Soleimani’s AssassinationAuthor(s): Raffaello Pantucci
Source: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses , Vol. 12, No. 2 (March 2020), pp. 6-11
Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
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Soleimani’s Assassination: Could Jihadist Groups Benefit?
Soleimani’s Assassination: Could
Jihadist Groups Benefit?
Raffaello Pantucci
Synopsis cooperation between IS and AQ, though it is
not clear if this is centrally mandated or
While the geopolitical implications of General coordinated.1
Qassim Soleimani’s killing have been well
discussed, an understudied aspect is its The growing importance of Africa in both
impact on the jihadist terrorist milieu. The groups’ global footprint is a more noticeable
general assumption is that the act is either trend. For IS, that is represented through the
tangential to or undermines the fight against growing influence and presence of IS-linked
the Islamic State (IS), given Iran’s role in anti- or inspired groups eager to brandish their
IS operations on the ground in the Levant. connections – for example, there has been an
However, it is not clear that either of these increase in violence in the Sahel,2 Nigeria3
assumptions are true, or in what ways and Mozambique4 linked to groups that have
Soleimani’s death and its consequences been releasing videos through IS channels.
might shape the future behaviour of jihadists. AQ also continues to be represented on the
battlefield through their own affiliates, though
The Current Milieu they appear less vocal. The growing reported
alignment between AQ and IS-linked groups
On the surface, the global jihadist landscape in the Sahel is an interesting regional
remains dominated by two core factions – development – unique globally according to
those aligned with al Qaeda (AQ) and those senior US military officials serving in the
closer to IS. However, some jihadist factions region5 – whose larger significance is not yet
continue to hedge against outwardly joining clear.
either side, and groups elsewhere around the
world have pledged allegiance to IS, but with Coherent Messaging
little evidence of a direct link or connection. At
the ground level, it is sometimes not clear that The exception in some ways for AQ is al
individual adherents see the distinction in the Shabaab in East Africa, which has managed
same way that leadership cadres might, with to demonstrate a constant capability and
arrests showing caches of radical material willingness to attempt ambitious attacks, while
drawing from both pools. Similarly, in West also maintaining a persistent public deference
Africa, there is growing evidence of to AQ central.6 IS has recently also taken to
1 Eric Schmitt, “Terrorism Threat in West Africa spreads to Africa,” Telegraph, March 1, 2020,
Soars as US Weighs Troop Cuts,” New York Times, [Link]
February 27, 2020, troops-back-front-line-against-jihadists-war-terror/.
[Link] 6 The attack on the Dusit hotel in Nairobi in January
[Link]. 2019 (James Kahongeh, “How Dusit terror attack
2 Jason Burke, “Sahel faces surge in violence from unfolded,” Daily Nation, January 15, 2020,
terror attacks,” Guardian, January 22, 2020, [Link]
[Link] attack-unfolded/1056-5418518-bp715yz/[Link])
el-faces-surge-in-violence-from-terror-attacks. and the attack on US and Italian forces in September
3 “Islamic State in Nigeria ‘beheads Christian 2019 (Caleb Weiss, “Sahabaab strikes American,
hostages’,” BBC News, December 27, 2019, Italian forces in Somalia,” Long War Journal,
[Link] September 30, 2019,
4 Peter Fabricius, “Is Islamic State taking charge of [Link]
Mozambique’s jihadist insurgency,” Institute for [Link])
Security Studies Today, January 10, 2020, show ambition, while their praise of AQAP’s
[Link] Pensacola attack claim and the reference in the
charge-of-mozambiques-jihadist-insurgency. Dusit attack to being Zawahiri’s soldiers shows
5 Adrian Blomfield and Will Brown, “British troops deference: “Blessing and Salutations for the Military
back on front line against jihadists as war on terror Operation at the US navy base in Pensacola,
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Soleimani’s Assassination: Could Jihadist Groups Benefit?
pushing a pan-regional narrative in direct authority weakness, societal fissures or
competition to al Shabaab.7 The link to AQ external tensions have created a context
core is something that is reflected across the where the group, or a cell pledging loyalty to
range of AQ affiliated groups who have in them, might launch a strike.11 But evidence of
recent months shown a considerable degree centrally directed plots successfully launched
of coherent messaging.8 by either group over the past year is lacking.
IS in contrast continues to push to inspire Rather, the groups appear to be focused on
wherever it can, with messages in support of local conflicts in which they sometimes use
its affiliates. While there is an equal degree of the rhetoric of an international attack as a garb
coherence in terms of style of messaging with to shroud their attacks with greater meaning.
AQ linked groups, it does not necessarily For example, Al Qaeda in the Arab
seem to fulfil the same role of seeking to Peninsula’s (AQAP) most recent claim of
bolster the centre and show higher levels of responsibility of the Pensacola terrorist attack
organisational coherence. In the wake of Abu in Florida, showed little evidence of a
Bakr al Baghdadi’s death, there appeared to connection beyond the group claiming the
be a rush from around the world of groups assailant as one of its own given his
pledging allegiance to the new IS leader, with nationality as a Saudi.12
little clarity about how this affects the various
groups or cells themselves.9 Given the Iranian Manipulation
continued questions around IS’ new leader –
with some in the security community even Contrary to popular consensus that it is the
doubting his existence – IS certainly appears sworn enemy of Sunni jihadists, Iran has
to be less concerned about global shown itself to be a pragmatic actor in dealing
organisational coherence than AQ.10 with violent Sunni groups. This partly stems
from a well-spring of early support from across
Focus on Local Conflicts the Muslim divide for the Iranian revolution. In
the early days of the revolution in 1979, the
At the same time, neither group appears at the overthrow of the Shah was treated as an event
moment in a position to launch a strategically in the same light as the defeat of the Soviet
significant strike against the West or out of Union in Afghanistan or the Siege of Mecca –
their immediate areas of operation. It is whereby dedicated believers, armed only with
possible such plots are being disrupted, but, guns, the Koran and the zeal of their beliefs,
regardless, the net result is a loss in visible were able to overthrow (or hurt) long-standing
effectiveness. In some parts of the world, local apostate regimes. The focus was on Islam
Florida,” Al Kataib Media, February 2, allegiance videos,” BBC Monitoring, October 7,
2020,[Link] 2019, [Link]
10 Mina al-Lami, “Analysis: Ongoing uncertainties
22329505792.
7 “Islamic State video seeks recruits in East Africa,” about identity of new Islamic State leader,” BBC
BBC Monitoring, February 28, 2020, Monitoring, January 24, 2020,
[Link] - it is [Link] and
also notable how al Shabaab is being reported as Martin Chulov and Mohammed Rasool, ISIS
broadening its recruitment base, Nicholas Komu, “Al- founding member confirmed by spies as group’s new
Shabaab changes tack, targets jobless youths in leader,” Guardian, January 20, 2020,
Nyeri slums,” Daily Nation, March 1, 2020, [Link]
[Link] leader-confirmed-amir-mohammed-abdul-rahman-al-
youth-in-Nyeri-slums/1056-5474832- mawli-al-salbi; there appears to be a debate about
xagos9z/[Link]. his identity which even a report in the Guardian
8 This can be seen in some of the aforementioned reportedly sourced from numerous intelligence
incidents, but also see Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda’s sources has not cleared up. IS’ recent statement
general command praises recent Shabaab attacks,” referred to the new leader again, without showing
Long War Journal, October 17, 2019, him.
11 The Easter 2019 attack in Sri Lanka is arguably an
[Link]
[Link]. archetypal example of this.
9 “Regional affiliates start pledging loyalty to new IS 12 Thomas Joscelyn, “AQAP claims ‘full
leader,” November 2, 2019, responsibility’ for shooting at Naval Air Station
[Link] Mina Pensacola,” Long War Journal, February 2, 2020,
al-Lami, “Analysis: Decoding Islamic State’s [Link]
ap-claims-full-responsibility-for-shooting-at-naval-air-
[Link].
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Soleimani’s Assassination: Could Jihadist Groups Benefit?
and anti-imperialism rather than Sunni-Shia also an expression of concern against
divides.13 growing Saudi influence in Pakistan and
particular investments in Baluchistan.
Support of Violent Extremists
Iran’s relationship with the Taliban and AQ is
While Iran has continued to maintain its also complicated. For years post-9/11, Iran
rhetoric of permanent revolution – something hosted a number of senior AQ figures,
alluded to within its constitution14 – providing alternatively jailing them and letting them run
a logic that connected it with anti-imperialist around under fairly loose supervision. This
movements around the world, for the most included senior figures like Saif al Adl and a
part, its links to violent groups have been number of Osama bin Laden’s close family.
highly pragmatic. For example, Iran has Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the subsequent
historically been supportive of Turkish founder of al Qaeda in Iraq (the precursor to
Hezbollah, a Sunni group that has targeted IS) was allowed to pass through Iran as he
Kurdish groups as well as Turkish fled Afghanistan for northern Iraq.18 Iran
authorities.15 From an Iranian perspective, appears to have held these individuals
supporting such a group is partly motivated by hostage as negotiating leverage as well as to
a desire to control Iran’s own Kurdish protect themselves against future attacks by
separatist regions as well as providing them a AQ. Nonetheless, relations between AQ and
card to play against Turkey. Iran have remained consistently antagonistic,
something evidenced by comments within
Since the early days of the revolution, Iran has Osama bin Laden’s correspondence found in
also supported Hamas against Israel.16 Abbottabad.19
Further, looking to Iran’s complicated border
region with Pakistan, the long-standing In 1998, when the Taliban overran Mazar-e-
Baluchi insurgency on both sides of the border Sharif, they reportedly massacred a group of
has generated repeated accusations by 11 Iranians (including 9 diplomats), pushing
Pakistan that Tehran is providing support to the two sides to the brink of war.20 This soured
some Baluchi elements, specifically the relations such that following the post-9/11
Baloch Raji Aajoi Saangar (BRAS),17 a Sunni invasion of Afghanistan by the United States,
group that has targeted Pakistani security Tehran actively reached out to the US offering
officials. Iran’s support appears tit-for-tat, but detailed maps of Taliban positions to aid in its
13 Emmanuel Sivan, “Sunni radicalism in the Middle One: Tehran’s Strategic Intent,” Iran’s Networks of
East and the Iranian Revolution,” International Influence in the Middle East, (IISS Strategic Dossier:
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.21, no.1, London), November 2019, pp.11-38,
February 1989, pp.1-30. [Link]
14 “Chapter One: Tehran’s Strategic Intent,” Iran’s
dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-03-ch-1-tehrans-
Networks of Influence in the Middle East, (IISS strategic-intent.
Strategic Dossier: London), November 2019, pp.11- 17 Shahaburddin Shahab, “Pakistan asks Iran to act
38, [Link] on militants behind Baluchistan killings,” Reuters,
dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-03-ch-1-tehrans- April 20, 2019, [Link]
strategic-intent. pakistan-iran/pakistan-asks-iran-to-act-on-militants-
15 Fatih Altayli, “Is Iran Supporting Turkish behind-baluchistan-killings-idUSKCN1RW0EQ.
Hezbollah?,” Al Monitor, April 16, 2013, 18 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, The Exile:
[Link] The Flight of Osama bin Laden (UK: Bloomsbury),
[Link]/pulse/security/2013/04/turkey-iran- August 2017.
[Link]; there is a live debate about 19 Nelly Lahoud, “Al-Qa’ida’s Contested Relationship
the degree to which Iran is involved with the group. with Iran: The View from Abbottabad,” New America
People close to the group deny (“Huda-Pars Foundation, September 2018,
emergence,” The Economist, November 23, 2013) [Link]
while Turkish sources tend to highlight links (Mustafa ments/Al-
Cosar Unal and Tuncay Unal, “Recruitment or Qaidas_Contested_Relationship_with_Iran_2018-
enlistment? Individual integration into the Turkish 08-20_151707.pdf.
Hezbollah,” Turkish Studies, vol. 19, No.3, 2018, 20 Douglas Jehl, “Iran holds Taliban responsible for 9
pp.327-362) diplomats’ deaths,” New York Times, September 11,
16 Adnan Abu Amer, “The Hamas-Iran alliance 1998,
remains and expands,” Middle East Monitor, January [Link]
14, 2019, holds-taliban-responsible-for-9-diplomats-
[Link] [Link].
hamas-iran-alliance-remains-and-expands/; “Chapter
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Soleimani’s Assassination: Could Jihadist Groups Benefit?
attack plans.21 However, as the American- affiliate on the ground in Syria, Hurras al Din,
Iranian relationship soured, the relationship celebrated his demise.23
between the Taliban and Tehran flourished.
To the point that there was a Taliban Mashhad In contrast, IS was more open in its gloating,
Shura formed, as well as Iranian support for with a message in late January from its new
Taliban groups in the north and west of spokesman, Abu Hamza al Qarashi,
Afghanistan.22 Iran’s calculations here appear celebrating Soleimani’s death, describing him
to be driven by a desire to keep its hand in as a ‘Safavid apostate’ and calling on God to
play in Afghanistan as well as formulate curse him and all who supported him.24 The
another way to frustrate the US. message followed an earlier one in IS’
newsletter al Naba, which hailed Soleimani’s
Pragmatic Relations death as a victory for the jihadist group.25
There was also substantial condemnation
The key takeaway from all of this interaction amongst the jihadist community for Hamas’
with the Sunni jihadist world is that Tehran is stance on Soleimani’s death.26
highly pragmatic in its relations with them.
While there are clear moments of conflict, Iran This does not mean jihadists would be averse
is seemingly willing to overlook them in order to once again strike pragmatic deals with Iran
to advance broader strategic goals. This if they advance broader strategic goals. They
perspective will unlikely change following the may shout anti-Iran rhetoric, and IS has in the
removal of Soleimani. Unlike a terrorist group, past sought to accelerate its conflict with Iran
where the leader is a figure around whom with its June 2017 attack on the Parliament
great mystique, ideology and personal and Mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini, which
linkages flow, Soleimani was simply (albeit followed its first ever Persian-language
very charismatic) the leader of an army – an video.27 But outside this attack, the group has
organisation with a fixed hierarchy and goals, done little in advance of its animosity towards
promotion and division of labour. The overall the Islamic Republic (though Iran has claimed
approach may be massaged by a leader, but numerous foiled attacks).
ultimately the institution will have political
perspectives that are dictated elsewhere. This Moreover, while both IS and AQ might see
will not change with the removal of a general. Shi’ite apostates as enemies, it is not clear
how much they are dependent on this
Jihadists’ View of Iran narrative to generate supporters and recruits.
It is notable, for example, that in IS’ messages
While Iran may have a highly pragmatic and claiming the 2017 attack in Tehran, they
agnostic view of Sunni jihadist groups, it is sought to emphasise the ethnicities of the
equally clear that the groups themselves have various attackers – highlighting their Baluchi
fairly firm views on Iran. The clearest and Ahvazi heritage; two minorities within Iran
expression of this is in the numerous postings with strained relations with Tehran.28 This
that appeared on extremist social media suggests a narrative around the attack that
channels in the wake of Soleimani’s death. attempts to manipulate local politics and
While AQ did not make a formal statement, its tensions rather than rely solely on the
simplistic Sunni-Shia divide.
21
Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” New 25
“IS gloats at death of Soleimani in first comment
Yorker, September 23, 2013, on US-Iran crisis,” January 9, 2020,
[Link] [Link]
e-shadow-commander. 26 “Jihadist supporters condemn Hamas for mourning
22 Javid Ahmad and Husain Haqqani, “What does Soleimani,” BBC Monitoring, January 7, 2020,
Soleimani’s death mean for Afghanistan?,” The Hill, [Link]
February 6, 2020, 27 Chris Zambelis, “Terror in Tehran: The Islamic
[Link] State Goes to War with the Islamic Republic,” CTC
does-soleimanis-death-mean-for-afghanistan. Sentinel, vol.10, no.6, June/July 2017,
23 “Syria-based jihadist group reportedly welcomes [Link]
Soleimani’s death,” BBC Monitoring, January 12, state-goes-to-war-with-the-islamic-republic/.
2020, [Link] 28 Ibid.
24 “Text of IS spokesman’s message announcing
new phase in jihad,” BBC Monitoring, January 27,
2020, [Link]
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Soleimani’s Assassination: Could Jihadist Groups Benefit?
Broader Geopolitics This perspective provides an interesting
resonance to the broader question of the
While Iran is seen as the heart of an alliance longer-term consequence of the strike for
of apostates that is oppressing Sunni Muslims Sunni jihadist groups. For the US, this strike
in the Middle East, the jihadist community still was part of a maximum pressure campaign
seems fixated on its enemies in the West and against Iran that appears to be intended to
the regimes they are supporting around the topple the Tehran regime. It also came as the
world. The Shia may also be seen as US continued to agitate to withdraw its troops
adversaries, but arguably, they are not a from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. If US
principal focus of the jihadist community. President Donald Trump is successful in his
Soleimani’s death is unlikely to change the desire to pull US forces out of these Middle
calculations for both sides (Tehran and the Eastern theatres, the resultant vacuum is one
jihadist community) a vast amount. that will likely be filled by instability or Iran-
Saudi tensions.
Continued Operations Across Middle East
Filling the Security Vacuum
This is not to say that in key theatres where
AQ and IS operate, including in Iraq and Syria, These tensions might express themselves
Soleimani’s death will not have some effect. through proxies like Sunni jihadist groups, but
While physically decimated, IS is still it is likely that these groups’ actions will be a
estimated to carry out 60 attacks a month in combination of manipulation and individual
Iraq alone targeting security forces and local agency. While IS and AQ (or other Sunni
rivals, as it seeks to regroup around an jihadist groups like the Taliban or those in
estimated 20,000 hardcore fighters across the Syria) might take advantage of the security
Iraq-Syria theatre.29 While concerned about vacuum that follows a US withdrawal to grow
IS’ regrowth in Syria, Iran will likely continue once again, their adversaries (including Iran)
to focus their efforts through either their forces will likely retaliate. This will give Iran’s foes an
on the ground or Iraqi or Syrian proxies. The opportunity to provide support to their
removal of Soleimani is not going to change enemies’ enemy. So, as IS advances and the
this approach. Iraqi and Syrian sides push back against them
with Iranian support, it would be unsurprising
Rather, the greater impact will be on the if some support flows towards IS from Gulf
broader US-Iran clash, where the escalation backers.31
marked by the removal of Soleimani will give
Iran and its proxies a greater sense of latitude Similarly, in Afghanistan in the peace deal that
in their operations. This will concern Saudi was signed, the Taliban seemed to appear
Arabia, Iran’s principle adversary in the Gulf, willing to sever their links with AQ. 32 While
who has been noticeably careful in official there has been much scepticism around this
statements to downplay any gloating over declaration and earlier intent by the Taliban to
Soleimani’s death.30 sever such links,33 the new agreement might
29 Loveday Morris and Louisa Loveluck, “Killing of [Link]
ISIS leader has not hurt group’s operations, says -qa-is-saudi-arabia-funding-isis
Iraqi Kurdish prime minister,” Washington Post, 32 “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan
February 15, 2020, between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is
[Link] not recognized by the United States as a state and is
leader-has-not-hurt-groups-operations-says-iraqi- known as the Taliban and the United States of
kurdish-leader/2020/02/15/d3e7303a-4ff8-11ea- America,” February 29, 2020,
a4ab-9f389ce8ad30_story.html [Link]
30 Yasmine Farouk, “What does the US killing of content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-
Soeimani mean for Saudi Arabia?,” Carnegie [Link]
Endowment for International Peace Commentary, 33 This skepticism was well articulated by Thomas
January 7, 2020, Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Trump’s Bad Deal with
[Link] the Taliban,” Politico, March 18, 2019,
does-u.s.-killing-of-soleimani-mean-for-saudi-arabia- [Link]
pub-80722 donald-trump-afghanistan-zalmay-khalilzad-225815
31 Martin Williams, “Factcheck Q&A: Is Saudi Arabia and was particularly illustrated in the death of Asim
funding ISIS?,” Channel 4 News, June 7, 2017, Umar in Afghanistan in September 2019, “Asim
Umar: Al-Qaeda’s South Asia chief ‘killed in
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Soleimani’s Assassination: Could Jihadist Groups Benefit?
provide a context in which Tehran could once
again seek to play its cards with AQ to Given the disruption or success of historical
maintain some leverage against Taliban – a plots by Iranian linked networks in places as
group with which they have deep historical diverse as Thailand, India, Georgia, Cyprus,
enmity which may have only temporarily been Argentina, Nigeria, Bulgaria, and the US,
put to one side. It might also be useful amongst others, the conflict against its
leverage in Iran’s broader conflict with the US enemies (Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia)
– who by virtue of the latest agreement are from Tehran’s perspective has no borders.
(theoretically at least) now allied with the While a permanent alignment between
Taliban against AQ and IS. Tehran and IS or AQ is unlikely, there is not
likely to be much of a focused effort in
Conclusion eradicating either group by Tehran. In fact, it
is possible and likely that Tehran will see IS,
The Sunni jihadist milieu is one that paints AQ and their various affiliates as useful
itself as ideologically pure. Yet it can be as potential assets to manipulate (if they are
brutally pragmatic as its state-based able) in their increasingly aggressive
adversaries. In Tehran, the leadership also confrontation with the US.
appears happy to cooperate with its perceived
adversaries to ensure broader strategic goals.
The death of General Soleimani will not alter Raffaello Pantucci is a Visiting Senior Fellow
such calculations, and rather may herald a at the International Centre for Political
period of greater confrontation between Iran Violence, Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a
and the world which will have the corollary constituent unit within the S. Rajaratnam
effect of both weakening some of the alliances School of International Studies (RSIS),
fighting against Sunni jihadist groups (for Nanyang Technological University (NTU),
example in Iraq and Syria) while also Singapore. He can be contacted at
increasing the willingness for Iran to use or israffaello@[Link].
manipulate proxies to launch attacks around
the world.
Afghanistan’,” BBC News, October 8, 2019
[Link]
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