GENERAL MANAGER SOUTHERN
RAILWAY GURBUX DAS INTERVENER
Vs. RANGACHARI (CASE ANALYSIS)
Submitted by: -
C. Sancho Roy – 20191BCL0015
K.L Shreegowri -20191BCL0026
N. Supriya – 20191BCL0019
PRESIDENCY UNIVERSITY
BANGALORE
560064
NAME OF THE CASE
GENERAL MANAGER SOUTHERN RAILWAY GURBUX DAS INTERVENER Vs.
RANGACHARI
CITATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE CITATIONS
1962 AIR 36, 1962 SCR (2) 586
FACTS
: Selection post was denied to the petitioner
based on the departmental circular reserving the seat for SC/ST
ISSUES
(A) Whether reservation could be made for ‘selection’ posts, which are
‘promotions’
(B) whether the term ‘backward classes’ includes SCs and STs and
(C) whether retrospective operation could be given to an order of reservation?
ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES
A divided court held that reservations could be made in promotions as well as appointments. It
was held that: By a majority decision the Court held that reservation could be
made both for initial appointment and promotion. The term backward class includes both
SC and ST Retrospective operation of an Order is possible.
JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT
(1.) On a writ petition filed by the respondent K. Rangachari in the Madras High Court under
Art. 226 of the Constitution a writ of mandamus has been issued by the said High Court
restraining the appellants, the General Manager, Southern Railway, and the Personnel Officer
(Reservation), Southern Railway, from giving effect to the directions of the Railway Board
ordering reservation of selection posts in Class III of the railway service in favour of the
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and in particular the reservation of
selection posts among the Court Inspectors in Class III one of which is held by the respondent.
After the writ was thus issued the appellant applied for and obtained a certificate from the said
High Court under Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution as it involved a substantial question of law,
namely, the scope of Art. 16 (4) of the Constitution. It is with this certificate that the appeal has
been brought to this court, and the only question which it raises for our decision is about the
scope and effect of Art. 16 (4). This question is of considerable public importance though the
dispute raised by it lies within a very narrow compass.
(2.) In the railway services there are four grades of Court Inspectors included in Class III, (1)
Court Inspectors on Rs. 200-300, (2) Court Inspectors. on Rs. 260 - 350, (3) Chief Court
Inspectors on Rs. 300-400, and (4). Chief Court Inspectors on Rs. 360 - 500. It appears that
Inspectors of the first category are recruited partly directly and partly by selection from other
categories of railway services. To the remaining three grades appointments are made by
promotion and they are classified as selection posts. Selection to these grades is made by a
committee of officers constituted for the purpose. In respect of non-selection posts seniority in
service is the qualification but in regard to selection posts seniority is only one of the
qualifications for promotion to such posts; suitability to promotion is considered on other
relevant grounds as well.
(3.) The respondent was initially recruited to the grade of Rs. 200-300 and was confirmed in that
grade on November 21, 1956. Between May 23, 1958 and August 22, 1958 as well as between
December 8, 1958 and December 31, 1958 he was promoted to officiate in the grade of Rs. 260-
350. He got a chance of another similar promotion to officiate on April 8, 1959. These
promotions were in the nature of ad hoc promotions and were consequently of temporary
duration. Later, on June 16, 1959 he was interviewed by the selection committee and his
promotion to the said higher grade was regularised and an order was passed in that behalf on
June 30, 1959. By this order he was allowed to continue to officiate in the said grade. Since then
he has been officiating in that grade.
ANALYSIS
Some aggrieved Forest Service Officers moved the Supreme Court in Hira
Lalagainst a memorandum. This memorandum provided for reservation to all promotional
posts lying vacant as on September 12, 1963, or falling vacant thereafter. The Court relied
upon Rangacharito uphold the memorandum on the ground that a qualitative interpretation of
Article 16(4) has been the intention of the Constitution makers, as has been acknowledged in
Rangachariand confirmed that this position established by law shall not be disturbed.
However, similar to Rangachari, the Court made statements in obiter against
reservation in this case as well. It was stated by the Court in Hira Lal that
“It is true that reservation under Article 16(4) does introduce an
element of discrimination particularly when the question of promotion arises.
It is an inevitable consequence of any reservation of posts that junior officers
are allowed to take a march over their seniors. This circumstance is bound to
displease the senior officers. It may also be that some of them will get
frustrated but the Constitution makers thought it fit in the interests of the
society as a whole that the backward class of citizens of this country should be
afforded certain protection.”
Similarly, in Karamchari Sangh, Krishna Iyer, J. upheld reservation in
promotion with a remarkable observation, stating that
“...as between the socially, even economically, depressed and
the economically backward, the Constitution has emphatically cast its
preference for the former. Who are we, as judges to question the wisdom of
provisions made by government within the parameters of Article 16(4)? The
answer is obvious that the writ of the court cannot quash what is not contrary
to the Constitution however tearful the consequences for those who may be
adversely affected.”
However, in this case too, Iyer, J. opined that “the proponent majority coming
from the unreserved communities are presumably efficient and the dilutions of efficiency
caused by the minimal induction of small percentage of ‘reserved’ candidates cannot affect
the overall administrative efficiency significantly.”
It appears that the Court had been apologetic about reservation guaranteed
under the Constitution that causes adverse effect against the non-reserved candidates while at
the same time, it upheld reservation schemes. Iyer, J. in this case, intended to clarify that
judges shall not interfere with rights guaranteed by the Constitution merely because they feel
that such rights were unnecessary or should have been guaranteed to some other
groups.Iyer, J. further clarified in the subsequent paragraph that
“...our examination system makes memory the master of merit
and banishes creativity into exile…The colonial hangover still clings to our
selection processes with superstitious tenacity and narrower concepts of
efficiency and merit…”
40
Even though it may appear that Iyer, J. agreed with reservation in promotion,
the overall discomfort of the Court is visible in the judgments delivered during this period.
This uneasiness of the Court, as has been seen through a number of cases, is premised on
presumptions of consequences as opposed to adhering to the rule of law.
The original Article 16 was more generally drafted to include reservation in
promotion within its clauses.41However, the Supreme Court continued to strike down
reservation schemes for promotion except for a few exceptional cases. Consequently, the
Court overruled Hira Lal and Karamchari case, through a nine-judge bench decision in Indra
Sawhney v. Union of India.
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