BEFORE,

THE HON’BLE NAGPUR BENCH OF BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

Nishant .......................................................................................................................PETITIONER

V.

Priyanka.................................................................................................................RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

Application under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code

Nishant..................................................................................................................PETITIONER

V.

Priyanka.............................................................................................................RESPONDENT

Memorial on Behalf of Petitioner

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .......................................................................................... ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... x
ISSUES RAISED......................................................................................................................... xii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................... xiii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ....................................................................................................... 1
I. THAT THE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION
AND APPLICATION FILED UNDER §482 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS
MAINTAINABLE. ..................................................................................................................... 1
1. Maintainability Of Petition Under Article 227 ................................................................... 1
1.1 There is an error apparent on the face of the record ..................................................... 1
1.2 There is violation of Procedure ..................................................................................... 2
2. Maintainability Of Application Under §482 CrPC. ............................................................ 3
2.1 To prevent the abuse of process of court ...................................................................... 3
2.2 To secure the ends of justice ......................................................................................... 4
II. THAT THE RELIEF OF INTERIM MAINTENANCE UNDER SECTION 23 OF THE
ACT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED. ....................................................................................... 6
1. No Prima Facie Case of Maltreatment ................................................................................ 6
1.1 No maintenance to unemployed but qualified wife. ..................................................... 7
1.2 Allegations of mental, physical and economic violence are false and vague. .............. 8
2. No Reasonable Cause To Leave The Matrimonial Home .................................................. 8
3. Domestic Incident Report Which Is Necessary Was not Submitted................................... 9
III. THAT THE FIR FILED UNDER §377 AND §498-A SHOULD BE QUASHED UNDER
§482 OF CrPC........................................................................................................................... 11
1. No Offence Under §377 Ipc .............................................................................................. 11
1.1 Wider Scope Of §375.................................................................................................. 11
1.2 Section 375 Is Not Subject To 377 ............................................................................. 11
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1.3 Importance of Consent ................................................................................................ 12

1.4 Ambiguity in The Word ‘Order of Nature’................................................................. 13
2. No Offence Under§498-A Ipc .......................................................................................... 14
2.1 The Intent Of §498-A is Different .............................................................................. 14
2.2 There is No Cruelty as Defined in §498-A ................................................................. 15
2.3 Malicious Intention on the Part of Priyanka ............................................................... 15
2.4 There is no Harassment to Constitute Cruelty ............................................................ 16
PRAYER ...................................................................................................................................... xv
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS

DV Act Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad
M.P Madhya Pradesh
Guj. Gujarat
Raj. Rajasthan
Mad Madras
PEN Penal
IPC Indian Penal Code
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
Ltd. Limited
CJM Chief Judicial Magistrate
CrLJ Criminal Law Journal
HC High Court
SCR Supreme Court Reporters
Bom Bombay
ed Edition
Ker Kerala
LR Law Reporter
NCT National Capital Territory
UP Uttar Pradesh
SC Supreme Court
HP Himachal Pradesh
AP Andhra Pradesh
MANU Manupatra
DLT Delhi Law Times
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MPLJ Madhya Pradesh Law Journal

RCR (Criminal) Rajasthan Criminal Reporter
Ors. Others
No Number
Anr. Another
Kar Karnataka
U/S Under Section
v Versus
UOI Union of India
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Supp Supplement
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
Exp Explanation
i.e. That is
INR Indian Rupee
Hon’ble Honorable
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 Cases
Anuj Gargand others v. Hotel Association of India and others, (2008) 3 SCC 1 ......................... 13
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 .................................................................... 16
Ashmin Kashmiri v. Pushkar Kashmiri,(2018) Online H.P. 841.................................................... 6
B.S. Joshi v. State of Harayana, (2003 ) 4 SCC 675..................................................................... 15
B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 2003 (4) SCC 675 ......................................................................... 5
Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board, AIR 1999 SC 519 ............................................................ 2
Bheekha Ram v. Goma Devi And Ors., (1999) SCC Online (Raj.) 265 ........................................ 9
Damanreet Kaur v. Indermeet Juneja & Another, 2012 (19) RCR (Criminal) 905 ........................ 7
Deb Narayan Haldar v. Anushree Haldar, (2003) 11 SCC 303. ..................................................... 8
Ganga Prasad v. State, 1964 SCC OnLine All 136......................................................................... 3
Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 5 SCC 177. ........................................ 16
Gopala Genu v. NPAA Trust, AIR 1978 SC 347 ........................................................................... 3
Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800. ..................................................... 12
Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., (1999) 4 SCC
710............................................................................................................................................... 1
Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh, (2006) 3 SCC 312........................................... 1
Kuppili Sridhar Kumar & Others v. Kupilli Siva Santoshi & Another, MANU/A.P./0661/2013. 6
Mamta Jaiswal v. Rajesh Jaiswal, 2000 (3) MPLJ 100. ................................................................. 7
Mohd. Habiburrahman Faizi v. State of U.P., 1996 Crim LJ 861 (“All”). ..................................... 4
Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. Of Hills Divison, AIR 1958 SC 398 ........................................... 1
Narayan DejuPuthrani v. Labour Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1957 Bom 142. .................................. 2
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 ................................................................... 3
Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1. .............................................................. 12
P.G. Jose v. T.K. Madhu, 1994 SCC OnLine Ker 423 ................................................................... 3
Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC. 641 ............................................................... 5
Rupali Gupta v. Rajat Gupta, MANU/DE/2384/2016. ................................................................... 7
Sanjay Bhardwaj & Ors. v. State, 171 (2010) DLT 644. ................................................................ 7
Sathish Mehra v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 506. ...................................................... 4
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Satish Kumar Batra v. State of Haryana, (2009) 12 SCC 491. ..................................................... 16

Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, 1977 Crim LJ 1146 ........................................................... 5
Smt. Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri,(1999) SCC Online (All.) 262; Bheekha Ram v. Goma Devi
And Ors., (1999) SCC Online (Raj.) 265.................................................................................... 9
Srikant RangacharyaAdya v. Anuradha, 1979 SCC Online (Kar.) 186 ........................................ 15
State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582 ........................................................ 16
State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Chhotelal Shukla, (1997) 11 SCC 26 .......................................... 16
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 ................................................................ 1
Uma Narayanan v. Mrs. Priya Krishna Prasad, (2008) SCC OnLine (Mad.) 543 ........................ 10
Zenna Soralaji v. Virabell Hotel Company (P) Limited, AIR 1981 Bom 446. .............................. 3

 Statutes
CODE CRIM. PROC., 1908, §482....................................................................................................... 3
PEN. CODE, 1860 §375. ................................................................................................................. 11
PEN. CODE, 1860 §377 .................................................................................................................. 11
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §12 .................................................. 2, 3
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §2(n). ................................................ 10
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §23. ..................................................... 6
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §3(1)(d). ............................................. 2
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §3(d)(iv) ............................................. 8
Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §9, §37. .............................................. 9
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 Rule 6. .......................................... 10
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 §5. ............................................... 2, 3

 Books
B.M. Gandhi, Indian Penal Code 815 (1996) (K.A. Pandey 4th ed. 2017)................................... 14
B.M. Gandhi, Indian Penal Code 816 (1996) (K.A. Pandey 4th ed. 2017)................................... 15
B.M. Gandhi, Indian Penal Code 819 1996 (K.A. Pandey 4th ed. 2017). .................................... 15
P.K. Das, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence 462 (2007) (4th ed. 2011). .................. 10
P.K. Das, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence, 426 (2007) (4th ed. 2011). ................... 9
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Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1009 (1908) (BM Prasad and Manish
Mohan 21st ed. 2016). ................................................................................................................. 4
Suman Nalwa and Hari Dev Kholi, Law reating to Dorwy, Dowry Death, Cruelty to Women &
Domestic Violence, 477 (2011) (2nd ed. 2013). ........................................................................... 9
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Memorial on Behalf of Petitioner

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioner humbly submits that this memorandum for petition filed before this Hon’ble
Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court of which has been posted for final hearing invokes the
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court.

Petition Under Article 227 of Constitution of India.

The Petitions invoke the appellant jurisdiction of this Honorable High Court specified under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Application Under Section 482 of CrPC.

The application invokes the inherent power of Honorable High Court.

This memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments for the petitioner in the
given case.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

MARRIAGE BETWEEN PRIYANKA AND NISHANT

Priyanka, an engineer is a graduate of Engineering from VNIT Nagpur. She is from Nagpur and
got married to Mr. Nishant on 28th July, 2017 at Nagpur according to Hindu rites and customs.
He is an engineer and a graduate from IIM Shillong andwas working and staying at San
Francisco, United States and had salary of INR 2.5 lac per month. Their marriage was an
arranged Marriage. The newly married couple went to USA on the very next day of their
marriage i.e., on 29 July, 2017 and started cohabiting at residence of Nishant.

PROBLEMS ARISING AFTER MARRIAGE

Priyanka alone returned back to Nagpur to her parents without informing Nishant & for the first
time after wedding on 3rd September, 2018. She told her parents that Nishant was a man of
perverted desires and preferred having intercourse against the order of nature. While in early
days of marriage she raised objection to such relations later she had made her peace with it and
through unwillingly she stopped objecting to such intercourse.

But her silence finally took toll on her mental health and when she refused to have physical
relations with Nishant, he became emotionally distant & started ignoring her. When her parents
asked Nishant, he said that he was a man of particular tastes and she was very much aware of the
same since before their marriage & she never voiced her protest. He, further informed that,
though she was very well qualified yet she refused to work professionally in USA & also refused
to take care of household chores. He also informed her parents that despite of his multiple
attempts to tell her to control her spending, she did not listen to him and hence just a month
before he had told her that he will be taking her credit card away. Since then she was refusing to
have any physical relations with him.
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FILING OF FIR AND APPLICATION FOR INTERIM MAINTENANCE

Priyanka approached City police station (Nagpur) to lodge complaint against Nishant. Officers of
City police station registered a First Information Report against Nishant as Crime No. 47/18 for
offences under §498A and§377 of Indian Penal Code on September 6, 2018 and also filed
Proceedings under the provisions of domestic violence act against Nishant before the learned
court of chief judicial magistrate, Nagpur inter alia making allegations of mental, physical &
even economic violence on September 7, 2018. Nishant in turn filed his reply to the said
proceedings and applications therein, stating that there has not been any violence and hence
Priyanka was not entitled to any maintenance under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act.

GRANTING OF INTERIM MAINTENANCE

The learned magistrate on December 27, 2018 allowed the application filed by Priyanka for
interim maintenance and granted maintenance to the tune of INR 1,00,000/- per month.

Prior to decision of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nishant had filed an application before
Hon’ble Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court under §482 of Code of Criminal Procedure inter
alia seeking quashing of First Information Report registered as Crime No. 47 of 2018 at City
Police station, Nagpur. The Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court was pleased to issue
notice to the complainant in the said matter & till then further investigation in the said First
Information Report was stayed.

APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF CJM

After decision of the learned Chief Judicial magistrate grantingmaintenance to Priyanka, Nishant
filed a petition under article 227 of Constitution of India, before Hon’ble Nagpur Bench of
Bombay High Court inter alia challenging the said order. The court issued the notice to Priyanka
in the said matter and by way of interim relief stayed effect and operation or order dated
December, 2018 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in the Domestic Violence complaint
filed by Priyanka.
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ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER THE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION

AND APPLICATION FILED UNDER §482 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS
MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER THE RELIEF OF INTERIM MAINTENANCE UNDER §23 OF THE ACT

SHOULD BE GRANTED?

3. WHETHER THE FIR FILED UNDER SECTION 377 AND SECTION 498-A SHOULD BE
QUASHED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CrPC?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THAT THE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION

AND APPLICATION FILED UNDER §482 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS
MAINTAINABLE.

The counsel humbly submits before the Hon’ble Nagpur bench of Bombay High Court that the
petition filed under article 227 of Indian Constitution and application filed under §482 of Code
of Criminal Procedure is maintainable. The High Court can interfere under article 227 when
there is an error apparent on the face of the record and also has an inherent power under §482
CrPC to quash the proceedings if prima facie case is not made out against the accused. In the
present case there is violation of procedure because the chief judicial magistrate has not followed
the procedure while granting maintenance to Priyanka. No prima facie case is made out against
the accused. The FIR is filed out of an ill motive to harass the petitioner. Therefore, to prevent
the abuse of process of court and to secure the ends of justice, the FIR should be quashed.

2. THAT THE RELIEF OF INTERIM MAINTENANCE UNDER §23 OF THE ACT

SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED.

It is submitted that a prima facie case qua maltreatment and existence of instances of domestic
violence is required to be made out to grant interim maintenance as per the mandate of the
Protection of Women from Domestic violence Act, 2005, but this was not proved in the present
case. Allegations of physical, mental and economic abuse made are vague and false, there is
absolutely no material of any kind to support the version of the complainant. The respondent is
also well-qualified and capable of maintaining herself. It is also stated that there was no
reasonable and sufficient cause for the respondent to leave the matrimonial home. Neither there
is evidence to show that husband has denied cohabitation between the parties. Also, there is no
compliance of Rule 6 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules 2006 and no
DIR was submitted before taking any cognizance of the alleged offence. Thus, it is contended
that the respondent should not be granted interim maintenance.
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3. THAT THE FIR FILED UNDER §377 AND §498-A SHOULD BE QUASHED UNDER
§482 OF CrPC.

The counsel humbly submits that the FIR filed under §377 and §498A should be quashed as no
prima facie case is made out against the accused and the wider scope of §375 will immune
Nishant and prevent him from being held guilty under §377.

Further, §375 IPC which does not criminalize consensual carnal intercourse between
heterosexuals including husband and wife is not subject to §377 IPC. The indeterminacy and
vagueness of the terms ‘carnal intercourse’ and ‘order of nature’ renders §377 infirmed. In the
present case, Nishant is not liable, if made liable for having sexual intercourse with his own wife
would deteriorate the sanctity attached to the institution of marriage, and will bring Stress in the
institution of marriage and would go against the principles of family harmony.

The object of section 498 is related to dowry death and there was neither there was cruelty nor
harassment and §498A can prove to be a weapon to women to harass their husbands.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THAT THE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION

AND APPLICATION FILED UNDER §482 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS
MAINTAINABLE.

¶1.The counsel humbly submits before the Hon’ble Nagpur bench of Bombay High Court that
the petition filed under article 227 of Indian Constitution and application filed under §482 of
Code of Criminal Procedure before the hon’ble Nagpur bench of Bombay high court is
maintainable.

1. MAINTAINABILITY OF PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 227.

¶2.It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court that petition
under article 227 of Indian Constitution is maintainable because the High Court can interfere
with interim orders of courts and tribunals if they are without jurisdiction.1 If a lower court
comes to a finding of fact asking itself a wrong question in an improper manner, the said finding
cannot be said within the jurisdiction and, therefore, can be corrected under Article 227. Failure
to necessary findings to support the order of court is also a jurisdictional error which can be
corrected under this article.2

1.1 There is an error apparent on the face of the record

¶3.Under Article 227, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions
within the limits of its authority.3 But it can interfere when there is an error apparent on the face
of the record. 4 In the present case Priyanka was granted interim maintenance under the Domestic
Violence Act in spite of the fact that she was not subjected to any of the acts or conduct defined
as ‘domestic violence’ under the Act.

¶4.Physical abuse means any act or conducts which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain,
harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved

1
Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., (1999) 4 SCC 710.
2
Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh, (2006) 3 SCC 312.
3
Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. Of Hills Divison, AIR 1958 SC 398.
4
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675.
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person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force.5 In the present case she
was not subjected to any act which has caused her bodily pain, harm or danger to life, limb or
health etc. and she has not even alleged that which kind of physical violence she was going
through. There is no economic abuse in this case because she was not deprived of the thing
which is required out of ‘necessity’ and to spend extravagantly on clothes, parties and other
luxurious items does not come under the word ‘necessity’.

¶5.The Supreme Court has asserted that under Article 227, the High Court can set aside a finding
of fact by the tribunal if it is arrived by non-consideration of the relevant and material
documents, the consideration of which could have led to an opposite conclusion.6 In the present
case if the Chief Judicial Magistrate has taken into consideration the fact that denying
extravagant spending does not constitute economic abuse and that she has not specified any
particular act which constitute physical violence then she would not have been able to get interim
maintenance of one lakh. Grant of interim maintenance on the basis of the allegations and not
looking into the fact that which act or conduct of the husband has constituted physical violence is
an error apparent on the face of the record.

1.2 There is violation of Procedure

¶6. The counsel humbly submits that the High Court can also interfere in the matters where there
is violation of procedure or disregard of principles of natural justice.7 In the present case the
magistrate passed the order granting interim maintenance to Priyanka without considering the
Domestic incident report which is a violation of procedure provided in the act.

¶7.As per the proviso of §128 the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident
report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider before passing order
on such application and as per §59 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules,
2006 the Protection Officer shall prepare a domestic incident report in Form I and submit the
same to the Magistrate and forward copies thereof to the police officer in charge of the police

5
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §3(1)(d).
6
Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board, AIR 1999 SC 519.
7
Narayan DejuPuthrani v. Labour Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1957 Bom 142.
8
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §12.
9
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 §5.
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station within the local limits of jurisdiction of which the domestic violence alleged to have been
committed has taken place and to the service providers in that area.’

¶8.It is humbly submitted that the interim order is liable to be set aside because there was
violation of §1210 and section §511 while granting interim maintenance to Priyanka because in
this case no DIR report was submitted to the magistrate and the magistrate without asking for the
DIR report passed the interim order. The provision of Domestic incident report is there to
prevent the false reporting of cases and if it will not be taken into consideration then it can lead
to injustice to the other party. Normally, the High Court does not enter into the arena of facts
under article 227 but the high court may interfere if a substantial portion of the evidence relied
upon by the lower courts is found to be inadmissible, or of no evidentiary value, 12 or a finding of
fact is not supported by any evidence, or is based on manifest misreading of evidence, or if its
conclusion is perverse.13It is submitted before the court that in this case the conclusion of the
magistrate is perverse and therefore the High Court can interfere under Article 227.

2. MAINTAINABILITY OF APPLICATION UNDER §482 CRPC.

¶9.It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the application filed under section 482
CrPC for quashing the FIR registered under section 377 and 498A IPC is maintainable because
there is no prima facie case made out against the accused. It is necessary to quash the FIR to
prevent the abuse of process of court. The Court held that regarding quashing of FIR, the
decision of the High Court ought to be guided by the following twin objectives14 –

2.1 To prevent the abuse of process of court

¶10.The power under §48215 should be exercised ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of
process of Court. The word ‘process’ is a general word meaning in effect anything done by the
court.16 The Court in P.G. Jose v. T.K. Madhu,17 held that ‘abuse of process’ means generally
that the filing of case is itself oppressive, having a collateral purpose, which is other than what
10
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §12.
11
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 §5.
12
Zenna Soralaji v. Virabell Hotel Company (P) Limited, AIR 1981 Bom 446.
13
Gopala Genu v. NPAA Trust, AIR 1978 SC 347.
14
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466.
15
CODE CRIM. PROC., 1908, §482.
16
Ganga Prasad v. State, 1964 SCC OnLine All 136.
17
P.G. Jose v. T.K. Madhu,1994 SCCOnLine Ker 423.
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the case is to ultimately deliver under legitimate judicial process. The inherent power to quash
such proceedings should cautiously be used otherwise inherent power may itself happen to be
abused.

¶11.In the present case, the FIR was filed for a collateral purpose just to harass him because the
very fact that she denied to have any physical relations with him from the day he told her that he
will be taking her credit card. He did so because she was spending extravagantly and in spite of
his multiple attempts to tell her to control her spending, she did not listen to him. 18 It shows that
there was no offence as alleged by her under §377. Further, there is no conclusive proof of the
offence alleged under §498A as the allegations are vague and with an intent to harass the
petitioner.

¶12.In the latest judgement, the SC held in the case of Prof. RK Vijayasarathy&Anr v. Sudha
Seetharam,19 that ‘Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are not made
out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation of the criminal proceeding will
constitute an abuse of the process of the court.Therefore, the High Court should quash the FIR
because to allow the proceedings to continue would be allowing a farce to be enacted to the great
harassment of the accused. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or sham out to be
interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to abuse of process of
law.20

2.2 To secure the ends of justice

¶13.Every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a state has inherent
power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice.21 In Mohd. Habibur
Rahman,22 the Allahabad High Court quashed a complaint under §482 where it was found to be
factually false and untenable in law and was filed only with ulterior motive to harass and
humiliate the named accused. In such cases, it becomes necessary to impart justice to the party
against whom the false allegations are made.

18
Moot proposition, ¶4.
19
Unreported judgement, 2019.
20
Sathish Mehra v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 506.
21
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1009 (1908) (BM Prasad and Manish Mohan 21 st ed.
2016).
22
Mohd. HabiburrahmanFaizi v. State, 1995 SCC OnLine All 215.
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¶14.In the present case, the FIR was lodged with the motive to trouble the petitioner. On the face
of the compliant it shows that complaint is false because it was such then she would have
registered the complaint and not have waited for almost one year and two months. Therefore,
there is no need to continue the legal proceedings against him and it should be quashed. Where
allegations in a complaint or chargesheet did not constitute any offence, an order taking
cognizance, it was held, could be quashed by the high court in exercise of its inherent powers.23

¶15.The Court in ParbatbhaiAahir v. State of Gujarat,24 held that in forming an opinion whether
a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under §482,
the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the
inherent power. In the present case, quashing of FIR registered under §377and §498A will do
justice to the petitioner by saving him from undergoing trials of false allegations. The Supreme
Court in B.S Joshi25justified the exercise of powers under §482 CrPC to quash the proceedings in
matrimonial cases to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts and circumstances of
the case even where the offences alleged are non-compoundable.

23
Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, (1977) 1 SCC 505
24
ParbatbhaiAahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC. 641.
25
B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 2003 (4) SCC 675.
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II. THAT THE RELIEF OF INTERIM MAINTENANCE UNDER SECTION 23 OF THE

ACT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED.

¶16.The counsel humbly submits that interim maintenance should not be granted as the
allegations are false and vague, and without any conclusive proof.

1. NO PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MALTREATMENT

¶17.The counsel humbly submits that there was no prima facie case of maltreatment and the
learned court of Judicial Magistrate has failed to appreciate the common question that unless
domestic violence is proved, no relief can be granted to the respondent/complainant as per the
mandate of the Protection of Women from Domestic violence Act, 2005.

¶18.Additionally, the magistrate has failed to consider the evidences placed on record,
particularly which established that no cruelty or harassment has ever been caused by the
petitioner and also the salary details of the petitioner and passed the order in a very mechanical
way. The order was passed without recording any prima facie finding qua alleged instances of
maltreatment to the petitioner, by the respondent. The Court held that inAshminKashmiri,26that in
order to seek the relief of interim maintenance under §2327, a prima facie case qua maltreatment
and existence of instances of domestic violence was required to be made out which was not done
in this case.

¶19.In the present case, apart from making vague allegations, there is absolutely no material of
any kind to support the version of the complainant. On the other hand, because of the attitude of
the complainant and her way of life, her husband became upset and developed problems.
Material on record, prima facie, show that the complainant is accustomed to lead luxurious life,
and when denied of it she put false accusations on the petitioner. There were no specific
instances of domestic violence so the complaint is not maintainable under Domestic Violence
Act because it lacks mentioning of specific instances of domestic violence. Allowing such a case
to continue will be a complete abuse of the process of courts. The Court in Kuppili Sridhar
Kumar,28held that one of the main ingredients which has to be prima facie established before

26
Ashmin Kashmiri v. Pushkar Kashmiri,(2018) Online H.P. 841.
27
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §23.
28
Kuppili Sridhar Kumar &Others v. Kupilli Siva Santoshi &Another, MANU/A.P./0661/2013.
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Memorial on Behalf of Petitioner

claiming reliefs under the provisions of the said act is that there should be domestic violence as
contemplated under §3.In present case, there is no commission of domestic violence against her.
She is alleging all this out of her ill motive.

1.1 No maintenance to unemployed but qualified wife.

¶20.The counsel for the petitioner humbly submits that the respondent/complainant is a well-
educated lady and therefore, she does not require any maintenance and she is intentionally not
doing the job. The respondent also refused to take care of the household chores 29. The Court held
that the Court cannot ask husband that he should beg, borrow or steal but give maintenance to the
wife, more so when the husband and wife are almost equally qualified and almost equally
capable of earning.30

¶21.In the present case, that wife is an engineer graduate from VNIT Nagpur31 and therefore, can
very well maintain herself. It was held in the case of Damanreet Kaur,32 that a well-educated
lady who has chosen not to work on her own will, though has capacity to work and find suitable
job for herself, is not eligible for maintenance. Those seeking justice and equity from the court
must come to the court with clean hands. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
since the wife is well qualified and, therefore, can earn handsome amount by working and there
is no need for her to be financially dependent upon the husband, sheis not entitled for any
maintenance. The Madhya Pradesh High Court,33 held that the spouse well qualified to get
service immediately with less efforts is not expected to remain idle and put her burden on
husband for demanding maintenance and alimony.

¶22.Further, the wife is not entitled to take advantage of her own wrong, she cannot harass the
husband on the count of maintenance though she is capable to earn. In the present case in hand,
the wife is well qualified and it was held in Rupali Gupta v. Rajat Gupta,34 that maintenance can
be denied to professionally qualified capable of self-sustaining herself.

29
Moot Proposition, ¶4.
30
Sanjay Bhardwaj &Ors. v. State, (2010) 17DLT 644.
31
Moot Proposition, ¶1.
32
Damanreet Kaur v.IndermeetJuneja & Another, 2012 (19) RCR (Criminal) 905.
33
Mamta Jaiswal v. Rajesh Jaiswal,2000 (3) MPLJ100.
34
Rupali Gupta v. Rajat Gupta, MANU/DE/2384/2016.
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1.2Allegations of mental, physical and economic violence are false and vague.

¶23.The counsel submits that there was no physical and mental abuse as there was no complaint
made regarding use of any force on the respondent nor was there any act or conduct which is of
such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm or danger to life, limb etc. The fact that Nishant was
a man of particular taste was known to her before their marriage & she never voiced her protest
for almost a year. She refused to have physical relations and put false accusations on the
petitioner only when he cut off her expenses and took her credit card.

¶24.The allegations of economic violence are also false, for there to be an economic abuse there
should be deprivation of the basic necessities of lifeand willful negligence by the husband as
defined under §3(d)(iv)35. The respondent in the present case has done no such thing. He only to
control her exorbitant spending, told her that he will be taking her credit card away. The
respondent has never denied his wife the necessities of her lifestyle and has taken proper and due
care to maintain the respondent.

2. NO REASONABLE CAUSE TO LEAVE THE MATRIMONIAL HOME

¶25.It is humbly submitted that the allegations of matrimonial cruelty and violence are invented
by the respondent (wife) and are unacceptable on the grounds that the allegations made are
vague. On appreciation of the evidencetendered by the wife, itcan be concluded that she left his
house, probably because petitioner controlled her exorbitant spending on clothes, parties and
luxurious items and was unwilling to take care of the household chores and refused to work
professionally. Thus, it is contended that she is guilty of leaving him without any
reasonableexcuse.InDeb Narayan Halder,36the Apex Court held that the maintenanceapplication
of the wife is liable to be set aside, holding that she had on her own left thematrimonial home.

¶26.In the present case, there is no possibility ofill-treatment,it does not appear to be properand
legal in the circumstances of the case.The applicant has positively stated that she was subjected
to ill-treatment but she did not lodge any complaint inPolice Station, this prima-facie gives rise

35
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §3(d)(iv).
36
Deb Narayan Haldar v. Anushree Haldar, (2003) 11 SCC 303.
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Memorial on Behalf of Petitioner

to the fact that she was not ill-treated andshe has left the opponent house without any reasonable
excuse. Also, there is no scintilla of evidence showing that she really had lodged a complaint
about the matrimonial cruelty. Nor her so-called positive statement finds support from her. Her
merestatement could not have been taken as gospel truth as regards neglect and refusal of the
husband to maintain her.37 Petitioner was taking good care of her, she lived a comfortable life
and was duly maintained in her matrimonial home. The Court held that when there was no
reasonable and sufficient ground to live away from her husband then the respondent cannot be
entitled to maintenance.38

¶27.In the instant case, there is no evidence to show that husband has denied cohabitation
between the parties. Per contra the respondent has made false and wild disparaging allegations
against the spouse,sherefused to do any work then she filed a criminal case under §498A of IPC
against the appellant falsely and the respondent as a wife is guilty of deliberate refusal of sexual
intercourse since after the appellant tried to control her lavish spending. Also, it is specifically
alleged that the petitioner/husband all along cohabited with the wife till the wife/respondent
willfully withdrew herself from the matrimonial relationship. The right to be maintained by the
husband stems from performance of marital duty. It is only when the Court inter alia comes to
the finding that the wife claiming maintenance had been prevented from performing the marital
duty by the husband that she could be awarded maintenance.39 When it is found that the wife
declines to live with husband without any just cause and there is no evidence of ill-treatment by
the husband, wife is not entitled to maintenance.40

3. DOMESTIC INCIDENT REPORT WHICH IS NECESSARY WASNOT SUBMITTED.

¶28.In the present case, there is no Domestic Incident Report filed under §9(b) and §37(2)(c)41 of
the Act and also no compliance of Rule 6 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Rules 2006. According to that Rule, the complaint must be filed in Form II given in the Rules. It

37
P.K. Das, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence, 426 (2007) (4th ed. 2011).
38
Smt. Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri,(1999) SCC Online (All.) 262; Bheekha Ram v. Goma Devi And Ors., (1999)
SCC Online (Raj.) 265.
39
Suman Nalwa and Hari Dev Kholi, Law relating to Dowry, Dowry Death, Cruelty to Women & Domestic
Violence, 477 (2011) (2nd ed.2013).
40
Bheekha Ram v. Goma Devi And Ors., (1999) SCC Online (Raj.) 265.
41
Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §9, §37.
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was held that without compliance of Rule 6, the complaint cannot be entertained by the
Magistrate.42

¶29.Further, the complaint cannot be filled directly to the Magistrate, but it should be filed before
the Protection Officer as defined in §2(n)43and on receiving the complaint, the Protection Officer
will submit Domestic Incident Report and then the Magistrate will take cognizance of the matter.
In the present case, the Protection Officers, as contemplated under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 having not been appointed, the same is causing great
prejudice and loss to the petitioner.44

¶30.An application under Section 12 of Domestic Violence Act has to be treated in accordance
with provisions given under the Domestic Violence Act. Domestic Violence Act provides for
obtaining domestic incident report. The domestic incident report proforma is given in Form I of
schedule 2 of Domestic Violence Rule45. This proforma is in detailed analytical form wherein the
details of each incident of domestic violence are to be entered with date, time and place of
violence and person who caused domestic violence. The purpose is that all allegations made in
application must be specific and the court should not exercise jurisdiction without considering
domestic incident report since it is necessary for the Court to know before issuing any notice to
respondent as to who was the respondent who caused domestic violence and what was the nature
of violence and when it was committed. The proforma specifies different heads of physical
violence, sexual violence, verbal and emotional abuse, economic violence, dowry related
harassment and other forms of violence.

¶31.It is apparent from the above provision of Domestic Violence Act that before passing an
order on application, the magistrate has to take into consideration the domestic incident report
received from him by Protection Officer or Service Provider. No such thing was done in the
present case at hand.

42
Uma Narayanan v. Mrs. Priya Krishna Prasad, (2008) SCCOnLine (Mad.) 543.
43
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 §2(n).
44
P.K. Das, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence462 (2007) (4th ed. 2011).
45
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 Rule 6.
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III. THAT THE FIR FILED UNDER §377 AND §498-A SHOULD BE QUASHED UNDER
§482 OF CrPC.

¶32.The counsel humbly submits that the FIR filed under §377 and §498-A should be quashed
under §482 CrPC because no prima facie case is made out against the accused and there is
malicious intent on the part of Priyanka who filed FIR just to harass the petitioner.

1. NO OFFENCE UNDER §377 IPC.

¶33.It is humbly submitted that the petitioner has committed no offence under §377 because he
did not have sexual intercourse against the order of nature. Whatever he has done was consensual
and does not come under the scope of §377.
1.1 Wider Scope Of §375
¶34.The wider scope of §37546 will prevent Nishant from being held guilty under §377. After
amendment of 2013, the scope of §375 becomes wide. This amendment has rendered sexual
carnal intercourse against the order of nature. Under this section, the husband is immune by
virtue of exception 2 of §375 which states ‘Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his
own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.’ Hence, Nishant is immune
by virtue of §375.
1.2 Section 375 Is Not Subject To 377
¶35. §37747 contain no such descriptions/exceptions embodying the absence of willful and
informed consent and criminalize even voluntary carnal intercourse both between homosexuals
as well as between heterosexuals. While saying so, we gain strength and support from the fact
that the legislature, in its wisdom, while enacting §375 IPC in its amended form after the
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, has not employed the words - subject to any other
provision of the IPC. The implication of the absence of these words simply indicates that §375
IPC which does not criminalize consensual carnal intercourse between heterosexuals including
husband and wife are not subject to §377 IPC.In above context it can be contented that since
Nishant is husband of Priyanka hence, he is immune under §375, implying his non-liability under
§377.

46
PEN. CODE, 1860 §375.
47
PEN. CODE, 1860 §377.
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1.3 Importance of Consent

¶36.Since §375 is covering the aspect of sexual intercourse against the order of the nature dealt
in §377. Consent in §375 is completely irrelevant by the virtue of entering into matrimonial
institution and by way of an exception 2 of §375. It was held in Independent thought,48 that
when a woman is between 15 and 18 years of age then sexual intercourse with her is not rape if
the person having sexual intercourse with her is her husband. Her willingness or consent is
irrelevant under this circumstance.

¶37.The result of the above situation is that the husband of a woman between 15 and 18 years of
age has blanket liberty and freedom to have non-consensual sexual intercourse with his wife and
he would not be punishable for rape under the IPC since such non-consensual sexual intercourse
is not rape for the purposes of §375 and because §375 is not subject to §377 therefore, consent
plays no role.

¶38.The celebrated case of Navtej Singh johar v. Union of India,49 has laid emphasis on consent,
thus criminalizing non-consensual sexual acts which are against the order of the nature. In
arguendo, if consent is to be taken into consideration then in the case at hand there was consent
form her side. She was aware of the same before their marriage. Moreover, she never voiced her
protest in 1 year and 35 days.50 Having intercourse against the order of nature was one of his
primary condition before marriage and she had willingly accepted it. 51 Above stated facts clearly
show her consent to the act. Since, the sexual intercourse between the two was consensual,
therefore, it cannot be brought under the purview of §377.

¶39.§375 is a clear indicator that in a heterosexual context, certain physical acts between a man
and woman are excluded from the operation of penal law if they are consenting adults. Many of
these acts which would have been within the purview of §377, stand excluded from criminal
liability when they take place in the course of consensual heterosexual contact. Justice Indu
Malhotra contented in Navtej SinghJohar,52 that the provisions of §377 will continue to govern

48
Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800.
49
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
50
Moot proposition, ¶4.
51
Moot proposition, ¶5.
52
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
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non-consensual sexual acts against adults, all acts of carnal intercourse against minors, and acts
of bestiality, therefore, not covering consensual acts.

1.4 Ambiguity in The Word ‘Order of Nature’

¶40.The determination of order of nature is not a constant phenomenon as it changes with time.
Hence, every consensual sexual act done in a matrimonial institution cannot be brought under
penalization because this will lead to social problems. Moreover, the phrase ‘order of nature’ is
limited to the procreative concept.

¶41.The indeterminacy and vagueness of the terms ‘carnal intercourse’ and ‘order of nature’
renders §377 infirmed. Justice D Y Chandrachud in Navjot Singh Johar,53 stated that ‘Human
sexuality cannot be reduced to a binary formulation. Nor can it be defined narrowly in terms of
its function as a means to procreation.’ Further, the moral belief which underlies Section 377 is
that sexual activities which do not result in procreation are against the ‘order of nature’ and
ought to be criminalized under §377. The interveners submit that §377 criminalize anal and oral
sex by heterosexual couples as well. Hence, it is urged that Section 377 applies equally to all
conduct against the ‘order of nature’, irrespective of sexual orientation. This submission is
incorrect.’

¶42.There is no intelligible differentia or reasonable classification between natural and unnatural

sex as long as it is consensual in view of the decision of the Court in Anuj Garg and others v.
Hotel Association of India and others,54 in which the apex court laid down the principle that
classification which may have been treated as valid at the time of its adoption may cease to be so
on account of changing social norms.

¶43.The phrase ‘against the order of nature’ has neither been defined in §377 IPC nor in any
other provision of the IPC. The foundation on which §377 makes carnal intercourse an offence is
the precept that such carnal intercourse is against the order of nature. §377 is based on a moral
notion that intercourse which is lustful is to be frowned upon. It finds the sole purpose of
intercourse in procreation. In doing so, it imposes criminal sanctions upon basic human urges. It
does so, on the basis of a social hypocrisy which the law embraces as its own.

53
Id.
54
Anuj Gargand &others v. Hotel Association of India and others, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
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Memorial on Behalf of Petitioner

¶44.If it would have been that human beings lead a sanitized life, in which physical relationships
are conditioned by a moral notion of what nature does or does not ordain. It would have human
beings accept a way of life in which sexual contact without procreation is an aberration and
worse still, penal. It would ask of a section of our citizens that while love, they may, the physical
manifestation of their love is criminal. This is manifest and arbitrary in itself. Hence, a section
which in itself is very derogatory and unstable in nature, cannot make husband liable for having
sexual intercourse with his legally wedded wife with her consent.

¶45.In the present case, Nishant is not liable, if made liable for having sexual intercourse with his
own wife would deteriorate the sanctity attached to the institution of marriage, the state has
decided to make a provision in the nature of Exception 2 to §375 was solely based on the view of
the parliamentarians that criminalizing sexual intercourse between husband wife would bring
under stress the institution of marriage and would go against the principles of family harmony.
Hence, if we allow the institution of marriage to be challenged on the ground of §377
irrespective of wife’s consent then this can have its disadvantage. Since, this can give arbitrary
power to women, therefore, the weapon cannot be given solely in hands of wife if so under such
circumstance wife who earlier consented to the act later might withdraw on ground of
irrelevancy of consent, hence, the court might be then flooded with cases in regard to
matrimonial matters in context of §377.

2. NO OFFENCE UNDER§498-A IPC

¶46.It is humbly submitted that the petitioner has committed no offence under §498-A as the act
of Nishant does not constitute cruelty. The FIR was filed out of an evil motive to harass him as
he was trying to put restriction her extravagant spending.

2.1The Intent of §498-A is Different

¶47.The counsel humbly submits that §498-A was inserted as an independent chapter with effect
from December 25, 1983 by the criminal law (second amendment) Act, 1983. The object of this
chapter is to punish a husband and his relatives who torture the wife in order to coerce her or her
relatives to satisfy any unlawful demands or to drive her to commit suicide.55

55
B.M. Gandhi, Indian Penal Code 815 (1996) (K.A. Pandey 4th ed. 2017).
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Memorial on Behalf of Petitioner

¶48.As observed by the Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi56, the object of introducing chapter 20-A in
the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her
husband. §498-A was added with a view to punish a husband and his relatives who harass or
torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. 57 Since, this
section has a diverse object than the case at hand which deals with sexual relations under §377
and §375 between husband and wife which was consensual and therefore, immune under the
same, hence, he cannot be held guilty under this section.

2.2 There is No Cruelty as Defined in §498-A

¶49.The counsel humbly submits that the word ‘cruelty’ occurring in §498 A is to be understood
in accordance with the definition of the said word as given in the Explanation thereto. The said
Explanation consists of two clauses namely, clauses (a) and (b). With regard to clause (a) in case
at hand there are no evidences that prove she was driven to commit suicide or had any grave
injury was there or there was some danger to life, limb or health. Neither can it be established
from give circumstances that there was any danger to her physical or mental health.

¶50.Further, the case at hand does not at all satisfy clause (b) of the said Explanation, there was
no harassment with view of coercing her or any other related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or on account of failure by her or any person
related to her meet such demand. In Srikant RangacharyaAdya,58 the Karnataka high court has
taken a practical and broad view in conformity with the recent trend and development of
matrimonial law. The court observed that to define this word is to limit its application and that is
not advisable. Failure to comply with one of the essential obligations of martial life or any
conduct of either spouse which causes disgrace to the other or subjects him or her to annoyance
and indignity, amounts to legal cruelty. However, cruelty for the purpose of §498-A must be
understood in the sense it is explained in the section itself.59

2.3Malicious Intention on the Part of Priyanka

¶51. §498A can prove to be a weapon to a woman. Therefore, women have started using it as a
weapon to get their husbands arrested if they are not satisfied with them or their behavior. In the

56
B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003 ) 4 SCC 675.
57
B.M. Gandhi, Indian Penal Code 816 (1996) (K.A. Pandey 4th ed. 2017).
58
Srikant RangacharyaAdya v. Anuradha, 1979 SCC Online (Kar.) 186.
59
B.M. Gandhi, Indian Penal Code 819 (1996) (K.A. Pandey 4th ed. 2017).
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present case there is similar situation, Priyanka preferred to spend “extravagantly” on her
clothes, parties and other luxurious items and when Nishant tried to control her spending and a
month before he told her that he would take her credit card away.60 After this she booked Nishant
under §489-A, based on false allegations. Such cases are registered every year, as a result, it
increases the pendency of cases in the courts.

¶52.The court in Satish Kumar Batra v. State of Haryana,61 said that ‘It is true that possibility of
abuse of law is no ground to declare a law invalid and it must be presumed, unless the contrary
is proved, that administration and application of a particular law would be done ‘not with an
evil eye and unequal hand’. The abuse of §498A is being done to such an extent that the
Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar,62 issued guidelines to be followed by the
investigating officer in cases of cruelty against women. Expressing concern over the manner in
which abuse of §498A is becoming an endemic problem, the court said that the attitude to arrest
first then proceed with the rest is despicable.

2.4There is no Harassment to Constitute Cruelty

¶53.It is humbly submitted that harassment is a series of acts and not singular or isolated act
which constitute cruelty for both the clauses.63 However, in the absence of evidence regarding
demand for dowry or other unlawful demand of property, harassment by itself cannot and would
not constitute ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of Explanation (b) of §498A.64 In the present case,
the act of putting restriction on extravagant spending does not amount to cruelty at all.

¶54.In State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao,65 the Supreme Court observed that for the purpose
of §498A, harassment simpliciter is not cruelty and it is only when harassment is committed for
the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand
for property.

60
Moot proposition, ¶4.
61
Satish Kumar Batra v. State of Haryana, (2009) 12 SCC 491.
62
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.
63
State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Chhotelal Shukla, (1997) 11 SCC 26.
64
Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 5 SCC 177.
65
State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582.
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PRAYER

Wherefore in light of the questions presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
the Appellant respectfully requests this Court to adjudge and declare that:

i. The petition under article 227 of the Constitution and the application under §482 of
Criminal Procedure Code is maintainable.
ii. Interim maintenance should not be granted under §23 of Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
iii. The FIR filed under §377 and §498A IPC should be quashed.

And pass any other order that it deems fit.

Date: On the behalf of counsel for Petitioner.

Place: