Pacific Sociological Association

Collective Consciousness, Morphology, and Collective Representations: Durkheim's Sociology of

Knowledge, 1894-1900
Author(s): Dénes Némedi
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 38, No. 1, Celebrating the 100th Anniversary of Émile
Durkheim's "The Rules of Sociological Method" (Spring, 1995), pp. 41-56
Published by: University of California Press
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 Perspeties
Sociokgical Vol.38,No. 1,pp. 41-56
Copyright01995PacificSociological
Association ISSN 0731-1214

COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS,
MORPHOLOGY, AND COLLECTIVE
REPRESENTATIONS:
Durkheim'sSociologyofKnowledge,1894-1900
DENES NEMEDI
E6tv6sLorkndTudomknyegyetem

ABSTRACT: Thispapergwes anovmieew ofDurkheim's ideasconcerning

knowledgeinthebroadsenseintheperiod indicat Itshowsthatthenotion
ofcollctieconsciousness
wasabandoned, andtheprinciple ofmorphological
detrminism was retained,largely forrhetorical purposes. Durkheim's
contradictystatements toa slowdrift
attest awayfrom theconceptionwhich
divides
socieyintotwoparts,onedetennining theother.Itis shownthatthe
ofcolltverepresentation
notion replacesearlier Durkheim
conceptualizations.
colletverepresentations
considered a realm
as constituting ofsocialfacts-
indeedthesocialsphere
parexcellence.Thenotion ofcollectierepresentations
playeda crucial
roleinDurkheim's attempts todemonstratetheindepndence
ofsociolog.

Durkheim's TheRulesofSociological
Method ("TheRules")was writtenas partofan
extensivebody ofresearch Durkheim's
activity. publishedworksreflect onlyparts
ofhisvastprogram. Whilehe was inBordeaux(1887-1902), he investigated
suicide,
family,crime,punishment, and religion,as he notesin the introductionto his
lecturesonsocialismin1895(Durkheim He alsogavelectures
1928:11). oneducation
and politics.We knowonlyhalfof thiswork-muchof it is lost forever. The
statementsin TheRulesneed to be comparedand contrasted withremarks made
in theseworks.In thispaper,I analyzethreecentralideas ofthe Durkheimian
sociologyof knowledge(collectiveconsciousness,morphology, and collective
representations)inthisbroadercontextofwhichTheRulesforms onlya minorpart.
In particular,
I showhow theseideas developedand weretransformed afterthe
publicationofTheTheDivision ofLaborin Society
("TheDivision").
The typologyof
mechanical and organicsolidaritydevelopedin thelatterbookis well-known and
I willnotpresentithere.

* Directall correspondenceto: D6nesN6mediE5tv5sLorindTudominyegyetemn Szociologiai

Intezet,
University
ofBudapest, BudapestVI, PollackMfihly
t6r10,H-1446BudapestP.O.B.394,Hungary.
42 SOCOLOGICALPERSPECI
IVES Volume
38,Number
1,1995

COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AFT-ER1893

It can be presumedthatwhilewriting TheDivision,Durkheimwas uneasywith
the originaltypologyof mechanical solidarity(resultingfromcollective
consciousness) andorganicsolidarity
(resultingfromthedivisionoflabor).He had
partiallymodifiedit by the timehe completedthe book,mostovertlyin the
condudingchapter(Durkheim After
[189311984:339-340). thepublication oftheThe
Diuision,he abandonedthe wholetypologyand it neverappearedagainin his
writings in a theoretically way.Thenotionofcollective
significant consciousness
was modified, too, as Parsonspointedout (1949320).It was not abandoned
completely, but as I will demonstrate, it was not subsequentlyused in a
theoreticallyprecisesense.
In TheRules,Durkheimdeclaresthatthereare phenomenawhichare different
fromorganicones,sincetheyconsistofrepresentations and actions(1982:52).'
Elsewhere inthesametext,he characterizescollective
consciousnessas thetotality
ofrepresentations whicharecollectiveinthesensethattheyarepresentinseveral
minds.He used "collectiveconsciousness"in thisway in a famousnotewhich
was subsequently invokedby thosewho saw in Durkheima theoretician ofthe
groupmind:

Inthissenseandforthesereasonswecanspeakofa collectiveconsciousness
distinct
fromindividual Tojustify
consciousnesses. thisdistinction
there
isno
needtohypostatisethecollective
consciousness;
it is something
specialand
mustbe designated by a specialterm,simplybecausethestateswhich
constituteit differ
specifically
fromthosewhichmakeup individual
Thisspecfficity
consciousnesses. arisesbecausetheyarenotformed from the
sameelements.
(1982.145)2

Thisis a decisivedeparture fromtheuse ofthetermin TheDivision. As itis used

here,"collective consciousness"is nota specific
modeofintegration (opposedto
thedivisionoflabor,as itwas in TheDivision), buta generalconditionofsociety.
This concept of collectiveconsciousnessreappearedagain and again in
Durkheim's writings ofthe1990s.The mostdetailedexplication can be foundin
thefirstchapterofBookImofSuicide, whereDurkheim considersmethodological
questions.Here,he speaksofsocietyas "a psychicalexistenceofa new species"3
whichhas "itsown mannerofthinking and feeling" and which
([1897J1951:310)4
is "essentially... made up ofrepresentations" In thecourseof
([1897J1951:312).5
theslowchangein Durkheim's thought, religionacquireda paramount position
and thenew conceptof"collective consciousness"was developedin accordance
withthenew roleofreligionas a centralexample.As Durkheimsays,"Religion
is ina wordthesystemofsymbolsbymeansofwhichsocietybecomesconscious
of itself,it is the characteristic way of thinkingof collectiveexistence"
([189711951:316).6
The"socialbeing"has a certainexteriority
initsrelations
to theindividuals
and
materializes
in things-inindependentrealities-andit showsitselfin the free
Colective
Conllne, andCoDediVe
Morpholagy, inDurkheim
Rrepsentions 43

cunentsofcollectivelife(Durkheim[189711991:355). Exterioritymeansthat"there
is notoneofallthesingle
ct ofconsciousnesswhomakeupthegreabody ofthenation,
towhomthecollectiv is
currentnotalmost wholyetrior,sinceeachcontains onlya spark
This formulation
of it" ([189711951:316).7 is obviouslydifferentfromthe one
containedin The Division.There,"collectiveconsciousness,"in the case of
mechanicalsolidarity,meantthattherewas a setofelementswhichwas present
in each individualconsciousness. Here,theonlycriterion ofcollectivenesswhich
Durkheimthoughtto be important was thatthe elementshouldnotbe bound
toonlyoneparticular consciousness. Theimplication ofthisdrawninthepreceding
quotationwas thatno particular individualconsciousnesscould comprisethe
totality ofthe"collective
current."8
Durkheim uses severalrelatedtermsto denote"collective" phenomena.Some
ofthemare termswhichhave a broadermeaningwithno specificreference to
psychicprocessesorconsciousness "collective
(e.g.,"socialcurrent," tendencies,"
"socialorcollectivebeing")butwhichareused byhimin a contextimplying this;
some of them,however ("social consciousness,""commonconsciousness,"
"collectiverepresentations") make explicitreferenceto the psychic.This
terminological indeterminacy suggeststhatDurkheim abandonedthespecific
theory of
as a general
butretained,
thecollacticonsciousness, methodological thatideasfonm
principle,
partofthesocialcontext.

THE PRINCIPLEOF MORPHOLOGICALDETERMINATIONAFTER1893

In TheDiuision,Durkheimsupposedthattherewas a generalmorphological or
determination
socio-ecological ofideas.In itsgeneralform, thethesiswas rather
to maintain.
difficult The overalltheorysupposedthata beliefsystem(collective
consciousness)anda particular
morphological (divisionoflabor)were
constellation
functional It was difficult,
alternatives. however,to understand how two orders
ofphenomenacouldprovidealtrnative mechanisms ofintegration, ifone ofthem
was determined bytheother.
causally However,theincompatibility ofthecausaland
functional didnotdisturb
principles Durkheim verymuchinTheDivision. Andsince
thebookis notverytightly organized,theproblemis notobvious.The message
thebookconveyedwas Durkheim's commitment to a deterministicapproachto
consciousness:

Most of our statesof consciousnesswould not have occurredamongmen

isolatedformone anotherand would have occurredcompletely differently
amongpeoplegroupedtogether in a different
way.Thustheyderivenotfrom
thepsychological natureofmangenerally, butfromtheway in whichmen,
once theyassociatetogether, exerta reciprocaleffectupon one another,
accordingto theirnumberand proximity. Productsofthelifeofthegroup,
itis the
natureofthegroupalonethatcanexplainthestates
ofconsciousness(1189311984:287,
emphasisin original)9
44 SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Volume
38,Number
1,1995

The disapearanceofthecentraltenetsofTheDivision, themodelsofmechanical

and organicsolidarity, openedup thepossibility ofdevelopinga detailedtheory
ofmorphological determinism. Yet,Durkheim did notexploitthispossibility, in
largepartbecauseitwas incompatible withsomeothertheoretical changeshe had
madein themeantime thatgaveriseto a fundamental conflict.
In The Rules,Durkheimstressedthat societyconsistsof representations.
Durkheim's generaltheoretical orientationled himto rejectany positionwhich
wouldisolatetherepresentations from otherthings, whichwouldmakea separate
world(unmonde a part)ofthem(1898-99:420). Separating somesocialelements, and
considering themas theconditioning "morphological" sphere,was incompatible
withthisidea.A consistent morphological determinism alongtheselineswould
lead to a "twoworldtheory"-asrepresented by thelaterGermansociologyof
knowledge.'0 But,ifsocietyconsistsofrepresentations, ifrepresentations are the
only"world,"so to speak,it is difficult to say whatis cause and whatis effect.
Durkheim producedmanyconfusing statements and dubiousformulations as
a consequenceof,and in thecourseof,hisslowresolution oftheconflict between
theprinciple ofmorphological determinism and hisemerging conceptionofsocial
lifeas made of representations. In TheRules,forexample,he says: "Collective
representations, emotionsand tendencieshave notas theircauses certainstates
ofconsciousness ofindividuals,buttheconditions underwhichthebodysocial
as a wholeexists"(1982:131)." Takenoutofcontext, thisseemstobe a clearformula
for morphologicaldeterminism: the body is the morphologicalstuff,the
representations arecausedby its"conditions." Butthelargerargument in which
the statement appearswas a justification ofhis anti-individualist methodology.
Andin thisargument, the"conditions ofthesocialbody"to whichhe refers are
nota distinct sphereofmorphological factsbutratherthetotality ofantecedent
collectivestates which generatedthe presentconstellation, which include
representations.
Thesameconfusion reappeared inhislectureson socialism, atthepointatwhich
he justifiedhis interestin socialistconceptionswhose scientific and theoretical
value he doubted.He saw two reasonsto studysocialism."First,one can hope
thatitwillaid us in understanding thesocialconditions whichgaveriseto it.For
preciselybecause it derivesfromcertainconditions, socialismmanifests and
expressesthemin itsown way,and therebygivesus anothermeansofviewing
them"([192811962:42). On theotherhand,ifone wishesto disputethe socialist
doctrine, "socialismmustnot be consideredin the abstract,outsideof every
condition oftimeandplace.On thecontrary, itis necessary torelateittothesocial
settingin whichitwas borne"([192811962:44). In thesequotations, thereare two
distinctconceptions oftherelationship ofideasand socialstates.On theonehand,
Durkheim supposedthatthereis a causalrelationship suchthatone can infer the
causes(socialconditions) fromtheeffects (socialistdoctrines). On theotherhand,
hesawan expressive relationshipbetweenthetwo.Itwasneverexplainedindetail.
however,howcertainsocialistideas expressedconcreteconditions(cf.Filloux
1977:301).
Collective
Consciousness, andCollective
Morphology, inDurkheim
Reprntations 45

As I havenoted,theidea ofmorphological determinismwas gradually softened

and its use was reducedto rhetorical purposes.The resultinggenerality and
indeterminacy makesit difficult
to discussits theoretical
content(cf Birnbaum
1%9:7-9).Durkheim didnotbothertoclarify
theissue-his interestwas elsewhere.
Butthereweretwooccasionswherehe feltitimportant to statehisposition.His
statements,however,areseemingly contradictory.
The firstoccasionwas in a reviewofLabriola.Thatwas one oftherarecases
in whichhe openlyconfronted Marxistpositions.'2
Labriolahad also developed
a morphological deterministtheory,and Durkheimbelievedthat he had to
distinguishhis positionfromLabriola's.He also saw thathis own sociological
determinism couldbe confusedwithsomeMarxianideas.He explainedhisown
viewas follows:

idea thatsocial lifemustbe explainednot by the

We believeit a fruitful
conceptionofit formedby thosewho participate in it,but by theprofound
causeswhichescapetheirconsciousness.We alsothinkthatthesecausesmust
be soughtmainlyin the way in whichindividualsassociatingtogether are
formedin groups.(1982:171)'3

However,he added,theMarxianschemeofbasis/superstructure was unacceptable

to him,and he explainedwhy:"we knowof no meansofreducingreligionto
economics"(1982:173).14
Yet only two yearslater,he wrotean introductory note to the subsection
"morphologiesociale"in theAnniesociologique
in whichhe developeda conception
whichwas,at firstsight,veryclose to theideas ofLabriola'she had previously
criticized:

Socialliferestsupona substratum determinateinbothsizeandform.

Itis made
up ofthemassofindividuals whoconstitute society,
themannerinwhichthey
have settledupon theearth,thenatureand configuration ofthosethingsof
all kinds which affectcollectiverelationships....
On the otherhand, the
constitutionof this substratumdirectlyor indirectlyaffectsall social
phenomena, justas allpsychological
phenomenaarelinkedeitherobliquelyor
immediately to theconditionofthebrain.(1982:241)'5

ButthereareatleasttwowaysinwhichDurkheim's positionisprofoundly
different
fromthe Marxisttheoryas well as fromthe "classical"Germansociologyof
knowledge.On theone hand,Durkheimsays nothingaboutthespecificnature
ofthesocialphenomenawhichare affected by the"substratum."The termitself
is vague:it is verylikelythateverythingexceptthedemographic characteristics
and spatialdistribution of the populationshouldbe includedunderthe social
phenomena.Thereis at leasta vague hintthatconsciousnessand "knowledge"
elements form an importantpartofthesubstratum.Thedividing linebetweentwo
parts,substratum and socialphenomena,does notseparateconsciousnessfrom
46 SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVISVolume
38,Number
1,1995

the"material" aspectsofsociety.According to Durkheim, thetwo couldnotbe

separated, and,therefore, he didnotbelievethattherecouldbe a purely"material"
substratum determining a purely"ideal"sphereofconsciousness. His research
remainedfreefromthis kind of dualism.On the otherhand,the notionof
"substratum" is veryvaguelydefined, and it is questionablewhetherDurkheim
was thinking ofmorphological factsas socialfacts(see Alexander1982:2534).The
lastsentencein thequotationabove,whichstatesthattherelationship between
morphological phenomenaand sociallifeis similarto thatof brainand mind,
formulates a thesiswhichI discuss in the next section.However,note that
Durkheim, by analogicalargument, excludesmorphological phenomenafromthe
socialdomain.
The incompatibility oftheprinciple ofmorphological determinism (whichwas
inanycaseneverexaminedindetailbyDurkheim) withthethesisthateverything
in societyis made up ofrepresentations was neverdiscussedexplicitly. Butthe
conflict
was,ina fashion, resolved:theprinciple ofmorphological determinism was
slowlyweakened,butnotabandonedaltogether. Unfortunately,thedocumenta-
tion of this slow driftis hinderedby the superficial similarityof the idea of
morphologicaldeterminism to the characteristic Durkheimiantenet of the
autonomyof socialfacts.BecauseDurkheimwas on onlyone occasiondirectly
confronted witha theorywhichfervently affirmed the idea of morphological
determinism inits"materialist"form,he didnotfeela needtodevelophisposition
in detail.'6
Subsequentcommentary on theprinciple has inadvertently distorted matters
inanotherway.Durkheim's commentators inthe1970sand 1980swereverymuch
preoccupied withrelating hisideas to thoseofthemanyMarxisms and therefore
overlooked thehistorical orcontext
specificity ofhisarguments. In the1890s,when
Durkheim was speakingofconsciousness and knowledge, hismaininsights were
formulatednot in termsof collectiveconsciousnessor of morphological
determinism butin termsofcollective representations.

THE PROBLEMOF REPRESENTATIONS

The word"representation" occursfrequentlyin thewritingsofDurkheim. In the
1890s,he used theterm"collective representations"
moreand morefrequently as
a scientific
concept.Thedevelopment ofhisideasaboutcollectiverepresentations
was veryimportant to thetheoretical whichled to hisethnological
reorientation
studiesofreligion. The word"repr&enation" was acceptedin Frenchvemacular
and philosophical language.Littr6(1%8,6:1379-1381) distinguishes13 meanings
ofit.In thepresentcontext, two ofthemare important: the"active"momentof
representation(actionderepr&enter)andthe"result"ofrepresentation which
(image),
are also distinguished in Lalande'svocabulary(actedese repr&enter quelquechose
againstcequiestpr&ent a l'esprit) Itis believedthatthephilosophical
(1960:920-922).
usage of the word goes back to Leibniz(who complemented the traditional
meaning"sereprlnter= imaginer" with"reprentation= con?spondance').
TheFrench
Collectiue andCollectiue
Morphology,
Consciousness, inDurkheim
Representaions 47

termwas translated byWolff as "Vorstellung' and thetwotermswereconsidered

Repr&entation
as equivalent.'7 is a centraltermin Renouvier, Taine,and Hamelin.'8
The factthat Durkheimuses the word frequently is in no way specificor
The curiousdoublemeaningoftheword("ambiguousassimilation
significant.'9
oftheknowinginstrument and the knownthing";Bohannan1960:79% cf Lukes
1973:7)was notspecificto Durkheim, either.
Durkheimused the word repr&sentation in an earlybook review(Durkheim
but its use did not becamefrequent
[188711975:161) untilafter[189311984 when
he cametotheconclusion thatsocialphenomena"aremadeup ofrepresentations"
and representationsareto be regardedas socialfacts(Durkheim [189511988a:97)20
However,theconception in TheRuleswas rather weak,evenifthewordwas used
frequently
relatively (Alexander1982:483). The firstsubstantial discussionwas in
Suicide(Durkheim[189711991:345 ff.)and the conceptwas laterdevelopedin an
independent essay(Durkheim [189811965).
Durkheim's detailedexplication oftheterm"collective representation"coincides
withthedisintegration oftheoriginal senseof"collective consciousness"andwith
the weakeningofmorphologicaldeterminism(Lukes1973:229-23O).21 Thegrowing
importance ofthe term"collectiverepresentation" allowedDurkheimto give a
moredetailedand betterorganizedpictureofsocialthoughtthanhe was able to
do withthe one-dimensional and crudeconceptof "collectiveconsciousness"
1984:532-533).
(Beillevaire-Bensa Theintroduction andfrequent use ofthetermwas
crucialforDurkheim.It helpedhimto avoid the dualismof materialfactsand
consciousnessand thenecessityofsupposinga causalrelationship betweenthe
two.Facts,whichareconsideredas "material" thingsinothertheories, are"made
up" of representations accordingto Durkheim(and, on the other hand,
representationsare just as extemaland thing-like as so-calledmaterialfacts,cf.
Turner1983-84:52_53).22
The explicationof the theoryof collectiverepresentation was connectedto
Durkheim's repeatedefforts to demonstrate therightofsociologyto thestatusof
autonomous science.Theessay,whichis hismostimportant from thispointofview,
dealsextensivelywiththepsychological theoryofrepresentations-in thispart
fact,
of the essay is much longerthan thatdevotedto collective-thatis, social-
representations.Thisis highlysymptomatic withrespectto Durkheim's aims:he
referredtopsychology everytimeheneededan exampleofsuccessful emancipation
ofsciencefromphilosophyand generalspeculation(e.g, [189511988a:122, 234).23
Here,thelengthy analysisofindividual has thesamefunction.
representations
Durkheim discussesin greatdetailpsychological epiphenomenalism, whichby
thistimewas no longeralivein theformrepresented bybHuxleyand Maudsley
but had reappearedin a modified versionin Jamesand Rabier.He believesthat
thememory and thefaculty ofassociationcannotbe understood ifone supposes,
as the epiphenomenalists do, that the mind is identicalwith the actual
physiological,nervous state ([189811%5:2-23). This extended (and, in the
Durkheimiansense, dialectical) discussion comes to the conclusion that
psychologicalphenomena constitute an independent realm ofreality:
48 SOCIOLOGICALPERSPECTIVES Volume38,Number1,1995

Ifrepresentations,
oncetheyexist,continue
toexistinthemselves withouttheir
existencebeingperpetually dependentupon the dispositionof the neural
iftheyhavethepowertoreactdirectly
centres, uponeachotherandtocombine
according to theirown laws,theyarethenrealitieswhich,whilemaintaining
an intimaterelationwiththeirsubstratum,
areto a certainextentindependent
ofit(Durkheim [1898]1%5:23).

Durkheim's reasoning here is analogical. He supposed that collective

representations
wereindependent ofthetotality ofindividualmindsin thesame
wayas themindisindependentofbrain;ifforthisreasonpsychologywas properly
considered
to be independent
ofphysiology, sociologyshouldbe independentof
psychologytoo:

Theconception oftherelationshipwhichunitesthesocialsubstratum and the

sociallifeis at everypointanalogoustothatwhichundeniably existsbetween
thephysiological substratumand thepsychiclifeofindividuals,if thatis,one
isnotgoingtodenytheexistence ofpsychology inthepropersenseoftheword.
The sameconsequencesshouldthenfollowon bothsides.Theindependence,
therelativeexternality ofsocialfactsin relationto individuals,
is even more
immediately apparentthanis thatofmentalfactsinrelation tothecerebralcells
([1898]1%5:34).

Durkheimwas fondofsayingin thiscontextthatthewholewas morethanthe

sumofitsparts(e.g.[1895]1988a:195).24
He does so hereas well:

Representationallifecannotbe dividedamongandascribedtoparticular neural

elements,sinceseveraloftheseelements combineforitsgeneration; butitcould
notexistwithout
thewholeformed bytheir justas thecollective
union, couldnotexist
without
thewhole formed bytheunionofindividuals.
Neithertheone northeother
is madeup ofparticular partsthatcanbe attributed
tothecorresponding parts
oftheirrespective substrata emphasisintheoriginal).
([1898]1%5:27-8,

Theanalogyofthebrain-mind relationshipwiththerelationshipofpsychological
and social phenomena25 forcedDurkheimto change the sense of the term
"substratum." Whereasearlierhe regardedthe substratum as belongingto the
social sphere,here he was led to declarethatthe totalityof individualsand
individualrepresentations(substrat whichconstitute
collectif), thenecessarybasis
ofsociallife,areoutsideofit.Ofcourse,he was notspeakinghereofsubstratum
in theearlier,materialsense-thatis,ofthesoil,itscharacteristics,
ofpopulation
and its territorial The real substratum
repartition. of societyis constitutedby
individualrepresentations.
Thesearethepreconditions ofsociallife,whichcannot
be explainedbythem:26

Also,whileitisthrough
thecollective
substratum lifeisconnected
thatcollective
to therestoftheworld,collectivelifeis notabsorbedin it.It is at thesame
Collective
Consciousness, andColleiveRepresentations
Morphology, inDurkheim 49

timedependenton and distinctfromit, as is the functionof the organ.

(Durkheim
[189811965:30)

In this essay, Durkheimgave an extra-socialinterpretation to the term

"substratum."He conceivedit as thetotality ofindividualswho have bodyand
mind,butwithouttakingintoconsideration thesocialbondswhichunitethem.
This step was necessaryto insiston the change in meaningof "collective
representations"
(see above).As theselatterconstitute
thespecificsocialelement
whichhas a peculiarand autonomousmodeofmovement, it was importantto
reduceeverything whichdidnotbelongtothemtothestatusofmerepreconditions
ofsociety:

[T]hebasicmatterofthesocialconsciousnessisincloserelation
withthenumber
ofsocialelementsandthewayinwhichtheyaregroupedanddistributed, etc.-
thatis to say,withthenatureofthesubstratum. Butoncea basicnumberof
representationshas thusbeencreated, theybecome,forthereasonswhichwe
haveexplained, partially
autonomous withtheirownwayoflife.They
realities
havethepowertoattract andrepeleachotherandtoform amongstthemselves
varioussyntheses,whicharedetermined bytheirnaturalaffinities
and notby
the conditionoftheirmatrix[U'Rtdu milieuau seinduquelellesAvoluentJ.
As a
consequence, thenew representations bornofthesesyntheses havethesame
nature;theyare immediately caused by othercollectiverepresentationsand
notbythisorthatcharacteristic ofthesocialstructure([189811%5:30-31).

This conclusionimpliesthat collectiverepresentations constitutethe most

important class of thingswhich should be analyzedby sociology.Durkheim
considersrepresentationsas thingsin themostexactsenseoftheword.
In chapterone ofBookIII ofSuicide(a chapterwherethebasicideasofthe1898
essaywerealreadyformulated), he refutes thosewho takecollectivetendencies
orpassions(whicharehererelatedto representations) onlymetaphorically(orin
a nominalistic
sense).Theseare,he repeats,reallythings:

thingssuigenerisandnotmereverbalentitiesthattheymaybe measured, their

relativesizes compared,as is done withtheintensity
ofelectriccurrents
or
luminousfoci([189711951:310)."

Collectiverepresentationsshouldbe investigated in a naturalistic

manner-that
was Durkheim'sintention. This impliesthathe did not conceivethemas the
utterancesofa giganticcollectivesubject-evenifhe sometimes used metaphors
whichwereambiguousin thisrespect.
Durkheim's researchintentions areclearlystatedinthesecondforeword to the
TheRulesin 1901.There,he defendedthethesisthatsociety, whileit is madeup
ofrepresentations,
conservesitsexternalityto theindividuals,and thethesisthat
itslawsaredifferent
fromthelawsofpsychology:
50 SOCIOLOGICALPERSPECITVES Volume38,Number1,1995

Whatshouldbe doneis toinvestigate,

bycomparing mythicalthemes, legends
and populartraditions,
and languages,howsocialreprsentatioss toor
areattnacted
exclude
eachother, withoraredistinguishable
amalgamate fromeachother,
etc.(1982:41-
42,emphasis
added).28

Durkheim conceivedtheresearch inthelawsofmotionofcollectiverepresentation

ina classicalpositivist
manner.Thisconception stilldominatedthe1898essayand,
in a lesserextent,the 1901Secondeditionprefaceas well.Basicto thisresearch
andtothisshift ofemphasiswas theideathatcollective constitute
representations
a specificdomain,theyare independent beingsand notjust theepiphenomena
ofother,morerealbeings.
Durkheim's mode ofexpressionreflects thisconception.He uses abundantly
expressions takenoverfromphysics:attraction, repulsion,naturalaffinity,
causal
relations,fusion,and differentiation.
However,aroundtheturnofcentury, he was
driftingtowarda less physicalist
conception ofresearchas exemplifiedin hisfirst
ethnological papers(cf.Durkheim [1898]1%9b):
he cametoconceivethestructure
producedbythemutualconnections ofcollective
representations
as a specialkind
ofgrammar.
Durkheim alwaysstressedthatcollective shouldbe conceived
representations
independently fromthe subjects who have them.There is no expressive
relationshipbetweenindividual mindandcollective representations.
Thelatterare
notthoughtsofindividuals. However,Durkheimcouldnotabandontotallythe
idea thatrepresentations should be, in some sense,the thoughtsof someone.
Formulations thatcouldbe foundalreadyin the7heRulesreappearedagainand
again:he perceivedsocietyas a newkindofmind,a groupconsciousness. Talking
ofthesuigenerisreality ofsocietywhichresultsfrom thecombinationofconscious
beingsbutcannotbe reducedto individual minds,he added:

In orderto understand it as it is onemusttaketheaggregate initstotality

into
It is thatwhichthinks,
consideration. feels,wishes,eventhoughit can neither
noractexceptthrough
wish,feelt individualminds.([189811965:26)

He did notarriveat a comprehensive groupmindtheory, however,becausehe

considered collective to be at thesametimesomething
representations similarto
physicalobjects.Therefore, he did notneed to producea conceptionofsociety
whichthinksand whichhas a willofitsown.
His commitment to this "elements"model of the collectiveconsciousness
appearsearly.In TheDivision,he conceivedcollectiveconsciousnessas thesum
ofidenticalelementsin individualconsciousnesses-that is,he did not assume
thatitis a colossalmind.Thecontradictory characterofDurkheim's formulations
can be seen in Suicide,too,wherethegroupmindanalogyis interwoven witha
researchprogram whichpostulatesthesimilarity ofcollectiverepresentationsto
physicalobjects.Here,he takesreligiousrepresentations as the mosttypical
exampleofcollective representations:
Colective
Consciousness, andCollectiv
Morphology, inDurkheim
Representations 51

Thepowerthusimposedon hisrespectandbecometheobjectofhisadoration
is society,
ofwhichthegodswereonlythehypostaticform. Herethenis a great
groupofstatesofmindwhichwouldnothave originated ifindividualstates
ofconsciousness had notcombined,and whichresultfromthisunionand are
superaddedto thosewhichderivefromindividual
natures(1951:312).29

To thesephrasessuggesting
a groupmindtheory,
Durkheim
added on thenext
page:

Notonlyhavewe admitted thatsocialstatesdiffer from

qualitatively individual
states,but thattheyare,in a certainsense,exterior
to individuals.
Similarly,
we have not hesitatedto comparethisexteriority to thatofphysicalforces
([189711991:353)3?

Durkheim's positionhereis theby-product ofhisscientific

strategy.
Psychology
was regardedby himas theexampleofsuccessful institutionalization.
Therefore,
sociologyshould followthe same routeand should become an independent
science,in the same way.Two requirements followfromthisstrategy. The first
is thata specfficobjectarea shouldbe defined;3' the secondis thatsociology's
achievements shouldbe comparableto thoseofpsychology. The replacement of
thecategory ofmindwiththatofsocietywasan obvioussolutiontothesedemands.
As societyand mindhad similarcategorical positions,
itwas buta smallstepto
supposesomething whichis indeedsimilarto "groupmind."
But,as suggestedearlier,
Durkheim's researchlogicwas morecompatible with
theidea thatcollective arequasi-physical
representations thing-like
objectsthan
withtheconceptionofsocietyas a giganticsubject.Fortunately, he followedthe
firstapproachin his ethnologicalstudies.As indicatedearlier,this intensive
research resultedina lessphysicalist
conceptionofrepresentations.ButDurkheim
didnotrevivethe"groupmind"motif ofhisearlier
writings.Infact,
thenaturalistic
conceptionofrepresentations was a steptowardthefamousthoriesociologique de
la connaissance
whichwas Durkheim's finalachievement in TheElementary
Forms of
Religious
Life.

NOTES
1. "... puisqu'ilsconsistent
enrepresentations etenactions"(Durkheim [189511988a:97).
2. "Voiladans quel sense et pour queUeraisonson peut et on doit parlerd'une
conscience collectivedistincte
des consciences individuelles.Pourjustifier
cettedistinction,
il n'estpas n6cessaired'hypostasier la premiere; elle est quelque chosede sp6cialet doit
etred6sign6e paruntermespeial,simplement parceque lesetatsquila constituent
diff6rent
spfcifiquement de ceuxqui constituent les consciencesparticuli6res.Cettespfcificit6
leur
vientde ce qu'ilsne sontpas form6s des m8meselements" (Durkheim [189511988a:1%).
3. "un8trepsychiqued'uneespecenouvelle"([189711991:350).
4. "sa maniereproprede penseret de sentir"(Durkheim 1897a:350).
52 SOCIOLOGICALPERSPECTIVES Volume38,Number1,1995

5. " ... estessentiellemetit faitede repr6sentations'(Durkheim [189711991:352). Another

conciseformulation inthelectures on moraleducation: Mais la soci6t6, ce n'estpas l'oeuvre
des individusqu'ellecomprendAtelleou tellephasede l'histoire; ce n'estpas davantage
le sol qu'elleoccupe;c'est,avanttout,un ensembled'id6eset de sentiments, de certaines
mani6resde voiret de sentir,une certainephysionomie intellectuelle et moralequi est
distinctive du groupetout entier.La soci&t6est, avant tout,une conscience:c'est la
conscience de la collectivit6.C'estdonccetteconscience collective qu'ilfautfaire passerdans
l'amede l'enfant" (Durkheim [1925]1963:236).
6. "La religion, c'est,en d6finitive, le syst6me de symboles parlesquelsla soci&t6 prend
conscienced'elle-m8me; c'est la mani6rede penserpropreal'atre collectif" (Durkheim
[189711991:352).
7. "De toutes lesconsciences particulire quicomposent lagrande massedela nation, il n'enest
aucuneparrapport a laquelle lecourant collectifnesoitexterieur presque entotalite,puisque chacune
d'elles
n'encontient qu'uneparcelle" (Durkheim [189711991:357, emphasisin theoriginal).
8. Durkheimgives an important integrative role to thislooselydefined"socialor
collectiveconsciousness." Speakingofreligious groups, he saysthattheyarewellintegrated
whenreligiousbeliefis firmand welldefined;thereis an "opinion commune" (Durkheim
[189711991:158) whenpeoplegettheiropinionsready-made ([1897]1991:171).
9. The mostimportant continuousargument written in the spiritofmorphological
determinism is the well-known chapterof TheDivisionwhereDurkheimexplainsthe
rationalization and generalization of ideas by changesin the social milieu(Durkheim
[189311984:229-233).
10. On the "two worldtheories"('Zwei-Welten-Theorien'l) and theirrole in German
sociology, see Lenk(1972).
11. "Les repr6sentations, les 6motions, les tendancescollectives n'ontpas pourcauses
g6n6ratrices certains 6tatsde la consciencedesparticuliers, maislesconditions ou'se trouve
le corpssocialdansson ensemble"(Durkheim [1895]1988a:198).
12. Alexander (1982:250) overstates theissuewhenhe saysthatDurkheim was offering
a theoretical alternative to Marxism. Thatwas nothis intention. He did notknowMarx
well and, therefore, it was not the Marxiantheoryto whichhe opposed his general
conception.
13. "Nous croyonsf6condecetteidee que la vie socialedoits'expliquer, non par la
conception que s'enfontceuxquiyparticipent, maispardescausesprofondes quiechappent
A la conscience:et nous pensons aussi que ces causes doivent etre recherch6es
principalement dans la manieredont sont groupesles individusassoci6s"(Durkheim
[1897]1969a:250).
14. "Nousne connaissons aucunmoyen de reduire la religion [whichwas, accordingto
Durkheim at that time, the most elementary social phenomenon] a l'conomie" (Durkheim
[1897]1969a:253).
15. "La vie socialereposesurun substrat qui est determine dans sa grandeur comme
dans sa forme. Ce qui le constitue, c'estla massedes individusqui composentla soci&t6,
la manifre dontilssontdisposessurle sol la natureetla configuration des chosesde toute
sortequi affectent les relations collectives....D'un autrecote,la constitution de ce substrat
affecte,directement ou indirectement tousles phenomenes sociaux,de memeque tousles
phenomenes psychiquessonten rapports, mediatsou immediats, avec 1'6tatdu cerveau"
(Durkheim [1899]1969c:181).
 Consciousness,
Collctive andCollective
Morphology, inDurkheim
Representations 53

16. Theconfusion withintheDurkheimian groupwasapparent inthearticle "Sociologie"

in the Grande writtenby Paul Fauconnetand MarcelMauss (and certainly
Encyclop6die,
approvedbyDurkheim). There,afterproducing contradictory statements on thestatusof
collectiverepresentations,theygo on to formulate boththerejection and theaffirmation
ofthemorphological determinist thesis:"Rienn'estvaincommede se demandersi ce sont
lesideesqui ontsusciteles societesou si ce sontlessocietesqui unefoisformees, ontdonne
naissanceaux ideescollectives. Ce sontdes phenomenes inseparables." Andthen:"Carles
representations collectivesne doiventpas etreconquescommese developpantd'elles-
memes,en vertud'une sortede dialectiqueinteme....Les opinions,les sentiments de la
ne changentque si les 6tatssociauxdontilsdependentont6galement
collectivit6 change"
(Fauconnet-Mauss 1901:163).
17. Itis obviousthatintheGermanterm, theoriginal linktothesenseofrepresentation
as actingorspeakingforsomeoneorsomething, on behalfofsomething (e.g.,thekingwho
represents in hispersontheimmortal principle ofroyalpower)is lost.
18. Hamelinwas Durkheim'sfriendand colleaguein Bordeauxand wrotea very
HegelianbookwiththetitleEssaisurlesel6ments principaux delarepr6sentation.Representation
thereis Begriff,
Idee,and Geistat thesametime.On Hamelin'sand Durkheim's relationship,
see Strenski (1989)and N6medi(1991).
19. One need not to suppose,as Mestrovic(1988)does,thatit was Schopenhauer's
influencewhichinspiredDurkheim to use representation (Vorstellung).
20. Durkheim, ofcourse,did notbelievethatcollective representations are or should
be true representations. In The Rules,he separatedknowledgeas correct,scientific
(sociological)representations fromrepresentations as socialfacts.Hirst'sproblemis a false
problem:"In so faras it [ie.,collectiverepresentation] is a mentalphenomenon, an idea,
he facesthethreatthatitis an illusion, a misrecognition ofthereal.Butsinceitis theorder
oftherealitself,thesociety-subject canonlybe a subjectwithout illusions,a subjectwhose
ideasarepureknowledge"(Hirst1975:100). It is an exaggeration to suggestthatDurkheim
considered societyas a hugesubject.
21. As "collective consciousness" and"collective representations" inan exacttheoretical
sensearenotused by Durkheim at thesametime,I findthecommonpracticeoftreating
themas meaningthesameorsomething similar tobe baseless.Theresulting identification
oftheDurkheimian termswiththemodemconception ofculture ismisleading, too.LaCapra,
forexample,believes that "collectiverepresentation... primarilyrefered... to the shared
modelorparadigm whichfunctioned as a modeofexplanation andjustificationin society,
especiallyas thecoreoftheconsciencecollective whichhe treatedinhismoralphilosophy
as la morale"(LaCapra1972:266). According to Nisbet,"collective representation ... is but
a phraseforwhatmostofus callmorecommonly traditions,
codes,and themesinculture"
(Nisbet1974:88).Fillouxsees that"conscience collective"
and "representations
collectives" are
bothareinserted
different; byhiminhismultilevel modelofdetermination: "lesrepresentations
collectives
nesontquele premier degre
dbbjectivation de la conscience
collective,
dontlesinstitutions
etlesubstrat
constituentlesautres
degres"(i.e.,in thesensethatthesubstratum is "below"the
collective
representations, collective
consciousness is "above"them)(Filloux1977:115). The
schemeis reallyingenious, butitcombinesideasand theories whichwereneveradopted
byDurkheim in thiscombination.
22. Becauserepresentations arething-like, itcannotbe saidthatthesocialworld,which
is of"ideal"character accordingto Durkheim, wouldbe theemanationor "objectivation"
ofa transcendent spiritor spiritual
being."Assurement, on ne sauraittrople r6p6ter, tout
54 SOCIOLOGICALPERSPECTIVES Volume38,Number1,1995

ce qui est social consiste en repr6sentations, par cons6quentest un produitde

repr6sentations. Seulement, ce devenirdes repr6sentations qui est la mati6re
collectives,
memede la sociologie, neconsiste pasdansuner6alisaon progessedeetainesidWmsfondanentales
qui d'abordobscurcieset voil6espar des id6esadventices, s'en affranchiraient peu Apeu
pour devenirde plus en plus compl6tement elles-mhnes.Si des 6tatsnouveauxse
produisent,c'est,engrandepartie, parceque des 6tatsanciensse sontgroup6s etcombin6s"
(Durkheim [1898J1%9b:100, emphasisadded).
23. Durkheim's proverbial anti-psychologism was ofa methodological kind.He never
questionedthe scientific characterof psychology, whereashe believedthat classical
economicswas essentially unscientific, "ideological" (Durkheim [1895]1988a:117 In his
ff.).
lectureson moraleducation, he repeatedly and positively referredto recentpsychological
monographs-hedidnotdo thatveryoftenon otheroccasions(Durkheim [192511963:114,
154,184,191).We mustnotforget thatinhisyouth,he visitedthepsychological laboratory
ofWundtin Leipzigand had verypositiveimpressions ofit.
24. As Durkheim himself said,he tookthisbanality fromComteand hisownProfessor
ofPhilosophy, EmileBoutroux (Durkheim 1907:403). Itwas connected tothestatement that
theparticular sciencesarebuiltonthose"below"butaredifferent andindependent ofthem.
25. Itreappeared in 1899in thenoteon socialmorphology (1982:241).
26. He warnshisadversaries that,iftheydo notaccepttheindependence ofsociology,
theywillbe forcedto abandontheindependence ofpsychology, too.'Those,then,who
accuseus ofleavingsociallifein theairbecausewe refuseto reduceit to theindividual
mindhavenot,perhaps, recognized alltheconsequences oftheirobjection.Ifitwerejustified
it would apply just as well to the relationsbetweenmind and brain" (Durkheim
[189811965:28).
27. "Ellessontsi biendes chosessui generis, et non des entit6sverbales,qu'on peut
les mesurer,comparer leurgrandeurrelative,commeon faitpour l'intensit6 de courants
6lectriquesou de foyers lumineux" (Durkheim emphasisadded).
[189711991:349,
28. "Ce qu'il faudrait, c'est chercher, par la comparaison des th6mesmythiques, des
l6gendeset des traditions populaires, des langues,dequellefaponlesrepr&entations sociales
et s'excluent,
s'appellent fusionnent les unesdans les autresou se distinguent" (Durkheim
[190111988b:85,emphasisadded).
29. "La puissancequi s'est ainsiimpos6eA son [theindividual's] respectet qui est
devenuel'objetde son adoration, c'estla soci6t6, dontles Dieux ne furent que la forme
hypostasi6e. La religion,c'est,en d6finitive, le syst6me de symbolesparlesquelsla soci6t6
prendconscience d'elle-meme; c'estla mani6re de penserpropreAl'etrecollectif. VoilAdonc
un vaste ensembled'6tatsmentauxqui ne se searientpas produitssi les consciences
ne s'6taient
particuli6res pas unies,qui r6sultent de cetteunionet se sontsurajout6s Aceux
qui d6rivent des naturesindividuelles" (Durkheim 1897a:352-353).
30. TheSpaulding-Simpson versionis misleading. "Nousn'avonspas seulement admis
que lesetatssociauxdifferent qualitativement des 6tatsindividuels,maisencorequ'ilssont,
en un certainsens,exterieurs aux individus. Memenous n'avonspas craintde comparer
cetteext6riorit6Acelledes forcesphysiques"([189711991:353).
31. In the introductory paragraphsto the essay on individualand collective
representations, Durkheim remarked thatsociologyshouldhavea researchareawhichis
independentof psychology-even if both investigaterepresentations (Durkheim
[189811965:2).
 andColctiveRepresentaions
Morphology,
ColeciveConsciousness, inDurkheim 55

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