A.

STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED

PENAL LAWS Held: No
- The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
1. Carungcong v people and Sato plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
Facts: exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does
- Mediatrix G. Carungcong filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in- not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with
law, William Sato, a Japanese national. another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

- Prior to the death of mediatrix’s mother, Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, - A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged
specifically on or about November 24, 1992, manolita’s son-in-law and mediatrix’ not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
brother-in-law, William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of
secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney. deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that
- William sato’s daughter attests to the fact that manolita signed the time) and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
document in the belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not (b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection
knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of with her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA)
Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties. authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
- A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal (c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
Code convinces the trial court of the correctness of the contention of the thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
defense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has (d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he
extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact neither delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
that accused and Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in- (d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the
law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
even beyond the death of Zenaida.
- The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against
o Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief.
states no proviso. No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the
from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious absolutory cause provided by the said provision. In other words, to apply Article
mischief fcommitted or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would
ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the
line. component crime that it is in that situation.

- Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, - While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents),
represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for
Appeals which, however, in a decision dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. which there is only one criminal liability. That is the concept of a complex crime. In
other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a
Issue: single criminal liability.
Whether or not the respondent may be exempt from criminal liability
invoking art 332 of the RPC
 - Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus for specific performance with the Pasig Regional Trial Court. Joaquin Novales III, general
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and manager of Solid Gold, and the petitioner entered into a compromise agreement where
requires the imposition of a single penalty petitioner was to issue ninety-nine post-dated checks amounting to P50,000 each to be
o Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it deposited every 15th and 30th of the month from October 1990 to November 16, 1994.
is only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or Balance of over P1 million was to be paid in cash, lump sum, on November16, 1994 as well.
more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as Petioner issued 10 checks amounting to P50,000 each, drawn against her account in
component crimes. EquitableBanking Corporation. When Novales deposited the checks with Far East Bank and
o In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, Trust Company, however, checks were dishonored as the account was already closed.
they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the On October 5, 1992, Novales filed 10 separate Informations. These were consolidated and
conscience of the offender. The offender has only onecriminal intent. Even raffled to Branch 99 of the Pasig RTC. And on December 22, 1993 RTC rendered a decision
in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, finding the accused guilty of ten counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, also known as the
the evil intent of the offender is only one.[ Bouncing Checks Law. She was sentenced to one year of imprisonment for each count and
indemnification of P500.
- The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the CA found it to be of no merit and
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to affirmed the RTC’s decision. Thus, the petition on certiorari of the decision of the court of
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, appeals, affirming the conviction of Elvira Yu Oh by the RTC dated May 30 1996 which
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification denied her motion for reconsideration.
of a public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of ISSUES:
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of 1.) Did the court err in not granting retroactive effect to R.A. 7691 in view of Art. 22 of
estafa. Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to the RPC?
defraud another is estafa. The damage to another is caused by the commission of 2.) Did the appellate court err in construing B.P. Blg. 22?
estafa, not by the falsification of the document.[ 3.) Is the notice of dishonor to the drawer important in warranting a conviction?
RULING:
- Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show Assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented acquitted of the ten counts for insufficiency of evidence but is ordered to pay P500,000 to
a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her the private respondent, with 12% interest per annum from the date of finality of judgment.
intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated REASONING:
upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when 1. NO. The court did not err in not granting retroactive effect to R.A. 7691.
Sato later utilized the SPA. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the A penal law, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties
falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of its nature and provides for its punishment.
Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent R.A. No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation; neither
use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment. Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not
used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present case.
the estafa. R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129, and vested on the
Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction to try cases
2. ELVIRA YU OH V COURT OF APPEALS punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years. Since R.A. No. 7691 vests
June 6, 2003; PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J. jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said law is substantive.
FACTS: Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
Elvira Yu Oh (petitioner) bought jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders (private force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
respondent) but failed to pay purchase price. The company filed civil complaints against her court. R.A. No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of the cases in
the trial court. It took effect only during the pendency of the appeal before the Court of  Presumption (provided in Sec. 2, B.P. Blg. 22) of knowledge cannot arise if
Appeals. There is therefore no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 7691 should be such notice of non-payment by the bank is not sent to the maker/drawer.
retroactively applied to this case and the same be remanded to the MTC. The Court has held  Jurisprudence has shown that notice of dishonor is vital insomuch as Sec. 2,
that a "law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court cannot be given retroactive effect”. B.P. Blg. 22 provides the drawee or maker five days in which to come up
2. NO. The appellate court did not err in construing B.P. Blg. 22. with the needed money. Procedural due process demands that a notice is
Petitioner: That because penal statutes must be strictly construed and resolved in favor of served in order to afford the accused the opportunity to aver prosecution.
the accused, the “insufficiency” of funds referred to in B.P. Blg. 22 must not be made to cover  Also, it was shown through the general manager’s testimony that no
those accounts that are “closed” or declared to have “no funds.” Post-dated checks, not personal demands were made on the petitioner prior to the complaints
being drawn payable on demand but rather on a fixed date, should also be considered as being filed.
ordinary and not special bills of exchange.  Novales also apparently knew of the possible insufficiency of funds. The
 Lozano v Martinez: Thrust of the Bouncing Checks law is to prohibit the Court has ruled before that when the complainant was informed by the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation as their effects drawer of such, there is no violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
directly affect public interest. Such intent is reiterated in Cueme v People
and in Recuerdo v People. 3. Villasenor v. Oco- Perguerra
 Claim on “closed accounts” not being included in the coverage of the B.P. Facts:
has no merit in view of the legislative intent of the law which is to protect On August 18, 2001, disaster struck. In the wee hours of the morning, the Quezon City
the interest of the community at large. Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of seventy-four (74) people and injuries to
 People v Nitafan: The law does not distinguish but merely provides that any scores of others. Investigation into the tragedy revealed that the hotel was a veritable fire
person who makes/draws and issues any check knowing that he does not trap.
have enough funds shall be punished.
3. YES. The notice of dishonor to the drawer is important. Petitioners, together with other officials of the City Engineering Office of Quezon City,
Petitioner: That no notice of dishonor had been given to her as drawer of the dishonored arepresently facing criminal charges before the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan for the
checks, pursuant to the requirement expressly provided in B.P. Blg. 22. crime of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and for violation of Section 3 (e) of
 Elements for conviction of violation of B.P. Blg. 22: R.A. No. 3019. They were also charged administratively with gross negligence, gross
a) Accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service in connection with the
value. Manor Hotel inferno.
b) Accused knows at the time of issuance that he/she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for payment of the In two separate Orders dated August 29, 2001 and September 7, 2001 in the administrative
check in full upon its presentment. case, petitioners Villaseñor and Mesa were preventively suspended for a period of six (6)
c) The check is subsequently dishonored. months, effective upon receipt of the suspension order. On September 20, 2006, during the
pendency of the criminal case, respondent special prosecutor Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra
 For liability to attach, it is not enough for prosecution to simply prove that �led a motion for suspension pendente lite of petitioners.
the checks were subsequently dishonored. Prosecution must also prove
awareness/knowledge of the accused at the time of issuance. Petitioners opposed the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for six
- Basis of Yu Oh’s awareness of the lack/insufficiency was a line in her (6) months relative to the administrative case, based on the same facts and circumstances.
Counter-Affidavit where she declares that she told the general manager that They posited that any preventive suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was
“the actual status of the checks that the same might not be able to cover the already absorbed by the preventive suspension in the administrative case because both the
amount of the said checks so stated therein [sic].” criminal and administrative cases were anchored on the same set of facts.
Issue: Petitioners have resorted to the present recourse, hoisting the lone issue of buying his property. City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with
"WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR the RTC of Pasig.
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss filled by Alberto Suguitan and allowed
THE SUSPENSION PENDENTE LITE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY the expropriation of the subject property.
HAD ALREADY BEEN PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED ADMINISTRATIVELY BASED ON THE SAME  The petitioner asserted that the respondent may only exercise its delegated power
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic
Act No. 7160 and not by means of a mere resolution.
Statcon Issue: It is petitioners' contention that as a penal statute, the provision on  Petition for review for reversal of the Order by the RTC of Pasig.
preventive suspension should be strictly construed against the State and liberally in their Issue:
favor. Whether a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filling of expropriation proceedings
with the RTC.
Provision: Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 Ruling:
No. Petition is granted and the decision of RTC of Pasig is reversed and set aside. An
Suspension and loss of benefits . — Any incumbent public offcer against whom any criminal examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or eminent domain is already being exercised.
property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of the “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” The due
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of this governmental power. Since exercise of the power of eminent domain affects
Held: We cannot agree. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 on preventive suspension is not a penal an individual’s right to private property, a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the
provision. It is procedural in nature. Hence, the strict construction rule finds no application. preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights
to life and liberty the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized.
The Court expounded on this point in Buenaseda v Flavier: Penal statutes are strictly The exercise of the rights of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero , 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes
Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual
the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful]
(People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644). interpretation.
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the
SATUTES IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous
scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which
1. Heirs of Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict
Petitioner: Heirs of Alberto Suguitan observance of substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as mode of the
Respondent: City of Mandaluyong exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse....
Facts: The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled,
 The respondent issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Banjamin Abalos to institute however, that such power may validly delegated to local government units, other public
expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan for the expansion of entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is
Mandaluyong Medical Center. Alberto Suguitan refused the offer Mayor Abalos in necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in
strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. The basis of the exercise of the prospective buyer of a home appliance — with neither cash nor any credit
power of eminent domain by local government units is Section 19 of RA 7160: card — may purchase appliances on installment basis from an appliance
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an dealer. After Philacor conducts a credit investigation and approves the buyer's
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for application, the buyer executes a unilateral promissory note in favor of the
the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to appliance dealer. The same promissory note is subsequently assigned by the
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power appliance dealer to Philacor
of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been  Philacor received Pre-Assessment Notices covering the alleged deficiency income,
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That percentage and DSTs, including increments
the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the  Philacor protested the PANs, with a request for reconsideration and
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court reinvestigation.
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the  It alleged that the assessed deficiency income tax was erroneously computed
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the when it failed to take into account the reversing entries of the revenue
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, accounts and income adjustments, such as repossessions, write-offs and legal
based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. accounts. Similarly, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) failed to take into
- The City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over account the reversing entries of repossessions, legal accounts, and write-offs
petitioners’ property by means of resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. when it computed the percentage tax; thus, the total income reported, that
The law is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an the BIR arrived at, was not equal to the actual receipts of payment from the
ordinance, not resolution, for exercise of the power of eminent domain. customers.
- 1st requisite: An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the  As for the deficiency DST, Philacor claims that the accredited appliance dealers
local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power were required by law to affix the documentary stamps on all promissory notes
of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular property. purchased until the enactment of Republic Act No. 7660, otherwise known as
- An ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief An Act Rationalizing Further the Structure and Administration of the
executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by Documentary Stamp Tax, 9 which took effect on January 15, 1994
the latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after the court has  The CTA rendered its decision and concluded that Philacor failed to declare part of
determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled. its income making it liable for deficiency income and percentage tax. The CTA also
In inconsistency between the Code (Section 19 of RA 7160) and the IRR (Article 36, Rule ruled that Philacor is liable for the DST on the issuance of the promissory
VI): The law itself surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is notes and their subsequent transfer or assignment.
automatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by mere  The CTA partially granted Philacor's motion in the resolution of April 6, 2004,
administrative rule issued for its implementing. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to 15 wherein it cancelled the assessment for deficiency income tax and
indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule deficiency percentage tax. These assessments were withdrawn because the CTA
VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief found that Philacor had correctly declared its income; the discrepancy of
executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance. P2,180,564.00 had been properly accounted for as proper adjustments to
While we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, we Philacor's net revenues. Nevertheless, the CTA Division sustained the
cannot grant judicial sanction to local government unit’s exercise of its delegated power of assessment for deficiency DST in the amount of P673,633.88.
eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.  Philacor filed a petition for review before the CTA en bacn and the CTA en banc
affirmed the resolution of the CTA division. It reiterated that Philacor is liable for
2. PHILACOR CREDIT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE the DST due on two transactions — the issuance of promissory notes and
FACTS: their subsequent assignment in favor of Philacor. With respect to the issuance
 Philacor is a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws and is of the promissory notes, Philacor is liable as the transferee which "accepted"
engaged in the business of retail financing. Through retail financing, a
 the promissory notes from the appliance dealer in accordance with Section incident thereto, there shall be levied, collected and paid for, and in
180 of Presidential Decree No. 1158, as amended (1986 Tax Code) respect of the transaction so had or accomplished, the corresponding
o citing Section 42 19 of Regulations No. 26, 20 the CTA en banc held documentary stamp taxes prescribed in the following sections of this Title,
that a person "using" a promissory note is one of the persons who by the person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring the
can be held liable to pay the DST. Since the subject promissory notes same, and at the same time such act is done or transaction had:
do not bear documentary stamps, Philacor can be held liable for DST Provided, that wherever one party to the taxable document enjoys
o As for the assignment of the promissory notes, the CTA en banc held exemption from the tax herein imposed, the other party thereto who is
that each and every transaction involving promissory notes is subject not exempt shall be the one directly liable for the tax
to the DST under Section 173 of the 1986 Tax Code  Philacor did not make, sign, issue, accept or transfer the promissory notes.
 Ggmyg The acts of making, signing, issuing and transferring are unambiguous. The
ISSUE: buyers of the appliances made, signed and issued the documents subject to
Whether or not Philacor is liable for the documentary stamp tax on the issuance of tax, while the appliance dealer transferred these documents to Philacor which
the promissory notes? likewise indisputably received or "accepted" them.
 Acceptance," however, is an act that is not even applicable to promissory
RULING: NO. Philacor, as an assignee or transferee of the promissory notes, is not notes, but only to bills of exchange. Under Section 132 of the Negotiable
liable for the assignment or transfer of promissory notes as this transaction is not Instruments Law (which provides for how acceptance should be made), the act
taxed under the law. of acceptance refers solely to bills of exchange. Its object is to bind the
drawee of a bill and make him an actual and bound party to the instrument
Neither party questions that the issuances of promissory notes are transactions which are  Further, in a ruling adopted by the BIR as early as 1955, acceptance has
taxable under the DST already been given a narrow definition with respect to incoming foreign bills
 Section 180. Stamp tax on promissory notes, bills of exchange, drafts, of exchange, not the common usage of the word "accepting" as in receiving:
certificates of deposit, debt instruments used for deposit substitutes and
others not payable on sight or demand. — On all bills of exchange (between The word "accepting" appearing in Section 210 of the National Internal
points within the Philippines), drafts, or certificates of deposits, debt Revenue Code has reference to incoming foreign bills of exchange which are
instruments used for deposit substitutes or orders for the payment of any accepted in the Philippines by the drawees thereof.
sum of money otherwise than at sight or on demand, on all promissory notes, o This ruling, to our mind, further clarifies that a party to a taxable
whether negotiable or non-negotiable except bank notes issued for circulation, transaction who "accepts" any documents or instruments in the plain
and on each renewal of any such note, there shall be collected a documentary and ordinary meaning of the act (such as the shipper in the cited
stamp tax of twenty centavos on each two hundred pesos, or fractional part case) does not become primarily liable for the tax. In the same way,
thereof, of the face value of any such bill of exchange, draft certificate of deposit, Philacor cannot be made primarily liable for the DST on the issuance
debt instrument, or note. of the subject promissory notes, just because it had "accepted" the
 Under the undisputed facts and the above law, the issue that emerges is: promissory notes in the plain and ordinary meaning.
who is liable for the tax?
o Section 173 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (1997 NIRC)  Revenue Regulations No. 9-2000 26 interprets the law more widely so that all
names those who are primarily liable for the DST and those who parties to a transaction are primarily liable for the DST, and not only the
would be secondarily liable: person making, signing, issuing, accepting or transferring the same becomes
liable as the law provides. It provides:
Section 173.Stamp taxes upon documents, instruments, and papers. — SEC. 2. Nature of the Documentary Stamp Tax and Persons Liable for the
Upon documents, instruments, and papers, and upon acceptances, Tax –
assignments, sales, and transfers of the obligation, right, or property
 (a) In General. — The documentary stamp taxes under Title VII of the such person is a party to the transaction, should be liable, as this
Code is a tax on certain transactions. It is imposed against "the reading would go beyond Section 173 of the 1986 Tax Code — the
person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring" the law that the rule seeks to implement. Implementing rules and
document or facility evidencing the aforesaid transactions. Thus, in regulations cannot amend a law for they are intended to carry out,
general, it may be imposed on the transaction itself or upon the not supplant or modify, the law. 31 To allow Regulations No. 26 to
document underlying such act. Any of the parties thereto shall be extend the liability for DST to persons who are not even mentioned in
liable for the full amount of the tax due: Provided, however, that as the relevant provisions of any of our Tax Codes, particularly the 1986
between themselves, the said parties may agree on who shall be liable or Tax Code (the relevant law at the time of the subject transactions)
how they may share on the cost of the tax. would be a clear breach of the rule that a statute must always be
(b) Exception. — Whenever one of the parties to the taxable superior to its implementing regulations.
transaction is exempt from the tax imposed under Title VII of the
Code, the other party thereto who is not exempt shall be the one directly  As Philacor correctly points out, there are provisions in the 1997 NIRC that
liable for the tax. specifically impose the DST on the transfer and/or assignment of documents
evidencing particular transactions. We can safely conclude that where the law
o But even under these terms, the liability of Philacor is not a foregone did not specify that such transfer and/or assignment is to be taxed, there
conclusion as from the face of the promissory note itself, Philacor is would be no basis to recognize an imposition
not a party to the issuance of the promissory notes, but merely to
their assignment. On the face of the documents, the parties to the 3. CIR v KUDOS
issuance of the promissory notes would be the buyer of the appliance, Fatcs:
as the maker, and the appliance dealer, as the payee. - On April 15, 1999, respondent Kudos Metal Corporation filed its Annual Income Tax Return
o Nor can the CIR justify his position that Philacor is liable for the tax (ITR) for the taxable year 1998.
by citing Section 42 of Regulations No. 26, which was issued by the
- Pursuant to a Letter of Authority dated September 7, 1999, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
Department of Finance on March 26, 1924:
(BIR) served upon respondent three Notices of Presentation of Records.
Section 42. Responsibility for payment of tax on promissory notes . — - Respondent failed to comply with these notices, hence, the BIR issued a Subpeona Duces
The person who signs or issues a promissory note and any person Tecum dated September 21, 2006, receipt of which was acknowledged by respondents
transferring or using a promissory note can be held responsible for President, Mr. Chan Ching Bio, in a letter dated October 20, 2000.
the payment of the documentary stamp tax. - Respondent filed three waiver of the defense of prescription.
- On August 25, 2003, the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice for the taxable year
The rule uses the word "can" which is permissive, rather than the 1998 against the respondent. This was followed by a Formal Letter of Demand with
word "shall," which would make the liability of the persons named Assessment Notices for taxable year 1998, dated September 26, 2003 which was received
definite and unconditional. In this sense, a person using a promissory by respondent on November 12, 2003.
note can be made liable for the DST if he or she is: (1) among those - Respondent challenged the assessments by filing its Protest on Various Tax Assessments on
persons enumerated under the law. Such interpretation would avoid any December 3, 2003 and its Legal Arguments and Documents in Support of Protests against
conflict between Section 173 of the 1997 NIRC and Section 42 of Various Assessments on February 2, 2004.
Regulations No. 26 and would make it unnecessary for us to strike - Believing that the governments right to assess taxes had prescribed, respondent filed
down the latter as having gone beyond the law it seeks to interpret. on August 27, 2004 a Petition for Review with the CTA
However, we cannot interpret Section 42 of Regulations No. 26 to - On October 4, 2005, the CTA Second Division issued a Resolution canceling the assessment
mean that anyone who "uses" the document, regardless of whether notices issued against respondent for having been issued beyond the prescriptive period.
 - It found the first Waiver of the Statute of Limitations incomplete and defective for failure to As to the alleged delay of the respondent to furnish the BIR of the required documents, this cannot
comply with the provisions of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90. be taken against respondent. Neither can the BIR use this as an excuse for issuing the assessments
o The waiver failed to indicate the date of acceptance. Such date of acceptance is beyond the three-year period because with or without the required documents, the CIR has the
necessary to determine whether the acceptance was made within the prescriptive power to make assessments based on the best evidence obtainable.
period
o the fact of receipt by the taxpayer of his file copy was not indicated on the 4.) MAPULO MINING ASSOCIATION and E.V. CHAVEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented by
original copy. The requirement to furnish the taxpayer with a copy of the ANTONIO M. CHAVEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FERNANDO LOPEZ, in his official capacity as the
waiver is not only to give notice of the existence of the document but also SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES; HON. FERNANDO S. BUSUEGO,
of the acceptance by the BIR and the perfection of the agreement. JR., in his official capacity as the DIRECTOR OF MINES; and PROJECTS & VENTURES, INC.,
 The subject waiver is therefore incomplete and defective. As such, respondents.
the three-year prescriptive period was not tolled or extended This is a petition under Section 61 of the Mining Act (C.A. NO. 137), as amended by R.A. No.
and continued to run. 4388, for review of the 24 March 1969 decision of then Secretary of the Department of
- Section 203 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) mandates the Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR), Hon. Fernando Lopez, in DANR Case No. 3359
government to assess internal revenue taxes within three years from the last day prescribed entitled Mapulo Mining Association and E.V. Chavez & Associates versus Projects &
by law for the filing of the tax return or the actual date of filing of such return, whichever Ventures, Inc., 1 affirming the 5 July 1968 Order of the Director of the Bureau of Mines, Hon.
comes later. Hence, an assessment notice issued after the three-year prescriptive period is Fernando S. Busuego, Jr., which dismissed petitioners' adverse claim against private
no longer valid and effective. respondent's Application For Lease of Mining Claims over certain mineral lands located at
Taysan, Batangas, principally on the ground that said claim was filed one (1) day after the
Issue: expiration of the period within which to do so pursuant to Section 72 of the Mining Act.
Whether or not the doctrine of estoppel can be applied in this case FACTS:
 In 1940, Eliseo Chavez and his wife, Lucia B. Mercado, located a limestone mining
Held: No claim (then known as the San Jose Placer Claim) over a piece of registered private
We find no merit in petitioners claim that respondent is now estopped from claiming prescription land situated at Barrio Mapulo, Taysan, Batangas with an area of 12.4469 hectares.
since by executing the waivers, it was the one which asked for additional time to submit the The said land is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-174(0-510). On
required documents. 6-12 and 18-27 March 1943, the lease survey of the placer claim was undertaken by
then Assistant Mineral Land Surveyor of the Bureau of Mines, Mr. Julian Lagman; on
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in this case as an exception to the statute of limitations on 5 July 1943, then Director of Mines, Hon. Quirico A. Abadilla, approved the survey
the assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed procedure for the proper execution of plan (Pla-163) prepared by the former. Under a temporary permit to extract
the waiver, which the BIR must strictly follow. minerals issued to them by the Director of Mines on 3 February 1943, spouses
extracted and mined limestone from the land.
The BIR cannot hide behind the doctrine of estoppel to cover its failure to comply with RMO 20-90  Subsequently, the Mineral Lands and Administrative Division of the Bureau of Mines
and RDAO 05-01, which the BIR itself issued. As stated earlier, the BIR failed to verify whether a declared as abandoned this claim of Mr. Chavez due to his failure to comply with
notarized written authority was given by the respondent to its accountant, and to indicate the date of requirements. Thereafter, the Mapulo Mining Association, petitioner herein,
acceptance and the receipt by the respondent of the waivers. Having caused the defects in the relocated the area through Antonio Chavez on 16-22 December 1963 and registered
waivers, the BIR must bear the consequence. It cannot shift the blame to the taxpayer. To stress, a it as the Mapulo Placer Mining Area with the Office of the Mining Recorder (Register
waiver of the statute of limitations, being a derogation of the taxpayers right to security against of Deeds) of Batangas on 22 January 1964.
prolonged and unscrupulous investigations, must be carefully and strictly construed.  On 4 February 1964, the Mapulo Mining Association filed an application for a mining
lease, which was docketed as PLA-V-1136.
 On 26-30 November 1963 and 1-4 December 1963, petitioner E.V. Chavez &
Associates located mining claims known as "Chavez I" and "Chavez II" inside private
 agricultural lands belonging to several individuals. On 5 December 1963, the 2.) Assuming that there was, whether or not petitioners' Adverse Claim and/or
corresponding declarations of location were registered in the Office of the Mining Opposition to such application was seasonably filed.
Recorder of Batangas. An application for mining lease over the claims was filed on RULING: The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the then Secretary of Agriculture and
25 August 1967. Natural Resources of 24 March 1969 in DANR Case No. 3359 affirming the Order of the then
 Upon the other hand, on 6-10 June 1966, private respondent Projects & Ventures, Director of the Bureau of Mines of 5 July 1968 in Mines Administrative Case No. V-417 is SET
Inc. (PROVEN) located mining claims known as "BAT 40, 41, 60, 22, 23, 38, 37, 44, ASIDE and the Adverse Claim and/or Opposition filed by petitioners is REINSTATED.
57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 39, 42. 58, 59, 43, and 24" over an area embraced by petitioners' REASONING:
mining claims. 1.) The Court agrees with the petitioner stating that there was no publication of the
 On 2 August 1967, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines an application for an notice in a newspaper published in the municipality or province in which the mining
order of lease survey of the "Mapulo Placer Claim," "Chavez I" and "Chavez II" claim was located.
mining claims. This application was denied on the ground that said claims are in Section 72 of the Mining Act provides, inter alia, that:
conflict with the claims of the private respondent. Upon receipt of the application, and provided that the requirements of this Act have been
 On 29 August 1967, petitioners filed an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to the substantially complied with, the Director of the Bureau of Mines shall publish a notice that
Issuance of Mining Lease dated 28 August 1967. such application has been made, once a week for a period of three consecutive weeks, in the
 Private respondent, on 20 October 1967, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners' Official Gazette and in two newspapers, one published in Manila either in English or Spanish,
adverse claim on the ground that the same was filed one (1) day late. and the other published in the municipality or province in which the mining claim is located,
 On 20 November 1967, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that: if there is such newspaper, otherwise, in the newspaper published in the nearest municipality
(1) Section 72 of the Mining Act, as amended, requiring the publication of the notice or province. . . .
of mining lease application in the provincial newspaper, has not yet been complied There was no publication, however, of the notice in a newspaper published in the
with and so, therefore, there is no publication deadline to speak of; (2) the issues of municipality or province in which the mining claim was located, i.e., in Batangas. It is not
the Official Gazette dated 7, 14 and 21 August 1967, where private respondent's denied that at that time, there were two (2) weekly newspapers in Batangas, namely the
notice of application was inserted, were actually released to the public only on 5, 19 People's Courier and The Batangas Reporter. All that respondent Director of Mines could say
and 29 September 1967, respectively; (3) private respondent's mining claims were in his challenged Order of 5 July 1968 is that "We are not aware of the publication in
located in violation of Sections 28(d) and 60 of the Mining Act as the same had Batangas of such newspapers." This non-awareness does not mean that the newspapers do
already been previously located by other parties; and (4) private respondent's not in fact exists; besides, the petitioners presented him with certifications issued by the
declarations of location are fraudulent as they are mere table locations, no actual Circulation Manager of the People's Courier (Exh. "5") and the Editor of The Batangas
location having been performed. Reporter (Exh. "4") attesting to the existence of said periodicals.
 On 5 July 1968, the Director of Mines dismissed petitioners' adverse claim on the And even granting for the sake of argument that these two (2) local newspapers do not
ground that: (1) the publication of private respondent's notice of filing of exist, the fact remains that there was still no publication of the notice in a newspaper
applications for lease in a provincial newspaper is not necessary; (2) with respect to published in the nearest municipality or province.
the publication in the Official Gazette, what is controlling is not the date of the Petitioners maintain that publication in a newspaper published in the municipality or
actual release but rather the date appearing thereon; and (3) petitioners are guilty province where the claims are located, if there be such a newspaper, or in a newspaper
of laches in filing their adverse claim only on 29 August 1967. published in the nearest municipality or province, is mandatory. The Court agrees with
 On 25 July 1968, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order but the same petitioners that the publication requirements prescribed in Section 72 of the Mining Act are
was later denied. mandatory and that substantial compliance therewith is not enough. Such mandatory
ISSUES: character is obvious from the Section itself.
1.) Whether or not there was valid and sufficient publication of the notice of private It is evident that the newspaper first mentioned refers to a periodical published in Manila
respondent's application for a mining lease over its claims; and and circulated in the Philippines while the second refers to a local newspaper. Publication in
one does not mean that the applicant can dispense with publication in the other. Otherwise,
it would have been absurd, nay ridiculous, for the law to require publication in both
newspapers in addition to publication in the Official Gazette. The legislature certainly abhors telecommunications businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its
absurdity. Corollarily, courts should not give a statute a meaning that would lead to successors or assigns, and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise
absurdity. 39 Besides, Section 72 imposes upon the Director of Mines the duty, "[u]pon or earnings thereof:
receipt of the application, and provided that the requirements of this Act have been
complied with," to publish the notice in the Official Gazette and in the said two (2) The BIR responded :
newspapers. The language of the mandate is undeniably clear and unequivocal. It should be The "in lieu of all taxes" provision under Section 12 of RA 7082 clearly exempts PLDT
taken to mean exactly what it says: from all taxes including the 10% value-added tax (VAT) prescribed by Section 101 (a) of the
. . . It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not same Code on its importations of equipment, machineries and spare parts necessary in the
obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined conduct of its business covered by the franchise, except the aforementioned enumerated
from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no taxes for which PLDT is expressly made liable.
room for construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, sec. 51). The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Hondoras vs. In view thereof, this Office . . . hereby holds that PLDT, is exempt from
Soto, 8 Am. St., Rep. 744). The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to VAT on its importation of equipment, machineries and spare parts . . .needed in its franchise
know the meaning of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent operations.
by the use of such words as are found in the statute (50 Am. Jur. p. 212).
Considering then that there was no publication in a newspaper published in the municipality Armed with the foregoing BIR ruling, PLDT filed on December 2, 1994 a claim for tax
or province where the subject claims are located — Batangas — despite the existence of credit/refund of the VAT, compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and other taxes it had
two (2) weekly newspapers therein, it is clear that there was non-compliance with Section been paying "in connection with its importation of various equipment, machineries and
72 of the Mining Act and that public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in spare parts needed for its operations".
holding that the publication in the Philippines Herald, El Debate and the Official Gazette was
sufficient. CTA granted PLDT’s petition.

STATUTES GRANTING PRIVILIGES Petitioner’s claim: The BIR Commissioner excepts. He submits that the exempting "in lieu of
all taxes" clause covers direct taxes only, adding that for indirect taxes to be included in the
1. CIR v. PLDT exemption, the intention to include must be specific and unmistakable. He thus faults the
Facts: Court of Appeals for erroneously declaring PLDT exempt from payment of VAT and other
PLDT is a grantee of a franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7082 to install, operate and indirect taxes on its importations. To the Commissioner, PLDT's claimed entitlement to tax
maintain a telecommunications system throughout the Philippines. For equipment, refund/credit is without basis inasmuch as the 3% franchise tax being imposed on PLDT is
machineries and spare parts it imported for its business. PLDT paid the following (a) not a substitute for or in lieu of indirect taxes.
compensating tax,advance sales tax and other internal revenue taxes. For similar
importations, PLDT paid value-added tax (VAT). Issue: WON "in lieu of all taxes " clause found in Section 12 of PLDT's franchise (R.A. 7082)
covers all taxes, whether direct or indirect.
On March 15, 1994, PLDT addressed a letter to the BIR seeking a confirmatory ruling on its
tax exemption privilege under Section 12 of R.A. 7082, which reads: Held: NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS; STATUTES GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED
STRICTLY AGAINST THE TAXPAYER AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXING AUTHORITY. —
Provision: Time and again, the Court has stated that taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception.
Sec. 12.The grantee . . . shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings, Accordingly, statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against
and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now the taxpayer and liberally in favour of the taxing authority. To him, therefore, who claims a
or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee, . . . shall pay a refund or exemption from tax payments rests the burden of justifying the exemption by
franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. . . . It cannot be
overemphasized that tax exemption represents a loss of revenue to the government and to the case since it affects public interest (involves taxes) and affects the powers of the
must, therefore, not rest on vague inference. When claimed, it must be strictly construed legislative.
against the taxpayer who must prove that he falls under the exception. And, if an exemption DOCTRINE: Locus Standi or Legal Standing to file a petition as taxpayers and member of
is found to exist, it must not be enlarged by construction, since the reasonable presumption the House of Representatives
is that the state has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that, unless
the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be extended beyond FACTS:
dispute in ordinary cases.
• PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or
[T]he clause "in lieu of all taxes" in Section 12 of RA 7082 is immediately followed by the not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the
limiting or qualifying clause "on this franchise or earnings thereof", suggesting that the country in relation to Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.
exemption is limited to taxes imposed directly on PLDT since taxes pertaining to PLDT's • The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and
franchise or earnings are its direct liability. Accordingly, indirect taxes, not being taxes on maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or
PLDT's franchise or earnings, are outside the purview of the "in lieu" provision. If we were to game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative
adhere to the appellate court's interpretation of the law that the "in lieu of all taxes " clause franchise for the purpose.
encompasses the totality of all taxes collectible under the Revenue Code, then, the • On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent
immediately following limiting clause "on this franchise and its earnings" would be nothing PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games on the
more than a pure jargon bereft of effect and meaning whatsoever. Needless to stress, this ground that the act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the
kind of interpretation cannot be accorded a governing sway following the familiar legal Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
maxim redendo singula singulis meaning, take the words distributively and apply the • On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR entered into an agreement with BELLE and
reference. Under this principle, each word or phrase must be given its proper connection in FILGAME wherein the latter parties would provide all the required facilities and
order to give it proper force and effect, rendering none of them useless or superfluous. requirements for the establishment and operation of jai-alai.
• On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
2. DEL MAR vs. PAGCOR questioning the validity of the agreement stating that PAGCOR is without
jurisdiction, authority, legislative franchise, or authority to enter into such
G.R. No. 138298 / November 29, 2000 agreement for the operation and establishment of jai-alai games.
• A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a
NATURE: Two consolidated petitions concerning the franchise granted to PAGCOR Petition for Injunction. A Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri
alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included
SUMMARY: PAGCOR requested legal advice from the Secretary of Justice if it’s in PAGCOR’s scope.
authorized under its charter to operate jai-alai games (a form of sport). The Secretary of • Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and intervenor Zubiri are suing as taxpayers
Justice said that PAGCOR has the authority; hence PAGCOR has the power under its charter and in their capacity as the members of the House of Representatives.
to operate. Petitioner del Mar filed a petition for prohibition preventing PAGCOR from • Respondent questions the locus standi or the standing of the petitioners to file the
managing jai-alai since its illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or petition at bar as taxpayers and as legislators because the operation of jai-alai does
PAGCOR’s own Charter. However, PAGCOR still entered in an agreement with BELLE and not involve the disbursement of public funds.
FILGAME, hence, del Mar filed a Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of the
agreement. Members of the House of Representative also filed a petition stating that ISSUES & RATIO:
operation of PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in its scope. Respondents 1. WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition – YES.
then questioned the locus standi or legal standing of petitioners filing as taxpayers and
members of the House of representatives. As stated by the Court, they have legal standing As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is without an “oven ready” legal support. A
party suing as taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue he testified, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from
where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being college in 1978. He did not specify or describe the nature of his business
deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from  He presented a health certificate to prove that he is of sound physical and mental
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The health and has no criminal record or pending criminal charges.
record shown under their agreement is barren of evidence that the operation and  The trial court held :
management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of public money. The Court also From the evidence presented by [respondent], this Court believes and
holds that as members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to so holds that [respondent] possesses all the qualifications and none of
file the petition at bar. The operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a citizen of the
the legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise. Hence, powers of Congress are being Philippines.
impared, so as the powers of each of its members.  The Republic, through the SolGen, appealed to the CA :
o faulted the trial court for granting Ong's petition despite his failure to
DECISION: prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
Petitioners have legal standing to file the petition occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law
o respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a
NOTES: businessman/business manager earning an average income of
The states issue is only a “procedural issue” questioning when can taxpayers file a suit. P150,000.00
The substantive issue concerns whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the right to o Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive
manage and operate jai-alai. It was ruled that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT to private schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank
operate jai-alai because: deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home, his alleged
• It was not stated under its scope. income cannot be considered lucrative.
• In accordance with its historical creation, there is a separate Executive Order which o respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a definite and
controls the operating of Jai-Alai (controlled by the Romualdezes) in Manila. existing business or trade
PACGOR’s franchise was never given a franchise to operate jai-alai.  The appellate court dismissed the Republic’s appeal:
• Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from o It may appear that the respondent has no lucrative employment. However,
each other. it is of judicial notice that the value of the peso has taken a
• PAGCOR is engaged in the business affected with public interest. considerable plunge in value since that time up to the present. If we
consider the income earned at that time, the ages of the children of
the respondent, the employment of his wife, we can say that there is
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KERRY LAO ONG an appreciable
FACTS:  Petitioner’s arguments:
o The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he
 Respondent Ong filed a petition for naturalization. He is a Chinese citizen registered qualifies under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration and a native- Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997,
born certificate of residence from the Bureau of Immigration. He has been which show that Ong earns from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually.
continuously and permanently residing in the Philippines from birth up to present. This declared income is far from the legal requirement of lucrative
 He married Griselda Yap who is also a Chinese citizen. They have four children who income. It is not sufficient to provide for the needs of a family of six,
were all born and raised in the Philippines. with four children of school age
 Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a “businessman business manager"
since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00. However, when
 o none of these tax returns describes the source of Ong's income, much consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
less can they describe the lawful nature civilization.”
 Respondent’s arguments: Ong submits that his tax returns support the conclusion  It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the
that he is engaged in lucrative trade courts should consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouse's income
should not be included in the assessment. The spouse's additional income is
ISSUE: immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess
Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some lucrative trade, profession or 'some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation' to qualify him to
lawful occupation in accordance with Sec. 2, paragraph 4, of the Revised Naturalization Law become a Filipino citizen."
 The applicant's qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing
RULING: NO. Respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a of his petition
known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised  The Court finds the appellate court’s decision erroneous:
Naturalization Law o First, it should not have included the spouse's income in its assessment
of Ong's lucrative income.
 The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued o Second, it failed to consider the following circumstances which have a
with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced bearing on Ong's expenses vis-à-vis his income: (a) that Ong does not
and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. own real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual income
The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete around the time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had
compliance with the requirements of law. to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c) that
 the controversy revolves around respondent Ong's compliance with the Ong's children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu
qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization City.
Law o Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that
Ong's income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses.
 Section 2. Qualifications – Subject to section four of this Act, any person
having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by EXCEPTIONS AND PROVISIOS
naturalization:
1. CIR v CENVOCO
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five Facts:
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation; - Private respondent Central Vegetable Oil Manufacturing Co.,Inc.(CENVOCO) is a
manufacturer of edible oil and coconut, copra meal cake and such other coconut related oil
 The qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful subject to the miller tax of 3%.
occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets - In1986, CENVOCO purchased a specified number of containers and packaging materials for
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the its edible oil from its suppliers, and paid the sales tax due thereon.
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of - After an investigation by the Revenue Examiner, CENVOCO was assessed for deficiency
his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate miller's tax in the total amount of P1,575,514.70.
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus - CENVOCO wrote petition era letter requesting for reconsideration, contending that the
avoid one's becoming the object of charity or a public charge." final provision of Section168 of the Tax Code does not apply to sales tax paid on containers
His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with and packaging materials, hence, the amount paid therefor should have been credited
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and against the miller's tax assessed against it.
- Petitioner, through a letter, reiterated the validity of its assessment.
- Dissatisfied, CENVOCO filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals, which execute the RTC decision pending appeal: Gateway was guilty of fraud, the appeal was
came out with a decision in favor of CENVOCO. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. interposed to delay the case, imminent danger of gateway's insolvency and that the
- The assailed decision was affirmed in toto. counterbond could be the subject of execution. The RTC granted the motion for execution of
judgement pending appeal on the ground that gateway admitted its principal obligation to
Issue: the petitioner and the case had been pending for a long time. The surety LEPANTO filed a
Whether or not petitioner can invoke section 168 of the Tax Code to exempt it from the motion to set aside the order of the RTC and to quash the writ of execution but it was
deficiency miller’s tax denied, a writ of execution was issued and was implemnted by the sheriff.

Held: No Both respondents filed a separate Rule 65 petitions before the Court of Appeals. In
- The law relied upon by the BIR Commissioner as the basis for not allowing the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (with urgent prayer for the issuance of
CENVOCO's tax credit is just a proviso of Section 168 of the old Tax Code. a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction .
- The restriction in said proviso, however, is limited only to sales, miller's or excise
taxes paid "On raw materials used in the milling process." Respondent Gateway's petition was initially dismissed by the appellate court, but
- The Court ruled that under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a upon motion for reconsideration, the appellate court ordered its reinstatement and the
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the enforcement of the RTC's
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the Decision
general provisions rather than the exception.
- The exception provided for in section 168 of the old Tax Code should be strictly Respondent surety's petition for certiorari, sought the nullification of the RTC
construed. orders , the quashal of the writ of execution, the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary
- The Court also ruled that it is a basic rule of interpretation that words and phrases injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the return of the
used in the statute in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, should garnished amount to respondent surety.
be given their plain, ordinary and common usage or meaning.
- Cans and tetrapaks are not used in the manufacture of CENVOCO's finished The court of appeals granted both the Respondents petitions and denied the motion for
products which are coconut, edible oil or copra meal cake. Such finished products reconsideration filed by the respondent
are packed in cans and tetrapaks. There is no error in allowing the sales taxes paid
on the containers and packaging materials of the milled products should be credited Hence petitition for certiorari by the respondent.
against the miller's tax due thereon.
ISSUE:
2. GEOLINGUISTICS, INC. vs. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION whether or not there is a sufficient ground exists warranting the discretionary execution of
the RTC decision.
FACTS:
Petitioner Geologistics, Inc., formerly known as LEP International Philippines, Inc., is HELD: There is none.
a domestic corporation engaged in the business of freight forwarding and customs
brokerage who instituted an action for the recovery of sum of money against respondent The rule on execution pending appeal, which is now termed discretionary execution
Gateway Electronic Corporation (respondent Gateway) before the RTC. Respondent First under Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, must be strictly construed being an exception
Lepanto-Taisho Insurance Corporation (respondent surety) filed a counter-bond in the to the general rule. Discretionary execution of appealed judgments may be allowed upon
amount of P5 million to secure the payment of any judgment that petitioner could recover concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party
from respondent Gateway. The RTC rendered a decision ordering the defendant to pay the with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending
plaintiff Geologistics. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. The yardstick remains the
opposed by respondent Gateway. The motion alleged the following "good reasons" to presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the SEC. 3-B. The benefits under this Act shall be granted to all those who have retired prior to
appealed judgment be reversed later. Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the benefits shall be applicable only to the
an exception to the general rule, the existence of good reasons is essential. In granting members of the Judiciary: Provided, further, That the benefits to be granted shall be
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal, the RTC gave weight to the fact that the prospective.
case had been pending since 1997 and the alleged admission of liability on the part of
respondent Gateway, Issue: (1) whether Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba; (2) whether the heirs of
Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits under Republic Act No.
The grounds cited by the RTC in allowing the discretionary execution of its decision 9946; and (3) whether Mrs. Gruba is entitled to survivorship pension benefits under the
cannot be considered "good reasons." The alleged admission by respondent Gateway of its same law.
liability is more apparent than real because the issue of liability is precisely the reason the
case was elevated on appeal. The exact amount of respondent Gateway's liability to Held: First two issues in favor of the heirs of Judge Gruba. However, we deny theapplication
petitioner remains under dispute even if, as claimed by petitioner, the evidence on record for survivorship pension benefits of Mrs. Gruba.
indicates that respondent Gateway's obligation is almost a certainty. Precisely the appeal
process must be allowed to take its course all the way to the finality of judgment to Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their
determine once and for all the incidents of the suit. objective is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no
longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being of
B. STATUTES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed
and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are
1. RE: APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION BENEFITS UNDER resolved in favour of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946 OF MRS. PACITA A. GRUBA, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF THE LATE
MANUEL K. GRUBA, FORMER CTA ASSOCIATE JUDGE. When Mrs. Gruba applied for benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, she was not claiming
Facts: additional gratuity benefits. She was invoking the second paragraph of
This case involves a judge, Manuel K. Gruba, of the Court of Tax Appeals 1 who died while in
service. He died at the age of 55 years, two (2) months, and six (6) days. He died prior to the Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, thus:
enactment of Republic Act No. 9946, which substantially amended the benefits provided in aSIUpon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice
Republic Act No. 910. or Judge has retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the
surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all the retirement benefits
The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba, Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba (Mrs. Gruba), applied for that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not
retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910. died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until
the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 1996, this Court approved the application filed by Mrs.
Gruba. The five-year lump sum retirement benefit under Republic Act No. 910 was remitted According to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946, survivorship pension benefits are given to
to the Government Service Insurance System effective surviving spouses of retired judges or justices or surviving spouses of judges or justices who
June 26, 1996. are eligible to retire optionally. This means that for the spouse to qualify for survivorship
pension, the deceased judge or justice must (1) be at least 60 years old, (2) have rendered at
On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. least fifteen years in the Judiciary or in any other branch of government, and in the case of
9946. Republic Act No. 9946 provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension eligibility for optional retirement, (3) have served the last three years continuously in the
benefits, among others. The law also provides a retroactivity provision which Judiciary.
states:
Mrs. Gruba could have been entitled to survivorship pension benefits if her late husband "RULE 3. FILING OF CLAIM
were eligible to optionally retire at the time of his death. However, we are faced with a Section 4. When to file.
situation where the justice complied only with two of three requirements for optional (a) Benefit claims shall be filed with the GSIS or the SSS within three (3) years from the date
retirement. He was only 55 years old, and the law required the age of 60 for eligibility for of the occurrence of the contingency (sickness, injury, disability or death).
optional retirement. (b) Claims filed beyond the 3-year prescriptive period may still be given due course,
provided that:
2. OBRA vs. SSS 1. A claim was filed for Medicare, retirement with disability, burial, death claims, or
Petitioner: Maria Buena Obra life (disability) insurance, with the GSIS within three (3)years from the occurrence of
Respondent: Social Security System (Jollar Industrial Sales and Servicex, Inc.) the contingency.
Facts: 2. In the case of the private sector employees, a claim for Medicare, sickness,
 Petitioner filed her claim for death benefits, when his husband Juanito Buena Obra burial, disability or death was filed within three (3) years from the occurrence of
died from heart attack while driving a dump truck inside his work compound, under the contingency.
the SSS law and started receiving pension in Nov. 1988 then she found out in 1998 3. In any of the foregoing cases, the employees' compensation claim shall be filed
there are other benefits under the Law on Employees’ Compensation (P.D. 626). She with the GSIS or the SSS within a reasonable time as provided by law.”
completed the necessary documents for filling her claim for funeral benefits under The petitioner claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be considered as the
the P.D. 626 but the SSS denied her claim. Employees' Compensation claim itself. This is but logical and reasonable because the claim
 The petitioner failed to substantiate that the cause of her husband’s death was work for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS is of the same nature as her claim
related. Filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. before the ECC. The SSS is the same agency with which Employees' Compensation claims are
 The appellate court ruled that the petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed. filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner, when she filed her claim for death benefits
Issue: with the SSS under the SSS law, she had already notified the SSS of her employees'
Whether the claim of petitioner had already prescribed. compensation claim, because the SSS is the very same agency where claims for payment of
Whether the cause of her husband’s death was work related. sickness/disability/death benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed. The petitioner was able to
Ruling: file her claim for death benefits under the SSS law within the three-year prescriptive period
No. In the issue of prescriptive period it is governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on also she has been receiving her pension under the SSS law since Nov. 1988. The evidence
Employees’ Compensation. Art. 201 of P.D. No. 626 and Sec. 6, Rule VII of the 1987 shows that the System failed to process her compensation claim. Under the circumstances,
Amended Rule of Employees’ Compensation. "No claim for compensation shall be given the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the lapse committed by the System. It is the
due course unless said claim is filed with the System within three years from the time the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislations liberally in favour of the
cause of action accrued." beneficiaries. 13 This court has time and again upheld the policy of liberality of the law in
This is the general rule. The exceptions are found in Board Resolution 93-08-0068 and ECC favor of labor. Presidential Decree No. 626 itself, in its Art. 166 reads:
Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees' Compensation Claims. Board "ART. 166. Policy . — The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees'
Resolution 93-08-0068 issued on 5 August 1993, states: "A claim for employee's compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work-
compensation must be filed with System (SSS/GSIS) within three (3) years from the time connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit, and medical
the cause of action accrued, provided however, that any claim filed within the System for or related benefits."
any contingency that may be held compensable under the Employee's Compensation Furthermore, Art. 4 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Program (ECP) shall be considered as the EC claim itself. The three-year prescriptive period Philippines, which P.D. No. 626 forms a part of, reads as follows:
shall be reckoned from the onset of disability, or date of death. In case of presumptive "ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the implementation and
death, the three (3) years limitation shall be counted from the date the missing person interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
was officially declared to be presumptively dead." regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor."
Section 4(b), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Yes. The cause of her husband’s death was work related the petitioner's husband's heart
Employees' Compensation Claims, reads: disease falls under the second condition of ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977
which states that the strain of work that brought about the acute attack must be of to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P.
sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
insult to constitute causal relationship. Petitioner's husband was driving a dump truck within
the company premises where they were stacking gravel and sand when he suffered the The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, Primo
heart attack. He had to be taken down from the truck and brought to the workers' quarters died. Petitioner married Angelo Olario, an American citizen.
where he expired at 10:30 a.m., just a few minutes after the heart attack, which is much less
than the 24 hours required by ECC Resolution No. 432. This is a clear indication that severe Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
strain of work brought about the acute attack that caused his death. 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing
“(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and
of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute 18 years old.
causal relationship.”
Heavy exertion or emotional stress can trigger a heart attack. The petitioner’s husband is Michelle’s husband gave his consent to the adoption of Michelle. Olario likewise gave his
under a lot of stress in the workplace. He had to be taken down from the truck and brought consent.
to the workers' quarters where he expired at 10:30 a.m., just a few minutes after the heart
attack, which is much less than the 24 hours required by ECC Resolution No. 432. This is a Trial court dismissed the petitions.
clear indication that severe strain of work brought about the acute attack that caused his
death. Issue: Whether petitioner, who has remarried, adopt singly.
The petition is granted. Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution are set aside.
The SSS is directed to pay the petitioner the death/funeral benefits under existing law. Held: No.
P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide
meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and Joint adoption by husband and wife. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
other contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Thus, as the official agents charged by reads:
law to implement social justice guaranteed by the Constitution, the ECC and the SSS should
adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
xxx
especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
illness or injury, as the case may be. It is only this kind of interpretation that can give
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of other; or
the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her
be resolved in favor of labor. consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
3. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009 spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption
Topic: As a general rule, a petition for adoption shall be filed jointly by the husband and wife. by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
Facts: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession, married Primo Lim. They were childless. adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lcia spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must (2) to receive support from their parents; and
jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions
for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
exceptions enumerated in Section 7. the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in 4. THE COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION vs. CLARITA P. GACAYAN
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the G.R. No. 149433, June 22, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for 2. Labor Law c. Framework 4.1 Social Justice vis-a-vis Management prerogative
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed SUMMARY:
to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Coca-Cola assailing a prior decision of
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
the Supreme Court which found that Gacayan was illegally dismissed. Coca-Cola
Effects of adoption
fired Clarita alleging loss of trust and confidence. Allegedly, Clarita tampered with
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the her meal receipts which served as her request for reimbursement. The Labor Arbiter
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is and the NLRC found just cause in the dismissal. The CA reversed the NLRC holding
untenable. that there was an illegal dismissal and that the penalty was too severe. The Supreme
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he Court initially agreed with the CA. However, in this MR, the Supreme Court reversed
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental its prior position and held that (see doctrine)
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of DOCTRINE:
the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection
adoption. of the working class, it should not be expected that every labor dispute will be
Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as
(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except
such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
FACTS:
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: ● Respondent, Clarita Gacayan, is a Senior Financial Accountant (SFA) of
a. the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; Petitioner, Coca-Cola.
and ● Employees of Coca-Cola enjoyed the benefit of reimbursement with respect to
b. the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs meal and transportation expenses incurred during overtime work.
of each other. ● Gacayan submitted three receipts which were allegedly altered and tampered
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still with in support of her reimbursement. Some dates were adjusted.
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child
such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
 ● Petitioner sent Respondent several memoranda requiring her to explain why ● Ironically, while she was tasked with ensuring financial reportorial/regulatory
her reimbursement should not be considered as fraudulent. Respondent replied compliance of the company, she repeatedly submitted tampered or altered
denying personal knowledge with the said alterations. receipts, in gross violation of the rules and regulations of petitioner company.
● Petitioner conducted a series of hearings and investigation on the case but the ● She cannot mistakenly file a claim for overtime meal allowance
Respondent only attended the first hearing. reimbursement for a day she knew she was not entitled to, as she did not
● Petitioner dismissed Respondent for fraudulently submitting tampered receipts actually render overtime work. She altered dates and items in the receipt and
in gross violation of the company’s rules and regulations. fraudulently claimed that a co-worker agreed to split the bill with her on one
● Gacayan filed a complaint with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the occasion.
complaint. The NLRC sustained the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. However, ● Gacayan failed to refute the charges brought to bear against her and merely
the CA reversed the Decision of the NLRC. pointed fingers at others she believed to be responsible for the alterations.
● The SC initially sustained the Decision of the CA citing that the dismissal of ● Lest it be forgotten, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found just cause for her
the Respondent was not grounded among any of the just causes enumerated in termination. Moreover, the CA never absolved her of her crimes but only
Art 282 of the Labor Code. recognized that the penalty levied upon her was too severe for her crime.
● Furthermore, the termination letter neither mentioned its alleged loss of trust
and confidence in respondent Gacayan, nor discussed the alleged sensitive and (optional??) [2] W/N her right to due process was infringed - NO
delicate position of respondent Gacayan requiring the utmost trust of ● Due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen,
petitioner company. for whatever reason, not to be heard.
● Moreover, the penalty imposed was too harsh considering the attendant ● The law requires that the employer serve two written notices before the
circumstances. Gacayan was working with Coca-Cola for 9 ½ years and there employee to be terminated prior to termination.
was no prior mark in her record. The Constitution urges moderation on the ● Herein, she was served multiple repeated notices and invited to attend
sanction that may be applied. The provisions of the Labor Code are to be multiple hearings. She only attended the first one.
construed liberally in favor of labor. ● Finally, it was only after the evidence was received and her fraudulent
participation ascertained that Coca-Cola decided to terminate her services.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
[1] W/N there is just cause for dismissing Gacayan - YES Conclusion and actual relevant part beyond the main issues:
● Well settled in jurisprudence [Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.] is the rule In fine, Coca-Cola sufficiently proved that the dismissal of Gacayan was for just
that loss of trust and confidence constitutes just cause in dismissing an cause and made in accordance with law. Moreover, the respondent was afforded due
process. To allow respondent Gacayan to be reinstated to her former position with
employee. It is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a
payment of backwages would tend rather to reward dishonesty and ennoble breach of
position where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters. trust by employees to the prejudice of the employer.
● Moreover, the act complained of must be "work-related" that would show the
employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection
● Herein, Gacayan is the SFA of Coca-Cola. Respondent handled delicate and of the working class, it should not be expected that every labor dispute will be
confidential matters and was privy to strategic and operational decision- automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as
making requiring the Petitioner’s utmost trust and confidence. such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.
RULING:  In its August 5, 2003 Order, the Regional Adjudicator allowed the appeal of the heirs
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner The of the two decedents and nullified the writ of execution as regards to them.
Coca-Cola Export Corporation and RECONSIDER our Decision dated December 15, 2010. The assailed Decision
dated May 30, 2001 and Resolution dated August 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49192 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions dated April 14, 1998 and June 19, 1998 of the National Labor  Respondents moved for reconsideration but was denied in the November 13, 2003
Relations Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. Order which also ordered the sheriff to restore the farm holdings of the heirs of the
deceased in view of the quashal of the writ of execution.

5. REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUCTION BOARD vs. COURT OF APPEALS  Thus, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with CA, arguing that both notices of
G.R. No. 165155 | 13 April 2010POLITICAL LAW appeal by the petitioners were infirm for failure to state the grounds for appeal and
– for containing forged signatures.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY - ACQUISITION, OWNERSHIP ANDTRANSFER OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LANDS  CA held that the notice of appeal bearing the signatures of the deceased contained
DOCTRINE: Rules of Procedure in agrarian cases should be liberally construed for as long as forgeries,
the purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process takes place.  brushing aside the heirs’ explanations that they merely signed the decedents’
names to show intention to appeal the decision. The said notices of appeal also
FACTS: failed to specifically allege the grounds relied upon.
 Respondents, co-owners of several parcels of land primarily devoted to rice production,
filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for non-payment of rentals before  Petitioners, in their petition for certiorari, claim that the stringent application of the
the DARAB. They averred that petitioners were agricultural lessees while the petitioners rules denied them substantial justice. Respondents maintain that there should be
themselves contend that they are farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27. strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure because DARAB rules frown
upon dilatory appeals.
 When the complaint for ejectment was filed, the actual tillers on the land were the
successors-in-interest of two of the named defendants (Pedro and Avelino) as they had ISSUE:
died at the time of filing, and the same participated in the proceedings despite no Whether or not the notices of appeal are mere scraps of paper for failure to state the
formal substitution of party litigants. grounds relied upon for appeal and are null and void for containing two falsified signatures?

 The Regional Adjudicator directed the petitioners to surrender possession of the land to HELD:
the respondents as they could only retain their status as agricultural lessees if they No. Under Section 2 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it is provided that the rules should be
complied with their statutory obligation to pay the required leasehold rentals. liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the agrarian reform program and to
promote just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of agrarian cases. The defects found
 Upon appeal, the Regional Adjudicator issued, in its May 6, 2003 Order, a writ of in the two notices of appeal also are not of such nature that would cause a denial of the
execution against the non-appealing defendants and deceased defendants. right to appeal as the defects are inconsequential. There is nothing sacred about the forms
of pleadings for the sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the claims of
 Dissatisfied, both respondents and petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order. contending parties so pleadings and procedural rules should be construed liberally. In a
The respondents argued that the appeal should not have been given due course DARAB case, the notice of appeal serves only to inform the officer that rendered the
because it did not adhere to Section 2, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. On appealed decision of the timeliness of the appeal, the general reason for such appeal and to
the other hand, the petitionersincluded in the writ of execution contended that said prepare the records for transmission to DARAB. As such, the notices of appeal substantially
Order was hastily executed. complied with what is required under the DARAB rules as the petitioners were appealing the

decision on the grounds of questions of fact and law. While the notices omitted to state that On March 19, 2004, respondent filed a protest letter citing lack of due process and
the decision would cause grave and irreparable injury, requiring a literal application of the prescription as grounds. On April 16, 2004, respondent filed a supplemental letter of
rules when its purpose has already been served is a superfluity. protest. Subsequently, on June 14, 2004, respondent submitted a letter wherein it attached
documents to prove the defenses raised in its protest letters.
The Regional Adjudicator has no power to determine if the appeal was intended for delay as The CTA En Banc held that petitioner's right to assess respondent for deficiency taxes for the
such matters are for the appellate body to determine after it has studied the appeal taxable year 1999 has already prescribed and that the FAN issued to respondent never
memorandum. This principle is applicable to agrarian disputes by virtue of Section 8, Rule attained finality because respondent did not receive it.
XIII of the DARAB rules. Since the Board is the one which has the power to punish, it is also
the one which has the power to decide if there has been a violation. When an appeal is Petitioner’s claim: Insofar as respondent's alleged deficiency taxes for the taxable year 1999
timely filed, it becomes a ministerial duty to approve the same. are concerned, the running of the three-year prescriptive period to assess, under Sections
203 and 222 of the National Internal Revenue Act of 1997 (Tax Reform Act of 1997) was
PRESCRIPTION suspended when respondent failed to notify petitioner, in writing, of its change of address,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 223 of the same Act and Section 11 of BIR Revenue
1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. BASF COATING + INKS PHILS., INC., Regulation No. 12-85.
BASF COATING + INKS PHILS., INC was a corporation which was duly organized under and by
virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines on August 1, 1990 with a term of Provision/s: Sec 203 of the National Internal Revenue Act
existence of fifty (50) years., Majority of the members of the Board of Directors and the
stockholders representing more than two-thirds (2/3) of the entire subscribed and Sec. 203. Period of Limitation Upon Assessment and Collection.– Except as provided in
outstanding capital stock of herein respondent corporation, resolved to dissolve the Section 222,internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within three (3) years after the last
corporation by shortening its corporate term to March 31, 2001. Subsequently, respondent day prescribed by law for the filing of the return, and no proceeding in court without
moved out of its address in Las Piñas City and transferred to Carmelray Industrial Park, assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such
Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. period: Provided, That in a case where a return is filed beyond the period prescribed by law,
the three (3)-year period shall be counted from the day the return was filed. For purposes of
On June 26, 2001, respondent submitted two (2) letters to the Bureau of Internal Revenue this Section, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for the filing thereof shall be
(BIR) Revenue District Officer of Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 53, Region 8, in Alabang, considered as filed on such last day.
Muntinlupa City. The first letter, dated April 26, 2001, was a notice of respondent's
dissolution, in compliance with the requirements of Section 52(c) of the National Internal Sec. 223. Suspension of Running of Statute of Limitations. — The running of the Statute of
Revenue Code.4 On the other hand, the second letter, dated June 22, 2001, was a Limitations provided in Sections 203 and 222 on the making of assessment and the
manifestation indicating the submission of various documents supporting respondent's beginning of distraint or levy a proceeding in court for collection, in respect of any
dissolution, among which was BIR Form No. 1905, which refers to an update of information deficiency, shall be suspended for the period during which the Commissioner is prohibited
contained in its tax registration.5 from making the assessment or beginning distraint or levy or a proceeding in court and for
sixty (60) days thereafter; when the taxpayer requests for a reinvestigation which is granted
Thereafter, in a Formal Assessment Notice (FA N) dated January 17, 2003, petitioner by the Commissioner; when the taxpayer cannot be located in the address given by him in
assessed respondent the aggregate amount of P18,671,343.14 representing deficiencies in the return filed upon which a tax is being assessed or collected: Provided, that, if the
income tax, value added tax, withholding tax on compensation, expanded withholding tax taxpayer informs the Commissioner of any change in address, the running of the Statute
and documentary stamp tax, including increments, for the taxable year 1999. The FAN was of Limitations will not be suspended; when the warrant of distraint or levy is duly served
sent by registered mail on January 24, 2003 to respondent's former address in Las Piñas City. upon the taxpayer, his authorized representative, or a member of his household with
On March 5, 2004, the Chief of the Collection Section of BIR Revenue Region No. 7, RDO No. sufficient discretion, and no property could be located; and when the taxpayer is out of the
39, South Quezon City, issued a First Notice Before Issuance of Warrant of Distraint and Philippines.
Levy, which was sent to the residence of one of respondent's directors.7
In addition, Section 11 of BIR Revenue Regulation No. 12-85 states: Likewise, in Republic of the Philippines v. Ablaza, this Court elucidated that the prescriptive
period for the filing of actions for collection of taxes is justified by the need to protect law-
Sec. 11. Change of Address. — In case of change of address, the taxpayer must give a written abiding citizens from possible harassment. Also, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
notice thereof to the Revenue District Officer or the district having jurisdiction over his Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it was held that the statute of limitations on the
former legal residence and/or place of business, copy furnished the Revenue District Officer assessment and collection of taxes is principally intended to afford protection to the
having jurisdiction over his new legal residence or place of business, the Revenue Computer taxpayer against unreasonable investigations as the indefinite extension of the period for
Center and the Receivable Accounts Division, BIR, National Office, Quezon City, and in case assessment deprives the taxpayer of the assurance that he will no longer be subjected to
of failure to do so, any communication referred to in these regulations previously sent to his further investigation for taxes after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. Thus, in
former legal residence or business address as appear in is tax return for the period involved Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. B.F. Goodrich Phils., Inc., this Court ruled that the legal
shall be considered valid and binding for purposes of the period within which to reply. provisions on prescription should be liberally construed to protect taxpayers and that, as a
corollary, the exceptions to the rule on prescription should be strictly construed.
Held: Pettion DISMISSED. It is true that, under Section 223 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997,
the running of the Statute of Limitations provided under the provisions of Sections 203 and 2. SYHUNLIONG vs. RIVERA
222 of the same Act shall be suspended when the taxpayer cannot be located in the address Petitioner: Ramon A. Syhunliong
given by him in the return filed upon which a tax is being assessed or collected. In addition, Respondent: Teresita D. Rivera
Section 11 of Revenue Regulation No. 12-85 states that, in case of change of address, the Facts:
taxpayer is required to give a written notice thereof to the Revenue District Officer or the  The petitioner is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation and
district having jurisdiction over his former legal residence and/or place of business. likewise owns construction, restaurant, and hospital businesses.
However, this Court agrees with both the CTA Special First Division and the CTA En Banc in  The Respondent is the Accounting Manager of BANFF, who worked for 3 years then
their ruling that the abovementioned provisions on the suspension of the three-year period filed a resignation but continued working of the same year to complete the turnover
to assess apply only if the BIR Commissioner is not aware of the whereabouts of the of papers to Jennifer Lumapas, who succeeded her.
taxpayer.  The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the National Labor
Relations Commissions for unpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentives,
Prescription in the assessment and in the collection of taxes is provided by the Legislature gratuities and tax refund a total of Php 698,150.48
for the benefit of both the Government and the taxpayer; for the Government for the  The petitioner filled a complaint for libel against the respondent because of the text
purpose of expediting the collection of taxes, so that the agency charged with the messages the respondent sent to one of BANFF’s official cellular phone held by
assessment and collection may not tarry too long or indefinitely to the prejudice of the Lumapas.
interests of the Government, which needs taxes to run it; and for the taxpayer so that  Petitioner seeks for the reversal of the CA’s decision and resolution.
within a reasonable time after filing his return, he may know the amount of the Issue:
assessment he is required to pay, whether or not such assessment is well founded and  Whether Rivera’s text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged
reasonable so that he may either pay the amount of the assessment or contest its validity communication.
in court . . . . It would surely be prejudicial to the interest of the taxpayer for the Government  Whether the prescription of the crime had set in.
collecting agency to unduly delay the assessment and the collection because by the time the Ruling:
collecting agency finally gets around to making the assessment or making the collection, the Yes. The petition was denied. Rivera’s text message falls within the ambit of a
taxpayer may then have lost his papers and books to support his claim and contest that of qualified privileged communication since she “was speaking in response to duty (to protect
the her own interest) and not out of intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Also there
Government, and what is more, the tax is in the meantime accumulating interest which the was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to the party
taxpayer eventually has to pay. concerned. Lamapas was the one who told Rivera about the delay so Rivera expressed her
grievances to Lumapas and she was the best person at that time that could help expedite
the release of Rivera’s claims. Supreme Court ruled that it should be noted that the libellous ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and
material must be viewed as a whole. In order to ascertain the meaning of the published Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' is hereby amended to read as
article the whole of the article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the follows: "'
light of the entire publication.
The prescription had set in. There is no merit in the instant petition of Syhunliong 1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the
against Rivera since it was filled more than one year after the allegedly libellous message Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in
was sent to Lumapas. Its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court finds no persuasive reason why Rivera should be deprived at the time of the adoption of this code: Provided, That any person who,
of the benefits accruing from the prescription of the crime ascribed to her. The plea of prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held,
prescription should be set up before the accused pleads to the charge, as otherwise the under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the
defense would be deemed waived, but the rule is not absolute especially when it conflicts Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
with a substantive provisions of the law, such as that refers to prescription of crimes. The judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
Supreme Court has only power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice, and position of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General,
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and cannot cover substantive rights, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting
the rule we considering cannot be interpreted or given such scope or extent that would attorney for the city of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the city
come into conflict or defeat an express provision of our substantive law. PRESCRIPTION OF of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
THE CRIME IS ALREADY A COMPELLING REASON FOR THE REASON OF THE COURT TO provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE LIBEL INFORMATION, BUT THE COURT STILL STRESSES THAT the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the
THE TEXT MESSAGE WHICH RIVERA SENT TO LUMAPAS FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF A Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the
QUALIFIED PRIVELEGED COMMUNICATION. Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said
Even if the court were to sustain Syhunliong’s stance that Rivera availed of the court.'"
wrong remedy when she restored to filling a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail
the RTC orders denying the motion to quash, the result would only prove circuitous. Even if  It is contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
the trial proceeds and an adverse decision is rendered against Rivera, she can appeal the order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
same, but the CA and the Supreme Court would still be compelled to order the dismissal of candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
the information on account of prescription of the crime.  It must be confessed that were the inquiry limited strictly to the provisions of
local law touching this matter, the contentions of the applicant would have
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES great weight. For it is well settled that in statutory interpretation the word
"may" should be read "shall" where such construction is necessary to give
1. ART 5 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE effect to the apparent intention of the legislator

2. In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the bar. ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether or not, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding
 Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact a
case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, law mandatory in its character
on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of
Batanes
 Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows: RULING:
"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One hundred and  Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and
imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be
 determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as  "Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to make it
gathered from the context, as well as from the language of the particular conflict with the constitution, but will rather put such an interpretation upon
provision. it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force and effect,
 Applying these canons of construction to the statute under consideration, and if this can be done without extravagance. If there is doubt or uncertainty as
limiting ourselves strictly to the provisions of local law touching the admission to the meaning of the legislature, if the words or provisions of the statute are
of candidates to the bar, we might, as we have said, be inclined to give the obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions,
statute the mandatory effect which applicant claims should be placed upon it. that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of
But we are of opinion that such a construction is precluded by the provisions unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to
of the Act of Congress enacted July 1, 1902, which confirm and secure to this disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language employed."
court the jurisdiction therefore conferred upon it.  Without undue straining of the language used in the statute under
 Prior to the passage of this Act the power and jurisdiction of this court in consideration, the word "may" may be construed as either mandatory or
relation to the admission of candidates to the bar of the Philippine Islands permissive in its effect. But to construe it as mandatory would bring it in
had been fixed by the provisions of the Organic Act (No. 136) and the Code direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we conclude therefore, despite
of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); and as we understand these provisions this the contentions of the applicant as to the apparent intention of the legislator,
court was vested thereby with authority, and charged with a duty to pass that it should be given its permissive and not its mandatory effect, and that
upon the "moral character" and the "qualifications and ability" of all the true intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the
candidates for admission to the bar. court to admit to the bar without examination the officials mentioned in the
 Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Commission Act in any case wherein the court is otherwise satisfied that they possess the
and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, necessary qualifications.
and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the  In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the
word "may," as used in the above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory applicant was not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any
rather than a permissive effect. But any Act of the Commission which has the other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and
effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1, it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
conferred upon the Commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority. 3. ADASA VS. ABALOS
 In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our
duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of February 19, 2007
Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another
construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we Facts:
should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints and affidavits that petitioner
of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission Bernadette Adasa was encashed two checks issued in the name of the respondent
intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress.
through deceit without knowledge of respondent Abalos. Adasa failed to pay to the
 In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it
proceeds of the checks despite demands of Abalos. Adasa filed a counter-affidavit
was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law,
and one which should change the prior law no further than may be necessary admitting that she received and encashed the checks and alleged further in a
to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question. The construction supplemental affidavit that Bebie Correa instead received the 2 checks and that she
should be in harmony with this assumption whenever possible." left the country. The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City issued a
resolution finding probable cause against Adasa and ordered for filing of two
separate informations for Estafa through falsification of commercial document by a and would undermine the main objectives of the said circular which is “for the
private individual. This petition only concerns one of the two (Criminal Case #8782) expeditious and efficient administration of justice.”
criminal cases (8781 & 8782) that were docketed. Petitioner Adasa filed a motion
upon the trial court in order for the OCP to conduct a reinvestigation, in which the
OCP has reaffirmed its finding of probable cause. Adasa has entered a not guilty plea 4. PHILIPPINE REGISTERED ELECTRICAL PRACTITIONER, INC. vs. JULIO FRANCIA, JR.
during her arrangement on October 1, 2001 and later filed a petition for review
before the DOJ where it reversed and set aside the resolution of the OCP and Facts:
ordering it to withdraw the information for estafa. Petitioner is an organization composed of professional electrical engineers, associate
electrical engineers, assistant electrical engineers, and master electricians. It is
Respondent Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the DOJ should represented in this case by several of its officers and members. They assailed the
have dismissed the petition for review outright contending that Sec 7 of DOJ Circular constitutionality of Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986 issued by the Board of Electrical
no 70 mandates that “If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the Engineering (BEE), adopting guidelines for the implementation of Continuing
appealed resolution the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had Professional Education (CPE) Program for Electrical Engineers. It requires every
already been arraigned” the aggrieved party cannot file a petition for review as the electrical engineer to earn credit units of CPE before his license could be
secretary of Justice shall deny it outright. renewed.||| Petitioner questioned the authority of the BEE to issue the subject
Resolution, and the constitutionality of said Resolution. Sec. 3 of RA 184 mandated
The trial court has granted the petitioner’s “motion to withdraw information” and the Board to recommend proper measures for the maintenance of good ethics and
dismissed the criminal case, on February 2003. Respondent filed a petition for standards in the practice of electrical engineering in the Philippines. The same is
certiorari before the CA on the DOJ resolution and it reversed the sad resolution. supported by Sec. 6(a) of PD 223. Petitioner argues that PRC and BEE have only
The appellate court emphasized that DOJ Circular 70 Sec 7 used the phrase “shall visitation powers as stated in the said provision. The RTC as affirmed by the CA,
not.” decided that the board had the authority to promulgate the questioned resolution
pursuant to Section 3, RA no.184. That the latter law is not limited to the power of
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari contending that section 12 of the same inspection and visitation as petitioner contends. It includes the power to formulate
DOJ Circular used the word “may” that would give discretion to the Secretary of policies and programs as may be necessary to improve the practice of a profession.
Justice to entertain an appeal, thus this petition.
Issue: whether the Board of Electrical Engineers in the light of the provisions of R.A.
Issue: WON the overall language and the intent of DOJ Circular no 70 is directory No. 184, had the authority to issue the questioned resolution.
that it would give discretion to the Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal even if
the accused has been arraigned. Held: Yes, The Court found that BEE had the authority to issue the resolution. The
court found that the objective of the resolution is to upgrade the knowledge and
Held: No. the court held that CA is correct, the DOJ cannot give an appeal/petition skills of electrical engineers. And that Section 3 of RA no 184 mandates the Board to
for review due course and must dismiss such actions if the accused has already been recommend to the PRC the adoption of “measures as may be deemed proper for the
arraigned. Therefore in Sec 12 if the ground for the dismissal is the arraignment of maintenance of good ethics and standars on the practice of electrical engineering in
the accused, it must go back and act upon through Section 7. If Sec 12 is given a the Philippines…”. Moreover, Section 6(a) of PD no 223 gives various professional
directory application it would render earlier mandatory provisions invalid/negligible boards the power “to look from time to time into conditions affecting the practice of
the profession….” It said that the members of a Board may personally or through
subordinate employees of the Commission conduct ocular inspection or visit
industrial, mechanical, electrical or chemical plants or works, hospitals, clinics and
other engineering works. . ." On this point, petitioner now insists that the authority Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
of the Board is limited to the conduct of ocular inspections. But nothing in said from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
provision in any way imposes such an interpretation. The Board in fact may even do made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made,
the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject
away with ocular inspections, as can be gleaned from the use of the word "may,"
of compromise under the Civil Code.
implying that the conduct of ocular inspections is merely directory and not
mandatory. For sure, conducting ocular inspections is only one way of ensuring Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No," the
compliance with laws and rules relative to the professional practice of electrical requirement is mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should
engineering. But it certainly is not the only way. allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed,
so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."

5. GAUDENCIO GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which
LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING,AND PEDRO G. HERNANDO, provides as a ground for a motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the
Facts: Filed by petitioner, GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, as an accion publiciana against private same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made."
respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent
Judge on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint should have The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the
alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a
complaint is given due course —
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest efforts towards a This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle
compromise and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent bitterness than between strangers . . . A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than
Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters a lawsuit between strangers.
hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five ..
(5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the above-quoted
close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the
should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend
Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect. "sisters-in-law." In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law"
(hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as
Petitioner’s claim: Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same
court a quo. (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family enumeration of "members of the family," we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence
contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero,
1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest
before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained; and, efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.

Held: Petition granted.The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to
strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. 2 This is also embodied in Art. 149, 3
and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
6. LOKIN vs. COMELEC party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register
political parties.

(2) No error because it is indicated clearly in the law that Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.
FACTS: No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
 COMELEC issued resolution giving due course to CIBAC’s Manifestation of Intent to participate in immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party
the party-list election. or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
 Respondents, President and chairman Villanueva submitted the certified Certificate of Nomination election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. Pia Derla, who is not
of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and clearly not qualified to attest to

nd
Pia Derla submitted a 2 Certificate of Nominees including Lokin, Jr (petitioner) as party-list petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use
nominees as she affixed her signature as “acting secretary-general” of CIBAC. their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees,
 The nomination of petitioners was unauthorized including Derla, are bona fide members of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even
 Respondents filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to expunge from the records and/or for presented evidence proving the affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral
disqualification,” seeking to nullify the certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contented that Derla Party that is registered with COMELEC.
had misrepresented herself as “acting secretary-general”, and not even a member of CIBAC.
 Resolution filed by the COMELEC First division granted the petition and ordered the Certificate filed
by Derla to be expunge from the records, and declared respondents’ group as the true nominees of
CIBAC.
 COMELEC en banc affirmed the Division’s findings as the commission reiterated that Derla was 7. BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC., petitioner, vs. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased)
unable to prove her authority to file a certificate, whereas respondents presented evidence that substituted by Reynaldo P. Villareal, Jr.-spouse, Shekinah Marie Villareal-Azugue-
Villanueva deputized CIBAC secretary to submit the Certificate of Nomination pursuant to CIBAC’s daughter, Reynaldo A. Villareal III-son, Shahani A. Villareal- daughter, and Billy Ray A.
Constitution and bylaws.
 The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Lokin Jr. (petitioner) to file Petition Villareal-son, respondents.
for Certiorari for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the said
Resolution. The petitioner wants to be recognized as the legitimate nominees and representative of FACTS:
CIBAC party-list.
 Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized
ISSUES:
and existing domestic corporation engaged in the selling of ready-to-wear
(RTW) merchandise.
(1) WON the authority of Secretary of CIBAC to file the part’s Certificate of Nomination is an intra-  Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal) is one of Boardwalk's distributors of
corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC RTW merchandise.
has no jurisdiction;
 Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint 5 for replevin against Villareal covering
a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the latter's alleged failure to pay a car loan
(2) WON the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents
as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list. obtained from the former.
 Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court:
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant adjudging that the
(1) The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination of former has the right to the possession of the subject motor vehicle
party-list representatives. The present dispute stemmed from an intra-corporate matter, their
submissions even recognize the COMELEC’s constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws
and for the latter to pay the costs of the suit.
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. More specifically, as
one of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC is also tasked to "register, after sufficient publication, Villareal moved for reconsideration but failed
political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government.” Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The  Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
Court also declared that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The assailed judgment of the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra- lower court is reversed and set aside. Defendant Villareal has the right of
 possession to and the value of subject vehicle described in the  As for the defective Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping,
complaint. Hence, plaintiff is directed to deliver the subject vehicle to Boardwalk contends that these are formal, not jurisdictional, requisites which
defendant or its value in case delivery cannot be made. The complaint could as well be treated with leniency. Its subsequent submission of the
and counterclaim are both dismissed proper secretary's certificate should thus have cured the defect.
 It adds that the same treatment should be accorded its subsequent payment
Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by of the docket fees with the CA Cashier and submission of the required
the RTC in a December 14, 2006 Order, which Boardwalk received on January 19, annexes and pleadings in support of its Petition.
2007. On February 5, 2007, Boardwalk through counsel filed with the Manila RTC a  It prays the Court to consider these as substantial compliance with the Rules.
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying that it be granted
30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition for Review. It paid the docket and ISSUE:
other legal fees therefor at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC. On
even date, Boardwalk also filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC which the said court Whether or not the rules to effect substantial justice in accordance with Rule 1,
denied for being a wrong mode of appeal. On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally construed; specifically, the assailed
through mail its Petition for Review with the CA. resolutions ordering the outright dismissal of the petition for review due to procedural
lapses, in total disregard of the substantial issues clearly raised thereat, are contrary to
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals: existing rules, law, jurisprudence, and the principle of equity and substantial justice
The CA held that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for Extension and
paying the docket fees therefor with the RTC. It should have done so with the RULING: NO
CA as required by Section 1 25 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It held that
as a result of Boardwalk's erroneous filing and payment of docket fees, it was  Petitioner's case is not unique, and there is no compelling reason to accord it
as if no Motion for Extension was filed, and the subsequent March 7, 2007 the privilege it now seeks.
filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus late and beyond the  The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor [is it a component] of due
reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42. process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
 The CA added that Boardwalk's prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion  In this case, petitioner must comply with the following requirements laid
for Extension was irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court:
is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension of 15
days should only be granted for the most compelling reason which is not Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. —
obtaining in the present case
 Petitioner’s Arguments: A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
 Boardwalk invokes the principle that litigations should be decided on the rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
merits and not on technicalities; that litigants should be afforded the amplest petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their causes, free from the time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other
constraints of technicalities. lawful fees, . . . . The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen
 It claims that it should not be faulted for the error committed by its counsel's (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the
clerk in wrongly filing the Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration . . . .
with the RTC Clerk of Court. It prays that the Court review the merits of its Upon proper motion . . ., the Court of Appeals may grant an
case. additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
 petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the  Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court specifically states that payment of
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. the docket fees and other lawful fees should be made to the clerk of the CA.
A plain reading of the Rules leaves no room for interpretation; it is categorical
Sec. 2. Form and contents. — and explicit. It was thus grave error on the part of the petitioner to have
misinterpreted the same and consequently mistakenly remitted its payment to
The petition shall be . . . accompanied by . . . copies . . . of the the RTC clerk. Petitioner's subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support docket fees and other lawful fees did not cure the defect
the allegations of the petition. The petitioner shall also submit together
with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore  Petitioner sought an extension of 30 days within which to file its Petition for
commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Review with the CA. This is not allowed. Section 1 of Rule 42 allows an
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other extension of only 15 days. "No further extension shall be granted except for
tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he the most compelling reason . . . ." Petitioner never cited any compelling
must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn reason.
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof,  Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is deemed perfected as to the
or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the petitioner "upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of
aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within 5 days the corresponding docket and other lawful fees." Undisputably, petitioner's
therefrom appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and
to pay the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is the
 The Rules also require that the Petition must be verified or accompanied by CA
an affidavit by which the affiant attests under oath that he "has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal  To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it
knowledge or based on authentic records." must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an
appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
 Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that non-compliance "with any of the foregoing followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, . . . delays.
and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."  the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the
 Records show that petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing rules same renders the judgment final and executory.

 Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency and relaxed the  It must be emphasized that since petitioner's right of appeal is a mere
Rules. However, in this case, petitioner committed multiple violations of the statutory privilege, it was bound to a strict observance of the periods of
Rules which should sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. As will be appeal, which requirements are not merely mandatory, but jurisdictional.
shown below, petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition
within the reglementary period and paying the docket and other lawful fees
before the proper court. These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional.
8. QUIZON V COMELEC Whether or not the Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of Roberto V. Puno valid?
Facts:
 -Petitioner Quizon and Respondent Puno were congressional candidates during the
May 14, 2007 national and local elections. Ruling : No
 -Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of -The instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Candidacy against Puno. -Respondent is a resident of the 1st District of Antipolo City, and is thus qualified to run as a
 -Quizon alleged that Puno is not qualified to run as candidate in Antipolo City for Member of the House of Representatives of the same district.
failure to meet the residency requirement prior to the day of election; Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code 11 provides that petitions to deny
 -Puno’s claim in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he is a resident of 1906 Don due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy should be resolved, after due notice
Celso Tuazon, Valley Golf Brgy. De la Paz, Antipolo City for four years and six and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. In construing this
months before May 14, 2007 constitutes a material misrepresentation since he was provision together with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of
in fact a resident of Quezon City 1987, 12 this Court declared in Salcedo II v.COMELEC 13 that the fifteen-day period
 -On April 24, 2007, Quizon filed a Supplement to the petition claiming that Puno in Section 78 is merely directory.
cannot validly be a candidate for a congressional seat in the First District of Antipolo Thus:
City since he indicated in his COC that he was running in the First District of the If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is
Province of Rizal which is a different legislative district. subsequently declared by final judgment to be disqualified before the election, he
 -Quizon filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc which shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
remains unresolved up to this date. reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
 -On June 5, 2007, Quizon filed this Petition for Mandamus alleging that the disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
COMELEC had not rendered a judgment on the above-mentioned petitions and that election, the Court or the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
the unreasonable delay in rendering judgment deprived him of his right to be action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
declared as the winner and assume the position of member of the House of may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
Representatives candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. The fifteen-day period in
 -Puno argues that the petition for mandamus was mooted by the July 31, section 78 for deciding the petition is merely directory.
2007Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. He also alleged that the petition
must be dismissed for the act sought to be performed is a discretionary and not a
ministerial duty.
 -COMELEC Second Division DISMISSED the instant Petition for Disqualification and
Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Roberto V. Puno.
 -The COMELEC then continued to state that the respondent is a resident of the 1st
District of Antipolo City, and is thus qualified to runs as Member of the House of
Representatives of the same district.
 -The Office of the Solicitor General agrees that the petition for mandamus was
mooted by the July 31, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. Any
question regarding Puno qualifications now pertains to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

Issue: