 5.1.1
Example Pre-Move Checklist #3

No Task To Be Completed Initial

1 Remove all containers and heavy loads from the bow area

2 Prepare towing gear as required

3 Stow and secure all tubulars

4 Secure main deck cargo and equipment

5 Block stow as much deck load as possible within the control pipe bay
And within the inside deck load limits
6 Pick up and secure all loading hoses & vent lines

7 Prepare jetting lines as required

8 Close and secure all water tight doors above and below decks,
Including quarters entry doors
9 Remove and secure mooring lines

10 Close and secure all main deck hatches and vents

11 Secure all items in the sack store

12 Secure all movable gas bottles and cutting sets

13 Secure welders area and steel rack

14 Place leg grease and brushes at each leg chords

15 Lay down all crane booms in the racks and secure main block and
Or whipline

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 5.1.1
Example Pre-Move Checklist #4

No Task To Be Completed Initial

1 Check operation of all pre-load dump and fill valves

2 Check that all required pre-load dump valve blanking caps are
Secured
3 Check that all pre-load tanks that are not required for ballast are
stripped
4 Sound all tanks and void spaces and record soundings

5 Check all tank & void space manhole covers

6 Test the bilge system and ensure that bilge pumps properly prime

7 Charge all hand held radios, spare batteries and ensure operation

8 Complete and check all afloat and pre-load stability calculations

9 Check that all water tight doors and closures are secured

10 Check all leg wells for obstructions

11 Assemble all required charts, weather forecast, tidal data

contemplated towing route
12 Test jacking panel, lamp test and alarms as required

13 Calculate position of raw water tower for moving off location and
onto the new location
14 Grease skid rails as required

15 Ensure that jacking system bearings are greased during system

Operation

WATERTIGHT HATCHES AND DOORS MUST REMAIN PROPERLY CLOSED AND

SECURED AT ALL TIMES WHEN THE UNIT IS AFLOAT AND UNTIL PRE-LOADING
OPERATIONS ARE COMPLETED.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 5.1.1
Example Pre-Move Checklist #4 (continued)

No Task To Be Completed Initial

16 Calculate required pendant wire length if anchors are used

17 Check Navigation lights and day shapes

18 Check all jetting equipment and function test

19 Check all towing gear is ready

20 Check and grease anchor fairleads if used

21 Check that rack grease and brushed are ready

22 Check mooring lines are disconnected and secured

23 Check that all dump valves are secured

24 Check sea chest for proper operation

25 Check that raw water tower is ready to be raised and disconnected

when required
26 Check that master dump valves are secured

27 Check that all equipment is properly secured

28 Test jacking system emergency stop

29 Test tow bridle deployment and recovery winch

30 Check all towing connections (smit brackets, bollards, bits)

31 Have heaving lines ready as required

32 Have sledge hammers ready at smit brackets

33 Have split pins, axe, hacksaw and knife at a ready place

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 5.1.1
Example Pre-Move Checklist #5

No Task To Be Completed Initial

1 Have adequate personnel available for skidding

2 Hold meeting with all key personnel just prior to skidding, assign
supervisors, record topics discussed
3 Skid sub base transverse and confirm securing arrangements

4 Skid cantilever / substructure inboard to the normal moving position

and confirm securing arrangements
5 Verify that all pre-move check list have been completed and signed
off by the respective supervisors
6 Verify that all jacking, stability and pre-load calculations have
been completed
7 Verify that the bilge system has been tested

8 Verify that towing equipment and attending vessels are on location

and ready
9 Just before jacking operations commence have meeting with all key
personnel assign leg supervisors, chain of command.
10 Check radio communications with each leg

11 Elevate hull 1 to 2 feet to equalize motor torque

12 Lower hull to 10 feet air-gap (connect tugs / this may vary)

13 Lower hull to 5 to 7 feet hull draft

14 Barge supervisor to check and confirm watertight integrity witnessed

by either attending warranty surveyor or Transocean attending rig mov
15 When watertight is confirmed continue with planned move operation

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 5.1.1
Example Pre-Move Checklist #6

No Task To Be Completed Initial

1

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 12 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

5.2 Stability Calculations

The Barge Captain shall produce a full set of stability calculations covering
jacking up and down, afloat and pre-load operations. The calculations shall
verify compliance with the marine operations manual for all operations. Stability
calculations are to be carried out on a Transocean Engineering approved
stability program.

5.3 Watertight Integrity

Prior to becoming water-borne, all watertight and weathertight closures other

than those normally open during transit conditions shall be secured. The status
of closing appliances shall be recorded on the pre-move checklist as well as in
the unit's official logbook.

5.4 Sea-fastenings

Before the hull is jacked down into the water, drilling equipment and materials
carried on deck should be reduced to a minimum and arranged so that they will
not interfere with access or escape routes. Sea-fastenings on equipment must
be of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum loading likely to be imposed.
Transport quality chain and ratchet type boomers are the preferred way of
securing equipment and tubulars. Particular care must be taken to properly
secure items in the vicinity of tanks vents or any pipe-work penetrating through
the main deck. Drums should preferably be secured in purpose built racks.
Heavy items should be secured as far as possible between the cantilever
beams.

5.5 Safety Equipment

All safety equipment to be inspected 12 hours prior to commencing Installation

move operations. Any special instructions pertaining to lifeboat and life raft use
while the unit is afloat shall be discussed with ALL Persons on board.

5.6 General Operations Instructions

General operational instructions while afloat are addressed in each

Installation’s marine operations manual. Compartment and watertight integrity
compliance as described in each unit's marine operations manual shall be
strictly adhered to.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 13 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

5.7 Jacking Systems

The OIM and Barge Captain shall ensure the jacking system, leg rack teeth
and leg guides are properly attended and constantly greased during all jacking
operations. Although greasing main bearings prior to jacking is a common
practice, main bearing greasing is better achieved with the system in operation
and with the use of designated high pressure grease units at each leg. In
addition any manufacturers recommendations for operation of the elevating
system shall be followed.

5.8 Connecting of Attending Marine Support Vessels

5.8.1 Summary

This appendix gives guidance on how towline connections with attending tugs
should be handled to provide the safest conditions during this process.

5.8.2 Bow Main Tow Bridle

All self elevating drilling units should be fitted with a chain bridle connected to Smit
brackets on the bow area, the chain sections are connected to a suitably sized
triangular plate.

A pendant type fore runner wire of sufficient length (100 - 150 feet) is connected to
the triangular plate and the connecting end to an air winch wire for deployment and
recovery. The air winch wire should be connected at least 20 feet back from the
connecting end in order to allow tug deck crews to be able to secure the connecting
end in tug's shark jaws or other available deck securing devices and provide
sufficient slack to make the connection to the tug's main tow wire. The pendant
wire should be at least 60mm diameter.

5.8.3 Port & Starboard Quarters or Stern Wires

All self elevating drilling units should be fitted with Smit bracket on the stern or
quarter connecting points and fitted on the hull edge with a closed Panama type
fairlead. A chafing chain should be provided from the Smit bracket clear through
the fairlead, connected to suitable sized (2 to 3 inch) pendant wires 100 to 150 feet
in length with either hard eye thimbles mechanically spliced or closed spelter type
sockets.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 14 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

(SOFT EYE PENDANT WIRES CONNECTED TO BOLLARDS OR BITS IS NOT

ACCEPTABLE FOR AN OFFSHORE MARINE ENVIRONMENT AS THEY CAN NOT BE
READILY RELEASED IN CASE OF TUG FAILURE)

The towing pendant wires are to be suspended outside the unit's hull with the use of
the cranes and secured against the outer hull handrails, coiling wire on the main
deck is a dangerous and un-acceptable practice.

A pick up sling is to be connected to the pendant wire at least 10 to 15 feet from the
pendant end, in order to allow tug deck crews to be able to secure the connecting
end in the tug's sharks jaw or other available deck securing devices and provide
sufficient slack to make the connection to the tug's main tow wire. The pick up sling
shall be new manila rope of 25mm diameter or greater, with a spliced eye
termination and maximum 10 feet in length.
The handling sling provides a weak link in case a tug runaway situation
occurs, which could cause serious damage to a crane.

Note: Whilst this practise does not comply with QHSE Manual section 4.5.5.4.1
provisions, it has been approved under a management of change process for this
specific operation.

The port or starboard side pendant wire shall be passed to an attending tug with the
crane.
(THE PRACTICE OF PULLING IN A PENDANT WIRE FROM A TUG OR SLIPPING A
PENDANT FROM THE UNIT'S MAIN DECK IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS
PRACTICE AND IS NOT PERMITTED)

The pendant wire rope pick-up sling shall be connected to a hook and short steel sling,
(20 - 30 feet) which in turn is connected to the crane block.
(SHACKLES ARE NOT TO BE USED BETWEEN CRANE SLING END AND
PENDANT WEAK LINK HANDLING SLING AS THEY CAN NOT BE READILY
DISCONNECTED AND POSSESS A DANGER TO THE TUG DECK CREWS,
THE QUICKEST RELEASE METHOD MUST BE PROVIDED)

In cases where the Smit bracket and fairlead are not within crane reach, a handling
tugger winch is to be fitted inboard of the Smit bracket. The wire from the tugger is to be
passed through the bracket and fairlead, and outboard to connect to the pennant wire at
a point within reach of the crane. The tugger is then used to draw the inboard end of
the pennant into the Smit bracket for connection.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 15 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

6 PULLING LEGS ON PLATFORM LOCATIONS

These guidelines are directed to the OIM and Barge Captain to minimize potential
for contact between the Installation’s hull and the adjacent platform during leg
pulling operations.

The guidelines start with the unit at 5 - 7 feet draft for the watertight integrity check.

• Once the watertight integrity check has been completed, lower the hull to 3 feet
over the calculated floating draft, and observe the draft / level indicators for
approximately 15 minutes.

• If the legs do not begin to free themselves connect the jetting system to the stern
legs and commence jetting. A designated key person shall remain at the stern of
the unit and observe movement / clearance between the stern of the unit and the
platform.

• If one of the stern legs begins to lose draft while the other does not, continue to jet
and pull the opposite leg to keep the unit as level as possible. If the rate of draft
loss increases, stop jetting and pull hull back down to an even keel. If the hull draft
holds at 2 feet or less over calculated draft and not at 3 feet over calculated, leave
that leg alone until the other stern leg reaches the same point.

• If the hull draft remains at 3 feet over calculated draft it may be necessary to start
jetting again. A stern leg should not be raised more than 20 percent of the total
penetration depth without the other stern leg being free. Once both stern legs
appear to be losing hull draft bring them to a level where they no longer lose draft.
This would entail raising the hull stern to decrease buoyancy pull on the stern legs,
stop jetting on stern legs.

• Commence jetting on the bow leg. Pull down the hull on the bow. This will move
the stern of the Installation away from the platform. Once the bow leg is pulling
free, allow the bow to lose draft to a point where all leg penetrations are more or
less even. Ensure the Installation’s stern / platform distance is constantly monitored
and reported.

• If all legs lose draft at similar rates the unit should remain clear of the platform.

• Once all the legs are free, bring them to a level that will provide sufficient stiffness
to the unit to avoid excessive movement or wallowing in the spud-can holes. At this

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 16 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

time the aft assist vessels are connected and positioned until the proper conditions
exist to move off the location.

• Usually at slack tide, continue raising the legs until movement of the unit is
observed. The power settings and headings of the attending vessels are adjusted
to ensure a straight pull away from the platform. While still in the immediate vicinity
of the platform, the legs should continue to be raised without interruption until at
least 10ft clear of the seabed to avoid potential contact with pipelines. Thereafter
continue raising the legs to the desired towing position and continue with
moving/towing operations

These guidelines will vary for each location and are very much depending on leg
penetrations, soil consistency and internal resistance and distance between rig hull
and platform.

Successful leg pulling is achieved by taking the necessary precautions, necessary

time and letting the jetting system do the majority of the work. This together with
limiting the amount of over pull, will allow less rapid and less forceful movements of
the hull as the legs become free, reducing the possibility of contact between unit
and platform in tight fit situations.

7 PROCEDURES UNDER TOW

All operating criteria and guidelines for stability and watertight integrity contained in
the Installation’s marine operating manual will be complied with.

7.1 Watertight Integrity

Once all pre-move preparations have been carried out and the Installation is deemed "fit
for tow", a complete watertight integrity check shall be made with the unit at
approximately 5 feet hull draft. All tanks and lower deck spaces, especially those
containing through hull fittings shall be inspected by the Barge Supervisor and
witnessed by either the Warranty Surveyor or the Transocean rig-mover (if present).

7.2 Hull Draft, Trim, List

Once the Installation is afloat and prior to commencing towing operation the hull draft on
forward port and starboard and stern port and starboard shall be obtained and checked
for consistency with the calculated afloat loading condition. Any significant
discrepancies must be immediately investigated and corrected if required.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 17 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

7.3 Under Tow Monitoring Requirements

During the tow, conditions shall be monitored on a regular basis and recorded in the
move report and or the Installation’s official logbook as appropriate. The following items
shall be included:

• Status of all closures required to be secured (every 2 hours)

• Draft readings (every 2 hours)
• Tank soundings (every 2 hours)
• Sea-fastening of all deck cargo and equipment below decks
• Status of towing equipment (main, secondary, emergency and recovery system)
• Rig motions (compared with allowable motion parameters)
• Position report (obtained from lead tug - generally every 4 hours)
• Personnel below decks shall be kept to a minimum
• In case of adverse weather situations roving deck parties shall work in pairs and in
constant radio contact with the control room

8 WEATHER FORECASTING

Good quality weather forecasting is essential for safe towing operations. The weather
forecast services for each move should be obtained from a recognized and reliable
weather forecasting service such as Fugro, Noble Denton weather services, Ocean
routes or Wilkins weather. Direct communication with at least one forecaster should be
possible at all times.

8.1 Weather Services

Weather forecasting services should be contracted to provide the following:

• Both site and route specific forecast

• Transmissions direct to the Installation twice each 24 hours
• Each forecast to provide real time, 24, 48 and 72 hour forecast outlook
• Immediate updates provided in the event of significant change in the forecast
• Receipt of the first forecast to be received 24 hours in advance of move
commencement

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 18 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

8.2 Weather Forecast Data

Weather forecast data shall at a minimum contain the following information.

Information for wind wave and swell components should contain the combined sea.

• Synopsis of weather system

• Wind speed and direction
• Wave height, period and direction
• Swell height, period and direction
• Current speed and direction
• Special remarks, thunder storms, rain, fog etc.
• Confidence level of the forecast (high, medium, low)

9 JACKING OPERATION PLANNING

Preparation and testing of the Installation’s jacking system shall be conducted in

accordance to the unit's marine operations manual and jacking system manufacturer’s
recommendations.

Just prior to jacking operations, a meeting with all personnel involved shall be
conducted to review jacking procedures and safety precautions associated with jacking
the unit. In this meeting the OIM and Barge Supervisor shall clarify individual’s
responsibilities and tasks to be performed.

Each leg supervisor will have direct communications with the jacking panel operator and
be responsible for directing lubrication operations, notification of any abnormalities and
noting draft and leg position readings as requested.

10 LOCATION APPROACH AND FINAL POSITIONING

10.1 Planning

At the pre-move meeting held prior to commencement of Installation move

operations specific details regarding the Installation’s location arrival and approach
shall be determined. Dependent upon an open or platform location the following
topics should be reviewed:

• Safe distance from field installations

• Pipeline identification and marking requirements
• Weather criteria

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 19 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

• Approach plan including intended rig heading at open locations

• Initial leg pinning
• Reposition of Installation to a standoff location
• Adjustments to raw water tower position as required
• Attending vessel disconnect and reconnect procedures when anchors are run
• Anchor deployment procedures (where required)
• Anchor pattern (where required)
• Bottom disturbance due to previous units on location, including sliding problems
• Measurement techniques and acceptance criteria and tolerance for final unit position
• Divers and / or R.O.V. requirements

10.2 Marine Support / Towing Vessels

The marine support / towing vessels availability for each individual Installation and
area of operation shall be reviewed prior to the start of each move. As a general
guide, units can be positioned on open locations with the use of two (2) attending
vessels. For platform locations, approach and final positioning will generally require
three (3) attending vessels. Where it is anticipated that strong currents will act on
the legs as they are lowered (generally in water depths greater than 55m) towing
vessels of higher capacity than normal may be required to maintain full control of the
Installation.

10.3 Obstruction Clearance

When crossing pipelines or other subsea structures, an overall clearance of 30 feet

or half the available water depth (whichever is less) shall be maintained below the
spud-cans. Leg lowering should not commence until a horizontal clearance of 50m
(where possible) has been obtained from any obstruction.

Pipelines in close proximity to the Installation shall be marked with buoys clearly
identifying the distance and direction. Where spud-can / pipeline clearance is less
than 10m, adequate separations shall be verified and confirmed by divers or R.O.V.
prior to lowering the leg.

10.4 Tides

The magnitude and direction of tidal flow shall be assessed for potential effects on
final positioning onto a platform. The final approach of the Installation to the Platform
should be scheduled to coincide with either slack tide or tidal flow running away from
the platform.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 20 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

10.5 Motions

Installation motions can have a major role in final positioning onto a platform. Motions
should never exceed the allowable motions described in each unit's marine operations
manual. In cases where close proximity between the Installation and Platform exist
more onerous motion limits might be required to reduce the risk of collision.

To mitigate the risk of collision between an Installation and Platform final

positioning shall not commence until Tidal and Motion limiting criteria is
understood and agreed by all responsible parties .

10.6 Anchors

When anchors are deployed, an exclusion zone of 100 meters from pipelines or power
cables should be maintained as far as practical. In cases where anchors need to be
placed within this exclusion zone, the position of the obstruction and the proposed
anchor drop position in relation to the obstruction shall be positively identified and
confirmed by the field operator. Pre-installed anchors are preferred to deploying the rig
anchors in such circumstances. Where pipeline or cable positions cannot be confirmed
it may be preferable to avoid the use of anchors in the vicinity of obstructions and rely
on towing vessels only.

As a general rule, anchors that are deployed crossing pipelines shall be secured on the
anchor handling vessel's deck during crossing. The anchor tail chain or wire shall be
suitably secured typically in a shark jaw type arrangement or suitable sized pelican
hook.

10.7 Final Positioning

On an Open Location, once the Installation is pinned in the final position, position
acceptance shall be obtained from the on-board Company representative.

On a Platform Location, after the unit is pinned in the final position measurements shall
be taken to confirm that the drilling package can reach the scheduled well slots in
longitudinal and transverse directions. This process shall be repeated after the unit is
elevated to minimum air-gap and as penetration occurs during pre-loading. Position
acceptance shall be obtained from the on-board Company representative prior to the
commencement of pre-loading.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 21 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

On a Platform Location, during elevating operations and during the initial stages of leg
penetration, the relative position and distance between unit and platform shall be
monitored to ensure that position tolerances are maintained.

11 PRE-LOADING

11.1 General

Initial leg penetrations will depend on the soil conditions, the person in charge of
jacking must be vigilant and ensure that the unit remains level within 0.2 degree in
all directions.

11.2 Bore Hole Operations

Depending upon the results of the site assessment it may be required to conduct
coring or pilot hole drilling operations prior to pre-loading, in such cases the unit shall
remain at draft or minimum air-gap subject to suitable weather conditions. Detail
procedures for these activities are prepared on a case by case basis, which should
specify the appropriate weather limitations.

11.3 Pre-load Operations

Pre-loading must be performed immediately following the move onto a new location
or after completion of coring / pilot hole drilling operation. This operation replicates
as nearly as possible the maximum on-bottom loading condition that may occur
during storm conditions. Each Installation shall be pre-loaded either in accordance
with the Installation’s Marine Operations Manual requirements or as directed by site
specific data generated or approved by Houston Engineering.

Pre-load operations are strictly conducted at minimum air-gaps with an absolute

maximum allowable air-gap of 5 feet above the wave crest. Due regard shall be
extended in calculating the tidal rise or fall. In cases where large tidal ranges exist it
may be necessary to develop special pre-loading procedures.

The towing vessels may be disconnected prior to commencing pre-loading

operations, but at least one of the attending vessels must remain in close proximity
to the unit and be on full alert rapid response stand-by in case rapid settlement or
punch through should occur.

During pre-loading operations all required afloat closures are to remain secured. All
cranes booms are to be racked and secured. No crane movements are allowed.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 22 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Helicopter operations should be suspended during pre-load operations. If a

landing Is required in an emergency, pre-loading operations shall be suspended
and 5 percent of pre-load dumped to compensate for the helicopter landing and
take-off weight. Helicopter landings are not permitted during pre-load holding
periods

11.4 Pre-loading Procedures & Minimum Holding Times

The pre-loading procedure and holding period are dictated by the actual soil
conditions encountered on each location. Generic Minimum pre-load holding
times, during which time the unit is not to settle, are indicated in Figure 11.4 below
for different geographic areas. Individual site conditions may require increased
times or justify reduced times from these typical values.

Figure 11.4
Typical Preload Holding Times

Operating Area Hard soils Soft soils Punch-through

Africa 2hrs 4hrs 6hrs
Middle East 1hr (reentry) 4hrs 6hrs
2hrs (new)
Mediterranean 3hrs 6hrs 6hrs
Caspian - 6hrs 6hrs
Southern North Sea 2hrs - -
Brazil 3hrs 4 hrs 6 hrs
US Gulf - 6 hrs 6 hrs
SE Asia 3hrs (without crust) 6hrs 6 hrs
6 hrs (with crust)
Australia 2hrs 4hrs 6 hrs

In deep soft clay soils where consolidation occurs, a rate of creep not exceeding
0.1 degree per hour in the second half of the pre-load holding period is generally
acceptable. HOWEVER, this rate of creep is not applicable when soil of
significantly weaker strength is present below the final level reached by the spud
can. Requests by Rig Management for reduced pre-load holding time will be
considered by Engineering on a case by case basis. Granting of such requests is
dependent upon evaluation of geo-technical, environmental parameters and field
operating experience. Supporting data must accompany the request.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 23 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Upon completion of pre-loading operations, the final leg penetrations are to be

recorded and compared with site assessment predictions. Any anomalies are
to be reviewed and recorded. In cases of doubt or concern, the Regional /
District Manager is to be consulted.

12 CONTINGENCY & EMERGENCY PLANS

12.1 Contingency Plans

Contingency plans should be presented and agreed upon at the pre-move meeting.
Contingency & emergency plans should be prepared at a minimum for the following
potential hazard scenarios:

• Excessive weather conditions

• Towline breakage or failure of towing fitting
• Attending tug(s) propulsion or equipment failure
• Navigation or positioning equipment failure
• Water ingress on board the unit
• Failure or deficiency of raw water/cooling water supply
• Unit's loss of main power
• Uncontrolled settlement / Punchthrough
• Jacking system failure (electrical or mechanical)
• Shallow gas (where pilot hole drilling undertaken)

Contingency plans should address:

• Secondary or emergency towing arrangements that is readily deployed and

recovered by the attending vessels
• Suitable alternate jacking locations or areas of refuge should be determined
• Procedures to release attending vessel in case of propulsion or equipment failures
• Available salvage equipment on the Installation, alternative means of pumping
out compartments, available means to patch openings to the environment
• Available and alternate means to partially or fully evacuate personnel.
• Available and alternate means of escape or rescue (as required).
• Availability of helicopter and refueling facilities for emergency assistance or medivac.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 24 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

13 SCOUR

13.1 General

Scour can occur in areas of sandy soils subject to currents in excess of 2 knots. In
many cases high currents occur during spring tides and during storms. The risk of
scour is particularly high when spud can penetration into the seabed is less than the
depth of the maximum bearing area of the spud can.

Scour prevention methods (sandbagging or prelaid gravel bases) are to be provided at

locations where major scouring of surface sands could cause the rig to settle
catastrophically into underlying softer soil that is unable to adequately support the rig.

If the Installation is supported on a foundation where scouring or erosion will not

adversely affect the foundation integrity, the Installation may be re-leveled should minor
settlement attributable to scouring occur.

13.2 Inspection

If the final spud-can penetration is less than the spud-can height at full spud-can
diameter there is potential of scouring. This is especially true in soils with coral /
boulder outcrops. In such conditions an initial inspection of all spud-cans shall be made
by means of divers or R.O.V. within one week of the unit's arrival. Checks shall
thereafter be conducted at intervals not exceeding one month. Reports of scour
inspections shall be submitted to Rig Manager and Regional management for review.

Spud cans with penetrations of 4m or less into sandy soils in general should be
inspected for scour following severe storms with wind speeds of 50knots or sea states
of 7.5m or more.

14 MINIMUM TUG INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

14.1 Summary

Figure 13.1 provides a Minimum Tug Inspection format recommended for all anchor
handling tugs or anchor handling tug supply vessels presented to Transocean self-
elevating drilling installations for an in-field location move. All presented vessels shall
be inspected prior to commencing move operations by the Barge Supervisor and/or

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 25 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

attending Transocean rig mover and witnessed by a marine warranty surveyor (if in
attendance) or by the OIM. As a general guideline any presented vessel that can not
produce valid flag state and or classification society certification shall be un-
conditionally rejected.

As general policy only vessels with a minimum of two independent propulsion units are
acceptable for towing any Transocean self elevating drilling unit.

Any vessel presented for a single vessel tow must possess a spare tow wire capable of
rapid deployment. Actual as opposed to original tow wire lengths should be
ascertained.

14.2 Items to be Inspected

During inspection of older vessels and / or vessels in apparent dubious condition,

particular attention shall be paid to the condition of towing winch, towing wire, towing
wire certification, bollard pull certification and visual condition of main engines and
general engine room condition during these inspections. Thruster performance and
functionality of navigation and steering gear is to be checked.

Maximum continuous engine revolutions should be verified, and in tropical areas

verification of the operating efficiency of the engine cooling system under maximum
load should be made.

Specifically in benign areas around the tropical latitudes, an older fleet of vessels exists,
whose owners and operators will typically present the technical specification of such
vessels as in new condition and in particular quote the original brake horse power BHP
and bollard pull BP rating. These doubts can be diminished if recent authentic bollard
pull test certificates are available. Where this is not the case, a general guideline is that
a vessel built vessel15-20 years ago as a 4000 bhp/45 ton BP would today realistically
produce 75 percent of those ratings if properly maintained. Inspectors are advised to
calculate total available bollard pull from such vessels on the basis of 75 percent
efficiency of new listed specifications. The combined bollard pull for a specific area of
operations must still meet underwriter's requirements.

Inspectors are to place close attention to the general appearance of a presented vessel.
An older vessel well organized and maintained and with an apparent trained and
responsible crew will perform better than a new vessel apparently poorly maintained
and cared for.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 26 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 14.1
Minimum Tug Inspection Checklist

Vessel Name
Registered Owners
Vessel Type Tug / Anchor Handling Tug / Anchor Handling Tug Supply
Flag
Port of Registry
Classification ABS / Lloyds / BV / GL / DNV / Rina / Other -
Class Notations
Year Build
Builder
Length/Beam/Depth/Draft
Gross tonnage
Net tonnage
Main Engines No: Make: Type: BHP: BP:
Propulsion No: Make: Type: fixed/cpp Nozzles: yes / no
Rudders No: Make: Type: fixed / independent
Generators No: Make: KW:
Bow Thrusters No: Make: BHP: Thrust:
Stern Thrusters No: Make: BHP: Thrust:

Towing Make: Model: Hydraulic / Diesel

Winch Max Pull: Max Brake: No of Drums:
Drum 1 Capacity: Drum 2 Capacity: Drum 3 Capacity:
Main Tow Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Wire Break Strength: Cert. No:
Spare Tow Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Wire Break Strength: Cert. No:
Work Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Wire Break Strength: Cert. No:
Pendant Diameter: Length: Certified: yes / no
Wire No Available: Break Strength: Cert. No:
Shackles Type Amount: Type Amount: Type Amount:
SWL SWL SWL
Certified: yes / no Certified: yes / no Certified: yes / no
Cert. No: Cert. No: Cert. No:
Shark Type: Max. Load: Ton Tow Pins: yes / no
Jaws No: single / double set Type:
No: single / double set
Pendant Storage Reels No: Capacity: #1 #2 #3 #4

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 27 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self Elevating Installations – In Field Moves

Figure 14.1
Minimum Tug Inspection Checklist
(continued)

Certificate Name Number Date Issued Expiry Date Endorsement Date

Certificate of Nationality or
Registry (flag state) **
Minimum Safe Manning
Certificate (flag state)
Radio License
(flag state) **
Certificate of Class
Hull & Machinery **
International Load Line
Certificate **
Tonnage Certificate
(this cert. has no expiry date)
Cargo Ship Safety
Construction Certificate
Cargo Ship Safety
Equipment Certificate
Cargo Ship Safety
Radio Certificate
International Oil Pollution **
Prevention Certificate I.O.P.P.
Bollard Pull Certificate Issued By: Date of Test Maximum Continuous

Rig Name : _____________ Location Move Number: ____ Area of Operation: _______________

Inspection Carried Out By:__________________________

Position : O.I.M. / Barge Supervisor / Transocean Rig Mover

Date & Place: ____ / _________ / 2001 / ______________

NOTE: ANY VESSEL PRESENTED FOR INSPECTION THAT DOES NOT HAVE THE ABOVE
MANDATORY CERTIFICATES PRESENT (MARKED AS **) OR IN VALID DATES
SHALL BE REJECTED FOR TOWING AND OR ANCHOR HANDLING OPERATIONS.
VESSELS WITHOUT BOLLARD PULL CERTIFICATES OR WITH CERTIFICATES
OLDER THAN 5 YEARS SHALL BE DOWN RATED TO 75% OF THE VESSEL’S
ORIGINAL SPECIFICATIONS OR OLD BOLLARD PULL TEST RESULTS

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 28 28
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 10
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self-Elevating Installation Mover Certification

1 GENERAL

These guidelines recommend minimum qualifications and training of Self-Elevating

Installation Movers. Transocean’s goal is the assigned Installation Barge Supervisors
and OIMs become suitably trained and qualified as “Approved” Self-Elevating
Installation movers. This will reduce the need for regular attendance by an independent
Underwriters Warranty Surveyor.

2 MINIMUM STANDARDS PRIOR TO QUALIFICATION

2.1 Required Training and Experience

Self-elevating Installations movers should be able to demonstrate a minimum level of

training and experience as indicated below:

• Minimum 5 years working experience as Barge Supervisor or equivalent.

• OIM license for bottom bearing units.
• Advanced stability course.
• Independent leg rig moving course (if applicable).
• In full command, conduct 1 Self-elevating Installation move on open location
witnessed by a qualified rig mover.
• In full command, conduct 1 Self-elevating Installation move onto a platform
location witnessed by a qualified rig mover.
• In full command, conduct 1 Self-elevating Installation move, witnessed by an
independent qualified person representing the Warranty Survey organization
which will issue the rig mover certification for a particular unit or class of unit's.
The Warranty Surveyor may elect to limit Certification to “Open Locations Only” if
experience and witnessed mobilization does not support “unlimited” Certification.

As the safety of Transocean personnel and equipment are dependent upon the
decisions of Self-elevating Installation Movers, a written recommendation from
the Installation Manager is required. It is recommended that an interview by
the Regional Operations Manager and Regional Marine Advisor (if assigned)
also be conducted.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 3
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 10
MARINE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
Self-Elevating Installation Mover Certification

3 TRAINING

In conjunction with the regional training centers, a training matrix should be developed
for selected Self-elevating Installation Mover candidates. The training matrix will include
an overall time line for individual completion of theoretical requirements i.e. advanced
stability course, attending Installation movers school (similar to that provided by
Dutton’s Navigation) and conducting supervised rig moving operations.

It is recommended candidates practical on board training be assessed periodically by

Regional Marine Advisors (if assigned) or Underwriter’s Warranty Surveyors who will
evaluate and report on performance and recommend when a candidate is ready to be
certified.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 1

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION

1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this section is to ensure consistency, and philosophical commonality

of DP operations that Transocean expects to be maintained onboard Dynamic
Positioned installations. The general standards outlined in this section should be
amplified by the installation specific procedures that may incorporate specific client
requirements that have been authorised for a particular installation or area of
operation.

The standards of operation herein are to be viewed as minimum for effective

operation. The responsibility for implementing and operating to a standard
consistent with the guidance herein is assigned to the Rig Manager and delegated
to the OIM and Master.

2 OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Section are to:

• Establish protocols which allows for a process of continual risk assessment to

take place
• Identify lines of communication both onboard and ashore regarding DP related
matters
• Identify reporting requirements both for routine and non routine occurrences
• Outline the roles of key personnel within the DP Operation
• Establish the background of industry standards that will be applied for the fleet
DP Operations
• Establish standard DP Operating Criteria and how it is applied on a installation
by installation basis
• Indicate the requirements for Personnel Standards of Competency for DP
Operators that comply with IMO Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping (STCW) requirements to be implemented February 1, 2002.
• Identify the formal requirement for Check Lists and Records
• Identify and explain the Company policies regarding internal and external
reporting to operational staff.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 1

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION

REFERENCES:

This section has been completed with reference to the following documents;

• IMCA (International Marine Contractors Association) Guidelines for the Design

and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels, M 103 February 1999

• IMCA Publication, the Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel , January

1996

• IMO Guidelines for vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems – Annex 7 (IMO
MSC Circular 645 June 1994)

• IADC Deepwater Drilling Manual

• DP Operations & Management Periodical Audit (Appendix 3 enclosed)

• Transocean DP Event Report Form (Appendix 4 enclosed)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL PLANNING INFORMATION

1 GENERAL

The Well Planning Checklist for DP Installations (Form 4.2) is included as an

example only and is intended to allow regions and installations to take advantage of
an established checklist rather than having to create their own. Locally prepared
checklists should, however, include the elements listed on the prepared checklist.
The Regional Operations Manager should approve all such locally created
checklists.

2 RECORDING AND RETENTION

Completed checklists should be made part of the installation’s Well Planning

reporting system and retained for the same length of time as the original report.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 WELL PLANNING CHECKLIST
FOR DP INSTALLATIONS

Location
Confirm spud in location Geographical co-
ordinates, Block and Well
ID.
Confirm location datum
criteria
Confirm location criteria in
standard geodetic format
(WGs 84)
Depth of Water Obtain tidal information
to assist with riser length
calculations
Sea bed Bathymetry Ensure suitable 1:500
and 1;5000 up to date
charts available.
Identify suitable escape
route for installation
towards deep water.
Verify lack of contours
that effect placing of
seabed transponders
Confirm proximity of nearest
surface unit
Confirm no seabed Identify necessity for
structures in vicinity Dropped Object Hazid
Operations
Confirm nature of operation (see documentation)
at Location.
Confirm impact for any USCG or HSE
coastal state requirements Inspections
upon vessel arrival at Safety case etc.
location.
Environment
Confirm contractual weather Ensure that weather
criteria. criteria matches weather
criteria of Capability pots
Confirm prevailing wind
direction
Confirm prevailing current or
tidal information
Confirm availability of
suitable weather forecasting
information
BOP
Confirm acceptable BOP To be confirmed in
landed heading conjunction with weather
and vessel heading
criteria

Page 1 of 2
 Documentation
Confirm as a minimum 1. Blackout Recovery
following vessel procedures 2. Collision Contingency
in place and up to date for 3. Emergency tow
new location
Confirm if need for additional Enhanced station
procedures in event of keeping requirements
special Well, marine or DP
ops. I.. dual DP vessel ops
Confirm suitability of vessel Determine magnitude of
specific Riser Manual yellow and Red DP
Watch circles
Complete WSOG Develop with client.
Confirm suitability of current Client may require
DP documentation verification audit of
vessel documentation
Acceptance Trials
Independent 3rd Parties.

DP Reference Systems
Confirm proximity of nearest Verify acoustic
DP unit and possible source frequencies of other
of acoustic interference users and identify
priorities
Confirm availability of Identify if client has
suitable differential stations requirements re DGPS
systems configuration, or
Confirm presence of
scintillation or other possible
DGPS interference
DP Operations
Confirm acceptability of Ensure definition of
Transocean 4 level DP Alert Degraded status
status understood.
Confirm DP incident IMCA or corporate
reporting format structure to definitions of incident.
client.

Comments:

Installation: _______________________ Signed: ___________________ Date: _______

Form 4.2 Revised December 31, 2001 Page 2 of 2

 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITES

1 Key DP Personnel

Drilling or production activities from a Dynamically Positioned (DP) installation

demands close co-operation of all onboard departments.

It is critical to the operation of the DP installation that an effective flow of

communication exists throughout all levels of management and all departments.
Departmental specialists must be aware and have knowledge of what is happening in
areas outside their immediate domain and understand the ramifications of activities
within their sphere of operation.

The following personnel are identified as having roles that are key to the Company’s
DP Operations and have input to the communication flow.

It should be noted there may be a duplication of roles or variation in terminology.

However installation specific personnel will be formally identified in an installation
specific manual.

• Master
• Chief Mate
• Senior DPO /2nd Mate
• DPO
• Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)
• Toolpusher
• Driller
• Subsea Supervisor
• ROV Supervisor
• Chief Engineer or Maintenance Supervisor
• Assistant Engineer
• VMS Operator
• Electrical Supervisor / Electrician
• Electronic Technician
• Crane Operator
• Clients Representative

All of the above personnel have general roles and responsibilities that are prescribed
in other documentation, i.e., Job Descriptions that should be read in conjunction with
this section. The specific duties in relation to the DP Operations follow.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 1 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2 Personnel Responsibilities During DP Operations

2.1 Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)

The Offshore Installation Manager is the onboard manager, who reports directly to the
shore-based Rig Manager. It is his role to control the onboard administration and
ensure the day to day operations are carried out in accordance with best industry
standards as well as the client’s and Rig Manager’s instructions. He is the principal
liaison with the onboard client representative. It is the responsibility of the OIM as
chairman of the onboard management team, consisting of the installation’s
department heads, to insure the department specialist are aware and have
knowledge. .

The Offshore Installation Manager is the most senior onboard manager. However,
the Master is the Person in Charge during an emergency in accordance with the
Station Bill. The Person in Charge is assigned the legal requirement to hold
overriding authority in situations involving safety and pollution prevention based upon
written procedures, policies, recognized industry safe working practice, relevant codes
and standards.

The OIM is responsible to the Shore Management for the overall performance of the
DP Drilling operation (Refer to Section 1, subsection 3).

The OIM must liase closely with the departmental heads so that he has an overall
understanding of the daily DP Drilling operation and is aware of any critical areas that
may impact on the continuity of the operation.

The OIM must have an understanding of the Company Minimum Operating Standards
as they relate to his operation and be able to communicate any concerns to the Client.

The OIM and the Master will at all times work very closely together. In the event of a
deteriorating situation the OIM, or his nominated deputy, has the support of
management should he determine that he must take immediate action to ensure the
safety of personnel and equipment (Red Alert / Emergency Disconnect).

2.2 Master

The Master is responsible for DP station keeping, safe navigation and collision
avoidance, general safety and pollution prevention, Installation stability, regulatory
compliance, ISM/MODU Code compliance, implementation of emergency response
training and all marine operations

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 2 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Under Section 14.8 of the MODU Code, the Company designates the Master as
“Person in charge” during an emergency as indicated on the Station Bill. During an
emergency he determines from available situation reports, written procedures,
acceptable safe working practices and advice from the onboard management team if
there is a threat to personnel or installation safety or the environment.

The Master has the responsibility and authority under IMO convention A.443.(XI) to
operate in a manner consistent with safety of human life, equipment and protection of
the marine environment. With his experience and knowledge of Marine Operations he
is authorized to make decisions that may effect the overall DP Drilling operation.

The Master must ensure that:

• All DP Operating personnel and technical staff have received the correct induction
and are competent to carry out their duties associated with the DP System. If
potential shortfalls become evident, the Master shall be responsible for drawing
these to the attention of the OIM and Rig Manager.
• All new personnel fulfilling a role identified as a key position in the DP Drilling
operation have satisfactorily completed a period of familiarization and are ready to
assume that position.
• The necessary documentation and records associated with the operation of the
DP system are completed and distributed as required.
• All DP policies, procedures, guidelines, standing orders and specific operational
guidelines are being adhered to.
• The DP control system and all reference systems are operational and fully
available for use.
• Any shortfall in equipment performance or personnel competence are reported to
the OIM and Rig Manager in a timely manner

The Master must also ensure there is full liaison between all key DP personnel
regarding DP Drilling operations and highlight any specific marine related issues and
their possible impact upon the current operation, i.e. weather, supply vessels etc.

As the DP Operations Department Head, the Master should be a qualified DP

Operator in possession of a DP Operators Certificate, and should be able, if required,
to take over a DP watch.

The Master and the OIM will at all times work very closely together. In the event of a
deteriorating DP marine situation the Master, or his nominated deputy has the support
of management should it become apparent that immediate action is required to
ensure the safety of the crew, equipment and the protection of the marine
environment.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 3 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.3 Chief Mate

The Chief Mate is the Master’s deputy and second in command of the installation. The
Chief Mate must have the same level of knowledge of the DP Operating System as
the Master.

The Chief Mate's prime activity is centered about the Deck, however in his role as the
Master’s immediate subordinate he should undertake DP watch-keeping duties to
gain suitable DP experience to fulfil the future role of Master of a DP installation.

The Chief Mate should be prepared to undertake such DP watch-keeping duties so to

enable the DPO/Mate to undertake any necessary maintenance duties about the
installation as required.

The Chief Mate should work with the DPO/Mate to develop his DP Desk skills if he is
not familiar with the installation’s DP Operating system.

The Chief Mate should be in possession of a DP Operators Certificate and the

supporting DP Logbook.

2.4 Senior DPO/2nd Mate

The Senior DPO/2nd Mate is the primary DP watchkeeper and the Master’s
representative on the bridge/control station in his absence. Apart from navigational
duties he will also ensure the safe and efficient operation of the DP system.

The Senior DPO/2nd Mate will be responsible for maintaining the various records,
reports and industry publications regarding the DP operation, and will ensure the
suitable distribution of that information to all relevant personnel.

In his role the Senior DPO/2nd Mate will have a close working relationship with the drill
floor and as such he must develop a working knowledge of the drill floor operations, to
ensure the smooth conduct of the integrated DP drilling operation.

It is absolutely vital in the pursuit of a safe and effective DP drilling operation that the
on tour Driller and on desk DP Operator are both aware of the ongoing operations in
each others area and of any heightened risks arising.

Each must be aware of any forthcoming change or likely change of operational status
that will effect the DP drilling operation.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 4 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The on tour Driller and on desk DP Operator hold the authority to initiate emergency
disconnect activities and Red Alert Alarms respectfully in the event of a deteriorating
situation, without immediate reference to their superiors.

It is therefore critical that there is a clear and precise level (line) of communication
between the DPO and Driller with no possibility for confusion should there be a critical
situation arising which requires immediate action.

The Senior DPO/2nd Mate shall at all times keep the Master or his authorized deputy
informed of any changes in equipment status or current operations that may require a
change of installation DP criteria, i.e. heading, offset, reference system status.

The Senior DPO/2nd Mate shall be in possession of full DP Operator certification and
the necessary supporting IMCA DP Logbook.

2.5 DP Operator (DPO)

The DPO is subordinate to the Senior DPO/2nd Mate and will work under his direction
at the DP console. The DPO shall be in possession of full DP Operator certification
and the necessary supporting IMCA DP Logbook. The DPO should be striving
towards obtaining a DP Certificate if not already held.

When at the DP Desk the DPO will confirm any change of parameter to the Senior
DPO/2nd Mate prior to them being initiated. When the DPO has been adjudged
Competent by both the Senior DPO/2nd Mate and Master of the installation to which
he is appointed he will be able to act upon his own discretion at the DP Control desk.

As part of normal operational Guidelines the DPO must always ensure the Senior
DPO/2nd Mate is made fully aware of any change of operating parameters as they
happen.

The DPO main activities in respect of DP Drilling Operations are:

• Become competent in the operation of the DP system and it’s peripheral systems
under supervision of a Senior DPO and the Master
• Become competent in the controlling of the installation in the Manual / Joystick
control mode
• Gain an understanding of the DP Computer Control systems, reference systems
and the various modes of operation
• Gain a general understanding of the vessel management system, power plant and
power distribution system that provides power to the thruster units and drill floor

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 5 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

• Gain an understanding of Capability Plots, FMEA, Proving Trials, Riser

Performance Studies and consequence analysis
• Gain an understanding of the various Drilling Operations carried out onboard
• Gain an awareness of the various DP industry standards, IADC, IMCA, IMO, and
Transocean DP Policies, Procedures and Guidelines

2.6 Toolpusher

As the OIM’s deputy the Toolpusher may at times be called upon to make decisions
that will require an understanding of the interaction between Drill Floor activities and
the DP System. He must have a good understanding of the installation’s DP station
keeping system.

It is particularly critical that the Toolpusher has an understanding of the following

areas of activity that will effect the DP station Keeping operation:

• Increased requirement for electrical power to the drill floor, or instability of power
on the drill floor
• The timing of critical drilling operations in the face of deteriorating or changing
environmental conditions
• Loss of redundancy on any system as it effects the DP station keeping ability of
the installation
• Drill floor emergency Guidelines as they effect the DP operation

2.7 Driller

The Driller will at times be called upon to make critical decisions in the absence of the
Toolpusher, to whom he normally reports. Therefore the Driller must have a good
knowledge of how his activities interface with the DP system operation.

The Driller must maintain a close line of communication with the watch keeper at the
DP Desk to ensure that these two critical control centers are each aware of the others
activities. The Driller shall inform the DP Operator before a BHA or casing that cannot
be sheared enters into the BOP and again when that BHA is clear of the BOP.

It is absolutely vital in the pursuit of a safe and effective DP drilling operation that the
on tour Driller and on desk DP Operator are both aware of the ongoing operations in
each others area and any heightened risks arising. Each must also be aware of any
forthcoming change or likely change of operational status that will effect the DP
drilling operation.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 6 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The on tour Driller and on desk DP Operator both hold the authority to initiate
emergency disconnect activities and RED ALERT alarms respectively in the event of
a deteriorating situation, without immediate reference to their superiors.

It is critical that there is a clear and precise level (line) of communication between the
Driller and DPO with no possibility of confusion should there be a critical situation
arising which requires immediate action.

The Driller must be aware of the necessary activities in the event of receiving a Yellow
or Red DP alerts, and he should be able to respond immediately.

The Driller’s main focus will be the effective and safe operation of the Drill floor
activities, but as an integral part of the DP Drilling operation he must also gain an
understanding of the DP operation as it interacts with the Drilling operation.

2.8 Assistant Driller

It is important that the Assistant Driller understands the DP operations and

terminology, and he should communicate with the DP Control desk on a regular basis
under the supervision of the Driller and / or Toolpusher.

2.9 Sub Sea Supervisor

The Sub Sea Supervisor is in charge of and responsible for all sub sea related
equipment, including and not limited to BOP/LMRP, Riser Tensioners, Riser Angle
Indicators and Drill String Compensators, where fitted, and the associated equipment.

The Sub Sea Supervisor is an integral part of the communication chain for DP Drilling
Operations as his role is critical when responding to a change of Operational status
and alerts, brought about by the requirements of the operations at the DP or Drill
Floor Control Centers.

In addition it is also possible that the maintenance of certain Sub Sea related
equipment may have an impact upon ongoing DP Operations hence the Sub Sea
Supervisor must have some knowledge how his components are integrated into the
DP station keeping system.

2.10 Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor

The Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for the installation’s power

generation, distribution and propulsion systems.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 7 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor must have an in depth knowledge of the

interface of his systems and how they influence the DP station keeping system from
the point of view of control and system redundancy. He must be able to recognize
when systems are operating close to their maximum parameters and ensure that
maintenance systems do not compromise system redundancy on a long-term basis.

The Chief Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor must work closely with both the Master
and OIM to ensure that both are fully aware of the availability of the systems under his
control and how any potential failures could affect the current DP Station keeping
requirements.

It is vital to the continuity of the DP Drilling system that any preventative maintenance
being performed does not impact upon the conduct of the DP Station keeping system
in it’s widest context. Before any such work is commenced it must be brought to the
attention of the Master and OIM, and if deemed necessary a suitable permit raised
and the DP Operator informed both at the commencement and completion of the
work.

Given the extensive amount of equipment that falls under the Chief
Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor’s responsibility, he must be aware of the various
DP Studies that have been conducted on the installation such as:

• FMEA
• FMEA Proving Trials – including action items and resolution thereof
• Annual trials document when completed
• Riser and Vessel Capability
• Installation specific PMS and DP limitations documentation
• Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels
IMCA M 103 dated February 1999.

He should also be aware of other relevant DP related publications as they effect his
area of responsibility such as the publications relating to fires in engine rooms on DP
installations.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 8 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.11 Assistant Engineer

The Assistant Engineer (on tour) is the person responsible for the safe and
efficient operation of the Engine Room spaces during his duty period. The
watch keeping duties may be carried out either within the Engine Room(s) or at
the remote Vessel Management System (VMS)) control station provided the
installation is classed for unmanned engine room operations. The Assistant
Engineer must be Deemed Competent to operate the VMS system and
associated machinery systems by the Chief Engineer / Maintenance Supervisor
and Master (for the purpose of delegating authority).

Due to the nature of the DP station keeping operation it is essential that the Duty
Assistant Engineer is aware of the ongoing DP Drilling operation and
understands the need to ensure equipment optimization is maintained to sustain
a suitable level of equipment redundancy in support of the DP Drilling operation.

At all times the Assistant Engineer must maintain a good level (line) of
communication with the DP control center and, if required, the Drill floor, and he
must ensure that all communications are fully understood by all parties. In the
event of a critical situation arising there can be no room for any
misunderstanding if urgent remedial activity is required.

The Assistant Engineer must be fully aware of all DP and drilling emergency
procedures and guidelines as they effect his area of operation.

2.12 Vessel Management System (VMS) Operator

The VMS Operator will have a designated primary function for the safe and
efficient operation of the vessel management system (VMS) during his period of
duty. Dependent upon the classification and operation of the installation, these
duties may be undertaken remote from the engine spaces in the case of an
installation being classed for an Unmanned Machinery Space or at the local
Engine Control Center in the case of a conventionally classed installation.

In the case of an installation operating a conventionally manned engine room,

the VMS watchkeeping shall be a part of the Assistant Engineer’s role and his
duties are outlined in subsection 2.11.

In the case of an installation operating with an unmanned engine room the VMS
Operator must be deemed competent to operate the VMS and associated
machinery systems by the Chief Engineer / Maintenance Supervisor and Master

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 9 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(for the purpose of delegating authority). The VMS Operator shall hold an
engineering license if required by the Installation’s Safe Manning Certificate.

Due to the nature of the DP Station keeping operation, it is essential the VMS
Operator is aware of the ongoing DP Drilling operation and understands the
need to ensure equipment optimization is maintained to sustain a suitable level
of equipment redundancy in support of the DP Drilling operation.

At all times the VMS Operator must maintain a good level (line) of
communication with the DP control center and if required the Drill Floor, and he
must ensure that all communications are fully understood by all parties. In the
event of a critical situation arising there can be no room for any
misunderstanding if urgent remedial activity is required.

The VMS Operator must be fully aware of all DP and Drilling Emergency
Guidelines as they effect his area of operation.

2.13 Chief Electrician/Electrical Supervisor

The Chief Electrician/Electrical Supervisor is responsible for a critical area of

equipment and subsystems that are integrated with the DP station keeping
system.

The Chief Electrician/Electrical Supervisor must have a particularly in depth

knowledge of the interface of his systems and how they influence the DP station
keeping system operation from the point of view of control and system
redundancy. He must be able to recognize when systems are operating close to
their maximum parameters and ensure that maintenance does not compromise
system redundancy on a long-term basis.

It is vital to the continuity of the DP Drilling system that any preventative

maintenance being performed does not impact upon the conduct of the DP
Station keeping system in it’s widest context, from reference system signal
receivers to thruster feedback signals. Before any such work is commenced it
must be brought to the attention of the Master, OIM and Chief
Engineer/Maintenance Supervisor, and if deemed necessary a suitable permit
raised and the DP Operator informed both at the commencement and
completion of the work.

The Chief Electrician/Electrical Supervisor must have a good working knowledge

of the installation’s FMEA and FMEA Trials results as well as all the appropriate
manuals, including the DP system Operating and Commissioning Manuals. He

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 10 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

should also be aware of the relevant DP industry publications that are relevant to
his area of responsibility within the DP operating system.

2.14 Electronic Technician (ET)

The Electronic Technician will be undertaking routine DP electronic (IT) equipment

maintenance, and as such he must hold an appropriate DP maintenance training
certificate from the equipment manufacturer. He must have a thorough knowledge of
the various DP Control System manuals and their associated position reference
systems. He should also have knowledge of the installation’s FMEA and FMEA
Proving Trials report.

Due to the criticality of any work associated with the DP Control systems he must
liase closely with the DPO’s, Chief Electrician/Electrical Supervisor, and Master. He
will not undertake any work on the DP System without consulting with one of those
three key persons, and obtaining the permission of the on duty DPO / 2nd Mate.
Should there be any changes to system settings the Senior DPO / 2nd Mate must be
informed and record such changes in the DP Occurrence Log. Such changes will also
be notified in the Monthly DP report.

The Electronic Technician should be in possession of an IMCA DP Logbook that will

verify his DP Maintenance Experience.

3 Training and Familiarization

3.1 General

Properly trained Dynamic Positioning personnel and effectively maintained systems

are essential to the safe and successful completion of all operations undertaken by
DP installations.

It is the Company’s intent that all personnel directly involved with the day to day
operation of the DP Station Keeping System will have the appropriate DP Operation
and Maintenance Training in line with the International Marine Contractors
Association (IMCA) agreed standards of Competency and Training and Transocean
DP OJT.

All personnel involved directly with the daily operation of the DP system should
ensure they record their time dedicated to DP Operations in an approved format, i.e.
IMCA or other approved DP Logbook.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 11 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.2 Onboard Training

Some installations have a DP simulator available for personnel to undertake specific

DP Maneuvering training on a dedicated DP simulator. Where this is possible a set of
scenarios relevant to the area of operation should be undertaken by the relevant
personnel on a routine basis, at a time when they are Off Watch, or full DP Watch-
keeping is not ongoing. Such onboard training should be formally recorded by the
Master and records maintained.

Where such a dedicated stand-alone facility is not available but is only in-built as part
of the DP control desk, the ability for such training will be limited to periods of non-DP
operation. Although there may be other demands upon the DP operators at this time
they should avail themselves of such an opportunity to enhance their skills.

During periods where the installation is not connected subsea with a riser, the Master
shall be responsible for ensuring that DP training is undertaken on an opportunity
basis. Practice in DP manual (joystick) may form part of the installation’s operational
training to develop the DPO’s level of competence in ship handling. Any training
should be undertaken in a controlled manner under supervision of the Master or his
representative. Permission for such training shall be sought from the Master and
appropriate records shall be maintained.

3.3 DP Emergency Training

Emergency preparedness is a contingency for which the DP Operators must always

be prepared in case of a system, component or function failure. For installations with
stand alone DP training simulators such an eventuality can be practiced with
comparative ease. For those installations that do not have such equipment it may be
valid for the Master to conduct “table top” exercises with the off-duty personnel so
that formal procedures and guidelines can be practiced and any shortfalls noted and
amendments made. Records of such training shall be maintained. The DP Alert drill
training shall take the form of discussion between all involved as well as actual (non-
intrusive) practice sessions.

3.4 DP Familiarization

In accordance with his responsibilities, the Master shall develop an installation

specific DP shipboard familiarization course for all new hire marine, engineering and
drilling staff. These personnel will receive an induction upon joining an installation for
the first time that emphasizes their specified duties.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 12 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The period of familiarization may extend for a period of time until it is deemed that a
particular individual is sufficiently competent and familiar with the systems for which he
will eventually be responsible.

Specific induction checklists for personnel associated with the DP station keeping or
VMS Control systems will be developed by each installation and will be appended to
the installation specific DP manual. Once completed such an individual checklist
should be signed by the designated authority and kept on file.

Every DP installation will differ from another in some way or another even if they are
intended as being of the same class or design. Therefore, whenever personnel
transfer between what should be identical installations the requirement for the
completion of the formal induction checklist remains valid.

3.4.1 DP Familiarization Process

Figure 1 below should be used to introduce new Key DP Personnel to DP Operations.

This checklist may be used as a means of providing guidance for the following
personnel engaged in DP Operations. Reference: IMCA M 117 Jan 1996 Training &
Experience of Key DP Personnel.

• Chief Mates
• Senior DPOs / 2nd Mates
• DPOs
• Toolpusher & Drillers
• Maintenance and Engineering staff including C/E, Assist/E, and VMS Operators
• Electronic / electrical staff

The Company Dynamic Positioning Operator OJT Module shall be completed by

personnel identified in the Worldwide Training Matrix.

3.4.2 DP Marine Personnel

All key DP personnel joining any DP installation should follow a structured

familiarization procedure which starts with the reading of appropriate manuals, DP
Event reports, FMEA, DP operations manual and any documented DP history, e.g.
DP trials reports, checklists etc. Installation familiarization requirements should be
controlled onboard to ensure relevant manuals and familiarization routines are
completed.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 13 14
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.4.3 Engineering Personnel

The Master shall be responsible for ensuring that the provisions of IMCA M117
Paragraph 6.1.5 are followed for all newly appointed Engineering staff. Additional
cross familiarization (Engineering / DP) will be provided by the installation DP staff.

3.4.4 Drilling Personnel

The Master shall be responsible for ensuring that all newly appointed key operating
personnel are provided with cross Drilling / DP familiarization training following IMCA
M117 Section 6.2, Project Familiarization. The training will be provided at the DP
control station by the Senior DP watch keeper or Master's nominated deputy.

3.5 Checklist for Training

Figure 1 should be used to ensure that the installation and project specific training is
given to all new key DP personnel.

3.6 Training Material

It shall be the Master's responsibility to formulate training material that can be used to
facilitate training requirements. Best practice within the fleet is a checklist with
supporting information in a package that can be followed easily by the trainer. This
familiarization should take no longer than 30 minutes and should be able to be of use
to previously experienced personnel as well as fully new-hire personnel. Masters shall
use this guidance to develop an onboard familiarization regime that can be easily
undertaken and administered.

REVISION NO: 01 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 14 14
 Figure 1 - DP Familiarization Criteria

No Description Position Check

SDPO DPO C/O TP Driller Engr Elec

1 HSE Policy ! ! ! ! ! ! !

2 Floating Ops. – DP Section ! ! ! ! ! ! !

3 Masters responsibility ! ! ! ! ! ! !

4 Shipboard reporting lines ! ! ! ! ! ! !

5 Senior DPO’s responsibility ! ! ! ! ! ! !

6 DP system overview ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Station keeping task
7 ! ! ! ! ! ! !
overview
8 Engineering & Redundancy ! ! ! ! ! ! !

9 Generation available ! ! ! !

10 Propulsion available ! ! ! !

11 Electrical – DP awareness ! ! ! ! ! ! !

12 DP Guidance documents ! ! ! ! !

13 Codes of best practice ! ! ! ! ! ! !

14 Position reference systems ! ! ! !

DP logbooks (Marine, Eng,
15 ! ! ! ! !
Elec)
16 DP Checklists ! ! !

17 Engineering checklists ! !

18 Hazardous Operations cases ! ! ! ! ! ! !

19 Drilling systems checklists ! ! !

Show Alert matrix for
20 ! ! ! ! ! ! !
installation
Reporting (to Master and
21 ! ! ! ! ! ! !
OIM)
22 Advisory Condition definition ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Yellow, Advisory & Red
23 ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Alerts
24 Alerting & communications ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Client contact and Policy
25 ! ! ! ! ! ! !
aboard

A record should be maintained to show that all Key DP Personnel have been provided with an
adequate level of instruction to enable them to carry out their function correctly.
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

1 POLICY

It is a Policy of the Company that three key areas be manned at all times. These
areas must maintain regular communication with each other on any change of
status that may effect the overall safety of the operation:

• DP Control Desk
• Driller’s Console
• Vessel Management System Control Center

It is a Policy of the Company that manning levels for key locations should not
be compromised.

2 PURPOSE

The purpose of the Guidelines identified below are to establish a standard of

watchkeeping that Transocean expects to be maintained by the DP Operational
Team. These guidelines shall be addressed in each installation’s DP manual and
adhered to at all times. If the installation specific or Client requirements dictate non-
compliance with the guidelines herein, then an Exemption (Refer to Section 1,
subsection 4) shall be sanctioned accordingly.

3 SCOPE

This Policy covers all DP installations and employees of the Company.

4 DP WATCHKEEPING

4.1 General

Effective DP Operations combines vigilant and conscientious Watch-keeping with

correct remedial action in the event of a worse case event occurring at the worst
possible moment.

4.2 Manning Level at Key Locations

Note: The client may have a requirement for an enhanced level of manning above or
beyond that which has been stated which has been agreed at the contract
negotiations stage.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

During any period when there is an increased level of manning present in one
specific control area the person in charge in that area must be clearly identified.

For the purposes of this procedure where reference is made to the “DP watch
stander/keeper” this means the DP Operator actually manning the DP desk.

4.2.1 DP Control Desk

1. At all times an installation is engaged in DP operations the DP desk will be

monitored continuously by a DP watchkeeper. There will be a competent
DP Operator in attendance within the DP Control center at all times.

2. When the installation is engaged in DP Operations in close proximity to

another installation or structure, or when attached to the sea floor by
means of a riser or similar rigid system, the DP desk will be manned by a
competent DP watch keeper. A second competent DP operator will be
available in or near the DP Control center.

3. When the installation is engaged in DP operations and environmental

conditions are deteriorating to a level where equipment utilization is beyond
normal operational parameters, 2 DP watchkeepers must be in the DP
control room, one of whom will man the DP Desk continuously.

4. In the event the installation is on DP but there is a component failure such

that the system has limited/impaired redundancy two competent DP watch
keepers will be in attendance at the DP Control center and the DP desk
continuously manned.

5. The above are the minimum manning levels that will be adhered to, the
Master may require an enhanced level of manning to support other specific
DP or other operational Guidelines as he deems necessary.

The manning of the DP Desk should be undertaken on a rotation of one hour to

ensure the “on desk” watch keeper maximizes his concentration during the
watch period.

4.2.2 Vessel Management System Control Center

At all times that the installation is engaged in DP operations and connected to

the seabed, the Vessel Management Control Center must be monitored by a
competent VMS Operator / Assistant Engineer.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

On installations which have combined DP and vessel management control

centers it is permissible for the Vessel Management System Operator / Assistant
Engineer to be an assistant DPO, and the duties at the consoles to be shared.

The installation’s Management Team will decide upon any enhancement to this
level of manning during periods of especially critical DP Drilling Operations.

4.3 DP Associated Watch-keeping Duties

The Watch-keeping duties identified below are those necessary in the operation
of a Dynamically Positioned installation and are in addition to those required for
an installation at sea on a routine passage. At all times the safety of personnel
and the installation will remain the paramount consideration.

4.3.1 DP Operator

DP Operators in general will work a 12-hour shift with a rotation of one hour on
the DP Desk. With one person dedicated to the DP desk the other will
undertake all other support duties which may include:

• VMS Watchkeeping
• General VHF Communications
• Communications with Helicopters and standby vessels
• Anti collision and weather radar watch
• Dealing with Supply vessels
• GMDSS associated duties
• Ballast and Stability issues
• Advise relevant parties if a heading or positional change is required
• Obtaining up to date weather forecast
• Completion of Marine Log and DP check lists etc
• Respond to any central alarms e.g. fire or gas and ensure their cause is fully
investigated by another party, and necessary action set in place.
• General navigational and marine duties.
• Calling or liasing with the Master or his nominated deputy as required.

The Senior DPO/2nd Mate will always be in charge of the watch. The DPO will
operate as directed by the 2nd Mate/Senior DPO depending upon his experience
to date. The two personnel will work as a team, with a free flow of information
between them, to ensure both are fully aware of ongoing and intended
operations.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

The on-shift/on desk DPO will be dedicated to the operation of the DP console
and communicating with the key control centers, Driller, Machinery Control
Room, as is required by the operation. The off-desk DP operator will
communicate all activities with his colleague to ensure that both parties are fully
aware of the current situation as it effects the overall DP operation.

The on desk DP Operator will concentrate on the following tasks:

• Maintaining the installation within the circle of critical position to enable

operations to continue. Ensuring reference systems operability are effective
and defective systems taken off line if not rejected.
• Ensure power generation and propulsion configuration as indicated at the DP
desk represents actual on-line systems, and ensure systems are being used
efficiently to sustain optimum fuel usage and efficient equipment running
time.
• Monitor position-keeping trends with particular reference to any deterioration
that may indicate a requirement to change the installation’s position or
heading.
• Communicating with the key areas, particularly when making a heading
change to ensure:

• Drill floor aware of operation as regards orientation of down hole tools

• Subsea Supervisor monitors choke and kill lines, slip or fluid rings and
control hoses etc
• VMS Operator / Assistant Engineer is aware of increased power
requirements.
• ROV are aware with regard to re-orientation of vehicle if required.

When the DP Operator is on-duty at the DP Desk he will not stand down until
such time as the off-shift operator relieves him. The on-duty watch keeper will
reside at the DP desk and he will only undertake such communication duties as
he can achieve without leaving his position.

4.3.2 Duty (On-Tour) Engineer

On installations operating with a conventionally manned engine room, the Duty

Engineer is designated as the Senior Engineer on watch at any time. The Duty
Engineer will work a 12-Hour shift during which time his prime responsibility will
be to ensure there is sufficient electrical power on line with sufficient reserve
power available to support current operations. In addition he must also ensure

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

that the requirements for equipment configuration are met to support the aspect
of equipment redundancy should any failure occur.

The Duty Engineer must undertake frequent communication with the Bridge and
Driller’s console to advise them both of equipment status.

The Duty Engineer will also communicate immediately with the Chief or Second
Engineer in the event of any unplanned or unexpected event occurring which
causes a deviation of the on line plant from their normal configuration. In such a
case the Duty Engineer must also inform the DP Operator and the Driller, of the
occurrence.

The Duty Engineer will always ensure the Control room is manned by a
competent engineer if he has to undertake any specific task, e.g. maintenance
or log duties outside of the area. He will also ensure that his relief is fully briefed
as to the ongoing situation as it effects the DP operation. He will inform the
watch keeper of his movements prior to departing and after returning to the
Machinery Control Room, and at that time he will ensure he has had a full
handover from his relief.

4.3.3 Driller

As the prime contact on the drill floor and person responsible for the activity in
that area he regularly communicate with the DP watchkeeper to advise him of
current activities and deviation from the planned activity that may require a
change of installation attitude or online equipment.

The Driller must at all times inform the DP Operator when he leaves the Driller’s
Work Station and also when he returns and keep him advised of any changes of
status during the period of his absence. Only by building up such a flow of
communication will the Driller and watch keeper both be fully aware of any
adverse operating trends that may require urgent remedial actions.

5 DP CONTROL CONSOLE PROCEDURES

The purpose of the guidelines presented below are to establish set guidelines on the
standard of Watch-keeping that the company expects to be maintained by the DP
operational team. These guidelines shall be repeated in every installation’s DP
manual and adhered to at all times. If local or client requirements dictate these
guidelines be modified then such modifications shall be sanctioned by the Rig
Manager and the Regional Operations Manager. By adhering to a high standard of

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

operational guidelines the DP operation will itself be maintained to a high standard

ensuring the continued employment of the installation at it’s specific location.

5.1 General

• The DP Control Desk will not be left unattended at any time when on DP
operations.
• The on watch DP operator is not to be involved in any other activity than DP watch
and communicating as required with the other control centers.
• When the watch keeper takes over the desk he must ensure he is fully aware of
reference system status, and be ready to respond to any failures.
• Hourly check sheets of the DP Operations will be completed.
• Under no circumstances will drinks be consumed at the DP desk, and under no
circumstances will other personnel be allowed to congregate in the area of the DP
desk or otherwise distract the watch keeper from his duties.
• If required, on-watch personnel will ask other personnel to leave the DP Control
Center area if these “vistors” are distracting the personnel on watch.
• A log will be maintained of all spurious alarms or computer anomalies that may
need software fixes. The details of these systematic errors will be passed to the
DP system vendor if required. This log will also form a historical record of system
performance.
• All unexpected DP alarms will be reported to the Master.
• The DP status board shall be kept up to date. The status board should display
such items as:-
♦ Stack heading
♦ Position co-ordinates
♦ Escape route heading to deep water
♦ Rotational Limits
♦ Direction to deeper water in event of EDS
♦ Engine availability and/or maintenance
♦ Thruster availability
♦ On line acoustics details
♦ Antennae elevation and azimuth for reception of Differential Signals
♦ Reference Stations for DGPS solutions.
♦ Fuel status
♦ Any degraded Reference item.
♦ Other DP vessels in close proximity
♦ Acoustic conflict
♦ Supply vessel noise

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

♦ Critical Data derived from the Rig DERPS Riser management system (if
installed)
♦ ROV Status
• If there is any doubt as to DP performance, the “Off Desk watch keeper” will call
the Master, at the direction of the Sr. DPO/2nd Mate.
• Regular weather forecasts will be obtained and made fully available to the DP
control room, in order to plan any necessary maneuvering to prepare the
installation for adverse conditions.

For contingency planning the direction of deep water will be noted. Suitable
bathymetric chart data must be readily available to determine this direction.

5.2 DP Desk Hand Over Checks

The on-coming watch keeper will confirm the following items and be aware of their
status as a minimum. When satisfied the status is verified he will confirm to the off-
going watch keeper that he has control.

• Station keeping redundancy is secure.

• Installation position is stable and footprint within levels expected for the existing
environmental conditions.
• On-coming watch keeper knows the well position setpoint aspect in relation to the
installation setpoint.
• Riser angle, tension and mud weight data to be confirmed (as applicable)
• On-coming watch keeper to be aware of quantity and direction of riser windup
from BOP land heading (if applicable).
• On-coming watch keeper to be aware of number of on line reference systems (3)
and that systems on line are set to achieve maximum performance.
• On-coming watch keeper to be satisfied that heading is optimized for the
prevailing meteorological conditions and Online/Hypothetical capability check has
been made.
• On-coming watch keeper is aware of diesel generator and switchboard status and
is familiar with action required in the event of a failure.
• When satisfied that all checks have been completed the on-coming watch keeper
will confirm to the off-going watch keeper that he has control, with a clear verbal
statement:

“I HAVE CONTROL”

6 DOCUMENTATION

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP WATCH KEEPING

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy however; other

reference sources may have documentation requirements.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 8
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

1 DP DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

1.1 General

To ensure that DP desk operational guidelines remain consistent throughout all

Transocean installations, a system of procedural checks and records has been
developed. Such checklists and records will establish the background of a formal
approach to the DP station keeping operation as it is undertaken by the DP
Operational Support Group. These records will provide important historical data
identifying how the installation has operated for given criteria in the past and therefore
providing a sound basis for future operational employment.

1.2 Definitions

For the purpose of reporting any unusual activities associated with the DP system the
following terminology should be used as standard throughout the fleet to report DP
Events:

1.2.1 DP Occurrence

A DP Occurrence (ex-“DP Degraded”) is any situation where capability / redundancy

is reduced (not routine maintenance). The performance of the DP system does not
result in loss of position outside the Green watch circle, but by it’s nature is unusual
and worthy of note. A “DP Occurrence” is usually managed by the DP operator as an
operational fact of life (loss of a reference system due to scintillation or acoustic noise
etc).

1.2.2 DP Upset

A DP Upset is an unexpected event or activity that, if not controlled, could have led to
a grave consequence, i.e. disconnect scenario. The outcome of a DP upset may be a
loss of position within the “Yellow DP alert criteria”.

1.2.3 DP Incident

A DP Incident occurs where excursion becomes equal to or greater than the “Red DP
Alert” limit or results in damage to equipment or riser disconnect.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

2 DP SYSTEM RECORDS AND REPORTING

In accordance with IMO 645 Section 4 every installation will establish a system of
formal DP System checklists and logs to cover various stages of the operation. The
intent of these documents is to ensure system integrity and confirm that the current
DP operating parameters are verified against the operational and environmental
criteria at the current location. Upon completion of a checklist it will be signed off by
the authorized persons and the Master and then placed on file and retained onboard
the installation for at least one-year.

The contents of these checklists will be developed by each installation and copied to
the HQS DP Operations Superintendent for information and reference.

The following shall be developed by each installation:

• Pre Location Arrival Trials

• DP Desk Hourly Log
• Daily Rough Log (Operational Log)
• Engine Room Checklists
• DP Anomaly Log
• Beacon Log
• Weather
• Bridge Marine or Deck Log
• DP Event Reports
• Well Planning Checklist (refer to Section 6, subsection 2)

2.1 Pre-Location Arrival Trials (Checklist)

This checklist shall be completed when:

• The installation arrives at a new location (excludes template shifting moves) prior
to spudding in.
• The installation has been off DP for more than 4 days
• Work has been carried out on any of the systems between wells

The purpose of the Pre-Location Arrival Checklist is to document and ensure the DP
system functionality. This check list identifies the minimum trials/testing guidelines
required to ensure that by the time the installation is established in a full automatic DP
mode above the well location, all the DP and associated systems have been proven
to be fully functional. The formal document will be signed off as proof of satisfactory
completion of the trials.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

In addition to the Location trials report the installation will also use a single page
document as a record of initial system set up.

The checklist will follow the process as the DP installation arrives on location, and will
fall into distinct sections aimed at verifying the functionality of the system.

• Pre arrival physical checks - Well verification and equipment inspection

• Pre operational checks - Basic functions checks
• Manual DP checks - Functionality of the manual DP controls
• Automatic DP checks - Auto DP system functionality checks
• Drift-off test to determine vessel drift rate over a 10-minute period with loss of
power

The following data must be clearly recorded on the checklist at the completion of the
tests:

• Heading Alarm deviation limits

• Position Alarm deviation limits
• Thruster Alarm levels if manually set
• Escape corridor or direction of deeper water
• Position reference Set-Up Coordinates

2.2 DP Desk Status Log

This hourly / bi-hourly (environment and operation dependent) status check should act
as the system hand-over check between the DP operators. It should log the current
operational status with regard to varying parameters that effect DP operations, e.g.,
power usage, footprint, wind speed, direction, generators on line, riser angle and if
necessary, any operator input variable settings. The log will also be used to record
the system set up and established settings etc. The log will demonstrate an overall
picture of the DP station keeping performance, the settings in place, equipment on
line and their performance.

2.3 Daily Rough Log (Operational Log)

This is a daily hand written rough log of every circumstance or event that affects the
DP and marine based operation. Every action taken by the DPO, information
received from external sources and any other event that may be relevant shall be
recorded in this log. The log should include details of vessel movements, helicopter
movements and ROV Operations.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

2.4 Engine Room Checklists

These checklists will be utilized by the Engine Room watch keepers, to ensure
that the status of the generation and propulsion plant within their remit remains
fully functional to support the necessary level of redundancy for the DP
operation. The duty watch keeper will complete these checklists at the
commencement of each shift. Any compromise of system status must be
reported immediately to the on-tour DPO and Chief Engineer

2.5 DP Anomaly Log

This log will be used to record any malfunction of the DP system and it’s
peripherals, e.g. reference systems, control systems, propulsion unit’s software
etc, however trivial that it might appear. This hand written log will provide a vital
history of the performance of the system components. This information may
provide important detail for future software upgrades. The sequence of events
leading to the malfunction and relevant timings should be accurately recorded. It
may be useful to append print outs from the DP control system printer to provide
increased clarity as to the sequence of events.

The relevant technical authority must be provided with ready access to the log.
When a fault has been rectified a suitable entry should be made in the log
detailing the means of repair.

2.6 Beacon Log

This log shall be used to record the number and type of acoustic beacons both
deployed and available as spare, and to monitor battery life and necessary
change out. Each beacon shall have a unique identification number. The
following details should be recorded:

• Beacon deployment date

• System identification for each beacon
• Transmit and receive frequencies
• Beacon location, by co-ordinates or reference to the BOP
• Daily plus cumulative running hours
• Battery status

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

2.7 Weather

The DP Operator will ensure that current weather forecasts are available at all
times. Weather forecasts, observations and weather radar (where installed) may
indicate adverse conditions such as squalls likely to impact DP operations,
necessitating a change of heading, or the re-scheduling of preventative
maintenance activities.

Extracts from these reports may be utilized in the DP Rough Log to validate DP
actions.

2.8 Bridge Marine or Deck Log

The requirement for this log has been identified in other sources. This log will
provide an overall view of the ongoing Marine and DP operation. It will be
particularly critical to update this log regularly during periods of adverse weather
when the vessel is waiting on weather.

2.9 DP Event Reports

All DP installations will maintain a file of their DP Event Reports as submitted to

the Houston HQS DP Operations Superintendent. These documents will be
supported by relevant documentation, i.e. alarm printouts, copies from the rough
log etc. The formal reports will provide a valuable guide to the installation’s past
performance history and may also influence modifications to software, hardware,
policies, procedures, guidelines or training. Both Transocean and IMCA report
forms shall be submitted to the Houston HQS DP Operations Superintendent.

The Houston HQS DP Operations Superintendent will submit reports to IMCA.

3 OTHER DP DOCUMENTATION

The documents identified below must be available to DP Operators and other relevant
personnel associated with the DP control system. The document’s circulation should
be closely controlled at all times, as they will contain necessary information as to the
DP operation of the installation. Such available documents would be:

• DP Capability Study
• FMEA Study and FMEA Trials report
• Various IMCA (International Marine Contractors Association) Standards
• OPL Publication on Principles of Dynamic Positioning

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

• Alarm Page/Parameter Print Out Reports

• DP and Reference System Operating Manuals.
• Vendors reports & DP related correspondence
• Riser Performance Analysis and associated Riser Management plan
• Site specific Environmental Operating Limits for the various drilling related
operations
• Monthly DP Report
• OPDOC – Operational Information Document

3.1 DP Capability Study

This document provides examples of expected station keeping performance for

a variety of environmental conditions and for a variety of thruster failure
configurations and limiting thruster power levels. It will be the guide to the DPO
on the expected DP station keeping capability of the unit and must be readily
available.

3.2 FMEA Study and Trials Report

These documents contain an extensive amount of information on the failure

modes of the DP station keeping hardware and software and identifies the
ramifications of system failures. This document is a valuable source on the DP
Station keeping system as fitted and as tested, and is therefore an important
source of information for all those associated with the DP system. The FMEA
should be referred to during the preparation of Emergency DP Guidelines.

3.3 IMCA Publications

These publications provide a valuable source of information on Equipment

Standards, Equipment Performance and Internationally Agreed Operating
Standards and Guidelines. All installations should maintain their Library up to
date with the relevant material. Transocean is a member of IMCA with a
representative elected to the Marine Management Committee. The company
receives all the IMCA latest publications.

Every DP installation should carry copies of the following subject specific

publications:

• M 103 Guidelines for the Design & Operation of DP Vessels issued 1999
• M 141 Guidelines on the use of DGPS as a Position Reference Systems in
DP Control Systems 1997

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

• M 145 Review of Three Dual Hydro-acoustic Position Reference Systems for

Deepwater Drilling 1998
• M 151 The Basic Principles and Use of Hydro-acoustic Position Reference
Systems in the Offshore Environment 1999
• M117 The Training and Experience of Key DP personnel 1996
• A World Wide Comparison Study of DGPS Network Services, Provision and
Support (To be issued February 2000)
• Current edition of the IMCA Annual Review of Station Keeping Incidents

The above core documents should be supplemented by more subject specific

documents as deemed suitable by the Master of the installation.

3.4 OPL Publication No 9 - Principles of Dynamic Positioning

This document is an essential tool for trainee watch keepers who are new to the
industry and are starting the DP Training process.

3.5 Alarm Page/Parameter Print Out Reports

These reports should be available to the DPO & VMS watch keeper as they
provide specific information regarding alarms.

3.6 DP and Reference System Operating Manuals

These manuals must be readily accessible to the DP watch keepers and those
Technical personnel involved with the maintenance of the DP and it’s associated
systems.

3.7 Vendors Reports & DP Related Correspondence

These documents will provide important data on the operating and related
systems and all DP Operators must have access to the relevant sections that
may effect the operation.

3.8 Riser Performance Analysis and Management Report

This document must be readily available to the DP Operator, as it will identify the
degree of station keeping required to minimize stresses on the riser system. The
document will therefore identify the critical positioning of the installation for a
combination of drilling and environmental parameters.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

3.9 Environmental Operational Limits

These limits may be contained within the Riser Performance Analysis or they
may be contained within a generic operations manual, or they may form part of
the contract agreement with the client. The DP Operator must be aware of the
agreed environmental limits that apply to specific operations.

These limits may be guidelines. However, if there are contractual obligations

based upon these limits, the Master should advise the OIM and Clients at any
time that these limits are being reached.

3.10 DP Monthly Report

This document contains statements as to the DP system operability during the

past calendar month, and is the main DP functionality report from the
installation. This report will be sent to the Rig Manager, HQS DP Operations
Superintendent, and HQS DP Discipline Manager. It will be held on file by the
Master but also available to the watch keepers and Technicians.

3.11 Operational Advisories

This document or set of documents contain operational guidance on a wide

range of DP operations, and activities. It is a system designed to enable the
rapid communication of any lessons learned, operational experiences, or
technical memoranda that are pertinent to the operation and use of the DP and
associated systems. Both the DP and related Technical disciplines should retain
a hard copy file for access (Refer to Section 9).

4 REPORTING

4.1 General

The Master is responsible for ensuring that all Operational and Technical issues
relating to functionality of the DP system is reported by the installation to the Rig
Manager, HQS DP Operations Superintendent and Region Field Support Group. The
headquarters DP Operations Superintendent will ensure the information is copied
within headquarters Engineering to ensure a speedy resolution of any outstanding
issues. The usual medium for the transmission of the information will be by electronic
mail, unless the seriousness or criticality of the issue warrants an immediate
response, in which case the individuals should be contacted direct.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION & REPORTING

4.2 DP Event

In the event of the installation sustaining a DP Event or any unexpected loss of

position, the Rig Manager, headquarters DP Operations Superintendent,
headquarters Field Support Group will be informed as soon as the installation has
returned to a stable operational status.

The Well Specific Operational Guidelines (WSOG) (Refer to Section 4, subsection

9) document will clearly and systematically identify significant limiting criteria that
impact upon the station keeping ability of the installation. The document will quantify
the minimum availability of these criteria for the various stages of degrading
operational status, i.e., through the deteriorating operational conditions:

GREEN ADVISORY YELLOW RED

The document must be developed by the installation prior to the commencement of

operations at the drilling location and will be site-specific. It is likely that the client will
require input and ultimately the document should carry the acceptance of the
installation Master, OIM and the client, if involved.

It will form a critical part of the site-specific documentation and made readily available
to relevant departments and personnel.

Timely and accurate reporting is essential in hazardous DP operations in order that

defined limits can be used and allow timely cessation of operations where risk may be
increased. The following Matrix is designed to assist both the Master and OIM in
following Transocean policies with respect to effective incident reporting. This Matrix
should be read in conjunction with installation and site-specific guidelines.

4.3 Equipment Malfunction

In the event of the malfunction or failure of any system associated with the operation
of the DP and it's associated reference systems the Rig Manager, headquarters DP
Operations Superintendent and Region Field Support Group should be informed.

Reference: Minimum Operating Standards Manual (HQS-OPS-001) – Section 2,

subsection 7, Internal Reporting

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 9
 DP MONTHLY REPORT Month Of:

Installation:

Vessel Client
Details
Arrival Date: Field: Water Depth:
Well Designation: Latitude: Longitude:
Summary (Brief overview of significant DP and Operational activities during last month)
of
Operations

Operational
Goals

DP Personnel
Movements

Computers

DGPS

Hydro
acoustics

Beacon
Batteries

Riser Angle
Sensors

1
 DP MONTHLY REPORT Month Of:

Installation:

Wind Sensors,
MRUs & Gyros

Engines &
Generators

Power
Management

DP UPS System
& Battery Status

Thrusters

Incidents

Items Closed
Out

Items Pending

Items carried
over from
previous
Months
awaiting close -
out

Master: - Date: -

2
 DP MONTHLY REPORT Month Of:

Installation:

Form 4.5 Revised December 31, 2001

3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTING

No. Event Criticality of Failure Report Type Report Distribution

Irrespective of whether position maintained Full Incident Report Rig Manager

Total loss of power to
1 or not. This is a fundamental failure which Transocean DP Event Report HQS DP Ops. Supt.
propulsion system
will require full investigation IMCA Incident Report* Discipline Mgr. DP/Control/IT

Loss of Position due to Full Incident Report

Rig Manager
2 excessive environmental High potential incident resulting Transocean DP Event Report
forces, with EDS HQS DP Ops. Supt.
IMCA Incident Report*
Discipline Mgr. DP/Control/IT

Full Incident Report Rig Manager

Loss of Reference System
3 High potential incident resulting Transocean DP Event Report HQS DP Ops. Supt.
leading to a RED Alert
IMCA Incident Report*

Loss of propulsion system Report as Near Hit Rig Manager

4 leading to Loss of Transocean DP Event Report HQS DP Ops. Supt.
position no EDS IF yellow alert results
IMCA Incident Report* Discipline Mgr. DP/Control/IT

Loss of Position due to Report as Near Hit

Has high potential but contained, no
5 excessive environmental Transocean DP Event Report Rig Manager
damage to equipment
forces, no EDS IMCA Incident report* HQS DP Ops. Supt.

Loss of Reference System Report as Near Hit

6 leading to a YELLOW Has a high potential but contained Transocean DP Event Report Rig Manager
alert IMCA Incident Report* HQS DP Ops. Supt.

• IMCA Incident Report to be completed by the HQS DP Operations Superintendent

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTING

No. Event Criticality of Failure Report Type Reporting Notes

If long term > 12 Hours has significant Rig Mgr and Region Field Support Manager
potential - dependent upon current drilling
mode. Unless damage sustained to units no
Loss of thruster resulting
7 formal report required unless initiated Period and reason for non-availability to be
in Advisory status. If short term ie < 12 Hours has limited by shore Management. noted in Bridge Ops Book and detailed in
potential - dependent upon current drilling
mode. Monthly DP Report.

Loss of Thruster not Routine report to Rig Manager

Unless damage sustained to units no
impacting upon current Low criticality provided not a critical unit, Period and reason for non-availability to be
8 formal report required unless initiated
operations, or operational i.e. critical to station keeping. noted in Bridge Ops Book and detailed in
by shore Management.
redundancy Monthly DP Report.

If long term > 12 Hours has significant Rig Mgr and Region Field Support Manager
potential - dependent upon current drilling
Loss of Available mode. Unless damage sustained to units no
9 generation power leading formal report required unless initiated Period and reason for non-availability to be
to Advisory Status If short term i.e. < 12 Hours has limited by shore Management.
potential - dependent upon current drilling noted in Bridge Ops Book and detailed in
mode. Monthly DP Report.

Loss of Generator not Routine report to Rig Manger

Unless damage sustained to units no
impacting upon current Low criticality provided not a critical unit, Period and reason for non-availability to be
10 formal report required unless initiated
operations, or operational i.e. critical to station keeping. noted in Bridge Ops Book and detailed in
by shore Management.
redundancy Monthly DP Report.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2

 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
COMMUNICATIONS & ALARMS

1 COMMUNICATIONS AND ALARMS

1.1 General

All personnel have a responsibility to report to the watch keeper any observation or
occurrence which may indicate that the safety and efficient operation of the
installation may be effected. This would include, but not be limited to the following:

• Intention to perform and notification of completion, of maintenance or

modification to any electrical or mechanical system which could directly affect on-
line DP equipment, or make standby equipment unavailable. A Permit to Work
must be obtained, signed by the Master / Chief Officer, before any DP related
equipment is worked on
• Intention to start or stop auxiliary air or hydraulic units, which may reduce
pressure on DP associated equipment
• Intention to dump mud, discharge sand traps (acoustical interference)
• Intention to start or stop the use of radio or radar equipment that may effect the
DP signal reception.
• Intention to handle equipment that may effect the trim of the installation
• Imminent arrival or departure of a helicopter or vessel alongside
• Effective DP antenna reception

1.2 Testing of Communication and Alarms

The following tests of communications must be carried out between the DP control
center, drill floor, engine room or VMS center and the ROV control cabin before
commencement of DP drilling operations. Additionally, these alarms must be tested
at the commencement of every watch. Notification of an alarm test must be given
and acknowledged by all areas in advance of the test. All areas must also confirm
the satisfactory operation of the visual alarm signals, i.e. Yellow or Red Lights:

• Open line - loud speaker communication

• Back up communication system
• DP Alert System
• VHF/UHF radio

2 COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS

Communication between the Driller’s station, the DP console, and the Engine Control
Room must be regular and frequent. Each watch keeper must inform the other about
any changes in operational circumstances. Good communication is of importance on

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
COMMUNICATIONS & ALARMS

a DP installation. Actions taken by one department may impact the functions of

another department. Communication between the three watch keepers is vital and
must never be underestimated:

• Plain language must be used when using the open net

• Communication must be in English. On all Transocean DP installations key
personnel must communicate in English
• Communication must be clear and an acknowledgement of understanding
received
• Channels of communication must not be tied up for other reasons
• Channels of communication must only involve relevant parties

Note: Communication by alarm system must provoke immediate, “no questions

asked”, reaction.
.
3 TYPES OF INFORMATION

Communication between the DP Operator and the Driller is important. The extreme
example of this is when the DP Operator initiates a Yellow or Red Alert and the Driller
must react instantly and correctly.

The DP Operator and Driller shall communicate verbally and regularly regarding
normal operations. The DP Operator and Driller shall develop an understanding that
they keep each other informed of all events in their respective working areas that
could affect the other.

3.1 DP Operator Communication to Driller (example)

• Any change to be made to setpoint heading. DPO has the responsibility to

ensure that the tensioner load ring is observed during maneuver.
• Watch keeper to confirm KT ring pressurized with the Driller
• Any unplanned operational change that may impact on Riser Management.
• Any significant change to be made to setpoint position
• Deterioration of environmental conditions (forecast and actual)
• ROV launch and recovery
• Supply boat arrival and departure
• Indication that installation is approaching preset limits regarding station keeping
• Helicopter arrival and departure
• Loss of reference system or loss of redundancy
• Degraded system status other than Yellow or Red Alert

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
COMMUNICATIONS & ALARMS

3.2 Driller Communication to DP Operator (example)

• Any situation which could develop into an emergency

• Any unplanned operational change that may impact on Riser Management
• Increased mud weight
• Advise when Drill string above BOP
• Commencing new operation
• Dumping mud or cleaning pits (acoustical interference)
• Entering and clear of BOP with BHA
• Entering and clear of BOP with Casing
• Commence run in or pull out of hole
• ROV in water

3.3 Engine Control Room (VMS) Communications (example)

• The DPO must communicate with the ECR / VMS Watch-keeper, as applicable, if
the DPO expects any significant increase in power demands and if the DPO is
either bringing on or taking thrusters off line. In an emergency situation, this is
not always possible but during normal operational conditions the ECR / VMS
Watch-keeper must be advised.
• The ECR / VMS Watch-keeper must communicate to both the DPO and the
Driller any problems with the power plant that might limit the power available to
either the drill floor or the DP Systems.
• The ECR / VMS Watch-keeper must inform the DPO of any problems identified
during routine thruster checks.
• The ECR / VMS Watch-keeper must communicate with the DPO in regard to any
intention to take engines off line or to change the sequence of on- line engines.
• The DPO must inform the ECR / VMS Watch-keeper when DP operations are to
commence
• The DPO must keep the ECR / VMS Watch-keeper informed whether the
installation is connected to the seabed and when it is not. This affects the
number of engineers required to be on-line.

3.4 ROV Communications (example)

• The Drill Floor, DP Control Desk and ROV supervisor must have good
communication during operations such as open hole re-entry and running of the
BOP. When this type of operation takes place, there must be three way
communication at all times and all three parties must work together to obtain the
best result.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
COMMUNICATIONS & ALARMS

• The ROV Supervisor must be in continuous communication with the DPO

every time the vehicle leaves the deck and until it is safely onboard on
completion of operations. The ROV supervisor must inform the DPO and the
Driller immediately of any problems when the vehicle is in the water.

• The DP Control Desk must communicate with the ROV Supervisor at times
the ROV is operating, any change in DP status, anticipated heading changes
or other action that could effect the operation or safety of the ROV.

4 DP ALERT STATUS

All Transocean DP installations will operate on a modified two alert system (Refer to
Section 4, subsection 9). A “Green Light” or “Green Status” will signify the normal
operating status.

These levels of alert must be clearly defined prior to the commencement of any DP
operation. The limits may change according to environment, geographical location,
water depth, client instructions, or limitations decided by the installation management
onshore or offshore. Limits may also change depending on the nature of work being
carried out, namely completion operations as against normal drilling operations.

When the limits have been defined they must be documented and copies given to all
relevant parties. This document must be unambiguous and easily understood
regarding the conditions set.

Copies of this document must be displayed close to the DP desk so that the DPO is
aware of his duty regarding implementation, and at the Driller’s console so that the
Driller is aware of his duty of immediate response.

Note: The watch keeper can activate an alert status prior to the conditions being
met. Nothing in these status levels is meant to imply, or impose, any constraints on
him taking any reasonable, effective action in a timely manner based upon his
assessment of the circumstances of the case.

4.1 Normal Status GREEN

The installation is defined as in ‘Normal Operating Status’ when all the following
conditions apply:

• Under DP control and the DP system is operating normally with appropriate back
up systems available.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
COMMUNICATIONS & ALARMS

• Environmental conditions are within the installation’s anticipated capabilities.

• Thruster outputs do not exceed 50% of thruster power with allowable
thrusters on-line, for more than brief and isolated periods.
• Installation’s indicated position is remaining within the normal expected
location within the Green watch circle for all but brief and isolated periods

4.2 Advisory Condition

When the installation is in an "ADVISORY" status it will still be able to maintain

position, but there has been an equipment, system or component failure which
could, together with another similar failure, lead to a further degradation of
operating status, i.e. Yellow alert.

In the Advisory Condition the following conditions will apply:

• Under DP control and which is operating but with reduced capability in some
way.
• Thruster power and total power consumption is equal to or less than the
maximum thrust and power that would be needed after the worst case single
failure to avoid exceeding the critical excursion.
• Installation's indicated position and heading are within predetermined limits
• Negligible risk of collision exists from other vessels.

4.3 Potential Emergency or YELLOW Alert Status

The installation is in ‘YELLOW’ Alert Status when:

• As a result of degraded operating status, the decision has been taken to

activate a Yellow Alert.
• The indicated position moves outside the GREEN watch circle.
• Riser system operational limitations are approached.
• Environmental conditions have approached operational limits.
• System failure results in a degraded positioning control.
• Any other specific condition or situation identified by the Master and listed in
the site-specific standing orders.
• Any other specific condition or situation that the DPO feels warrants a
YELLOW alert.

These conditions are given as standard but may be altered by the Master as
each location demands. Yellow is a situation where if something else happens
the Installation’s operation could be in trouble. Yellow is not purely an indication

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
COMMUNICATIONS & ALARMS

of DP limit. For example, a ship on collision course, a water spout on collision

course, fire alarm, unexplained excessive trimming / change in draft, etc. The
list of situations reflecting a yellow alert concludes with any situation the DPO
feels warrants a yellow alert. DP operators should not hesitate to use the
yellow alert.

4.4 DP Emergency or RED Alert Status

The installation is in ‘RED Alert Status’ when:

• Environmental conditions exceed operational limits.

• The maximum limitation of the Riser System has been reached to enable a
Planned Disconnect.
• System failure results in the inability to maintain position control within the
YELLOW watch circle.
• There has been a catastrophic equipment failure rendering the DP system
incapable of maintaining station.
• Any other specific condition or situation identified by the Master and listed in
the site-specific standing orders.
• Any other specific condition or situation that the watch keeper believes to
warrant a RED alert.

RED Alert indicates the installation is no longer fully under control and that
immediate action must be taken to allow the installation to leave location in a
safe and controlled manner so as to avoid damage to the installation, riser,
wellhead or environment.

The dangers of remaining connected when a Red Alert situation exists must be
clearly emphasized during on board familiarization. The damage to installation,
riser, well head or environment may far exceed the cost of a disconnect.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

1 OPERATING GUIDELINES

1.1 Standard Operational Procedures

Every installation will develop procedures to cover all activities relating to and
impacting upon DP Operations. The limit setting processes outlined in Section 4,
subsection 9 (incorporating WSOG) Document shall be followed.

Standard guidelines issued herein shall be used by all installations as a guide for
their specific requirements. The installation should ensure that any such procedures
they produce remain specific to equipment and location and if necessary, updates
must be made should any such parameter change. The date of compilation of the
procedure must be clearly identified within the installation specific manual.

1.2 Planning

Forward planning is essential to efficient DP operations. A plan shall be developed

for every new location and for any unusual operation. The plan shall include
information such as approach to location, location of installations in the immediate
area, beacon deployment and installation heading. Information on the expected
environmental conditions for the proposed location must be collected and used in
the preparation of a site-specific plan. The planning process must also take into
account all the site-specific criteria outlined within the Riser Management plan.

Bathymetric charts shall be obtained from the Operator defining sub sea
obstructions and depths at the drilling site. This information is vital to planning an
escape route.

In some cases of extensive seabed architecture the ongoing operation may be

deemed to be of sufficient risk that extensive Hazard Identification processes are
initiated. In mitigation, special guidelines may be put in place to ensure, in the event
of a installation loss of power, the potential for damage to the sub sea equipment is
minimized.

1.3 DP Operational Briefing

Prior to any DP operation it is essential that all key personnel be briefed in all
aspects of the project, including hazards to the installation, personnel, equipment
and the interaction of other operations in the immediate vicinity.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

Prior to arrival on location a meeting must be held to review the project guidelines.
DP Operators must be fully conversant with methods and lines of communication
prior to the commencement of DP operations.

1.4 Position Reference Systems

The company standard for DP Reference System availability requires that as a

minimum, three reference sensors shall be on-line (and actively selected) at any
time with two being based on different principles. In deep water DP operations,
DGPS and acoustic reference systems are likely to be the only such references
available, hence the total loss of the DGPS will degrade system redundancy.

Two independent position reference systems are defined as reference systems

giving positional data to the DP system based upon two different principles, i.e.
DGPS being one and hydro-acoustic systems being another.

During scintillation only non-hazardous operations should continue if DGPS drops

out. Use of dual-acoustic systems during scintillation is acceptable and must be a
part of the WSOG planning.

1.5 DP Trials

The requirement for trials is outlined in IMO 645 sections 4.4 and 5.

The intent of DP Trials will be to verify the operability and performance of the DP
system. Copies of all trials results must be retained onboard for information to the
DP personnel.

DP Trials will be undertaken for the following reasons:

• Client Acceptance/Mobilization
• Software amendment trials
• Classification Society Trials

All trials will be conducted in a safe area disconnected from the well, and if possible
should be undertaken on transit between locations. In all cases, trials will be
conducted in line with a formal documented procedure and results recorded and
witnessed. If the HQS DP Operations Superintendent or designated representative
is not available the trials will be witnessed by the OIM. All documentation must be
submitted to the Rig Manager, HQS DP Operations Superintendent and Region
Field Support Manager.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

1.5.1 Client Acceptance/Mobilization Trials

Records of these trials must be retained onboard for two years and then
archived for a further four years. The format for these trials will be agreed with
the HQS DP Operations Superintendent, and must be submitted to him prior to
the anticipated activity.

1.5.2 Periodic DP Trials

Periodic DP trials may either be conducted to Client requirements or by the

installation itself. The philosophy behind these trials is to ensure that the entire
DP system is set up and functioning in the correct manner, by functioning all
systems to their likely performance requirements and failure modes. In addition,
the following will be reviewed:

• Preceding period’s maintenance history

• Any hardware modifications
• Any software modifications
• Footprints
• Incident records
• Switchboard inspection reports
• Trials Guidelines
• Review Operators records of experience

1.5.3 Software Amendment Trials

On any occasion DP system software is upgraded or changed the DP system

must be tested to ensure there is no change to the installation’s DP operational
criteria. All such trials must be attended by the HQS DP Operations
Superintendent or his designated representative to witness and sign for trial
documentation.

1.5.4 Classification Society Periodic Trials

Many DP systems are classed by the Classification Society. For the system to
continue to remain in class the society will require undertaking periodic trials.
These trials must be scheduled when operations permit and not when the
installation is attached to the well. If at all possible they must be scheduled to be
concurrent with annual or acceptance trials.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

1.5.5 Conduct of DP trials

For trials to be valid they should be undertaken when all the DP and associated
systems are fully functional. All tests must be carried out in realistic
environmental conditions and with regard to the safe navigation of the
installation.

All personnel involved in the trials will be fully briefed on the conduct and
requirements of the trials and attendees must be limited to ensure that the trials
themselves and the results cannot be compromised or confused due to any
misinterpretation. During failure tests, systems must not be re-instated until such
time as the personnel undertaking the trials are satisfied they have understood
the failure effects, and all information has been noted.

When reinstating systems after failure simulations, two people will confirm that
the necessary breakers have been reinstated.

Trials will be undertaken in a controlled manner and should any uncertainty arise
as to actual system status, the test may have to be repeated.

The intent of the trials is to verify the functionality of the DP system in a

controlled manner and provide accurate results that will assist the DP Operators
in the future operation of the DP system.

2 OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY TRIALS

“Blackout” and UPS failure are two worst case scenarios for which every installation
must have control procedures in place. Alternatively, recovery tests shall be
undertaken on an annual basis to ensure the competency of the personnel to effect
recovery. If after completion of these recovery tests a deviation from the standard
procedure has been noted to be of use, the current procedure should be amended
and circulated.

2.1 Blackout

A regular Blackout recovery should be practiced when possible, to ensure all

personnel are familiar with the duties assigned to them, thereby minimizing the
likelihood of an extended time that the installation sustains a loss of ability to
maintain position.

The details of all such trials must be documented.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

2.2 Failure of UPS

In addition to actions to be taken, following a failure of an UP, a step by step

recovery procedure must also be prepared. This is more critical where a static
switch is used for rapid load transfer.

Particular care must be taken when reinitializing failed UPS, as historically it is

during this process that subsequent failures have been experienced.

3 PERMIT TO WORK GUIDELINES

Any shut down of DP equipment for repair or maintenance must be carefully

planned, with special regard to ongoing or future operations. Planned maintenance
scheduling must take into account operational requirements and must be flexible
enough to accommodate this. A work permit duly signed by the Master must
precede such tasks. Due regard must be given to the long-range weather forecasts,
and if necessary, planned maintenance may need to be deferred.

4 REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

As stated above every DP installation will develop a set of DP operating procedures to

cover its particular DP Operational circumstances. The list below identifies some
specific operations that may need formal procedures established.

• Setting Up for New Location.

• Coming On Location
• Deploying Transponder Beacons
• Calibration of Acoustics
• Spudding in
• Establishing Well Location
• Use of ERA’s as Position Reference System:
! ERA's can and have been used to facilitate station keeping. In the unlikely
event that a simultaneous loss of satellite as well as acoustic position
information is lost ERAs may be used as a reference sensor under exceptional
circumstances. This must not be construed as tacit approval to carry out drilling
operations only with ERA.
! Some systems have a Hold Ball Joint angle mode. This must be used with
caution, and not for the purpose of carrying out drilling operations but only to
keep the installation in a relative position where the ball joint angle is as close
to zero as possible, in order to effect a disconnect should all other position
reference systems fail.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 7

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
OPERATING GUIDELINES

• Launch & Recovery of ROV

• ADCP (Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler) launch and Recovery
• Running GRA
• Running Casing (20”)
• Running BOP
• Landing the Stack
• Passing non-shearables through the stack
• Installation Heading Changes
• Heavy Weather Precautions
• Bulls Eye Reports
! A record of the bulls eye reading must be maintained. One set of readings
must be taken, prior to landing the stack, and one soon after the stack has
been landed, and the connection tested against overpull. When the ROV is
launched to carry out riser inspections, bulls eye readings must be recorded
and checked against the previous records. Any significant deviations must
be immediately notified to the Master, OIM.
• Loop Current/Eddies Procedure
! In certain work areas, Loop Currents or Eddies may be experienced.
Guidelines need to be developed to address any limitations being imposed.
Of significance is the fact that heading changes may be dictated by the
currents. It is not unusual to have to make frequent large heading changes
when hit by squalls thus well head and riser torque considerations must be
preplanned. At times it may become necessary to suspend drilling
operations due to riser limitations in extreme currents.
• Plug and Abandon
• Pre Departure Location
• Recovery of Beacons
• Transponder Battery Change out
• Emergency Disconnect

5 NON STANDARD OPERATIONS

While the above list identifies a wide scope of operational procedures it will not cover
every possibility. There will be occasions when operations present a higher risk profile
due to system limitations or potential equipment failure requiring a rapid decision
process. Such may be the case for Drill Stem Testing (DST) with a DP installation
(Refer to Section 7). It is therefore important that Well Specific operational
procedures are prepared for all non-standard operations and all personnel are familiar
and prepared for the worse case scenario in each case.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 8

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DYNAMIC POSITIONING WATCH CIRCLES

1 BACKGROUND & TECHNICAL INFORMATION

In order to determine the red disconnect watch circle of a dynamic positioned vessel the
following information is required:

• Environmental forces specific to the subject vessel

• Estimated drift off curves providing time versus position for a number of wind speeds
and directions

• Riser connected limits for slip joint stroke, maximum upper and lower flex joint
angles, and wellhead bending moment limit.

The first two points are obtained from model tests and computer simulations for each
installation. The drift curves are independent of water depth (for a given wind speed the
installation will drift at a certain rate, regardless of water depth), therefore, no matter
what the site water depth one set of drift curves will apply for the installation on all
locations. Item 3, however, is determined on a well-by-well basis. The riser limits are
highly dependent upon water depth, current profile, top tension, and mud weight when
operating in deep water. An on-board riser advisory program can determine on a real-
time basis the operating limits of the riser system to properly adjust the dynamic
positioning watch circles.

In deepwater, the red disconnect watch circle is an ever-changing limit based on the
environment at a given time. When little or no wind and current are present the watch
circle may be quite large and the reaction time before initiating an EDS during a power
loss situation is a considerable amount. The time may be so great as to allow power
recovery and repositioning before it becomes necessary to start the disconnect
sequence. If winds pick up, the drift rate of the vessel will increase and the watch circle
will need to be tightened in order to provide time for an EDS sequence before drifting
past the riser limits.

2 INSTALLATION DRIFT-OFF CALCULATIONS

The drift-off curves are calculated for a range of environmental headings and wind
speeds. They are estimated and used in a manner to build conservatism into the
results of the watch circle calculation worksheet. Briefly, the background assumptions
are as follows:

• Wind, waves, and current act collinear (in the same direction, therefore the vessel
will lose heading faster than in a non-collinear environment)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 8

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DYNAMIC POSITIONING WATCH CIRCLES

• The 1-min mean, sustained wind speed is used rather than a gusting wind spectrum

• A minimum 1.0 knot background current is applied in addition to a wind driven

current equal to 2% of the wind speed (total current = 1.0 kt + Wind speed x 0.02)

• The heading is rounded up to the next highest increment of 5 degrees from the bow
(example 16 degrees is calculated with a 20 degree off bow curve)

• A 3-second margin is applied in the position of the point of disconnect to account for
normal vessel excursion around well center.

To calculate the drift-off curve a relationship between wind speed and significant wave
height, wave period, and current speed was developed. The relationships are provided
in Figure 1. For a given wind speed, the chart can be used to estimate a wave height,
period, and current speed. For instance, a 30-knot wind is estimated to generate 10-ft
significant seas with an 8-second peak period and a 1.6-knot current.

Wave and Current vs. Wind Speed

2.5
24 Hs, Significant Wave Height

Tp, Peak Period

Wave Height (Hs, ft), Peak Period (Tp, sec)

20 Surface Current 2.0

16 .
Current Speed (knots)
1.5
.

12

1.0

0.5
4

0 0.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Wind Speed (knots, 1-min mean)

Figure 1 - Relationships between Wind Speed, Wave Height, Wave Period, and Current Speed

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 8

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DYNAMIC POSITIONING WATCH CIRCLES

3 DRIVE-OFF SCENARIO

The drive-off scenario is a difficult situation to predict since there are a large number of
conditions that could occur. Typically, the drive-off scenario is caused by a faulty input
for position reference. Should the vessel suddenly begin to drive-off the DPO or
captain should have ample time to place the ship on manual control or turn off power to
thrusters causing the drive-off. Since the possibilities to prepare for and calculate are
endless, the drive-off scenario is not included at this time in the DP watch circle
calculation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1 PRIORITIES

Priorities should be clearly established for dealing with a DP problem. The authority
of the Master and OIM are of fundamental importance at such times (N.B. An
immediate RED alert may only involve the Master or OIM if they are present at the DP
control or drillfloor when the alert is issued). They should co-operate closely on these
priorities so that there is no room for doubt or dissension and that the DP Operator
and Driller on-duty at the time of an emergency act to the same priorities without
undue hesitation.

The safety of life is the first priority. As a guideline, the following information shall be
assessed jointly by the Master and OIM during any alert condition if time allows such
conference.

• Any position or heading performance loss as a result of alert cause

• Weather conditions at time of alert
• Drilling operation in progress at time of alert
• Expected changes in work progress planned
• Additional hazards presented as a result of alert (Hazards of wire cable and
tensioners, i.e., moonpool)
• Assessment of additional weather forecasts which may be required
• Time required to reach a safe situation

2 DP ALERT STATUS GUIDANCE & WSOG

The intent of this subsection is to identify the potential critical issues that influence a
DP installation to undertake an emergency disconnect in the event of system
failure(s). This guidance will generate a Well Specific Operational Guidance (WSOG)
document, quantifying system requirements vs. specific DP alert conditions. In
addition, by identifying critical items, it will be possible to rank the relevance of that
item in the decision path to initiate the correct level of DP status alert.

The WSOG takes into account the installation’s equipment and capabilities, the site
specific requirements and the client’s requirements.

3 SCOPE OF GUIDELINES

• Establish the definition of an Emergency Disconnect.

• Identify DP alert status level and establish a clear definition of the DP system
status for each level.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

• Establish the standard operational requirements with respect to systems, power

and environmental criteria, for a DP Class II or DP Class III vessel when
connected to a well.
• Identify root causes that may influence an emergency disconnect.
• Establish the intermediate stages between normal operating status and an
emergency disconnect.
• Identify the relationship between the riser management criteria and the disconnect
criteria

4 REFERENCE MATERIAL

• Petrobras DPPS Emergency Disconnection Procedures

• IMCA DP Incident Data Base
• Installation Specific DP Capability Plots
• Installation Specific FMEA and Proving Trials.
• IMO 645 Guidelines for Vessels fitted with DP systems
• Installation Specific Emergency Response Manual

5 DEFINITIONS

5.1 Emergency Disconnect

The process of Emergency Disconnect is defined by the satisfactory completion of the

following activities:

• The detection of abnormal operation condition affecting the integrity of the

installation to maintain station, leading the DPO to initiate a RED DP alert, and
subsequent Emergency Disconnect.
• Execution of the procedure for a safe Emergency Disconnection, the shear ram
should close the well, all BOP functions should be blocked and the LMRP should
be separated from the BOP.
• Confirm that the Emergency Disconnect Function has been correct.
• Movement of the installation along the pre-ordained escape route to a safe
location clear of any subsea architecture and into deeper water.

5.2 DP Status Alert Levels

Installations operating offshore Brazil shall assess these requirements against those
limitations contained in the Degraded Status Document agreed between the Client
and the installation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Installations operating in areas other than Brazil shall use the Alert definitions
and WSOG process outlined herein.

Transocean defines four alert levels as follows:

NORMAL > GREEN

The following condition will apply when the installation is in a Normal or GREEN
operating status and is either connecting or connected to the seabed:

• The installation will be under DP Control and the DP system operating

normally with appropriate back up systems available.
• Thruster power and total power consumption is equal to or less than the
maximum thrust and power that would be needed after the worst case single
failure to avoid exceeding the critical excursion.
• Installation's indicated position and heading are within predetermined limits.
• Negligible risk of collision exists from other vessels.

ADVISORY (no color allocated)

The installation is able to maintain position when in an "Advisory" operating

condition, but there has been an equipment, system or component failure that
when combined with another similar failure could result in a change of operating
status. The installation shall be in the ADVISORY Condition when the following
apply:

• A failure in a subsystem has occurred leaving the DP system in an

operational state but with no suitable back up available.
• The installation is under DP control but with reduced capability in some way.
(loss of a single thruster, loss of single generator)
• Thruster power and total power consumption is equal to or greater than the
maximum thrust and power that would be required after the worst single case
failure to avoid exceeding the critical excursion.
• Installation’s indicated position and heading are outside predetermined limits
• Negligible risk of collision exists from other vessels

The Advisory Condition is designed in order that supervisory staff can assess
any failure or loss of performance against current and planned operations in
order to make prudent changes to planned operations. Use of the Advisory
condition should be maximized.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Loss of Capability > YELLOW

Yellow Watch Circle:

The distance from installation set point at which drilling operations stop and
preparations are made to conduct an emergency disconnect should the
installation continue to lose station. Typically the distance is one half the
distance from well center to the red watch circle.

A YELLOW Alert status will exist when the installation has lost some form of DP
capability. In addition, in the event of a well control situation being outside
normal parameters the change of alert status may be generated from the drill
floor.

A YELLOW Alert status is given when there has been a system, component or
equipment failure that leaves the installation with no suitable back up, so that a
further failure will result in a loss of position.

• Installation's position keeping performance is deteriorating and/or unstable.

• Installation's indicated position deviates beyond established limits for efficient
riser management.
• Environmental conditions exceed installation's anticipated operational
capability limits.
• An individual thruster power demand reaches a predetermined upper limit
(nominally 80%) for any period more than occasional peak demands, i.e. less
than 1 minute.
• Total power demands exceeds predetermined upper limit (nominally 65%) for
any period of more than an occasional 1 minute duration sudden peak
demands; i.e. a power demand of greater than 65% and a duration of 1
minute with maximum number of generators on line for DP-2 / DP-3
capability.
• Risk of collision exists from another vessel.
• Risk of a Well control situation outside normal operational control criteria

LOSS OF DP CONTROL > RED

Red Watch Circle:

The distance from installation set point at which disconnect sequence must be
initiated (activate EDS button) in order to properly unlatch the LMRP from the
BOP before any riser limit is reached.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

BOP Disconnect.

A RED Alert Status will exist when the installation cannot maintain it’s station at
the well site and immediate disconnect is required to prevent damage or safety
of personnel, the environment and equipment.

• The installation excursion crosses the RED watch circle that has been
established as the initiation point of EDS so as to unlatch the BOP safely.
• A loss of control such that the installation will not be able to maintain either
heading or position control or a loss of control of both functions.
• There is an imminent risk of danger by maintaining the installation on
location, i.e. collision

There is an imminent risk of danger to the installation and crew due to a

deteriorating well control situation.

6 STANDARD DP OPERATIONAL STATUS

The ability of the installation to maintain position over a specific location through
the use of it's DP system is dependent upon the satisfactory operation of
numerous systems and the integrity of the back up systems providing
redundancy. There are significant enhancement of requirements for a Class 3
installation as opposed to a Class 2 installation, although the Class 3 installation
is able to operate in Class 2 mode provided contractual requirements are met.
There are four main areas where there is an ability to define failure impact or
quantify limiting factors:

• Hardware
• Systems
• Riser Limitations
• Environmental Limits

In addition, these areas may be further reviewed in their applicability to a Class 2

DP or Class 3 DP operation.

Some Transocean DP installations do not have a formal DP Class notation. As

such, these installations should always strive to follow Class 2 requirements as
far as practical in accordance with IMO 645 requirements.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

6.1 Hardware

The main hardware components effecting DP status are identified in Table 1.

The operational alert level is defined by relating to the level of redundancy

available in the light of a single system failure. When defining the alert level
required in the event of a component failure consideration will be taken to the
risk involved by operating with this reduced capability. The loss of a
communication system has a minimal impact, but it can be defined. The loss of a
thruster in certain circumstances may be of little consequence but in others
could be critical.

Loss of Position reference systems may in certain circumstances be sustainable,

i.e. model control may be acceptable for very short periods, depending upon
operations at that time, and dependant upon a proven model control capability
test.

Table 1 identifies possible system failure criteria and action areas to be

considered that could lead to quantifiable figures. DP class II and DP Class III
installations are covered.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Table 1 – Potential Hardware Failure Areas

System Failure Class II DP Unit Class III DP Unit Comments
DP Control Unit Standard requirement a Standard requirement
dual redundant system Dual system, and
another independent
system in fire/flood
segregated
compartment.
Wind Sensors 2 Required 2 plus 1 required
Motion Sensors 2 Required 2 Plus 1 required
Heading Sensors 2 Required 2 Plus 1 required
Position Reference 2 + 1 Independent 2 + 1 Independent Class 3 system will be using a
Systems dissimilar systems dissimilar systems. The data network arrangement.
third DP Control unit This enables the third
must have a dedicated independent system to be
reference system within made available to the dual
the same physical system.
segregation
Communication 2 Independent systems 2 Independent systems Status lights should have
Systems suitable UPS back up.
Generator Sufficient power Sufficient power Single worst case failure will
generation available to generation available to have been determined within
meet demand in event of meet demand in event the vessels DP capability
a single worst case of a single worst case plots.
failure failure
Thrusters Sufficient units on line at Sufficient units on line Single worst case failure will
any time to maintain at any time to maintain have been determined within
vessel on location in vessel on location in the vessels FMEA, and
event of loss of worst event of loss of worst proven by documented trials
case Bus Bar case Bus Bar
Network Single network Dual network
UPS UPSs’ to be configured UPSs’ to be configured
to provide at least single to provide at least single
system availability in system availability in
event of loss of main event of loss of main
supply supply

6.2 Systems

System limitations can be established to identify the upper limit of any system operating
level allowing sufficient spare capacity in the system to cover a worst case failure. In any
event where power generation demands reach 50% of the total power available, a loss of a
single generator will critically impact upon power availability and station keeping. A similar
scenario applies in the trust consumption requirements and the loss of worst case thruster
must be considered. Refer to Table 2.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

For DP Class III installations, the concept of working both with open and close
busbars must be considered and suitable limits set for both configurations.

The station keeping ability of the installation is defined for both positional and heading
footprints. It is the ability of the installation to maintain these footprints with small and
only occasional excursions that will provide the DPO with a very significant indicator
of the installation’s ability at any one time.
Table 2 - Potential System Failure Areas Effecting DP System Status
System Failure Class II DP Unit Class III DP Unit Comments
Power Consumption Should not be Limit to be set in
greater than the line with both open
total power and close bus
available less operation
largest generator.
Thrust Consumption Maximum limit on Maximum limit on
unit demand to be unit demand to be
set and maximum set and maximum
limit on total system limit on total system
thrust. Both to be thrust. Both to be
set in event of loss set in event of loss
of most useful unit of most useful unit
DP Position Set limiting criteria Set limiting criteria
Footprint over suitable time over suitable time
(over set time) scale scale
(5 Minutes) (5 Minutes)
DP Heading Set limiting criteria Set limiting criteria
Footprint over suitable time over suitable time
(over set time) scale scale
(5 Minutes) (5 Minutes)

6.3 Riser Limitations

The intent of the dynamic position keeping system is to maintain the installation in a
location that has been defined by reference to the location specific riser management
document (Refer to Section 6). The dynamics of riser management are driven by an
extensive number of variables.

For installation operational purposes the definition of the mechanical limitations upon
the riser is interpreted into positional information in the form of Offset. Offset will have

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

it's own margin of safety which is given by YELLOW and RED limitations, which is
relevant to riser management. The relationship between the riser watch circles and
the DP position and heading alarm status is shown in diagrams below.

As a guideline, the installation is expected (as far as possible) to be stationed at the

ZAP (Zero Angle Position). ZAP is defined as the position of installation which
maintains the BOP / LMRP rotation across the lower flex joint as close to zero as
possible. This means that, generally, the installation will be stationed in a position
where the DP center of rotation (moonpool) may not be directly over the well / BOP
position when connected.

Close monitoring of the BOP / LMRP sensors is required and use should be made of
trend options within the DP Control system software to maintain the ZAP. It is the
effect of not having the riser perpendicular to the BOP (not in the ZAP position) and
movement of the drill pipe that causes “key seating” of subsea equipment. It shall be
the OIM/Master's responsibility to decide on the optimum position over the well
bearing in mind the following:

• Present weather conditions

• Current, surface and water column conditions
• Riser condition including length (water depth) weight and net tension applied
• Sub-surface Sensor availability and accuracy
• Position of unit when BOP (or in re-entry) LMRP when landed
• Slip joint stroke limitations and space-out set-up
• Limitation imposed by moonpool or tensioning system
• Any difficulties in passing tubulars through BOP

Within the Transocean Riser Management Guidelines (Refer to Section 6), the
following definitions apply for Riser Watch circles.

• Yellow Watch Circle

The distance from installation set point at which drilling operations stop and
preparations are made to conduct an emergency disconnect should the installation
continue to lose station. Typically the distance is one half the distance from well
center to the red watch circle.

• Red Watch Circle

The distance from installation set point at which disconnect sequence must be
initiated (activate EDS button) in order to properly unlatch the LMRP from the BOP
before any riser limit is reached.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Installation motion limitations will also be a factor that will clearly be identified
within the well specific riser management document, and while not being an
immediate concern, these limitations may influence a possible course of action in
the event of a degradation of operating status.

Table 3 - Riser Limitations

System Failure Class II DP Unit Class III DP Unit Comments

Upper Flex Joint Limit to be set Limit to be set Information
limitation available from the
location Specific
Riser Management
Document
Lower Flex Joint Limit to be set Limit to be set
limitation
Slipjoint/Tensioner Installation Specific Installation Specific
Stroke
Well Head Bending Well Specific Well specific
Moment
Wind Up Limit to be set Limit to be set Requires to be
formally agreed

The Diagrams below illustrates the relationship between the Riser watch circles
derived from the Riser Management data, and the installation watch circle which is
set as a standard DP alarm criteria.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Riser Watch Circles and Vessel Position Watch Circle

Yellow Watch Circle Max Well Offset

(Red Watch Circle)

Set Point
ZAP
Environmental
Forces

Well Center

Vessel DP Position
Alarm

In the previous Diagram the following should be noted;

The installation set point is at a position offset from the Well center. This position is
defined by the various riser criteria and environmental conditions.

The set point is the location from which the Yellow and Red Watch Circles are
calculated. The diagram shows that the installation is operating so that it’s excursion
from the set point is currently within it’s position alarm radius.

The Red and Yellow Watch circles are dynamic circles that will vary with respect to
ongoing riser and environmental criteria, their radius being derived from the
appropriate Riser Software program, or from the tabulated data contained in the Site
Specific Riser Management manual.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

The Diagram below illustrates those criteria that are input manually into the DP for
the purpose of generating position or heading alarms.

Operator Set DP Alarms

Position Alarm Heading Deviation

Radius Alarm

Note; These are manual input DP alarm set points only

6.4 Environmental Limits

Installation operating environmental limitations must be taken into account at all times.
As environmental forces increase, the propulsion and generation systems may
approach maximum operating capability for DP classification. Drift-off speed will be
accelerated resulting in reduced operational margins and time for problem recognition
and decision making.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 12 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Table 4 - Environmental Limits

System Failure Class II DP Unit Class III DP Unit Comments
Wind Speed Limit to be Limit to be Information
quantified quantified available within the
DP capability study
document
Wind Direction Limit to be Limit to be
quantified quantified
Surface current Limit to be Limit to be
quantified quantified
Significant wave Limit to be Limit to be
height quantified quantified

7 DRIVE OFF / DRIFT OFF

The effect of Drive-off and drift-off must be considered. In the event of a Drive-off
there will have been a significant power ramp up by the thrusters which will be beyond
what the system is applying to retain the installation on location. In this case, the time
frame for remedial action is minimal. To ensure immediate safety a RED Alert must be
imposed.

In the case of a drift-off, the rate and direction of movement away from the location
will be dependent upon the effect of existing environmental forces. Drift-off data is an
item that should have been quantified during the time of either pre-location, annual, or
DP trials. Any theoretical or calculated drift rates should be verified at the earliest
opportunity, and made available via the Rig Manager to the Transocean headquarters
riser specialist, Rig Manager and HQS DP Operations Superintendent who will
forward it to the Engineering Department Houston/Montrouge.

A major factor influencing the activity during any drift-off will be monitoring of the
installation's position with respect to the well. Any loss of that facility will inevitably
accelerate the requirement for a disconnect if not already issued for some other
reason.

8 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

The following documentation will be of significant benefit when determining any

criteria affecting the Emergency Disconnect criteria:

• FMEA and FMEA Trials Report

This document will clearly identify any possible failure modes. Knowing these, an
appreciation can be made of their impact at any specific instance. In addition, the

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 13 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

FMEA trials will also verify failure patterns and consequences which provide the
installation with a significant background as to the installation's capability in the
event of a particular system failure.

• DP Trials Report
This document should provide valuable proven data on installation performance
in certain power and thrust configurations. The performance section should
provide data on actual drift-off tests and power consumption and thruster
loadings for an assortment of standard tests for both heading and position
changes.

• DP Capability Plots
This document will identify expected installation performance for an assortment
of weather criteria and thruster configuration. In particular the document will
clearly identify the expected installation performance in the event of a worst
case failure condition, i.e. in the event of the failure of the most significant
thrusters or in the event of the failure of the most significant bus bar section.

• Location Specific Riser Management Document

This document will clearly identify the limiting criteria for the safe management
of the riser during specific operations. It not only specifies the limiting offsets
but also limiting weather criteria for specific operations.

9 WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

A WSOG will be developed for each location.

The WSOG document will clearly and systematically identify significant limiting criteria
that impact upon the station keeping ability of the vessel. The document will quantify
criteria for the various stages of degrading operational status, i.e. through the
deteriorating operational conditions:

GREEN ADVISORY YELLOW RED

9.1 WSOG Review & Approval

The Well Specific Operational Guidelines document will be completed prior to the
commencement of operations at a new site. The WSOG will be reviewed by the
onboard operations team and carry the endorsement of the OIM, TP, Master, and
Chief Engineer. The client shall be asked if they wish to be involved in the approval of
the WSOG even if they have not actually requested such a document. If client
involvement is not required the WSOG will remain an internal (within Transocean)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 14 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

document and carry the signature of the onboard team as already identified. If the
client actively requires a WSOG, the issued document must carry the signatures of
the Installation Manager, and the Client. Once agreed the WSOG for that location
must be forwarded to the Rig Manager and to the HQS DP Operations
Superintendent or his nominated deputy for information purposes.

9.2 WSOG Template

An example of a template for a WSOG follows. The items to be covered are not
definitive. The objective is to quantify as far as possible any possible areas of failure
that can assist the DP Operator to make a decision as to what status of DP alert
should be issued within the available time frame.

The example used is for a class three installation. The tabulated data are for guidance
only, and demonstrate the degree of quantification required. Every installation should
quantify the precise limitations as far as practical and valid. The attached format
should be used.

It should be stressed that the figures contained in the sample WSOG are provided as
guidance only. It shall be the responsibility of the onboard management team to set
limits that are effective for their particular installation, well site etc.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 15 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

(WSOG)

VESSEL: ________________________ DATE: ____________

LOCATION: Block: WELL: CLIENT:

ALERT STATUS
Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
DRIVE OFF 0 – 10m 10 – 14m >14m or Immediately when
DRIFT OFF Immediately when confirmed that
FORCE OFF recognized that situation cannot be
Unit offset deviation cessation of Ops controlled.
Waterdepth: required No later that at 50
meters meters offset from
Initial (Pre-incident)
Position.

Power; Thrust/Electrical

Power consumption <50% 50% >70% or consequence Situation specific

each network (2-splt alarm, whichever occurs
HV net) first
Power consumption < 70% 70 % > 80% or consequence Situation specific
each alarm, whichever occurs
Network (4-split HV first
net)
Thrust consumption <50% 50% >70% or sudden change Situation specific
each online unit ( 2-
split HV net)
Thrust consumption < 70 % 70 % > 80 % or sudden change Situation specific
each online unit (4-
split HV net)

Footprint Alarm Settings

DP position footprint <3m 3m Situation specific Situation specific

(5 min. maximum
from set point)
DP heading footprint <3 deg. 3 – 5 deg. 5 deg. If threat to position
(5 min. maximum
from set point)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 16 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

System Redundancy

DP control system 3+1 Any failure 1 or failure/loss of backup 0

backup or loss of controller (F)
performanc
e in any
system
Network 2 NA 1 0

Reference Systems

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red

Position reference 3 Any failure or 2 If threat to position
available independent loss of
performance in
any system
Wind sensors 3 2 1 If threat to position
Motion sensors 3 2 1 If threat to position
(VRS)
Heading sensors 3 2 1 If threat to position
(Gyro)

Communications

Comm.´s systems` Dual 1 Situation specific Situation specific

systems
(DP/Driller)

Riser Limits (from Site Specific Riser Document)

Riser limitation UFJ 0 - 1,5 2 deg. >2 deg. Situation specific

deg
Riser limitation LFJ 0 - 1,5 2 deg. >2 deg. Situation specific
deg.
Riser twist +/- 180 > 160 deg. Situation specific Situation specific
deg. When vessel
From BOP heading
landout cannot be
rewound

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 17 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 9

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
WELL SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

Environmental Factors (Riser Document & DP Capability Manual)

Wind speed 0 - 15 m/s 15 – 20 m/s > 20 m/s Situation specific

(10m/10s)
Wind direction +/- 30 15 deg. When Situation specific Situation specific
deg. wind speed
> 15 m/s
Sign. Wave height 0 – 4,5 m 4,5 – 6,5 m 6,5 m Situation specific

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red

Advise Master, Issue alarm and
Issue alarm and
Normal IM, Driller, follow procedures
Action required follow
status Toolpusher,
procedures
Company Rep.
Notify Master and IM Normal
Y Y Y
immediately (Y/N) conditions
Notify Client Normal
Y Y Y
immediately (Y/N) conditions

This WSOG is valid inside 100 meters from the wellhead / spudding position. Alerting shall
be used during both connected and non-connected situations where appropriate
Escape route: (To be identified: shortest route to Deep water, crossing NO subsea
architecture)

Well: __________ Direction: __________

WSOG Assessment Team

Position Name Signature Date

Master
OIM
TP
Chief Engineer

Signed on behalf of Transocean: Signed on behalf of Client:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 18 18
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 10

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP TECHNICAL OPERATIONS CRITERIA

1 GENERAL

Each Transocean DP installation should establish and document installation specific

procedures dealing with the following subjects:

• Operation of open/close bus tie breakers

• Engine loading criteria

• Use of consequence analysis

• Protocol for installation and verification of DP software upgrades

2 GUIDELINES

2.1 Operation of Open/Closed Bus Tie Breakers

All DP Class 3 installations are capable of operating with an open bus tie
configuration, however within the Transocean fleet it is unusual for this option to be
enabled.

Nevertheless, all Transocean DP Class 3 installations must have suitable procedures

in place to cover installation operation when the bus bar is broken into it’s relevant
sections. It is particularly important for such procedures to be in place when the main
control center has a dual role as both DP and vessel management control center.
Under such circumstances both the DP and vessel management system operators
must be fully familiar with any divergence for the normal (closed bus) operating
procedures that are required under an open bus operation.

Some DP Class 2 installations are also capable of working under a split bus condition
as a routine operation but such a configuration should not be enabled without the prior
consent of HQ Engineering. As in the previous case such an “open bus” configuration
should only be undertaken provided all the necessary installation specific procedures
are in place and the offshore team are familiar with the operating criteria under the
new regime.

2.2 Engine Loading Criteria

The benefits of operating diesel engines close to their capacity rather than at
consistently light loads is well understood. The latter is generally believed to cause
greater maintenance costs over the life of an engine. The engine manufacturers may

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 10

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP TECHNICAL OPERATIONS CRITERIA

state that their engines can operate extensively at light loads without detrimental
effects, but practical experience indicates differently. Operational experience has
shown that engine maintenance and down-time can be significantly reduced by
keeping average engine loading in the range from 45% to 75% of engine capacity.

Engine loading is controlled by the vessel power management system, and will be
monitored by the DP consequence analysis software. The reaction time of engines to
sudden additional power demands will be driven by the system software, and there
maybe occasions when it appears that actual generation power available is in conflict
with consequence analysis for short and intermittent periods. At these times it is likely
that engine loadings will be within the 45% to 75% capacity, i.e., within an optimum
area of usability.

The acceptability of the higher engine loadings will vary between installations and will
be dependant upon the ability of the vessel power management systems to cope with
a sudden loss of an engine, but higher engine utilization should not be seen as
detrimental to engine wear or maintenance.

2.3 Use of consequence Analysis

It is an IMO requirement that every Class 2 or Class 3 DP installation has a DP

software function called Consequence Analysis IMO 645 Section 3, para. 3.4.4.

The Consequence Analysis software will continuously verify that the installation will
remain in position even if the worst case failure occurs. This analysis should verify
that the thrusters remaining in operation after the worst case failure can generate the
same resultant thruster force and moment as required before the failure. The
consequence analysis should provide an alarm if the occurrence of a worst case
failure would lead to a loss of position due to insufficient thrust for the prevailing
environmental conditions. Frequently intermittent alarms are generated indicating that
insufficient thrust may be available for a short moment.

The issue of such an alarm is a precautionary advice to the DP Operator and does not
indicate that immediate remedial action should be taken. The alarm should be
acknowledged and the trend of alarm initiation reviewed in the light of the current
operation and the environmental conditions. If it is apparent that there is a
deteriorating situation then the installation should initiate remedial action that will also
be effected by the previous section.

2.4 Protocol for Installation and Verification of DP Software Upgrades

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 10

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
DP TECHNICAL OPERATIONS CRITERIA

It is inevitable that as operational experience evolves and DP software matures there

will be requirements for necessary upgrades to the existing systems.

The vendor supplying the software will be required to install the new software onboard
the installation. Under no circumstances will the DP installation personnel undertake
any software upgrades themselves. Only in exceptional cases will the vendor’s
software be upgraded without a representative onboard and then the installation of
that software should be supervised by a suitable member of the Region Field Support
group.

Whilst the vendor will have taken every opportunity to ensure the integrity of the
software it is always possible that previous changes may not have been incorporated,
hence particular attention should be taken of system performance during the early
stages of operation. Every opportunity should be taken to test the functionality of the
software on the DP simulator fitted onboard, if available. The system performance
should be carefully monitored during the initial period of start up and usage and the
vendor informed immediately of any anomalies. During this stage of operation the use
of the DP Anomaly log will be critical to ensuring the successful performance of the
system in the future operation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

1 GENERAL

The intent of this subsection is to provide generic guidelines regarding the operation
of two DP vessels operating in close proximity with each other.

1.1 Reference Material

• IMO 645
• IMCA M103 Guideline for the Design and Construction of Dynamically Positioned
Vessels (Feb 1999)
• IMCA M125 Safety Interface Document for a DP Vessel working near and
Offshore Platform (July 1997)
• Annex to M103 “Two vessel Supplement” by Poseidon Maritime Draft; (Aug 2000)

2 RISK

During a dual DP vessel operation there is a heightened potential for a failure that
could lead to a collision. It is likely that in the event of collision, depending upon the
circumstances, either owner may be found to have been negligent and therefore
assume the burden for the full value of the loss. Therefore, the operation must be
subjected to a full risk assessment for operational marine exposure. Table 1
provides guidelines for the conduct of a risk assessment.

2.1 Risk Mitigation

Prior to the commencement any such dual DP operations Transocean should ensure
they accept the risk posed by the other vessel working within close proximity of their
own installation. Transocean defines “close proximity” as within the Transocean
installation’s 500-meter zone. This assurance process should be undertaken through
vessel auditing using either the company’s own specialists familiar with such
processes or by the use of a third party.

2.2 Comparative risk of Vessels with Differing DP Classification

To ensure consideration of worst case events the perceived level of risk must be
equated to that which is attributable to the least reliable system. This realistic level of
risk will ensure all worst case scenarios are captured through the assessment
process. Hence if one vessel is a Class 1 DP vessel and the other vessel/installation
a Class 3 the risk must be perceived greater than if it was a DP Class 2 and DP
Class 3, and the risk associated from a non-redundant system considered.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

3 DP CLASSIFICATION

3.1 DP Class 1

A vessel that has a DP system classed as DP Class 1 is a vessel that may lose
position in the event of a single fault. These types of units should not be accepted to
close within the 500-meter zones of vessel except under the most stringent
conditions. These types of vessels pose a significant risk when using DP for
positioning alongside other DP units.

3.2 DP Class 2

A vessel that has been classed as DP Class 2 is one in which loss of position should
not occur from a single fault of an active component or system such as generators,
thrusters, switchboards, remote controlled valves etc. However a fault may occur after
failure of a static component such as cables, pipes, or manual valves.

These vessels pose a significantly lower risk than a type 1 vessel due to their
equipment configuration and redundancy. In the event of a loss of redundancy
however, operations should be curtailed accordingly as a safeguard for systems no
longer redundant.

3.3 DP Class 3

A vessel that carries the DP Class 3 notation is one in which loss of position should
not occur from any single failure including a complete loss of a compartment due to
fire or flooding. A single fault includes a single inadvertent act by any person
onboard the vessel.

These vessels carry a low degree of risk when associated with dual DP vessel
operation in close proximity.

4 DUAL DP VESSEL OPERATIONS

4.1 Positioning of vessels

During dual DP vessel operations it is likely that the service vessel will be
considerably smaller than the Transocean DP installation. The smaller of the two DP
installations will be more able to maneuver than the parent or larger installation,
which will be connected to the seabed and possibly bringing hydrocarbons to
surface. It is therefore critical that the smaller unit maintains visual contact with the
parent or larger vessel to ensure that the stand of distance is not compromised.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

4.2 Minimum Stand-off Distance

Class 1 DP vessels should not be allowed to approach closer than 100 meters of the
main unit and then only on the lee side. A class 1 DP vessel should not be allowed
within the 500-meter zone on the weather side of the main unit.

A Class 2 or 3 DP vessel should not approach closer than 20 meters to the main
vessel on the leeward side. The service vessel should at all times ensure it
maintains either a parallel or a diverging heading from the main unit. The Master of
the service vessel shall always ensure his vessel is in a suitable orientation so that
in a main propulsion unit ramp up to full thrust it will not collide with the other vessel.

4.3 Working on Weather side

When working on the weather side of the main vessel the Masters of the two vessels
will discuss the increased risk and either one will have the right to stop the operation
until the weather moderates. At no time will the service vessel operate in such
conditions that the vessel is using more than 50% thrust power on any unit except
for anything more than occasional peak demands.

4.4 Minimum Reference Systems.

When working within the 500-meter zone of the DP drilling installation the service
vessel when working in DP mode should have at least two reference systems
operating on differing principles active and selected into the DP. The use of dual
identical systems with no alternative on line should not be permitted as such a
reference system configuration comprises a single point failure.

5 PRE OPERATIONAL CHECKS

5.1 Pre Entry Checks

Before entering the 500-meter zone of the DP drilling installation, the Master of the
service vessel shall complete all necessary pre operational checks and then confirm
verbally to the Master of the DP drilling installation that these checks have been
completed. In addition, the service vessel will also confirm there are no known
defects that compromise the operation of the vessel or the vessel’s station keeping
ability. The service vessel may then enter the 500-meter zone with the consent of
the OIM of the drilling installation and upon suitable completion of a Permit to Work.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

5.2 Operational Checks

The Master of the service vessel will be required to ensure that the DP
Watchkeepers maintain an efficient watch and the full operability of the DP system.
If at any time there is a failure in any part of the system that could compromise the
station keeping ability of the vessel the DPO must immediately contact the DP
drilling installation.

6 REFERENCE SYSTEMS

Any DP vessel operating within the 500-meter zone of a DP drilling installation must
at all times have at least two dissimilar reference systems actively selected to the
DP system.

In the planning process the conflict of similar systems must be considered, i.e.
similar acoustic beacons.

The use of DGPS as a sole reference system when working in close proximity to
another large installation should be avoided. It is likely the DP drilling installation will
mask the reception of differential signals at some stage during the operation. In
addition, the accuracy is such that when close alongside the other vessel the small
separation distance could be reduced without any untoward warning due to a
systematic error. During periods of scintillation DGPS will not be available
continuously due to signal attenuation causing position jumps.

The use of the laser based system Fan Beam has been proven to be of significant
advantage for use in close proximity work alongside other fixed installations.
However, some systems are not able to cope if there is significant movement
between the two vessels due to pitching and rolling. DP Operators must ensure the
system remain locked on to the correct target.

Artemis is based upon a line of sight microwave transmission system and has a long
history within the DP position reference world. Such system is used for position
referencing between vessels due to their reliability and accuracy. Typically the Mk
IV system is the most suitable system available, this system being used commonly
between FPSO’s and shuttle tankers.

7 COMMUNICATIONS

When vessels are operating in close proximity using DP systems it is vital that, at all
times, there are at least two distinct and independent means of communications

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

between the units. These means of communication must be regularly tested to ensure
their integrity.

7.1 Authorized Person

When Installations support multi vessel construction activities, pipelay, etc, there may
be several groups of persons on the bridge such as survey or construction
management. At such times it is necessary to ensure that communication is correctly
routed during multi vessel operations.

The Master of each vessel will clearly identify to the other who is the authorized
person for the transmission and receipt of the various communications to ensure that
all such information received is channeled to the correct recipient, and that it is fully
understood.

The authorized person will also carry the responsibility for making routine
communications with the other vessel and conveying any routine operational issues.

In the event of an emergency each “Authorized Person” will immediately communicate

the nature of the emergency to the other and if possible the activity he is about to
initiate. The “Authorized Person” on the responding vessel will immediately initiate his
response to this emergency and cease all inter-vessel operations and prepare his
vessel to leave the location.

7.2 Critical Communications

In the event of any change of environmental conditions or any other circumstances

that requires the DP drilling installation to alter it’s heading or adjust it’s position to
minimize lower flex joint angle, the “Authorized Person” must communicate this
requirement to the other vessel. Both vessels will then confirm they understand the
requirement. Changes of heading or location will be completed in 5 degree or 5 meter
steps only, unless both Masters are comfortable with larger increments. The vessels
will not move simultaneously but only after the other has completed the original move.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

Figure 1 – Guidelines for Elements to be Considered During the Risk Assessment.

Item Explanation Review Areas Possible Mitigation

rd
Reliability of DP and other station This would entail review of 3 party Review specifically the system DP Audit undertaken on behalf of
keeping systems. Hardware / software vessel DP system MTB failures and redundancy client by competent third party
historical data etc
Competency of Personnel and Do personnel carry DP certification. Personnel Competency and DP Audit undertaken on behalf of
organization. Has the organization got a DP Management system client by competent third party
management system in place
Identification of consequences of “What if” failure of position on one DP System design capability and
single vessel excursion and designed vessel or an operationally normal redundancy
position excursions by both vessels position loss on both.
Identification and consequence of Consequence of an initiated failure FMEA for both vessels
design worst case single vessel and mode for thrusters or main propulsion
combined failure modes on the two etc. Human Error.
vessels
Effects of environmental forces on the Different vessels hence differing Capability plots for each vessel
vessels effects
Safe environmental limits Can vessel maintain position safely Set Operational limits for combined
operation, based upon both vessels
Safe Operational Limits What are vessel operational limits Use similar format as WSOG
Controlled disconnect Ensure a suitable operational window
is identified to enable a safe
disconnect
Emergency Disconnect Ensure both vessel are aware of Use a suitable Interface Document
actions required by each other in
event of an emergency disconnect

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

In considering the Dual DP installation from an operational Dynamic Positioning basis the following items
must be clarified.

1 PERSONNEL
Risk Area Potential failure Issues
DP Console Manning Is structure routine used; Is Desk left Console manned 24 Hours a day by
unattended competent personnel,
Experience / competence of Personnel Have personnel a knowledge of the system
and competent with that system.
Lookout / Bridge manning In addition to DP console manning are both Installation has dual man operation on
bridge teams able to maintain normal watch Bridge.
duties and communicate with respective
control centers
Personnel awareness of Lack of understanding on either vessel Ensure full briefing to key personnel on
Operation leading to mis-informed decisions each vessel, and that all personnel are
aware of the key issues of the operation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

2 SYSTEM/ EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCY

Risk Area Potential failure Issues
Classification of DP system DP system is it single or dual redundant. Single systems should not be used for
prolonged close approach work.

Dual independent reference Two similar system should not be in the Use combinations of;
systems system at the same time, without another Acoustics / DGPS / Fan Beam etc.
system working on a different principle
Numerous inputs of same system are a
single point of failure
Also note effects of scintillation will reduce
availability to single reference system, i.e.
acoustics
Probable that Well intervention vessel may
interfere with Installation Acoustics therefore
requiring operations to be suspended at
night during scintillation periods.
With close approach type systems more
usual to use a DARPS type system for the
smaller vessel to receive local UHF
differential corrections from the larger
vessel.
Fan Beam type laser systems should not be
used as a sole positioning system in close
approach mode.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

3 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Risk Area Potential failure Issues
Use of DGPS in close Loss of signal due to masking by other Reduction in reference system - degraded during
approach vessel high risk operation
Loss of Laser fan Beam Potential loss due to relative movement Loss of position keeping if only one system
System between unstable vessels.
Potential loss if old type MDL Fan Beam
due to possible wandering off reflector to
another reflecting target; i.e. reflective strips
etc.
Interference with Acoustics Loss of position keeping ability Loss of position keeping ability by Installation.
Operational maneuvering Collision Establish communication route to confirm
about well center to maintain movement between vessels.
min flex joint angle
Blackout - Drift Off Collision between vessels Risk quantified by FMEA of both vessels and if
necessary testing. NB Installation has valid
FMEA
Drive Off Collision between vessels due to thruster Ensure both units have established non-
ramp up on either vessel conflicting escape routes.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

4 LOCAL ISSUES
Risk Area Potential failure Issues
Proximity of other vessels, Interference with acoustic reference system Have to be controlled and if necessary
supply vessels or survey and/or collision access denied.
vessels etc
Dropped Objects Damage to equipment below surface Control of any significant overside lifts.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 4
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 11

DP OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
CLOSE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

5 COMMUNICATIONS
Risk Area Potential failure Issues
Onboard communications Break down in event of an emergency Installation has multiple lines of
communication between control centers
Third party vessel??
External Communications Language
Failure in communications leading to Identify and name responsible person for
incident communicating on each vessel

Misunderstanding of contents of AS identified

communication or implication Ensure open communications in all events.
Identify suitable means of alternative VHF/ Portable unit/ Voice / PA etc.
communication in emergency
Differentiate between Mis-understanding in priority or criticality of Identify classification of communications as
Routine and Non Routine message leading to potential for an incident part of Sim Ops Manual or Bridging
communications Document

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 11
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 1

MOORING GUIDELINES
PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

1 GENERAL

This Section is intended to describe the basis for evaluation of floating installation
mooring systems as applicable to the minimum safety, operational and equipment
requirements of international, regional and local standards, notwithstanding
additional company and/or operator requirements.

This Section and its contents applies to all company floating installations for which a
mooring system is required, including semi-submersibles, moored drill ships, or
tender-assisted operations, especially in the vicinity of other floating installations,
fixed structures or platforms.

This document uses various terms and abbreviations in the description of mooring
concepts and standards, specifically when referring to regulatory and trade
organizations. A brief summary list is provided below for reference.

ABS American Bureau of Shipping

API American Petroleum Institute

DNV Det Norske Veritas

IACS International Associate of Classification Societies

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISO International Standards Organization

NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate

MOM Installation Specific Marine Operations Manual, Operating

Manual or similar document

MWL Mean water level

TA The vessel is provided with a thruster assisted mooring

system dependent on a manual, remote, thrust control
system.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 1

MOORING GUIDELINES
PURPOSE AND APPLICABLITY

ATA The vessel is provided with a thruster assisted mooring

system dependent on an automatic remote, thrust control
system.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

MOORING GUIDELINES
REQUIRED LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

1 GENERAL

The Engineering departments in Houston and Montrouge share installation specific

information that is required for completing mooring analysis. The types of analysis
undertaken (depending on location specifics) are divided into two (2) types:

Quasi-static: The basic static analysis is used most often to evaluate the mooring for
a specific location. The quasi-static analysis assesses the capabilities of the system
when acted upon by external (environmental) loads and furnishes requested
information as-calculated for the equilibrium offset position.

Dynamic: The dynamic analysis currently performed contain line dynamics

completed in the frequency domain. Although a frequency domain analysis with line
dynamics is usually sufficient when a dynamic analysis is needed, time domain
dynamic analyses will typically be subcontracted as the scope is beyond current in-
house capabilities.

2 LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

The degree of analysis required for site-specific assessment of mooring spreads

varies depending on site characteristics and the level of difficulty in deployment and
survivability of the system. Mooring analysis will be performed for each location, in
accordance with the applicable industry standard below:

2.1 Level 1: Simplified (Routine) Mooring Assessment, including the

following:

• An anchor pattern will be defined, overlaid on current bathymetric and geological

layout of the location.
• Pretension and initial line tensions will be determined.
• Chain and/or wire payouts will be determined.
• Installation heading
• Ranges and bearings to anchors will be defined.
• Mooring Line configuration (Anchor type, chain, wire and jewellery)
• Anchor Bolster clearance

2.2 Level 2: Quasi-Static Mooring Analysis

• Analysis per Level 1 requirement above.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 2

MOORING GUIDELINES
REQUIRED LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

• Calculation of mooring line safety factors per desired code requirements, intact
and damaged conditions
• Installation offsets from well center, intact and damaged conditions.
• Anchor and mooring line clearances from known bottom obstructions.
• Anchor loads and uplift angles, intact and damaged conditions.

2.3 Level 3: Line Dynamic Analysis

• Analysis per Levels 1 and 2 requirement above.

• Line Dynamic Analysis

2.4 Level 4: Time Domain Analysis

• Analysis per Levels 1 and 2 requirement above.

• Time Domain Analysis

3 MOORING ANALYSIS

Level 1 mooring assessment can be performed by installation Operations personnel,

provided the location specifics and other criteria fall within the published capabilities
of the installation as prescribed by the Marine Operating Manual.

Level 2, 3 and 4 analysis is required as follows:

• Operations determines analysis by Engineering department is required

• Anchors are located within 100m of pipelines
• Anchors are located upon subsea structures
• Anchor lines pass over pipelines
• 3rd party mooring systems are proposed for use (Pre-moored locations)

Regions/Districts are encouraged to request Engineering clarification and/or

assistance whenever necessary regardless of the location difficulty level. Requests
for analysis can be made through the Request for Engineering Action (REA) system,
but simple clarifications can often be handled by phone or email.

Engineering will be notified whenever a 3rd party is doing mooring analysis on behalf
of the Company or Client.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 2

MOORING GUIDELINES
REQUIRED LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Mooring Analyses for Tender-Assisted Drilling operations will always be considered

as Level 2 or greater due to close proximity to existing installations, platforms and
subsea obstructions.

Mooring analysis cannot be conducted at any level without current bathymetric and
subsea hazard surveys.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

MOORING GUIDELINES
OPERATOR FURNISHED DATA

1 GENERAL

Although not all locations will require specific assistance and/or approval from
Engineering , the Operator must furnish the following information (as a minimum) for
each location prior to mooring system installation:

• The type of operation to be performed while moored will be specified. Typical

examples include but may not be limited to exploratory or developmental drilling,
floating production, tender assisted drilling (TAD) and subsea
installations/completions. The drilling start date and duration should also be
furnished allowing for seasonal considerations.

• The coastal state, geographic co-ordinates of the well, field name, well name,
etc. shall be specified.

• Water depth at the well and field bathymetry must be furnished out to a distance
at least equivalent to the mooring pattern. The water depth at the well, seabed
slope, and confirmation of the conditions on the ocean floor constitutes the
minimum acceptable information.

• Accurate and comprehensive metocean data is required, including wind speed

(1-hour, 10-minute, 1-minute and 3-sec gust), wave height (significant and/or
extreme), wave period data, spectral data and current profile(s) (surface to mud
line). The extent required is dependent on the acceptance criteria used, such as
DNV POSMOOR, UK POSMOOR or API RP 2SK but should consist of return
periods of 1 year, 5 year, 10 year, 50 year and 100 years for the area where
operations will be conducted.

In tropical revolving storm (TRS) areas, both data with and without
hurricane/typhoon shall be provided since the timing of the operation may affect
their inclusion. It is extremely important that the sources for the environmental
data be specified to ensure all parties are confident in its accuracy.

• Wind

• Current Omni-directional, non-seasonal data is a minimum. Seasonal and

directional data should be provided to optimize the system. Since riser
analysis is nearly always required, speed and directional profiles to the
bottom should be available.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 3

MOORING GUIDELINES
OPERATOR FURNISHED DATA

• Wave Seasonal and directional data should be provided to optimize the

system.

• Platforms, pipelines, flow lines, umbilicals, templates, subsea wellheads,

other moored installations and structures, traffic lanes, etc. and stand off
requirements at the location shall be specified. Chemo-synthetics and other
bottom anomaly information shall be provided.

• Required or preferred installation heading shall be specified. Predominant

weather, helicopter and supply vessel operations, communications, etc. may
determine the heading.

• Surface and shallow sub-surface type of soil, density, undrained shear

strength or friction coefficient. The soil conditions are not mandatory,
however, if they are not given, verification of the anchor holding capacity will
not be performed.

• Any area-specific special requirements, such as iceberg avoidance, surface

stack operation, large installation shifts between wells without mooring
system redeployment, etc. must be specified to allow due consideration
during the mooring design and review processes.

Reference: Section 2, subsection 6 – Metocean Environmental

Considerations

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 4

MOORING GUIDELINES
INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS

1 GENERAL

Mooring system analysis and review is accomplished through the use of computer
software and a mathematical model of the installation. In order to maintain a high
level of accuracy in engineering analysis, the mathematical model and the
associated data input files are updated each time modifications are made to the
installation, either permanent or temporary (with sufficient magnitude to affect the
outcome of the analysis) and logged and recorded.

Modifications changing the under water drag, wind sail area, mooring line capacity,
size or tension capability are to be identified to the Engineering department.
It is critical that Engineering be notified in a timely manner when such changes are
made.
For a given location, anchors will be deployed in a pattern around the installation.
Patterns using anywhere from four (4) to twelve (12) lines may be specified
depending on the installation-specific equipment and criteria spelled out in the
Marine Operations Manual (MOM). Mooring Patterns will be classified as
symmetrical or asymmetrical. Symmetrical spreads are essentially defined where
the headings between lines are the same or consistent from the installation heading,
symmetrical about the centreline of the installation and line make-ups do not differ
appreciably. Asymmetrical mooring spreads are those with line headings or make-
ups that vary to clear obstacles, geological features not conducive to good anchor
setting and holding or where the anchor headings are not routinely symmetrical
about the installation centreline.

Mooring lines are classified as catenary, or taut-leg. Catenary systems use the
weight of the components to develop the restoring forces that keep the vessel on
location. Taut-leg systems use the elastic properties of the components to generate
the restoring forces. Both can be broken down further into single component or
combination (chain/wire, wire/synthetic, etc.) systems.

2 INSTALLATION PARTICULARS

The following installation particulars and data are used in the review and analysis of
mooring systems:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 4

MOORING GUIDELINES
INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS

2.1 Mooring System Particulars

This is the complete description of the mooring pattern, mooring lines, and
components that make up the mooring spread and comprise several elements. The
description of the mooring line components is found either in the MOM, provided by
the Operator or other 3rd party for systems supplied by parties other than
Transocean, and from component supplier/manufacturer documentation on the
minimum breaking load, weight in water and stiffness. The following information,
including specifications, ratings and quantities on-hand should be available (onboard
or within the Engineering department) for each component within each mooring line:

• Anchor – Type, Class, Holding Power (mud, clay and sand)

• Chain – Diameter, Construction (stud link, studless, etc.), Weight (air and
underwater), Length (usable), Breaking Strength (new/certified or age reduced as
applicable), Elastic Modulus, Added Mass, Drag Diameter.
• Wire Rope – Diameter, Construction, Weight (air and underwater), Length
(usable), Breaking Strength (new/certified or age reduced as applicable),
Termination Construction, Elastic Modulus, Added Mass, Drag Diameter.
• Synthetic Rope – Diameter, Weight (air and underwater), Length, Breaking
Strength (new/certified or age reduced as applicable), Elastic Modulus, Added
Mass, Drag Diameter.
• Buoys (Surface) - Max Buoyancy, Pendant properties (length, diameter, breaking
strength)
• Buoys (Submerged) - Net Buoyancy, Depth Rating, Diameter
• Clump Weights - Underwater Weights if used

2.2 Installations Dimensions, Systems and Motion Analysis

Installation Dimensions, Systems and Motion Analysis - Data is taken from the
Marine Operating Manual, wind tunnel or wave/towing tank tests, and/or empirical
formulae as applicable and in accordance with recognized industry standards. The
following installation characteristics are utilized in the assessment of mooring, at
both drilling and survival drafts unless additional acceptance criteria are specified:

• Draft
• Associated Displacement
• Fairlead Co-ordinates – Longitudinal, Transverse and Vertical
• Anchor Winch - Holding Capacity, Heaving Capacity
• Wind Force Coefficients – Longitudinal, Quartering/Oblique and Transverse
• Current Force Coefficients – Longitudinal, Quartering/Oblique and Transverse

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 4

MOORING GUIDELINES
INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS

• Center of Motion
• Yaw Radius of Gyration
• Added Mass – Surge, Sway and Yaw
• Dampening Coefficients – Surge, Sway and Heave
• Response Amplitude Operators (RAO) – Surge, Sway, Heave, Roll, Pitch and
Yaw
• Wave Drift Coefficients (Model Tests or API) – Surge, Sway and Yaw

2.3 Thrusters

Propeller or thruster force is used as a steady-state force to counteract those steady

state loads by the wind, current and wave drift. Data on thrusters and their
performance is taken from the MOM, towing/propulsion tests, and manufacturer’s
information. Thruster force used shall be considered “net” force which is defined as
the rated force with reductions as a result of the proximity and orientation of the hull
and intake current speed. Thruster data required is as follows:

• Number
• Location – Longitudinal, Transverse and Vertical
• Thrust – Net Available (any direction)
• Control System Classification – “Thruster Assist “ (TA) or “Automatic Thruster
Assist” (ATA)

The permissible use of thrust effect in a thruster-assisted mooring is not consistent

within all industry standard acceptance criteria and depends on the acceptance
criteria used.

2.4 Wind External Forces

Wind External Forces - The mean wind forces are extracted from the Marine
Operating Manual, wind tunnel test results or American Petroleum Institute (API)
guidelines for the calculation of wind forces as outlined in Recommended Practice
(RP) 2SK

2.5 Current External Forces

The mean current forces are extracted from the Marine Operating Manual, wind
tunnel or towing tank test results or American Petroleum Institute (API) guidelines
for the calculation of current forces as outlined in Recommended Practice (RP) 2SK

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 4

MOORING GUIDELINES
INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS

2.6 Mean Wave Drift Forces

The mean wave drift forces are extracted from the Marine Operating Manual, wave
tank test results, calculation using the vessel’s mean drift transfer functions or from
empirical data presented within API RP2SK (The API curves for semi-submersibles
represent the upper bound of the mean wave drift forces generated by a motions
analysis computer program for four (4) semi-submersible designs including typical 4,
8 and 8 circular column twin hull designs and the pentagon design. These are not
recommended for large installations, with displacements over 30,000 short tons.

2.7 Installation Motions

The installation first order motions, characterized by the wave spectrum, are
extracted from the MOM (suitable for quasi-static analyses only), calculation using
the vessel’s response amplitude operators (suitable for both quasi-static and
dynamic analyses, however a mooring analysis program capable of time or
frequency domain dynamic analysis is required), Wave tank test (suitable for both
quasi-static and dynamic analyses) or API-RP-2SK data if applicable (suitable for
quasi-static analyses only). The second order vessel motions, characterized by the
wind and wave spectra, are extracted by calculation using the vessel’s mean drift
transfer functions (using a hydrodynamic motion analysis program), wave tank test
data or API RP 2SK data if applicable.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 5

MOORING GUIDELINES
MOORING SYSTEM ANALYSIS

1 GENERAL

This subsection is not intended to serve as a step-by-step analysis procedure, rather

a guideline to outline the process by which the mooring spread is analysed to
demonstrate minimum compliance with selected regulatory and industry mooring
system codes.

The required wind (1 minute, 10 minute or 1 hour average speed at 10m above sea
level, spectrum), wave (Hs, Tp or Tz, spectrum), and current (surface velocity,
profile) data, and the combination thereof depend on the acceptance criteria used.
For column stabilised units and ships that are directionally fixed, the loads from
wind, waves and current are assumed acting in the same direction. Directional
distribution of wind, waves and current may be applied if available. For DNV
POSMOOR, UK POSMOOR and API RP 2SK this is presented for operating and
survival conditions (Refer to Section 5, subsection 9).

For installations with a symmetrical anchor pattern, the following environmental

directions shall be analysed:

• Bow/stern (longitudinal), quartering (oblique) and beam (transverse) load

directions as a minimum. Additional environmental directions may be required to
demonstrate full compliance and these are determined on a case-by-case basis
during the analysis.

• Any direction that would offset the installation toward a fixed structure or other
installation/vessel in the vicinity.

• For installations with asymmetrical anchor patterns, in addition to those

directions described above, environmental forces acting on the asymmetric
portions of the mooring spread.

The following three (3) environmental forces acting on the mooring system are
always considered:

• Steady state forces - The steady state forces acting on the system, including
current, mean wind, and mean wave drift forces, are determined using one of the
techniques outlined in Section 5, subsection 4. If significant, as is often the
case in deeper water depths, the steady state current force acting on the
mooring lines and riser are taken into account. The restoring forces generated

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5

MOORING GUIDELINES
MOORING SYSTEM ANALYSIS

by the mooring system to mean forces are predicted by static catenary

equations. A static mooring analysis program is used.

• Low frequency installation motions (second order) - The low frequency motion
amplitude due to wind and waves, is determined using one of the techniques
outlined in Section 5, subsection 4. The low frequency motion is highly
dependent on the stiffness of the mooring system and the system damping.
Consequently, if the low frequency motions are calculated using the installation
mean drift transfer functions, the stiffness of the mooring system and the system
damping must be determined. The mooring stiffness should be calculated and
checked at the mean offset using a static mooring analysis program. The main
sources of damping are viscous damping of the installation, wave drift damping,
mooring and riser system damping and thruster damping (only applicable for
thruster assisted mooring). The wave drift damping and the mooring system
damping are often the most important parts of the total damping. The line
tensions, as a result of the low frequency motions, are predicted by static
catenary equations because of the long periods associated with the motions
(typical periods range from 1 to 3 minutes).

• Wave frequency (first order) installation motions - The installation response to

wave frequency motions are predicted by either a quasi-static or dynamic
approach using one of the techniques outlined in Section 5, subsection 4. With
a quasi-static approach, the dynamic wave loads are taken into account by
statically offsetting the installation by an appropriately defined wave motion.
Vertical fairlead motions and dynamic effects associated with mass, damping
and fluid accelerations are neglected. A dynamic approach accounts for the time
varying effects due to mass, damping and fluid acceleration. In this approach
the time-varying fairlead motions are calculated from the installation’s surge,
sway, heave, pitch, roll and yaw motions.

The selection of a quasi-static or dynamic approach depends on the installation,

location, and client requirements. In general, a dynamic analysis should be
undertaken if the water depth is greater than 450 metres and the mooring
system stresses determined by quasi-static analysis are approached. For
permanent mooring systems a dynamic analysis should be undertaken.

The DNV POSMOOR and API RP 2SK mooring line safety factors for both quasi-
static and dynamic analyses are presented in Section 5, subsection 9.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 5

MOORING GUIDELINES
MOORING SYSTEM ANALYSIS

The “transient condition” is the condition in which the installation is subjected to

transient motions after a mooring line breakage before it settles at the new
equilibrium position.

The transient condition can be an important consideration for certain operations,

such as mooring an installation close to a platform. However, accurate
determination of the damping force on the installation, which is a critical parameter,
is complex and incorrect calculation of the damping force can significantly affect the
results of a transient analysis.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 6

MOORING GUIDELINES
PRE-MOORED LOCATIONS

1 GENERAL

The use or pre-set mooring systems is increasing in frequency, especially in deep

water depths and for field development drilling as a means to reduce installation
move times by pre-installing mooring equipment for a subsequent location while the
installation is completing operations on a previous site.

For the purpose of this subsection, a pre-set mooring spread is one that is installed
by an anchor-handling contractor in accordance with good offshore practice in
advance of the arrival of the installation for hook-up and commencement of
operations.

While pre-set mooring spreads usually employ alternate type of anchors, for
example suction pile or suction-embedded plate anchors (refer to Section 5,
subsection 7) rather than conventional drag-embedment anchors, the acceptability
criteria remain consistent with industry-standard codes.

In most cases, the analysis for a pre-set mooring spread, often referred to as the
design calculations, are performed by a third party contracted directly by the
respective operator. In this case, any analysis should be reviewed by the
Engineering department (Houston or Montrouge) against company minimum
operating standards prior to hook-up of the installation on location.

When a pre-set mooring spread is to be used, the operator will furnish (possibly
through the mooring contractor) the following information prior to hook-up of the
installation on location (The following list is considered the minimum acceptable
data set. While additional information may be supplied, the following must be
fulfilled):

• Make, model, rating, serial number or other unique identification for each of the
components which comprise the mooring system, including anchors, buoys,
chain, wire, connectors and associated jewelry.
• Material Tracability and certification for all components which can be directly
cross-referenced to the equipment employed for installation mooring.
• Age and Work History for all components.
• Load test reports for any components designed and/or fabricated for the
particular location, for example tri-plates.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 6

MOORING GUIDELINES
PRE-MOORED LOCATIONS

Mooring components furnished as part of an operator-supplied system must be of a rating

and quality consistent with the rating and quality of the installation mooring system and
company minimum standards where applicable.

It should be noted that the use of synthetic mooring lines is increasing, specifically in pre-
set mooring spreads. The use of synthetics has been limited to date, but their use will
continue to increase as clients continue to moor in deeper and deeper water depths. There
are several issues that should be noted and require specific attention:

• Mooring analysis software currently employed by the Engineering department in

Houston and Montrouge do not address a variable stiffness line component, which is
characteristic of all synthetics used for mooring. Currently, several runs are made using
different stiffness values to model the potential system response.

• Installing a torque-neutral synthetic line component in series with a wire rope

component was identified several years ago as potentially detrimental to the wire rope
component. When the synthetic component is torque neutral and does not provide any
torque resistance for the wire rope, it was shown that the fatigue in the wire rope
accelerated. Consequently, Engineering review and acceptance of mooring
configurations with wire rope in series with synthetics is on a case-by-case basis only.

Further, there is concern about moving an installation around on a template when

synthetics are used in a taut leg system, specifically, when moorings are not retrieved and
relocated. Since winching significant distances in a taut leg pattern changes the angles at
the fairleads and the length of the mooring lines, special attention is required to ensure that
these changes and the resultant effects on angles and stiffness are being properly
addressed.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 7

MOORING GUIDELINES
USE OF DIFFERENT ANCHOR TYPES

1 GENERAL

The use of anchor types other than conventional drag embedment anchors is
increasing in frequency, particularly where pre-set mooring systems are employed.
As the water depth of interest increases, the mooring spread becomes more taut,
that is to say the scope decreases below what is considered conventional for drag
embedment spreads.

A typical minimum scope (ratio of the range-to-anchor vs. water depth) for a
conventional mooring spread may be 3:1, depending on the various parameters that
affect the moored installation. Conversely, the minimum scope for a semi-taut
mooring spread using suction piles (which are not subject to uplift) may be 1.5:1,
thereby minimizing the range-to-anchor and the amount of wire, chain and hardware
required to successfully moor the installation.

Note: The use of alternate anchor types in installation mooring should be reviewed
by Headquarters Engineering & Construction department prior to hook-up on
location, including mooring design calculations.

The important item to note concerning the use of alternate anchor types is that they
are analysed in the same manner as conventional drag embedment anchors with
respect to uplift (where applicable), holding capacity and resultant factor of safety in
the various conditions assessed.

2 DESCRIPTION OF SEVERAL ALTERNATE ANCHOR TYPES

2.1 Suction Pile Anchors

The suction pile is an engineered cylindrical pile that is driven into the seabed in
place of a conventional drag embedment anchor. The method for driving the pile
forms the basis for the name.

The pile is lowered from the stern of the anchor-handling vessel to the seabed.
After contact is made with the seabed, the water inside the pile, trapped inside the
pipe, is evacuated by means of a pump and the resulting suction inside the pile
draws the pile into the seabed to the prescribed depth.

The ground tackle and mooring wire or chain is connected to the pile prior to driving.
A primary advantage of the suction pile is the ability to precisely locate the anchors
during the installation of the mooring spread, as no dragging along the seabed is

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7

MOORING GUIDELINES
USE OF DIFFERENT ANCHOR TYPES

required to embed the anchor and develop the holding capacity. This is especially
useful in areas with existing seabed infrastructure where precise anchor placement
is a necessity to prevent damage to subsurface equipment. Further, the suction pile
is generally not subjected to uplift as would be the case with a drag embedment
anchor which can lose holding capacity and slip if the shank is lifted too far off the
seabed.

2.2 Suction-Embedded Plate Anchors (SEPLA)

The SEPLA (Suction-Embedded Plate Anchor) consists of a fabricated plate anchor

that is installed in the seabed using a modified suction pile. The plate anchor is
fitted into a slot in the bottom of the suction pile and lowered as an assembly to the
seabed from the stern of the anchor-handling vessel.

After touchdown, a specially equipped ROV is deployed from the AHV to attach to
the top of the suction pile. The ROV, equipped with a pump, evacuates the water
from the suction pile, driving the SEPLA into the seabed with the ground tackle and
mooring tackle attached. After the SEPLA is driven to the prescribed depth, the
suction pile is refilled with seawater, extracting the pile from the seabed while
leaving the SEPLA embedded in the sea floor.

The primary advantages to the SEPLA are not unlike those for the suction pile, but
some benefit is gained by the anchor handling contractor in that the suction pile can
be reused to install the inexpensive fabricated plate anchors.

2.3 Vertically Loaded Plate Anchors (VLA)

The vertically loaded plate anchor is a fabricated plate anchor that is handled over
the stern of the anchor-handling vessel in a manner similar to a conventional drag
embedment anchor. The anchor consists of a fabricated plate fluke with a four-point
wire bridle attached to an engineered, two-position catch mechanism which is
triggered at the appropriate time during the installation to develop the holding
capacity.

After the anchor is landed on the seabed, the AHV takes tension on the mooring
line to embed the anchor similarly to a conventional anchor. After a prescribed
depth below the mud line is attained or a prescribed tension on the line is observed,
the catch mechanism is triggered to change the angle-of-attack of the fluke in the
seabed, significantly increasing the holding capacity of the anchor.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 7

MOORING GUIDELINES
USE OF DIFFERENT ANCHOR TYPES

The primary advantages of the VLA include installation and recovery

procedures which do not require significant additional equipment, minimal
possibility of uplift and the ability to develop high holding power in taut
mooring spreads with high mooring line angles from the seabed and little or
no ground tackle.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 8

MOORING GUIDELINES
FLOATING OPERATIONS OVER TEMPLATES

1 GENERAL

There are several additional considerations that must be addressed with respect to
installation mooring over subsea templates. Details associated with each of the
following is addressed elsewhere in this Section:

• Drilling operations over a subsea template will likely mandate that the installation
will be moved from well to well, possibly by active winching rather than mooring
line redeployment. Consequently, consideration must be made during the
planning and assessment stages of the operation to ensure the configuration of
the mooring system, as outlined for a level 1 mooring analysis allows for
sufficient movement of the installation within the prescribed acceptability criteria.

• Consideration must be made of seabed infrastructure while running and

retrieving the BOP and marine drilling riser. It is preferable that the installation
be winched away from the position directly above the template while handling
riser and BOPs so to minimize the potential for subsea equipment damage in the
event of a loss-of-load incident resulting in equipment dropped to the sea floor.

• Similar consideration should be given of the consequence of dropped loads

impacting subsea equipment installations when offloading supply vessels.Where
warranted, the mooring spread should allow for installation position adjustment
for this scenario as well.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

1 GENERAL

Mooring analysis is performed for each location according to an industry standard

code. The criteria used will be clearly stated. If the Operator requests that analyses
to be undertaken based on other rules, deviations from industry or regulatory-
standard, the request and computations must be documented. In addition, the
following criteria below are also verified, when required:

1.1 Vessel Offset for Semi-Submersible Installation, Exploration or

Template Mode

Offset will be governed by the limitations of the marine drilling riser. Limits shall be
maintained in accordance with the API RP 16Q (1st Edition. November 1st 1993) and
one or more of the following may apply:

1.2 Riser Flex Joint Angle

In shallow to mid-water depths, which for this purpose will be less than 2000-feet,
riser flex joint angle tends to be the limiting criteria for maximum permissible offset.
The following values are not intended to be hard limits, as different operating
scenarios may preclude angles of 2-degrees. Additionally, allowable flex joint angle
(for purposes of determining offset in the mooring analyses will not be greater than
90-percent of the rated maximum angle for the flex joint).

Drilling Condition Flex Joint Angle

Mean 2.0°
Full Drilling
Maximum 4.0°
Suspended Drilling 9.0°

1.3 Telescopic Joint or Riser Tensioner Stroke Length

Careful attention must be paid to the effects of installation offset on telescopic joint
and riser tensioner stroke, especially in deep to ultra-deep water depths, which for
this purpose will be greater than 3000-feet where the stroke length equates to an
increased “riser length” and, by geometry, corresponds to a horizontal offset. Heave
further limits this offset. Pitch or roll may also add offset limits depending on the
location of the well center relative to the center-of-motion.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

1.4 Clearance

The follow minimum clearances must be met between the installation’s mooring
system and various obstructions. Operators may impose stricter limits.

When other installation mooring lines are present, the following criteria apply:

• The vertical clearance between any mooring line shall be at least 30 ft.
• The horizontal distance from anchors will be at least 300 ft.

When subsea wellheads are present, the following criteria apply:

• The closest point of mooring line under all conditions shall be at least 300 ft.
• The distance from the anchors shall be at least 500 ft.

1.5 Tender Operations

The clearance from the drilling platform must be verified according to either
POSMOOR-V criteria in the case of a North Sea or severe environment, or when a
gangway or a bridge is fitted to the installation, or, in milder environment, clearance
greater than the transient dynamic motion in case of a line breaking, i.e. no contact
permitted.

1.6 Pipeline Crossings and Platform Legs

The following minimum clearances should be maintained during corresponding

mooring conditions:

Mooring Condition Minimum Clearance

Normal Drilling 50 ft.

Intact Survival (mean) 30 ft.
Damaged (extreme) 1 ft.
Transient Contact Permitted

For mooring spreads where the above-outlined minimum clearances cannot be

maintained at all times, remedial action may be required, for example the use of
buoys. Application of such measures should be assessed through analysis by the

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

Engineering department and arrangements mutually agreed and approved by the

operator in advance of commencement of operations.

1.7 Bolster and/or Hull Contact

Certain installations are prone to leeward mooring line anchor bolster and hull
contact during heavy weather in deep-water operations. Since contact with a bolster
in combination with installation motion can saw a mooring line and part it, this
condition shall be examined. The vertical angle associated with the leeward line
tension at maximum offset shall be determined. The roll and pitch components
relative to the line are then added and the resultant vertical angle calculated. This
angle is then compared with the vertical angle where bolster or hull contact occurs.
Additional operational limitations may be imposed as a result of this analysis.

1.8 Mooring Line Length

The mooring line length must be long enough to avoid lifting force on the anchor in
the operating condition. For the survival and transient conditions vertical forces on
the anchors may be accepted if it is documented that the vertical forces experienced
will not destroy the holding capacity of the anchor. For soft clay API RP 2SK
suggest that the maximum line angle at the mudline (including the effect of wave
and low frequency motion) should be less than 10° in the damaged survival
condition and 5° in the intact survival condition. Additionally, sufficient line should
be left on onboard to allow the installation a shift of 300 ft in any direction in case of
emergency.

1.9 Line Adjustment

Line adjustments shall be made based on the capabilities of the winching equipment
and location of operation. Installations with traction winches, for example, may be
able to winch into the weather and balance windward lines while other installations
with conventional winches will not be able to do this. Areas where the installation is
abandoned during hurricanes/cyclones/typhoon will allow only slacking of all lines,
while other locations were the installation remains manned during storm survival
conditions may allow some active line adjustments.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

1.10 Anchor Holding Capacity

Anchor performance data for the specific anchor type and soil condition should be
obtained if possible. In the absence of any credible anchor performance data, the
conservative anchor holding power curves given in API RP 2SK should be used.

Anchor dragging should not occur in the operating condition. Anchor dragging in the
survival and transient conditions should be assessed using the safety factors
presented in paragraph 2.

2 GENERAL

Following is a summation of the acceptance criteria for the three (3) widely used
industry codes and standards for mooring system assessment and approval.

2.1 DNV POSMOOR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Metocean Criteria
Installations not sensitive to low frequency Installations sensitive to low frequency motion
motion

The most unfavorable of: The most unfavorable of:

10 minute, 100-year return wind with 100-year 1 hour, 100-year return wind (with a gust
return waves and 10 year return current. spectrum) with 100-year return waves and 10 year
- or - return current.
10 minute, 10-year return wind with 100-year - or -
return waves and 100 year return current. 1 hour, 10-year return wind (with a gust spectrum)
with 10-year return waves and 100 year return
current.
General Notes

Wind speeds refer to an elevation of 10m above still water level.

2.2 Mooring Line Breaking Strength

Permissible safety factors for chain cable and steel wire rope are indicated in the
following table. The safety factors are to be multiplied with a factor 1.10 to be
applicable for fiber (synthetic) ropes. A dynamic analysis must be used in water
depths greater than 450 m. (1,476 ft.).

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

Quasi-static Analysis Dynamic Analysis

Operation Condition
POSMOOR POSMOOR V POSMOOR POSMOOR V
Intact System
1.80 (56%) 2.00 (50%) 1.50 (67%) 1.65 (61%)
Transient
I (Survival) Motion 1.10 (91%) 1.10 (91%) 1.00 (100%) 1.00 (100%)

Single Line
1.25 (80%) 1.40 (71%) 1.10 (91%) 1.25 (80%)
Failure
Intact System
2.70 (37%) 3.00 (33%) 2.30 (43%) 2.50 (40%)
Transient
II (Operating) Motion 1.40 (71%) 1.40 (71%) 1.20 (83%) 1.20 (83%)

Single Line
1.80 (56%) 2.00 (50%) 1.50 (67%) 1.65 (61%)
Failure

1. Installations moored 300m or more away from a fixed installation are required to use
safety factors according to Operation Condition I or II, POSMOOR, depending on the
type of operation.
2. Installations moored within 50m and 300m from a fixed installation are required to meet
the following:
• The mooring lines outside the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition I or II, POSMOOR.
• The mooring lines within the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition I or II, POSMOOR V.
3. Installations moored less than 50m from a fixed installation are required to meet the
following:
• The mooring lines outside the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition II, POSMOOR.
• The mooring lines within the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition II, POSMOOR V.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

2.3 Permissible Use of Thrust Effect in Thruster Assisted Mooring Systems

Installation’s layout of thrust control system

Operation
Condition Manual remote control (TA) Automatic remote control (ATA)

70% of net thrust effect from all The net thrust effect from all
I (survival): intact (1)
thrusters thrusters

The net thrust effect from all

II (operating): intact 0% (Not Permitted)
thrusters

70% of net thrust effect from all The net thrust effect from all
I (survival): damaged (1) (2)
thrusters thrusters

The net thrust effect from all

II (survival): damaged 0% (Not Permitted (2)
thrusters

General Notes
(1)
- Provided continuous watch at joystick.
(2)
- A failure leading to stop of thrusters is to be considered equivalent to a line failure. Redundancy
equipment is not required if blackout is considered as a single failure and Factors of Safety for mooring
line break strength are satisfied.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

3 UK POSMOOR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Metocean Criteria
Installations not sensitive to low frequency Installationss sensitive to low frequency
motion motion

10 minute, 50 year return wind, waves and current 1 hour, 50 year return wind (with a gust spectrum),
50 waves and current.
General Notes

Wind speeds refer to an elevation of 10m above still water level.

3.1 Mooring Line Breaking Strength

Permissible safety factors for chain cable and steel wire rope. The safety factors
are to be multiplied with a factor 1.10 to be applicable for fiber ropes. A dynamic
analysis must be used in water depths greater than 450 m. (1,476 ft.).

Quasi-static Analysis Dynamic Analysis

Operation Condition
POSMOOR POSMOOR V POSMOOR POSMOOR V

Intact 1.80 (56%) 2.00 (50%) 1.50 (67%) 1.65 (61%)

I (Survival) Transient 1.10 (91%) 1.10 (91%) 1.00 (100%) 1.00 (100%)
Single Line
1.25 (80%) 1.40 (71%) 1.10 (91%) 1.25 (80%)
Failure

Intact 2.70 (37%) 3.00 (33%) 2.30 (43%) 2.50 (40%)

II (Operating)
Transient 1.40 (71%) 1.40 (71%) 1.20 (83%) 1.20 (83%)

Single Line
1.80 (56%) 2.00 (50%) 1.50 (67%) 1.65 (61%)
Failure

1. Installations moored 300m or more away from a fixed installation are required to use
safety factors according to Operation Condition I or II, POSMOOR, depending on the
type of operation.
2. Installations moored within 50m and 300m from a fixed installation, are required to meet
the following:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

• The mooring lines outside the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition I or II, POSMOOR.
• The mooring lines within the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition I or II, POSMOOR V.
3. Installations moored less than 50m from a fixed installation are required to meet the
following:
• The mooring lines outside the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition II, POSMOOR.
• The mooring lines within the critical sector are to be designed according to
Operation Condition II, POSMOOR V.

3.2 Permissible Use of thrust Effect in thruster Assisted mooring Systems

Unit’s layout of thrust control system

Operation Condition
Manual remote control (TA) Automatic remote control (ATA)

70% of net thrust effect from all The net thrust effect from all
I (survival): intact (1)
thrusters thrusters

The net thrust effect from all

II (operating): intact 0% (Not Permitted)
thrusters

70% of net thrust effect from all The net thrust effect from all
I (survival): damaged (1) (2)
thrusters thrusters

The net thrust effect from all

II (survival): damaged 0% (Not Permitted) (2)
thrusters

General Notes
(1)
- Provided continuous watch at joystick.
(2)
- A failure leading to stop of thrusters is to be considered equivalent to a line failure. Redundancy
equipment is not required if blackout is considered as a single failure and Factors of Safety for mooring
line break strength are satisfied.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

3.3 Performance Criteria for Drag Anchors (Applicable to DNV and UK POSMOOR)

Temporary Mooring Quasi-static and Dynamic

Factor of Safety 1.0
Intact
Angle Uplift 5.0°

Factor of Safety 1.0

Damaged
Angle Uplift 10°
Permanent Mooring Quasi-static Dynamic
Factor of Safety 1.8 1.2
Intact
Angle Uplift 5°

Factor of Safety 1.5 1.0

Damaged
Angle Uplift 10°
Uplift Angles Based on API for Ultra High Holding Power anchors

4 API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 2SK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Metocean Criteria
Permanent Moorings Mobile Moorings (MODUs)
The most unfavorable of:
Away from other structures – Minimum 5 year
100 year return waves with associated winds and return wind, waves and current
current.
- or - In the vicinity of other structures – Minimum 10
100 year return wind with associated waves and year return wind, waves and current
current.
General Notes
For the wind component, the criteria suggests using one of the following two methods:
1 minute average wind speed or 1 hour average wind speed in combination with a gust spectrum.

Due to the large variability in measured wind spectra, there is no universally accepted spectral shape.
In the absence of data indicating otherwise, the wind spectrum presented in API RP 2A can be used.

Wind speeds refer to an elevation of 10m above still water level

Mobile Mooring operations occurring out of the typhoon/hurricane storm season, these return periods
can be determined using the environmental data excluding typhoons/hurricanes. For operations during
the typhoon/hurricane storm season, this data shall be included.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

4.1 Analysis Methods and Conditions to be Examined

Type of Mooring Analysis Method Conditions Analyzed

Initial Design Quasi-static or Dynamic Intact & Damaged
Permanent Final Design Dynamic Intact, Damaged &
Mooring Transient
Fatigue Design Dynamic Intact
Away from Other Quasi-static or Dynamic Intact
Structures
Mobile Mooring Lines Over Quasi-static or Dynamic Intact & Damaged
Mooring Pipelines
Vessel Next To A Quasi-static or Dynamic Intact, Damaged &
Platform Transient

4.2 Permissible Safety Factors for Chain Cable and Steel Wire
Rope

Operating Condition Quasi-static Dynamic

Intact system 2.00 (50%) 1.67 (60%)

Transient
Operating and 1.18 (85%) 1.05 (95%)
motion
Survival

Damaged
1.43 (70%) 1.25 (80%)
system

4.3 Permissible Use of thrust Effect in Thruster Assisted Mooring Systems

Installation’s layout of thrust control system

Operation
Condition Manual remote control (TA) Automatic remote control (ATA)

Operating & 70% of net thrust after failure of any one Net thrust after failure of any one
Survival: intact thruster thruster

Operating & 70% net thrust from all thrusters Net thrust from all thrusters
Survival: damaged

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

4.4 Performance Criteria for Drag Anchors

Temporary Mooring Quasi-static Dynamic

Factor of Safety 1.0 0.8
Intact Angle Uplift 5°
Factor of Safety Not required
Damaged Angle Uplift
& Transient 10°
Permanent Mooring Quasi-static Dynamic
Factor of Safety 1.8 1.5
Intact Angle Uplift 5°
Factor of Safety 1.2 1.0
Damaged Angle Uplift 10°
Factor of Safety Not required
Transient Angle Uplift 10°
Uplift Angles Based on Ultra High Holding Power anchors

5 REFERENCES AND REGULATIONS

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)

Guide for the Certification of Offshore Mooring Chain

American Petroleum Institute (API)

API RP 2A Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing and

Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms (Latest Edition)
API Spec 2F Specification for Mooring Chain (Latest Edition)
API RP 2I In-Service Inspection of Mooring Hardware for Floating Drilling
Units (Latest Edition)
API RP 2SK Recommended Practice for Design and Analysis of
Stationkeeping Systems for Floating Structures (Latest Edition)
API RP 16Q Design, Selection, Operation and Maintenance of Marine
Drilling Riser Systems (Latest Edition)
API RP 2SM Recommend Practice for Design, Manufacture, Installation, and
Maintenance of Synthetic Fiber Ropes for Offshore Moorings
(Latest Edition)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 9

MOORING GUIDELINES
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA STANDARDS

Det Norske Veritas (DNV)

Rules for Classification of Mobile Offshore Units

Position Mooring (POSMOOR) (Latest Edition).
DNV Certification Notes No. 2.6
Certification of Offshore Mooring Wire Ropes (Latest Edition)

International Association of Classification Societies (IACS)

Chain Specification

International Standards Organization (ISO)

ISO Draft Revision on Mooring System Design and Analysis

ISO 9089 Marine Structures – Mobile Offshore Unit – Anchor Winches

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 1979
Edition

Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 1989
Edition

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 12 12
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 10

MOORING GUIDELINES
MINIMUM ANCHOR HANDLING VESSEL REQUIREMENTS

1 GENERAL

This subsection is intended to provide summary guidance for evaluation of the

deployment and retrieval of the installation’s mooring system using anchor-handling
tugs with emphasis on Transocean minimum recommendations for safety,
operations and equipment.

This subsection is applicable to all company floating moored installations including

semi-submersibles, moored drill ships and tender-assist installations conducting
operations in isolation or the vicinity of other installations, structures or platforms.
It is important to note that the installation-specific requirements for anchor-handling
tugs (AHVs) will vary depending on the mooring system that is to be deployed and
retrieved, the location, water depth, and installation equipment characteristics.
However, the following is intended to provide some initial guidance and outline the
differences in AHV requirements effected by increasing water depth.

2 DEEP TO ULTRA-DEEP CATENARY, CHAIN-WIRE, MOORING SYSTEMS

For the purpose of this subsection, ultra-deep will refer to water depths in excess of
3,000 ft. where catenary moorings are deployed. Forces seen by the AHV are
produced by the weight of the system and the requirement to “stretch” the line to get
the anchor out to its target distance.
Note: The following list is not intended to preclude installation-specific
requirements, which may exceed company-minimum acceptable capabilities.
• Bollard pull certified at 350 kips.
• Stern and bow thrusters of sufficient aggregate horsepower to maintain station
while running anchors in 25 knot beam wind and associated sea conditions.
• Anchor / towing winches with the following certified ratings:
• Dynamic inhaul and braking capacity on first layer of 775 kip.
• Static holding capacity of 990 kip.
• Total combined winch capacity for 7,200 ft. x 3 in. active work wire without
spooling from a storage winch.
• Inner drum diameter approximately 54 in. or sized with drum diameter to wire
diameter ratio (D:d) of 18:1. Minimum work wire diameter is 3 in.
• Level wind devices.
• Chain handling wildcat with whelps sized for installation chain.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 10

MOORING GUIDELINES
MINIMUM ANCHOR HANDLING VESSEL REQUIREMENTS

• Chain locker(s) and/or aft deck space capable of stowing 5000 ft. of installation
chain.
• Stern roller rated to 1,100 kips.
• Shark jaws, two (2), hydraulic, rated to 990 – 1,100 kips and sized for installation
chain
• Hydraulic pop-up 'guide' deck pins and capstans.
• Hydraulic deck tuggers rated to 30 kips +.

3 MEDIUM TO DEEP CATENARY, WIRE-CHAIN MOORING SYSTEMS

For the purpose of this subsection, medium-to-deep will refer to water depths from
1,500 to 3,000 ft. Forces seen by the AHV are produced by the weight of the
system and the requirement to “stretch” the line to get the anchor out to its target
distance. Additionally, bottom-dragging issues may manifest depending on the
mooring system particulars when deployed at the shallower end of this depth range.

• Bollard pull certified at 250 kips.

• Stern and bow thrusters of sufficient aggregate horsepower to maintain station
while running anchors in 25 knot beam wind and associated sea conditions.
• Anchor / towing winches with the following certified ratings:
• Dynamic inhaul and braking capacity on first layer of 500 kips.
• Static holding capacity of 600 kips.
• Total combined winch capacity for 4,500 ft. x 2-1/2 in. active work wire without
spooling from a storage winch.
• Inner drum diameter approximately 45 in.or sized with drum diameter to wire
diameter ratio (D:d) of 18:1. Minimum work wire diameter is 2-1/2 in.
• Level wind devices.
• Chain handling wildcat with whelps sized for installation chain.
• Chain locker(s) or aft deck space capable of stowing 3,500 ft. of installation
chain.
• Stern roller rated at 600 kips.
• Shark jaws, two (2), hydraulic, sized for installation chain, and rated at 550 - 600
kips.
• Hydraulic pop-up 'guide' deck pins and capstans.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 10

MOORING GUIDELINES
MINIMUM ANCHOR HANDLING VESSEL REQUIREMENTS

• Hydraulic deck tuggers rated to 45 kip.

4 SHALLOW TO MEDIUM CATENARY, ALL CHAIN MOORING SYSTEMS

This depth category is defined as water depths from 100 to 1,500 ft. Forces seen by
the AHV are produced by the requirement to keep from dragging the mooring line
across the bottom. As the chain is dragged, it slows the AHV down and may
prevent it from getting the anchor to its target distance. Additionally, if there are any
pipelines, bundles, umbilicals, etc. in the vicinity, careful attention must be paid as
chain cannot be dragged across the bottom with the potential for causing damage.

• Bollard pull certified at 200 kips.

• Stern and bow thrusters of sufficient aggregate horsepower to maintain station
while running anchors in 25 knot beam wind and associated sea conditions.
• Anchor / towing winches with the following certified ratings:
• Dynamic inhaul and braking capacity on first layer of 350 kips.
• Static holding capacity of 500 kips.
• Total combined winch capacity for 2,500 ft. x 2-1/4 in. active work wire without
spooling from a storage winch.
• Inner drum diameter approximately 41 in. or sized with drum diameter to wire
diameter ratio (D:d) of 18:1. Minimum work wire diameter is 2-1/4 in.
• Level wind devices.
• Chain handling wildcat with whelps sized for installation chain.
• Chain locker(s) or aft deck space capable of stowing 2500 ft. of installation
chain.
• Stern roller rated at 500 kips.
• Shark jaws, two (2), hydraulic, sized for rig chain, and rated at 450 - 500 kips.
• Hydraulic pop-up 'guide' deck pins and capstans.
• Hydraulic deck tuggers rated to 45 kip.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 5
HQS-OPS-004 SUBSECTION: 10

MOORING GUIDELINES
MINIMUM ANCHOR HANDLING VESSEL REQUIREMENTS

5 ANCHOR-HANDLING VESSEL EQUIPMENT

Equipment will vary depending on the location, water depth and mooring system
deployed and retrieved, however, the following should be considered as a minimum:

• Work wires shall be fitted with "Pee Wee" or "Goldnose" type closed spelter
sockets. Length and diameter shall be as noted above for each water depth
category. A continuous, single length work wire is preferred.
• 3 in. or 3-3/8 in. detachable chain connecting links of the "C", Kenter or Ramfor
type.
• Minimum of two (2) cross over chains, 3 in. diameter, eight (8) links long and two
(2) x 3 in. eye to eye "on load" type swivels for cross over connections.
• One full set of spare wires and connectors as above.
• One (1) ultra wide radius 'J' hook, suitable for chasing and recovering mooring
chain or wire.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 1

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

INTRODUCTION and BACKGROUND

1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Riser management guidelines must be established so that a consistent level of

safety and performance is achieved across the Transocean floating Installation fleet.
This section will address key areas of concern regarding operational limitations of
the riser system and the impact of those limits on station keeping.

Guidelines are provided for the following issues:

• Riser spaceout selection

• Riser/BOP deployment limits
• Riser connected mode limits
• Riser hang off limits in storms/high current
• Establishing station keeping parameters (watch circles and optimum drilling
position)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER SPACEOUT

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that all Installations will prepare a drilling riser
spaceout for each well that meets Company and API RP 16Q minimum
standards for performance and safety in the site-specific environment of
operation.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that adequate redundancy and safety margins are consistently applied
during all floating operations from riser deployment to recovery.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all installations of the Company utilizing drilling risers with tensioner
systems as well as employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work
on any offshore installation owned, operated and/or managed by the Company.

4 RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of the OIM, Toolpusher, Subsea Supervisor, DPO and Master to
understand riser management issues relating to riser and station keeping limits while
the riser is being deployed, connect to the wellhead, and suspended from the
installation in high environmental conditions.

5 PROCEDURE

A riser spaceout shall be designed for each well to take into account the following
criteria:

• Water depth
• Site-specific environmental conditions (wind, wave and currents)
• Connected performance including maximum required mud weight for well
• Riser collapse
• Riser running hook load limits and sea states
• Survival hang off requirements

The spaceout can be obtained from on-board spaceout records (subject to prior
approval from engineering) or by requesting a riser spaceout from Engineering for the
specific conditions through the REA process.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER SPACEOUT

Tension settings for various mud weights will be calculated according to API RP16Q
requirements and, where necessary, riser recoil requirements. The tension setting will
take into account as a minimum the following:

• Loss of a tensioner unit pair (or single if system allows) and still maintain sufficient
tension in the riser to avoid buckling
• Weight and buoyancy factors applied to nominal riser weights
• Tensioner fleet angle and friction losses
• For dynamic positioned installations, recoil and LMRP lift off tension requirements

As a minimum, the drilling crew should have prepared the following information prior to
the BOP run:

• Riser spaceout and running list

• Riser tension versus mud weight calculation

6 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION / BACKGROUND

The basic principles behind design of a spaceout will be discussed in this subsection.
By no means is this subsection intended to discuss all considerations that go into
spaceout selection, however, some of the key factors are outlined and further
information can be obtained through the Engineering department.

6.1 Riser Spaceout Design Considerations

A riser spaceout must balance the following requirements:

• Allow the maximum mud weight for the well to be achieved at no more than 90%
of the installed tension capacity (according to API calculation methods).

• Provide sufficient drilling operability (control of upper and lower angles) in the
design current profiles for the site.

• Maintain hook loads (static + dynamic) during a BOP run to less than gross
nominal hoisting equipment ratings.

• Provide sufficient in water weight during a hang off condition to prevent excessive
upper angles when suspended in a high current and prevent compression in the
riser during storm sea states.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER SPACEOUT

Some of these requirements contradict one another (i.e. minimize BOP running
loads while providing sufficient in water weight for storm hang off) and require
some experience when selecting the correct spaceout. In particular, as the riser
length increases, it becomes more difficult to maintain a balance that can meet
all of the above criteria without sacrificing safety margins or reducing allowed
environments in which some operations can be conducted.

6.2 Riser Stretch versus Drill pipe Stretch – RKB to Wellhead

Measurement

A general rule of thumb for water depths (<5000 ft) is that drill pipe stretch
during the RKB to well head measurement is about equal to the stretch in the
riser when it is under tension. In the past this has provided a relatively easy way
to account for stretch in the riser spaceout and pup joint selection. However, in
deeper water depths the stretch of the drill pipe can exceed the riser stretch by
some 5 to 10 ft. This is because the length can be 2 to 10 times greater over
which the stretch occurs.

Drill pipe stretch can be estimated as follows:

Stretch = (P x L) / (A x E)
Where:
P = Wt. Per foot pipe x 0.87 x length + overpull at wellhead during measurement, units [lb]
L = measured length of drillpipe, units [ft]
2 2
A = 0.7853 x (OD – ID ), OD and ID units [in]
2
E = 29,000,000 [lb/in ]

So, for example, if the measurement was taken with 6-5/8 in, 25.2 lb/ft drill pipe
with 50,000 lb overpull and the recorded length found to be 8206 ft the stretch
would be equal to:
2 2 2
A = 0.7853 x (6.625 – 5.871 ) = 7.40 in
2 2
Stretch = (25.2 x 8206 ft x 0.87 + 50,000 lb) x 8206 / (7.40 in x 29,000,000 lb/in )

= 8.8 ft (~9 ft)

So the true RKB to well head length would be 8206 + 9 = 8215 ft

6.3 Tension versus Mud Weight Calculation

The required tension setting for a specific mud weight should be calculated
according to API RP16Q methods and take into account LMRP lift off/recoil

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER SPACEOUT

criteria for DP installations. The basic equation from API RP 16Q to calculate
tension is:

Tmin = TSRmin N / [Rf (N-n)]

TSRmin = Minimum Slip Ring Vertical Tension
= Riser wet weight + Mud weight + margin over buckling

N = Number of Tensioners Supporting the Riser

n = Number of Tensioners Subject to Sudden Failure
Rf = Reduction Factor Relating Vertical Tension at the Slip Ring to Tensioner
Setting to account for fleet angle and mechanical efficiency (usually 0.90 –
0.95 for non-drilling and drilling modes)

This formulation outlines the minimum tension requirement. Tension can be

increased from the minimum value to help reduce angles and vortex induced
vibration up to the point where 90% of the total tension limit is reached, any one
component reaches a design load limit, or up to the maximum allowed riser
recoil system limits, whichever occurs first.

6.4 Collapse Estimate

The riser spaceout needs to be checked for collapse resistance for two
conditions:
1) When the entire connected riser is evacuated from losses to the formation
2) When the riser is quickly disconnected with mud as the content (EDS for DP
rigs does not allow the mud to be circulated to sea water) it will fall to a given
distance into the riser (u-tube effect) and the external pressure builds over a
distance of the upper portion of the riser

Collapse ratings can be estimated according to API Bulleting 5C3 formulas.

Engineering can assist with the calculation if necessary. When estimating the
collapse pressure of a tube the following should be taken into account:

• Inspection records for minimum wall thickness (if available)

• Mill tolerance (can be a large as -12% of wall thickness)
• Corrosion and wear allowance (from key seating or similar wear)

Once the collapse pressure or equivalent water depth is estimated, it should be

determined whether a fill-up valve is required to prevent riser collapse.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER SPACEOUT

7 DOCUMENTATION

Documentation is site and installation specific.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 5
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will prepare a riser running
and retrieval plan that outlines the limiting environmental parameters of the
operation, the required duration of the operation, and the forecasted weather
during the operation.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that adequate redundancy and safety margins are consistently applied
during all floating operation riser deployment and recovery operations and to provide a
means of communicating critical issues of riser running operations among personnel.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all installations of the Company utilizing drilling risers as well as
employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore
installation owned, operated and/or managed by the Company.

4 RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of the OIM, Toolpusher, Subsea Supervisor, DPO and Master to
understand riser management issues relating to riser running operation limits while
the riser is being deployed or retrieved.

5 PROCEDURE

BOP runs will be successful only if properly planned and executed with good
communication between the marine and drilling crews. For each well, a worksheet
should be developed for the riser spaceout to facilitate onboard discussions between
the marine and drilling departments in preparation for the riser run. Prior to the run a
meeting should be held to discuss the following issues:

• The riser running order and weights to be shifted need to be supplied to the marine
crew for use in the ballast and stability calculations.

• Estimate the duration of the BOP running operation.

• Obtain weather forecast for the duration of the riser run. Note maximum expected
wind speeds, swell, and sea including direction. This forecast should be compared
to the allowed maximum values for the operation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL

• Obtain current profile using the acoustic doppler profiler (if available) and obtain
current predictions for the days of the BOP run.

• Verify derrick rating in the max wind speed expected during the run is not
exceeded for combined setback and maximum predicted hook load for the BOP
run. If required, reduce setback weight to required level.

• Note riser normal drilling and maximum connected limits for angle & tension versus
mud weight. These limits will be used to establish the installation offset limits.

• Note riser collapse concerns. If high mud weights are expected on the well,
collapse may occur in the event of an EDS if there is not an auto fill-valve in the
system or if the fill-valve does not function properly.

• Discuss the maximum wave condition for the riser run, including the required
heading of the installation relative to the dominate wave/swell direction. The
heading should be selected to minimize heave motion of the installation during the
riser run. The OIM/Master must approve heading changes prior to conducting the
maneuver.

• Note the maximum survival hang-off storm wave and maximum allowed installation
heading to the wave.

6 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION / BACKGROUND

6.1 Dynamic Top Tension During Riser Running Operations

When running riser in deepwater, the hook load may oscillate because of the
installation heave motions. This is due to a “rubber band” effect that occurs when an
long and heavy riser is forced to move with the installation, causing it to stretch and
contract. The reason for this is a long riser can have a natural period (a period at
which it tends to most move up and down) in the range of 4 to 6 seconds. In shallow
water (less than 4000-ft) a typical riser natural period is less than 2 seconds.
Commonly, installations will move in waves and swell with 4 to 6 second periods.
Although the motion is small, because it is near the natural period of the riser, the
tension fluctuations can be extremely large. It is important that the vessel heave
motion be minimized during the riser run.

Dynamic tension problems usually occur during the last half of a riser run (first half of
a riser retrieval), therefore, a good weather forecast during this time period is

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL

extremely important. Each installation and riser combination is different in terms of

limiting heave motion before tension fluctuations may exceed allowed values.
Therefore, it is difficult to provide generalized guidelines for operations since an
installation that operates in 9000-ft of water will have very different limits when it
moves to 4000-ft of water. Each well will have limits outlined on a case-by-case
basis by a riser analysis.

If large tension fluctuations are experienced during a running operation and exceed
design system ratings, the following guidelines are recommended:

• The riser should be placed in the spider/gimbal and the load should be shared
25% on the hook and 75% on the spider. This load sharing will reduce the risk
of either component exceeding design limits.

• The weather and installation heave should be monitored. If possible a new

heading should be selected in an attempt to minimize heave motions. Typically,
this would be with the bow to the dominant wave direction. If bi-directional seas
and swell are present, the optimal heading will likely be somewhere between the
seas and swell direction, closer to the swell direction. At no time should the
heading be changed to bring an installation beam to the waves. This condition
will cause extremely large tension fluctuations in the riser leading to
compression in the riser string. BOP running/retrieving operations have priority
over supply boat offloading operations and installation heading should be
optimized accordingly during these operations.

For a semi-submersible the optimum heading to minimize heave motion is typically a

25 to 45 degree heading off the wave/swell.

6.2 Maximum Predicted Static Running Loads

The maximum static and dynamic running loads should be predicted in a running list
for each well. The installation should keep a record of the measured running
weights from the hook to aid in selecting future riser spaceouts. The comparison of
predicted to actual weight helps to estimate long-term buoyancy losses.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL

6.3 Predicted Riser Run Duration and Weather Forecast

The time it takes to run the BOP must be estimated prior to starting the operation so
that a sufficient forecast window can be obtained. The following is one example of a
run time estimate:

1) Total No. Riser Joints to Run (including pups) 90 joints

2) Estimated Run Time per Joint 20 min (0.33 hrs)
3) Number Joints between Testing 7
4) Total Tests 13 (90 / 7 = ~13)
5) Individual Test Duration 15 min (0.25 hrs)
6) BOP Prep Time 4 hrs
7) Telescopic Joint Rig Up Time 6 hrs
8) Slip Ring / Hose Terminations Time 4 hrs
9) Contingency 6 hrs
10) Total BOP run time estimate (1x2 + 4x5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9) 53 hrs

It should be kept in mind that forecasts lose accuracy the further they predict in the
future, therefore if a riser run is estimated to last 3 to 5 days, it is recommended that
each day the forecast is updated a review between the drilling and marine crews.

6.4 Derrick Rating, Combined Hook Load and Setback

Once the running loads (static plus dynamic) are estimated for the well, the derrick
setback load should be review to make certain the total gross derrick and
substructure loads during all portions of the riser run are within allowed values
according to the derrick operating manual and installation’s Operating/Operations
Manual. If the hook load plus setback will exceed design maximum values, drill pipe
or casing may need to be removed from the derrick prior to starting the riser running
operation.

6.5 Installation Heading Guidelines

During a BOP run the most critical installation motion is heave and secondary to that
is roll and pitch. The installation heading (bow) relative to the wave direction is the
single-most determining factor of heave motion. The 9120-ft water depth BOP run
by the Deepwater Expedition is a good benchmark for the importance of heading
selection. During the last 500-ft of riser deployment, the swell was approximately 2-
3 ft with negligible wind and seas. The vessel heading was changed from head into
the swell to 100 degrees off the swell in order to place the bow into the wind. This
caused hook load fluctuations from the riser to change from +/-75 kips to +/-240
kips, an increase of more than 3 times the optimal installation heading. It is
important that the bridge and drilling crews realize the importance of installation

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL

heading and that management of the heading relative to the waves and swell during
a BOP run is a critical factor to a successful operation.

Guidelines for heading selection on a dynamically positioned drillship are:

• For single direction swell / seas place the bow no more than 10 degrees from the
waves, do not exceed 20 degrees from wave direction

• For bi-directional sea and swell place the bow between the seas and swell.
Typically, the swell will cause more motion that moderate to mild seas, therefore
a heading slightly more towards the swell may help to reduce the motion.

Guidelines for heading selection on dynamically positioned semi-submersibles are:

• For single direction swell / seas place the bow 25 to 45 degrees from the waves,
heave is typically minimal in this condition, however, adjustments may be
required depending on roll and pitch motions and the hull shape of the specific
unit.

• For bi-directional sea and swell place the bow between the seas and swell.

6.6 Running BOP, Severe Current Conditions – Currents Greater than 2.0 knots

Running riser in severe currents (typically greater than 2 knots) can lead to several
concerns as follows:

• Extreme upper angles and diverter contact force (excessive local stress in the
riser)
• Vortex-induced vibration fatigue of the riser
• Riser contact with the hull

In order to limit the stresses, several methods can be employed to reduce the effect
of currents which include operations such as trimming the installation and drifting
into location while running (DP installations). These operations, however, are not
typically thought of as “routine” and therefore need to be review carefully prior to
commencing the operation. It is recommended that the Engineering department be
made aware of riser running operations when currents exceed approximately 2 knot
over a significant portion of the water depth to aid the installation crew in maintaining
a satisfactory level of safety during the operation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER RUNNING AND RETRIEVAL

7 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy or Procedure

however; other reference sources may have documentation requirements.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will establish safe operating
riser tensions according to API recommendations, safe excursion limits to
provide optimum drilling performance, and maximum excursion limits to
establish point of disconnect and watch circle limits.

2 PURPOSE

To prevent equipment damage and raise personnel awareness of drilling riser limiting
offset criteria and establish consistent safety margins during all floating operations
while a drilling riser is connected to a subsea wellhead.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all installations of the Company utilizing drilling risers as well as
employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore
installation owned, operated and/or managed by the Company.

4 RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of the OIM, Toolpusher, Subsea Supervisor, DPO and Master to
understand riser management issues relating to riser and station keeping limits while
the riser is connect to the a subsea wellhead.

5 PROCEDURE

Prior to connected mode operations on each well the following information and
communication will be established for the Drilling and Marine crews:

• A tension versus mud weight chart will be posted that is calculated according to
approved API recommended methods for setting tensions; it should include (for DP
rigs) minimum and maximum tension settings for safe EDS events.

• Allowed installation excursion for normal drilling limits (flex joint angle and stroke
control) will be established to aid in set point selection during operations.

• Maximum excursion limits based on riser parameters will be established so that:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 7
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS

a) for DP installations the LMRP may be disconnected in sufficient time so as to

not damage equipment
b) for moored installations, following a one line failure event the maximum
excursion will not damage equipment.

• Marine and Drilling crews shall hold pre-tour meetings and discuss the offset
limits, tension settings (for input to stability calculations), and unusual operations
(DST, running casing through the BOP, etc.) during their work shift.

6 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION / BACKGROUND

6.1 Tension Setting Requirements

Riser tension must be set to allow for the loss of one or more tensioner units to
provide redundancy and prevent riser buckling in the event of losing a tensioner unit
(or pair of units). For DP installations, the tension requirement can be greater than
the API recommended minimum since at all times the installation must be able to
perform an EDS in the event of a DP system upset. The amount of additional tension
is a function of the recoil control system installed on the unit, the riser weight
parameters, the mud weight at the time of disconnect, the LMRP weight, and vessel
heave.

6.2 Riser Connected Mode Limitations

There are several key parameters that determine the operating limit of a riser system:
the flex joint angle, slip joint stroke, stress limit, and wellhead/casing bending
moment. This subsection will address these limits and recommendations of API
RP16Q.

Riser connected limitations for drilling and not drilling conditions are outlined in API
RP16Q according to Table 1. Where possible, the flex joint angle limits should be
restricted further than API recommendations of 2 deg mean angle in order to prevent
key seating in the BOP and lower flex joint equipment.

6.2.1 Flex Joint Angles

The flex joints under the diverter and above the LMRP have rotation limits to prevent
damage to the riser from contact with the installation, key seating (rotating drill pipe
rubbing against riser ID), and improper disconnect. There are two types of angles,
mean and maximum. The mean angle is the average angle observed when watching
the indicator. A maximum angle is the highest angle observed. The installation roll
and pitch motions and surface excursions around a mean offset cause the maximum

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 7
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS

angle. Angle indicators should be calibrated before running the BOP. The Driller and
DP Operator are accountable to monitor the angle. Typical values for limiting flex joint
angles for various operating conditions are outlined in Table 1.

6.2.2 Slip Joint and Tensioner Stroke

Slip joint and tensioner stroke limits the installation in the amount of surface offset that
is allowed. When the tensioners or the telescopic joint runs out of stroke, the riser
tension increases rapidly and the riser is subject to catastrophic failure.

The stroke limit is the smaller of the tensioner or the telescopic joint stroke. For
instance, a vessel with a 50-ft (double amplitude) tensioner stroke and 65 ft telescopic
joint only has available 50 ft of allowed stroke capacity, the smaller of the two limits.
This value is then used to determine the amount of allowable surface offset in
combination with heave in the maximum design storm condition.

As an example, consider the following:

(1) Tensioner Stroke: 50 ft

(2) Telescopic Joint Stroke: 65 ft

(3) Allowable Stoke: 50 ft (minimum of (1) and (2))

Single amplitude stroke: 25 ft (50 ft / 2, up or down)

(4) Predicted vessel heave: 8 ft (single amplitude,

8 ft x 2 = 16 ft peak to peak)

(5) Stroke remaining for vessel offset: 17 ft (single-amplitude, up or down)

Note: (3) – (5) must be adjusted for space out actual results.

This example case shows there is only 17 ft of useable stroke to determine the
maximum offset allowed before a disconnect. The installation heave motion
determined from the maximum operating condition.

6.2.3 Stress Limitations

Stress in a riser is caused by a combination of applied tension (from MRTs), bending

moments (from current forces and offset), internal pressure, and auxiliary line
pressure end loads. The maximum amount of stress allowed in the riser is a
percentage of the yield stress of the material, typically 67% for deepwater risers.
Dynamic stresses occur in the riser system due to installation motions in the waves
and dynamic offsets around well center. These dynamic stresses must be kept to a
minimum to ensure a long fatigue life for the riser system. API RP-16Q requires that

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 7
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS

the stress criteria outlined in Table 1 are met while operating a riser system. The API
stress criteria is considered in the Engineering department riser analysis.

As an example, the stress in an 80 ksi yield strength riser joint must remain below
53.3 ksi, a 65 ksi yield joint must remain below 43 ksi for deepwater operations
(deeper than 2000-ft).

Table 1 - API RP-16Q & Transocean Drilling Riser Maximum Operating Guidelines

Connected Connected Riser

Design Parameter
Drilling Not Drilling Disconnected

Flex Joint Angle Limits < 1.0 deg mean The smaller angle of:
preferred, 1) max angle for bottom Less than angle where
< 2.0 deg mean load limits contact occurs
acceptable 2) safe LMRP disconnect (6 – 8 degrees)
departure angle, or
< 4.0 deg max 3) 90% of max available
angle.
Stress Criteria
Method A (< 2000 ft WD) 0.40 σy 0.67 σy 0.67 σy
(1)
0.67 σy 0.67 σy 0.67 σy
(2)
Method B (> 2000 ft WD)

Significant Dynamic Stress Range

(SAF = stress amplification factor)
@ SAF ≤ 1.5 10 ksi NA NA

@ SAF > 1.5 15 / SAF NA NA

(3)
Minimum Top Tension Tmin Tmin NA
(4)
Dynamic Tension Limit DTL DTL NA

Max Tension Setting 90% DTL 90% DTL NA

Note: 1) Method B for Deepwater Analyses 2) σy = yield strength of material

3) Tmin = TSRmin x N / [Rf (N-n) ] 4) DTL = PA x Acyl / NLF

6.2.4 Wellhead and Casing Loads

Forces at the lower flex joint impose shear loads and bending moments into the
wellhead structure at the sea floor. These moments must be carefully monitored in
deepwater riser system due to the large amount of installed riser tension on most
installations and the high current loads on the riser string. Figure 1 shows a typical
BOP and wellhead system with forces drawn describing the loads seen at the base of
the riser and BOP. Bottom loads are calculated from riser software output as follows:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 7
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS

1) The maximum bending moments and shear are given at the LFJ (lower flex-
joint) elevation. Shear at the mudline is equal to shear at the LFJ. The
wellhead bending moment is calculated as follows:

BMWellhead = BM LFJ + ShearLFJ x (Distance from LFJ to Wellhead)

2) The wellhead tension should be calculated as follows:

TWellhead = Tactual (at flex-joint) - Lower Stack Weight in Water

Where
Tactual = TSR - Steel Wet Weight + Buoyancy Module Lift

Tension at LFJ

Bending Moment
at LFJ

Shear at LFJ

Elevation

Shear at Wellhead =
Shear at LFJ

Bending Moment at Wellhead =

Bending Moment at LFJ +
(Shear at LFJ x Elevation LFJ from Wellhead)

Figure 1 - Riser Bottom Loads and Wellhead Bending Moment

This calculation assumes that the BOP is fixed at the seabed. In reality, the
lateral forces are supported by soil reactions with the structural casing allowing
the BOP to lean over under high load conditions. This “leaning” of the BOP
causes smaller differential lower flex joint angles than predicted and a reduced
bending moment in the wellhead by some 20% to even 30%. As each well
location has a different soil makeup with some uncertainty in composition, this
“fixed at the seabed” assumption is conservatively applied unless conditions
warrant a soil analysis.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 7
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS

Typical limits for common wellhead connectors have variations from 2500 kip-ft
to 8500 kip-ft of allowable bending moment based on the particular wellhead
system in use. This is an important factor in determining the DP or mooring
system allowable offset prior to unlatching the LMRP or starting the EDS
sequence. At no time can the design bending moment be exceeded in a drift-off
situation. When operating on a 16-3/4 inch system in deepwater, one will likely
find that the wellhead bending moment or structural casing bending moment limit
will determine the maximum allowed installation excursion.

It should be noted that in deepwater the mud weight (wet) can easily out weigh
the BOP (wet weight). When this happens the amount of tension required
according to API RP-16Q guidelines will put the well head in tension. Traditional
common practice has been to support approximately half of the BOP weight, or,
put the neutral point of tension in the BOP. This is not always possible in
deepwater applications due to buckling stability tension criteria, LMRP lift off
requirements during an EDS, and high current loads calling for ample tension to
minimize riser angles.

6.3 Vortex-Induced Vibrations (VIV)

Risers operating in moderate to strong current profiles are subject to vortex

induced vibrations during operations. This phenomenon will cause the riser to
shake back and forth at various speeds depending on the riser configuration,
current speed, and tension applied to the riser. The two principal effects of VIV
are fatigue damage due to cyclic stress as the riser bends and increased drag
on the riser creating larger upper and lower flex joint angles.

Deepwater risers will primarily be affected by increased drag. Fatigue is more a

factor with shallow water risers since the bending is over a shorter length of
riser, causing a smaller bending radius and higher stresses. Various methods to
prevent or reduce VIV have been devised including strakes, fairings, and
staggering buoyant and slick joints. Helical strakes reduce if not eliminate most
VIV, however the current drag on the riser will be significantly increased even
without the presence of VIV thus requiring more tension to manage riser angles.
Fairings, primarily used to reduce current drag, also aid in decreasing VIV. The
shape of the fairing allows water to flow evenly over the riser section whereas a
circular shape creates vortex shedding on the down-current side of the riser.
Staggering bare and buoyant joints can also aid in reducing VIV by changing the
diameter and flow along the riser, thus reducing the region of riser that can be
affected by one period of VIV. Bare joints with auxiliary lines exposed to the
current tend to disrupt vortex formation since the flow is not around a single
smooth cylinder such as with buoyant riser joints.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 7
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER CONNECTED MODE OPERATIONS

General guidelines to reduce VIV problems include:

• Increasing riser top tension (to the maximum recommended limit of the system,
limit of any component, or recoil tension limit)

• Decreasing mud weight while maintaining tension level

• Offsetting the installation slightly up current

• Using fairings in the high-current zone along a riser

• Staggering buoyant and bare joints along the riser

7 DOCUMENTATION

Associated documentation is site and installation specific.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 7
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER STORM HANG OFF

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will establish for each well an
upper limit environment condition for which safe riser hang off operations are
achieved. The method of riser hang off and a procedure to safely disconnect
the riser from the wellhead and secure it in the hang off method shall be
available throughout the well.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that in the event of an emergency disconnect or storm disconnect and hang
off event that the riser is securely supported from the installation by way of either hard
or soft hang off and that the crew is familiar with the hang off procedure for a safe
operation.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all installations of the Company utilizing drilling risers as well as
employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore
installation owned, operated and/or managed by the Company.

4 RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of the OIM, Toolpusher, Subsea Supervisor, DPO and Master to
understand riser management issues relating to riser and station keeping limits while
the riser is being suspended from the installation in high environmental conditions.

5 PROCEDURE

The survival sea or environment in which the riser can survive in a hung off condition
should be obtained from a riser analysis specific to the well and region of operation.
Installation specific procedures should be available on the installation for hang off
method and means of placing the riser in a safe hang off position.

6 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION / BACKGROUND

6.1 Weather Limit to Disconnect and Hang off with LMRP

The limiting weather where operations stop and preparations should be made to
disconnect depends on 3 parameters:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER STORM HANG OFF

• Water depth
• Installation motions
• Strength of current profile
• DP system/mooring system capability

The maximum wave the riser can survive in a hang-off condition depends on the
length of the riser (water depth) and the heave motion characteristics of the
installation. The third item, DP or Mooring system capability is simply, can the
installation remain on station in a storm with a single point DP system or
mooring line failure?

Current loading on riser can be quite large. During a disconnect, the upper riser
angle can greatly increase once the riser and LMRP are disconnected from the
BOP since tension in the string is reduced to the suspended wet weight of the
riser. Prior to disconnecting in a strong current, it should be determined whether
the riser upper angle will be too excessive to pull riser or so great that the riser
will make contact with the moonpool or hull.

6.2 Riser Compression – Max Design Survival Storm and Dynamic

Tensions

The riser spaceout is selected so that the riser can survive a design storm
condition in a hang off condition without experiencing compression. Hang off
conditions can be either “hard” or “soft”. A “hard hang off” is where the riser is
supported on the riser spider or by the tensioners/diverter flex joint with the
telescopic joint locked. A “soft hang off” is where the riser is supported on the
riser tensioners that are at approximately mid position on stroke and allowed to
stroke with all APVs open to allow the riser to remain nearly stationary while the
installation heaves. Both methods of hang off have rig specific issues that
require evaluation by Engineering department during the well planning riser
analysis to avoid potential riser damage.

The max storm, similar to the BOP run dynamics, depends on the installation
and riser combination. The minimum survival design storm for hang-off in any
region of operation is the 1-yr return period environment (the likely maximum
environment to occur in one year). It is preferable to design for the 10-yr return
period event so when the installation disconnects in the max design operating
condition the riser would safely ride out the storm if the weather were to worsen.

As a riser increases in length, the dynamic tension (tension fluctuations caused

by installation heave motion) increases. It becomes more difficult to prevent
compression from occurring in a deepwater riser than a shallow water riser in

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER STORM HANG OFF

the same storm condition. This is due to the greater amount of mass of the
longer riser system as compared to the apparent weight in water, or the wet
weight to dry weight ratio. A suspended riser with a large mass (6000+ kips)
can generate significant dynamic tensions for relatively low heave accelerations.
These fluctuations can easily exceed 500 to 800 kips in survival sea conditions.
This amount of tension fluctuation can be greater than the suspended weight at
the top of the riser or at the top of the buoyancy region resulting in the riser
experiencing compression.

6.3 Hang off Limit is Exceeded – Stay Latched or Disconnect?

Situations can occur where weather picks up rapidly and before anything can be
done, the seas may be larger than the survival condition of the riser in a
disconnect mode. The OIM is then faced with a decision to stay connected to
protect the riser or disconnect and ride out the storm, risking compression in the
riser. In this situation it is difficult to advise on the correct decision to make
since there are many parameters playing a role in the process. It is a “point of
no return” condition that should be avoided if at all possible. Several
considerations or suggestions in the decision process are as follows:

1) How much worse is the weather expected to get? Is the storm expected to
last a long time or will it be over shortly? If this is a short duration storm
chances are it may not get much worse than what is presently being
experience. However, if the event is something like a tropical storm, the
weather may get quite a bit worse and actions need to be taken to
disconnect and attempt partial riser retrieval.

2) Are installation roll/pitch motions causing the riser to contact the hull? Is
installation heave more than the slip joint/tensioner stroke allows?

3) Is the DP system at its power limit or is there margin remaining if the storm
were to worsen? Are the thrusters running at over 50% to 60% of their
capacity? What are the maximum excursions from well center and do the
excursions stay within allowable yellow circle offsets? If the DP system is
performing well, and since compression in the riser is likely if disconnected, it
may be best to stay connected to the last possible moment. Keep in mind,
that the Driller must be ready to start an EDS at any moment, therefore must
always remain at the EDS control button ready to take action if the DP
system becomes overloaded or fails.

Again, this is a last means of action that occurs only when guidelines have not
been followed or unexpected weather conditions arise due to poor forecasts.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

RISER STORM HANG OFF

Under normal operating conditions, proper planning and weather monitoring

should allow time to disconnect and retrieve riser to a safe length before a storm
exceeds the maximum allowable hang-off limits.

6.4 Riser Collapse

During an EDS, mud will evacuate from the riser by falling out of the bottom.
When the pressure at the bottom of the mud column reaches the seawater
pressure at the bottom of the riser, the mud will stop falling and a region of riser
will be evacuated (filled with air). This occurs if the riser is not equipped with an
auto fill-valve, if the valve malfunctions, or the required fill-rate is beyond the
capability of the valve system. The evacuated portion of the riser is then
subjected to high external pressures from the seawater without a balancing
internal pressure from mud. Whether the riser will collapse is a function of mud
weight (heavier mud will fall further), main tube dimensions (diameter and wall
thickness), and tension.

6.5 Hard Versus Soft Riser Hang Off Methods

The traditional and most common method of riser hang off is the hard hang off.
Typically in a hard hang off the riser is supported on either the riser spider or on
the diverter housing/tensioners. In both scenarios, the telescopic joint is closed
and locked and the riser is constrained to heave with the installation. This can
impart extreme stresses and loads in riser systems that are hung off in storm
conditions beyond the design capacity for such a hang off method.

An alternative hang off method is the soft hang off. This is a less common
method, but it has been proven successful in a limited number of trial conditions.
The tensioners are re-set to the connected mode condition following the LMRP
disconnect from the well. Once the tensioners pressures are set to support the
riser and LMRP weight at a mid stroke position, all APV are open and the
system is allowed to stroke as it would in a connected mode condition. This
allows the installation to heave while and the riser will very nearly stay
stationary. Prior to conducting such a hang off the situation must be approved
though Engineering department since the method depends directly on tensioner
system characteristics and sea states to perform correctly.

7 DOCUMENTATION

Documentation is site and installation specific.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that all installations will establish for each well
station keeping warnings based on riser offset limitations, environmental
conditions at the drilling location, and necessary crew response times to safely
react to loss in station keeping.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that adequate safety margins are consistently applied during all floating
operations by providing procedural means to determine the maximum excursion
conditions and minimum response times to emergency loss of station keeping
incidents.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all installations of the Company utilizing drilling risers as well as
employees of any operator, contractor or outside agency that work on any offshore
installation owned, operated and/or managed by the Company.

4 RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of the OIM, Toolpusher, Subsea Supervisor, DPO and Master to
understand riser management issues relating to riser and station keeping limits while
the riser is being deployed, connected to the wellhead, and suspended from the
installation in adverse environmental conditions.

5 PROCEDURE

Dynamically Positioned Installation:

1) Estimate installation drift off position versus time in real time environment.
2) From riser analysis, locate the POD on the drift off curve.
3) Move backwards in time by the duration of the EDS timing to arrive at a red watch
circle limit.
4) Note the maximum distance from the set point to the red watch circle and reaction
period time.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

Moored Installations:

1) From a riser analysis, note the maximum distance from well center to the riser
POD limit.
2) From a mooring analysis, note the maximum excursion following a one-line
mooring failure in the operating environment.
3) If the excursion is greater than the POD limit from well center, reduce operating
environment to limit the maximum excursion in a mooring line failure scenario. Use
active winch management to maintain near zero or up-environment mean
installation offset to minimize max excursion following a mooring line failure.

6 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION / BACKGROUND

6.1 Definition of Terms

In order to standardize thoughts, several terms and their definitions are as

follows:

Point of Disconnect (POD) – the distance from well center at which the LMRP must
lift clear of the BOP in order to prevent riser parameters (flex joint angles, stroke out,
stresses, wellhead bending moments, etc.) from exceeding allowed limits.

Red Watch Circle – the distance from the vessel set point at which the emergency
disconnect sequence must be initiated (pushing the EDS button) in order to properly
unlatch the LMRP from the BOP before any riser limit is exceeded.

Yellow Watch Circle – the distance from the vessel set point at which drilling
operations stop and preparations are made to conduct an emergency disconnect
should the installation continue to lose station. Typically, this distance is one-half the
distance from the set point to the red watch circle.

Emergency Disconnect Sequence Time – the time in seconds for the disconnect
sequence to occur from the point of pushing the EDS button until the LMRP connector
opens to allow the LMRP to separate from the BOP. This time is to be provided by
the OIM or Toolpusher for the system on-board and the EDS sequence in use for a
given operation.

Reaction Time – the duration of time from the start of a drift-off until the installation
moves to the red watch circle.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

Drift-off – a condition where the installation loses station due to a power blackout.
The installation will tend to drift in the direction of the resulting environmental forces of
wind, wave and current directions.

Drive-off – a condition where the vessel attempts to move off location under power
due to a bad or errant position reference signal, a thruster malfunction, or other
means.

6.2 Drift-off Prediction, DP Installations

The red watch circle is a changing limit based on the environment at a given time.
When little or no wind and current are present the watch circle may be quite large and
the reaction time before initiating an EDS following a power loss situation can be a
considerable reaction period. The time may be so great as to allow power recovery
and repositioning before it becomes necessary to start the disconnect sequence.
However, if winds/current pick up, the drift rate of the installation will increase and the
watch circle will need to be tightened in order to provide time for an EDS sequence
before drifting past the riser limits.

To adequately predict the reaction times allowed during an emergency a good

estimate of the installation drift off rate is required. This can be accomplished with a
software program that models:

• Installation mass and force coefficients

• Environmental forces in the real-time conditions (wind, wave, current)

• Riser forces and tensioner restoring force

Once the drift off rate (a history of installation position and heading versus time) is
calculated, it can be used with a riser analysis program to determine where the point
of disconnect (POD) limit will occur during a drift off. Once these two parameters are
known, drift rate and POD, the red watch circle can be established as discussed next.

6.3 Estimating the Red Watch Circle, DP Installations

The red watch circle will be based on the blackout scenario where the installation
drifts off when power to the thrusters is loss. The two primary goals to consider when
setting the red watch circle are:

1) To allow sufficient time for the EDS to occur from the initiation point (red watch
circle) until the POD is reached.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

2) To allow a sufficient reaction time for the crew to respond to the emergency
and/or for the blackout recovery system to restart the installation power
system.

Goal (1) is the most important, as the environment increases, the response time
portion is reduced to allow ample EDS time to safely get off the well. An
example of this philosophy is presented in Figure 1. In the figure, the blue curve
is the installation drift off position as a function of time for an environment at 15
deg from the bow. From a riser analysis, the POD position is determined to be
103m for the present riser and current conditions (black curve). The POD
occurs at approximately 245 seconds (4.1 minutes) into the drift off. The EDS
timing for this example is 45 seconds, therefore, the reaction time duration is
about 200 seconds. Looking at the drift off curve, the installation has moved to
about 68m from the set point at 200 seconds after the blackout. Therefore,
68m is the maximum distance from the set point to use as the red watch circle
and still allow enough EDS time before reaching the POD. Note that in this
example, with a moderate environment, there is about 3 minutes to allow the
installation to go through a blackout recovery sequence. If the installation
crosses the red watch circle, regardless of whether or not power is recovered,
the EDS shall be initiated. It is up to the Master, Driller, and OIM to set the
watch circle closer to the DP set point than the maximum distance calculated by
the outlined procedure in order to add additional margin if it is deemed
necessary.

6.4 Drive-Off Scenario, DP Installations

The drive-off scenario is a difficult situation to predict since there are a large
number of conditions that could occur. Typically, the drive-off scenario is
caused by a faulty input for position reference. Should the installation suddenly
begin to drive-off the DPO or Master should have ample time to place the
installation on manual control or turn off power to thrusters causing the drive-off.
Since the possibilities to prepare for and calculate are endless, the drive-off
scenario is not included at this time in the DP watch circle calculation as it is
expected that the DP Operator can correct for the position error manually.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

Figure 1 - Red Watch Circle Philosophy Description

6.5 Offset Limits for Moored Installations

A moored installation will also have excursion limits or weather limits in order to
prevent riser or other equipment damage. Some considerations for moored
installations when going on location are the following:

1) The maximum environmental condition in which a mooring line failure causes the
slip joint to stroke out should be identified. When operating in a greater
environment than this condition, the installation position may need to be adjusted
further up-environment to prevent stroke out or wellhead damage.

2) The maximum heave in the design operating environment should be estimated

and ensured to be less than the available single amplitude (+ or -) heave in the
storm condition with margin for mean stroke out due to offset.

In deepwater, the offset limit can be reached relatively easily with only 50-ft available
stroke on most tensioner systems in use today. While this is not typically a concern in
shallower water (<3000ft) with moderate environment, the crew should be informed of
position management requirements to prevent riser system damage in a one-line
failure scenario.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 6
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

RISER MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

CALCULATING STATION KEEPING LIMITS

7 DOCUMENTATION

Documentation is site and installation specific.

Reference: Floating Operations Manual (HQS-OPS-004), Section 4 – DP

Operations Guidelines Guidelines

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 1

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

INTRODUCTION

1 POLICY

It is the policy of the company that each installation shall prepare well specific
DST procedures.

2 PURPOSE

This Section is intended to provide guidance for the safe and effective operation,
planning and performance of Drill Stem Test (DST) activities on board moored and
dynamically positioned (DP) positioned vessels.

This Section provides a resource of example documents illustrating DST Operating

Criteria, general performance standards and Hazard Identifications (HAZID) related to
DST operations. The general policies and examples presented in this Section will be
developed by each installation for installation and well specific DP-DST
considerations that incorporate specific client requirements, DST equipment to be
used, environmental data for the area of operation and Region specific policies and
procedures.

3 SCOPE

This Policy covers all installations, facilities and employees of the Company.

4 INTRODUCTION

Drill Stem Testing (DST) activities are a crucial item in well development from an HSE
and financial standpoint. As deepwater wells progress into more challenging
environments, health, safety and environmental concerns become more sensitive due
to utilization of new technologies, new application of existing technologies as well as
lack of historical precedent.

5 OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Section is to:

• Communicate Transocean policies for conducting drill stem tests

• Establish DST HAZID protocols that allow for a process of improved risk
identification to take place.
• Identify specific considerations for the DP-DST Operations to be applied on a unit
by unit basis.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 1

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

INTRODUCTION

• Establish the background of industry standards that will be applied for the fleet DST
Operations.

6 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy however; other

reference sources may have documentation requirements.

References: Minimum Operating Standards Manual (HQS-OPS-001), Section 3 –

Well Testing

Minimum Operating Standards Manual (HQS-OPS-001), Section 3 –

Well Perforation

Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002), Section 7

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

1 POLICY

It is the Policy of the Company that:

• Well testing is carried out in a manner, which ensures safety of personnel,

the environment and equipment.

• A detailed review of the relevant test program will be first carried out
between the Rig Manager and Client representatives onshore, after which a
full risk assessment of the test program. An agreed upon plan by all
participants, will be carried out on the installation before commencing
operations to assess the risks involved.

• When conducting DST’s from a dynamically positioned installation, roles

and responsibilities of the DPO and Driller will be reviewed with respect to
DP stationkeeping.

• Each installation have written standing safety procedures during DST’s.

These procedures will be reviewed during the pre-DST risk assessment to
ensure they remain relevant for the DST operation being planned.

• To shut in DST operations from floating installations when rig motions

exceed 5-foot total (double amplitude) heave.

• A detailed engineered Hazop with the Operator and 3rd party personnel be
carried out at least one month prior to well testing.

• The surface SSTT control station will be manned at all times.

2 INTRODUCTION

A drill stem test (DST) is a temporary well completion to gather information on

potential productivity of a formation. Since drill stem testing involves bringing
formation fluids to surface special precautions are required to avoid loss of well
control.

A higher level of Safety awareness is required while conducting DST’s. The OIM and
Senior Toolpusher in conjunction with the Operator Representative and key Service
Company personnel will review all aspects of the program.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

The review should concentrate on key areas such as communication, roles and
responsibilities of personnel, emergency response, expected test parameters
(temperature, pressure, etc.) and any required changes to the program.

It is the responsibility of the OIM to ensure that all personnel involved with well testing
operations understand the work to be performed and their roles and responsibilities.

3 DOCUMENTATION

The following DST Operations Checklist checklists shall be completed by the OIM
prior to every DST. Problems that may arise must be brought to the attention of the
Rig Manager for resolution prior to opening the first DST for a particular well.

Completed checklists should be made part of the well report records and filed in
accordance the Region policy.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

Figure 1 - Example of DST Landing String

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 4
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 2

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST PLANNING INFORMATION CHECKLIST

Figure 1 continued – Example of Downhole Test String

Client : Various
Field :
Well :
Rig: Date: 11-Dec-01

EXAMPLE OF DOWNHOLE TEST STRING

Tensile DEPTH TO
TOOL DESCRIPTION O.D. I.D. Str. THREADS LENGTH BOTTOM
Inches Inches FEET FEET

5000.00
4 1/2" 533 Box
4 1/2" 533 Tubing (from x-over below 4.50 3.83 30.00
fluted hanger) 4 1/2" 533 Pin
4 1/2" 533 Box
Gauge Carrier 7.00 3.50 255,000 22.00
4 1/2" 533 Pin
4 1/2" 533 Box
4 1/2" 533 Tubing 3.50 3.83 7000.00
4 1/2" 533 Pin
X-Over 5.00 2.25 1.50
3 1/2" PH6 Box
3 1/2" PH6 Tubing 3.50 2.75 30.00
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Single Shot Reversing Valve (SHORT) 5.00 2.25 360,000 4.49
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" IF Box
Multi Cycle Circulating Valve (MCCV) 5.00 2.25 350,000 6.17
3 1/2" IF Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Pump Through Safety Valve (PTSV) 5.00 2.25 350,000 6.55
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
3 1/2" PH6 Tubing 3.50 2.75 30.00
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Data Latch (DGA + LDCA) 5.00 2.25 350,000 23.48
4 1/4" Taperd ACME
4 1/4" Taperd ACME
Intellegent Remote Dual Valve (IRDV) 5.00 2.25 300,000 20.41
3 1/2" IF Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
SCAR sample carrier 5.25 2.25 18.80
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Gauge Carrier 5.00 2.25 250,000 15.63
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Tubing Fill Tester Valve (TFTV) 5.00 2.25 360,000 5.60
3 1/2" PH6 Pin
3 1/2" PH6 Box
Seal Assembly ( in Permanent Packer) 5.96 2.44 20.00

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 4
 7 2.1 - BASIC PRECAUTIONS FOR DST CHECKLIST

TASK REMARKS
1. Prior to conducting any DST the BOPs and the gas
detection system should be tested.
2. Contractors drillpipe will not be used for DST.
3. Prior to testing a zone when high pressure is expected, the
OIM and the operator will meet to discuss the operation. Any
disagreement will be referred to the Rig Manager. During the
test the annulus pressure should be monitored to ensure a
leak does not develop in the drill stem.
4. All DST work will use a surface tree (flow head) that
enables the drill stem to be closed in. A minimum of two
primary surface pressure barriers must be used in the flow
path. The valves shall be rated (W.P.) to at least 1.25 times
the maximum expected shut-in pressure. The primary shut-in
vavles are located in the SSTT.
5. Special attention should be emphasized for H 2 S detection.
6. DSTs on floating units must always be conducted with the
drill stem hung-off in the BOPs, a subsea master valve
installed (E-Z tree or subsea test tree), a Pressure Controlled
Tester Valve installed that can be opened or closed by
annulus overpressure.
7. Should the client select not to run one of the above, an
Exemption must be filed with final approval by the VP Ops.
Support prior to opening the first DST.
8. The BOP pipe rams are closed around the slick joint
situated immediately below the master valve thus sealing off
the well annulus. Following emergency closure of the master
valve and disconnection of the hydraulic operator, the
blind/shear rams will be closed above the master valve during
temporary abandonment.
9. Ensure the shear rams can shear the flat pack, shear point.
10. Lock out rams that should not be allowed to close on the
tree.
11. Master valve strong enough to cut coil tubing and wireline.
12. When it becomes necessary to pull off location due to
rough seas or other emergencies, the well is closed in subsea,
pressure is bled off, the retainer valves closed and the
hydraulic latch assembly is disconnected , leaving the well
shut-in and safely under control.
13. Discuss the function of annular pressure. Annular
Pressure activates the down hole ball valve in either the open
or closed position. Further annular pressure is monitored to
insure a down hole packer is holding and not leaking and if
necessary annular pressure can operate the SSTT unlatch
function.
14. Disconnection of the subsea test tree during a well test
may allow for small amounts of gas to be released into the
riser. Calculations considering mud weight in riser and water
depth must be made to insure any gas trapped between
retainer valve and master valve in SSTT will “U-tube” out the
bottom of the riser following a quick or emergency disconnect.

Page 1 of 2
15. Ensure enough high-pressure flexible lines are used to
allow compensation for the maximum rig heave in which the
test string will remain connected.
16. Ensure the EDS is set to the correct mode for each phase
of the operation.
17. Surface SSTT control station is to be manned at all times.
18. Airlines to burners must have non-return valves fitted. Air
supply will be independent or rig air supply.

Form 7 2.1 Revised December 31, 2001

Page 2 of 2
 7 2.2 - PRECAUTIONS WHILE TESTING CHECKLIST

TASK REMARKS
1. When testing wells containing H2S, no gas, no matter how
small the amount, should be released into the atmosphere
unless it is burned immediately. Testing of wells with H2S is
not permitted unless the installation is equipped and
personnel trained for H2S. A separate detailed Hazop is
required.
2. When sampling, the separator must be properly grounded.
3. Always open up a well slowly, using the upper master
valve.

Form 7 2.2 Revised December 31, 2001

 7 2.3 – SPECIAL WELL CONTROL SITUATIONS CHECKLIST

TASK REMARKS
1. All installations shall develop a DST-Well Specific
Operations Guidelines that addresses DP-DST interactions
between the Driller, Well Test subcontractor and DPO. The
DP-WSOG must be agreed by the Operator/OIM and
implemented onboard the installation.
2. A surface shutdown system is required in any well test
hook-up.
3. Steel hammers or sledgehammers should be banned; brass
is a must.
4. Never allow a flame or naked light inside the safety
perimeters. All hot work will be suspended.
5. Always pressure test the installation prior to well opening.
6. When designing a well testing set-up, make sure the
equipment planned can safely withstand and handle the
maximum wellhead pressure for the portion that may be
exposed to such pressure.
7. Thermal expansion of test string below BOP should be
taken into consideration. Check design of test string slipjoints
and test string weight in view of expansion of test string due to
temperature increase. Expansion may lead to unseating of
fluted hangar in wellhead and test string moving up in BOP
with potential damage to BOP components or re-positioning of
shear sub away from shear rams.
8. The pressure in the BOP needs to be evaluated before a
well test. BOP's are not designed to resist hydrostatic
pressure from outside. External pressure can lead to collapse
of components inside the BOP (Various industry references
are available). Potential for severe down time and operational
risks (loss BOP integrity and control of well bore pressures)
exists if BOP internal pressure is less than external
hydrostatic pressure.
9. The spacing between the various units comprising a well
test hook-up should be reviewed considering BOP
arrangement, rig heave at drill floor, motion compensator
space out. Spacing should also consider location of lubricators
and bails with relation to rig floor and hook so as to allow
access to the lubricator with wireline tools.
10. When reversing out do not allow the fluid to u-tube and
create negative internal pressure which might damage the
bonnet seals.
11. Extended bails for test provided by Operator if coil tubing
frame is not used. Use of slings not allowed as emergency
disconnect requires turning to the right.
12. Wind direction should be considered when blowing gas
into the atmosphere. Total lack of wind currents may create
hazardous conditions as gas mixes 1:10 with air potentially
creating hazards in non-hazardous rated areas. Combustible
gases can migrate towards lower pressure areas that are not
suitable rated. “No wind, no test” is a recommended practice.

Page 1 of 2
13. DST tools must not be opened at night the first time
without permission of the Regional or District Manager as per
the Minimum Operating Standards Manual and Well Control
Manual.
14. All units must be properly grounded to prevent risks of
ignition by static electricity.

Form 7 2.3 Revised July, 2002

Page 2 of 2
 7 2.4 – PRE-DST CHECKLIST

TASK REMARKS
1. Those items noted in Checklist 7 2.1 plus the DST section
of the Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002) must be
checked.
2. Each operation shall list the installation specific equipment
required on location for DST. Items such as oil dispersant,
absorbents for spills, pup joints for correct space outs, brass
sledgehammers and fishing tools for testing equipment must
be included. Workboat with foam fire fighting capabilities plus
spill chemicals shall be on location.
3. The DST landing string and tubing should be checked
internally and verified free of contaminants.
4. The subsea test tree configuration should be reviewed with
testing personnel to verify the shear rams can close above the
valve part of the subsea tree.
5. A landing string diagram (Refer to Example) showing space
out and configuration shall be prepared and reviewed by the
Testing Company, Operator and OIM.
6. The entire installation (downhole and surface) should be
function and pressure tested at least 25 % above the
maximum anticipated pressure, and not to exceed the WP of
the equipment. Pressure tests shall be personally witnessed
by the OIM.
7. Have a heightened state of alert when non-shearable
tubulars go thru the BOP.
8. Wind direction and speed should be sufficient to carry
burned products away from the installation. Safe briefing
areas shall be designed and known by all personnel. Crews
shall know the location of the windsock and how to determine
wind direction. All crews will be briefed on escape routes to
safe briefing areas. Total lack of wind currents may create
hazardous conditions. Burner boom shall fare downwind.
Refer to checklist form 3 2.3.
9. Water curtains and fire-fighting equipment must be checked
and verified operational before opening the well.
10. All well testing units and gauge tanks must be electrically
grounded. All well testing equipment inclusive of air
compressors must be spark arrested and/or explosion proof. If
they are not, the equipment must be located outside the
hazardous area.
11. All breathing apparatus must be checked and verified
operational and sufficient for 30 minutes of use. The donning
and use of emergency breathing apparatus will be reviewed
until all personnel are proficient in its use.
12. The conditions for allowing helicopter landings while
flaring must be reviewed with the client and Helicopter
Company, and an agreed plan must be established.
13. Yokohama fenders shall be removed from the water
during well testing. Past experience has resulted in a
Yokohama fender becoming oil soaked then burned and
impossible to extinguish resulting in installation damage.

Form 7 2.4 Revised July, 2002

 7 2.5 – DST SAFETY PRECAUTIONS CHECKLIST

TASK REMARKS
1. Good house keeping is a top Priority especially the rig floor
and the DST Equipment area. Spillage of well fluids must be
kept to the absolute minimum.
2. No matches, lighters, or cigarettes are allowed outside the
quarters.
3. No welding, gas cutting, grinding other hot work while
flowing the well. Any hot work during the period the well is
shut in is to be done under a hotwork permit basis only
(inclusive of the welders bench area). Oxygen and acetylene
bottles will only be stored in the welding area during flaring
and not scattered around the rig.
4. No needle gunning, chipping or power brushing while
flowing the well except in areas designated by the OIM and a
permit to work.
5. No crane operation without a permit to work. Booms to be
racked as applicable.
6. The doors of all enclosed spaces shall be kept closed and
dogged. No one should enter a column except with a buddy at
the column entrance and with a supervisor’s knowledge.
7. All fluids from the well to be burned off as soon as feasible
and not to be kept in the gauge tank or separators for
extended periods of time or, in the case of installations with
approved oil storage facilities, transferred to the storage tank.
8. Wireline engineers should not expose explosives while
flaring.
9. Portable explosive and H2S gas meters will be available
and operational. Several daily checks at equipment locations
end enclosed spaces will be taken.
10. Testing operators will review the proper slinging and
handling procedures for their equipment with the drill crews
and roustabouts. Extra care is to be taken when handling
bulky and heavy equipment.
11. Personnel not directly involved in the testing to stay away
from the drill floor and well testing areas.
12. No one is allowed in the derrick while flaring without a
work permit approved by the OIM.
13. AII crews will be briefed in search and rescue procedures:
• Buddy system with limitation on report in time
• Search in confined spaces only after gas free check,
buddy (lifeline) system and only with SCBA’s and
established communications.
14. During crewchange handover’s the Driller must make a
special effort to review the details of the work in progress and
obtain relevant information from the test operator on duty.
15. Pumping functions shall not be disabled. The cementing
unit and one installation pump shall always be ready for
immediate use.
16. In case of extended flow periods, gauging surface test
lines in critical areas for wall thickness loss should be
addressed. This is especially important when solids are
expected to flow back (clean up test after sand frac).
Page 1 of 2
17. Consideration should be given to removing non-essential
personnel from the installation.

Form 7 2.5 Revised December 31, 2001

Page 2 of 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID

1 POLICY

It is the policy of the Company that each installation conducts a Hazard

Identification Exercise HAZID’s prior to performing drill stem tests or
completion operations. Dynamic positioned installations must expand the
scope of HAZID to incorporate stationkeeping issues particular to dynamic
positioning.

It is the policy of the Company that a passive compensated lift frame be used
during a DST on those floating installations where a passive motion
compensator system is not installed.

2 INTRODUCTION

HAZID’s are conducted in co-operation with the Operator, 3rd party, Rig Management
and Rig Crew so to conduct non-routine operations knowledgeably and to develop a
well specific action plan. HAZID’s generate specific recommendations critical to the
success of the Operator’s projects. Significant recommendations may include:
• Ascertain whether the BOP shear rams can shear the completion jewelry which
may be across the BOP during a DST / Completion operation.
• Determine the operating limits for various stages of DST/ Completion operation
including:
• Flex joint angle
• Heave limitations
• Weather and sea state limitations
• An interface between the Subsea Test Tree Contractor and the drilling contractor
needs to be established. This includes the disconnect timing of the SSTT and the
time to clear the flex joint with the SSTT so to establish watch circles during
DST/Completion operations.
• The interfaces between the DP Operator, Driller and SSTT crew needs to be
identified and clearly outlined and authority levels defined.

Note: The accompanying Examples should be used by the installation as a guide

during their conduct of the HAZID.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: June 1, 2002 1 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID

3 DST- COMPENSATED COIL TUBING LIFT FRAME for AHC DRAWWORKS

The DEEPWATER PATHFINDER Class, SEDCO EXPRESS Class, DEEPWATER

NAUTILUS AND DEEPWATER HORIZON drilling units within the Transocean fleet
are outfitted with Active Heave Compensated (AHC) drawworks which combine the
activities of a standard drawworks and a drill pipe motion compensator. In the
process of conducting HAZID for DST operations the potential of a motion
compensator failure type event was raised which could potentially impose undue
stress upon the DST test tubing.

Investigation of similar type incidents with standard motion compensators revealed

this type of event had occurred in the past resulting in uncontrolled release of
hydrocarbons. Failure of the test tubing was located at the highest stressed location
near the top of the test string in near proximity to the drill floor. As such Transocean
initiated engineering and construction of a passive compensated coil tubing lift frame
to be used in conjunction with the AHC drawworks during DST/Completion
operations.

The passive compensated coil tubing lift frame can operate as a stand alone passive
compensator or an additional in-line safety device in the event of an AHC drawworks
failure wherein the drawworks either stops compensating or fails “safe” by setting the
brakes. At this point in time the passive compensated coil tubing lift frame is
designed to stroke out, minimizing the added tension on the DST test tubing, and
allowing sufficient time to secure the test and disconnect the test string.

4 DOCUMENTATION

Completed HASZIDs should be made part of well specific files and/or reports. They
should be archived in accordance with Regional policies.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLES

HAZARD/CAUSE Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

COMMUNICATION Develop communication Examples during flow testing

PRIOR FLOW PERIOD Health/Safety period with SSTT across BOPS. Ensure this posted
through the rig and communicated to all parties.
• During flow period

DISCONNECT SEQUENCE: Develop “Emergency Disconnect Procedure”, ensure

• Prior to perforating this posted through the rig and communicated to all
• After perforating – prior to parties. Develop evacuation plan.
SSTT Health/Safety Contingency - Ensure fishing equipment is on location
• SSTT across BOP Financial Impact if shearing is required.
• Shear Scenario

RU on motion compensator Develop Operating Procedure with and with out

• Perforating Phase compensator (determine setting criteria acceptable
• Gravel Packing Phase Health/Safety heave to handle task). Ensure this posted through the
• SL Operations Financial Impact rig and communicated to all parties.
• CT lift frame/Flow Testing

Heave on rig floor (Weather) Prepare stackup drawing above rig floor.
Operating envelope for heave.
Spaced surface tree - > 10 ft above rig floor
Health/Safety Accommodate space for CT lift frame, bails, elevator
Damage to Coflex. & etc.
Hose & Surface
Tree

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

WELLBORE DISPLACEMENT / CLEANUP PHASE

Step 1
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Scheduling of supply boat for Financial Impact Extra supply boat for this period. Work out detail schedule.
displacement of SOBM and Delay
completion brine.

Time required to clean the pits Financial Impact Hire extra crew and equipment to clean pits. Prepare
Delay a procedure ahead of schedule and review with rig
personnel to ensure an efficient / safe cleaning
process is executed.
Brine contamination during Financial Impact
displacement Healthy/Safety Review and test the valves in the pits (leak resistant), Have the mud co. rep. prepare a
Delay or ensure all the mud is removed from the rig. Need to proposal with client drilling supervisor
develop a detail plan on how the brine will be stored approval on how the completion fluid
and managed on the rig. Ensure proper PEP is going to be managed on the rig.
equipment is (ordered) and worn by personnel who (Minimize contamination, losses,
will come in contact with the brine. Review the First- safety & etc.)
Aid brine treatment with brine in the eyes and on the
skin.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

WELLBORE DISPLACEMENT / CLEANUP PHASE

Step 2
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Casing Leak Financial Impact Pressure Test casing Existing safeguards satisfactory.
(13 5/8” x 9 5/8” x 7 5/8”) Repair If leak - Isolate with packers, tieback casing

Step 3
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Poor/bad cement job across tests Financial Impact Centralization, spacer, mud & cement compatibility Existing safeguards satisfactory.
zone. Repair – block check.
squeeze.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

WELLBORE DISPLACEMENT / CLEANUP PHASE

Step 4

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Pickle: Xylene & Acid (10% HCL) Heath/Safety & Use dedicated pumping equipment. Existing safeguards satisfactory and
disposal Environmental Gel spacer ahead/behind product. may want to consider evaluating
Impact Disposal tote tanks same as storage/mixing tank. alternative products instead of Xylene
Halliburton will provide communication radios for this for pickle. Develop a procedure of
operation and line to reverse fluids to tanks. collecting the Xylene/Acid after
pumping on the rig.

Step 5

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Unable to shear tubulars during test. Health/Safety All tubing string (3 ½”, 4 ½” & 5 ½”) except packers is
Financial Impact shearable. Minimize time with non-shearable items
across BOPS.

Step 6

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Plug filter equipment & contamination Financial Impact Pit capacity on the rig is not an issue of hold both mud
of completion fluid. & completion brine. Procedure (scrappers & brushes)
BHA and high pump rate and contingency DE and
filters on location. Ensure sufficient quantities of DE
are on the rig.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

PERFORATING PHASE

Step 1
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Unable to set Sump Packer. Financial Impact Make a bit/scraper/brush run across casing/ TOLS. Existing safeguards satisfactory.
(tag top of liners, Clear filter (brine) – Solids Free
stuck in casing, USIT/CBT log run across casing/TOLS
GR-CCL locators Straight hole.
fails)

Step 2
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Damage while picking up perforating Heath/Safety (Optional) Radio/phone silent while PU guns and Refer to Min. Ops. Standards Manual
string and TIH (handling “Live: making up firing head. Section 3 Well Perforation.
gun, damage to Safety joint above between firing head and gun
tools while, Only essential people on rig floor while making up
obstruction in test firing head.
string) Procedure – Hold safety meeting on rig floor.

Rabbits all tubulars while tripping in hole

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

PERFORATING PHASE

Step 3

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Leak in perforating string (workstring, Financial Impact Pressure tests tubing against TFTV after the 3 ½” test Existing safeguards satisfactory.
packer or test tools) (Unable to hold a tools are picked up. Repeat the testing 3 ½” x 4 ½”
pressure test tubing 2 more times
against the TFTV
on the perforating
string)

Step 4

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Downhole circulating valve mal- Health/Safety Inspection/certification of equipment. The circulating Consider perforate over balance
function (achieve underbalance). Financial Impact tool is very reliable. Previous experience with tool. followed by surge trip on he
(Unable to open (good track record with Texaco). perforations.
circulating valve,
failure to close
circulating)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

PERFORATING PHASE

Step 5
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

No pressure buildup after firing guns Financial Impact Contingency firing system – Pressure delay Confirm firing procedure
(Guns fail to fire - Clear filtered brine – Solid free Existing safeguards satisfactory
drop bar not Rabbit all tubulars while TIH with perforating string
reaching firing head If necessary – confirm by injection test
– obstruction in test
string)

Define tool string & define sufficient

Problems with SL Operations Financial Impact SL lubricator rated for 10K psi. lubricator length for tool string.
(Retrieve Bar) (Guns fire with SL Subsea Lubricator included in Perf string. Existing safeguards for pressure
in hole, pull out of SL can be cut by valves if rapid disconnect is rating satisfactory.
SL, pull out of required.
lubricator)

Step 6
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Downhole circulating valve mal- Health/Safety Kill well by bullheading down test string. Existing safeguards satisfactory.
function (achieve underbalance -kill Financial Impact
well (Reverse Circulate) (Unable to open
circulating valve,
failure to close
circulating)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

PERFORATING PHASE

Step 7
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Pull perforating string Heath/Safety If pull live gun: (Optional) radio/phone silent while PU Existing safeguards satisfactory.
(handling “Live: guns and making up firing head. Ensure bar is
gun, damage to retrieved. Safety joint above between firing head and Refer to Min. Ops. Standards Manual,
tools while pulling gun. Section 3 – Well Perforation.
out of hole, stuck Only essential people on rig floor while removing the
guns) firing head.

If guns are stuck - Release perforating string at CTR –

tension release sub (85 Ksi). Wash over guns and
then latch guns.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

GRAVEL PACKING (FRAC-PACK: SAND CONTROL) PHASE

Step 1
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Damage to gravel pack assembly Heath/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on rig floor Existing safeguards satisfactory.
and TIH (Handling Screen table, tongs & etc.
“Screen/Blank”
Damage to tools Rabbit all tubulars while tripping in hole
while TIH,
Obstruction in test
string)

Step 2

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Leak in GP/FP string (workstring, Health/Safety Procedure – trip speed in hole & ball drop. Existing safeguards satisfactory.
packer or cross-over test tool) Financial Impact
(Unable to set Tested during perforating stage (same string)
packer, pressure
test against cross-
over tool).

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

GRAVEL PACKING (SAND CONTROL) PHASE

Step 3

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Problems during Gravel Pack (Frac- Heath/Safety/ Procedure – Experience Supervisor (hold safety
pack Treatment) operations Financial Impact meeting on the rig floor).
(Pre-mature Surface head – rated form 10K psi
screen-out, failed to Pop-off valves – Shut down pumping
PU & reverse out, Communication between operator and tool man
reverse out Backup choke - Dual choke for reversing out.
ceramic, proppant,
cut surface choke Calm/good weather: 4’-6’ perform treatment off
out. stimulation boat next to rig. (NO DP required).
Pumped only during good conditions, pickle performed
Weather – from skid equipment.
Stimulation Boat
moored next to the
rig

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 12 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

GRAVEL PACKING (SAND CONTROL) PHASE

Step 4
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Problems retrieving tool out of hole & Heath/Safety/ Install fluid loss device in GP assembly (Shur-Shot)
losing completion fluid Financial Impact 2 3/8” WP (0.794” clearance between screen and
(Fluid loss, wash wash pipe)
pipe inside GP
screen). Skid pump/blender will assist in mixing the LCM pill to
ensure the correct volume is pumped (Contingency
Only).

Procedure moving cross-over tool – Minimize surging

the formation with screen in hole.

125 Micron Poroplus - screen.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 13 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

RUNNING TEST STRING PHASE

Step 1
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

DAMAGE WHILE PICKING Heath/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on rig floor
UP DST TOOLS AND TIH (Handling downhole Rabbits all tubulars while tripping in hole
tools, damage to
tools while TIH,
obstruction in test
string)

Step 2

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Leak in Tubing (3 ½” & 4 ½”) Financial Impact Pressure tests tubing against TFTV after the 3 ½” test
(Unable to pressure tools are picked up. Repeat the testing 3 ½” x 4 ½”
test tbg against the tubing 2 more times.
TFTV on the
perforating string).

Packer leak Financial Impact 10 ft of seals

(Unable to test Clear filtered (brine) completion fluid.
tbg/pkr on the Straight hole
backside).

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 14 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

RUNNING TEST STRING PHASE

Step 3
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

DAMAGE & INJURY TO Heath/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on rig floor.
PERSONNEL WHILE (Handling downhole
tools, damage to Pre-stackup drawing confirmed by rig personnel prior
PICKING UP SSTT AND TIH tool/umbilical while to equipment RU.
TIH,
obstruction in test Rabbits all tubulars while tripping in hole
string)
Use Weatherford – Flush Mounted Rotary table with
slot to accommodate control lines & umbilical with out
squeezing them when hanging off string

Clamps (protect) umbilical.

SSTT - Perform a FAT (unlatch & latch) on the rig

floor prior running in hole.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 15 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

Step 4
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

DAMAGE INJURY TO Heath/Safety Procedure - Hold safety meeting on the rig floor.
PERSONNEL WHILE (Handling
equipment, Pre- Stackup drawing- Verify required elevations, work
PICKING UP SURFACE clearance on rig, area.
TREE AND CT LIFTING damage to Inspection/certification on all hoisting equipment
FRAME tool/umbilical while (elevators, bails & etc) equal or exceed expected loads.
PU).

Financial Impact
Health/Safety Pressure tests lines upstream/downstream to choke
(Unable to hold manifold. Pressure from SSTT to choke (through
pressure test surface tree).
Leak of tree/surface lines. system)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 16 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

Step 5
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Unable to land seals into Financial Impact Stackup drawing with actual strapped BOP
packer/fluted hanger on wear dimension.
bushing
Make a space out trip with adjustable fluted hanger
and painted slick joint. Have the joint painted at least
two days before task This will provide strapped length
from wear bushing to middle and check against the
initial drawing.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 17 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

FLOW TESTING PHASE

Step 1
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Downhole circulating valve mal- Financial Impact Inspection/certification of tool. The circulating tool is Consider achieving an underbalance
function (achieve underbalance). (Unable to open very reliable. Previous experience with tool. (good with chemical injection system.
circulating valve, track record with Texaco).
failure to close Rock well with diesel/SW – last
circulating) option. After shearing fluid loss
device.

Step 2

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

NO FLOW OR STOPS (LOW Health/Safety During startup- Spot methanol across SSTT. (Prevent
PRESSURE) DURING (Hydrate, debris hydrate - continuously inject methanol until starts to
blockage, SSTT flow).
INITIAL UNLOADING closed. line rupture,
PHASE. increase in annulus All lines are pressure tested prior to unloading well.
pressure or EDS).
Continuously monitor annulus pressure, do not let it
build up over “SHORT” shear valve.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 18 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

FLOW TESTING PHASE

Step 3
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

FLOW TEST WELL:

• Rig Floor – Visual Indication Health/Safety Procedure – Hold safety meeting on rig floor prior to Shut-in SSTT, as soon as possible,
of problem w/ wellhead or Potential opening up well. notify Co. Man & Tool pusher.
tubing fire/explosion
st
ALL EQUIPMENT WILL BE PRESSURE Shut-in 1 surface tree from panel if
• Rig Floor – Leak in coflex line TESTED. accessible. If not accessible, shut in
or connection ESD installed on the rig. lubricator or SSTT.
Sampling for CO2 & H2S.
• Surface leak/problem other Equipment design for maximum rate and pressure. Shut-in, ESD system from affected
than on rig floor Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on around area.
diverter, run below rotary, no damage to umbilical for
• Well flowing on annulus (trip SSTT and lubricator.
Shut-in at the same time: Lubricator
tank)
valve & SSTT

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 19 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

FLOW TESTING PHASE

Step 3 - Continued
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

FLOW TEST WELL:

• Annular pressure increase Health/Safety ALL EQUIPMENT WILL BE PRESSURE If pressure increase cannot be bled
(rapid, not tie to changes in Potential TESTED. off immediately & stabilized, then
well flow) fire/explosion ESD installed on the rig. Shut-in: ESD system. Prepare to kill
Sampling for CO2 & H2S. well by bullhead down the tubing.
• Annular pressure decrease Equipment design for maximum rate and pressure.
(rapid, not due to changes in Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on around Attempt to increase pressure with rig
well flow) diverter, run below rotary, no damage to umbilical for pump. If continued decrease in
SSTT and lubricator annular pressure, isolate rig pump
from BOP stack by closing standpipe
valve. Monitor annulus pressure from
choke manifold gauge. If pressure
cannot be stabilized immediately, the
Shut-in.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 20 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

FLOW TESTING PHASE

Step 3 - Continued
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

FLOW TEST WELL:

• High pressure (between Health/Safety ALL EQUIPMENT WILL BE PRESSURE High pilot would trip shut down valve
choke manifold and steam TESTED on choke manifold and master panel
exchanger) ESD installed on the rig. (Well shut-in)
Health/Safety Sampling for CO2 & H2S.
Equipment design for maximum rate and pressure. Low pilot would trip shut down valve
• Low pressure (between Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on around on choke manifold and master panel
choke manifold and steam diverter, run below rotary, no damage to umbilical for (Well shut-in)
exchanger) SSTT and lubricator.
HEATH/SAFETY Additional (portable spray) will be
Financial Impact Water spray (curtain) on rig / HITEC flare boom - installed to protect life boat/ etc. The
• Heat radiation Protects rig and personnel. The calculations are flare boom installed on the rig already
acceptable (depends on wind direction) at 30,000 includes water spray.
Heath/Safety BOPD rate (more water is desirable). Plans are to test
Financial Impact at lower rates.
• Gas in riser (due to leak in
landing string)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 21 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

FLOW TESTING PHASE

Step 3 – Continued

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

FLOW TEST WELL:

ALL EQUIPMENT WILL BE PRESSURE Install a deluge spray system over the
• Methanol leak (chemical HEALTH/SAFETY TESTED methanol tanks. Additional chemical
injection system) Financial Impact ESD installed on the rig. /foam (hand held fire fighting
Sampling for CO2 & H2S. equipment) for both methanol and
Potential Fire/ Equipment design for maximum rate and pressure. hydrocarbon fires. Drape the tanks
Explosion Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on around with caution barricade tape and
diverter, run below rotary, no damage to umbilical for applied salt around the manhole
SSTT and lubricator. covers where opening of tanks may
occur. Add dye to methanol, help in
locating leaks. Stainless steel tubing
(eliminated) major problems of hoses
burning if a fire occur. ESD was also
tied into the injection pumps to shut
them down in case of emergency.
Someone present in the area and
every 30 minutes check areas with
gas detector for leaks.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 22 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

FLOW TESTING PHASE

Step 3 - Continued

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

FLOW TEST WELL:

All equipment will be pressure tested High pilot would trip shut down valve
• High pressure (between Heath/Safety ESD installed on the rig. on choke manifold and master panel
steam exchanger and Sampling for CO2 & H2S. (Well shut-in)
separator) Equipment design for maximum rate and pressure.
Heath/Safety Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on around Low pilot would trip shut down valve
• Low pressure (Between diverter, run below rotary, no damage to umbilical for on choke manifold and master panel
steam exchanger and SSTT and lubricator. (Well shut-in)
separator) Heath/Safety
Trip master panel (Well shut-in)
• High Shell pressure (steam
exchanger) Heath/Safety Trip master panel (Well shut-in)

Trip master panel (Well shut-in)

• High Pressure, Low
Heath/Safety
Pressure, High Level, Low
Level (on Separator)

• High Pressure, High level (on

p-tank)

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 23 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

FLOW TESTING PHASE

Step 3 - Continued
Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

FLOW TEST WELL:

Open dump valve (Start flow from p-
• High Level Controller Heath/Safety All equipment will be pressure tested tank)
• Low Level Controller Heath/Safety ESD installed on the rig. Close dump valve (Stop flow from p-
• Level-Safety Low Heath/Safety Sampling for CO2 & H2S. tank)
Equipment design for maximum rate and pressure. Close S.D.V. (Stop flow from p-tank)
Heath/Safety Riser Sealer Mandrel (RSM) – seals on around
• ESD Panels
diverter, run below rotary, no damage to umbilical for Trip master panel (Well shut-in)
Heath/Safety SSTT and lubricator.
• Gas Leak in riser
Low L.E.L. sound horn
High L.E.L trip master panel
Heath/Safety (Well shut-in)
• High flow
(Cut choke out Well is gravel pack (sand control)
surface choke w/ ESD installed on rig Trip master panel (Well shut-in)
sand) Onsite supervision - Personnel monitoring well at all
times.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 24 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

WELL KILL / TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT PHASE

Step 1

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Downhole circulating valve mal- Financial Impact Kill well by bullheading down test string.
function (achieve underbalance -kill (Unable to open
well (Reverse Circulate) circulating valve,
failure to close
circulating)

Step 2

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

DAMAGE AND INJURY TO Heath/Safety Procedure (Safety Meeting)

PERSONNEL WHILE RD CT (Handling Experience from RU equipment.
equipment,
LIFT FRAME & SURFACE clearance on rig,
TREE/LINES: damage to
tool/umbilical while
RD).

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 25 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 3

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DRILL STEM TEST HAZID EXAMPLE

WELL KILL / TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT PHASE

Step 3

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Damage while POOH w/test string:
Heath/Safety Hole starts taking fluid - Spot fluid loss pill Experience from RU equipment
(Handling Experience from running/handling DST tools during
equipment). installation.

Step 4

Hazard/Cause Consequences Safeguards Recommendation

Unable set packer plug and dump 50’ Financial Impact Procedure spotting pill
– 75’ sand on top. (Debris inside Skid pump/blender will assist in mixing the pill to
packer prevents ensure the correct volume is pumped.
sting into packer, Clear filter (brine) – Solids Free
sand plugs Large amounts of sand – pump using a slurry using
workstring) the skid pimp/blender

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 26 26
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS

1 8POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that a Well Specific Operations Guidelines (WSOG)

is to be developed by each DP installation as part of DST planning.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that detailed planning is carried out prior to each DST in the DP mode.

3 SCOPE

This policy covers all DP installations and employees of the Company.

4 DP – DST GENERAL

The key factors to ensure an effective DP-DST Operation, is vigilant and

conscientious watch-keeping, combined with an ability to react immediately with the
correct remedial action in the event of a worse case scenario occurring at the worst
possible moment.

Forward planning is essential to safe DP-DST operations. A plan must be developed

for each DST operation that includes limiting rig motions, limiting environmental
conditions and installation specific DST Example Procedures to ensure the potential
for damage to the test string or sub sea equipment is minimised.

5 DRIVE - OFF

A worst case scenario during a DP-DST may be the “drive-off” condition where the
drilling unit propels itself away from the well location and limited time is available to
react. This condition has been greatly mitigated with the high standard, triple
redundant, blended position reference systems installed on the latest DP drilling units.
Further, DP-3 rated drilling units have further redundancy provided by 100%
independent back up control stations and engine rooms.

The past “full thrust” failure mode of constant speed, hydraulic actuated, controllable
pitch propeller thrusters has been overcome in modern drilling rig design by the use of
variable speed electric motor driven fixed pitch azimuthing thrusters. Thruster motor
speed is controlled through redundant computer networks.

Today “drive-off” conditions are primarily the result inaccurate position data where the
drilling unit is “driving” to a false position. The company standard for DP reference

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS

system availability requires that as a minimum, three reference sensors shall be on

line (and actively selected) at any time with two being based on different principles. In
deep water DP operations, DGPS and acoustic reference systems are likely to be the
references available, both of which can provide position reference accuracy within 1
meter. In geographic areas such as Brazil, atmospheric conditions (space wind,
sunspots, scintillation) can impede the quality of DGPS satellite signals and resulting
position reference accuracy.

6 DP – DST WATCH CIRCLES

In general, DP-DST “green” watch circles are limited to a 25ft radius. Modern drilling
installations with triple redundant, blended position reference drilling units routinely
maintain station within a few meters and are easily capable of “tight” stationkeeping in
the “fair” weather conditions required for DST operations.

This “tight” watch circle radius is used as an early indicator of a potential DP incident.
If the drilling unit was off location 25ft, the DST would be suspended and preparations
made to disconnect the test string as pre-planned. This precaution further minimises
any additional tension on the test string as a result of rig offset. The subsea BOP and
Riser would remain connected until such time as the “red” watch circle is reached
requiring disconnection as pre-planned.

Examples of DP-DST watch circles with action plans are provided below. These are
examples only. Calculated watch circles will be specific to each well and test
parameters.

7 DP – DST OPERATING EXAMPLES

A Well Specific Operations Guidelines document will be completed specifically for

DST Operations prior to the commencement of DST operations. This WSOG is in
addition to that required for drilling at a new site. The DST-WSOG will be reviewed by
the onboard operations team and carry the endorsement of the OIM, Driller, Master,
and Chief Engineer. The client must be made aware of these Examples if he has not
actually requested such a document. If client involvement is not provided the DST-
WSOG will remain an internal (within Transocean) document and carry the signature
of the onboard team as already identified. If the client actively requires such a DST-
WSOG, the issued document will carry the signatures of the Installation Manager and
the Client. Once agreed the DST-WSOG for that location will be forwarded to the Rig
Manager.

The intent of this document is to identify the potential critical issues that influence a
DP drilling unit to undertake an emergency disconnect in the event of system failures

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS

while conducting DST. This guidance will generate a template quantifying system
requirements against specific DP alert conditions.

The DST-WSOG document will clearly and systematically identify significant limiting
criteria that impact upon the station keeping ability of the vessel. The document will
quantify the minimum availability of these criteria for the various stages of degrading
operational status, i.e.; through the deteriorating operational conditions:

Green Advisory Yellow Red

It should be stressed that the figures contained in the sample DST- WSOG below are
provided as GUIDANCE ONLY. It shall be the responsibility of the onboard
management team to set limits, which are effective for their particular installation, well
site, etc.

7.1 Example DST – Well Specific Operations Guidelines (DST – WSOG)

VESSEL: "Deepwater Installation DP-3" DATE: 17th March 2001

LOCATION: (Anywhere) WELL : # CLIENT: (Client name)

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red

DRIVE OFF 0 – 3m >3m – 14m or >One half of the Red Watch Immediately when
DRIFT OFF yellow circle Circle as established by the confirmed that situation
value – which latest riser analysis program cannot be controlled.
FORCE OFF ever is the output Red Watch Circle as
Unit offset deviation lesser Immediately when recognized established by the latest
Waterdepth: 1422 mtrs riser analysis

Power; Thrust & Electrical (Refer to Section 6, subsection 10)

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
Power consumption <50% 50% >70% or consequence alarm, Situation specific
(common Bus Ring Main) whichever occurs first

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS

Power consumption < 70% 70 % > 80% or consequence alarm, Situation specific
(common split bus) whichever occurs first

Thrust consumption each <50% 50% >70% or sudden change Situation specific
online unit
Thrust consumption each < 70 % 70 % > 80 % or sudden change Situation specific
online unit (2-split HV
net)

Footprint Alarm Settings

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
DP position footprint <3m 3m Situation specific Situation specific

DP heading footprint <3 deg. 3 deg/5 deg. >5 deg. If threat to position

System Redundancy
Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
DP control system 2+1 Any failure 1 or failure/loss of backup 0
backup or loss of controller
performance
in any
system
Network 2 NA 1 0

Reference Systems
Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
Position reference 3 Any failure 2 If threat to position
available indepen or loss of
dent performance
in any
system
Wind sensors 3 2 1 If threat to position
Motion sensors (VRS) 3 2 1 If threat to position
Heading sensors (Gyro) 3 2 1 If threat to position

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS

Communications
Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
Comm.´s systems Dual 1 Situation specific Situation specific
systems
(DP/Driller)

Riser Limits (from Site Specific Riser Analysis)

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
Riser limitation UFJ 0 - 2.0 3 deg. >3 deg. Situation specific
deg
Riser limitation LFJ 0 - 2.0 3 deg. >3 deg. Situation specific
deg.
Riser twist +/- 180 > 160 deg. Situation specific Situation specific
(Chock/kill Windup) deg. When vessel
From heading
BOP cannot be
land-out rewound

Environmental factors (Riser Document & DP Capability Manual)

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red
Wind speed (10m/10s) 0 - 15 15 – 20 m/s > 20 m/s Situation specific
m/s
Wind direction +/- 30 15 deg. Situation specific Situation specific
deg. When wind
speed
> 15 m/s
Sign. waveheight 0 – 4,5 4,5 – 6,5 m 6,5 m Situation specific
m

Condition Green Advisory Yellow Red

Action Required Normal status Advise Issue alarm and follow Issue alarm and follow
Master, OIM, procedures procedures
Driller,
Toolpusher,
Client Rep.
Notify Master & OIM Normal Y Y Y

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 4

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DYNAMIC POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS

immediately (Y/N) conditions

Notify Client Normal Y Y Y
immediately (Y/N) conditions

This WSOG, is valid inside 100 meters from the wellhead / spudding position.

Alerting shall be used during both connected and non-connected situations where appropriate.

Escape route: (To be identified and noted herein: shortest route to deep water, crossing NO subsea
architecture)

Well: __________ Direction: __________

WSOG Assessment Team

Name Signature Date

Master

Offshore Installation
Manager

Toolpusher

Chief Engineer

Signed on behalf of Transocean:

Signed on behalf of Client:

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 6
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

1 POLICY

It is a policy of the Company that installation heave shall not exceed 5 feet total
(double amplitude) as indicated by movement on the drill floor while flowing the
well during a DST.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure personnel are adequately informed regarding procedures to be followed

during emergency disconnect.

3 SCOPE

This Policy covers all installations and employees of the Company.

4 INTRODUCTION

Emergency disconnect during a DST requires an extended amount of time in view of

the time required to activate and disconnect the subsea test tool prior to initiating the
normal rig EDS sequence. Further, during DST watch circles are significantly
reduced in view test string compensation limitations.

The amount of combined heave and offset at which point the subsea test tool is
disconnected is a function of water depth, tubing size, tubing stretch, etc and will be
determined on a well specific basis with the Operator. The main consideration is to
limit the amount of overpull imposed upon the test string in the event of compensator
failure or drift off.

Environmental conditions during a DST are limited as a result of the installation

motion limitations. However, local conditions must be considered when calculating
drift rates and the resulting watch circles. The well is only shut-in when 5 feet of
motion is experienced and not disconnected unless needed.

5 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT WATCH CIRCLE CALCULATIONS

Calculating watch circles during a DST must consider the time to disconnect the
subsea test tree in addition to the time required for the installation’s EDS to function.
Calculation of the DST “Yellow” watch circle at which time the DST test string is
disconnected must consider overpull on the test string in view of compensator failure
as agreed with the Operator. Below is an example of Watch Circle Calculation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

6 DST – ESD SUMMARY

The understanding of the interactions required between the Driller, Well Test
subcontractor and DP Operator during a DP-DST requires clear communication and
on-site planning. The following Figures are provided as an example for
communicating the required actions of the Driller and Well Test subcontractor during
the various DP watch circles.

References: Well Control Manual (HQS-OPS-002), Sections 7 and 8

Figure 1 – Drift-off Predications / Emergency Disconnect and Red Watch Circle Limits

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

Figure 2 – Drift-off Curve

Drift-off Curve
(from present setpoint to disconnect point)

200

180

160
Surface Offset From Set Point (m)

140
30 sec EDS Time

120

100
90
Drift-off Curve
80
65

60
Disconnect Point

40

20 DP Red Watch Circle Limit

0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
Time (sec)

Figure 3 – DP Red and Yellow Watch Circles

D P R ED and YELLO W Watch C ircle s

W ell C enter
Y (m)
-11 -13 -15 D P Set Point
150 130 110 90 70 50 30 10 -10 -30 -50 -70 -90 0 0 0
-150
D is connect Point
-130

-110 YELLO W W atch C ircle

-90
R ED W atc h C irc le
-70

-50
30 s ec ED S Tim e
-30

-10 W ind
X (m)

10
W aves
30

50 C urrent
70

90
Vess el Heading

110

130

150

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

Figure 4 – DW Discovery Drift-off Curves Example

DW Discovery Drift-off Curves

20 deg Heading to Colinear Environment for Various Wind Speeds
2000

1800

1600 50 knots
60 knots
70 knots

1400
40 knots
1200
Position (m)

1000

30 knots
800

600

20 knots
400

200
10 knots

0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600

Time (sec)

Figure 5 – Agbami 3, DST Watch Circles Example

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

Figure 5 – Agbami 3 – DST Watch Circles Example

Agbami 3 -DST Watch Circles

R&B Deep Water Discovery

Water Depth - 1422 meters

Condition

Green - 0 to 3 meters
Advisory - 3 to 31 meters
Yellow - 31 meters
Red - 62 meters

Figure 1

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

Figure 6 – DW Discovery ESD Summary example

Green Advisory Yellow Red

Lubricator Lubricator Lubricator Lubricator

Valve Open. Valve Open. Valve Open. Valve Open.
Retainer Valve
Closed..Sentree
Retainer Valve Retainer Valve Retainer Valve
3 SSTT ball
Open. Open. Closed..Sentree
and flapper
3 SSTT ball
Sentree3 Sentree3 closed.Sentree
and flapper
SSTT valves SSTT valves 3 unlatched.
closed. IRIS
open. open. IRIS closed.
closed.
IRIS open. IRIS closed. Close shear
Sentree3
rams.
unlatched.
Disconnect
LMRP

DWD ESD Summary

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

Figure 7 – Agbami 3 DST Watch Circles Examples

A g b a m i 3 - D S T W a tc h C irc le s
R & B D e e p W a te r D is c o v e ry

N o r m a l O p e r a tin g C o n d itio n N o r m a l O p e r a tin g C o n d itio n

D S T V a lv e s S t a t u s W e ll C o n tr o l V a lv e s S t a tu s

F lo w h e a d M a ste r O p e n D iv e rte r O p e n
F lo w h e a d K ill C lo s e d
F lo w h e a d S w ab C lo se d S hea r R am s O pen
F lo w h e a d F lo w lin e O p e n U p p e r P ip e R a m s O p e n
M i d d l e P ip e R a m s C l o s e d
L u b r i c a t o r V a lv e O p e n L o w e r P ip e R a m s O p e n
S en tree 3 S S T T O p e n
T e s te r V a lv e O p e n

G r e e n - 0 to 3 m e te rs

A c tio n s

M o n i t o r C o n d i t io n

F ig u re 3

Agbami 3 -DST Watch Circles

R&B Deep Water Discovery

Advisory Condition Advisory Condition

DST Valves Status Well Control Valves Status

Flowhead Master Open Diverter Open

Flowhead Kill Closed
Flowhead Swab Closed Shear Rams Open
Flowhead Flowline Open Upper Pipe Rams Open
Middle Pipe Rams Closed
Lubricator Valve Open Lower Pipe Rams Open
Sentree 3 SSTT Open
Tester Valve Closed

Advisory - 3 to 31 meters

Actions

Bleed annulus to close

tester valve.
Figure 4

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

Agbami 3 -DST Watch Circles

R&B Deep Water Discovery

Condition Yellow Condition Yellow

DST Valves Status Well Control Valves Status

Flowhead Master Open Diverter Open

Flowhead Kill Closed
Flowhead Swab Closed Shear Rams Open
Flowhead Flowline Open Upper Pipe Rams Open
Middle Pipe Rams Closed
Lubricator Valve Open Lower Pipe Rams Closed
Sentree 3 SSTT Closed
Tester Valve Closed

Yellow - 31 meters

Actions

Activate ESD2 on SSTT control panel

to close Sentree 3 Ball and Flapper valve
and disconnect latch from valve assembly.
Figure 5
Close Lower Pipe Rams.

Agbami 3 -DST Watch Circles

R&B Deep Water Discovery

Condition Red Condition Red

DST Valves Status Well Control Valves Status

Flowhead Master Open Diverter Open

Flowhead Kill Closed
Flowhead Swab Closed Shear Rams Closed
Flowhead Flowline Open Upper Pipe Rams Open
Middle Pipe Rams Closed
Lubricator Valve Open Lower Pipe Rams Closed
Sentree 3 SSTT Closed Red - 62 meters
Tester Valve Closed

Actions

Pick up landing string.

Figure 6 Close shear rams.

Disconnect LMRP.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 5

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

EMERGENCY DISCONNECT

7 DOCUMENTATION

There is currently no documentation associated with this Policy however; other

reference sources may have documentation requirements.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 9
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

1 INTRODUCTION

This subsection provides a series of flowcharts that were developed in view of drill
stem testing, production testing and coiled tubing operations. These charts reflect an
appropriate thought process for conducting THINK, START, and FOCUS evaluations
for these non-routine operations.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 1 - Operations with Cement, Coiled Tubing and STT

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 2 - Operations with Coiled Tubing and Cement (With Christmas Tree
Installed)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 3 – DST (RIH or POOH)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 4 – DST (Flowing or Shutting In the Well)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 4 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 5 – Production Test with STT Installed

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 5 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 6 – Production Test with Christmas Tree Installed

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 6 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 7 – Gravel Packing (RIH, POOH Tests)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 7 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 8 – Gravel Packing (Displacing the Sand Slurry)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 8 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 9 – Stimulation’s with STT (Subsea Testing Tree)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 9 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 10 – Stimulation with Coiled Tubing and STT

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 10 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 11 – Stimulation with Christmas Tree

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 11 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 12 – RIH Production Packer with “Tail”

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 12 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 13 – Setting or Testing the Production Packer

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 13 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 14 – RIH / POOH Production String

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 14 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 15 – RIH Production String with Completion Riser and TIH

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 15 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 16 – Operations with BAP / UGB

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 16 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 17 – Vertical Connection

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 17 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 18 – Running Christmas Tree / TRT / Tree Cap

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 18 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 19 – Coiled Tubing Jet Lifting with STT (with No String Bottom Valve)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 19 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 20 – Coiled Tubing Jet Lifting with STT (with String Bottom Valve)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 20 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 21 – Lifting with Christmas Tree

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 21 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 22 – Jet Lifting with Christmas Tree

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

Remarks:
1. A workover bop must be used (Christmas tree gate valves don’t cut coiled tubing).
2. Keep permanent communication between the driller and CT unit.
3. Observe unlatching angle of the workover bop, keeping top tension for EDS.
4. Clean riser with a diesel cushion to prevent hydrate formation.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 22 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 23 – Slickline Operations with STT

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

Remarks:
1. Use always short STT (15k) so that is still possible to close the shear rams with the STT connected.
2. Keep permanent communication between the driller and the wireline operator.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 23 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 7
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 6

DRILL STEM TESTING GUIDELINES

DST EXAMPLE PROCEDURES

Example 24– Slickline Operations with Christmas Tree Installed (Well Killed)

Approving Authority: Rig Manager

Remarks:
1. Keep permanent communication between the driller and the slick line operator.
2. Keep top tension in case of TRT EDS.

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 24 24
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 9
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 1

OPERATIONS ADVISORIES
DP OPERATIONAL INFORMATION DOCUMENTS (OPDOCS)

1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE

Information relating to DP operational and technical issues will be made readily

available and communicated in a controlled manner to all personnel involved in
DP.

2 PURPOSE

To ensure that personnel on all DP installations are adequately informed regarding

operational and technical issues and lessons learnt on other Transocean installations.

3 SCOPE

This Policy covers all DP installations, facilities and employees of the Company.

4 PROCEDURE

4.1 General

DP Operational Information Documents (OPDOCS) will be jointly issued under the

authority of Houston Engineering and Houston Operations to communicate issues
that may effect the course of daily DP operations. These OPDOCS communicate
recognized innovative good practice as well as equipment, material or operational
issues that may effect similar operations throughout the company and are an
immediate concern to deepwater operations. OPDOCS will also be used to:

• Transmit information relating changes in status of DP related issues

• Communicate lessons learnt from other DP operations both internal and external
to the company.
• Communicate any changes in operational procedures due to vendors technical
bulletins.
• Alert installations and its management to potential hazards in DP operations
• To inform and instruct personnel involved in DP operations

4.2 Initiation

OPDOCS may be initiated by anyone within the DP specialist electrical and

engineering groups or Operations , and should be submitted for joint approval of
Houston Engineering and Houston Operations before transmittal.

REVISION NO: 02 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 1 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 9
HQS-OPS- 004
SUBSECTION: 1

OPERATIONS ADVISORIES
DP OPERATIONAL INFORMATION DOCUMENTS (OPDOCS)

4.3 Documenting and Distribution

When approval for circulation has been given by the Houston Engineering Discipline
Manager DP/Controls/IT and DP Operations Superintendent, responsibility for
circulation will be undertaken by Houston Engineering.

The OPDOC will be transmitted by electronic mail to the following addresses:

• Masters of all Dynamically Positioned installations.
• Engineering Discipline Manager DP/Controls/IT, Houston
• Engineering Discipline Manager DP/Controls/IT, Montrouge
• DP Operations Superintendent
• Document Control Administrator Houston Engineering

Copies will also be transmitted to the following addresses

• Rig Managers and OIMs of all Dynamically Positioned Units
• Senior Engineering Manager – Control Systems, Core Expertise Group Houston
• Regional Technical Field Support Managers

4.4 Actions

Upon receipt, the Master will ensure the document is circulated to DP related
discipline supervisors onboard. This will always include:

• DP Operators (They will ensure that a hard copy of all OPDOCS will be
maintained on file in the DP/ASK Room)
• Maintenance Supervisor/Chief Engineer
• Electrical Supervisor
• ET Supervisor

5 DOCUMENTATION

An electronic version of OPDOCS will be held on the Company intranet site at:

http://hqs.eng.tsfnetlink.com/Engineering_Standards.htm

All OPDOCS will be reviewed on an annual basis to verify current applicability.

REVISION NO: 02 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: March 1, 2003 2 2
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 10
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 1

ANNEX
ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

API - American Petroleum Institute

HS&E - Health, Safety and Environmental

OIM - Offshore Installation Manager

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 1
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 10
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

ANNEX
DEFINITIONS

Accountable - Liable for the consequences of your action or lack of action

Analysis - A problem solving process to determine root cause

Authority - Permission to take action

Authorized - A person granted permission for specific action

Approved - Meets Company standard(s)

Certified - A person or apparatus that has passed a defined examination

Client - A customer to whom Transocean Sedco Forex is providing service

Company Employee - An individual on the direct payroll of Transocean Sedco

Forex

Company Personnel - Company employees and any sub-contracted personnel

under the direct supervision of the Company including
leased laborers that are filling a position that is considered
normal crew compliant.

Competent - An individual who can demonstrate the ability to perform

specific tasks to a defined standard

Engineering - A unified department located in Houston and Montrouge

Facility - Any onshore yard, office, warehouse or similar that is owned, leased,
operated or managed by the Company

FOCUS - The Company Improvement Process

Hazard - Is anything that can cause harm to people, the environment, property
or Company reputation

He, Him and His - means: he/she, him/her and his/hers

Health - An individual’s condition of being physically, mentally and emotionally
sound

Incident - The occurrence of an action which caused, or has the potential to

cause, injury, environmental damage or property damage

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 1 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 10
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

ANNEX
DEFINITIONS

Injury - Physical harm to a person

Installation - Any offshore installation (unit) owned, leased, operated or managed

by the Company; such as swamp barge, tenders, jack-up, drill-ship,
semi-submersible or similar

Investigation - To make a systematic inquiry to gather the facts

Kips - 1 KIP = 1000 lbs.

Load Test - An inspection, pull-test to a pre-determined level and re-inspection of

a piece of equipment

OIM - Offshore Installation Manager. In this manual it also means Platform

Manager, Man in Charge and where applicable, Facility Manager

Policy - A policy is a minimum requirement (method or course of action) that

will be strictly adhered to by all personnel at all times
• Corporate policy is a policy that applies world wide
• Region policy is a policy that applies to a specific Region
• District policy is a policy that applies to a specific District
• Installation policy is a policy that applies to a specific installation

Procedure - A series of steps followed in a particular order

Process - A series of actions, changes or function that produces progress

toward a desired result

Reporting - Informing others verbally or in writing

Responsibility -Obligation to take action

Risk - The possibility of suffering harm or loss

Scope - Where and to whom the policy and procedures apply

Shall - This indicates a mandatory requirement

Should - This indicates a recommendation

START - The Company Monitoring Process

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 2 3
 FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL SECTION: 10
HQS-OPS-004
SUBSECTION: 2

ANNEX
DEFINITIONS

Sub Contractors - Any company hired by either Transocean Sedco Forex or a

client to perform work

Supervisor - A person who directs and watches over the work and performance
of others

Task - An individual work assignment carried out by one or more people and
which may be their complete job or a part of a larger job

Their - means: his/her

THINK - The Company Planning Process

Will - Mandatory requirement

REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF

REVISION DATE: July 1, 2002 3 3
 SECTION 11

REGION / DISTRICT / INSTALLATION

SPECIFIC PROCEDURES
 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

General Introduction HQS-OPS-004 Section: 1

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 1 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to the Person in Charge at 1.3
the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Are the OIM / Master familiar with the Company’s designation of the “Person in
1 Charge” as defined in Section 2.2.2 Offshore Installation Manager / Master?
1.3.2.2.2
The following information based upon observations and
Ref: Sec 1
B interviews is provided with regard to Exemptions at the
1.4
Installation under review:
Has the HS&E Audit regarding Exemptions been completed within the last 12
1
months?
How many requests for Exemptions regarding Floating Operations have been made
2 No.
over the last 12 months?
Please List

The following information based upon observations and

Ref: Sec 1
C interviews is provided with regard to Management of Change at
1.5
the Installation under review:
Have Regional changes been made to the Floating Operations manual within the last
1
12 months?
Please List

Have Installation specific changes to the Floating Operations Manual been made
2
within the last 12 months?
Please List

(+) Self Audit Strengths

(o) Self Audit Observations

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 1 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

Well Planning HQS-OPS-004 Section: 2

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 2 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to Well Planning Information 2.2 – 2.3
Checklist at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Are well planning checklists completed and retained in accordance with Regional
1
policy? 2.2.2
2 Does Operator provide site information as indicated in section 2.3.3?
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 2
B interviews is provided with regard to Deepwater Well Head
4 Yes : No Yes : No
Design Considerations at the Installation under review:
Has corrective action been required for well head angles greater than 1 degree
1
during the last 12 months? 2.4.4
Please List

2 Is the maximum wellhead bending moment for the current well location known? 2.4.5
Is the maximum allowable Installation excursion for the current well location known
3
so not to exceed the maximum well head bending moment? 2.4.5
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 2 Self Audit RVA
C interviews is provided with regard to Tensioner Ring Operation 5
at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
1 For DP Installations: Is the tension ring break out torque known? 2.5.5
2 For DP Installations: Is the Wellhead torque limit known? 2.5.5
For DP Installations: Is the maximum allowed heading change with out tension ring
3
rotation provided to the DP Operator? 2.5.5
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 2 Self Audit RVA
D interviews is provided with regard to Metocean Environmental 6
Considerations at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Are Installation specific pre-determined operational weather criteria limitations
1 established and personnel aware of the hazards and controls to be put in place when
adverse weather conditions are anticipated or experienced? 2.6.4
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 2
E interviews is provided with regard to Field Moves with BOP
7 Yes : No Yes : No
Suspended in the Water at the Installation under review:
Has the Regional Manager approved OR the Installation run or retrieved the BOP
1
while drifting with a current during the past 12 months? 2.7.1

(+) Self Audit Strengths

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

(o) Self Audit Observations

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 2 of 2 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 2 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

MARINE OPERATIONS HQS-OPS-004 Section: 3

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 3 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to Marine Operations at the 1
Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Self Propelled Installations: Are Master’s Standing Orders provided, endorced by all
1
Masters and signed off as read by all watch keeping personnel? 3.2.1.1
Non Self Propelled Installations: Are written Standing Orders provided to be followed
2
by Marine / Control Room personnel? 3.2.1.1
Self Propelled Installations: Is the Navigational library and chart folio maintained up
3 to date so to allow the Installation to be navigated to the nearest port of refuge in the
event of an emergency? 3.2.1.3
Self Propelled Installations: Are the Publications listed in 3.2.1.3 on board the
4
Installation?
Are transit plans prepared in accordance with the Nautical Institute Publication
5
“Passage Planning”? 3.3.1.9
Self Propelled InstalIations: Is a “Bridge Maneuvering Card” immediately available in
6
accordance with IMO standards? 3.3.1.15
7 Are “Official Log Books” maintained as outlined in 3.4.1?
If DP Supply Vessels are serving the Installation has it been confirmed as acceptable
8
for close approach DP operations in accordance with 3.5.1.2 and 3.5.1.5?
Are specific procedures in place outlining activities to be initated upon the total loss
9
of power? 3.6.1.4
Are stability calculations carried out at least weekly and variable weights confirmed
10
daily? 3.7.7
11 Is a lightship alteration logbook maintained in accordance with 3.7.7.1?
Are the bilge and ballast system and bilge alarms function tested at intervals not
12
exceeding 60 days in accordance with 3.7.8?
Are Emergency Ballast exercises carried out on a bi-monthly basis and reported to
13
the Rig Manager in accordance with 3.7.8?
For Mono-hull Installations (drillships) is the cargo/ballast loading computer for
14 longitudinal strength operational and crew trained in its use for ballast & damage
control operations? 3.7.8.1
Are watertight doors and hatches normally closed except for the usual function of
15
access and egress? 3.7.9.1
Are watertight and weather tight remote operated closures operated on a monthly
16
basis and so logged? 3.7.9.1
(Self Elevating Installations) Are location approvals conducted in accordance with
17
3.8.5 and 3.8.6?
18 (Self Elevating Installations) Are field move checklists used similar to 3.9.5.1?
(Self Elevating Installations) Are preloading operations conducted in accordance with
19
3.9.11 or specifically approved on a case by case basis?

(+) Self Audit Strengths

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

(o) Self Audit Observations

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 2 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

DP Operations Guidelines HQS-OPS-004 Section: 4

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 4 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to DP Well Planning 2
Checklist at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Are well planning checklists completed and retained in accordance with Regional
1
policy? 4.2.1
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 4
B interviews is provided with regard to DP Personnel and
3 Yes : No Yes : No
Responsibilities at the Installation under review:
1 Has the Master ensured the requirements of 4.3.2.2 are satisfied?
nd
Are the DPO/2 Mates in possession of full DP Operator certification and the
2
supporting IMCA DP Logbook? 4.3.2.4
Do the Toolpushers and Drillers have an understanding of the Drilling Activities that
3
may possibly effect DP station keeping? 4.3.2.6 and 4.3.2.7
Is the Chief Engineer / Maintenance Supervisor aware of the DP Studies conducted
4
on the Installation, their contents and current applicability? 4.3.2.10
Is the Vessel Management System required to be manned by a Licensed Marine
5
Engineer by the Installation’s Safe Manning Certificate? 4.3.2.12
Is the Vessel Management System Operator deemed competent to operate the VMS
6 and associated machinery systems by the Chief Engineer / Maintenance Supervisor
and Master? 4.3.2.12
7 Has the Master conducted DP Emergency Training as outlined in 4.3.3.3?
Has the Master developed an Installation specific DP familiarization for all new hire
8
marine, engineering and drilling staff? 4.3.3.4
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 4 Self Audit RVA
C interviews is provided with regard to DP Watchkeeping at the 4
Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Are the DP Control Desk, Driller’s Console and VMS control center manned at all
1
times when connected to the wellhead? 4.4.1
2 Is a DP Status Board keep up to date? 4.4.5.1
3 Are DP Desk hand over checks performed? 4.4.5.2
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 4 Self Audit RVA
D interviews is provided with regard to Documentation & 5
Reporting at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
1 Are DP System Records developed as per 4.5.2?
2 Are the DP Documents identified in 4.5.3 available to DP Operators?
3 Have any DP Events been encountered within the past 12 months? 4.5.4
Please List:

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 3 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 4
E interviews is provided with regard to Communications &
6 Yes : No Yes : No
Alarms at the Installation under review:
Are Communications between the Driller’s station, the DP console and the Engine
1
Control Room clear, concise and frequent? 4.6.2
2 Does the Installation operate with a DP Alert Status as outlined in 4.6.4?
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
F interviews is provided with regard to Operating Guidelines at Ref: Sec 4
the Installation under review: 7 Yes : No Yes : No
Have Installation specific Operating Procedures been developed for all activities
1
relating to and impacting DP Operations? 4.7.1.1 and 4.7.4
2 Has a site specific DP Operations plan been developed? 4.7.1.2
3 Have DP Trials been conducted during the past 12 months? 4.7.1.5
4 Has a Blackout Recovery trial been conducted during the past 12 months? 4.7.2
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 4
G interviews is provided with regard to Dynamic Positioning
8 Yes : No Yes : No
Watch Circles at the Installation under review:
Are Drift Off curves providing time versus position for a number of wind speeds and
1
directions available on the Installation? 4.8.1
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 4
H interviews is provided with regard to Well Specific Operational
9 Yes : No Yes : No
Guidelines at the Installation under review:
1 Has a Well Specific Operational Guideline been prepared? 4.9.2 and 4.9.9
Is the Installation stationed at or near the Zero Angle Position of the lower flex joint?
2
4.9.6.3
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
I interviews is provided with regard to DP Technical Operations Ref: Sec 4
Criteria at the Installation under review: 10 Yes : No Yes : No
Has the Installation established and documented Installation specific procedures in
1
accordance with 4.10.1?
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
J interviews is provided with regard to Close Proximity Ref: Sec 4
Operations at the Installation under review: 11 Yes : No Yes : No
1 Are Dual DP Vessel Operations conducted (ie DP service vessel)?
2 Is a Permit to Work system in place for dual DP vessel activities? 4.11.5.1

(+) Self Audit Strengths

(o) Self Audit Observations

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 2 of 3 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 3 of 3 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

Mooring Guidelines HQS-OPS-004 Section: 5

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 5 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to the Required Level of 2
Analysis at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
1 Has a mooring analysis been performed for each location in accordance with 5.2.2?
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 5
B interviews is provided with regard to Operator Furnished Data
3 Yes : No Yes : No
at the Installation under review:
1 Has the Operator furnished site specific information in accordance with 5.3.1?
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 5 Self Audit RVA
C interviews is provided with regard to Installation 4
Characteristics at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Have any Installation Modification been made in the past 12 months that change the
1
underwater drag, wind sail area, mooring capacity, size or tension capability? 5.4.1
2 If YES to C1, has Engineering been notified of all changes?
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 5 Self Audit RVA
D interviews is provided with regard to Pre-Moored Locations at 6
the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
1 Has an Operator Supplied pre-moor system been used during the past 12 months?
If YES to D1, were the mooring system particulars provided to Engineering for
2
approval? 5.6.1
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 5
E interviews is provided with regard to Use of Different Anchor
7 Yes : No Yes : No
Types at the Installation under review:
Have alternate anchor types (non Transocean) been used during the past 12
1
months?
2 If YES to E1, was the mooring system approved by Engineering? 5.7.1
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
interviews is provided with regard to Minimum Anchor Ref: Sec 5
F 10
Handling Vessel Requirements at the Installation under
Yes : No Yes : No
review:
Are the Anchor Handling Vessels servicing the Installation meet Transocean
1
minimum recommendations for safety, operations and equipment? 5.10.1

(+) Self Audit Strengths

(o) Self Audit Observations

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 2 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

Riser Management Guidelines HQS-OPS-004 Section: 6

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 6 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to Riser Spaceout at the 2
Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Are riser spaceouts prepared that meet Transocean and API RP-16Q minimum
1 standards for performane and safety in the site-specific environment of operation?
6.2.1
2 Are riser spaceouts checked for collapse resistance? 6.2.6.4
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 6
B interviews is provided with regard to Riser Running and
3 Yes : No Yes : No
Retrieval at the Installation under review:
Has the Installation prepared a riser running and retrieval plan that outlines the
1 limiting environmental parameters of the operation, the required duration of the
operation and the forcasted weather during the operation? 6.3.1
Are records of the maximum static and dynamic running loads predicted and actual
2
measured running loads maintained on board? 6.3.6.2
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 6 Self Audit RVA
C interviews is provided with regard to Riser Connected Mode 4
Operations at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Has the Installation established safe operating riser tensions according to API
recommendations, safe excursion limits to provide optimum drilling performance and
1
maximum excursion limits to establish point of disconnect and watch circle limits?
6.4.1
2 Is the well head / structural casing design bending moment known? 6.4.6.2
Is the Installation maximum allowable excursion that will not exceed well head /
3 structural casing load capability known? (DP and Mooring Line Failure Cases)
6.4.6.2
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 6 Self Audit RVA
D interviews is provided with regard to Riser Storm Hang Off at 5
the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Has the Installation established for each well an upper limit environment condition for
1
which safe riser hang off operations are achieved? 6.5.1
Is riser space out selected so the riser can survive a design storm condition in a
2
hang off condition without experiencing compression? 6.5.6.2
Has a Soft Riser Hang Off been approved for this Installation during the past 12
3
months? 6.5.6.5
Please List:

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

(+) Self Audit Strengths

(o) Self Audit Observations

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 2 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

Drill Stem Testing Guidelines

HQS-OPS-004 Section: 7
(to be completed if a DST was performed during past 12 months)
Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 7 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to Drill Stem Testing at the 1
Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
If a DST was performed during the past 12 months, were Installation and Well
1
Specific DST procedures prepared? 7.1.1
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 7
B interviews is provided with regard to DST Planning Information
2 Yes : No Yes : No
Checklist at the Installation under review:
Was a risk assessment carried out on shore between the Client, Testing Contractor
1
and Transocean? 7.2.1
Are the roles and responsibilities of the DPO and Driller reviewed with respect to DP
2
stationkeeping during a DST? 7.2.1
3 Does the Installation have written standing safety procedures for DST? 7.2.1
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 7 Self Audit RVA
C interviews is provided with regard to Drill Stem Test HAZID at 3
the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Was a Hazard Identification Exercise (HAZID) conducted with the Client, Testing
1
Contractor and Transocean? 7.3.1
If an Active Heave Compensated Drawworks is installed on the Installation, was a
2
Passive Compensated Lift frame used? 7.3.1
The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 7 Self Audit RVA
D interviews is provided with regard to Dynamic Positioning 4
Considerations at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
Were Well Specific Operations Guidelines (WSOG) developed as a part of DST
1
planning? 7.4.1
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
Ref: Sec 7
E interviews is provided with regard to Emergency Disconnect at
5 Yes : No Yes : No
the Installation under review:
Was a heave limit of 5 feet total (double amplitude) as indicated on the drill floor
1
imposed while flowing the well during DST? 7.5.1
Were Emergency Disconnect watch circles calculated and specific plans of action
2
implemented for DST operations? 7.5.5
The following information based upon observations and Self Audit RVA
F interviews is provided with regard to DST Example Procedures Ref: Sec 7
at the Installation under review: 6 Yes : No Yes : No
Were Think, Start and Focus evaluations conducted for the DST non-routine
1
operations? 7.6.1

(+) Self Audit Strengths

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

(o) Self Audit Observations

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 2 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

Surface BOP Guidelines HQS-OPS-004 Section: 8

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:
Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and Ref: Sec 8 Self Audit RVA
A interviews is provided with regard to Surface BOP Operations 1
at the Installation under review: Yes : No Yes : No
1 Were Surface BOP Operations conducted during the past 12 months?
Please List location / operator / water depth:

2 Was a Transocean Approved project assessment returned to the Installation? 8.1.5

(+) Self Audit Strengths

(o) Self Audit Observations

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 2 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05

 Tracking No.
FLOATING OPERATIONS MANUAL
AUDIT CHECKLIST For Office Use Only

Operational Advisories
HQS-OPS-004 Section: 9

Installation/Facility: Self Audit Date:

Self Auditor(s): Audit Cycle:

The following information based upon observations and

Ref: Sec 9 Self Audit RVA
interviews is provided with regard to DP Operational
A 1
Information Documents (OPDOCS) at the Installation under
Yes : No Yes : No
review:
Has the Master circulated OPDOCS received in the past 12 months to DP related
1
discipline supervisors? 9.1.4.4
2 Is a copy of all OPDOCS maintained on file in the DP/ASK Room? 9.1.4.4

(+) Self Audit Strengths

(o) Self Audit Observations

(-) Self Audit Improvement Opportunities GRS Reference

REV 00 DEC 2001 Page 1 of 1 Form No: HQS-QUA-002FM05