PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SOTERO NAVARRETE
(G.R. No. L-43833, November 28, 1980, MAKASIAR, J)
DOCTRINE: It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused person cannot be
convicted in the courts of these Islands of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is
tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged
before he is put on trial
EMERGENCY RECIT: Sotero Navarette was charged with the rape of his own daughter. Upon arraignment, he pleaded
“not guilty” to the charge. The trial court found him guilty of the crime of rape, so did the CA. But the issue is that in the
information, the records disclose that only one charge of rape was committed, yet the evidence established by the
prosecution showed that the accused committed two other separate sexual intercourses on separate dates. The Supreme
Court held that indeed, the accused is guilty, but only for the charge included in the information. The SC held that: An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information because the Constitution guarantees
that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEDRO FLORES, JR., y FLORES ALIAS PESIONG,
(G. R. No. 128823-24. December 27, 2002, CARPIO-MORALES, J)
DOCTRINE: It is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives.
As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused
cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or
information.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Accused Pedro Flores was found guilty by the trial court on two charges of statutory rape and was
sentenced to death in both cases. The accused contends that he was denied the constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Supreme Court held that: The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse between a man and a woman under the circumstances enumerated in the penal
code.Thus, to sustain a conviction, the complaint or information must allege that the accused had carnal knowledge
of or sexual intercourse with the private complainant. Here, in the criminal complaints at bar, however, no such
allegation was made. The allegation in the instant criminal complaints that accused-appellant sexually abuse[d] the private
complainant cannot thus be read to mean that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with the
private complainant. The SC hence found the informations as null and void against the accused as violative of his
constitutional right.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO QUIBATE,
(G.R. No. L-54881, July 31, 1984, GUTIERREZ, JR., J)
DOCTRINE: Counsel de oficio's absence during the first promulgation of the decision rendered it uncertain whether or not
the accused was going to appeal. The fact that the accused is a detention prisoner does not justify the conjecture that he
did not appeal and that he had started the service of his sentence. It is the duty of the lower court to ascertain whether or
not the detention prisoner whose sentence of conviction had just been read intended to appeal. Upon the answer would
have depended its power to modify the decision but within the period for the taking of an appeal.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Accused Quibate was found by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. After the trial court’s promulgation of its decision
sentencing the accused to a period of imprisonment of 12 years minimum to 17 years maximum, it had second thoughts
and issued an order canceling the promulgation upon noting that the regular counsel de oficio was not present at the time
and the accused refused to sign a copy of the receipt of the decision.
The SC held that the trial court should have categorically asked the counsel de oficio of the accused (who was not the
counsel de oficio who handled the defense of the accused) whether or not he would appeal. Because the accused did not
file any notice of appeal immediately after the judgment was promulgated, the trial court jumped to the conclusion that he
had no intention of taking an appeal.
MANUEL BORJA vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and
HON. ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of the City Court of Cebu (Branch I)
G. R. No. L-45667; June 20, 1977
FERNANDO, J.
DOCTRINE: The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds support in the
procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed
as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed
in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Manuel Borja was accused of slight physical injuries. Respondent Judge Senining proceeded with
the trial in absentia and found him guilty of such offense. Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. Without any notice to Manuel and without requiring him to submit
his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered against petition. According to Manuel, the failure to arraign
him was violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, specifically of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
The Supreme Court nullified the decisions of the two judges for failure to arraign the accused which is violative of his right
to procedural due process.
FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO vs. HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR.
G. R. No. L-37933; April 15,1988
GANCAYCO, J.
DOCTRINE: Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is
acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from
the custody of the law.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence
on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has
consistently held that the right of the accused to and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr. together with Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula,
Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio were charged with the crime of murder. All the accused were arraigned and each of
them pleaded not guilty. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno set the hearing of the
case. All the accused were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled hearing, private respondent Teodoro escaped from
his detention center and failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscal handling the case to file a motion with the lower
court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that private respondent be tried in absentia.
The trial court proceeded with the case. The court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five while holding in
abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The dispositive portion stated that the case remains pending
without prejudice on the part of the accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense
whenever the court acquires back jurisdiction. The petitioners questioned this portion. The Supreme Court held that the
court did not lose its jurisdiction when respondent escaped. Moreover, the failure of the respondent to appear in court waived
his rights to cross-examine and present evidence on his behalf.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH XLV, URDANETA, PANGASINAN and RODOLFO VALDEZ, JR.
G. R. No. L-64731; October 26, 1983
RELOVA, J.
DOCTRINE: The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after
arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of Identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided
he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on
trial.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Rodolfo Valdez, Jr was charged with murder before the RTC of Pangasinan, First Judicial Region,
Branch XLV in Urdaneta. He was out on a P30,000 bail bond. After his arraignment, thru his counsel, manifested in open
court that he was waiving his right to be present during trial. The prosecuting fiscal moved that respondent be compelled to
appear and be present at the trial so that he could be identified by prosecution witnesses. Respondent judge in his Order
held that he cannot be validly compelled to appear and be present during the trial of the case. The Supreme Court held that
he can be compelled to appear during trial. The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital
offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of Identification by the witnesses
of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as
the defendant in the case on trial.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRISCO HOLGADO
(G.R. No. L-2809, 22 Maech 1950, Moran C.J.)
DOCTRINE:
Under Rule 112, Sec. 3, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Frisco Holgado was charged with the crime of slight illegal detention. On the day set for trial, the Judge asked him if he has
a lawyer and if he pleads guilty. Holgado said he has no lawyer and he pleads guilty, but that he “was instructed by one Mr.
Ocampo”, resulting to a qualified plea. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding before the trial court is irregular from
the beginning. Rule 112, Sec. 3 prescribed 4 important duties to be complied with when a defendant appears without an
attorney. As there was failure in compliance, there was a denial of fair hearing under the due process clause under the
Constitution.
EMMA DELGADO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R No. L-46392, November 10, 1986 PARAS, J.
DOCTRINE:
An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf
will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a
denial of due process.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
This is a petition for "Certiorari and mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction" to review the following orders:
a. Order of the Court of Appeals dated April 20, l977 denying petitioner's Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Judgment, to Recall the Records and allow the movant to personally receive copy of the decision dated February
16, 1977;
b. Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 3, 1977 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated May
23, 1977; and
c. Order dated May 11, 1977 of the Court of First In- stance of Manila ordering petitioner's arrest and confiscation of
her bond.
All the accused, except Catalino Bautista, pleaded not guilty. Delgado was represented by Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, but said
counsel failed to appear during the continuation of the defense evidence for he was allegedly sick, hence he sent a request
for postponement but was denied by the trial court and thus considered Delgado to have waived her presentation of her
evidence, then the case was submitted for decision. She was then guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years and
4 months prision correccional as minimum to 6 years prision correccional as maximum. Upon appeal alongside Celia
Capistrano, the CA sustained the decision on Delgado but reversed Capistrano’s. When the judgement was final, the
records of the case was remanded to the trial court for its execution. Believing that there was an irregularity in the sending
of notices and copy of the decision as petitioner was not informed or notified of said decision by Atty. Yco, Delgado thus
filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allw the Movant to Personally Receive
Copy of the Decision with the CA, but said motion was denied. The CFI of Manila issued an Order for Delgado’s arrest and
the confiscation of her bond because of her failure to appear at the execution of judgement. Delgado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration because she has just recently found that the counsel representing her was not a member of the Bar and
prayed for a new trial with a competent counsel representing her, but this was also denied.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALERIANO AMESTUZO
(G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001, KAPUNAN, J)
DOCTRINE: The guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.
EMERGENCY RECIT: An information charged Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro Viñas and
four other accused, whose identities are unknown and who are still at large up to the present, were charged with the complex
crime of robbery in band with double rape. The trial court convicted the accused with the complex crime of robbery in band
with double rape. Defendant Ameztuzo contended that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived him of his
constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for
identification without the benefit of counsel, accused-appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative
to be assisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police and placed on detention.
Furthermore, there was doubt as to the testimonies of the witness regarding the identity of the accused, as testimony of
witness Rosales corroborates Ampatin's declaration in court that he does not know herein accused-appellant and merely
pointed to him out of fear of the police. These testimonies remain unrebutted by the prosecution as the arresting officers
were not presented to refute or deny the same. The foregoing testimonies exculpating accused-appellant have sufficiently
cast at least a shadow of doubt as to his guilt. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted the
accused of the crime charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZOSIMO CRISOLOGO
(G.R. No. 74145, June 17, 1987, PADILLA,J)
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur
DOCTRINE: The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise,
to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The
accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not
safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
EMERGENCY RECIT: A criminal complaint was filed by the Station Commander with the Municipal Court of Magsaysay,
Davao del Sur against the accused Zosimo Crisologo alias "Amang," a deaf-mute, for robbery and homicide alleged to have
been committed in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. When the arraignment was set, the accused was
allegedly informed of the charge against him through sign language by Special Policeman Alejandro Muñoz, a childhood
acquaintance. Mr. Muñoz subsequently entered a plea of guilty on behalf of the accused. Upon objection of counsel,
however, this plea was disregarded and arraignment was rescheduled until such time as the Court could avail of the services
of an expert in the sign language from the school of the deaf and dumb. Several more attempts to acquire an expert in the
sign language but to no avail. The trial proceded and the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial
court. The SC reversed this decision stating that the absence of the expert in sign language violated the right of the accused
to due process since he was not given the opportunity to be heard and it was never ascertained that he understood the
nature of the accusations against him.
ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, (Sanchez, J.)
DOCTRINE: A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to
complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle. An information
was filed against the accused together with other accused that they conspired, with intent to gain and
abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not
guilty. During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused
opposed. Fiscal contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel of accused
answered that it will only incriminate his client. But the judge ruled in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted.
THE UNITED STATES v. ONG SIU HONG
(G.R. No. 12778, AUGUST 3, 1917, MALCOLM, J.)
DOCTRINE: To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit
himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence;
or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a
witness against himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his
mouth. The SC held that forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth is along the same line as requiring
him to exhibit himself before the court. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as
requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an
accused in his absence.
PEOPLE v. ANTONIO OTADORA ET AL.
[No. L-2164. April 26, 1950] Ponente: BENGZON, J.
Doctrine: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-lNCRIMINATION.—"Measuring or photographing the
party is not within the privilege" against self-incrimination. "Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes.
Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done."
Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. Early in the morning of June 16, 1947,
Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were shot dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. Antonio Otadora, the
defendant, was soon after arrested. Antonio confessed in an extra-judicial statement wherein he implicated Hilaria Carreon,
asserting that she induced him to commit the crime with the promise of a monetary reward. Both defendants were charged
with double murder in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation was waived and the record
was forwarded to the CFI, Antonio pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. In August 1947, the CFI of Leyte charged
both Antonio Otadora and Hilaria Carreon for the murders. Hilaria pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate trial. During
her trial, the following are condensed testimonies from witnesses, mainly from Antonio:
1) Apolonia Carreon was the sister of Hilaria. Due to a family quarrel regarding inheritance, Apolonia filed a criminal
complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos but were later withdrawn after a
friendly mediation;
2) Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April, 1947. That they had an initial discussion wherein Hilaria
would give Antoinio P3,000 if he would liquidate the spouses. He did not agree, then the proposal was renewed
with better conditions being offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.);
3) Hilaria supplied the weapon, a revolver as well as a bolo, a pair of trousers from Hilaria’s husband Francisco
Galos, a hat and a flashlight; however, the revolver was defective so Antonio returned it back to Hilaria, who had it
repaired by Benigno Baltonado who had previously sold it to her;
4) Antonio carried out the crime in the morning of June 16;
5) After committing the murders, Antonio returned to barrio Matica-a intending to go to Hilaria's home; but her
husband signalled him to go away. Later on, Hilaria warned Antonio that he was wanted by the police. He was given
money, then prepared to escape to Camotes Islands. But he was caught before he could run away.
Hilaria denied any connection with the assassination, presenting a theory that Antonio was motivated by revenge upon Leon
Castro because Castro was a spy who caused the death of Antonio’s father, Sergio Otadora at the hands of the Japanese.
And killed Apolonia Carreon as she was a witness. The theory can not be lawfully accepted. As Antonio denies that his
father died at the hands of the Japanese.
During the proceedings, the pants and hat worn by Antonio who asserts it was given to him by Hilaria, were made to be put
on Francisco Gallos to determine whether he owned it or not. When Francisco denied ownership of the pants, he was
ordered to put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly.
This incident gave the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional protection against self-
incrimination had been erroneously disregarded when Francisco was made to put on the pants.
Issue: W/N measuring Francisco to try on the pants violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination?
Held: NO "measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege" (against self-incrimination). "Nor is the removal
or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things
to be done." (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 878, quoted in Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil., 570, 576).
The Court finds that Hilaria did indeed induce Antonio to commit the double murder and furnished the deadly firearm. She
is just as guilty as if she herself had perpetrated the murderous assaults. The slaying is qualified by the circumstance of
treachery. It is aggravated by evident premeditation; but for lack of sufficient votes the appellant is sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment for each murder, (not exceeding 40 years, art. 70, Rev. Penal Code), and to indemnify the heirs of the Castros
in the sum of P4,000.
PEOPLE v. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR
SORELA
(G.R. No. 71902, September 30, 1987, Sarmiento, J.)
APPEAL
DOTRINE: Extrajudicial confessions done without the assistance of counsel, in contemplation of law, is involuntary even if
it were otherwise voluntary, technically. Evidence based on forced re-enactment is also incompetent evidence. Such were
violations of Constitutional infirmity within the ban against self-incrimination and that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
EMERGENCY RECIT: This is an appeal from the decision of RTC to Zamboanga Del Norte sitting in DIpolog City stemmed
from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging four accused for the murder of Deosdedit Bagon. Olvis was
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, while the three accused-appellants filed their statements to continue the appealed
case. The three accused-appellants pointed then Mayor Olvis as the principal by inducement in their five extrajudicial
statements. However, they recanted their confessions and Villarojo admitted inflicting fatal wounds on the deceased, which
in turn made him criminally liable for the crime of homicide. Cademas and Sorela were acquitted on the grounds that their
guilt was based on the evidence gathered from the re-enactment of the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE ORSAL
G.R. NO. L-47069 | MARCH 29, 1982
Ponente: Per Curiam
Doctrine: The test of violation of the right to speedy trial begins counting the delay from the time the information is filed, not
before the filing.
Emergency recit: Vicente Orsal is one of four (4) accused in four (4) separate cases filed in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City for two cases of Arson, Robbery in Band with Multiple Homicide, and Robbery in Band with Homicide. He
then contested that his right to speedy trial accorded in the Constitution was violated because the information was filed only
about nine months after his arrest. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay in the filing of the information, which in the
instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is, therefore, not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has
been a denial of the right to speedy trial. The test of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting
the delay from the time the information is filed, not before the filing.
TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988, Yap, J.)
DOCTRINE: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case
to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the
law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed
by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed
by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee
of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions),
the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information
filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command, charging Francisco S. Tatad with alleged
violations of RA 3019. Five years later, it became publicly known that Tatad resigned as Minister of Public Information. Two
months after, de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against Tatad, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices.
The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the previous report filed. This complaint was forwarded for fact-finding
investigation. Roberto Dizon, in his investigation report that Tatad indeed violated RA 3019. Tatad filed with the
Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the informations on the ground that the prosecution deprived accused-
movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. The Supreme Court
ruled in favour of Tatad.
FRANCISCO DELA PEÑA vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.)
DOCTRINE: The right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 16 of Article III thereof
provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies." This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
In the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay.
EMERGENCY RECIT: COA conducted an audit of the operations of a fishing vessel under the management of the Davao
del Norte School of Fisheries, Panabo, Davao del Norte. Thereafter, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Marie Dinah Tolentino
issued an order requiring herein petitioners and three other respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits. After
seeking for an extension of time to file their counter-affidavits, petitioners and their co-respondents filed their respective
counter-affidavits, the last of which was filed on December 3, 1992. GIO Coresis came up with a resolution on October 10,
1996, and it was finally approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on April 28, 1997. Based on that Resolution, an
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on May 6, 1997 charging petitioners with the violation of Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019. When the case was set for arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash because it was only
after the lapse of four (4) years and six (6) months, that the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao came out with its
resolution and information. Such an unreasonable length of time in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted
"inordinate delay" amounting to "a clear and flagrant violation of the constitutional right[s] to due process and speedy
disposition of cases." The prosecution asserted that there was neither inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation nor
any violation of any right of the petitioners. From the time the last counter-affidavit was filed, other incidents, letter-queries,
requests and other communication were taken into consideration and acted upon by GIO Tolentino. Thereafter the case
was reassigned to GIO Coresis. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because the case was transferred to GIO
Coresis. He had to go over the lengthy COA report and counter-affidavits of the five respondents, as well as the numerous
receipts and other evidence forming part of the "voluminous records." It took him more or less two years to evaluate the
evidence and come up with a resolution. In any event, the delay could scarcely be considered as "vexatious, capricious and
oppressive." Moreover, it was only at the time of arraignment that petitioners raised the issue. During all those four years,
they failed to show signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts, like
filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted
as a waiver of such right.
ABELARDO B. LICAROS v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
(G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, Panganiban, J.)
DOCTRINE: The unreasonable delay of more, than ten (10) years to resolve a criminal case, without fault on the part
of the accused and despite his earnest effort to have his case decided, violates the constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of a case. Unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege applies not only during the trial stage,
but also when the case has already been submitted for decision.
EMERGENCY RECT: On July 6, 1982, the Tanodbayan (now Special Prosecutor) filed an Information for robbery with
the Sandiganbayan docketed as Crim. Case No. 6672 against the persons allegedly responsible for the robbery of the
Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank. Petitioner Abelardo B. Licaros, who was then the Vice Chairman and Treasurer
of the Home Savings Bank, the bank where the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen money was charged as an
accessory to the crime. After trial, the case was deemed submitted for decision on June 20, 1990. Notwithstanding the
lapse of more than ten (10) years after the case was deemed submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not
rendered the Decision. Hence, the present petition. According to petitioner, the unexplained failure of the
Sandiganbayan to render the Decision for more than ten (10) years violated his constitutional right to due process and
to a speedy disposition of the case. The Supreme Court upheld the contention of petitioner. According to the Court,
petitioner had been assertively and assiduously invoking his right to a speedy disposition even before the case was
submitted for decision on June 20, 1990. He filed several motions: an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, a Motion to Resolve
and a Reiterative Motion for Early Resolution, all of which have fallen on deaf ears in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
has been kept in the dark as to the final outcome of the case, which was deemed submitted for decision more than ten
years. And though such failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended by respondent court, its unjustified
delay has nonetheless caused just as much vexation and oppression, in violation of the right of petitioner to a speedy
disposition of his case. The criminal case against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan wasdismissed.
PEOPLE v. ANG GIOC (alias ANG GIOC KO, alias TOMAS)
(GR No. 48547, 31 October 1941, Abad Santos, J.)
Petition for Review on Certiorari
DOCTRINE: The right of appeal is a statutory right which may be waived, even by the defendant himself. By RESP’s failure
to appear for trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal.
EMERGENCY RECIT: October 30, 1926, the respondent Ang Gioc, together with Sio Go, Gang Kan, and Chua Chui, was
charged with the crime of frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On November 5, 1926, he was released
on bail. After protracted trial, he was found guilty of murder by the CFI. Ang Gioc and his sureties were duly notified to
appear before the court for the reading of the sentence, but the former failed to appear and thereupon the trial judge ordered
his arrest and the confiscation of the bond furnished for his temporary release. However, he has escaped and fled to China,
fact that was only found 13 years after the scheduled date for the reading of the decision. He was subsequently brought to
the court for arraignment, against the objection of the Solicitor General, he was allowed to file a bond for his temporary
release. Herein respondent appealed and filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the CA. SC reversed and
declared the CFI decision, final and executory.
RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190798 | Jan. 27, 2016 | Perez, J.
Doctrine:
The fact that a particular counsel de oficio did not or could not consistently appear in all the hearings of the case, is effectively
a denial of the right to counsel, especially so where, as in the instant case, there is no showing that the several appointed
counsel de oficio in any way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had
suffered in any substantial sense therefrom
Summary: The Ibañezes were convicted of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE by the RTC-Las Pinas, which the CA
affirmed with modifications. During the pendency of the trail, multiple counsel (4 attorneys) were designated successively
as the petitioners counsel de officio. They now are claiming that their right to counsel was deprived because Atty. Manzano
failed to show up thus 2 witnesses of the prosecution was not crossed examined. Now they’re raising the issue that they
were deprived of their right to counsel.
ELMER G. SINDAC @ "TAMER," v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
(G.R. No. 220732, 06 September 2016, Perlas-Bernade, J)
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Doctrine: Section 5, Rule 113 identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These
are:
a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
and c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In instances a & b, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential. Under Section
5(a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
Emergency Recit: PO3 Penamora and PO1 Asis have conducted surveillance operations on Sindac’s alleged drug trade.
On April 17, 2007, they saw Sindac transacting with Canon while they were about 5-10meters away from them. Suspecting
there was illegal drugs involved, they searched for Sindac’s wallet and found a sachet of shabu. They arrested him and
brought him to the police station. RTC and CA rules that Sindac is guilty of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs based
on a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest.
SC held that there was no valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest considering that the arresting officers were at a
considerable distance of 5-10 meters away from the scene and that the actuations of Sindac cannot be considered criminally
overt act to warrant an arrest and a search. The police lacked personal knowledge of the existence of a commission of a
crime since they only based the search and arrest on the information they gathered from their surveillance operations.
