634A International Court of Justice: The Peace Palace The Hague, The Netherlands

634A
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
THE PEACE PALACE

THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
THE 2018 PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW

MOOT COURT COMPETITION
THE CASE CONCERNING

THE EGART AND THE IBRA
PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF ANDUCHENCA
(APPLICANT)
v.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RUKARUKU

(RESPONDENT)
MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT
2018
PRELIMINARY PAGES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION xviii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED xix
STATEMENT OF FACTS xx
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS xxv
PLEADINGS 1
I. ANDUCHENCA IS NOT BOUND BY THE ARBITRAL AWARD OF 1
2 MARCH 2017 AS IT IS INVALID.
A. THE TRIBUNAL HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE RUKARUKU HAD NO 1
AUTHORITY TO INITIATE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE
10(A) OF THE FCN TREATY.
1. There was no legal dispute between the parties under the 1
“awareness” test.
2. The dispute prior to arbitration, if any, does not call for the 2
application of Articles 1 to 9 of the FCN Treaty.
a. The freedom of commerce and navigation clause under the FCN 3
Treaty only covers commercial vessels.
i. It should be presumed that the parties never intended to give 3
“freedom of commerce and navigation” an evolving
meaning.
ii. In any case, the Egart cannot be construed as a commercial 4
vessel even using evolutionary interpretation.
iii. The Egart is not a commercial vessel under restrictive treaty 5
interpretation.
b. La competénce de la competence doctrine cannot apply due to 5
improper constitution of the tribunal.
B. IN ANY CASE, THE AWARD IS VOID AS THE PROCEEDINGS WERE 6
TAINTED BY IRREGULARITIES NEGATING IMPARTIALITY, INTEGRITY,
DUE DILIGENCE AND NON-DELEGATION.
1. The tribunal was neither independent nor impartial under the 6

“appearance of bias” test.
a. Brasht Moyet’s continuing relationship with Rukaruku gave the 7
tribunal an appearance of bias.
b. The tribunal’s impartiality was compromised because of the ex 7
parte communication between Brasht Moyet and Buoc Chivo.
i
PRELIMINARY PAGES
2. The tribunal violated the rule on delegatus non potest delegare by 8

having Orvindari write the award.
II. RUKARUKU VIOLATED ARTICLE 6 OF THE FCN TREATY 8
WHEN THE EGART OPERATED IN ANDUCHENCA’S
TERRITORIAL SEA, BUT ANDUCHENCA DID NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE 7 OF THE FCN TREATY WHEN IT CAPTURED THE
EGART.
A. RUKARUKU VIOLATED ARTICLE 6 OF THE FCN TREATY BY OPERATING 9
THE EGART WITHIN ANDUCHENCA’S TERRITORIAL SEA.
1. The Egart, as an autonomous unmanned vehicle, is not a ship, 9

hence, cannot exercise the right to innocent passage.
a. Unmanned vehicles are not ships that are entitled to right of 9
innocent passage.
b. In any case, the Egart failed to comply with the conditions of 10
innocent passage.
2. In any event, the Egart’s underwater espionage operation 11
constituted a violation of Anduchenca’s territorial and maritime
sovereignty.
a. The Egart is engaged in maritime espionage. 11
b. Peacetime espionage is a violation of territorial and maritime 11
sovereignty of Anduchenca.
B. ANDUCHENCA DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 7 OF THE FCN TREATY 12
WHEN IT CAPTURED THE EGART.
1. Anduchenca’s capture of the Egart is within its sovereignty and 12

jurisdiction.
a. Anduchenca has the sovereign right to prevent non-innocent 12
passage in its territorial sea.
b. The operation of the Egart is not protected by Article 7 of the 13
FCN Treaty.
2. Capturing the Egart is a valid response under international law. 13
a. The Egart may be validly captured as it does not enjoy immunity. 13
b. Moreover, Anduchenca’s capture of the Egart qualifies as 14
retorsion and its hacking was proportionate and necessary.
III. ANDUCHENCA DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 16 OF THE FCN 15
TREATY BY COMMISSIONING AND OPERATING THE IBRA.
A. ANDUCHENCA CAN POSSESS AND ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER 15
CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW.
1. The prohibition under Article 16 of the FCN Treaty only 16

pertains to the export and import of small arms and light
ii
PRELIMINARY PAGES
weapons (“SALWs”).
a. “Weapons and ammunition” only refers to SALWs pursuant to 16
the teleological approach.
b. “Weapons and ammunition” only refers to SALWs based on the 17
parties’ subsequent practice.
c. In any event, the Ibra and its nuclear weapons were neither 18
exported nor imported.
2. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols do not 19
impose a disarmament obligation.
B. ANDUCHENCA HAS NO DISARMAMENT OBLIGATION UNDER 19
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW.
1. There is no generally recognized and universal obligation to 19

disarm as disarmament obligations are essentially treaty-based.
2. Article II of the NPT has not attained the status of a customary 20
norm.
3. Mere possession of nuclear weapons is not inconsistent with 21
international humanitarian law.
C. IN ANY CASE, ANDUCHENCA HAS ATTAINED A PERSISTENT OBJECTOR 21
STATUS TO ANY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT RULE OF CUSTOM.
1. The requirements for invoking the rule have been met. 22

a. Anduchenca complied with the objection criterion. 23
b. Anduchenca complied with the persistence criterion. 23
c. Anduchenca complied with the consistency criterion. 23
d. Anduchenca complied with the timeliness criterion. 24
2. The rule requiring nuclear disarmament is not a jus cogens 24
norm.
IV. RUKARUKU VIOLATED ARTICLE 17 OF THE FCN TREATY 25
WHEN IT ATTACKED THE COVFEFE AND WHEN IT
CAPTURED THE IBRA.
A. THE ATTACK AGAINST THE COVFEFE WAS AN IMPERMISSIBLE THREAT 25
OR USE OF FORCE.
1. The attack against the Covfefe was directed against 26

Anduchenca’s political independence by forcefully limiting its
possession of weapons.
2. In any case, “political independence” and “territorial integrity” 26
do not qualify the prohibition against threat or use of force as
appearing in the FCN Treaty using treaty interpretation.
iii
PRELIMINARY PAGES
a. Under the teleological approach, it is not the object and purpose 26

of the FCN Treaty to limit threat or use of force only in cases
which affect political independence or territorial integrity of
parties.
b. Article 17 of the FCN Treaty must be interpreted in relation to 27
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter using systemic integration and
supplementary means of treaty interpretation.
3. The attack against the Covfefe was not consistent with Article 51 28
of the UN Charter, contrary to Rukaruku’s claim.
a. There was no armed attack against Rukaruku either in its 28
traditional notion or in the more liberal “accumulation of
events” test.
b. The firing of 12 cruise missiles violated the requirement of 29
necessity and proportionality under jus ad bellum framework.
c. Rukaruku cannot invoke anticipatory, pre-emptive or preventive 30
self-defense.
4. Even assuming Anduchenca is guilty of armed attack, 30
Rukaruku’s use of force violated the rules of jus in bello.
a. The Covfefe was not a legitimate military objective as it neither 31
lost its civilian character nor effectively contributed to
Anduchenca’s military capacity.
b. The attack against the Covfefe violated the principle of 31
proportionality under jus in bello.
5. Rukaruku cannot justify the use of force against the Covfefe 32
under United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) Resolution
3790.
a. Resolution 3790 failed to conform to Articles 40, 41 and 42 of 32
the UN Charter.
b. Resolution 3790 cannot be interpreted in a manner that violates 32
fundamental human rights.
B. RUKARUKU’S CAPTURE OF THE IBRA VIOLATED ARTICLE 17 OF THE 32
FCN TREATY.
1. Article 17 of the FCN Treaty does not authorize the capture of 33
the Ibra.
2. International law does not permit the capture of the Ibra. 33
a. Possession of a nuclear-armed submarine per se does not 33
amount to an armed attack which triggers the right of Rukaruku
to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter.
b. The capture of Ibra cannot be justified under UNSC Resolution 33
iv
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3790.
c. UNCLOS and Customary International Law grant Anduchenca 34
the exclusive jurisdiction over Ibra in the high seas under the
flag state rule and freedom of navigation.
PRAYER 34
v
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (24 October 1945) 26, 28, 32, 33
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1125 31
U.N.T.S. 609 (8 June 1977)
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 7
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, E.T.S. 5 (1950)
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161 (1968) 15, 18, 20, 21,
23, 24
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, U.N.T.S. Ch XXVI-9 (2017) 15
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (10 9, 10, 12, 13, 14,
December 1982) 34
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) 9, 13, 15, 24, 26,
27
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
International Cases and Arbitral Decisions
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey), 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (19 4
December)
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the 18
Congo), Merits, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 582 (30 November)
Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the 2
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (17 March)
Anglo-Norweigan Fisheries Case (U.K. v Norway), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (18 22
December).
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 2
of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 70 (1 April)
Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, 6
Partial Award, P.C.A. Case No 2012-04 (30 June 2016)
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem Rep Congo v Uganda), 18
2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec 19)
Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey 15
and Iraq), Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. Series B. No. 12
Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (13 June) 22
Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd., I.C.S.I.D. Case No. 6
ARB/12/20 (26 April 2017)
vi
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Burlington Resources, Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, Decision on the Proposal 6

for Disqualification of Professor Vicuña, I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB/08/5
(13 December 2013)
Caratube International Oil Co. LLP v Republic of Kazakhstan, Decision on 7
the Proposal for Disqualification of Bruno Boesch, I.C.S.I.D. Case No.
ARB/13/13 (20 March 2014)
Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, 4, 17
1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045 (13 December)
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 18
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia
and Montenegro) Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43
Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v 18
Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 425 (20 April)
Case Concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in 5
Morocco (France v United States of America), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J.
Rep. 176 (27 August)
Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), 17
Merits, Judgment 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (15 June)
Case of Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, Application no. 27021/08 (7 July 2011) 32
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. (9 April) 18
Di Curzio Case, 1959 R.I.A.A. Vol XIV 2
Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel XXI 18
(Pt II), Award, 1977 R.I.A.A. 53 (18 February)
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v 3, 4, 27
Nicaragua), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 213 (13 July)
Domingues v United States of America, Merits, IACmHR, Report No. 62/02, 23
Case No. 12.285 (2002)
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Judgment, 1932 P.C.I.J. 15
Series A/B, No. 46
Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovenia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 4
Rep. 3 (5 February)
Georges Pinson (France v United Mexican States), 1928 R.I.A.A. 327 27
(1927-8) AD Case No 292
Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and 16
Braila, Advisory Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 14 (8 December)
Jurisdictional Immunities of the States (Germany v Italy: Greece 34
intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep 99 (3 February)
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon 29
and Equatorial Guinea, intervening, v Nigeria), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J.
vii
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Rep. 303 (10 October)

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 28
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep 136 (30
January)
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 20, 21, 33
I.C.J. Rep 226 (8 July)
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v Britain), Judgment, 1
1924 P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 2
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 17, 20
United States of America), Judgment, Merits, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (27
June)
National Grid P.L.C. v Argentine Republic, Decision on the Challenge to Mr. 7
Judd L. Kessler, Case No. UN 7949 (3 December 2007)
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone), 1923 4
P.C.I.J. Series B No 4 (7 February)
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands, 20, 21, 24
Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark), Merits, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, 1955 I.C.J. 6
Rep. 4 (18 November)
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear 1
Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v UK),
Judgment, General List No. 158 (5 October 2016)
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Merits, 27
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161 (6 November)
Prosecutor v Duško Tadiç, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) 31, 34
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v 2, 24
Senegal), Merits, Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422 (20 July)
Roach and Pinkerton v United States of America, Merits, IACmHR, 23
Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647 (1987)
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), 18
1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (July 18)
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 17
Rep. 7 (3 Feb)
The Case of S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 15, 20, 26
No. 10 (7 Sep)
The S.S. ‘Wimbledon’, United Kingdom and Poland (intervening) v 5
Germany, Judgments, 1923 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 1
The Walfish Bay Boundary Case (Germany/Great Britan), Award, R.I.A.A. 6
viii
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Vol. XI 23 (May 1911)

United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 13
(“US-Shrimp”), Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October
1998)
Vito G. Gallo v Government of Canada, Decision on the Challenge to Mr. J. 7
Christopher Thomas, QC, PCA Case No. 55798 (14 October 2009)
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening), 16
Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (31 March)
Yukos Universal Ltd (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, Final Award, 8
PCA Case No 2005-04/AA227 (18 July 2014)
National Case Law

Fetherstone v Cooper, 9 Ves 67 (1803) 8
Giacamo Costa Fu Andrea v British Italian Trading Ltd., 1 QB 201 (1963) 8
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Okowa, Phoebe, The International Court of Justice and the Georgia/Russia 2
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MISCELLANEOUS
Caroline Case, 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1841) 1137–1138, 29
available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (last
accessed 5 January 2018).
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August 1949 38–39 (1987)
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xvi
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resolution of the IBA Council on 23 October 2014.

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of Naval Operations - Annotated Supplement, ¶2.1.3 (1997)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The People’s Republic of Anduchenca (“Anduchenca”) instituted proceedings against the
Federal Republic of Rukaruku (“Rukaruku”) before the International Court of Justice pursuant to
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court regarding the dispute concerning alleged violations by
Rukaruku of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Anduchenca and
Rukaruku on 12 March 1947 (“FCN Treaty”).
Rukaruku made known its intention to file counter-claims under Article 80 of the Rules
of Court on 10 July 2017.
On 4 August 2017, the Agents of the Parties agreed to have all the claims and counter-
claims heard together in a single set of proceedings, and after negotiations, the Agents of the
Parties jointly communicated to the Court the Statement of Agreed Facts on 23 August 2017.
The Agents of the Parties have agreed that a “dispute” between the Parties exists with
respect to each of the aforementioned claims and counter-claims within the meaning of Articles
10 and 20 of the FCN Treaty, and that all of the counter-claims are “directly connected with the
subject matter” of at least one of the claims within the meaning of Article 80 of the Rules of
Court.
Both States are party to the Court’s compromissory and compulsory jurisdiction under
Article 36(1) and Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute respectively.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the arbitral award of 2 March 2017 is valid;
II. Whether Rukaruku violated Article 6 of the FCN Treaty when the Egart operated
in Anduchenca’s territorial sea, and whether Anduchenca violated Article 7 of the
FCN Treaty when it captured the Egart;
III. Whether Anduchenca violated Article 16 of the FCN Treaty by commissioning
and operating the Ibra; and
IV. Whether Rukaruku violated Article 17 of the FCN Treaty when it attacked the
Covfefe and captured the Ibra.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
ODASARRAN NEIGHBORS AND THE INCONGRUENCE OF POWER
Anduchenca and Rukaruku are neighboring States in the Odasarra Region, with the latter
as the dominant military, diplomatic and economic power in the region. Except for Rukaruku,
the region was left with decimated civil infrastructures and shattered economies post World War
II, and there was a proliferation of small arms and light weapons among civilians. For decades,
Odasarra became a hub for illicit international arms trafficking.
To stimulate growth and promote stability in the region, Rukaruku concluded bilateral
treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (“FCN Treaty”) with all Odasarran States,
including Anduchenca in 1947. Rukaruku also provided economic aid packages, expanded its
Navy and helped the other States implement large-scale disarmament programs. Beginning 1995,
Rukarukan Navy implemented an aggressive interdiction strategy to end illicit small-arms trade
in Odasarra.
In 1968, all Odasarran States, except Anduchenca, signed the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“NPT Treaty”). On numerous occasions in the last half
decade, Anduchenca has consistently maintained that the NPT Treaty “establishes and
aggravates an inherent inequality between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States”.
In December 1982, all Odasarran States, again with the exception of Anduchenca, signed
and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). Anduchenca
cited the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS to be “unnecessary”.
EGART, THE RUKARUKAN SPY DRONE
In August 2015, the Rukarukan Navy began deploying autonomous underwater vehicles
(“AUVs”) in its naval operations outside Odasarra. The AUVs are programmed to navigate
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autonomously for a week and return to their deploying ships. They are equipped with
sophisticated optical, acoustic and sonar systems. Anduchencan press labelled them as “spy
drones” conducting surveillance of Anduchenca’s naval activities.
On his speech before the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, the Anduchencan
Head of State, General Tovarish, gave notice to all States that should Anduchenca find any spy
drone within its territorial sea, it shall be captured and not returned.
A month thereafter, the Anduchencan Navy announced the capture of a Rukarukan AUV
found less than 11 nautical miles from the Anduchencan coast. Hours later, Rukaruku released a
statement confirming the capture of its AUV, called the Egart. It insisted the Egart’s immediate
return, without necessarily invoking the FCN Treaty as having been violated by Anduchenca.
The dispute of the Egart’s return was the subject of diplomatic conversations between the
States throughout November 2015. Failing to come to an agreement, Rukaruku initiated
arbitration proceedings against Anduchenca under Article 10(a) of their FCN Treaty.
Anduchenca did not respond to the request for arbitration. It later argued that the FCN Treaty
does not apply to the dispute involving the Egart.
A TRIBUNAL WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND THE RUKA RUSE
The arbitral tribunal was composed of (1) Bhrasht Moyet, a Rukarukan elected into the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and arbitrator for Rukaruku in 4 arbitrations in the last
decade, (2) Alice Bacal, ICJ President and presiding arbitrator, and (3) Mou Tong, member of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, appointed by Bacal on behalf of Anduchenca.
Upon its constitution, Anduchenca sent a Note Verbale to Rukaruku and the tribunal
declaring that it will neither participate in the arbitration nor recognize the validity of the award.
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Anduchenca believes that the dispute is not arbitrable and the tribunal is not seized of
jurisdiction.
The tribunal decided to continue with the proceedings and treated Anduchenca’s Note
Verbale as an objection. On 2 March 2017, the tribunal rendered an award in favor of Rukaruku.
It concluded that it was seized of jurisdiction, and ordered the Egart’s immediate return.
On 21 March 2017, an international non-governmental organization that reports on high-
profile arbitrations, the Institute for Legal Studies of Arbitration (“ILSA”), published a report
called “The Ruka Ruse”.
The report reproduced transcripts of three telephone conversations between Moyet and
Rukarukan counsel and lawyer for the Rukarukan Ministry of External Relations, Buoc Chivo,
before and during the tribunal’s deliberations. In the ex parte communication, Chivo requested
Moyet to emphasize to the tribunal certain arguments. Moyet agreed and interposed no objection
to the communication made to him.
The report also revealed the hiring of Mikkel Orvindari as assistant to the tribunal
without the knowledge and consent of either party. Orvindari billed 522 hours, ten times more
than the judges of the tribunal. ILSA also discovered and published Orvindari’s draft of the
award which was identical to the final version. Chivo resigned from his post in the Rukarukan
Ministry.
On 27 March 2017, Rukaruku addressed the ILSA Report and downplayed the
irregularities as not having any significant influence over the tribunal’s decision.
THE IBRA AND THE ATTACK ON THE COVFEFE
In April 2017, General Tovarish called a special conference to confirm reports that
Anduchenca had commissioned a nuclear-armed submarine, called the Ibra. In the same
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conference, Tovarish declared that Anduchenca would not be attending the second substantive
session to the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit
Nuclear Weapons, and would consequently not sign any treaty that might emerge from those
meetings.
On 8 May 2017, the Security Council adopted Resolution 3790 which called on Member
States to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the NPT, and
to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed vessels, whose very existence
constitutes a threat to peace.
Nothing in the said resolution explicitly authorizes use of force. However, during the
Council’s discussions, Rukaruku declared that it would do “what is necessary to promote peace
and stability in the region”.
The Covfefe, an unarmed vessel owned and operated by a privately held company, the
High Seas Supplies, was en route to deliver to the Ibra 10 Anduchencan sailors, bedding, medical
supplies, communications equipment, food and water on 6 June 2017.
Rukarukan warships fired 12 cruise missiles at the Covfefe, on the high seas. Four of the
12 missiles hit the Covfefe which caused it to sink within the hour from the attack, resulting to
the death of 10 Anduchencan sailors and 7 civilians employed by High Seas Supply.
On 14 June 2017, Rukaruku located the Ibra, approximately 20 nautical miles from the
Anduchencan coast. Rukarukan warships began enclosing the submarine and fired torpedoes that
forced the Ibra to surface. After its deck was hit by machine gun-fire, the Ibra was boarded and
Rukaruku seized operational control of the submarine. The personnel on board were escorted to
the Rukarukan naval base, with the Ibra’s crew detained for questioning. They were then
delivered to the Anduchencan Embassy in Rukaruku for repatriation.
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On 19 June 2017, the Security Council adopted a Resolution affirming Rukaruku’s
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) and two NPT nuclear
weapon States. The agreement provided for the Ibra’s complete dismantling. The IAEA certified
that the agreement had been carried out six weeks later, with initial findings that the weapons
found on the Ibra, including its nuclear weapons, had been manufactured in Anduchenca.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
The arbitral award of 2 March 2017 is invalid because the tribunal had no jurisdiction.
There was no legal dispute cognizable by the tribunal based on the requirements of Article 10(a)
of the 1947 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (“FCN”).
The Egart does not enjoy freedom of commerce and navigation as Article 7 of the FCN
only covers commercial vessels, using the principle of contemporaneity. The parties did not
intend to give the treaty an evolving meaning as reflected by their subsequent acts. In any case,
there is no existing norm under international law which supports the classification of
autonomous underwater vehicles as commercial vessels.
Assuming the tribunal had jurisdiction, the award is still invalid due to serious breach of
arbitral integrity. Using the “appearance of bias” test, the tribunal’s impartiality and
independence were compromised. Further, the tribunal violated the rule on delegatus non potest
delegare.
II
Rukaruku violated Article 6 of the FCN Treaty by operating the Egart within
Anduchencan waters. The Egart is not entitled to the right of innocent passage, and also failed to
comply with the conditions to enjoy such right. The Egart also violated Anduchenca’s maritime
sovereignty for engaging in espionage during peacetime.
The Egart’s capture does not violate Article 7 of the FCN Treaty as it is within
Anduchenca’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. Anduchenca has the right to prevent non-innocent
passage within its territory. The Egart’s capture is a valid response under international law
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because it is not protected by sovereign immunity. In any case, it qualifies as retorsion, and is
proportionate and necessary under the circumstances.
III
Commissioning and operating the Ibra does not violate Article 16 of the FCN Treaty as
the prohibition only pertains to the export and import of small arms and light weapons. This is
supported by a teleological approach of treaty interpretation, and by the parties’ subsequent
practice. In any event, the Ibra and its nuclear weapons were neither exported nor imported.
Anduchenca has no disarmament obligation under conventional or customary
international law. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols do not impose
disarmament obligations. Mere possession of nuclear weapons is not inconsistent with
In any case, Anduchenca is a persistent objector to any nuclear disarmament custom as it
met the criteria of objection, persistence, consistency and timeliness. The rule requiring
disarmament is not a jus cogens norm.
IV
The attack against the Covfefe was an impermissible threat or use of force as it was
directed against Anduchenca’s political independence to forcefully limit its possession of
weapons. In any case, under the teleological approach of treaty interpretation, it is not the object
and purpose of the FCN Treaty to limit threat or use of force only in cases which affect political
independence or territorial integrity. Article 17 of the FCN must be interpreted in relation to
Article 2(4) of the United Nations (“UN”) Charter using systemic and supplementary means of
treaty interpretation.
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The attack on the Covfefe was inconsistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter as there
was no armed attack against Rukaruku under its traditional notion or under the “accumulation of
events” test. The firing of 12 cruise missiles was unnecessary and disproportionate under jus ad
bellum, and Rukaruku cannot invoke anticipatory, pre-emptive or preventive self-defense.
In any case, Rukaruku violated the rules of jus in bello. There was no military necessity
which made the Covfefe a legitimate military objective as it retained its civilian character and
did not effectively contribute to Anduchenca’s military capacity. UN Security Council (“SC”)
Resolution 3790 cannot justify Rukaruku’s use of force as it failed to conform to Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the United Nations Charter, and it cannot be interpreted in a manner that violates
Rukaruku’s capture of the Ibra violated Article 17 of the FCN Treaty and international
law. Possession of nuclear-armed submarine per se does not amount to armed attack which
triggers invocation of UN Charter Article 51. UNSC Resolution 3790 does not justify the capture
of the Ibra. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international
law grants Anduchenca exclusive jurisdiction over the Ibra in the high seas.
xxvii
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF ANDUCHENCA
PLEADINGS
I. ANDUCHENCA IS NOT BOUND BY THE ARBITRAL AWARD OF 2 MARCH

2017 AS IT IS INVALID.
Interstate arbitration is created and defined by treaty,1 and the arbitration clause becomes
the foundation of a tribunal’s jurisdiction.2 Anduchenca submits that [A] the tribunal did not
have jurisdiction, and [B] in any case, the award is invalid because of the irregularities in the
proceedings.
A. THE TRIBUNAL HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE RUKARUKU HAD NO AUTHORITY

TO INITIATE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 10(A) OF THE FCN
TREATY.
Under the FCN Treaty3 arbitration clause, a tribunal shall arbitrate only when (1) there
exists a dispute between the parties and (2) the dispute concerns interpretation or application of
Articles 1 to 9 of the FCN Treaty.
1. There was no legal dispute between the parties under the “awareness”
test.
Under international law, a dispute is a clash of legal views, or a disagreement on a point
of fact or law between two parties.4 In the 2016 Marshall Islands Case5, the International Court
of Justice (“ICJ”) laid down the “awareness” test, under which there must be an assessment
1
David Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving
Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 A.J.I.L. 104 (1990).
2
Doyin Rhodes-Vivour, The Agreement to Arbitrate – A Primary Tool for the Resolution of
Maritime Disputes, Practical Maritime Arbitration Conference, Dubai, (5-7 April 2008).
3
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the People’s Democratic Republic
of Anduchenca and the Federal Republic of Rukaruku, Statement of Agreed Facts
[hereinafter Agreed Facts], Annex I. [hereinafter FCN Treaty]
4
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v Britain), Judgment, 1924 P.C.I.J. Series
A, No. 2, 11.
5
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v UK), Judgment, General List No. 158 (5
October 2016).
1
whether the respondent is aware of the existence of a dispute6, to place it on notice7 and give it
an opportunity to recognize or deny an international obligation.8
Here, Anduchenca could not be seen as being aware of the dispute cognizable by the
tribunal. The subject of the communication between itself and Rukaruku prior to the initiation for
arbitration was limited to the return of the Egart.9 There is no clear showing that Rukaruku ever
specifically alleged 10 any FCN Treaty violation on the part of Anduchenca, which is the
threshold set by the ICJ in its recent decisions.11
2. The dispute prior to arbitration, if any, does not call for the
application of Articles 1 to 9 of the FCN Treaty.
The arbitration tribunal under the FCN Treaty can only be legally constituted when
Articles 1 to 9 of the FCN Treaty apply to the dispute. Here, the only disagreement existing at
the time of Rukaruku’s initiation for arbitration had been about the Egart12 – a matter falling
outside the FCN Treaty as discussed below.13
6
Meenakshi Ramkumar and Aishwarya Singh, The Niclear Disarmament Cases: Is
Formalistic Rigour in Establishing Jurisdiction Impeding Access to Justice?, 33 Utrecht
Journal of International European Law 85 (2017), 128-134.
7
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2011
I.C.J. Rep. 70 (1 April), ¶30. [hereinafter Georgia v Russian Federation]
8
Di Curzio Case, 1959 R.I.A.A. Vol XIV, 391-393.
9
Agreed Facts, ¶16-19.
10
Phoebe Okowa, The International Court of Justice and the Georgia/Russia Dispute, 11
Human Rights Law Review (2011), 739-757.
11
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Merits,
Judgment, 2012 ICJ Rep. 422 (20 July), 444-5, 462; Alleged Violations of Sovereign
Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Colombia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (17 March), ¶78.
12
Agreed Facts, ¶19.
13
Id., ¶23.
2
a. The freedom of commerce and navigation clause under the FCN

Treaty only covers commercial vessels.
Under the principle of contemporaneity, the terms of the treaty must be interpreted
according to the meaning attributed to them at the time when it was originally concluded14 to
ascertain the original intent of the parties. 15
The FCN Treaty was concluded after World War II as part of the rehabilitation of the
region.16 The freedom of commerce and navigation was intended to stimulate financial growth
after the war shattered Odasarran economies.17 Thus, Article 718 must be construed to only cover
vessels which facilitate trade between both parties.19
For this provision to cover Egart, the parties must have intended to give “freedom of
commerce and navigation” an evolving meaning 20 such that commercial vessels cover
autonomous underwater vehicles (“AUVs”).21 Such intent is lacking in this case.
i. It should be presumed that the parties never intended to

give “freedom of commerce and navigation” an evolving
meaning.
14
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4:
Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, B.Y.I.L., Vol. 33 (1957), 212.
15
Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International
Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in Binder, et al (eds.),
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF CRISTOPH SCHREUR (2009), 694.
16
Agreed Facts, ¶5.
17
Id., ¶4.
18
FCN Treaty.
19
Agreed Facts, ¶23.
20
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment,
2009 I.C.J. Rep. 213 (13 July), ¶64-67. [hereinafter Costa Rica v Nicaragua]
21
Agreed Facts, ¶13.
3
Without clear subsequent practice,22 it must not be presumed that the parties intended to
give the terms of a treaty an evolving meaning. 23
Here, Anduchenca manifested to the world that it would not permit any foreign
government vessel proposing to enter its territorial sea without obtaining prior authorization. 24
The subsequent practice of Rukaruku also supports this interpretation since it piloted the AUVs
outside the region despite having freedom of navigation throughout the entire Odasarra. 25
ii. In any case, the Egart cannot be construed as a

commercial vessel even using evolutionary interpretation.
Evolutionary treaty interpretation dictates the understanding of the treaty in light of
emerging norms of international law. 26 Current state practice show that AUVs used for
commerce are deployed by private entities for specific commercial endeavors27 such as deep sea
exploration for offshore oil and mineral deposits. 28
22
Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep.
1045 (13 December), 1076. [hereinafter Kasikili/Sedudu Island]
23
Report of the ILC, U.N.G.A.O.R. 66th Sess Supp 10, U.N. Doc A/66/10/Add.1 (2011), 33;
Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty
Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 Law and Practice of
International Courts and Tribunals (2010), 443; Costa Rica v Nicaragua, ¶66.
24
Agreed Facts, ¶12.
25
Agreed Facts, ¶5, ¶12-13.
26
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey), 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (19 December), ¶77-78;
Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovenia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (5
February); Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone), 1923
P.C.I.J. Series B No 4 (7 February).
27
Stephanie Showalter, The Legal Status of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, 38 Marine
Tech. Society J. 38 (2004), 80.
28
Ibid.
4
Here, the Egart is controlled by the Rukarukan Navy for naval operations.29 Rukarukan
AUVs routinely collect optical and acoustic data, 30 hence, considered engaged in undersea
peacetime espionage.31
iii. The Egart is not a commercial vessel under restrictive

treaty interpretation.
Restrictive interpretation is applied when the intention of the parties to restrict their
sovereign rights is doubtful.32 Here, when the FCN Treaty was concluded,33 it was unlikely for
Anduchenca to act against its own interest by granting Rukaruku navigational rights outside the
contemporaneous understanding 34 of “freedom of commerce and navigation” in order to
accommodate spy drones.35
In any event, the Egart’s characterization 36 is a matter falling outside the tribunal’s
competence.
b. La competénce de la competence doctrine cannot apply due to

improper constitution of the tribunal.
The general principle of international law37 doctrine of la competénce de la competence
provides that a tribunal has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Nevertheless, such
29
Agreed Facts, ¶14, ¶17.
30
Id., ¶14.
31
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
SOVEREIGNS (1797), 374-76.
32
The S.S. ‘Wimbledon’, United Kingdom and Poland (intervening) v Germany, Judgments,
1923 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 1, 24-25.
33
Agreed Facts, ¶6.
34
Case Concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco
(France v United States of America), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 176 (27 August).
35
Agreed Facts, ¶15.
36
Andrew Henderson, Murky Waters: The Legal Status of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, 53
Naval L. Rev. 55 (2006).
5
tribunal must have been validly constituted under the arbitration agreement which is not the case
here.
B. IN ANY CASE, THE AWARD IS VOID AS THE PROCEEDINGS WERE TAINTED BY

IRREGULARITIES NEGATING IMPARTIALITY, INTEGRITY, DUE DILIGENCE AND
NON-DELEGATION.
A tribunal has the duty to safeguard the integrity of the arbitral process, the core of which
are the principles of independence and integrity. 38 Anduchenca submits that the award of 2
March 2017 is invalid because (1) the tribunal’s independence and impartiality were
compromised and (2) the tribunal delegated its decision-making power.
1. The tribunal was neither independent nor impartial under the

“appearance of bias” test.
A tribunal is obligated to protect the procedural rights of the parties which includes the
right to an impartial and independent arbitrator.39
The point of inquiry is not whether there is actual bias or dependence, but whether there
is an appearance of lack of independence or impartiality40 from the viewpoint of a reasonable
and informed third party. 41 This “appearance of bias” test is reflected in the corpus of
37
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (18
November), 111, 119; The Walfish Bay Boundary Case (Germany/Great Britan), Award,
R.I.A.A. Vol. XI (23 May 1911), 263.
38
Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, Partial Award,
P.C.A. Case No 2012-04 (30 June 2016), ¶183.
39
Id., ¶227.
40
Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd., I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB/12/20 (26 April
2017), 59; Burlington Resources, Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, Decision on the Proposal
for Disqualification of Professor Vicuña, I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB/08/5 (13 December
2013), 66.
41
Caratube International Oil Co. LLP v Republic of Kazakhstan, Decision on the Proposal for
Disqualification of Bruno Boesch, I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB/13/13 (20 March 2014), 1-2.
6
international law through convention,42 jurisprudence,43 and writings of scholars including non-
government organizations like the International Bar Association.44
a. Brasht Moyet’s continuing relationship with Rukaruku gave the

tribunal an appearance of bias.
Independence requires that there be no actual or past dependent relationship between the
parties that may, or at least appear, to affect the arbitrator’s freedom of judgment.45
Here, even while Moyet was sitting as a judge in the ICJ, he was also appointed by
Rukaruku as arbitrator in four arbitrations. 46 Moyet, therefore, has a standing and continuing
relationship with Rukaruku which may appear to a reasonable third party as a factor which
compromises his impartiality.
b. The tribunal’s impartiality was compromised because of the ex

parte communication between Brasht Moyet and Buoc Chivo.
Impartiality is a definitive feature of every dispute resolution system. 47 As enshrined in
Rule 5.3 of the IBA’s Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators 48, arbitrators must not discuss
42
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, E.T.S. 5 (1950), Article 6.
43
Vito G. Gallo v Government of Canada, Decision on the Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher
Thomas, QC, PCA Case No. 55798 (14 October 2009), ¶19; National Grid P.L.C. v
Argentine Republic, Decision on the Challenge to Mr. Judd L. Kessler, Case No. UN
7949 (3 December 2007), ¶80.
44
International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration
(23 October 2014), General Standard 2(b).
45
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (2004), 4-51.
46
Agreed Facts, ¶21.
47
Georgios Dimitropoulos, Constructing the Independence of International Investment
Arbitrators: Past, Present and Future, 36 NW J. International L. & Bus. 371 (2016).
48
International Bar Association Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (9 July 2008).
7
with one party in the absence of the other49, so as not to give rise to suspicions of bias50 and to
guard against interference from the parties to the relevant issues.51 The ex parte communication
between Judge Moyet and Chivo casts doubt in the impartiality of the tribunal. Chivo was acting
as counsel for Rukaruku when he colluded with Moyet. Pursuant to the “state organ doctrine,”
Rukaruku may not escape responsibility by Chivo’s resignation and the State’s denial.
2. The tribunal violated the rule on delegatus non potest delegare by

having Orvindari write the award.
Decision-making of the tribunal is non-delegable. 52 In fact in the Isle of Man
Arbitration,53 the award was set aside after expert evidence showed that 79% of the award was
written by the tribunal secretary. Here, the entire award was written by Orvindari, as buttressed
by the fact that Orvindari billed 522 hours for the case, almost ten times the average number of
hours spent by the three arbitrators.54
II. RUKARUKU VIOLATED ARTICLE 6 OF THE FCN TREATY WHEN THE

EGART OPERATED IN ANDUCHENCA’S TERRITORIAL SEA, BUT
ANDUCHENCA DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 7 OF THE FCN TREATY WHEN
IT CAPTURED THE EGART.
49
JOHN TACKABERRY, ARTHUR MARRIOTT AND RONALD BERNSTEIN,
BERNSTEIN’S HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PRACTICE (2003), ¶2-424.
50
SUNDRA RAJOO, LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF ARBITRATION, SECOND
EDITION (2017), 491.
51
U.N.G.A., Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, U.N. Doc No. A/Res/40/32 (29 November 1985); U.N.G.A., Human Rights
in the Administration of Justice, U.N. Doc No. A/Res/40/146 (13 December 1985).
52
DAVID ST. HIN SUTTON, JUDITH GILL and MATTHEW GEARING, RUSSELL ON
ARBITRATION (2007), ¶6-74; Fetherstone v Cooper, 9 Ves 67 (1803); Giacamo Costa
Fu Andrea v British Italian Trading Ltd., 1 QB 201 (1963).
53
Yukos Universal Ltd (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, Final Award, PCA Case No
2005-04/AA227 (18 July 2014).
54
Agreed Facts, ¶32.
8
A. RUKARUKU VIOLATED ARTICLE 6 OF THE FCN TREATY BY OPERATING THE

EGART WITHIN ANDUCHENCA’S TERRITORIAL SEA.
States are required to comply with their treaty obligations in good faith. 55 Rukaruku
violated Article 6 of the FCN Treaty because (1) the Egart, as an AUV, is not a ship, hence,
cannot exercise the right to innocent passage. (2) In any case, the Egart’s underwater espionage
operation constituted a violation of Anduchenca’s territorial and maritime sovereignty.
1. The Egart, as an autonomous unmanned vehicle, is not a ship, hence,

cannot exercise the right to innocent passage.
a. Unmanned vehicles are not ships that are entitled to right of

innocent passage.
The Egart, a Rukarukan AUV, is an independent, autonomous conveyance from the ship
from which it was deployed, programmed to navigate autonomously for one week, and then
return to the ship from which it was deployed.56
Although United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) does not
define the term “ships”, a reading from its context pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Law of
Treaties (VCLT)57 shows that “ships” are considered manned.58 Even several other instruments
characterize ships or vessels as being controlled by a human.59
55
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969), Article 26.
[hereinafter VCLT]
56
Agreed Facts, ¶14.
57
VCLT, Article 31.
58
Michael Schmitt and David Goddard, International Law and the Military Use of Unmanned
Maritime Systems, International Review of the Red Cross 567 (2016), 576; United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (10 December 1982),
Article 94. [hereinafter UNCLOS]
59
Daniel A.G. Vallejo, Electric Currents: Programming Legal Status into Autonomous
Unmanned Maritime Vehicles, 47 Case W. Res. J. International L. 405 (2015), 412.
9
Neither can the Egart be considered as a warship under UNCLOS or customary
international law as “warships” are limited to those under the command of an officer and manned
by a crew. 60
Indeed, there is absence of state practice and opinio juris that would support a custom
granting unmanned vessels navigational rights.61
b. In any case, the Egart failed to comply with the conditions of

innocent passage.
Assuming that the Egart is entitled to navigational rights, it should comply with the
conditions associated with those rights,62 including the rules on innocent passage.63 Submarines
and other underwater vehicles must navigate on the surface and show their flag for their passage
to be considered innocent under UNCLOS.64
Here, the Egart failed to navigate on the surface and show its flag. 65 Its recurrent
surfacing was only for the purpose of obtaining GPS signals and not to comply with the rules on
innocent passage. 66 Moreover, it was only identified as of Rukarukan ownership when the
Anduchencan authority captured and inspected it. 67
60
UNCLOS, Article 29; Schmitt and Goddard, supra note 58, 579.
61
Schmitt and Goddard, supra note 58, 578.
62
Ibid.
63
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., An Overview of Second Committee Negotiations in the Law of the
Sea Conference, 63 Or. L. Rev. 53 (1984), 63-64; Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 77 Am. J. International L.
616 (1983), 619; see also PHILIP JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND
MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927).
64
UNCLOS, Articles 18(2), 20.
65
Agreed Facts, ¶16.
66
Clarifications, ¶2.
67
Agreed Facts, ¶16.
10
2. In any event, the Egart’s underwater espionage operation constituted

a violation of Anduchenca’s territorial and maritime sovereignty.
a. The Egart is engaged in maritime espionage.
In its broad sense, espionage encompasses a wide range of clandestine government
activities with the objective of acquiring in advance as much information as possible.68
Egart’s underwater operation within Anduchencan territorial sea was premised upon the
false pretext of ensuring safe passage of all ships and to facilitate friendly trade and commerce in
the Odasarra Region. 69 It can be inferred that it was cunningly obtaining information about
Anduchenca’s military and naval improvements aided by other socialist countries, and its
Advance Electronic Warfare Division. 70 The Egart’s sophisticated optical, acoustic and sonar
systems71 are capable of collecting data including the position, specification and configuration of
20 Anduchencan surface ships and submarines.72
b. Peacetime espionage is a violation of territorial and maritime

sovereignty of Anduchenca.
The international legal norm against peacetime espionage is based on respect for the
territorial boundaries of sovereign states, as these lines enclose the land territory extending to
68
Tara Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity and International Law: An Intersectional
Analysis, 24 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech. 57 (2015), 92.
69
Agreed Facts, ¶17.
70
Id., ¶2, ¶8.
71
Id., ¶14.
72
Id., ¶2.
11
internal waters and territorial seas.73 Within the territorial sea, the flag state must respect the
qualified sovereignty of the coastal state.74 Operating the Egart militates against this duty.
B. ANDUCHENCA DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 7 OF THE FCN TREATY WHEN IT

CAPTURED THE EGART.
Anduchenca submits that it did not violate Article 7 of the FCN Treaty because: (1)
Anduchenca’s capture of the Egart is within its sovereignty and jurisdiction and (2) capturing the
Egart is a valid response under international law.
1. Anduchenca’s capture of the Egart is within its sovereignty and

jurisdiction.
a. Anduchenca has the sovereign right to prevent non-innocent

passage in its territorial sea.
The coastal state’s sovereignty over its territorial sea is comparable to that which exists
over the land territory,75 including all the rights and duties inherent thereto.76
Anduchenca is justified in taking necessary steps77 to prevent the Egart’s non-innocent
and illegal passage.78 An act aimed at collecting information in the territorial sea to the prejudice
73
Myers McDougal, Harold Lasswell & Michael Reisman, The Intelligence Function and
World Public Order, 46 Temple L.Q. 365 (1973), 367.
74
OPPENHEIM, LASSA, I INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, HERSCH.
LAUTERPACHT ED. (1955), 460-61.
75
Natalie Klein, Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security, 7 Melbourne J.
Intl. L. (2006).
76
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2012), 264.
77
UNCLOS, Article 25(1); see also Brendan Gogarty and Meredith Hagger, The Laws of Man
over Vehicles Unmanned: The Legal Response to Robotic Revolution on Sea, Land and
Air, 19 J. Law Info. & Science 73 (2008), 117.
78
James Kraska, Putting Your Head in the Tiger's Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial
Waters, 54 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 164 (2015), 226.
12
of the defense or security of the coastal state is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the latter.79
b. The operation of the Egart is not protected by Article 7 of the FCN

Treaty.
In any case, Anduchenca’s actions do not violate Article 7 of the FCN Treaty, which
guarantees freedom of commerce and navigation. By the ordinary meaning of the text and its
object and purpose,80 the parties are bound to respect navigation that is commercial in nature.
In deciphering the ordinary meaning of the text, the object and purpose of the treaty must
be taken into account. 81 The preambular language, being a reflection of the intentions of the
negotiators, must add color, texture and shading to the interpretation of the treaty 82 and is a
constant source to identify the object and purpose of a treaty.83
Here, the preamble prominently speaks about “encouraging mutually beneficial trade and
investment.”84 Clearly, the object and purpose of the FCN Treaty is to guarantee navigation in
order to promote commerce. It does not cover navigation that is military in nature, like the
operation of the Egart.85
2. Capturing the Egart is a valid response under international law.
a. The Egart may be validly captured as it does not enjoy immunity.
79
UNCLOS, Article 19(c); Kraska, supra note 78, 219.
80
VCLT, Article 31(1).
81
Id.
82
United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“US-Shrimp”),
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998), ¶153.
83
CHANG-FA LO, TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES: A NEW ROUND OF CODIFICATION (2017), 186.
84
FCN Treaty, Preamble.
85
Agreed Facts, ¶13.
13
Sovereign immunity attaches only when the vessel is a warship or a government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes.86 Since Egart is unmanned, it cannot be considered as a
“warship” or a “ship” under applicable international law regimes.87
It is neither an extension of a ship or warship because it is an autonomous machine 88 nor
a naval auxiliary as auxiliaries are vessels other than warships.89
b. Moreover, Anduchenca’s capture of the Egart qualifies as

retorsion and its hacking was proportionate and necessary.
Retorsion is widely regarded as a freedom and largely unregulated by international law90
because it involves no illegal action.91 It lives and breathes in the incompleteness of international
law where no clear rules of international law prohibit the remedy. 92 It must, however, be
proportionate93 and necessary.94
Here, hacking the Egart was necessary and proportionate. As a machine, the Egart can
only “understand” through codes and programs. Hacking the Egart was proportionate in order for
it to cease its non-innocent passage. It is also necessary to neutralize the Egart as it is a threat to
86
UNCLOS, Articles 32, 95-96.
87
88
Id., ¶14.
89
U.S. Dept. of Navy, NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations - Annotated Supplement, ¶2.1.3 (1997).
90
Tom Ruys, Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International Legal
Framework, in Larissa van den Herik (ed.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON UN
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016), 5.
91
Christopher Champonovo, Dispute Settlement and the OECD Multilateral Agreement
Investment, 1 UCLA J. International L. & For. Aff. 181 (1996), 201.
92
HJORTUR SVERRISSON, COUNTERMEASURES, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM, AND ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS (2008), 72.
93
Troy Anderson, Itting a Virtual Peg into a Round Hole: Why Existing International Law
Fails to Govern Cyber Reprisals, 34 Ariz. J. International & Comp. Law 135 (2017), 144.
94
UNCLOS, Articles 22, 25, 212.
14
navigation and safety.
III. ANDUCHENCA DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 16 OF THE FCN TREATY BY

COMMISSIONING AND OPERATING THE IBRA.
The in dubio mitius95 principle instructs that absent a clear international obligation, all
doubts must be resolved against a finding of breach or violation96 and in favor of upholding state
sovereignty.97 Restrictions upon the independence of states cannot be presumed.98
Anduchenca submits that [A] it has every right under conventional international law to
acquire and possess nuclear weapons and that [B] there is no disarmament obligation binding
upon it under customary international law. [C] In any case, Anduchenca has attained a persistent
objector status to any nuclear disarmament rule of custom and Anduchenca may invoke this
status because nuclear disarmament is not a jus cogens norm.
A. ANDUCHENCA CAN POSSESS AND ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER

CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Treaties do not directly bind non-parties.99 Anduchenca is not a party either to the 1968
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”) 100 or to the 2017 Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.101 While Anduchenca is a party to the FCN Treaty, its act of
95
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990), 631.
96
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Judgment, 1932 P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No.
46, 167.
97
Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and Iraq),
Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. Series B. No. 12, 25.
98
The Case of S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (7 Sep),
18-20. [hereinafter S.S. Lotus].
99
VCLT, Article 34.
100
Agreed Facts, ¶9; Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161
(1968).
101
Id., ¶48. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, U.N.T.S. Ch XXVI-9 (2017).
15
commissioning and operating the Ibra does not amount to a violation thereof as Article 16 only
contemplates small arms and light weapons.
1. The prohibition under Article 16 of the FCN Treaty only pertains to

the export and import of small arms and light weapons (“SALWs”).
Article 16 of the FCN Treaty prohibits the export and import of weapons and
ammunitions without the express approval of appropriate government departments.102
a. “Weapons and ammunition” only refers to SALWs pursuant to the

teleological approach.
In Whaling, 103 the ICJ underscored that treaty terms are not to be determined in the
abstract, 104 but in light of its context, object and purpose. 105 Apart from the preamble, 106
reference is made to the treaty’s historical,107 political and social factors.108
Post-conflict regions are normally characterized by excessive accumulation and
uncontrolled spread of surplus SALWs109 necessitating disarmament measures.110 Here, states in
102
FCN Treaty, Article 16.
103
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 2014
I.C.J. Rep. 226 (31 March), ¶55-58.
104
ILC Commentaries on Draft Articles, Y.I.L.C. Vol II, 221(1966), ¶12.
105
GEORGE NOLTE (ED.), TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE (2013), 5.
106
IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1984), 130.
107
Special Rapporteur Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, Y.I.L.C. Vol
II (1964), 59; Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz
and Braila, Advisory Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 14 (8 December), 28.
108
OLIVER DÖRR AND KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (2011), 578.
109
Office for Disarmament Affairs, THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK:
DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST
SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Volume 41 Part I (2017),
174.
110
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA), SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT WEAPONS: SELECTED UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS (2008), 40.
16
the Odasarra Region concluded the FCN Treaty after World War II111 to ensure perpetual “peace
and stability in the region”112 and address the “proliferation of small arms and weapons among
the civilian populations” that made the Region a “hub for illicit international arms trafficking”.113
Thus, Anduchenca submits that “weapons and ammunition” in the FCN Treaty could
only refer to SALWs and not nuclear arsenals, which was not the reality of the situation in the
Odasarra Region.
b. “Weapons and ammunition” only refers to SALWs based on the

parties’ subsequent practice.
In several cases114 the ICJ affirmed the role of subsequent practice in treaty interpretation
as constituting objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the
treaty.115
Since 1947, the object of Article 16 of the FCN Treaty had always been the surplus
SALWs left by World War II, based on Rukuruku’s aid programs and campaigns against illicit
arms trade.116
Further, in Temple of Preah Vihear, 117 the ICJ held that subsequent practice can also be
gleaned from silence in circumstances calling for some reaction, thus allowing the inference that
111
112
FCN Treaty.
113
Agreed Facts, ¶4.
114
Kasikili/Sedudu Island, ¶49; Frank Berman, Treaty “Interpretation” in a Judicial Context,
29 Yale J. International L. 318 (2004), ¶82; Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment, Merits, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14 (27 June), ¶¶36-47 [Nicaragua v US]; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (3 Feb), ¶¶66-71.
115
RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION (2015), 253.
116
117
Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Merits, Judgment
1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (15 June), 23.
17
the acts confirm an interpretation of the meaning of the Treaty.118 Here, if Article 16 of the FCN
Treaty covered nuclear weapons, Anduchenca’s refusal to sign the NPT in 1968 would have
called for reaction from Rukaruku and the rest of the Odasarran States.119
c. In any event, the Ibra and its nuclear weapons were neither
exported nor imported.
A party that alleges a fact in support of its claims must prove the existence of such fact.120
While “a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence” has been
recognized,121 direct evidence must be within the sole control of the opposing party.122 Indeed,
charges of “exceptional gravity” require a higher degree of direct proof.123
Here, initial findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) indicate that
the nuclear weapons in the Ibra were manufactured in Anduchenca. 124 Further, Anduchencha is
rich in uranium, allocates a substantial portion of its budget to its military, and even maintains an
Advanced Electronic Warfare Division in its Navy. 125 These facts, taken together, will
118
Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel XXI (Pt II), Award,
1977 R.I.A.A. 53 (18 February), 187.
119
Agreed Facts, ¶9.
120
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits,
Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 582 (30 November), 660; Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on
the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 425 (20 April),
¶162.
121
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. (9 April), 18.
122
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), 1966 ICJ 6 (July
18, 1966); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem Rep Congo v Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec 19).
123
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. Rep. 43.
124
125
Agreed Facts, ¶2.
18
demonstrate that Anduchenca is capable of acquiring Ibra and its nuclear weapons without
violating the export-import prohibition.
2. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols do not

impose a disarmament obligation.
While Anduchenca is a party to the four (4) Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its
Additional Protocols of 1977,126 the Martens Clause127 under Article 1(2) and Articles 35 and 36
of the Geneva Conventions all refer to the use of weapons in armed conflict, and not a
prohibition on mere possession, which is what a disarmament obligation is.128
B. ANDUCHENCA HAS NO DISARMAMENT OBLIGATION UNDER CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A disarmament obligation means physical destruction or elimination of particular types
of armaments129 and essentially remains treaty-based.130 Hence, Anduchenca may only be bound
by rules under customary international law pursuant to systemic integration. 131 There is no
generally recognized and universal obligation to disarm in contemporary international law.132
1. There is no generally recognized and universal obligation to disarm as

disarmament obligations are essentially treaty-based.
126
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Commentary on the Additional Protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 38–39 (1987).
127
Id., 389-420.
128
Id. 424-425.
129
Relationship Between Disarmament and International Security, Report of the Secretary
General of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, U.N. Doc. A/36/597 (1982), ¶46.
130
Goran Lysen, The Adequacy of the Law of Treaties Regarding Arms Control Agreements, in
Julie Dahlitz (ed.), AVOIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT OF ARMS CONTROL DISPUTES
(1994), 123.
131
ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961), 466.
132
Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Disarmament in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck
Encyclopedia Of International Law (May 2011), ¶5.
19
In international law, there are no rules limiting level of armaments other than that which
may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, and this principle is valid for all
states.133 With respect to nuclear weapons, the ICJ concluded that there is no “comprehensive
and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”134
Further, the “humanistic approach” as a general principle in support of nuclear
disarmament135 must be rejected in favor of sovereignty laid down in the S.S. Lotus case.
2. Article II of the NPT has not attained the status of a customary norm.
Anduchenca acknowledges that formal sources in the ICJ Statute “are not self-contained
but interrelated so that any non-consensual element in one source of law may indirectly affect the
rules deriving from other sources”136 resulting to “crystallization” or codification by subsequent
adoption.137
Thus, while the NPT enjoys near-universal membership,138 Anduchenca submits that the
opinio juris for a customary prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear
weapon states (“NNWS”) is less evident. Furthermore, the quid pro quo nature of the obligations
under the NPT cannot form the basis of a general rule of law. Unlike other multilateral treaties
133
Nicaragua v US, ¶269.
134
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep 226 (8
July), ¶64-73. [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]
135
ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE UNIVERSAL OBLIGATION OF
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (2017), 164.
136
ROBERT JENNINGS AND ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
VOL. I: PEACE (1996), 25.
137
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands, Federal Republic
of Germany v Denmark), Merits, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, ¶63. [“North Sea Continental Shelf”]
138
Miguel Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Future in Laurence Boisson De
Chazournes and Philippe Sands (eds), THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1999), 388.
20
that have lawmaking character, the NPT is a contract treaty 139 intended to be a “grand
bargain,”140 involving differential reciprocal obligations that are not applied universally across
the full spectrum of states parties.141 This quid pro quo arrangement precludes the provisions of
the NPT from acquiring the character of a general rule of law”. 142
3. Mere possession of nuclear weapons is not inconsistent with

While the ICJ held that international humanitarian law rules out any possibility of a
lawful use of nuclear weapons, it has not made the same conclusion with regard to its mere
possession.143 In fact, the ICJ was even equivocal as to the legality of the use of nuclear weapons
in “an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at
stake”.144
C. IN ANY CASE, ANDUCHENCA HAS ATTAINED A PERSISTENT OBJECTOR STATUS TO

ANY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT RULE OF CUSTOM.
A rule of custom will not be binding on persistent objectors 145 who demonstrated
unwillingness to be bound by it before the rule becomes established. 146 Anduchenca is a
139
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2003); Hugh
Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in Malcolm Evans (ed), INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2006), 119-120.
140
Christopher Chyba, Second-Tier Suppliers and Their Threat to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Regime in J. PILAT (ED), ATOMS FOR PEACE: A FUTURE AFTER FIFTY YEARS?
(2007), 120-122.
141
DANIEL JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2009), 10.
142
Id., 68-69; North Sea Continental Shelf, ¶72.
143
Nuclear Weapons, ¶74–86.
144
Id., ¶97.
145
ADEMOLA ABASS, COMPLETE INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS (2014), 46-9; M. DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2013), 34-5.
21
persistent objector because: (1) the requirements for invoking the rule have been met and (2) the
rule requiring nuclear disarmament is not a jus cogens norm.
1. The requirements for invoking the rule have been met.

147 148
The criteria for the operation of the rule includes objection, persistence,
consistency149 and timeliness.150 Anduchenca submits that all four (4) criteria have been met.
a. Anduchenca complied with the objection criterion.
Under this criterion, the objection “must be expressed, not entertained purely privately
within the internal counsel of the state”.151 It may relate to the lack of consent to the formation of
the rule or the applicability of the rule in question to the objecting state. 152 In both the Fisheries
and Asylum cases, the ICJ viewed failure to sign the relevant treaty as an acceptable instance of
objection.153
146
JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013), 30-31; P. MALANCZUK,
AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997) 48.
147
Cemile Guldahl, The Role of Persistent Objection in International Humanitarian Law, 77
Nordic Journal of International Law 51 (2008), 54.
148
Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities Of and For Persistent Objection, 21 Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law 121 (2010), 130.
149
Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 British Yearbook of
International Law 1 (1974–5), 24.
150
Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law, 56 Brit. Y.B. International L. 1, 4 (1985), 1.
151
See Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions
Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, 5, Draft
Conclusion 15: Persistent Objector. [hereinafter Persistent Objector]
152
Olufemi Elias, Persistent Objector, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia Of
International Law (September 2006), ¶17.
153
Anglo-Norweigan Fisheries Case (U.K. v Norway), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (18 December);
Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (13 June).
22
Here, Anduchenca consistently denied the existence of a rule prohibiting possession of
nuclear weapons154 and declined to sign, ratify, or accede to the NPT.155
b. Anduchenca complied with the persistence criterion.
Under the persistence criterion, sporadic objections will not suffice. 156 The objection
need not manifest a certain level of intensity in every case; 157 it must only be repeated as often as
circumstances require. 158 Here, Anduchenca has expressed its objection to the NPT “on
numerous occasions over the past 50 years.”159
c. Anduchenca complied with the consistency criterion.
The consistency criterion allows isolated occasions of affirmation;160 the state’s actions
need not “be in absolute rigorous conformity” 161 with its objector stance. Substantively, a
principled position of disagreement is favored, requiring “fuller consideration of the general
international interest”162 and discouraging “wholly self-interested objections”.163
154
Agreed Facts, ¶40.
155
Id., ¶9.
156
I. MacGibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Protest in International Law, 30 British
Yearbook of International Law (1953), 293.
157
BRIAN LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS (2010), 235-8.
158
Persistent Objector, Draft Conclusion 15.
159
Agreed Facts, ¶9.
160
JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR RULE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2016), 109; Roach and Pinkerton v United States of America, Merits, IACmHR,
Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647 (1987).
161
Domingues v United States of America, Merits, IACmHR, Report No. 62/02, Case No.
12.285 (2002), ¶83.
162
Ted Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector
in International Law, 26 Harvard International L.J. 459 (1985), 479.
163
Id., 479.
23
For five decades, Anduchenca has remained firm on its principled position that the NPT
“establishes and aggravates an inherent inequality between nuclear-weapon States and non-
nuclear-weapon States.”164
d. Anduchenca complied with the timeliness criterion.
The objecting state must react to unwelcome developments prior to the norm’s
“crystallization” as a binding customary norm. Norm-gestation begins when any practice by
some states, potentially constituting the birth of a new norm, is followed by the others. 165
Anduchenca, which expressed its objections as early as 1968, has therefore clearly satisfied the
timeliness criterion.
2. The rule requiring nuclear disarmament is not a jus cogens norm.
Peremptory norms trump the persistent objector rule.166 As defined in Article 53 of the
VCLT, reiterated in Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite,167 jus cogens
norms are “fundamental [international] legal norms from which no derogation is permitted”.168
164
Agreed Facts, ¶9.
165
GREEN, supra note 160, 160.
166
Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-ninth session, 7 May–5 June and 9 July–
10 August 2007, UN Doc. A/62/10, 101; North Sea Continental Shelf, Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Lachs, 229.
167
VCLT, Article 53; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v
Senegal), Judgment, 2012 ICJ Rep. 422, ¶99.
168
Hillary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 Human Rights
Quarterly (1993), 15.
24
The legal criteria for establishing peremptory norms are onerous,169 hence, they are only
limited to a “handful of human rights norms”. 170 As one scholar notes, “the category of jus
cogens is still largely an empty box”.171
IV. RUKARUKU VIOLATED ARTICLE 17 OF THE FCN TREATY WHEN IT

ATTACKED THE COVFEFE AND WHEN IT CAPTURED THE IBRA.
Threat or use of force is characterized as coercive172 and aimed at compelling the state to
adopt a certain conduct of action.173 The prohibition against it is customary174 and peremptory175.
Anduchenca submits that [A] the attack against the Covfefe amounts to an invalid use of force
and [B] the capture of the Ibra violated the FCN Treaty.
A. THE ATTACK AGAINST THE COVFEFE WAS AN IMPERMISSIBLE THREAT OR USE

OF FORCE.
169
Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights
Law, 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 495 (2005–6), 498; C.L. ROZAKIS, THE
CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES (1976), 15.
170
Bruno Simma and Phillip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens,
and General Principles, 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 82 (1988–9), 103;
CHARLES QUINCE, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), 62.
171
Olufemif Elias, Some Remarks on the Persistent Objector Rule in Customary International
Law, 6 Denning Law Journal 40 (1991).
172
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (1988), 89.
173
OLIVIER CORTEN, LE DROIT CONTRE LA GUERRE (2014), 145-6.
174
Krysztof Skubiszweski, Use of Force by States, Collective Security, Law of War and
Neutrality in Max Sorensen (ed), MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968),
745.
175
International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol
II, 270; See also William Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 Yale
Journal of International Law (2004), 305.
25
Unless the threat or use of force is justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter or
permitted under Chapter VII thereof, it shall be considered in contravention of international
peace and security176 and thus illegal177.
1. The attack against the Covfefe was directed against Anduchenca’s

political independence by forcefully limiting its possession of weapons.
Political independence specifically relates to the right of the state to fully and freely
exercise the range of powers possessed by it as a sovereign nation.178
Here, the attack against the Covfefe was to deprive the Ibra of supplies and compel it to
resurface to be captured.179 Thus, the firing of missiles was to impair the legitimate exercise of
Anduchenca’s sovereignty 180

through military build-up, a right within its sovereign
prerogative.181
2. In any case, “political independence” and “territorial integrity” do

not qualify the prohibition against threat or use of force as appearing
in the FCN Treaty using treaty interpretation.
a. Under the teleological approach, it is not the object and purpose of

the FCN Treaty to limit threat or use of force only in cases which
affect political independence or territorial integrity of parties.
The teleological element182 under Article 31(1) of the VCLT allows considerations of the
principle of “effectiveness” or the “purposive approach”. 183 Object and purpose may be
176
Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (24 October 1945), Articles 1(1), 2(3).
[hereinafter UN Charter]
177
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963).
178
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT (ED.), DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY (1952), 154.
179
Agreed Facts, ¶43.
180
See S.S. Lotus.
181
Marcelo Kohen, The Notion of State Survival in International Law, in Philippe Sands and
Laurence Boisson De Chazournes (eds.), INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1999), 293.
182
GARDINER, supra note 115, 211.
26
determined from its preamble 184 , circumstances of adoption 185 and other associated matter
pursuant to Article 31(2) of the VCLT.
Here, the parties’ desire to strengthen their friendly relations especially since Anduchenca
was a war front during World War II186 is defeated by any use of force by one against the other.
b. Article 17 of the FCN Treaty must be interpreted in relation to

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter using systemic integration and
supplementary means of treaty interpretation.
187
Systemic integration contemplates that treaties are themselves creatures of
international law188 and must be deemed to refer to principles of international law189 relevant to
the relations between parties.190
Article 17 of the FCN Treaty mirrors Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The latter’s travaux
preparatoires191 and initial draft at Dumbarton Oaks show that the terms “territorial integrity or
183
Costa Rica v Nicaragua.
184
GARDINER, supra note 117, 212.
185
Martin Ris, Treaty Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires: Towards a
Proposed Amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 14 B.C. International & Comp. L. Rev. 111 (1991), 115.
186
Agreed Facts, ¶4.
187
Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention, 54 I.L.Q. 279 (2005), 280.
188
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, STUDY ON THE FUNCTIONS AND SCOPE OF THE LEX
SPECIALIS RULE AND THE QUESTION OF “SELF-CONTAINED REGIMES” (2004).
189
Georges Pinson (France v United Mexican States), 1928 R.I.A.A. 327 (1927-8) AD Case No
292.
190
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 2003
I.C.J. Rep. 161 (6 November).
191
JUDGE SHIGERU ODA, LIBER AMICORUM, NISUKE ANDO, EDWARD
MCWHINNEY, RUDIGER WOLFRUM, EDS. (2012), 144.
27
political independence” were used to emphasize protection to smaller states 192 , not qualify
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 193 . This broader approach 194 emphasizes the absolute nature
against the prohibition while a restrictive interpretation195 results to aggressors invoking absence
of intent to violate territorial integrity or political independence196.
3. The attack against the Covfefe was not consistent with Article 51 of
the UN Charter, contrary to Rukaruku’s claim.
Self-defense 197 requires an armed attack against the state and that the response be
necessary and proportional.198
a. There was no armed attack against Rukaruku either in its

traditional notion or in the more liberal “accumulation of events”
test.
While modern weapons199 pose emerging threats, the ICJ’s standard of armed attack is
sending by or on behalf of a state of groups which carry out acts of armed force against another
state of such gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack has been consistently retained in its
decisions.200
192
HARRIS, DAVID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), 726; See
also David Gordon, Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe
Incident, 9 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 117 (1977).
193
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963),
265-266.
194
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).
195
DEREK BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958), 152.
196
BROWNLIE (1963), supra note 193, 265-266.
197
UN Charter, Article 51.
198
Raphaël van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-State Actors in the
Light of Recent Practice: A Step Forward?, 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 183
(2010), 186.
199
CHRISTINE GREY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000), 128.
200
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep 136 (30 January).
28
Thus, Anduchenca’s possession of a nuclear-armed submarine does not amount to an
armed attack, much less the act of supplying provisions by Covfefe.
Rukaruku cannot argue that the attack was necessary as it was justified under
‘accumulation of events test’201, allowing an otherwise disproportionate response.202
The commissioning of a submarine for lawful purpose cannot be considered sufficient to
provoke an attack since military build-up to protect sovereignty is a legal act under international
law.203
b. The firing of 12 cruise missiles violated the requirement of

necessity and proportionality under jus ad bellum framework.
The Caroline incident sets out the requirements of necessity and proportionality204 in self-
defense205. Necessity exists when the situation is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means and no moment of deliberation206 while proportionality requires that the means employed
must not be unreasonable or excessive.207
201
Norman Menachem Feder, Reading the UN Charter Connotatively; Toward a New Definition
of Armed Attack’, 19 N.Y.U. J. International L. & Pol. 395 (1987), 395.
202
ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963), 201.
203
Kohen, supra note 181, 38-39; See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, intervening, v Nigeria), Judgment, 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 303 (10 October).
204
Caroline Case, 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1841), 1137–1138, available at:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (last accessed 5 January 2018);
Theodora Christodoulidou and Kalliopi Chainoglou, The Principle of Proportionality in
Self-Defence and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 Journal of International Law of Peace
and Armed Conflict 79 (2007).
205
Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September, 51
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 401 (2002), 159.
206
ELIZABETH WILMSHURTS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE BY STATES IN SELF-DEFENSE (2005), 9.
207
JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES (2004), 158.
29
Here, the Covfefe itself did not present an overwhelming threat negating necessity. It
could have been impaired by using less fatal means.
c. Rukaruku cannot invoke anticipatory, pre-emptive, or preventive

self-defense.
Some scholars do not recognize substantial difference between anticipatory 208 , pre-
emptive and preventive209 self-defense as they all presuppose an imminent attack that the state
seeks to address. 210
There is no legal framework for anticipatory self-defense211 due to the extreme difficulty
of determining the imminence of an armed attack. 212 Indeed, leaders often give scathing
comments against other states without any intention of attacking.213
4. Even assuming Anduchenca is guilty of armed attack, Rukaruku’s use

of force violated the rules of jus in bello.
The fundamental principles of military necessity, distinction 214 and proportionality 215
under jus in bello must be observed independently of jus ad bellum216 from the moment force is
used. 217
208
Leo Van den hole, “Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law.” American
University International Law Review, Volume 19, Issue 1, 103.
209
Ashley Deeks, Part III - The Prohibition Of The Use Of Force, Self- Defence, And Other
Concepts, Ch. 29 Taming The Doctrine Of Pre-Emption, in Marc Weller (ed) THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1
January 2015), 2.
210
US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-
02 (2015).
211
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N.G.A.
Res. 2625(XXV) (1970); see also Definition of Aggression, U.N.G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX).
212
RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-
SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1989), 140-41.
213
John Quigley, A Weak Defense of Anticipatory Self-Defence, 10 Temp. International &
Comp. L.J. 255, 257 (1996).
30
a. The Covfefe was not a legitimate military objective as it neither

lost its civilian character nor effectively contributed to
Anduchenca’s military capacity.
A civilian vessel which makes effective military contribution to the enemy and whose
neutralization offers a definite military advantage218 loses its immunity from enemy attack.219 It
is not exceptional for commercial vessels to provide services for states’ militaries. 220 Further, it
is a wise corporate judgment that the directors of a military supplier are former members of the
military.221 Since a nuclear submarine may remain submerged for months222, attacking a supply
ship could not compel it to resurface.
b. The attack against the Covfefe violated the principle of

proportionality under jus in bello.
Proportionality under jus in bello is concerned with moral appropriateness223 of force and
the interplay between military advantage and protection to humanitarian values.224
214
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK (ED.), SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (1995), Section 39. [hereinafter San
Remo Manual]
215
San Remo Manual, Section 38.
216
Jasmine Moussa, , Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the
two bodies of law, 90 International Review of the Red Cross no. 872 (2008).
217
Prosecutor v Duško Tadiç, Judgment, ICTY, IT-94-1-A (2 October 1995), ¶70.
218
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (8
June 1977), Article 52(2); Horace Robertson, An International Manual for the Law of
Armed Conflict at Sea, Duke L. Mag., Winter 1995, 14.
219
J. Ashley Roach, Legal Aspects of Modern Submarine Warfare, 6 Max Planck Yearbook of
United Nations Law Online (2002), 14.
220
DONALD WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS (1995), 14.
221
222
KONGBRAILATPAM RATNABALI, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN
INTRODUCTION (2017).
223
Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 34
(2005); JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (2009).
31
Rukaruku could have chosen measures short of attack 225 instead of firing 12 cruise
missiles at an unarmed merchant ship if only to impair the Covfefe from delivering supplies to
Ibra.226
5. Rukaruku cannot justify the use of force against the Covfefe under
United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) Resolution 3790.
a. Resolution 3790 failed to conform to Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the

UN Charter.
In issuing Resolution 3790, the UNSC neither provided provisional measures nor did it
employ non-military measures not involving force.227
b. Resolution 3790 cannot be interpreted in a manner that violates

Because of their political nature228, UNSC resolutions must be interpreted in good faith
without intent to distort in order to achieve a predetermined result. 229 This consideration is
critical since Rukaruku has been a non-permanent member of the UNSC four times.230
In any case, an interpretation of a UNSC Resolution should not require violations of
fundamental human rights or jus cogens norm231 such as killing innocent civilians.
B. RUKARUKU’S CAPTURE OF THE IBRA VIOLATED ARTICLE 17 OF THE FCN

TREATY.
224
Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the
Lebanese War, 88 International Review of the Red Cross no 864 (2006).
225
San Remo Manual, Part V.
226
227
UN Charter, Articles 40-42.
228
JACK STRAW, LAST MAN STANDING: MEMOIRS OF A POLITICAL SURVIVOR (2012),
377–381.
229
SIMON CHESTERMAN, DAVID MALONE, IAN JOHNSTONE, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: DOCUMENTARY AND COMMENTARY (2008), 7.
230
Agreed Facts, ¶48.
231
Case of Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, Application no. 27021/08 (7 July 2011), ¶102.
32
Rukaruku is not justified in capturing the Ibra as (1) the FCN Treaty does not authorize
the capture and (2) neither is it permitted under international law.
1. Article 17 of the FCN Treaty does not authorize the capture of the
Ibra.
The capture using torpedoes and machine-gun fire was by means of use of force.232 The
capture was an undue limitation to Anduchenca’s sovereign right by impairing its capacity to
expand its military.233
2. International law does not permit the capture of the Ibra.
a. Possession of a nuclear-armed submarine per se does not amount

to an armed attack which triggers the right of Rukaruku to invoke
Article 51 of the UN Charter.
While the ICJ has stated that possession of a nuclear weapon may infer preparedness to
use them, 234 only when the envisaged use is violative of the UN Charter may the possession of
the nuclear weapon be considered illegal.235
Here, General Tovarish announced that the acquisition of the nuclear-armed submarine
was in order to serve as firm deterrent against violations of Anduchenca’s sovereignty.
b. The capture of Ibra cannot be justified under UNSC Resolution

3790.
UNSC Resolutions should not be interpreted to adopt derogation from customary
international law. 236 State properties used for governmental non-commercial purposes enjoy
232
Agreed Facts, ¶46.
233
Eugene Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 A.J.I.L.
(1991), 510.
234
Nuclear Weapons, ¶48.
235
George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon State,
The Non Proliferation Review (Fall 1993).
33
sovereign immunity.237 Since UNSC Resolution 3790 did not express its intention to violate the
immunity of Ibra, its capture is not justified under the said resolution.
c. UNCLOS and Customary International Law grant Anduchenca the

exclusive jurisdiction over Ibra in the high seas under the flag
state rule and freedom of navigation.
Articles 30 of the UNCLOS gives the flag state the exclusive jurisdiction over a military
vessel like a submarine. Further, Article 88 of UNCLOS allows all states to use the high seas
peacefully while Article 90 recognizes every state’s right of navigation.
PRAYER
Anduchenca respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. The arbitral award of 2 March 2017 is not valid;  
2. Rukaruku violated Article 6 of the FCN Treaty when the Egart operated in
Anduchenca’s territorial sea, but Anduchenca did not violate Article 7 of the FCN
Treaty when it captured the Egart;  
3. Anduchenca did not violate Article 16 of the FCN Treaty by commissioning and
operating the Ibra; and  
4. Rukaruku violated Article 17 of the FCN Treaty when it attacked the Covfefe and
when it captured the Ibra.
Respectfully submitted,
AGENTS FOR THE APPLICANT
236
Prosecutor v Duško Tadiç, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997).
237
Jurisdictional Immunities of the States (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. Rep 99 (3 February).
34

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634A

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

THE PEACE PALACE

THE 2018 PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE CASE CONCERNING

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RUKARUKU

MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

1. The tribunal was neither independent nor impartial under the 6

2. The tribunal violated the rule on delegatus non potest delegare by 8

1. The Egart, as an autonomous unmanned vehicle, is not a ship, 9

1. Anduchenca’s capture of the Egart is within its sovereignty and 12

1. The prohibition under Article 16 of the FCN Treaty only 16

1. There is no generally recognized and universal obligation to 19

1. The requirements for invoking the rule have been met. 22

1. The attack against the Covfefe was directed against 26

a. Under the teleological approach, it is not the object and purpose 26

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Burlington Resources, Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, Decision on the Proposal 6

Rep. 303 (10 October)

Vol. XI 23 (May 1911)

National Case Law

BOOKS AND TREATISES

AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1989)

NOLTE, GEORG, TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE (2013) 16

WOOD, DONALD, INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS (1995) 31

ESSAYS, ARTICLES, AND JOURNALS

Chyba, Christopher, Second-Tier Suppliers and Their Threat to the Nuclear 21

INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Comp. L. Rev. 111 (1991)

Van den hole, Leo, Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 19 30

resolution of the IBA Council on 23 October 2014.

The People’s Republic of Anduchenca (“Anduchenca”) instituted proceedings against the

Rukaruku on 12 March 1947 (“FCN Treaty”).

of Court on 10 July 2017.

Article 36(1) and Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute respectively.

I. Whether the arbitral award of 2 March 2017 is valid;

in Anduchenca’s territorial sea, and whether Anduchenca violated Article 7 of the

FCN Treaty when it captured the Egart;

III. Whether Anduchenca violated Article 16 of the FCN Treaty by commissioning

and operating the Ibra; and

Covfefe and captured the Ibra.

ODASARRAN NEIGHBORS AND THE INCONGRUENCE OF POWER

Odasarra became a hub for illicit international arms trafficking.

aggravates an inherent inequality between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States”.

cited the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS to be “unnecessary”.

EGART, THE RUKARUKAN SPY DRONE

drones” conducting surveillance of Anduchenca’s naval activities.

States throughout November 2015. Failing to come to an agreement, Rukaruku initiated

does not apply to the dispute involving the Egart.

A TRIBUNAL WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND THE RUKA RUSE

On 21 March 2017, an international non-governmental organization that reports on high-

called “The Ruka Ruse”.

to the communication made to him.

THE IBRA AND THE ATTACK ON THE COVFEFE

constitutes a threat to peace.

and stability in the region”.

supplies, communications equipment, food and water on 6 June 2017.