Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan

Author(s): Khalid Bin Sayeed

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1959), pp. 389-406
Published by: Middle East Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4323166 .
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 COLLAPSEOF PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACYIN PAKISTAN
KhalidBin Sayeed

P ARLIAMENTARYdemocracyis both a form of governmentand

a way of life. It has worked well among homogeneouscommuni-
ties which can afford to bicker without resorting to violence or
civil war, or can do so at a time when the ambitionsof others concerning
them are relatively few. Its form of government is the constitutional ex-
pressionof certain idealsin which the community believes.Consent of the
people is the bedrock on which the whole edifice of democracy has been
reared.
Those who have watched Pakistan's political history are led to ask
whether democracy is part and parcel of the Pakistaniway of life. There
have been many occasionswhen heads at the Center and in the Provinces
flouted some of the fundamental conventions of parliamentarygovern-
ment and resorted to arbitrary action. But there was no leader or party
bold enough to rally the people to defend the sovereignty of the parlia-
ment. Perhapspeople's anger could not be arousedfor such causes. Nor
did Pakistanisseem to be capableof carrying on political debateswithout
tearing apart the fabric of the state. Both physically and culturally,
Pakistan is a heterogeneous community brought together because its
people, adherentsof Islam, refused to be absorbedby the wider Hindu
culture of India. Soon after Pakistanileaderswere assuredof the fact that
they had a separate state and that Hindus would no longer be able to
dominate them, they began a decade of squabbles.
It cannot be said that Pakistan lacked strong leaders. There were
too many of them and they were too strong for each other. What there
often seemedto be was a total lack of loyalty to any ideal or set of prin-
ciples or even to the country on the part of these party leaders.Pakistan
was very much like Hobbes' state of nature where every political or
provincial group fought against every other group. It was a ceaselessand
ruthless struggle for power. Most of the leaders thought of themselves,
their families, or at best their provincial groups and did not give a second
thought to Pakistan.Pakistanneeded a desperateremedy for this malady.
* KHALID BIN SAYEED is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of New Brunswick,
Canada. The author is grateful to the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, whose grant en-
abled him to carry on the research in Pakistan upon which this article is based. He was in Pakistan from
May to December, 1958.

389
390 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

And martial law was the Leviathan which emerged to maintain law and
order and public good at the point of the sword.
The Muslim League, which took credit for establishingPakistan, was
essentiallya party which lived not by programor organization,but by its
leaders.After MuhammadAli Jinnah'sdeath, it languishedas a coalition
of Punjabi-Bengaligroups, with the Frontier and Sindi groups sulking on
the sidelines.There was no one to challenge Liaqat Ali Khan and, with
his enormousprestige, he could at least prevent the Punjabisand Bengalis
from flying at each other's throats.
After Liaqat's assassinationin October 1951, one witnesses a contin-
uous conflict both in the Cabinet and in the Constituent Assembly
between the Punjabisand the Bengalis.Until the dissolutionof the Con-
stituent Assembly in October 1954, the Bengalishad not only a majority
in the Muslim LeagueParliamentaryParty, but had also secured the sup-
port of the Sind and Frontier groups. Punjabis, though in the minority,
had both the Civil Servants and the Governor Generalon their side. The
Punjabi Governor General,Ghulam Mohammad,could be relied upon to
frustrate Bengali attempts to foist any constitution on the country which
was likely to weaken the influence and power of the Punjabis.But Ghulam
Mohammad, in dismissing Khwaja Nazimuddin (see List of Perso-nsat
end of article for this and other names) in April 1953, and particularly
in dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954, had not merely over-
stepped his normal constitutional authority, but in doing so had to seek
the support of the Army. Dawn's comments on what had happened are
not too exaggerated:
There have indeed been times-such as that October night in 1954-when,
with a Generalto the right of him and a Generalto the left of him, a half-
mad GovernorGeneralimposedupon a capturedPrime Ministerthe dissolution
of the Constituent Assembly and the virtual setting up of a semi-dictatorial
Executive.'
Recently General Mohammad Ayub Khan himself has revealed that
Ghulam Mohammadhad asked him several times to take over the coun-
try.2 After the dissolutionof the Constituent Assembly in October 1954,
the Army was always in the background, holding its striking power in
abeyance.
In October 1955, the Punjabi group, led by ChaudhriMohamadAli,
Gurmani and Daultana, brought about the integration of West Pakistan.
Bengalis had often been charged not only with using their majority
against the Punjabis,but dividing West Pakistan itself by supporting the

1. Editorial, "Revolution,"Dawn (Karachidaily), August 11, 1957.

2. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Message to the Nation (Karachi: Ferozsons), October 8, 1958,
pp. 4-5.
 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 391
Sind and Frontier groups against Punjab. Thus, one of the principal
benefitsof the One Unit schemewas that East Bengal would be prevented
from playing "the small brother's big brother role" of dividing West
Pakistan.
The strategy used in integrating West Pakistan was spelled out in the
famous documents drafted by Daultana. In these documents could be
found the most explicit version of Pakistani Machiavellianism.A few
extracts will suffice:
In fact the real merit of the present regime is that it can hold a pistol to
achieve political, constitutional agreement.
. . . It would be fatal to launch our political campaignif, for a period,opposi-
tion is not effectively stilled, and a time gained for our voice to gain volume
amidst surroundingsilence.
Punjab must be kept quiet. The folly of our friends must be checked. At a
later stage Punjab will have to take the lead. At that time I hope an effective
intelligent Punjableadershipwill have been put in place both at the Centre and
at Lahore.3
Daultana had argued that a judicious mixture of consent and force
should be used in integrating the province of West Pakistan. "With one
voice I assertthat One Unit can only be obtained and preservedwith con-
sent, with the other I demand that all opposition must be stilled."4But
in the triumvirate of Ghulam Mohammad,Gurmani and Chaudhri Mo-
hamad Ali, force was bound to win over persuasionby a heavy margin.
Pirzada and Noon were dismissedaccording to the plan laid down in the
documents. But Rashid, who, the documents urged, should be handled
carefully because he was the Chief Minister of a province where Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan was popular, was also arbitrarily dismissed and
thereby antagonized. Thus, it seemed that the plan had gone away. In-
stead of silencing opposition, it had raised a storm. The gulf created be-
tween Punjab, on one hand, and Sind and the Frontier, on the other, by
these political animosities was further widened by the excessively cen-
tralized administrativemachinery that came into being in Lahore. The
Report of the Council for Administration of West Pakistanhad warned:
"As the new Province of West Pakistanwould be a Province of long dis-
tances, care is to be taken that the public does not have to travel long
distances to the Provincial Capital for redressof their grievances."5This
warning presumablywent unheeded.

3. These extracts have been taken from Documents A, B, and C and Document "X". They were examined
by a Committee of the Constituent Assembly and quoted in the Assembly by several Members in the
debate on the Establishmentof West Pakistan Bill. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 1955,
Vol. I, pp. 508-513 and pp. 612-629.
4. Ibid.
5. Report of the Council for Administrationof West Pakistan (Lahore), Pebruary,1955.
392 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Chaudri MohamadAli was successful in presenting the Constitution

of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in March 1956. It was supposed to
be a compromise,but it left most of the major problems of Pakistan un-
resolved. West Pakistan was united, no doubt, into a single province, in
order to present a united front to East Bengal and persuadethe Bengalisto
accept parity. But in the second Parliamentof Pakistan, Punjabi-Pathan
and Punjabi-Sindi antagonism became as serious as the normal East
PakistanversusWest Pakistanconflict. The President'spowers were care-
fully circumscribedin order to prevent him from resorting to arbitrary
action under the cloak of reserve powers. But his discretionary powers
with regard to the dismissaland appointment of a Prime Minister left
him with enormousinitiative, the more so because there was no majority
party in the National Assembly. As regards the federal problem, it was
by no means certain that the Bengali demand for provincial autonomy
and equitable distributionof financial resourcesbetween the two parts of
Pakistan had been satisfied. In the words of Abul Mansur Ahmad, the
basic problem of Pakistan,namely, that of creating one state out of two
countries and one nation out of two peoples still remainedunsolved.6
When the West Pakistanprovince came into being in October 195 5,
it was expected that the Muslim League would continue as the majority
and the cementing force in West Pakistan.The central administratorshad
their own ideasabout how a party should function. To them it was a mere
instrument of their will and not a body to which they were responsible.
One provincial Minister had given place to another in the former prov-
inces of West Pakistan,but the Muslim League had continued to support
who ever was foisted on the province by the Government. The Muslim
League,true to form, had also accepted Dr. Khan Sahibas the Chief Min-
ister of West Pakistan.
The election of SardarAbdur Rabb Nishtar as Presidentof the Mus-
lim League upset the calculation of administratorslike Iskander Mirza,
ChaudhriMohamadAli and Gurmani.Nishtar belonged to the old guard
of the Muslim Leaguewho believed that the party should decide on major
policy matters and the Government should merely carry out the instruc-
tions of the party. He resented the fact that Dr. Khan Sahib, an ex-
Congressiteopponent of his from the Frontier, was being placed as Chief
Minister of West Pakistan by the Central administrators.The Muslim
League, therefore, decided to fight rather than face painlessdeath by be-
coming a handmaidenof the administrators.The West Pakistan Muslim
League ParliamentaryParty called upon Dr. Khan Sahib first to join the
Muslim League. Dr. Khan Sahib refused. Thereupon, the Parliamentary

6. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. I, p. 1816.

 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 393

Party in April 1956, called upon Dr. Khan Sahib's Cabinet Ministers
to resign from the Cabinet or face expulsion from the party. Dr. Khan
Sahib, backed by Governor Gurmani and Governor General Iskander
Mirza, formed the Republican Party. The result was that the strength
of the Muslim League, which claimed an overwhelming majority in the
House, was soon reduced to an equal position with the newly formed
Republican Party. Men like Pirzada, Rashid and Noon had been dis-
missed by the Governor General, who had suspected them of opposing
the One Unit plan. Now they saw the utter futility of opposing the
Governor General and his group and joined the Republican Party which
had the Government's blessing.
There was an alternative way of looking at the same situation. The
West PakistanAssemblywas divided into two rival landlordfactions. The
Republican Party was supported by landowners like Qizilbash, Noons,
Tiwanas, the Legharisand the Gilenis from old Punjab. All these families
were sworn enemies of the Daultana group. They were also joined by
Hasan Mahmood and the Lalekhafamily of Bahawalpur,Hoti from the
Frontier, Talpur, Pirzada, and the supportersof the Pir of Pagaro from
Sind. Daultana enjoyed support from landowners from Multan from
where he came, Qureshisfrom Sargodhato whom he was related, and the
Joya tribe to which he belonged and which existed along both sides of the
Sutlej River.7Daultana was also supported by the new middle class and
urban interests in Punjab.
What is significant is that the Punjab group in the West Pakistan
Assemblywas hopelesslydivided and membersfrom this group were lead-
ing both the Republican and Muslim League parties. The Punjab group,
both in the Muslim League and in the Republican Party, stood firmly in
favor of retaining the existing, integrated West Pakistan Province. The
National Awami Party, led by G. M. Syed of Sind and a few supportersof
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were prepared to support any party which
would agree to the breaking up of the West Pakistan province into its
former constituencies.The National Awami Party held the balancein the
Assembly and could bring about the defeat of any Government in the
House by supporting the Opposition. Both the Muslim Leaguersand the
Republicans were forced to woo the support of this group in order to
command majority support in the House. Thus, when the Muslim
Leaguersagreed, in March 1957, to support the demand of the National

7. The writer is not aware of any study of Pakistan which throws any light on this highly important
aspect of Pakistan's politics, namely, the support that politicians derive from their tenants and tribes.
Even Chaudhri Mohamad Ali, who is not a landlord, was campaigning for support before martial law
in areas where his tribe, Arains, were concentrated, such as Lyallpur and Bahawalpur.
394 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Awami Party that West Pakistan Province should be broken up into its
former constituent parts, the Republican Government lost majority sup-
port. The Government, however, was saved by the intervention of Pres-
ident Mirza, who imposed Section 193 (allowing the President, under
some circumstances, to assume direct rule) on the province. When the
Republicans were later restored to power, they in their turn were pre-
pared to support the demand of the National Awami Party in order to
save themselves from another defeat. The result was that the Assembly
was reduced to a steady see-saw between the two rival groups. Ministers
were more busy gatheringsupport from membersthan in day-to-day ad-
ministration. In order to get support, they had to bribe members with
ministries or deputy ministerships,or resort to other corrupt practices,
such as the granting of import licenses to membersof the West Pakistan
Assembly. Thus, in January 1957, just before the commencement of the
Assembly session,fourteen membersfrom the Frontier region were given
import licenses.8It was well known that none of these members was a
trader. The first two Chief Ministers,Dr. Khan Sahib and SardarRashid,
both Pathans, were not very skilled in the game of political bribery and
party manoeuvresand therefore gave way to Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan
Qizilbash, one of the big Punjab landownersand a former Unionist.
When the leadersof the National Awami Party found that neither of
the two parties,the Muslim Leagueor the RepublicanParty, was seriously
interested in supporting their demand for the breaking up of the West
Pakistan Province, they turned their attention to building up solid sup-
port in smallerprovinces like Sind and the Frontier where One Unit had
become unpopular. Thus, G. M. Syed formed an alliance with big land-
owners of Sind, such as the Pir of Pagaro, Talpur, and Khuhro to work
for the dissolutionof One Unit and its reconstruction into four or more
autonomous provinces.9Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan called upon Pathans
belonging to all parties to unite and fight against One Unit which he de-
clared "symbolisedthe slavery of the Pathans."'0The Republican Party's
manifesto on the question of One Unit was a document of pure oppor-
tunism. It enabled Republicansto oppose One Unit in Sind and Frontier
and fight for its maintenancein West Punjab."
Against all this agitation, Punjab leadershipstood hopelessly divided.
If there were a group of people in Pakistan who could have provided
leadershipof the country other than the Army, it was the Punjabis.They
were in a majority in the Armed and Civil Services.Most of the big land-

8. The PakistanTimes (Lahore), February 8, 1957.

9. Ibid.,September7, 1958.
10. Ibid.,September28, 1958.
11. Ibid.,October 1, 1958.
 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 395
owners were Punjabis.And for politicians, they had a galaxy which in-
cluded Chaudhri Mohamad Ali, Gurmani, Daultana, Qizilbash, Amjad
Ali, and Feroz Khan Noon. But Punjab leadershipwas torn by unending
feuds between men like Gurmani and Noon, Daultana and Noon, Daul-
tana and Qizilbash, Amjad Ali and Qizilbash.
As compared to internal bickering in West Pakistan, the problem of
East Pakistan'sgrievancesagainst the Center and West Pakistanwas even
of a more seriousnature. Sindis,Pathansand Punjabis,despite their differ-
ences, lived in a contiguous territory and were united loosely by a com-
mon religion and a Mughal pattern of culture. East Pakistan was both
physically and culturally separate.
There was also the problem of economic disparity between the two
wings. Bengali politicians bitterly complained of the stepmotherly treat-
ment that was being meted out to East Pakistan. Central expenditure,
becauseof the location of Karachiand the concentration of the Army in
West Pakistan,was much greaterin West Pakistanthan in East Pakistan.
East Pakistancontributed much more to foreign exchange earningsof the
country than the West and yet it was lagging far behind West Pakistan
in industrialization.The Center's plea was that scarce resourceswere be-
ing invested in West Pakistanbecauseits developedeconomy would yield
higher returns than East Pakistan.These disparitieswere further accentu-
ated by the fact that, becauseof the physical separationof the two parts,
central expenditure in the West generatedno additionalincome and em-
ployment in the East.
United as all Bengaliswere in their bitterness against the Center and
West Pakistan, politically they were divided into rival groups led by
Suhrawardyand Fazlul Huq. These two leaders had combined to from
the United Front Party in orderto defeat the MuslimLeaguein the spring
of 1954. But as soon as the party assumedoffice, it split on the matter of
distributionof officesand the old rivalry for power in pre-partition Ben-
gal appearedin the form of the Awami League led by Suhrawardyand
the KrishakSramik Party under Fazlul Huq. This was followed by the
imposition of Section 92A in Bengal which lasted until August 1955.
After that, the KrishakSramikParty was in office for a year.
The Awami League, when it was invited to form a government in
September1956, enjoyed the support of about 200 Membersin a House of
309.12 The Awami League enjoyed the support of a great majority of the
seventy-two Hindu Membersin the Assembly because of its support of
joint electorate.In March 1957, when MaulanaBhashaniresignedas Presi-

12. Dawn (Karachi), September18, 1956.

396 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

dent of the Awami League because he disagreedwith Mr. Suhrawardy's

pro-Western foreign policy, a number of Awami LeagueMembersin the
ProvincialAssemblyalso resignedin support of MaulanaBhashani'sstand.
Later, in July 1957, these Members joined the newly formed National
Awami Party under Bhashani'sleadershipand their party strength in the
Assembly was twenty-eight. The Krishak Sramik Party also enjoyed the
support of the Nizam-i-Islam Party and the Muslim League. Their total
strength hoveredbetween 100 and 106.
The Awami League Government soon ran into difficulties when it
agreedwith the Central Government to let the Army seal the border dis-
tricts to stop smuggling. It was well known that food, imported goods
and capital worth 800 million rupeeswere being drained away from East
Pakistan'seconomy.'3In December 1957, the Army launched its famous
'Operation Close Door.' A number of Hindu members of the Assembly
reacted sharply against this policy as it meant that a number of Hindu
families, who were engaged in sending their capital and valuablesout of
Pakistan, would be adversely affected."4They threatened the Awami
League with withdrawal of their support if the anti-smuggling drive by
the Army was not relaxedor abandonedaltogether.
Fazlul Huq, who was Governor, but actively interested in restoring
his party, KrishakSramik, to power, knew that the Awami League Gov-
ernment was finding it difficult to maintain its majority. Fazlul Huq dis-
missedMr. Ataur Rahman Khan, the Awami League Chief Minister, and
appointed Mr. Abu Hussain Sarkar, the leader of the Krishak Sramik
Party, as Chief Minister on March 31, 1958.1' But this action brought
about his own immediate dismissalby the Central Government on the
same day. A new Governor was appointed and the Awami League was
back in power on April 1, 1958.
The see-saw for political power continued. On June 18, 1958, the
Awami League was defeated because some of the Hindu members had
withdrawn their support and also becausethe National Awami Party re-
mained neutral when the Ministry was faced with a division on the floor
of the House. The KSP leader,Mr. Sarkar,was invited to form a Ministry.
He was out of officein less than a week, when the National Awami Party

13. Amrita BazarPatrika (Calcutta), September9, 1958.

14. The total smuggling of Hindu capital was Rs. 400 million. This is apportioned into its constituent
parts: income of Hindu jute traders-120, Sale, proceeds of Hindu urban properties-160, Zamindars'
rent and lease values-50, Collection of bankers, 'film traders,' and other Hindu traders' income-40,
Hindu pleaders' income-20, and income of service holders of Indian nationals-10. Total Rs. 400
million. A. Sadeque, The Economic Emergence of Pakistan, Part I (Dacca, East Bengal Government
Press, 1954) pp. 23-24.
15. Under Article 71 (6) the Governor could dismiss a Chief Minister if he were satisfied that he had
ceasedto commandthe confidenceof the House.
 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 397
decided to support the Awami LeagueParty becausethe latter had agreed
to work for a neutral foreign policy and the disintegrationof One Unit.
This was sheer opportunism. In order to get back in power, the Awami
League was prepared to agree to the proposal of a neutral policy when
its leader, Mr. Suhrawardy, was an ardent advocate of a pro-Western
policy.16However, Section 193 was clamped on the Province.
By the end of August 1958, the Awami League Government was
again back in power when Section 193 was lifted by the Center and
responsiblegovernment restored in East Pakistan. Within a month the
Awami League Government once again found its majority unstable. The
Government also suspectedthe Speakerof siding with the Opposition. On
September 20, 1958, when the House met, the Government moved a
resolution of nonconfidence in the Speaker. When the Speaker ruled it
out of order, the Government members rushed towards the Speaker in
order to remove him physically from the House. The Speaker was as-
saulted but escaped from the House with minor injuries. This was fol-
lowed by fighting between the Government and Opposition members in
the Assembly in which furniture was freely used by the members to
assaultone another. The Government tried to pass a resolution declaring
that the Speakerwas of an unsound mind and that his chair had fallen
vacant.'7 On September23, when the Deputy Speaker,who was a mem-
ber of the Awami League, appearedto conduct the proceedings of the
House, he was assaultedby the membersof the Opposition. The Inspector
General of Police, on orders of the Government, brought in policemen
and the membersof the Opposition were removed from the House. The
Government was thus able to have all its budget demands passed.A few
days later the Deputy Speakerdied as a result of the injuries received in
the House.
r * * *F *

Parliamentarygovernment had been reduced to a farce. East Pakistan

at the time these tragic incidents took place was in the grip of acute food
shortages,flood and epidemics.
The outlook for parliamentarygovernment at the Center was equally
bleak. Since the dissolutionof the Constituent Assembly in October 1954,
no Central Government under any Prime Minister had functioned inde-
pendently without fear of being dismissedby the Head of the State. Is-

16. The leaders of the National Awami Party explained their willingness to enter such an understanding
on the plea that the Awami League, because of its support of joint electorates, was a lesser evil than
the KSP. Moreover, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Secretary of the Awami League, has assured them
that he would be able to convince Mr. Suhrawardy of the futility of following a pro-Western
foreign policy.
17. The author was presentin the House when these events took place.
398 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

kander Mirza did not give the impressionof being as crude and ruthless
in the exercise of his power as Ghulam Mohammad.But his control was
as thorough and complete. The instrument he used was the Republican
Party, the largest single party-twenty-one members in a House of
eighty. Mirza had risen from the position of the Defense Secretaryto that
of President. Probably, as a Civil Servant, he regardedhis post of Presi-
dent as permanent. Thus his one object was to preservehimself in power
and it seemednot to be his concern as to how low the politics or adminis-
tration of the country sank.
Mirza never ceased to act as the Political Agent on the North-West
Frontier he had been.18As such, his main function had been to maintain
law and order and never let any tribe or malik become very powerful. As
Political Agent, he had never had anything to do with welfare administra-
tion. Mirza regardedthe whole of Pakistanas a sort of North-West Fron-
tier, where his role was to set one party against another and preserve
himself in power. Either he would bring about a change in the Center and
the new Prime Minister would try to place his supporting parties in the
provinces or he would try to upset governments in the provinces with
the result that this would disturb the coalition at the Center.
In October 1957, faced with Republican withdrawal of support,
Suhrawardyadvised the President to summon the National Assembly so
that it might be known whether he enjoyed majority support in the As-
sembly. Mirza askedhim to resign at once or he would dismisshim. The
President did not want a precedent, under which the Assembly deter-
mined whether a Prime Ministerenjoyed its confidence, to be established.
This would mean that the power of dismissing or appointing a Prime
Ministerwould slip from his hands.
Later on the Presidentfound that he could not dragoon the Republi-
cans into accepting Muslim Leaguersas their partners by agreeing to in-
troduce separate electorates in the country. In December 1957, Feroz
Khan Noon became Prime Minister and Mr. Suhrawardy'sparty, the
Awami League, was preparedto support Noon's cabinet without sharing
any office in it. After that, the President'scontrol over the Republican
Party was not as great as before. Feroz Khan Noon did not need to be
completely at the call of the President, for he had his own supportersin
the Republican Party and, in addition, Suhrawardy'sAwami League was
also supporting him.

18. Iskander Mirza started his career as an Army officer in 1920. He joined the Indian Political Service
in 1926. As Political Agent and Deputy Commissioner,he spent most of his service life in the Frontier
before Independence.
 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 399
The Presidenttriedto compensate for this lossby seekingsupport
fromotherparties.So far as his Republicansupportwas concerned, it
camefromthetribalareaof theFrontierandfromSind where he had the
Pirof PigaroandTalpur.And,fromPunjab,he hadthe ShiCa
influential
group consisting AmjadAli, AbidHussainfrom
of theFinanceMinister,
Jhang,andQizilbash(whowasbotha friendof the Presidentandthe
chiefadviserof MalikNoon). HisMuslimLeaguefriendswereDaultana
andChundrigar, bothof whomhadtriedtheirbestto dissuade Qaiyum
Khanfromhiscampaignof denunciation againstthe President.In East
Pakistanhissupportcamefromthe KSP led by Fazlul
Huq and Yusuf
Ali Choudhry.
ThePresident hadoneobjectin mind-and that wasto get himself
electedasPresident afterthe next generalelections.In orderto do this,
hehadto winfriendsandfrustratethedesignsof hisenemies. Suhrawardy
hadthreatened thathehadnamesof a coupleof candidates for thePresi-
dencyin his pocket.19 Mirzatriedto cut the groundfromunderSuh-
rawardyby gettingthe AwamiLeagueMinistrydismissed in Dacca.He
didnot succeedin thisandhisfriend,Governor FazlulHuq,hadto lose
hisofficein tryingto do the President's
bidding andalsoinstallhis own
party, the KSP,in power.The Presidentturnedonce againto Mr.
Suhrawardy andit wasreportedthat theirdifferences hadbeenpatched
up andthat they hadreachedan understanding on the basisof certain
post-electionarrangements.20Thesehopeswerenot confirmed by future
events.ThePresident, was
untiltheend, trying getto the Awami League
Ministryin Daccaremovedfromoffice.
FatimahJinnahoncedeclaredthat therewas a hiddenhandwhich
guidedPakistan'spolitics;herreferencewasclearlyto the roleof Presi-
dentMirza.A caricature of thisrolewaspresented in a cartoonin the
Lail-o-Nahar.Thetragicfightingin the EastPakistan Assemblyin Sep-
tember1958waspicturedas a puppetshowwith the Presidentpulling
TheNew Statesman
the strings.21 correctlypointedout thatit wastrue
that most of the politiciansdeservedto be stonedbut it was not for
GeneralMirzato castthe stones.22
that,eventhough
It hasoftenbeenpointedout by politicalobservers
boththe CentralandProvincialCabinetswerecoalitioncabinets,very
by votesof non-confidence
few of thesecabinetswerechallenged on the

19. Dawn, March 21, 19S8.

20. The PakistanTimes (Lahore), August 10 and 19, 1958.
21. Lail-o-Nahar (Lahore), September 28, 1958.
22. New Statesman (London), October 18, 195 8.
400 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

floor of the House.23How could such challengesbe made when opponents

could be bought off by offering them ministries? Thus, when Central
and Provincial Governments were dismissedunder Martial Law, twenty-
six of the eighty Membersof the National Assembly were Ministers. If
ProvincialMinistrieswere taken into account, thirty-four of these eighty
Memberswere holding Ministerialposts.' On the day Martial Law was
declared,the Presidenthad sworn in two different Cabinets.25And it was
obvious that on the same day Mr. Suhrawardywas trying to get back as
Prime Minister by creating these ministerial crises by first allowing his
party members to accept posts in Mr. Noon's Cabinet and later with-
drawing them. A Pakistannewspapercommented:
The ministerialmerry-go-round goeson and on. The newly-selectedMinisters
eagerlymounttheirhobbyhorses,fly highup; they feaston the lights,takein
the music.Then,the ramshackle structurecomesto a creakinghalt. We see a
scramblefor the next ride;somearedraggedoff theirseats,somecling on. In
places,two ridershangon to onehobbyhorse;sometimesnew mountsarepro-
videdfor the increasingtribeof riders.26

Offering ministries was not the only way of obtaining political sup-
port. Mr. M. A. Qizilbash,the Chief Minister of West Pakistan, blaming
the Muslim League for having started political bribery by issuing permits
and import licences to its supporters,admitted on the floor of the House
that "now, from top to bottom, there was hardly a person who was not
corrupt."27The Muslim League Governments did not have to resort to
corruption on such massive scale as the Republicans because they all
enjoyed the support of vast majoritiesin their legislatures.
Corruption and inefficiency had infected the ranks of civil servants
as well. Even before the imposition of martial law it was common knowl-
edge that a number of civil servants, including those who had originally
been recruited into the famous Indian Civil Service, were corrupt. It
looked as if the normal roles of ministers and their civil service advisers
had been reversed.Ministers,instead of framing policies, were busy ad-
ministering departments-transferring civil servants who, they thought,
were not likely to be useful in the forthcoming elections and granting
import licences to traders in lieu of bribes they offered or the contribu-
tions they made to the party. Civil servants, on the other hand started
formulating the policies of their departments.But the corruption started

23. The only examples are those of the defeats of the Awami League and Krishak Sramik Party Govern-
ments on the floor of the House and both in the sameweek (June 18, and June 23, 1958).
24. The PakistanTimes, October 3, 1958.
25. The Gazette of PakistanExtraordinary(Karachi), October 7, 1958, pp. 1925-1928.
26. The PakistanTimes, October 4, 195 8.
27. Ibid., August 26, 1958.
 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 401
by politiciansbecameso rampantandtemptingthatmanycivilservants
couldnot resistit.
The IndianCivilServicehadbeendescribed as the steelframework
of theBritishGovernment in Indiaandwasnotedforits corporate spirit.
Itssuccessor,theCivilServiceof Pakistan, couldnot liveup to thisrepu-
tation.It waswidelyknownthatthetop civilservantsweredividedinto
differentcliquesbasedon provincialor partylines,eachof whichwas
supported politicalparty.It wasobviousthatwhenboth
by a particular
politiciansandcivil servantshadfailedto provideany leadership to the
countrythat a well-organized institutionsuchas the Armywouldstep
in to seizepower.
Martiallaw was declaredby PresidentMirzaon October7, 1958.
But fromthe beginningit wasclearwhohadtakenthe initiative.In a
pressinterviewGeneralAyub revealed:"I saidto the President:'Are
you goingto act or areyounot goingto act?It is yourresponsibility to
bringaboutchangeandif you do not, whichheavenforbid,we shall
force a change.'"28After havingestablished martiallaw, Ayub knew
thata freshstarthadto be madeandthatthisdualleadership couldnot
continue.Ayub alsoknew that Mirzawas not likelyto let him work
freelyandthathemightalsotry to dividetheArmyin thesamemanner
as he haddividedthe politicians.Probably, evenafterthe imposition of
martiallaw,Mirzagavesomegroundsfor suchsuspicion. Commenting
on Mirza'sresignation, Ayub observed,"Certainthingscame to my
knowledge-Iwouldnot like to saywhat."29
Theconstitutional changesbroughtaboutby the imposition of mar-
tial law wereas follows:The Constitutionof March1956 was abro-
gated,the CentralandProvincialcabinetsweredismissed, the National
Parliamentand the two ProvincialAssemblies were dissolvedand all
politicalpartieswere declaredillegal.
After the impositionof martiallaw, one sawno massingof troops.
TheArmywasservedby a well-organized intelligence
serviceandprob-
ablyexpectedno civilresistance.
Accordingto GeneralMusa,thepresent
Commander-in-Chief, armyinstructions for wintercollectivetraining
wereissuedtwo daysaftermartiallaw wasdeclared.30 Martiallaw was
welcomedall over the country.Peoplefound that big landlordsand
Ministers
werebeingarrestedfor variousoffencesthey hadcommitted.
Particularly
the arrestof Mr. Khuhro,a formerDefenceMinister,on
the chargeof sellinga caron the blackmarket,wasdramaticandwon
28. The Pakistan Times, October 10, 1958.
29. Ibid., October 31, 1958.
30. Ibid., November 13, 1958.
402 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

many friends for the martial law regime. Special military courts were
establishedall over the country with powers to try and punish persons
for offences under the ordinary law and for contraventions of martial
law regulations. Complaint centers were also establishedwhere people
could go and report to Army officersabout their particular cases which
were still pending either on the police files or before the courts. The role
of martial law, it was repeatedlypointed out, was to speed up the admin-
istrative processeswhich had been hamstrung by the corrupt practices
and delaying tactics of the former regime.
Soon after the imposition of martial law, a number of former Central
and Provincial Ministers and members of the Central and Provincial
Assemblies were arrested on charges of corruption. These arrests con-
tinue. In addition to weeding out corruption, President Ayub seems to
be interested in eliminating effectively the influence and power that
politicians have enjoyed so far in Pakistan. Three enactments of the
present regime may be noted in this respect: Land reforms in West Pak-
istan will paralyze the political power of landlords in that area. The
Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, 1959, lays down that politicians
found guilty of misconduct or corrupt action will be disqualifiedfrom
public office for fifteen years.3'Under this order, all offences committed
since August 15, 1947 can be investigated. It has recently been disclosed
by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Department, West Pakistan,
that cases of nearly 150 former Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Par-
liamentary Secretaries,and about 600 members of the former Central
and Provincial Assemblies from West Pakistan are being investigated.32
It has been found that the procedure of investigation and prosecution
under the Order is slow and elaborate.Therefore, the President has pro-
mulgated the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959. In this
order the term 'misconduct' has been given a definition wide enough to
include both subversive activities, jobbery and corruption.33Under this
order, besidescorrupt politicians, leaderslike Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan
and Maulana Bhashani, who have been arrested under the Security of
Pakistan Act, 1952, will be automatically disqualified until December
31, 1966 (the term of disqualificationis shorter under this order) from
being a member or a candidate for membership of any elective body.
Since the procedure of investigation and prosecution is much quicker
than it is under the Public OfficesOrder, the Government is likely to use
the Elective Bodies Order, more frequently in future. There is a tribunal

31. The PakistanObserver (Dacca), March 26, 1959.

32. Ibid., August 11, 1959.
33. Ibid., August 8, 1959.
 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 403
underthe latter,presidedoverby a judge,but the tribunalitself has
beenfully empowered, likethe screeningcommitteein the caseof civil
servants, to conduct its own inquiriesand to examinedocumentsand
evidenceconnectedwith personswhoseconductis beinginvestigated
insteadof dependingupon the slowermethodof policeinvestigation.
It is obviousthat the Presidentis in a hurryto haveas manycorrupt
anddangerous politiciansremovedin thismannerso that theymaynot
contaminate the new Panchayat, DistrictandDivisionalCouncilsthat
he hasproposed to setup. Anothersignificant featureof thenewregime
is the declinein prestigethat civil servantshaveexperienced. Members
of the CentralCivilServicesandparticularly the CivilServiceof Pak-
istanhavebeenin completecommand of everyimportantadministrative
postbothin the CentralandProvincialGovernments.34 Now they are
beingtold by the generalsthat theircumbrousprocedure involvestoo
muchshuffling of paperandthatit is not conduciveto quickdecisions.
Theyhavealsobeenaccusedof a colonialoutlookwhichprizeslaw and
orderandthe collectionof taxesfar abovewelfareadministration. But
the mostdisastrous blowhasbeendealtby the ScreeningCommittees
whichweresetup by thenewregimeto assess theintegrityandefficiency
of all civilservants.Thestartlingresultsof theseinvestigations arethat
asmanyas1,662civilservants havebeendismissed orcompulsorily retired
for misconduct, corruption or inefficiency.
Theseincludethirteenofficers
who previouslybelongedto the CivilServiceof Pakistan,threeto the
ForeignService,andfifteento the PoliceService.35
Themartiallawregimehadto justifyitselfin theeyesof thecommon
man.Theirprimaryconcernwasto lowerpricesof food andotheres-
sentialcommodities. MartialLawRegulation No. 42 fixedthe pricesof
wheat,rice,vegetable,gheeandedibleoils,textiles,sugar,bicycles,cig-
arettes, tea, etc., which affected the daily budget of the common man.
Punishments ranging from fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment to
death could be awardedfor contravention of this regulation under Mar-
tial Law Regulations Nos. 21, 23, 25, and 26, which dealt with various
kinds of hoarding.36
The martial law regime also tried to create the impressionthat it was
no respecter of big firms or wealthy people. Thus, firms like Ali Auto-
mobiles, belonging to the family of Amjad Ali, the former Finance Min-

34. There are other Central Serviceslike the Foreign Service, the Audit and Accounts Service, the Customs,
the Police, etc., but the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) attracts most of the bright candidates and
is the most powerful. See Sayeed, K. B., "The Political Role of the Civil Service of Pakistan", Pacific
Affairs,June, 1958.
35. The PakistanObserver,June 2 8, 1959.
36. The Gazette of PakistanExtraordinary(Karachi), December9, 195S8.
404 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

ister, and a number of textile mills owned by SaigolBrothers,well-known

textile magnates of West Pakistan, were raided by the police and their
records and documents taken into custody for the purpose of govern-
ment scrutiny.37Smuggling of all kinds was prohibited by Martial Law
Regulation No. 27 and maximum punishment was death.38The Karachi
Customs and Anti-Smuggling Police had been able to seize gold bullion
and goods worth Rs. 30 million during the last eleven years. But under
martial law, the seizure of these items amounted to Rs. 20 million in
a period of one month.39Vast quantitiesof food were also being smuggled
acrossthe bordersto India and Afghanistan. One could see how effectively
the bordershad been sealedto stop smuggling by the fact that food prices
rose sharply in the western districts of East Punjab, and Calcutta expe-
rienced a fish famine.40
The collection of taxes which were due but evaded under the previ-
ous regimes was another achievementof the martial law regime. Accord-
ing to Martial Law Regulation No. 44, personsmaking false declarations
of income for income tax purposes were to be punished by rigorous
imprisonment which might extend to seven years, with an additional
fine. But such false declarations could be rectified by submitting fresh
declarations before January 15, 1959 in order to avoid punishment.
After fresh declarationshad been filed, it was found that the total in-
come concealed by taxpayershad been as high as Rs. 1,340 million. For-
eign exchange surrenderedlocally was Rs. 40.6 million while the foreign
exchange held unauthorizedly abroad by Pakistani nationals and now
declared to Pakistan authorities amounted to another Rs. 42 million.4'
Politics in West Pakistan has been dominated by a few powerful
landowning families such as the Talpurs, the Tiwanas, and the Noons.
The new regime appointed a Land Reforms Commission soon after it
assumed office. The findings of the Commission were incorporated in
Martial Law Regulation No. 54. Jagirdariwas abolishedwithout com-
pensation. No landlord could own more than 500 acres of irrigated land
or more than 1,000 acres of non-irrigated land. Compensationwas to be
paid to landlordsfor their non-jagirdariholdings through non-negotiable
but heritable bonds redeemablein 25 years. These reforms stripped the
big landlords of their political and economic power. The approach was

37. The PakistanTimes, October 3 1, 195 8.

3 8. A number of Martial Law Regulations prescribe death as maximum punishment for offenses like
hoarding, smuggling etc. But this served as a deterrent. So far no death sentence has been given for
these offences.
39. The PakistanObserver,December6, 1958.
40. See The PakistanTimes, October 30, 1958 and The Times of India (Bombay), November 2, 1958.
41. The Department of Advertising, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Under the New Regime (Karachi:
Ferozsons), p. 7.
 COLLAPSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 405
Middle-sizeholdings,which were essentialfor main-
not doctrinaire.
tainingagricultural werenot eliminated.42
productivity,
GeneralMohammad Ayub Khan,as well as beingPresident,is the
SupremeCommander,Chief MartialLaw Administrator,and the Defense
Minister. His ministers, eleven in number, constitute collectively the
PresidentialCabinet; there is no Prime Minister. Three of the Ministers
are from the Army and hold the portfolios of Rehabilitation, Health
and Social Welfare, and Interior. There are four East Pakistanisin the
Cabinet. There are three civil servants. The Foreign Minister, a brilliant
lawyer, is from Punjab. It cannot be said that GeneralAyub rides rough-
shod over every government institution. In his Cabinet, besidesthe Gen-
erals, there are men of first-rate technical and administrative ability.
The Foreign Minister has recently disclosed that the President has been
outvoted by his Ministersin some Cabinet decisions.43
What has Ayub done so far to give his regime a sense of legitimacy?
The origin of his power lies in its outright seizure and the abrogationof
the constitution, though he can rightly claim that he has displayedmore
social responsibility in the exercise of it than did his predecessors.He
has recently put forward the idea of reviving democracy on a four-tier
basis. At the lowest level will be the Union Panchayats, each containing
ten elected and five nominated members.Each elected member will rep-
resent from 1,000 to 1,500 people. They will be entrusted with judicial,
police and developmental functions pertaining to their areas. The next
tier will be the Sub-District Councils, called Tehsil Councils in West
Pakistan and Thana Councils in East Pakistan. These Councils will con-
cern themselves with development activities within their areas. They
will be composed of Presidentsof Union Panchayats and officersof De-
velopment Departments. The other two tiers will be the District Coun-
cils, presided over by Deputy Commissioners,and Divisional Councils
under Commissioners.These Councils will be composed of officials and
non-officials on a fifty-fifty basis. Elections to Union Panchayats will
be held on the basisof adult franchise. In case the new constitution pro-
vides for indirect elections to the Parliamentor to the office of President,
the Union Panchayatsare likely to form the electoral college.44
Ayub has put the constitutional clock back to the days of Lord Mayo
and Lord Ripon-the late 19th century-when democratic experiments
were initiated by putting life into the existing indigenous local institu-
tions and creating other wider organs of local government like the Dis-

42. For a fuller discussionof this see Report of the Land Reforms Commissionfor West Pakistan (Lahore),
1959, pp. 28-33.
43. The PakistanObserver,April 20, 1959.
44. Ibid., June 14, 1959.
406 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

trict Boards and the Municipal Councils. Ayub's experiment also indi-
cates the sort of government that is likely to work in an Asian country.
Democracy in Pakistan, according to Ayub, should be a government for
the people by the bureaucraticelite. Whether this bureaucracywill evoke
support in East Pakistan,particularly when both the Army and the civil
service are dominated by West Pakistanis,remainsto be seen.

LIST OF PERSONS
Ahmad,Abul Mansur-an influentialBengaliAwami Leagueleader and also Central Minister, 1956-57.
Ali, Amjad-A Punjabiindustrialmagnate;Finance Minister, 1955-58.
Bhashani,Maulana-President, National Awami Party, 1957-1958.
Choudhry, Yusuf Ali-From Bengal; An influentialleaderof the KrishamSramikParty.
Chundrigar,Ismail Ibrahim-Prime Minister,October-December,1957.
Daultana, Mian Mumtaz Mohammad-Chief Minister,Punjab, 1951-1953.
Gurmani, Mushtaq Ahmad-Governor, Punjab, 1954-1955; Governor, West Pakistan, 1955-1957.
Huq, A. K. Fazlul-Governor, East Pakistan, 1956-1958.
Khan, Abdul Ghaffar-A Pathan leader and an exponent of a separatePakhtoon Province.
Khan, Ataur Rahman-Chief Minister, East Pakistan, 1956-1958 (with interruptions).
Khan, Qaiyum-President, Muslim League,elected 1958.
Khan Sahib,Dr.-Chief Minister,West Pakistan. 1955-57.
Khuhro, Muhammad Ayub-Chief Minister, Sind, 1947-48, 1951 and 1955; Defense Minister in the
Central Government,1958.
Mahmood,Hasan-Minister, West Pakistan, 1956-1958.
MohamadAli, Chaudhri-Prime Minister, 1955-1956.
Mohammad,Ghulam-Governor-General, 1951-1953.
Nazimuddin, Khwaja-Prime Minister, 1951-1953.
Nishtar, SardarAbdur Rab-President, Muslim League,1955-1957.
Noon, Feroz Khan-Punjabi landlord; Prime Minister, 1957-1958.
Pir of Pagaro-Spiritual leaderand landownerin Sind.
Pirzada,Abdus Sattar-Sind leader; Ministerin West PakistanGovernment,1956-1958.
Qizilbash,MuzaffarAli nhan-Punjabi landlord; Chief Minister,West Pakistan,April-October, 1958.
Rashid, SardarAbdur-Chief Minister,N-W.F.P., 1953-1955; Chief Minister,West Pakistan, 1957-1958.
Sarkar,Abu Hussain-Chief Minister,East Pakistan, 1955-1956, and also later for brief periods.
Syed, G. M.-Sind leaderand an exponentof a separateprovince for Sind.
Talpur, Mir GhulamAli-Sind landlord; Minister,Central Government; 1956-1958.