68. VDA. DE SINGSON VS.

DE LIM administratrix "to amend the project of partition so as to include therein the said
properties and that all of those not disposed of in the will be adjudicated in equal parts
VOL. 74, FEBRUARY 19, 1943 109 to the brothers and nieces of the deceased."
Singson vs. Lim The only question raised in this appeal is the interpretation of clause 8 of the will
[No. 48627. February 19, 1943] above quoted. Said clause provides that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise
TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SINGSON PABLO, deceased. ROSALIA ROSARIO VDA. DE in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." In
SINGSON, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOSEFINA F. VDA. DE LIM, oppositor- this connection appellants invoke article 751 of the Civil Code, which provides that "a
appellee, EMILIA FLORENTINA ET. AL., oppositors-appellees, EVARISTO SINGSON ET disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood
AL., oppositors-appellants. as made in favor of those nearest in degree."
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; INTERPRETATION OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISION IN CONNECTION
WITH ARTICLE 751 OF THE CIVIL CODE.— Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer, died The trial court noted that the testator, who was a lawyer, did not use the word
without any descendant or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his "relatives" in the clause in question. We do not need to decide here whether, had the
widow, four brothers, and four nieces, the children of a deceased sister. He left a testator used the word "relatives," the nieces would be excluded.111
will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which provides that "all of my properties VOL. 74, FEBRUARY 19, 1943 111
not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all Singson vs. Lim
who are entitled thereto." Article 751 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides that "a The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said
disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be article the nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and
understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree." The authorities differ on sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others, Manresa among them, hold
the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the nephews and that said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We
nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters of the think the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his
testator, as in legal succession; while others, Manresa among them, hold that said "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article 751
article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. Held: That and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts to all
the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate.
"relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal Yulo, C. J., Moran, Paras, and Bocobo, J J., concur.
parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate. Order affirmed.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Bautista, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
M. H. de Joya and Evaristo Singson for appellants.
Teofilo Mendoza and Vicente Paz for appellees.
OZAETA, J.:
Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April 15,1938,
without any descendant or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow
Dona Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and four nieces, the chil-110
110 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Singson vs. Lim
dren of a deceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which
reads as follows:
"Octavo.—Ordeno y mando que todos mis bienes no dispuestos de otro modo en
este testamento, se distribuirán en partes iguales a todos los que tienen derecho a
ello."
The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties
not disposed of in the will were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of
the deceased "in the proportion provided in paragraph 8 of the will." The brothers,
appellants herein, objected to the project of partition insofar as it includes the nieces of
the deceased, on the ground that under clause 8 of the will, in relation to article 751 of
the Civil Code, they were not entitled to any share. The nieces also objected to the
project of partition, alleging that certain other specified properties had been omitted
therefrom, which formed part of the properties not disposed of and which under clause
8 of the will "should be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." The
trial court sustained the contention of the nieces (appellees herein) and ordered the

Page 1 of 5
 70. LAPUZ VS. EUFEMIO On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and
VOL. 43, JANUARY 31, 1972 177 canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously
Lapuz vs. Eufemio until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties
No. L-30977. January 31, 1972. during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner- named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance
appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee. of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S.
Persons and family relations: Legal separation; Action abated by death of one of the Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
spouses before final decree.—An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged
bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim properties, counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O.
legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, Lapuz Sy, on the grou nd of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese
stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Being personal in character, it follows that the death of the action itself—actio personalis moritur Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.
cum persona. But before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present
Same; Same; Same; Even if action involves property rights; Article 106 of the Civil Code surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular
explained.—A review of the result ing changes in property relations between spouses shows that accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation: hence, they can not survive the death On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the “petition for legal separation”1 on
of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. Article 107 makes it apparent that the right to the two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property ), the provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for
loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or legal separation.
community , or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the On 26 June 1969 , counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms if the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case.2 In the body
in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be
difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff’s cause of action has survived, which the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of property rights.—These rights are mere effects of a court resolved in the negative. Petitioner’s moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not September 1969.
come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14
death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights October 1969. The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who
and claims would necessarily remain unborn. prayed for the affirmance of the said order.3
Same; Declaration of nullity of marriage; Effect of death of one of the spouses.—Such Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed
action became moot and academic upon the death of one of the spouses, and there could be no counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz
Code of the Philippines could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either marriage to be null and void ab initio.
the surviving spouse or by the heirs of the deceased spouse. _______________
Remedial law; Substitution of the deceased party in an action for legal separation involving But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute—for the lower court did
property rights.—A claim to the rights provided for by Article 106 of the Civil Code is not a claim not act on the motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows
that “is not thereby extinguished” after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of “When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of
Court, to warrant a continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party. The same nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?”
result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court, Neither actions for legal to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted
separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration. that “the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim” (Petitioner’s Brief, page
PETITION for review by certiorari of an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of
Manila. the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant. by the counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee. has a voidable marriage as a precondition.
REYES, J.B.L., J.: The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action
29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, involves property rights?
dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil
as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and
the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by
and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment. their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation

Page 2 of 5
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in
causes the death of the action itself—actio personalis moritur cum persona. the enumeration.
“. . . . . . . . . . When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even
is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of separation, their
the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come in to existence, so that
D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D, H, 1933, 332.”4 before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
“Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical
divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of remain unborn.
the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his
separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise,
are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as
decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a
111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N. Y. 127, 89 N. E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article
659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185. 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141.”5 first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three
Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208). persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
plaintiff if it o ccurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: voidable marriage must be carried out “in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
“Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: spouse”, as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
1. “(1)The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage proceeding.
bonds shall not be severed; ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
2. “(2)The conjugal partnership of grains or the absolute conjugal community of property Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the profits earned by the partnership or community , without prejudice to the _______________
provisions of article 176; 6
“Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
1. “(3)The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless married, or that marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
appoint a guardian; co-ownership.”
2. “(4)The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse Concepcion,
by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. ,
in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . concur.
....... Judgment affirmed.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains Note.—For a comprehensive treatment of jurisprudence on actions that do not survive, see 11
(or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share SCRA 749.
of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy —————
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms
of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature
and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that “is not thereby extinguished” after a party dies,
under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a
substitute of the deceased party.
“Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) day s, or within such time as may be
granted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .”
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or
against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
“SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall
be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.”

Page 3 of 5
 71. BARITUA VS. CA Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity)—Bienvenido Nacario’s widow, Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia
VOL. 183, MARCH 22, 1990 565 executed on March 27, 1980 a “Release of Claim” in favor of the petitioners and PFICI,
Baritua vs. Court of Appeals releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from
G.R. No. 82233. March 22, 1990.* the accident which resulted in her husband’s death and the damage to the tricycle
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF ________________
1
APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents. Chua, Segundino G., J., ponente, Ejercito, Bienvenido C., and Lapeña, Nicolas P., Jr.,
Civil Law; Succession; Surviving Spouse; Mere estrangement is not a legal ground JJ., concurring.
2
for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.—It is Judge Conchita Carpio-Rosales, presiding.
3
patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a Rollo, 46.
4
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of Id.
5
heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot Id., 42.
6
a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not Id., 46.
compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with 567
Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so VOL. 183, MARCH 22, 1990 567
even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground Baritua vs. Court of Appeals
for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in
Same; Same; Same; The purchase price of the damaged tricycle loaned to which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or
Bienvenido (private respondents’ deceased son) and the latter’s funeral expenses criminal, against the petitioners.7
shouldered by private respondents are not liabilities of petitioners. They are but money On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident
claims against the estate of private respondents’ deceased son.—Neither could the private on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario,
respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of
petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the Camarines Sur.8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for
purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private
purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their
son. These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage to the tricycle
been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The
Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim’s widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their
their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a “Release Of Claim” in favor of the obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that
petitioners. the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, Chua, J. P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle,
________________ P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and
*
SECOND DIVISION. for moral damages.9
566 After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and
Baritua vs. Court of Appeals successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners. (petitioners).10
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents. The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial
SARMIENTO, J.: court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by
laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December the private respondents in their own capacity and
11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, ________________
7
Camarines Sur.2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private Id., 42.
8
respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs. Id., 24.
9
The facts are as follows: Id., 62-65.
10
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Id., 42-44.
Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, 568
figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned 568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his Baritua vs. Court of Appeals
passenger died,4 and the tricycle was damaged.5 No criminal case arising from the incident not as “heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns” of Alicia; and Alicia could not have
was ever instituted.6 validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the
the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus’ insurer—Philippine First Insurance appellate court said that the petitioners “failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants

Page 4 of 5
(private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and
the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
fact in their testimony x x x.”11 Anent the funeral expenses,” (T)he expenses for the funeral Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.
contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). x x x. Payment (for these) were made by the (Emphasis ours.)
appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor.”12 570
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private 570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for “complete” funeral Baritua vs. Court of Appeals
services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney’s It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without
fees.13 The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision 14 but a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes
their motion was denied.15 Hence, this petition. of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not
petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with
despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim’s Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so
compulsory heirs. even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground
The petition is meritorious. for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief
1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished: loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the
(1) By payment or performance; expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims
________________ against the estate of their deceased son.16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the
11
Id., 50. petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial
12
Id. settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim’s widow and
13
Id., 45-51. heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she
14
Id., 52-58. executed a “Release Of Claim” in favor of the petitioners.
15
Id., 61. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is
569 REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
VOL. 183, MARCH 22, 1990 569 REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
Baritua vs. Court of Appeals SO ORDERED.
1. (2)By the loss of the thing due; Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
2. (3)By the condonation or remission of the debt; Petition granted; decision reversed and set aside.
3. (4)By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor; ________________
16
4. (5)By compensation; Rule 87, Section 1, Rules of Court; see also, MORAN, 3 Comments on the Rules of
5. (6)By novation. Court, 479-480 (1980).
(Emphasis ours.) 571
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation arising from the accident VOL. 183, MARCH 22, 1990 571
that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the Rubio, Jr. vs. Sto. Tomas
surviving spouse and the one who received the petitioners’ payment, is entitled to it. Note.—The rights to the succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his heirs
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom from the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and
payment to extinguish an obligation should be made. obligations that survive the decedent. (Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., L-15499, February
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 526.)
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. ———o0o———
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The
Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. 1.Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. 2.In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
3. 3.The widow or widower;
4. 4.Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
5. 5.Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

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