Republic Vs Manalo

G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018.
*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPINES, petitioner, vs. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Divorce; Divorce, the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two (2) types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.—Divorce, the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types:
_______________
** Designated Acting Chief Justice.

* EN BANC.
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Republic vs. Manalo
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In
this jurisdiction, the following rules exist: 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New
Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad. 3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws. 4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses,
must still be determined by our courts.—Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes
our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses,
must still be determined by our courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In 2005, the Supreme Court (SC) concluded that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by
naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.—In 2005, this
Court concluded that paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: The jurisprudential answer
lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American
citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus re-
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Republic vs. Manalo
marry. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. x x x If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the
foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are
freed from the marital bond.—There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above
mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of
the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed,
there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted.—Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse
is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither
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Republic vs. Manalo
can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by
the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating
his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively
be without a husband or wife.—The purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law.
Same; Conflict of Laws; Nationality Principle; Blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law.—Conveniently invoking the
nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is
not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of paragraph 2 of Article 26
is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence
to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they
are constitutional.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; “Fundamental rights” whose
infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Con-
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Republic vs. Manalo
stitution.—While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid

classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice,
such classification may be subjected to judicial review. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection
by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role
as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
“Fundamental rights” whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. It
includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.
On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of
rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as
the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. It essentially involves
a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows
the former to take precedence over the latter.
Same; Same; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly,
the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is
unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.—Although
the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to
the acts of the President, which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by
the court. In this case, We find that paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to
a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. A Filipino who is married to another
Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There
are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures,
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all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with.
More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null
and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made
in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land.—There is
no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who
have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them
are alike. Were it not for paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings
or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other. Further, the differentiation in paragraph 2 of Article 26 is
arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized
even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. In filing for
divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law
at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or
she chooses. The dissent’s comment that Manalo should be “reminded that all is not lost, for
she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanisms now existing under the Family Code” is anything but comforting. For the
guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail
what these “mechanisms” are and how they specifically apply in Manalo’s case as well as
those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
Same; Freedom of Religion; The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs
and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation
follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.—The Roman
Catholic Church can neither
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Republic vs. Manalo
impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate. The declared State
policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized
with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino
family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development. It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application
of paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all
forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order
to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and
similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 (“Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004”), R.A. No. 9710 (“The Magna Carta of Women”), R.A. No. 10354 (“The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012”), and R.A. No. 9208 (“Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003”), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 (“Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2012”). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to
value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Divorce; Before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.—Indeed, where
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirit or intent. The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet
write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila. Jurisprudence has set guide-
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lines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be proven. Before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Divorce; View that
following Section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9710, Article 26 of the Family Code should be
read to mean that who initiates the divorce proceedings abroad is immaterial.—Section 19 is
straightforward: the State shall ensure that men and women are to have “the same rights to
enter into and leave marriages.” Following Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, Article 26 of
the Family Code should be read to mean that who initiates the divorce proceedings abroad is
immaterial. Once a divorce decree is issued, the foreign spouse is deemed to have “obtained”
a divorce which capacitates him or her to remarry. The same status should therefore be
afforded to the Filipino spouse. Besides, in many jurisdictions, the foreign spouse is given the
option to divorce on the basis of a mutual recognition that irreconcilable differences have
surfaced in the context of their relationship. Some foreign laws, therefore, allow joint filing
for a divorce decree to ensure that there be less incrimination among the spouses, a more
civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less financial burden for the families
affected. The interpretation proposed by the Solicitor General does not accommodate this
possibility. It is blind to the actual complexities experienced by our citizens in mixed
marriages.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that the State’s obligation to
“ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men” applies with equal if not
greater force.—Clearly, it is not only Article 26 of the Family Code or the Civil Code that
applies. It should also include the Constitution, which is the bedrock of rights of any citizen.
Thus, the State’s obligation to “ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men” applies with equal if not greater force. In my view, this is the full extent of the
nationality principle. It is borne of rational interpretation, not judicial legislation.
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; View that the
restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family which is already
far from the living realities of many couples and children.—The restrictive nature of our
marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family which is already far from the living
realities of many
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Republic vs. Manalo
couples and children. For instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not
compare with the various types of care that various other “nontraditional” arrangements
present in many loving households. The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to
regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty
or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each
commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has
gone through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for
each couple. It is that which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our
beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social expectations but by the care and love
each person can bring. Yet, the present form and the present interpretation we have on the
law on marriage constrains. In love, there are no guarantees. In choosing our most intimate
partners, we can commit mistakes. It is but part of being human. Our law cruelly defines the
normal. The legal is coated in a false sense of morality poorly reasoned. It condemns those
who have made bad choices into a living inferno.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Divorce; View that the law never intended for the Filipino to
be at a disadvantage. For so long as the Constitution itself guarantees fundamental equality,
the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and unfeeling interpretation of our laws
should not hold.—A world whose borders are increasingly becoming permeable with the ease
of travel as well as with the technological advances will definitely foster more intercultural
relationships. These relationships can become more intimate. I am of the belief that the law
never intended for the Filipino to be at a disadvantage. For so long as the Constitution itself
guarantees fundamental equality, the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and
unfeeling interpretation of our laws should not hold. To say that one spouse may divorce and
the other may not contributes to the patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship prone to
abuse in such intimate relationships.
Caguioa, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Divorce; View that at
present, there exists no legal mechanism under Philippine law through which a Filipino may
secure a divorce decree upon his own initiative.—At the outset, it bears to emphasize that the
public policy against absolute divorce remains in force. At present, there exists no legal
mechanism under Philippine law through which a Filipino may secure a divorce decree upon
his own initiative. Accordingly, it is the Court’s duty to uphold such policy and apply the law
as it currently stands until the passage of an
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amendatory law on the subject. As members of the Court, ours is the duty to interpret
the law; this duty does not carry with it the power to determine what the law should be in
the face of changing times, which power, in turn, lies solely within the province of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that deliberations show that Article 26(2) has the
effect of (i) enforcing divorce decrees which are binding on foreign nationals under their
national law; and (ii) recognizing the residual effect of such foreign divorce decrees on their
Filipino spouses who are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce under the Civil
Code.—While Article 26(2) was reinstated by executive fiat, it is nevertheless clear that the
true spirit behind the provision remains explicit in the Committee deliberations — Article
26(2) had been crafted to serve as an exception to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, which states: ART. 15. Laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. The deliberations
show that Article 26(2) has the effect of (i) enforcing divorce decrees which are binding on
foreign nationals under their national law; and (ii) recognizing the residual effect of such
foreign divorce decrees on their Filipino spouses who are bound by the prohibition against
absolute divorce under the Civil Code. To be sure, Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute
the Philippines’ policy against absolute divorce. In fact, this perceived possible dilution is
precisely what prompted the majority of the Committee members to vote for the deletion of
Article 26(2) in the initial version of the Family Code found in EO 209. As the deliberations
indicate, the exception provided in Article 26(2) is narrow, and intended only to
address the unfair situation that results when a foreign national obtains a divorce
decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving the latter stuck in a marriage without a
spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Nationality Principle; View that
citing the nationality principle, the Supreme Court (SC) stressed that “a foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the
jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.”—Still,
in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree against her American husband from an
Illinois court. The decree awarded sole custody over the parties’ daughter in favor of the
Filipino wife. While the parties subsequently executed a Joint Custody Agreement, the
Filipino wife refused to honor the agreement, prompting the American husband to seek
redress before the Philippine courts. The Court held that the Illinois divorce decree is binding
on the American citizen, and that the latter cannot be permitted to evade the terms of the
custodial award. Citing the nationality principle, the Court
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Republic vs. Manalo
stressed that “a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the
alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s
nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.” It bears stressing that the issue
raised in Dacasin was the enforceability of the Joint Custody Agreement against the
American husband, and not the validity of the foreign divorce decree as against the Filipino
wife.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that a divorce decree issued by a
foreign court remains binding on the foreign spouse in the Philippines, regardless of the party
who obtained the same provided that such decree is valid and effective under the foreign
spouse’s national law.—It should be emphasized, however, that the prohibition against
absolute divorce only applies to Filipino citizens. Accordingly, it cannot be invoked by a
foreign national to evade the effects of a divorce decree issued pursuant to his national law.
To reiterate, a divorce decree issued by a foreign court remains binding on the
foreign spouse in the Philippines, regardless of the party who obtained the
same provided that such decree is valid and effective under the foreign spouse’s
national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in essence, the applicable rule (whether
Article 15 of the Civil Code on one hand, or Article 26[2] of the Family Code on the other), is
determined by (i) the law upon which the divorce decree had been issued; (ii) the party who
obtained the divorce decree; (iii) the nature of the action brought before the Philippine courts;
and (iv) the law governing the personal status of the party seeking relief.—In essence, the
applicable rule (whether Article 15 of the Civil Code on one hand, or Article 26[2] of the
Family Code on the other), is determined by (i) the law upon which the divorce decree had
been issued; (ii) the party who obtained the divorce decree; (iii) the nature of the action
brought before the Philippine courts; and (iv) the law governing the personal status of the
party seeking relief.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that the
classification under Article 26(2), (that is, between Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos
married to fellow Filipinos) was created as a matter of necessity, in recognition of the
classification between Filipinos and foreign nationals which has been created by Article 15 of
the Civil Code decades prior.—The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family Code
as unconstitutional, as it proceeds from a “superficial [and] arbitrary” classification. This
position appears to be based on the premise that Article 26(2) creates new distinctions in
itself. This premise, however, is simply erroneous. The classification under Article 26(2), (that
is, between Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos married to fellow Filipinos) was
created as a matter of necessity, in
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recognition of the classification between Filipinos and foreign nationals which had been
created by Article 15 of the Civil Code decades prior.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Law; Nationality Principle; View that to
characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be to disregard the
nationality principle and the reasons which render the adoption thereof necessary; it would be
tantamount to insisting that Filipinos should be governed with whatever law they choose.—
To characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be to disregard the
nationality principle and the reasons which render the adoption thereof necessary; it would
be tantamount to insisting that Filipinos should be governed with whatever law they choose.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that the guarantee of equal
protection under the Constitution does not require that all laws indiscriminately operate with
equal force with respect to all subjects at all times; the guarantee does not preclude
classification provided they are reasonable and based on substantial distinctions.—It has
been argued that the verba legis interpretation of Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates
the equal protection clause, and that the application of the provision in this manner would
not only be oppressive, but likewise unconstitutional. These reservations appear to proceed
from three different classifications which, in turn, have been called into question — first, that
between Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos who are married to fellow
Filipinos; second, that between Filipinos and foreigners; and finally, that between men and
women. As earlier discussed, the ponencia finds the first classification “superficial [and]
arbitrary” insofar as it limits the scope of recognition to cover only those divorce decrees
obtained by foreign nationals. It bears to stress, however, that the guarantee of equal
protection under the Constitution does not require that all laws indiscriminately operate with
equal force with respect to all subjects at all times; the guarantee does not preclude
classification provided they are reasonable and based on substantial distinctions.
Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; Divorce; View that
the recognition afforded to foreign divorce under Article 26(2) is extended only as a means to
recognize its residual effect on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed
by operation of the latter’s national laws.—As observed by the ponencia, the most important
distinction between Filipinos in mixed marriages and those who are married to fellow
Filipinos is their exposure to the absurdity for which Article 26(2) had been precisely crafted,
as only Filipinos in mixed marriages may find themselves married without a spouse due to
the effects of a foreign divorce decree. This distinction is “substantial” as to necessitate a
difference in treatment before
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Republic vs. Manalo
the law. To disregard these substantial distinctions for the sake of liberality would
empower Filipinos in mixed marriages to obtain divorce decrees by invoking foreign law at
whim, and effectively sanction a legal preference in their favor at the expense of those
Filipinos who happen to be married to their fellow Filipinos. A liberal interpretation of Article
26(2) would, in Dean Carale’s words, “encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners.” To stress, all
Filipinos are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce. The recognition afforded
to foreign divorce under Article 26(2) is extended only as a means to recognize its
residual effect on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national laws. The provision was not intended to grant any
preferential right in favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but intended merely to
recognize the operation of foreign divorce on foreigners whose national laws
permit divorce.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Article 26(2) does not make any discernable
distinction between men and women, as the exception therein may be invoked by both men and
women with equal force to attain the same end, provided that the requirements for is
application obtain.—I find that Article 26(2) does not make any discernable distinction
between men and women, as the exception therein may be invoked by both men and women
with equal force to attain the same end, provided that the requirements for its application
obtain. While I am certainly aware that the respondent in this case is one of the many Filipino
women who find themselves in unsuccessful marriages with foreign nationals, I am equally
aware that this unfortunate circumstance is similarly faced by Filipino men, who, like their
female counterparts, are precluded from obtaining an absolute divorce under Philippine law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the divorce decree which respondent obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan,
but of the Philippines.—In this case, it has been established that (i) the respondent is a
Filipino citizen who married a Japanese national; (ii) it was the respondent who
subsequently obtained a divorce decree against her Japanese husband from a
Japanese court; and (iii) the respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Recognition and
Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment before the RTC. It is clear that respondent is, and has
always been, a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the nationality principle, respondent’s personal
status is subject to Philippine law which, in turn, prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which respondent obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she
is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the verba
legis application of Article 26(2) does not deprive the respondent of legal remedies, as she
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Republic vs. Manalo
may pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanisms now existing under the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Family Code characterizes marriage as a special
contract of permanent union, and regards the family as “an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law” and generally, not subject to
stipulation.—The Constitution mandates the protection of the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. In this connection, the Family Code characterizes marriage as a special
contract of permanent union, and regards the family as “an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law” and generally, not subject
to stipulation. Upon these fundamental principles rests the prohibition against absolute
divorce, which had remained effective and unchanged since the enactment of the Civil Code
in 1950. Adherence to this prohibition is met with much reservation, as it purportedly forces
Filipinos to play second fiddle to their foreign spouses, and places said Filipinos at a
disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued in the deliberations of the Court that such
adherence sanctions various forms of abuse that plague mixed marriages, and deprives
Filipinos in such marriages of a way out. I find that these observations, pressing as they are,
already delve into the wisdom of statutes governing marriage and personal status with which
the Court cannot interfere.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Divorce; View that the Supreme Court (SC) is bound to respect
the prohibition, until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same through the passage of a
statute permitting absolute divorce.—To note, Article 26(2) of the Family Code has remained
unchanged since the issuance of EO 227. The blanket recognition of absolute divorce
overturns the Court’s unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in the cases
of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin, Bayot, Fujiki and Medina, which span a period of nearly
three decades. Ascribing a contradictory interpretation to the provision, under the guise of
equal protection, essentially rewrites Article 26(2) and gives it a meaning completely
different from the framers’ intention. While I am not oblivious to the difficulty that results
from the prohibition on absolute divorce and commiserate totally with the respondent in this
regard, I find that the prohibition remains, and thus, must be faithfully applied. To my mind,
a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that
of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is bound to respect the
prohibition, until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same through the passage
of a statute permitting absolute divorce.
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Republic vs. Manalo
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Fernando P. Cabrera for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in
SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and
Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-31.
2 Id., at pp. 32-33.
3 Id., at p. 30. (Emphasis in the original)
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Republic vs. Manalo
case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting
of the trial court’s Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan
to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning
the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
xxx
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after
due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter
are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
husband’s marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear
anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of
marriage;
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Republic vs. Manalo
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant
to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by
virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of
her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28-March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that,
based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 42-43.

5 Id., at pp. 25, 37-38.
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Republic vs. Manalo
duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages.”6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC’s decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who
filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained
makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider
Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married
to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case
is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo,
Jr.8 where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a
divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA’s decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.10
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 40-41.

7 663 Phil. 546; 648 SCRA 400 (2011).
8 223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985).
9 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575; 514 SCRA 607, 613 (2007), citing Garcia v.
Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735-736; 366 SCRA 437, 452 (2001).
10 Garcia v. Recio, id., at p. 730; p. 446; and Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA
733, 739.
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Republic vs. Manalo
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive
Order (EO) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code
_______________
11 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
12 Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
13 Tenchavez v. Escaño, 122 Phil. 752, 759-760; 15 SCRA 355, 362 (1965), as cited in Cang v. Court of
Appeals, 357 Phil. 129, 162; 296 SCRA 128, 160 (1998); Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 342, 356; 345
SCRA 592, 602 (2000); and Perez v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil. 204, 211; 480 SCRA 411, 418 (2006). See
also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at p. 730; pp. 446-447; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 504; 470 SCRA 508,
527-528 (2005); and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil. 331, 341-342; 730 SCRA 376, 388 (2014).
14 Garcia v. Recio, id., at pp. 730-731; p. 447.
15 FAMILY CODE, Article 26, paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, id., at p. 730; p. 447; and Medina v.
Koike, supra.
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Republic vs. Manalo
of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No.
227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the
Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was
originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the

effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on
_______________
16 Republic v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 112; 472 SCRA 114, 119 (2005), as cited in San Luis v. San
Luis, 543 Phil. 275, 291; 514 SCRA 294, 310 (2007).
17 Id., at pp. 112-113; p. 119, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, id.
18 Id., at p. 113; p. 119, id.
19 Sempio Diy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 26-27, 1988.
20 Medina v. Koike, supra note 10; and Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555; 700 SCRA 69, 101 (2013).
21 Fujiki v. Marinay, id.
22 Id.
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Republic vs. Manalo
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his
or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he
or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.24 The aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands’)
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic
of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The
wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens,
_______________
23 See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 498; 665 SCRA 487, 493 (2012); Roehr v.
Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617-618; 404 SCRA 495, 502 (2003); and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note
13.
24 Sempio Diy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 27, 1988. See also Republic
v. Orbecido III, supra note 16 at p. 114; pp. 120-121, as cited in Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20; and San
Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16 at p. 292; p. 311.
25 Sempio Diy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 27, 1988.
26 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 16.
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Republic vs. Manalo
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of paragraph
2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and
enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry “in order that it would
not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said Japanese national who is
no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of
marriage,” and to return and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
_______________
27 Id., at pp. 114-115; pp. 121-122. (Citations omitted)

28 625 Phil. 494; 611 SCRA 657 (2010).
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Republic vs. Manalo
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody
of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to
enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among
others, that the divorce decree is binding following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this
jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by
his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to
entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity — not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse — to support the
Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign
divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render
an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be
declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her
ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not
prevail over the pro-
_______________
29 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 8.

30 Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra note 28 at p. 507; p. 669. (Citations omitted; underscoring ours)
603
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Republic vs. Manalo
hibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the
foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton v. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
“The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by
a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without
a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.”
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
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Republic vs. Manalo
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan’s family court, which declared
the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void
on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.
_______________
31 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 8 at pp. 361-363; pp. 143-144. (Citations omitted)
32 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20.
33 Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.
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There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported “in keeping with the financial capacity of the family” and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III (“Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife”) of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly
filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground
that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing
his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in accordance with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled
that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing
the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above mentioned rulings. When this
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
_______________
34 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20 at pp. 549-550; pp. 95-96. (Citations omitted)
35 642 Phil. 420; 628 SCRA 266 (2010).
36 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9.
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Republic vs. Manalo
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that
one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo’s personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she
is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a
contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also
that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore,
bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading
of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither
can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.37 “The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”38
_______________
37 Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc., 298 Phil. 79, 86; 227 SCRA 317, 322 (1993).
38 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660; 206 SCRA 701, 711 (1992),
as cited in Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 263, 268; 229 SCRA 269, 273 (1994); Enjay, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 315 Phil. 648, 656; 245 SCRA 588, 593 (1995);
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word “obtained” should be
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the
alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so
would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to
address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.42 Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
_______________
and Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073; 280 SCRA 806, 822-823 (1997). See
also National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251; 453 SCRA 70, 79
(2005); Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Board, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 545 Phil. 62, 72;
516 SCRA 154, 164 (2007); Republic v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100; 517 SCRA 255, 268 (2007); and Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI),
604 Phil. 547, 553; 586 SCRA 658, 664-665 (2009).
39 Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 312 Phil. 259, 268; 242 SCRA 211, 219 (1995).
40 Id.
41 623 Phil. 531, 564-565; 608 SCRA 636, 663-664 (2009).
42 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20.
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Republic vs. Manalo
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in “like circumstance as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national
law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the
mere existence of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide
for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes
of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must
_______________
43 See Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933), as cited in Tenchavez v. Escaño, supra note
13 at p. 762; p. 364.
44 See Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256
Phil. 777, 808; 175 SCRA 343, 375 (1989); and Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil.
403, 436; 732 SCRA 22, 58 (2014).
45 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 597; 446
SCRA 299, 386-387 (2004), as cited in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 436; 582
SCRA 254, 280 (2009). See also Puno, CJ., Separate Concurring Opinion, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections, 632 Phil. 32, 100; 618 SCRA 32, 87-88 (2010); Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 550; 637 SCRA 78, 360 (2010); and Leonardo-De
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Republic vs. Manalo
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require
a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47
“Fundamental rights” whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to
exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to
travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution
and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
_______________
Castro, J., Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 125; 699 SCRA 352, 449 (2013).
46 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, id.
47 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 45 at p. 282; p. 278; and Mosqueda v. Pilipino
Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA
313, 360. See also Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note
45; Velasco, Jr., J., Concurring Opinion, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), 774 Phil. 508, 706; 776 SCRA 434, 653 (2015);
and Jardeleza, J., Concurring Opinion, Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 &
221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.
48 Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, id., at p. 553; p. 359.
49 See Carpio-Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 45 at pp. 697-698; pp. 496-498, as cited by Brion, J., Separate
Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, id., at p. 553; p. 360; and Leonen, J., Separate
Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017, 835 SCRA 350.
50 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 45 at p. 298;
p. 296.
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Republic vs. Manalo
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and effect of
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who
is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they
_______________
51 Id.
52 Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1, 326-327; 721 SCRA 146,
533 (2014).
53 To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must rest on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class. (See Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation [PAGCOR] v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648; 645 SCRA 338, 349 [2011]; Garcia
v. Executive Secretary, 692 Phil. 114, 141-142; 677 SCRA 750, 778 [2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353,
405; 724 SCRA 1, 109 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277; 760 SCRA 652, 709-710
[2015]; Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on Disability Affairs, G.R. No.
194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 55; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097,
226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016, 807 SCRA 223; and Mindanao Shopping
Destination Corporation v. Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017, 826 SCRA 143).
54 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
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Republic vs. Manalo
should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities
as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly,
while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null
and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for paragraph
2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on
the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is
inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized
even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56
_______________
55 Tenchavez v. Escaño, supra note 13, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13; Llorente v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v.
Recio, supra note 9 at p. 730; p. 442; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces
Luna, supra note 13. Family Code, Article 26, paragraph 2. See also Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.
56 Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties
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Republic vs. Manalo
_______________
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between stepparents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse
or his or her own spouse. (82)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
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Republic vs. Manalo
In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking
foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with
whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent’s comment that Manalo should be “reminded
that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC
in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code” is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these “mechanisms” are and how they specifically apply in Manalo’s
case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that
our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly,
and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court’s liberal interpretation of paragraph 2 of Article 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings
against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was
shown to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of
good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed
(i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of
_______________
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall
be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect
third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
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Republic vs. Manalo
crime or wrong,57 that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts,58 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a
belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact,60 that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal,
irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry
a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into
out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take
judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages.
And fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino’s decision to marry an
alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,

is the foundation of the family and shall be pro-
_______________
57 Rule 131, Section 3(a).

58 Id., Section 3(c).
59 Id., Section 3(d).
60 Id., Section 3(x).
61 Id., Section 3(aa).
62 Id., Section 3(ff).
63 Republic v. Albios, 719 Phil. 622, 636; 707 SCRA 584, 598-599 (2013).
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Republic vs. Manalo
tected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on

divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question
by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA.
Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS.
Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce?
His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON.
Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage
the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned
the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS.
No. My question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON.
No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
_______________
64 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This echoed the Family Code provision, which provides:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
65 Bernas, Joaquin G, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, p. 1132, 1995
edition, citing Record, Volume V, p. 41.
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Republic vs. Manalo
FR. BERNAS.
Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No.
2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine
Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 (“New Divorce Law”), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to
such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse’s
incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or
the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here
or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to reinstitute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
_______________
66 Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, Volume V, p. 41, September 24,
1986.
67 See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 944 (1920); Francisco v. Tayao, 50 Phil. 42
(1927); People v. Bitdu, 58 Phil. 817 (1933); Sikat v. Canson, 61 Phil. 207 (1939); and Arca v. Javier, 95 Phil.
579 (1954).
68 See Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461 (1946); Luz v. Court of First Instance of Tacloban, 77 Phil.
679 (1946); and Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337; 484 SCRA 353 (2006).
69 Baptista v. Castañeda, id., at p. 463.
70 Tenchavez v. Escaño, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals; Llorente v. Court of Appeals; and Perez v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at p. 730; p. 442; Republic v. Iyoy;
and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, supra note 13 at pp. 341-342; pp. 388-389.
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Republic vs. Manalo
116,71 1062,72 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of Representatives. In
substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled “An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce
and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines” or the Absolute Divorce Act of
2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on
February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading — with 134
in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial
decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified
or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner,
a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, even if pardoned;
_______________
71 Entitled “Instituting Absolute Divorce in the Philippines and for Other Purposes,” with
Representative Edcel C. Lagman as Principal Author.
72 Entitled “An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3, of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, Prescribing Additional Ground for Annulment,” with Representative Robert
Ace S. Barbers as Principal Author.
73 Entitled “An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines, Amending for the Purpose Articles 26, 55 to
66 and Repealing Article 36 Under Title II of Executive Order No. 209, as Amended, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, and for other Purposes,” with Gabriela Women’s Party Representatives
Emmi A. De Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as principal authors.
74 Entitled “An Act Providing for Grounds for the Dissolution of a Marriage,” with Representatives
Teddy B. Baguilat, Jr., Rodel M. Batocabe, Arlene D. Brosas, Ariel B. Casilao, France L. Castro, Nancy A.
Catamco, Pia S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Ana Cristina
Siquian Go, Edcel C. Lagman, Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L. Tinio, and Carlos Isagani T. Zarate as
Principal Authors.
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Republic vs. Manalo
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the

respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person
other than one’s spouse during the marriage, except when upon the
mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a
similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of
rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common
child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2)
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute
divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code,

restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twenty-one (21), and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or
person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband or wife;
b. Either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
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Republic vs. Manalo
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage

with the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable;
and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found
to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of
the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at
the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and reconciliation is
highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the
Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or
transitions from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition
for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent,
or vice versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the
total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and
repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to
our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However,
none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
_______________
75 See Leonen, J., dissenting in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016, 808 SCRA
480.
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simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs,
even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. 77 While marriage is
considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by
the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the
State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligations if We limit the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those
foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and
children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.
In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the
menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262
(“Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004”), R.A. No. 9710 (“The Magna
Carta of Women”), R.A. No. 10354 (“The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012”), and R.A. No. 9208 (“Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003”), as amended by
R.A. No. 10364 (“Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012”). More-
_______________
76 Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in
Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 819 SCRA 313 (Resolution).
77 Supra note 52 at p. 167; pp. 325-326.
78 Tilar v. Tilar, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017, 831 SCRA 116.
79 Article XV, Section 1.
80 Id., Section 3(2).
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over, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the
dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing “mechanisms” under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he
or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such “extramarital” affair has to suffer
the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the
adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but
without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With
the advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from
all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual’s full human
potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage.
Thus, it is hypocriti-
_______________
81 Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 14. See also Republic Act Nos. 7192 (“WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT AND
NATION BUILDING ACT”) and 9710 (“THE MAGNA CARTA OF WOMEN”).
82 Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERs, p. 1132, 1995
edition, citing Records, Volume V, pp. 40, 44.
83 See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil. 786, 804; 529 SCRA 81, 100 (2007).
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Republic vs. Manalo
cal to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside
the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to
it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. “Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a
law,” so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, “where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them.”
xxxx
_______________
84 San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16 at pp. 292-293; p. 311.

85 Id.
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More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due.” That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice
is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention
of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases
not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo’s petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by
the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact
of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
_______________
86 Id., at pp. 293-294; pp. 312-313.

87 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 16 at p. 115; pp. 121-122.
88 Id.
89 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at p. 731; p. 447, as cited in Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note
23 at p. 501; p. 497.
90 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20 at p. 544; p. 94; and Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, id., at p. 499;
pp. 494-495.
91 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at p. 731; p. 447, as cited in Medina v. Koike, supra note 10;
and Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 16 at p. 116; p. 123. See also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, 591 Phil.
452, 470; 570 SCRA 472, 488 (2008).
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Republic vs. Manalo
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the

document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo’s petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court,
these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court’s judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence
of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the
divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the
_______________
92 Garcia v. Recio, id., at pp. 732-733; pp. 448-449. (Citations omitted) See also Vda. de Catalan v.
Catalan-Lee, supra note 23 at pp. 499, 501-502;
p. 495; and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16 at p. 294; pp. 313-314.
93 Rollo, pp. 29-30.
94 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at pp. 733-734; p. 450.
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ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do

so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied
by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband’s capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September
18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
95 See Bayot v. Court of Appeals, supra note 91; and Roehr v. Rodriguez, supra note 23 at p. 617; p. 502.
96 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at p. 735; pp. 451-452. (Citations omitted) See also Vda. de Catalan v.
Catalan-Lee, supra note 23 at pp. 500-501; p. 496; San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16 at p. 295; p.
314; Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 16 at p. 116; p. 123; and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note
13 at p. 354; p. 600.
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Republic vs. Manalo
Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Martires, Tijam, Reyes,

Jr. and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., On Leave.
Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., We join the dissent of J. Caguioa.
Leonen, J., I concur. See Separate Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part.
Caguioa, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Peralta, adding the following points.
The proposal of the Solicitor General is to give Article 26 1 of our Family Code an
interpretation which capacitates and empowers the Japanese husband the option to
divorce and how such choice has effects in our country while, at the same time,
disallowing the Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because she is a
Filipina.
_______________
** Designated Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
1 FAMILY CODE, Art. 26 provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
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That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our

Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive
formulation in Article III, Section 12 to its more active orientation.
Article III, Section 1 simply states that “nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.” Traditionally, this means that the State has no duty to find
ways and means to ensure equality. It is only a prescription that whatever legal
burdens and benefits are given to men should likewise be given to women. It does not
require the State, through any of its organs, to find affirmative ways and means to
battle the patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that
ensure women’s disempowerment.
By enacting our Constitution and signing on to our political obligations to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, we
have legally committed to do better.
We likewise note that the Family Code was followed by Republic Act No. 7192 or
the Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Within this law are provisions
which ensure equal treatment between men and women, thus:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State recognizes the role of women in nation
building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.
_______________
2 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
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Republic vs. Manalo
....
Section 5. Equality in Capacity to Act.—Women of legal age, regardless of civil
status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in
every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances.
In all contractual obligations where married men have the capacity to act,
married women shall have equal rights.
To this end:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute
security and credit arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector
programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources
and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement
programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into
insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have the rights equal to those of married men in
applying for passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without
need to secure the consent of their spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and
shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of
men under similar circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)
Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women reflects the state policy to
“[abolish]. . . the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination and
inequality”3 between the sexes, and
_______________
3 Rep. Act No. 9710, Sec. 2 provides:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy.—Recognizing that the economic, political, and sociocultural realities
affect women’s current condition, the State affirms the role of women in nation building and ensures the
substantive equality of women and men. It shall promote empowerment of women and pursue equal
opportunities for women and men and ensure equal access to resources and to development results and
outcome. Further, the State real-
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Section 19 of the law is specific on the equality of women and men as to rights relating
to marriage and family relations:
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations.—The
State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure:
_______________
izes that equality of men and women entails the abolition of the unequal structures and practices that
perpetuate discrimination and inequality. To realize this, the State shall endeavor to develop plans, policies,
programs, measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality in the economic, political,
social, and cultural life of women and men. The State condemns discrimination against women in all its
forms and pursues by all appropriate means and without delay the policy of eliminating discrimination
against women in keeping with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and other international instruments consistent with Philippine law. The State shall
accord women the rights, protection, and opportunities available to every member of society.
The State affirms women’s rights as human rights and shall intensify its efforts to fulfill its duties under
international and domestic law to recognize, respect, protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and
fundamental freedoms of women, especially marginalized women, in the economic, social, political, cultural,
and other fields without distinction or discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender, language,
ethnicity, religion, ideology, disability, education, and status. The State shall provide the necessary
mechanisms to enforce women’s rights and adopt and undertake all legal measures necessary to foster and
promote the equal opportunity for women to participate in and contribute to the development of the political,
economic, social, and cultural realms.
The State, in ensuring the full integration of women’s concerns in the mainstream of development, shall
provide ample opportunities to enhance and develop their skills, acquire productive employment and
contribute to their families and communities to the fullest of their capabilities.
In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women in all sectors to participate in policy
formulation, planning, organization, implementation, management, monitoring, and evaluation of all
programs, projects, and services. It shall support policies, researches, technology, and training programs
and other support services such as financing, production, and marketing to encourage active participation
of women in national development.
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Republic vs. Manalo
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law
relationships referred to under the Family Code without prejudice to
personal and religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only
with their free and full consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child
shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have
access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise
these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses
including the right to choose freely a profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the
ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment, and
disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and
inheritance, whether formal or customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their
nationality. The State shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to
an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall
automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or
force upon her the nationality of the husband. Various statutes of other
countries concerning dual citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by
women and men shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not

discriminate against women. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 19 is straightforward: the State shall ensure that men and women are to
have “the same rights to enter into and leave marriages.”
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Following Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, Article 26 of the Family Code should
be read to mean that who initiates the divorce proceedings abroad is immaterial. Once
a divorce decree is issued, the foreign spouse is deemed to have “obtained” a divorce
which capacitates him or her to remarry. The same status should therefore be
afforded to the Filipino spouse.
Besides, in many jurisdictions, the foreign spouse is given the option to divorce on
the basis of a mutual recognition that irreconcilable differences have surfaced in the
context of their relationship. Some foreign laws, therefore, allow joint filing for a
divorce decree to ensure that there be less incrimination among the spouses, a more
civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less financial burden for the
families affected. The interpretation proposed by the Solicitor General does not
accommodate this possibility. It is blind to the actual complexities experienced by our
citizens in mixed marriages.
II
Justice Caguioa provides the argument that interpreting Article 26 of the Family
Code in the manner provided in the ponencia violates the nationality principle
enshrined in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
I disagree.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
Clearly, it is not only Article 26 of the Family Code or the Civil Code that applies.
It should also include the Constitution, which is the bedrock of rights of any citizen.
Thus, the State’s obligation to “ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men”4 applies with equal if not greater force. In my view, this is the full
extent of the nationality principle. It is borne of rational interpretation, not judicial
legislation.
_______________
4 CONST., Art. II, Sec. 14.
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Republic vs. Manalo
III
Finally, my agreement with the ponencia is also impelled by my understanding

that divorce is more consistent with the constitutionally entrenched fundamental
freedoms inherent in individuals as human beings. It is also most consistent with the
constitutional command for the State to ensure human dignity.
The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family
which is already far from the living realities of many couples and children. For
instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not compare with the various
types of care that various other “nontraditional” arrangements present in many
loving households.
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the
other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are
dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique,
borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and
defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be
different for each couple. It is that which we should understand: intimacies that form
the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social expectations
but by the care and love each person can bring.
Yet, the present form and the present interpretation we have on the law on
marriage constrains. In love, there are no guarantees. In choosing our most intimate
partners, we can commit mistakes. It is but part of being human.
Our law cruelly defines the normal. The legal is coated in a false sense of morality
poorly reasoned. It condemns those who have made bad choices into a living inferno.
In my view, this case is a step forward in the right direction.
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IV
As I stated in a dissent1 I wrote in 2016, we had absolute divorce laws in the past.
Act No. 2710,2 enacted in 1917, allowed the filing of a petition for divorce on the
ground of adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband.3
Eleven grounds for divorce were provided in Executive Order No. 141, 4 effective
during the Japanese occupation. These grounds included “intentional or unjustified
desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of a [petition] for
divorce” and “slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such
an extent as to make further living impracticable.”5
After the Japanese left, the laws they enacted were declared void. 6 Act No. 2710
again took effect until the Civil Code’s enactment in 1950. Since then, absolute
divorce has been prohibited in our jurisdiction.
A world whose borders are increasingly becoming permeable with the ease of travel as
well as with the technological advances will definitely foster more intercultural relationships.
These relationships can become more intimate.
I am of the belief that the law never intended for the Filipino to be at a
disadvantage. For so long as the Constitution itself guarantees fundamental equality,
the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and unfeeling interpretation of our
laws should not hold. To say that one spouse may divorce and the other may not
contributes to the
_______________
1 See Dissenting Opinion in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016, 808 SCRA 480.
2 AN ACT TO ESTABLISH DIVORCE (1917).
3 ACT. NO. 2710, Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage
on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven
of the Penal Code.
See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc].
4 Otherwise known as “THE NEW DIVORCE LAW.”
5 Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 (1946) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
6 Id., at pp. 462-463.
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Republic vs. Manalo
patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship prone to abuse in such intimate relationships.

The law is far from frigid. It should passionately guarantee equality and I stand
with this Court in ensuring that it does.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to
affirm, with modification, the Court of Appeals’ Decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100076.
The case should be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The Supreme Court x x x aims to adopt a liberal construction of statutes. By
liberal construction of statutes is meant that method by which courts from the
language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing laws, are
able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however,
between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon
a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have
been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise
of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite
division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial.1
On the basis of the Court’s rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.2 (Van
Dorn), Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III3 (Orbecido), and Dacasin v.
Dacasin4 (Dacasin), the ponencia holds that Article 26(2) of the Family Code permits
the blanket recognition, under
_______________
1 See Tañada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515, 516-519 (1935) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc]; emphasis supplied.
2 223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
3 509 Phil. 108; 472 SCRA 114 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
4 625 Phil. 494; 611 SCRA 657 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
635
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Republic vs. Manalo
Philippine law, of a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen against the latter’s foreigner spouse.
I disagree.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that the public policy against absolute divorce
remains in force. At present, there exists no legal mechanism under Philippine law
through which a Filipino may secure a divorce decree upon his own initiative.
Accordingly, it is the Court’s duty to uphold such policy and apply the law as it
currently stands until the passage of an amendatory law on the subject.
As members of the Court, ours is the duty to interpret the law; this duty does not
carry with it the power to determine what the law should be in the face of changing
times, which power, in turn, lies solely within the province of Congress.
Article 26(2) of the Family Code

is an exception to the national-
ity principle under Article 15 of
the Civil Code.
Article 26(2) was introduced during the meetings of the Joint Civil Code and
Family Law Committee (the Committee) to address the effect of foreign divorce
decrees on mixed marriages between Filipinos and foreigners. The provision, as
originally worded, and the rationale for its introduction, appear in the deliberations:
[Professor Esteban B. Bautista (Prof. Bautista)]’s position, even under the present
law, was that the Filipina wife should be allowed to remarry as long as the divorce is
valid under the national law of the husband, with which [Judge Alicia Sempio Diy
(Judge Diy)] and [Justice Leonor Ines-Luciano (Justice Luciano)] concurred.
After further deliberation, [Justice Ricardo C. Puno (Justice Puno)] suggested that
they formulate the base to cover the above situation. Judge Diy and [Justice Eduardo
P. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)] formulated the base as follows:
In a mixed marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, both
capacitated to marry under Philippine law, in case the foreigner should obtain a
valid divorce abroad, capacitating him to remarry, the Fili-
636
Republic vs. Manalo
pino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.5
However, subsequent deliberations show that the Committee ultimately resolved

to delete the provision and defer action until absolute divorce is determined in future
legislation:
On Article [26(2)], [Justice Jose B.L. Reyes (Justice Reyes)] commented that it seems
to discriminate against Filipinos, who are married to Filipinos, since the provision
governs only Filipinos married to foreigners.
Justice Puno suggested that, in line with Justice Caguioa’s view that x x x they
should make the Proposed Family Code as acceptable as possible and since they are
not touching on divorce which is one of the big issues and they are leaving it to future
legislation, they omit Article [126(2)] temporarily and take it up when they
take up the matter of absolute divorce.
Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that Article
[26(2)] should be retained. On the point raised by Justice Reyes, Prof. Bautista opined
that there is no unfairness in the case of a Filipino, who is married to a Filipino, because
in the case of a Filipino who is married to a foreigner, the foreigner is already free, and
yet the Filipino is still married to nobody. [Dean Bartolome S. Carale (Dean Carale)]
added that if two Filipinos are married anywhere, they are both covered by the
Philippine prohibitory laws because they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in effect, there is preferential treatment in the case
of Filipinos married to foreigners, since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino
spouse also automatically gets a divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will
in effect encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is
the foreigner and not the Filipino, who will seek divorce.
xxxx
Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of
foreign divorce, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and
[Professor Flerida Ruth P. Romero (Prof. Romero)] pointed out that the
article will
_______________
5 Minutes of the 146th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees dated July 12, 1986,
p. 5.
637
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 637
Republic vs. Manalo
only cover exceptional cases and special situations and that there is a reasonable and
substantial basis for making it an exception.
After further discussion, Justice Puno rephrased Article [26(2)] in accordance with
Dr. Cortes’ suggestion as follows:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated abroad and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
capacitating such foreigner to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
xxxx
Having sufficiently discussed the matter, the Committee decided to put the issue to
a vote.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, Dr. Cortes, Dean Carale, Dean Gupit and Prof.
Baviera were for the deletion of Article [26(2)].
(2) Justice Diy, Prof. Bautista, Prof. Romero and [Director Flora C. Eufemio] were
for its retention.
Hence, the Committee agreed that x x x Article [26(2)] shall be deleted x x
x.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, Article 26(2) did not appear in the initial version of the Family Code
under Executive Order (EO) 209 which was signed into law by then President
Corazon Aquino on July 6, 1987. Days later, or on July 17, 1987, President Aquino
issued EO 227 which incorporated, among others, Article 26(2). Thus, when the
Family Code finally took effect on August 3, 1988, Article 26, in its entirety, read as
follows:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
_______________
6 Minutes of the 149th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees dated August 2,
1986, pp. 14-15.
638
Republic vs. Manalo
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
While Article 26(2) was reinstated by executive fiat, it is nevertheless clear that
the true spirit behind the provision remains explicit in the Committee deliberations
— Article 26(2) had been crafted to serve as an exception to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
living abroad.
The deliberations show that Article 26(2) has the effect of (i) enforcing divorce
decrees which are binding on foreign nationals under their national law; and (ii)
recognizing the residual effect of such foreign divorce decrees on their Filipino
spouses who are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce under the Civil
Code.7
To be sure, Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute the Philippines’ policy
against absolute divorce. In fact, this perceived possible dilution is precisely what
prompted the majority of the Committee members to vote for the deletion of Article
26(2) in the initial version of the Family Code found in EO 209. As the deliberations
indicate, the exception provided in Article 26(2) is narrow, and
intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a foreign
national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving the
latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse, thus:
Justice Caguioa explained that the intention of the provision is to legalize foreign
divorces for the Filipino so that in the case of a Filipina, who was married to an
American, who in turn later secured a divorce, said Filipina will be allowed to remarry.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy remarked that this is not clear in the provision [Article
26(2)]. Justice Puno, however, commented
_______________
7 See CIVIL CODE, Arts. 15 and 17.

639
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 639
Republic vs. Manalo
that it will open the gates to practically invalidating the Philippine laws by the
simple expedient of marrying a foreigner, and that it will be an additional cause for
the breakage of families, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy stated
that, on the other hand, it is an absurdity for a Filipina to be married without a
husband.8 (Emphasis supplied)
I believe that this view is consistent with the Court’s rulings in Van
Dorn, Orbecido, and Dacasin.
In Van Dorn, a case decided prior to the enactment of the Family Code, an
American citizen sought to compel his former Filipina wife to render an accounting
of their alleged conjugal business in Manila. The American citizen argued that he
retained the right to share in the proceeds of the disputed business, as the divorce
decree issued by the Nevada District Court cannot be given effect in the Philippines.
Ruling against the American citizen, the Court held that the divorce decree
issued by a United States court is binding against him as an American
citizen.9 As a residual effect of such divorce, the American citizen no longer
had standing to sue as the husband of his former Filipina wife.10 Hence, in Van
Dorn, the Court held:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. x x
x11 (Emphasis supplied)
In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to remarry before the courts,

claiming that his former Filipina wife had obtained a divorce decree against him from
an American court after she had become
_______________
8 Minutes of the 146th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees dated July 12, 1986,
p. 5.
9 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 2 at p. 361; p. 143.
10 Id., at p. 362; p. 144.
11 Id.
640
Republic vs. Manalo
a naturalized American citizen. The Court held that the effects of the divorce
decree should be recognized in the Philippines since it was obtained by the
former wife as an American citizen in accordance with her national law,
and that as a consequence, the Filipino husband should be allowed to
remarry pursuant to Article 26(2). In so ruling, the Court laid down elements for
the application of Article 26(2), thus:
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when [the Filipino spouse’s] wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between [them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites
for the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus x x x the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Still, in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree against her American
husband from an Illinois court. The decree awarded sole custody over the parties’
daughter in favor of the Filipino wife. While the parties subsequently executed a Joint
Custody Agreement, the Filipino wife refused to honor the agreement, prompting the
American husband to seek redress before the Philippine courts. The Court held that
the Illinois divorce decree is binding on the American citizen, and that the latter
cannot be permitted to evade the terms of the custodial award. Citing the
nationality principle, the Court stressed that “a foreign divorce decree
carries as much valid-
_______________
12 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 3 at pp. 115-116; p. 122.
641
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 641
Republic vs. Manalo
ity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the
jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.”13 It bears stressing that the issue raised in Dacasin was the enforceability
of the Joint Custody Agreement against the American husband, and not the validity
of the foreign divorce decree as against the Filipino wife.
Thus, rather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign
divorce decrees in the Philippines, I believe that the Court’s rulings in Van
Dorn, Orbecido and Dacasin merely clarify the parameters for the
application of the nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
and the exception thereto found in Article 26(2) the Family Code. These
parameters may be summarized as follows:
1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the
prohibition against absolute divorce. As a consequence of such prohibition, a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be enforced in the
Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to permit a Filipino citizen to
invoke foreign law to evade an express prohibition under Philippine law.
2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign national may
be extended to the Filipino spouse, provided the latter is able to prove (i) the
issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the personal law of the foreign spouse
allowing such divorce.14 This exception, found under Article 26(2) of the Family
Code, respects the binding effect of the divorce decree on the foreign national, and
merely recognizes the residual effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse.
It should be emphasized, however, that the prohibition against absolute divorce only
applies to Filipino citizens. Accordingly, it cannot
_______________
13 Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra note 4 at p. 508; p. 670; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
14 See Medina v. Koike, 791 Phil. 645, 651-652; 798 SCRA 733, 740 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First
Division]; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 725, 730-731; 366 SCRA 437, 442 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].
642
Republic vs. Manalo
be invoked by a foreign national to evade the effects of a divorce decree issued

pursuant to his national law. To reiterate, a divorce decree issued by a foreign
court remains binding on the foreign spouse in the Philippines, regardless
of the party who obtained the same provided that such decree is valid and
effective under the foreign spouse’s national law.
In essence, the applicable rule (whether Article 15 of the Civil Code on one hand,
or Article 26[2] of the Family Code on the other), is determined by (i) the law upon
which the divorce decree had been issued; (ii) the party who obtained the divorce
decree; (iii) the nature of the action brought before the Philippine courts; and (iv) the
law governing the personal status of the party seeking relief.
The corresponding effect of these determining factors are, in turn, illustrated by
the relevant cases involving the issue at hand, decided after the issuance of EO 227:
_______________
15 256 Phil. 407; 174 SCRA 653 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
643
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 643
Republic vs. Manalo
_______________
16 507 Phil. 485; 470 SCRA 508 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
17 591 Phil. 452; 570 SCRA 472 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
18 712 Phil. 524; 700 SCRA 69 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
644
Republic vs. Manalo
The factual circumstances in the foregoing cases illustrate and confirm the
legislative intent behind Article 26(2), that is, primarily, to recognize foreign divorce
decrees secured by foreign nationals insofar as they affect Filipinos who would
otherwise be precluded from invoking such decrees in our jurisdiction, and, as well,
to recognize those foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipinos insofar as they affect
their foreign spouses whose national laws allow divorce. For emphasis, I quote the
relevant portion of the deliberations:
Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that
Article [26(2)] should be retained. x x x Dean Carale added that if two Filipinos are
married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine prohibitory laws because
they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in
effect, there is preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married to foreigners,
since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse also automatically gets a
divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in effect encourage Filipinos to
marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is the foreigner and not the
Filipino, who will seek divorce.
xxxx
Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of
foreign divorce, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and
Prof. Romero pointed out
_______________
19 Medina v. Koike, supra note 14.
645
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 645
Republic vs. Manalo
that the article will only cover exceptional cases and special situations and
that there is a reasonable and substantial basis for making it an
exception.20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court held in Iyoy:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of
the [parties in the marriage] is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By
its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she
was still, a Filipino citizen. x x x At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when
she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.21 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Article 26(2) of the Family

Code merely recognizes the
classification previously made
pursuant to the nationality
principle.
The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family Code as unconstitutional,

as it proceeds from a “superficial [and] arbitrary” classification. 22 This position
appears to be based on the premise that Article 26(2) creates new distinctions in itself.
This premise, however, is simply erroneous.
The classification under Article 26(2), (that is, between Filipinos in mixed
marriages and Filipinos married to fellow Filipinos) was cre-
_______________
1986, pp. 14-15.
21 Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 16 at pp. 503-504; pp. 527-528.
22 Ponencia, p. 610.
646
Republic vs. Manalo
ated as a matter of necessity, in recognition of the classification between Filipinos

and foreign nationals which had been created by Article 15 of the Civil Code decades
prior.
In his Separate Opinion in Pilapil, Justice Paras highlights the interplay between
these two provisions, thus:
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered
the absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid
and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed
by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme
Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law
and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce
as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino
wife is involved. This results in what he calls a “socially grotesque situation,” where a
Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct
view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will
be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign
law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an
injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since
to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would
be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before
the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should
be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, to characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be

to disregard the nationality principle and the reasons
_______________
23 Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, supra note 15 at p. 421; p. 666.
647
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 647
Republic vs. Manalo
which render the adoption thereof necessary; it would be tantamount to insisting that
Filipinos should be governed with whatever law they choose.
Article 26(2) of the Fam-

ily Code rests on substan-
tial and reasonable dis-
tinctions.
It has been argued that the verba legis interpretation of Article 26(2) of the Family
Code violates the equal protection clause, and that the application of the provision in
this manner would not only be oppressive, but likewise unconstitutional.
These reservations appear to proceed from three different classifications which, in
turn, have been called into question — first, that between Filipinos in mixed
marriages and Filipinos who are married to fellow Filipinos; second, that between
Filipinos and foreigners; and finally, that between men and women.
As earlier discussed, the ponencia finds the first classification “superficial [and]
arbitrary”24 insofar as it limits the scope of recognition to cover only those divorce
decrees obtained by foreign nationals.
It bears to stress, however, that the guarantee of equal protection under the
Constitution does not require that all laws indiscriminately operate with equal force
with respect to all subjects at all times;25 the guarantee does not preclude
classification provided they are reasonable and based on substantial distinctions.26
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on per-
_______________
25 See generally Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, 259 Phil. 1016; 180 SCRA
533 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
26 See Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 206-208; 417 SCRA 503, 525 (2003)
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
648
Republic vs. Manalo
sons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances

surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied
if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.27 (Emphasis supplied)
There should be no dispute on the existence of substantial distinctions between
Filipinos in mixed marriages and those who are married to fellow Filipinos. In fact,
several of these distinctions were highlighted in the ponencia, thus:
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences
between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are po-
_______________
27 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 559-560;
446 SCRA 299, 344 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
649
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 649
Republic vs. Manalo
litical, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino
against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.28 (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by the ponencia, the most important distinction between Filipinos in

mixed marriages and those who are married to fellow Filipinos is their exposure to
the absurdity for which Article 26(2) had been precisely crafted, as only Filipinos in
mixed marriages may find themselves married without a spouse due to the effects of
a foreign divorce decree. This distinction is “substantial” as to necessitate a difference
in treatment before the law.
To disregard these substantial distinctions for the sake of liberality would
empower Filipinos in mixed marriages to obtain divorce decrees by invoking foreign
law at whim, and effectively sanction a legal preference in their favor at the expense
of those Filipinos who happen to be married to their fellow Filipinos. A liberal
interpretation of Article 26(2) would, in Dean Carale’s words, “encourage Filipinos to
marry foreigners.”29
To stress, all Filipinos are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce. The
recognition afforded to foreign divorce under Article 26(2) is extended only
as a means to recognize its residual effect on Filipinos whose marital ties to
their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national
laws. The provision was not intended to grant any preferential right in
favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but intended merely to recognize the
operation of foreign divorce on foreigners whose national laws permit
divorce.
Equally apparent is the fundamental distinction between foreigners and Filipinos
under the second classification, the former being subject to their respective national
laws and the latter being bound by
_______________
1986, p. 14.
650
Republic vs. Manalo
the laws of the Philippines regardless of their place of residence. Clearly, foreigners and
Filipinos are not similarly situated. Hence, the determination of their legal status, among
others, cannot be made subject to the same parameters. In any case, I emphasize, at the sake
of being repetitious, that such classification had been created not by Article 26(2) of the
Family Code, but rather, the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code:
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
living abroad.
Finally, I find that Article 26(2) does not make any discernable distinction between
men and women, as the exception therein may be invoked by both men and women
with equal force to attain the same end, provided that the requirements for its
application obtain. While I am certainly aware that the respondent in this case is one
of the many Filipino women who find themselves in unsuccessful marriages with
foreign nationals, I am equally aware that this unfortunate circumstance is similarly
faced by Filipino men, who, like their female counterparts, are precluded from
obtaining an absolute divorce under Philippine law.
Respondent’s case falls

outside of the scope of
Article 26(2) of the
Family Code.
In this case, it has been established that (i) the respondent is a Filipino citizen who
married a Japanese national; (ii) it was the respondent who subsequently
obtained a divorce decree against her Japanese husband from a Japanese
court; and (iii) the respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Recognition and
Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment30 before the RTC.31 It is clear that respondent is,
and has always been, a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the
_______________
30 Formerly captioned as Petition for Cancellation of Entry of Marriage; see Ponencia, p. 595.
31 Id.
651
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 651
Republic vs. Manalo
nationality principle, respondent’s personal status is subject to Philippine law which,

in turn, prohibits absolute divorce.
Hence, the divorce decree which respondent obtained under Japanese law cannot
be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the
Philippines. Nevertheless, the verba legis application of Article 26(2) does not deprive
the respondent of legal remedies, as she may pray for the severance of her marital
ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the
Family Code.
The Constitution mandates the protection of the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.32 In this connection, the Family Code characterizes marriage as a
special contract of permanent union, and regards the family as “an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law” and
generally, not subject to stipulation.33 Upon these fundamental principles rests the
prohibition against absolute divorce, which had remained effective and unchanged
since the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950.34
Adherence to this prohibition is met with much reservation, as it purportedly
forces Filipinos to play second fiddle to their foreign spouses, and places said Filipinos
at a disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued in the deliberations of the Court that
such adherence sanctions various forms of abuse that plague mixed marriages, and
deprives Filipinos in such marriages of a way out. I find that these observations,
pressing as they are, already delve into the wisdom of statutes governing marriage
and personal status with which the Court cannot interfere.
To note, Article 26(2) of the Family Code has remained unchanged since the
issuance of EO 227. The blanket recognition of absolute divorce overturns the Court’s
unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in the cases
of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin, Bayot, Fujiki and Medina, which span a period of
nearly three decades. Ascribing a contradictory interpretation to the provision, under
_______________
32 CONSTITUTION, ART. II, Sec. 12.

33 FAMILY CODE, Title I, Art. 1.
34 See generally Raymundo v. Peñas, 96 Phil. 311 (1954) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
652
Republic vs. Manalo
the guise of equal protection, essentially rewrites Article 26(2) and gives it a meaning
completely different from the framers’ intention.
While I am not oblivious to the difficulty that results from the prohibition on
absolute divorce and commiserate totally with the respondent in this regard, I find
that the prohibition remains, and thus, must be faithfully applied. To my mind, a
contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also
that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is bound to
respect the prohibition, until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same
through the passage of a statute permitting absolute divorce.
As recognized by the ponencia, there are currently four bills on the subject of
divorce and severance of marriage pending before the 17th Congress: (i) House Bill
No. 116 (HB 116) and House Bill No. 2380 (HB 2380) which propose different grounds
for the issuance of a judicial decree of absolute divorce; (ii) House Bill No. 1062 (HB
1062) which proposes the inclusion of separation in fact as an additional ground for
annulment of marriage; and (iii) House Bill No. 6027 (HB 6027) which proposes
additional grounds for dissolution of marriage. These bills have been consolidated
and substituted by House Bill No. 730335 (HB 7303), which, at present, is awaiting
deliberations before the Senate.36
HB 7303 proposes the issuance of divorce decrees on the basis of the following
grounds:
1. The existing grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage under
Articles 55 and 45 of the Family Code;
2. Separation in fact for at least five years;
_______________
35 An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines.

36 HB 7303 passed its second reading on March 14, 2018, and was likewise approved on its third and
final reading before the lower house on March 19, 2018. See “House passes divorce bill on second reading,”
<http://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/423557> (last accessed on March 19, 2018) and “House approves divorce
bill on 3rd reading,” <https://www.rappler.com/nation/198516-divorce-bill-philippines-passes-third-
reading-house-representatives> (last accessed on March 22, 2018).
653
VOL. 862, APRIL 24, 2018. 653
Republic vs. Manalo
3. Psychological incapacity, whether or not present at the time of the celebration

of the marriage;
4. Gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another undertaken
by either spouse; and
5. Irreconcilable marital differences.37
These movements towards the passage of a divorce law illustrate that the difficulty
which results from the absolute prohibition against marriage is being addressed by
the 17th Congress through a statute specifically crafted for the purpose. That the
legislature has seen it necessary to initiate these proposed laws is a clear
delineation of the Court’s role — that is, to simply apply the current law and
not for it to indulge in judicial legislation.
Indeed, it is desirable, if not imperative, that statutes in a progressive democracy
remain responsive to the realities of the present time. However, responsiveness is a
matter of policy which requires a determination of what the law ought to be, and not
what the law actually is.38 Widening the scope of the exception found in Article 26(2)
so as to indiscriminately recognize foreign divorce in this jurisdiction is doing, in
Justice Elias Finley Johnson’s39 words, “exactly what the Legislature itself [has]
refused to do.”40 It not only subverts the standing public policy against absolute
divorce; worse, it sanctions a violation of the fundamental principle of separation of
powers — a violation which cannot be undone by any subsequent law. To wield
judicial power in this manner is to arrogate unto the Court a power which it does not
possess; it is to forget that this State, is foremost governed by the rule of law and not
of men, however wise such men are or purport to be.
Considering the foregoing, I submit that the Court of Appeals erred when it
reversed the RTC’s order denying respondent’s Petition for Enforcement. Hence, I
vote to GRANT the instant Petition for Review.
_______________
37 See HB 7303, Sec. 5.

38 See generally People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
39 Justice Elias Finley Johnson served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
from 1903 to 1933.
40 See Nicolas v. Alberto, 51 Phil. 370, 380 (1928) (Dissenting Opinion, J. Johnson).
654
Republic vs. Manalo
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in part. Case remanded to court
of origin.
Notes.—Article 78 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083 states that the care and
custody of children below seven (7) whose parents are divorced shall belong to the
mother, and the minor above 7 but below the age of puberty may choose the parent
with whom he/she wants to stay. (Mendez vs. Shari’a District Court, 5th Shari’a
District, Cotabato City, 780 SCRA 53 [2016])
It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves; a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void
marriage. (Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, 818 SCRA 83 [2017])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO

III, respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.—This case concerns the applicability of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty
to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in
the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second
marriage. x x x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
115
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 115

Republic vs. Orbecido III
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.—We are unanimous in our holding
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.—We state the twin elements
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point
is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for Declaratory Relief.—The
requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Br. 23.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
116
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision dated May
1
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
2
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.” 3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discov-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 20-22.

2 Id., at pp. 27-29.
3 Id., at pp. 21-22.
117
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 117
ered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s
5
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated
_______________
4 Id., at p. 105.
5 Id., at pp. 106-110.
6 Id., at p. 110.
118
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage

between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree,
_______________
7 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
8 Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286,
citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
119
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 119
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity
to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second
marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators
in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the “Family Code,” which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
120
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented
by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings on the Family Code, the Catholic
9
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to

Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. 1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are

Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not
be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them
abroad can.
2. 2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad
will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil
_______________
9 Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
121
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 121
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
10
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse
is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
11
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according
_______________
10 No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

11 G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
122
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent. 12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. 1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. 2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced”
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
_______________
12 Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
123
VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 123
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges
of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for
it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would
still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
14
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
15
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would
be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
_______________
13 Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
14 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
15 Id., at p. 451.
124
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution set aside.
Note.—The accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the
Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy. (Diego
vs. Castillo, 436 SCRA 67 [2004]).
——o0o——

Republic Vs Manalo

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G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018.

** Designated Acting Chief Justice.

stitution.—While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Caguioa, J., Dissenting Opinion:

The facts are undisputed.

4 Id., at pp. 42-43.

6 Id., at pp. 40-41.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the

27 Id., at pp. 114-115; pp. 121-122. (Citations omitted)

29 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 8.

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,

57 Rule 131, Section 3(a).

tected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on

e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code,

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage

84 San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16 at pp. 292-293; p. 311.

86 Id., at pp. 293-294; pp. 312-313.

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the

In granting Manalo’s petition, the CA noted:

ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do

Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Martires, Tijam, Reyes,

That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our

2 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1 provides:

3 Rep. Act No. 9710, Sec. 2 provides:

Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not

4 CONST., Art. II, Sec. 14.

Finally, my agreement with the ponencia is also impelled by my understanding

patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship prone to abuse in such intimate relationships.

Article 26(2) of the Family Code

However, subsequent deliberations show that the Committee ultimately resolved

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

7 See CIVIL CODE, Arts. 15 and 17.

In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to remarry before the courts,

12 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 3 at pp. 115-116; p. 122.

be invoked by a foreign national to evade the effects of a divorce decree issued

19 Medina v. Koike, supra note 14.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court held in Iyoy:

Article 26(2) of the Family

The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family Code as unconstitutional,

ated as a matter of necessity, in recognition of the classification between Filipinos

Hence, to characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be

23 Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, supra note 15 at p. 421; p. 666.

Article 26(2) of the Fam-

sons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances

As observed by the ponencia, the most important distinction between Filipinos in

Respondent’s case falls

nationality principle, respondent’s personal status is subject to Philippine law which,

32 CONSTITUTION, ART. II, Sec. 12.

35 An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines.

3. Psychological incapacity, whether or not present at the time of the celebration

37 See HB 7303, Sec. 5.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO

VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 115

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

1 Rollo, pp. 20-22.