Case Digest: Ramos v.

 Mandagan
Posted on May 24, 2016

Pedro Ramos vs. Atty. Maria Nympha Mandagan

A.C. No. 11128         April 6, 2016

(Legal Ethics; Canon 16, Code of Professional Responsibility)

Facts

Atty. Mandagan demanded three hundred thousand pesos from Ramos to be

used as bail bond in the event that his petition for bail in the latter’s criminal
case is granted. Ramos’ bail was denied and Atty. Mandagan withdrew as
his counsel without returning the amount despite the demand sent by
Ramos’ new counsel.

Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount was not intended for payment of
bail, but as mobilization expenses. She also alleged that she was never paid
acceptance and appearance fees for legal services.

Issue

Whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility

Ruling

Yes, the respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.

The respondent’s failure to make an accounting or to return the money to the

client is a violation of the trust reposed on her. As a lawyer, she should be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to her in her professional
capacity because the CPR exacts a high degree of fidelity and trust from
members of the bar.

The defense that the amount she received was merely for mobilization
expenses was not substantiated by the records.
MARIA ANGALAN, et al. vs. ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE
AC No. 7181
February 6, 2009
(en banc)

FACTS:

In April 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their property to the
Eustaquio espouses in consideration of a loan in the amount of P15,000. The
Eustaquios prepared a document and sked the complainants to sign it; but because
complainants were illiterates, they affixed their marks instead. It turned out that the
document was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Hence, TCT
No. 9926 was issued in the name of Navarro Eustaquio.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante in November
1971 as shown in the receipt by respondent of P12,000 representing full payment of
his professional fees from the complainants. Thereafter, an amicable settlement was
entered into between complainants and the Eustaquios which stipulated that the
complainants would repurchase the lot at P30,000. But since the complainants did not
have the money, Atty. Delante advanced the money to complainants, possessed the
property and gathered its produce.
When the complainants tried to repay the money and recover the property, Atty.
Delante refused. Complainants learned that Delante transferred the title of the
property to his name as evidenced by TCT No. T-57932.
On April 30, 2004, complainants filed with the RTC of Davao a complaint for (1)
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, and (2) nullification of TCT No. T-57932; and
on December 28, 2005 charged respondent with gross violation of the Code
Professional Responsibilty. In April 2007, complainants filed with the Court a motion
to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.

ISSUES:

(1.) whether or not a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an
affidavit of desistance terminates the disbarment proceeding;
(2.) whether or not respondent committed grave violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he bought the property of his clients without their consent and
against their will.

HELD:

1. A motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance is
immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, “No investigation
shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.”
2. Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 16 states that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may
come into their possession. Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and
returned the property to complainants upon demand. Instead of holding in trust the
property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his
name, (2) refused to return the property to complainants, and (3) referred to
complainants’ charges as malicious and untruthful.
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants
reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses
Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent
in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the
interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred
the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds the recommended
penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct.
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is
incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the
practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
 [ A.C. NO. 6160, March 30, 2006 ]
NESTOR PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE,
RESPONDENT

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a letter-complaint[1] dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario

G. Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la
Torre with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing
conflicting interests.

Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga,

Camarines Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping
for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and
jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of
Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that
he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions;
that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the
murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were
filed against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the
extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which
they were being charged.

Respondent denied the accusations against him.  He explained that while being
detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in
drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of
kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents
about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his
constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-
witness.

Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his
extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and
only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist
the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[2]  On August 16, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner submitted his report with the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be

suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession for
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the
period of suspension to two years.

In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the

Investigating Commissioner opined that:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by

substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was
able to prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e.
The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both
 Avila and Ilo.  Perez was able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre
was representing the said two accused, he was also representing the interest
of the victim's family. This was declared by the victim's daughter, Vicky de
Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of Atty. Danilo de la Torre
to prosecute the case against her father's killers. She even admitted that she
was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on one
occasion.  This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services
to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was already representing the family
of the two accused's victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent
purposely offered to help the accused in order to further his other clients'
interest. The respondent failed to deny these facts or offer competent
evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample opportunity given him.

Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall

not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.  Respondent is therefore duty bound
to refrain from representing two parties having conflicting interests in a
controversy.  By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he
secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to them the
existing conflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned.

We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.

There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of

two or more opposing parties.  The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it
is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client.  In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed
by him when he argues for the other client."  This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[3]

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new

retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection.[4]

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of

public policy and good taste.  In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
strong points of the case.  The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree.  It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.[5]

To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal
services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his
assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions.  Nonetheless, he acceded
to their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights
and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their
confession.

The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a
lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of
the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing
the family of the murder victim.  Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in
the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.

What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused
of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious
criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of
one of the victims.  Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law,
should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to accused's choice of
counsel.  It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel
and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.

Considering that this is respondent's first infraction, disbarment as sought by the

complaint is deemed to be too severe.  Under the present circumstances, we find
that a suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.  He
is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision.  He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the
IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 | February 3, 2015

By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:

Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant. Garcia
alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth,
filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of
the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was
dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his
return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that
Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal
Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a
crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase “with
the inherent accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the
accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence.
Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s
complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for
representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
 ISSUES:

1. WON conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

2. WON Sesbreño should be disbarred
HELD:

1. YES.
2. YES.
 RATIO:

 1. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always,
crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as
malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude
and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore,
that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that
Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that
justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado. We
cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political
rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was
granted “an absolute and unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a
circumstance not present in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon
was absolute and unconditional. There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can
extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely “commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on
Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished
criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. 

1. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
DISPOSITION: Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATT Y.
CARLOS B. SAGUCIO
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
FACTS:
Ruthie Lim-Santiago filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor. The
complainant is the daughter of one of the stockholder and former President of Taggat
Industries Inc where the respondent worked as a Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel before his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint. They alleged
that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of
her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April
1996 to 15 July 1997. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to
conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to
Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Complainant contends that
respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very
well and should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case
filed by Taggat employees.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received retainer's fee.
On the other hand, respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, he is
no longer part of Taggat. He contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. He points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint but instead
complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental
reservation. Respondent asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or the complainant and he was merely performing his
official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, after their investigation found that respondent is
guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating
the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding the labor case filed against the complainant.
2. Whether or not respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor

HELD:
1. The court found no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in
the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages. Clearly, respondent was no
longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be
presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he
was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. The fact alone that respondent
was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests.
A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon
the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of
evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of
the Code.

2. The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill. Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat
intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged.
This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy
services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are
usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within
the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant
while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the
payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal
services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to
one year. The court finds this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the court finds that respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS
effective upon finality of this Decision.
FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondents.
FACTS: Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his
company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation
(CVC). Atty. Guico’s legal services included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal
brought against CVC. Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be
given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. Chu
called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. On that
occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC
Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only produce P280,000.00, which he
brought to Atty. Guico’s office. The amount was received without issuing any receipt.

ISSUE: Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from
Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?

RULING OF THE IBP: IBP found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu. and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his act of
extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt for the legal profession.

RULING OF THE COURT: In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the
complainant to establish respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify
the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty.The testimony of Chu, and the
circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico of
presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had been printed on used paper emanating
from Atty. Guico’s office, sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross
misconduct by demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable
decision. In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice x x x.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave
misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.” There is no question that any
gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him
unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification
for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege. Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s
Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of
the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting
artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients
and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of
the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary
sanctions.ACCORDINGLY,theCourt FINDS and DECLAR ES respondent ATTY. JOSE
S. GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.