Valles v.

COMELEC

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of
fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. She was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a
Filipino citizen.

In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., alleging that she was an Australian citizen. This was dismissed by COMELEC en
banc.

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: W/N Lopez meets the citizenship requirement.

Petitioner maintains respondent is an Australian citizen given that: a) In 1988, private respondent
registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

HELD: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle ofjus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to
the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect. The laws applicable were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.

Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a
fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the
same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If
Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship. In order that citizenship may
be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.

In the case of Aznar v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a
holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino and that
an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor
of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship.

Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states that
those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position. As held in the case
of Mercado, dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”

Furthermore, It was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto.

It is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of

Renunciation of Australian Citizenship. As a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of
private respondent was cancelled.

Petition is dismissed.
Ong Chia v. Republic

FACTS: Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he
arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking. Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he
had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino
citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by
which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No.
473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes
have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence.The state also annexed income tax returns allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. The
state also contended that petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953
until they were married in 1977. The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate
of Residence, petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA can deny an application for Philippine citizenship on the basis of documents
not presented before the trial court and not forming part of the records of the case. Yes.

HELD: Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified
the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was argued, because under Rule 132,
§34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that
— These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. The Court is not persuaded. Indeed, the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford
the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.

On the issue of the petitioner’s failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in
accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. It is settled, that naturalization laws should
be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. As
noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in
the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of
the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
denied.
Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners ( Commission on Immigration and Deportation)

FACTS: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother.
He had 5 children with his wife, including Francisco Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian,
then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and
Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by
the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are
the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of
Francisco.

After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of
Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the
Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry.
The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was
allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. The new Board of Commissioners, after a
review of the proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and
ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian, and instituted deportation proceedings. A
warrant of exclusion was issued alleging that the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated has now
become final and executory. Petitioner Commissioner of the CID issued a mission order commanding the
arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.

ISSUE: Is Gatchalian an alien?

The Board alleges that that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the
marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not
supported by any evidence other than their own self- serving testimony nor was there any showing what
the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid
in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same
were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be
considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother,
having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having
been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.

HELD: In Miciano vs. Brimo, this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws
on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there
being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that
of Philippine law.

The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. As records indicate, Santiago was
not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having
been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same
scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and
Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as
statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule
130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the
Civil Code provides:

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation.

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now
Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the
extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture
is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression." Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in
Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of
proof to present the foreign law.

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn
is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who is admittedly a Filipino
citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July
12, 1960.

Respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1,
Article IV of the Constitution

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .

OTHER ISSUE:

What if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceeding
be allowed to continue?

The Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot
operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings.

But, in Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, the court stated that when the evidence submitted by a
respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and
the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting
him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings
is, therefore, not without exception. Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where
the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is
correct.

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of
1940, reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
 warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.

The Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. A warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing
a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes
of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional

As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why
should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not
indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass
the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).

The warrants were issued only for purposes of investigation. Hence, Board's argument that the arrest of
Gatchalian was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand
on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final
order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

Note: Also, the cause of action has prescribed. Having only 5 years to file.
Tecson v. COMELEC

FACTS: On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, initiated a petition with COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

ISSUE: W/N FPJ is a natural-born Filipino? Yes.

HELD: The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis
of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of
Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84
years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was
born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering
that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office.
Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same
period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3.Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents.
Paternity and Filiation

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the
day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was
required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.

Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
thereof, that -

“In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses…”

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have
been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to
be "some other public document."

“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.”

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e)
the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ.

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for
the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line
with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to
support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no
cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
Co v. HRET

FACTS: On May 11, 1987, Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the grounds that Jose
Ong Jr. was not a natural-born citizen and that he was not a resident of the said district. The HRET found
in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: W/N Ong was a natural-born citizen?

HELD: In 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong
Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits
of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by
Ong Te to Samar in 1915. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan
married a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal
status, filed with the CFI an application for naturalization in 1954. In 1955, he was declared a Filipino
citizen. Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was
issued.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years. In 1971, his
elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a
natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution
removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship
formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and
1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, He decided to be of greater service to his
province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.

Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Article IV states that “the following are citizens of the Philippines:

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Article IV above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair
position which discriminates against Filipino women. It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or
after January 17, 1973, making him a natural-born citizen. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof.

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he
was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural- born.

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino
citizen.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask
for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could
not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been
a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a
Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

As the HRET had stated, “It was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee
by declaring him as such."

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping
Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship. It must be done through direct action.

Furthermore, under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto
were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen. Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain states: The following
are Spaniards: xx 4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub- paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
He already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject.
Republic v. Sagun

FACTS: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex
Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This was not recorded with
the Local Civil Registrar.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied
due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar be ordered to annotate the same on her birth
certificate. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts (vote, study etc), she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the
issuance of a Philippine passport. The RTC granted the petition, declaring her to be a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible when law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial
action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship

HELD 1: This Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.

2. Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of
majority, is considered to have been made “within a reasonable time” as interpreted by jurisprudence.

HELD 2: When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution,
which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (Section 1(4)).

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided that “[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens of the Philippines.

It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.

Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon
reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. But in the case of respondent, for her to be
considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority.

Based on Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, prescribing the procedure of election, the statutory
formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625
unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien Pertinently,
the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule, which authorizes the direct filing
of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding
provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in
the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent.

Even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly elected
Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to
comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a
sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by
respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after
she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. Even assuming arguendo that respondent’s
oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the
age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A.
No. 625. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority

The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar
acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship.
Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her
Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in
Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court must be denied.
So v. Republic

FACTS: On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization
under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended.

He alleged that he was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No.
528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth, and is qualified to become a Filipino citizen by alleging
that he has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section
4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended. He presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. Mark Salcedo who testified as character
witnesses. The RTC granted the petition in June 4, 2003.

The CA set aside the RTC ruling. According to the CA, petitioner’s two (2) witnesses were not credible
because they failed to mention specific details of petitioner’s life or character to show how well they knew
him; they merely “parroted” the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their
applicability to petitioner’s case. The appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the
requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing
of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine
(9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of the requirement. The CA stated, however, that it
was not its intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization which petitioner
would file, and that it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to
this country.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner complied with the requirements of the law to become a Filipino citizen?

In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a Filipino citizen, it is
necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for
naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are “credible” in
accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.

HELD: Petition is denied.

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways
by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to
R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.

The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act.

R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It likewise addresses the
concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their
profession, thus promoting “brain gain” for the Philippines. These however, do not justify petitioner’s
contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by
judicial act.

CA No. 473 is separate and distinct from R.A. 9139. C.A. No. 473 covers all aliens regardless of class
while R.A. No. 9139 covers native- born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who
never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated
love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. There is nothing from which it
can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which
may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to
apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications.

Petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition.
Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.

Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the
legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in
R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein
since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years
from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct
qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be
naturalized under C.A. No. 473.

In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for his
good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that
character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct and
character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the
applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Petitioner’s
witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his
traits. Their testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading questions
propounded by his counsel.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.
The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good standing
in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.

A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does
not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently
discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions
arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago

FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from
detention of herein petitioner Willie Yu. The Court en banc denied the petition disposing of the pending
issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest
and detention of the same person. The Court resolved to deny with finality the motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order. Acting on said motion, a
temporary restraining order was issued by the SC. Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO,
the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of
Commissioners. The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988
is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately
deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9
December 1988, and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, the Court
resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which to explain
and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use
of a Portuguese passport.

Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid
for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese
consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.
While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun
Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a Fiipino citizen?

HELD: Thee foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us,
Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport
and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine
citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

The material facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A
rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process
was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued
Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC

FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
May 8, 1995 elections. Petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. This was
granted by Comelec Second Division. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted
upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. OnMay 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned
Resolution of the Second Division.

Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes. Lee filed a petition praying for his (Lee’s) proclamation
having received the second highest number of votes. Lee was proclaimed as the governor of Sorsogon.

Frivaldo filed with the Comelec praying for the annulment of Lee’s proclamation. He alleged that on June
30, 1995 (after the elections), he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
September 1994 had been granted." Hence, there is no more legal impediment to his (Frivaldo’s)
proclamation. In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the
Vice-Governor— not Lee — should occupy said position of governor. Comelec decided in Frivaldo’s
favor.

ISSUE:

1. Repatriation of Frivaldo

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for
elective local officials. Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).

Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Twice, he

was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular
mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a
favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having
successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D.
No. 725.

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the
very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of
candidates. Such qualifications — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence — should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the
time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart
from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
"registered voter." And, under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one — if he was not a citizen at the time of
such registration.

If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a
citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern. Registration—not the actual
voting—is the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is
to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not
anywhere else.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994. It is true that under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there
are settled exception to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature
or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right,
and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.

Frivaldo did not have dual citizenship either since Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship—long before May
8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his
UScitizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

2. Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship
under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata,hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands."
Labo v. COMELEC

FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. ran for mayor of Baguio City in the May 11, 1992 elections believing he was a
Filipino citizen. Roberto Ortega, also ran for the same position.

Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo on the ground that Labo made a false
representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,
presenting the decision in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a
citizen of the Philippines. Comelec issued a Resolution denying due course and cancelling the COC of
Labo. On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he shall
have raised the matter before the SC. (note: Labo is supposedly Australian)

ISSUE: It is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen. Alleging lack of trial on the merits
as well as the lack of opportunity to be heard in Labo v. Commission on Elections, it is the submission of
petitioner that he can prove his Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein it was held that in proving
expatriation, an expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the Commission on Immigration or the
Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings, where only one day was set
for hearing the case, and instead of holding the hearing, Comelec issued the assailed resolution.

HELD: We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's)
certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989
case of Labo v. Comelec

Suffice it to state that petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for reconsideration in Labo v.
Comelec. Having been previously passed upon, the Court sees no pressing need to re-examine the same
and make a lengthy dissertation thereon.

Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a legislatively
mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate
since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held.

Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which states
that Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning
number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any
evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

As stated in Labo v. COMELEC, under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not
appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of
these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. . . .

To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable
requirement for holding public office.

Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated before the respondent Comelec.
Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of
Instruction No. 270.
To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the Special
Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for repatriation. Indeed, such fact is
even admitted petitioner. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a
mere application for repatriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of the
applicant's Philippine citizenship.

(note: the other half of the case is w/n Ortega can be the mayor as the second highest number of votes.
He can’t cause he didn’t get the majority. So, the vice mayor wins)
Mercado v. Manzano

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano obtained the highest number of
votes.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was an American citizen based on
the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged
that he is a Filipino citizen because he was of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States, in California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US
Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

COMELEC’s second division granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d)
of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Private
respondent was proclaimed as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

ISSUE: W/N Manzano was a dual citizen?

HELD: The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as “disqualified from running for any elective
local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.”

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual’s volition.

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status,
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship.

In Parado v. Republic, when a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955,
of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States
follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent “effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law,” so that now he is solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private
respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached
the age of majority.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship.

Bengzon v. House of Representatives

FACTS: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution.

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and,
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country."

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto with
the HRET alleging Cruz was not a natural-born citizen.

ISSUE: W/N private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had
ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

HELD: Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since
he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly
states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

The petition is without merit. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-
born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law. To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law to become a Filipino citizen.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 63.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. The person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
Reyes v. COMELEC

FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution dismissing the petition, finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC.

Petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes argues that she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the
jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the
COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally
adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution. As a duly proclaimed winner and having
taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013? No. Was she a Filipino? No.

HELD: Before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency. It denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC first division’s decision cancelling the petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy.

As the Comelec First Division had stated, "x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following
acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-
General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born
citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-
American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said
motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner
explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to
comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If
petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No.
9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the
COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed
in September 2012.

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born
Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of
oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and evidence in the
present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously
passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute
an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present
it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her
natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends
that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator
of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. Said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of
R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-
04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of
2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner's oath of office as Provincial Administrator
cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship.
Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
AASJS- Calilung v. Datumanong

FACTS: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship Petitioner prays that a writ of
prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act
Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."

Section 2 states, “It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.”

Section 3 of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 states that “Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance …Natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.”

ISSUE: W/N RA 9225 violates section 5, article IV, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Petitioner avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who
become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship.
Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to
regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.

HELD: It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63, which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing

provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of
Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado.
That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction
between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.