Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc.
Rulings:
(MIWP) v.s. C.A., DAVENCOR
According to section 61 of P.D. no. 705, the
Facts: transferee shall assume all the obligations of the
transferor. However, the word obligations shall be
On June 28, 1973, the acting director of Bureau of construed in its common and ordinary usage. It
Forest Development issued Provisional Timber shall not be construed to mean those obligations
License no. 30, converting an area of 5400 and liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result
hectares, to Milagros Matuguina who was of transgressions of law, as these are the personal
conducting a business under the name of obligations of the transferor. It means that the
Matuguina Lumber Enterprises (MLE). A portion, MIWP, the transferee, is not liable for the
1900 hectares of the area was located within the transferor’s illegal encroachment into another
territorial boundary of Governor Generoso of Mati, forest’s concessionaire
Davao Oriental and adjoined the Timber
concession of DAVENCOR.
Milagros Matuguina became the majority
stockholder of MIWPI on September 24, 1974,
when the latter’s Board of Directors approved by
Resolution the transfer of 1,000,000 shares from
Henry Wee to Milagros Matuguina, thus giving her
seventy percent (70%) stock ownership of MIWPI.
In an undated letter to the Director of Forest
Development (BFD) on November 26, 1974,
Milagros Matuguina requested the Director for a
change of name and transfer of management of
PTL No. 30, from a single proprietorship under her
name, to that of MIWPI. This request was favorably
endorsed on December 2, 1974 by the BFD’s
Acting Director, Jose Viado to respondent
Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved the
same on September 5, 1975.
On July 17, 1975, MLE and MIWP executed a deed
of transfer, transfering all the rights, interests,
ownershipa, and participation in PTL no. 30 to the
latter fir and in consideration of P148000 shares of
stock in MIWP.
On July 28, 1975, the DAVENCOR, through its
General Manager, filed a complaint fir MLE’s illegal
encroachment in their forest concessionaire.
Issue:
Whether or not the MIWP, Inc., the transferee of
MLE, is liable for the latter’s illegal logging within
the licensed concessionaire area of DAVENCOR.
Tan v. People legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As
Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out,
petitioners were not “charged with the [unlawful]
Facts: possession of ‘firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and
even grass, shrub, ‘the associated water’ or fish;”
On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated
proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, items in EO 277 “is absolutely of no concern” to
Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for
Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra which they are entitled to a judicial determination at
and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by this time. Besides, they did not present any
Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal
Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October breach of the Constitution that would justify the
30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest nullification of said provision. A statute is always
Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks
another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded it on the ground of unconstitutionality must
with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by convincingly prove its invalidity.
Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E
Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the (2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court
construction firm, were owned by Petitioner held that lumber is included in the term
Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed
showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In
pieces of lumber were confiscated. the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third New
Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter
caretaker and timekeeper of A & E Construction, alia, as ‘timber or logs after being prepared for the
were charged by First Assistant Provincial market.’ Simply put, lumber is a processed log or
Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section timber. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the
68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. acts penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the
The accused were all convicted for failure to law itself.
comply with the Forestry Reform Code which
requires: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of
origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and
(5) a lumber dealer permit. The CA found no cogent
reason for the reversal or modification of the
decision.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is
unconstitutional.
(2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as
"timber" and/or forest product within the
contemplation of PD 705.
Held:
(1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting,
gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest
products without license.". One of the essential
requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law is the existence of an
Malanyaon v. Lising
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He
was suspended from office but he died during his
incumbency, and while the case was pending. The
case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner
sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his
period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA
3019 which provides - should a public officer be
convicted by final judgement he shall lose all
retirement or gravity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits to which he failed to receive during his
suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He
filed an action to declare illegal
the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal
Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion
of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of
such municipality during the period of his
suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November
28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the
action on the ground that the criminal case against
Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to
acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the
death of the accused constitutes acquittal.
Held:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the
suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that
after due hearing and consideration of the evidence
against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer
will not suffice because dismissal does not amount
to acquittal.
BERNARDO V BERNARDO
Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children, petition
this Court for a review of the decision of the Court The alleged preferential right of the appellants to
of Appeals (in its case No. 6677-R), declaring the the purchase of the disputed lot, which was also the
respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo entitled to main basis of the decision of the Rural Progress
preference under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20 and Administration, is their claim of actual occupation of
539, in the acquisition of lot No. 462-A of the the lot for many years before the acquisition of the
"Capellania de Concepción", also known as lot No. Concepción estate by the Government. The
4, block No. 26, of the Tambobong Estate plan, appellants’ occupation of the premises is not
located in Malabon, Rizal, and having an area of denied by the appellee. Appellee’s witness Otilia
208 square meters. Santos, however, said that the late Romulo
Bernardo had allowed his uncle, appellant Enrique
It is uncontested fact that on December 31, 1947, Bernardo, to stay in the premises since the year
the Republic of the Philippines purchased from the 1918. (Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 72-73).
Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the
"Capellania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, The Court of Appeals also found that the house
under the provisions of section 1, of standing on the lot had been since July 13, 1944,
Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes sold by petitioner Enrique Bernardo to the
the expropriation or purchase of private lands and respondent, who thereby became its owner; that
that lands acquired thereunder should be because of family relationship, the petitioners "were
subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices able to remain in the premises due to the tolerance
to "their bona fide tenants or occupants." of, and out of charity from, the appellee
Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein, (respondent Crisostomo Bernardo) and his
applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the deceased parents who were the rightful lessees of
purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique the lot in question."cralaw virtua1aw library
Bernardo, Et Al., contested the application and
claimed preferential right to such purchase, and on The Court of Appeals likewise found and declared
January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress in its decision that since February 1, 1945, the
Administration resolved to recognize the petitioners respondent Crisostomo Bernardo required the
as entitled to preference. The respondents then petitioner to vacate the premises. Finally, we
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and understand that in Case No. 6734-R, the Court of
the latter upheld their claim, and the decision was Appeals declared valid the sale of the house on the
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. lot in question made in 1944 by petitioner Enrique
Bernardo in favor of respondent Crisostomo R.
The decision of the Court of Appeals expressly Bernardo, and that the aforesaid judgment is now
finds that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph final.
". . . It has been incontestably proven that the There are thus before us, disputing the right of
disputed lot had been held under lease by preference to the acquisition of the lot, the
appellee’s deceased parents and later by him respondent who is the owner of the house standing
(appellee) continuously from 1912 to 1947. The on said lot since 1944, and has held the land in
appellee’s predecessors paid the rentals due on the lawful tenancy since 1912, paying rents and taxes
said lot from the commencement of their leasehold thereon; and the petitioner, who was allowed by
rights up to 1936, when Teodora Santos died. The respondent, out of deference and charity, to
appellee continued paying the rents on the same lot gratuitously occupy the lot and live therein since
from 1936 to December 31, 1947, when the 1918. Upon the facts on record, we are of the
Government acquired the entire Capellania de opinion that petitioner does not come under the
Concepción estate. Since 1912 the values of the description "bona fide tenant or occupant"
leasehold right of appellee amounts to about employed in the statute (C. A. 539).
P4,000.00.
The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly reasons nullify this contention. The first is that
petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine
who supposes he has a good title and knows of no Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona fide
adverse claim" (Philips v. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220, 221); settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that
"one who not only honestly supposes himself to be "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while
vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual"
contested by any other person claiming a superior and solely used the words "bona fide occupants",
right to it" (Gresham v. Ware, 79 Ala. 192, 199); thereby emphasizing the requirement that the
definitions that correspond closely to that of a prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be
possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code endowed with legitimate tenure. The second reason
of 1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The is that in carrying out its social readjustment
essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, policies, the government could not simply lay aside
lies in honest belief in the validity of one’s right, moral standards, and arm to favor usurpers,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or
intention to overreach another. The petitioner unlawful origin and character of their occupancy.
Enrique Bernardo falls short of this standard: for the Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of
precarious nature of his occupancy, as mere attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the
licensee of respondents, duty bound to protect and term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to
restore that possession to its real and legitimate cloak and protect violence, strategy, double
holders upon demand, could never be hidden from dealing, or breach of trust.
him. Moreover, at the time the Government
acquired the Tambobong Estate, petitioner had That the underlying motive behind the Homesite
already parted with the house that was his Acts is the desire that "the heads of the families
remaining link with the occupancy of the lot; and concerned be given opportunity to become the
since 1945, even before the Government’s owners of their homes and residential lots in which
purchase, he had been required to vacate. Thus they and their forbears have been raised and born"
bereft of all stable interest in the land, petitioner (Messages of the President, Vol. 4, pp. 288-290),
nevertheless seeks to turn respondent’s past favors the respondents rather than the petitioner,
deferential regard to his own advantage, and to for it is an inalterable fact on record that the rentals
exploit his gratuitous stay at respondent’s expense and taxes on the lot in question were always paid
for the purpose of ousting his benefactors and by the parents of respondent Crisostomo Bernardo
wiping out the investment that the latter, and their and continued by the latter upon his parents’ death,
predecessors in interest, had established and to the exclusion of herein Respondent.
preserved by faithful payment for thirty years of the
rental charged for the lot in question. That the law, As pointed out by the decision under review, had
in preferring "bona fide occupants,’ intended to not the respondents taken and maintained sincere
protect or sanction such utter disregard of fair and affirmative steps to own their lands through a
dealing may well be doubted. continuous and faithful payment of their obligations,
the chances are that the petitioner would have
The petitioner seeks to justify his stand by claiming been long ago speedily ejected from the premises
that the policy of the government, ever since the of the former landowners. To which may be added
start of the American sovereignty, had been to that at present, not being the lessee of the lot, nor
acquire the landed estates for the benefit of their the owner of the house standing thereon, the
"actual occupants," as allegedly exemplified in Acts petitioner’s interest in this particular lot appears to
1170 and 1933 (Friar Lands’ Acts), and be a purely speculative one.
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20, 260, 378, and 539
(Homesite Acts); that the words "bona fide We therefore rule that a person who, at the time of
occupants" employed in the Commonwealth Acts the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the
are equivalent to "actual" occupants. Two powerful Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot
therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who
does not own the house erected on such lot, is not
a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as
the term is used in Commonwealth Act No. 539.
Whether or not the situation would be different if the
occupant were a sublessee of the lot, need not be
decided in this case, the issue not being involved.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and
Jugo, JJ., concur.
