EN BANC

[G.R. No. 78053. June 4, 1990.]

FRANCISCO L. MENDOZA , petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES R.

QUISUMBING as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports ,
respondent.

[G.R. No. 78525. June 4, 1990.]

ERNESTO MANDANI, ANANIAS O. SALAZAR, ARACELI S. SARAIN,

IMELDA K. MASSENO, CARMELITA Y. MANLULU, EVELIO S. JAYAON,
ROMEO R. OFINA, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. SECRETARY JOSE ANTONIO
U. GONZALES and UNDERSECRETARY SOSTENES L. CAMPILLO, JR.,
Department of Tourism, and SECRETARY GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
Department of Budget and Management , respondents.

[G.R. No. 81197. June 4, 1990.]

DOLORES GARCIA, MAYDE SANTOS, TERESITA ANTONIO, CORAZON

CARLUEN, GEORGE ABELENDE, RENATO DILIG, JOSE HONTILLANO,
DIONISIO SENIANO, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. HON. TEODORO C.
BENIGNO as Secretary, O ce of the Press Secretary, DANILO A.
GOZO as Undersecretary, O ce of the Press Secretary, CONRADO
LIMCAOCO, JR., as O cer-in-Charge, Bureau of Broadcast Services,
MILA S. ALORA, Asst. Press Secretary and CELERINA G.
GOTLADERA as Chairman, Civil Service Commission , respondents.

[G.R. No. 81495. June 4, 1990.]

HON. SECRETARY ANTONIO V. ARIZABAL, Department of Science

and Technology, THE DIRECTORS and MEMBERS of the PHILIPPINE
NUCLEAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE REORGANIZATION EVALUATION
COMMITTEE, NAMELY: QUIRINO O. NAVARRO, EMERCIANA B.
DURAN, FLORDELIS T. GALLEON and LAPPET A. CALUAG , petitioners,
vs. HON. JUDGE OSCAR L. LEVISTE, Branch XCVII, RTC, Quezon City,
FE DISCAYA, E. GERONIMO, M. DE CASTRO, E. MATUTINA, A.O.
ABRIL, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 81928. June 4, 1990.]

JOSE L. GUERRERO , petitioner, HON. ANTONIO V. ARIZABAL, in his

capacity as Secretary of Science and Technology , respondent.

[G.R. No. 81998. June 4, 1990.]

ROGELIO BUSTAMANTE, ZENY MAGBUAL, ESTELITA A. AVILES,

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 JOSE M. BONA, DR. EDGARDO DOSAYLA, LEOPOLDO DEE, R.
JUMOROL, FLOR BULATAO, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT SECRETARY CARLOS DOMINGUEZ
OF AGRICULTURE and CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION , respondents.

[G.R. No. 86504. June 4, 1990.]

HON. RAINERIO O. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the

Department of Transportation and Communications , petitioner, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, MATIAS T. AUSTRIA and ARCEBIDO
M. GERVACIO , respondents.

[G.R. No. 86547. June 4, 1990.]

SECRETARY CARLOS DOMINGUEZ in his capacity as Secretary of

Agriculture , petitioner, vs. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN, Presiding
Judge of Branch 87, RTC, Quezon City; BALGOS, BERNARDO D.;
DIAZ, SABINA B.; INCIONG, NELSON L.; FERRANCO, GERMELINA O.;
JOSE, GENORO J.; ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 88951. June 4, 1990.]

DIMASANCAY A. PUNDATO, vice Jiamil I.M. Dianalan in his capacity

as Executive Director of the O ce on Muslim Affairs , petitioner, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; AMPAO, LUCMAN; ARIMAO,
SHEHERESAD; BANGCOLA, MA. CHRISTINA; DATUDACULA,
NORATA; DALUMA, OLIVIA; GUIANAN, ROSEMARIE; INDAR, CADER
P.; MACUD, ERLINDA; ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 89427. June 4, 1990.]

CONRADO L. VILLAZOR , petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON,

SECRETARY OF HEALTH , respondent.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR. , J : p

The issues raised in these consolidated cases refer to the validity of various
reorganization programs in different agencies and/or departments of the government
implementing the orders issued pursuant to the President's Proclamation No. 1
declaring as policy the reorganization of the government and Proclamation No. 3
"DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE
PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL
CONSTITUTION AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT
UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." In addition to the pleadings filed, the parties discussed
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 the basic issues raised in these petitions during the hearings held on January 24 and
31, 1989.
I
In G.R. No. 78053, the petitioner questions the validity of the March 19, 1987
letter-order of the then Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Lourdes R.
Quisumbing which terminated his employment as Schools Division Superintendent of
Surigao City.
Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City who,
on June 4, 1986, was reappointed by respondent Quisumbing as such with a
"PERMANENT" status. He has served the Department of Education for forty-two (42)
years, moving up the ranks in the public schools system. On January 30, 1987,
Executive Order No. 117 was issued by the President reorganizing the DECS. In a letter
dated March 19, 1987, the petitioner received the letter-order informing him that
pursuant to Executive Order No. 117 which provides for a reorganization of the DECS
and the implementing guidelines thereof he would be considered separated from the
service effective April 15, 1987 without prejudice to availment of bene ts. The letter
particularly stated that consistent with the mandate of reorganization to achieve
greater e ciency and effectiveness, all incumbent o cials/personnel are on 'hold-over'
status unless advised otherwise. In his place, Secretary Quisumbing appointed Dr.
Socorro L. Sering, on a permanent status on March 2, 1988. In the meantime, the
petitioner, in a letter dated April 2, 1987, wrote Secretary Quisumbing requesting
reconsideration of the letter-order. The letter was forwarded to the Reorganization
Appeals Board (RAB). The motion for reconsideration remained unacted upon, hence on
June 24, 1987, the petitioner led the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction. In a resolution dated September 19, 1988, the
RAB recommended that action on the petitioner's letter-reconsideration be deferred
pending resolution of the instant petition.
In G.R. No. 78525, the petitioners are tourism employees who question the
legality of Executive Order No. 120 and the consequent alleged illegal act of the public
respondents in summarily terminating their services. The twenty-eight (28) petitioners
were all permanent employees (with services ranging from 27 years to 3 years) of the
Department of Tourism (DOT). All the petitioners had no pending administrative cases
and some of them have received numerous citations for meritorious services. On
January 20, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 120 reorganizing the
Ministry of Tourism "structurally and functionally." Section 26 thereof decrees the
abolition of Tourism Services and Bureau of Tourism Promotions while Section 29
provides that the incumbents whose positions are not included in the new sta ng
pattern or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service, but
they shall receive retirement bene ts and separation pay. On March 19, 1987,
respondent Undersecretary Sostenes Campillo, Jr., issued a Memorandum which in
effect stated that pursuant to Executive Order No. 120 the implementation of the
reorganization program shall be effected starting March 19, 1987; that all positions are
declared vacant; and that all employees are considered in a hold-over capacity. On April
13, 1987, respondent Campillo, Jr., in his capacity as acting secretary issued a
memorandum notifying all employees of the DOT that thirty (30) days from said date,
or on May 13, 1987, termination orders will be effected. On May 14 and May 28, 1987,
the petitioners were served their termination papers. They now seek the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel the public respondents to reinstate them to their
respective positions and a writ of prohibition to enjoin said respondents from
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 implementing Executive Order No. 120. They state that they are career civil servants
who were summarily and unceremoniously separated from employment without due
process.
In G.R. No. 81197, the eighty-four (84) petitioners are personnel of the O ce of
the Press Secretary who question their dismissal from the government service
pursuant to what they allege is an unconstitutional reorganization law (Executive Order
No. 297) and the likewise alleged unconstitutional implementing order issued by
respondent, then Press Secretary Teodoro Benigno.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 297 which
reorganized the O ce of the Press Secretary (OPS). Section 13 of the law provides for
the merger of the Bureau of Broadcast and Radyo ng Bayan into the Bureau of
Broadcast Services (BBS).
On August 27, 1987, the then Press Secretary issued OPS Department Order No.
1 creating the Reorganization Committee and Placement Committee to set guidelines
in the implementation of the reorganization program. The Reorganization Committee
was created to oversee and set the directions for the reorganization while the
Placement Committee which was created in each Bureau was tasked to assist the
appointing authority in the selection and placement of personnel. One of the criteria to
be observed in the hiring process was the taking of oral and written examinations to be
administered by OPS through the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) with
a representative from the Civil Service Commission in attendance. It was further
provided that those who will not take the examinations will automatically lose the
percentage alloted to the examinations in the rating process.
In the meantime, a new position structure and sta ng pattern was prepared
retaining only around 333 positions of the nearly 770 regular employees of BBS. The
new sta ng pattern was approved on October 5, 1987 and implemented on November
1, 1987.
The affected employees whose positions were abolished appealed to the Press
Secretary to withdraw the proposed sta ng pattern and to create a committee from
the BBS o cials' rank to prepare a new sta ng pattern. The request was denied and
instead an order was issued that everybody must re-apply and undergo the oral and
written examinations provided for in the OPS Department Order No. 1.
The original (32) petitioners who were mostly permanent and regular civil service
employees of the BBS with more than ten (10) years of government service refused to
take the examinations. The then Press Secretary wrote the petitioners that their
"services shall be considered only until December 31, 1987."
On January 8, 1988, the thirty-two (32) petitioners led the instant petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order.
A supplemental petition was led by thirty-six (36) First Intervenors and sixteen
(16) Second Intervenors. The First Intervenors group was composed of permanent civil
service employees who took the examination but were uniformly informed that "due to
the limited number of positions" they were considered employees only until January 31,
1988. The Second Intervenors were temporary employees with most of them being in
the government service for more than fteen (15) years whose temporary
appointments were extended only until July 31, 1987 "due to the ongoing
reorganization."
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 In G.R. No. 81495, petitioners Secretary of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST), and Director and members of the Reorganization Evaluation
Committee of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) ask for the annulment of
the orders dated December 27, 1987 and January 15, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 97, Quezon City which restrained the petitioners from dismissing the private
respondents and from implementing the reorganization scheme of the PNRI under
Executive Order No. 128 and granted the private respondent's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
The forty-one (41) private respondents were employees of the Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission (PAEC). Some of them have been in the government service for
more than twenty (20) years, others for more than ten (10) years and almost all of them
are college graduates, holding permanent positions and are civil service eligibles.
On January 30, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 128 reorganizing
the DOST. Section 21 of the order provides for the reorganization of the PAEC into the
PNRI.
On April 24, 1987, the DOST Secretary issued Memorandum Circular No. 001
which created the Placement Committee.
On May 5, 1987, Memorandum Circular No. 002 was issued which provided for
guidelines on the evaluation and selection of officers and employees.
In the meantime in April, 1987, the DOST new position structure and sta ng
pattern which reduced the number of positions from 6,029 to 5,568 was approved by
the DOST Secretary. On September 25, 1987, the Department of Budget and
Management likewise approved the new position structure and staffing pattern.
On December 18, 1987, a list of employees to be retained under the new position
structure of the PNRI was posted in the PNRI premises. Those excluded were placed in
a manpower pool for possible placements in other DOST agencies. Thereafter,
appointments under the new sta ng pattern were issued and subsequently submitted
to the Civil Service Commission.
On December 28, 1987, the private respondents whose positions were not
included in the PNRI position structure and sta ng pattern led a complaint with the
respondent trial court for "Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Order" alleging that the termination of their services violated their right to security of
tenure; that the their is time limit of one (1) year from February 25, 1986 to implement
the reorganization (Article III, Section 2, Freedom Constitution); and that the Freedom
Constitution has been superseded by the 1987 Constitution and is no longer operative.
Acting on the complaint, the respondent court issued the questioned orders.
In G.R. No. 81928, petitioner Jose L. Guerrero assails his termination as Director
of the Science Promotion Institute (SPI) a regular line agency of the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST) and seeks reinstatement and assignment to any
position closest to his old position in terms of functions, duties, salary emoluments and
privileges and without diminution of his rank, salary and privileges as of September 24,
1987.
Section 35 (d) of Executive Order No. 128 provides for the abolition of SPI and in
lieu thereof creates the Science Education Institute (SEI) and Science and Technology
Information Institute (STII). It is also provided therein that SPI's "appropriation fund,
records, equipment, facilities, choses in action, rights, other assets, personnel as may
be necessary and liabilities if any," shall be transferred to SEI and STII.
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 On September 24, 1987, the then Secretary designated Mr. Benjamin Damian as
officer-in-charge of the newly created STII.
After the new position structure and sta ng pattern of DOST was approved by
both the DOST Secretary and the Department of Budget and Management, the
petitioner received a letter dated September 25, 1987 from the DOST Secretary which
noti ed him that since the SPI was abolished by Executive Order No. 128, his position
as Director no longer exists. The Secretary advised him to le his retirement
application. In another letter dated September 30, 1987 from the Secretary, the
petitioner was directed to turn over all property, equipment and funds in his custody to
the Officer-in-Charge of STII. The petitioner had held the position since June, 1982.
On September 25, 1987, Damian entered the SPI and since then the petitioner
has been kept out of his office and denied salaries, allowances and emoluments.
On February 19, 1988, the petitioner led the instant petition with preliminary
mandatory injunction. He accuses the DOST Secretary of grave abuse of discretion in
terminating his services and alleges that his termination was a violation of his right to
security of tenure. He contends that the functions of the old o ce are identical to the
functions of the two new o ces into which the old one has been split and, therefore,
there is no true abolition in the legal sense.
In G.R. No. 81998, the twenty-one (21) petitioners led by Rogelio Bustamante,
Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Agriculture (DAGR) led on February
24, 1987 the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for a
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from
holding examinations for the petitioners and others similarly situated on February 26,
1988 and from proceeding with the reorganization of the Department of Agriculture.
The petitioners are mostly division and section chiefs who are among the 1,500
regular and civil service o cers and employees of the DAGR. Pursuant to Executive
Order No. 116 issued on January 30, 1987 which provides for the reorganization of the
DAGR, the then Secretary Carlos Dominguez issued Memorandum Circular dated
February 10, 1988 requiring all provincial and municipal agricultural o cers, as well as
division chiefs to take an examination on February 26, 1988 to be given by Sycip Gorres
Velayo (SGV) under the authority of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
petitioners asked for a restraining order claiming that the proposed examinations were
calculated and designed to have a basis for laying off career employees and o cials in
order to replace them with proteges of the respondent. They stated that Division Chiefs
had already been ordered to work as "coordinators" or told to go on eld trips while
outsiders, proteges of the respondent, became OICs of the various Divisions.
We did not issue any restraining order, hence the examinations were conducted
on March 5, 11 and 30, 1988.
On March 23, 1988, the petitioners filed a supplemental petition praying for a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining the public respondents from proceeding with the
reorganization of their department and to desist from committing acts of harassment
or reprisals against the petitioners who were asked to explain in writing why they did
not take the competitive examinations.
In G.R. No. 86504, petitioner Rainerio Reyes, the then Secretary of the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) seeks the setting aside of the
resolution dated November 7, 1988 issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
which ordered the reappointment of respondents Matias T. Austria and Arcebido M.
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 Gervacio to the positions of Chief of the National Telegraphic Transfer Service (NTTS)
and Administrative Service Chief II of the Telecommunications O ce (TELOF)
respectively and declared the appointment of Aureliano de Leon as Administrative
Service Chief II ineffective as well as the CSC's resolution dated December 20, 1988
which denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In a letter-complaint dated January 11, 1986 led with the Sandiganbayan, a
certain Mrs. Calixta Ondevilla, an employee of NTTS, charged Austria with violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In another letter-complaint dated March 14,
1986 led with DOTC Minister Hernando Perez, Ondevilla charged Austria with various
irregularities such as favoritism, oppression, abuse of authority and nepotism.
Pursuant to the new reorganization plan of the Bureau of Telecommunications
(BUTEL) the Acting Director issued various office orders relieving Austria as NTTS Chief
and giving him other designations and at the same time designating Arcebido Gervacio
as Acting Chief, NTTS effective January 2, 1987. Aureliano de Leon who was holding the
item of Administrative O cer III was designated Acting Chief, Human Resources and
Administrative Department.
Austria was found guilty of nepotism, grave insubordination, grave misconduct
and or abuse of authority, neglect of duty and or acts prejudicial to the interest of the
service (falsi cation of documents) in a decision signed by the Assistant Secretary of
the Telecommunication O ce (TELOF). Petitioner DOTC Secretary, however, set aside
the decision on grounds of denial of fair and impartial investigation and ordered
continuation of a formal investigation upon motion for reconsideration of the Assistant
Secretary of TELOF.
In the meantime, pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 125 and 125-a (Executive
Order No. 125 was issued by the President on January 30, 1987) the reorganization of
the DOTC was undertaken. With respect to the BUTEL, now called TELOF, the highest
position in the Administrative Division was abolished and a new one was created
namely Administrative Services Chief II, (Range 75). On the other hand, the item of NTTS
Chief (Range 75) was retained in the staffing pattern.
The TELOF Placement and Selection Committee, which included the head of the
CSC Field O ce considered and evaluated four candidates, including Gervacio and
Austria for the top position in the Administrative Division while three candidates, also
including Gervacio and Austria were considered for the position of NTTS Chief. The
committee recommended De Leon and Gervacio for the top position and NTTS chief
respectively. Petitioner DOTC Secretary then appointed the two (2) and their
appointments were approved by the CSC through the head of the CSC Field O ce.
Austria was appointed Administrative Officer I of Region 1, Baguio City.
Gervacio and Austria were not satis ed with their appointments and led
separate protests with the DOTC Reorganization Appeal Board (RAB) against
Gervacio's appointment (opposed by Austria) as well as de Leon's appointment
(opposed by Gervacio). The protests were dismissed.
Gervacio and Austria then appealed the DOTC-RAB resolution to the CSC which
reversed the said resolution. After their motions for reconsideration were denied, the
DOTC Secretary filed the instant petition.
On July 7, 1989, the CSC issued an order directing the DOST Secretary and the
Assistant Secretary of the Telecommunications to immediately implement the CSC
resolutions in view of our non-issuance of any restraining order to bar the
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 implementation of the resolution.
On September 5, 1989, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
CSC to cease and desist from enforcing the July 7, 1989 order.
In G.R. No. 86547, petitioner Secretary Carlos Dominguez of the Department of
Agriculture seeks the annulment of the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87 of
Quezon City granting — (1) a series of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction which enjoined the petitioner from carrying out the reorganization
of the Department of Agriculture, and (2) several motions of the private respondents to
admit additional petitioners.
On January 19, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 116 "Renaming
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food as Ministry of Agriculture, Reorganizing its Units
Integrating all O ces and Agencies whose Functions relate to Agriculture and Fishing
into the Ministry and for other Purposes."
Pursuant to this law, the petitioner formed a Reorganization Committee to work
on the new sta ng pattern of the Department which was later approved by the
Department of Budget and Management. The newly approved sta ng pattern was
posted in every affected bureau and agency of the Department for all employees to be
notified.
The Department's reorganization entailed conversion of line bureaus into staff
bureaus resulting in the reduction and/or abolition of positions in the Bureaus affected
namely, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), Bureau of Soils and Water
Management (BSWM), Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) and the Bureau of Animal Industry
(BAI). Due to the aforesaid conversion, there was an increase in positions department-
wide but there were signi cant reductions in positions of the staff bureau where most
of the private respondents were employed.
To evaluate the quali cation of all personnel of the Department for possible
appointments, a Placement Committee was formed and the petitioner issued
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1987 containing the guidelines to be
followed in the reorganization process.
All the private respondents were among those whose positions were affected by
the reorganization. Thus, they were given the corresponding notices of termination.
They were all permanent employees of the DAR, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI),
Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources or Bureau
of Soils and Water Management.
Pending appeal to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB) the private
respondents submitted to the petitioner a manifesto requesting deferment of the
implementation of the reorganization.
In view of their impending dismissal effective October 9, 1988, the rst nine (9)
private respondents, on October 5, 1988, led with the respondent trial court a petition
for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
On October 7, 1988, the respondent trial court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the petitioner from carrying out the announced dismissal of the private
respondents and from appointing third persons to the positions in the new sta ng
pattern.
Later, the trial court ordered the inclusion of "additional petitioners" in the
persons of the other private respondents (total number of private respondents is 519)
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 the last batch of which totalled 35 whose services were to be terminated effective
November 5, 1988 upon motions by the counsel of the original nine petitioners in the
trial court.
After the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the respondent court's order
regarding the "additional petitioners" and grant of the writ of preliminary injunction with
respect to them was denied, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction with urgent prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order was filed.
In G.R. No. 88951, the O ce of Muslim Affairs (OMA) seeks the review of the
resolution dated January 27, 1989 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which ordered
that the private respondents, except retirees or those who have opted to be phased out
and received bene ts as such, should be immediately reinstated to their positions or to
positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the OMA without loss of seniority rights
and with back salaries as well as the CSC's resolution dated June 2, 1989 denying a
motion for reconsideration.
On January 30, 1987, the President issued Executive Order Nos. 122 as
amended, and 122-A abolishing the O ce of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities
(OMACC) and the Philippine Pilgrimage Authority (PHILPA) and creating out of these
o ces the O ce on Muslim Affairs (OMA) and the Bureau of Pilgrimage and
Endowment (BPE). Later, on July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No.
295 amending Executive Order No. 122.
On June 1, 1987, petitioner Executive Director Jiamil Dianalan issued O ce Order
No. OG-87-21 creating the OMA Personnel Screening Committee to review, evaluate
and recommend employees based on performance and merit.
On August 24, 1987, Dianalan issued a memorandum to all o cials and
employees of OMA to inform them that under Executive Order No. 117, the President
authorized extensions of sixty (60) days from the expiration of the earlier extension
period within which incumbent employees of defendant OMACC may continue to hold
o ce and receive their salaries in hold-over capacities or until September 24, 1987 and
that those not reappointed are ordered to desist from further holding office.
On September 24, 1987, Acting Assistant Executive Director Atty. Panumbalin M.
Membin, OMA issued a memorandum advising all those not reappointed to desist from
reporting to office.
On October 2, 1987, the President issued "GUIDELINES ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE ORDERS" requiring each agency
to constitute a Reorganization Appeals Board (OMA-RAB) to hear complaints of
affected employees.
On October 10, 1987, the petitioner issued O ce Order No. 09-87-100 creating
the OMA Reorganization Appeals Board (OMA-RAB) which was reconstituted on
February 24, 1988.
On November 3, 1987, the petitioner issued O ce Order No. 87-021 providing
for a procedure for reviewing or reconsidering appeals or complaints.
On April 27, 1988, the OMA-RAB issued a resolution adopting Executive Orders
Nos. 122 and 122-A as amended and the documents related to the reorganization of
OMA as basis in deciding appeals or complaints.
On July 12, 1988, the OMA-RAB resolved to dismiss the appeal of the 206 private
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 respondents stating that the non-appointment of the complainants who were former
employees of the defunct OMA and PPA were in accordance with law.
On July 16, 1988, the private respondents led appeals for reappointment in the
OMA with the CSC, alleging that their separation from service was in violation of law
and their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law and
security of tenure.
Acting on the appeals, the CSC issued the questioned resolutions.
Hence, the instant petition.
In G.R. No. 89427 petitioner Conrado L. Villazor led this petition for mandamus
to compel respondent Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon to reinstate him as
Assistant Provincial Health Officer of Zambales.
On May 1, 1985, the petitioner received a permanent appointment as Assistant
Provincial Health Officer, range 85 from the then Minister of Health.
By virtue of Order No. 267D dated November 7, 1986 the petitioner was assigned
officer-in-charge of the San Marcelino District Hospital in San Marcelino, Zambales.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner was informed through a letter from the
Regional Director of Regional Health Office No. III San Fernando, Pampanga by authority
of the Secretary of Health that after "a review of all our personnel" he shall not be
appointed to any position in the new sta ng pattern under Executive Order No. 119
(the reorganization law of the Department of Health).
On February 16, 1988, the DOH dismissed a protest and Dr. Arcellie Llamado was
designated as officer-in-charge, San Marcelino District Hospital.
Upon appeal to the Civil Service Commission, the DOH decision was reversed.
The CSC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Despite the CSC ruling and a letter of the petitioner asking for the immediate
issuance of his appointment, the DOH has not issued any appointment to the petitioner.
Hence, the instant petition.
II
After the February 1986 political upheaval, the political leadership decided to
proclaim the formation of a revolutionary government headed by President Corazon C.
Aquino. On February 25, 1986, immediately after the President was sworn in to o ce,
she issued Proclamation No. 1 declaring as policy the reorganization of the
government. The reorganization affected all branches of the Government as appointive
public o cials including the members of the Supreme Court as well as elective o cials
were included in its purview.
On March 25, 1986, the President promulgated Proclamation No. 3 "DECLARING
A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE,
PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION AND
PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION." Proclamation No. 3 reiterated the new policy of the government as
embodied in the law's Preamble, to wit:
"WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their
extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of the government, . .
."

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 The implementing guidelines were spelled out in the succeeding provisions of
the law, to wit:
"ARTICLE II.
"Section 1 ...
"The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of
the people to:
"a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and
oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
"ARTICLE III.
"Section 1. In the reorganization of the government priority shall be
given to measures to promote economy, e ciency, and the eradication of graft
and corruption.
"Section 2. All elective and appointive o cials and employees under
the 1973 Constitution shall continue in o ce until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment and quali cation of
their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986.
"Section 3. Any public o cer and employee separated from the
service as a result of the organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if
entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other bene ts
accruing thereunder.
"Section 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other
properties of all government o ces shall be carefully preserved. In case any
o ce or body is abolished or reorganized pursuant to this proclamation, its
funds and properties shall be transferred to the o ces or body to which its
powers, functions and responsibilities substantially pertain.
On May 28, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF
THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Among others, the law prescribed as "grounds for the
separation/replacement of personnel" (SECTION 3) the following:
"1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section
40 of the Civil Service Law;
"2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
"3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
"4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
"5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is un t
to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the
service."
Thereafter, the President issued Executive Orders directing the reorganization of
various different departments of the government which affected their employees,
among them the petitioners in some of the instant cases as well as the respondents in
the other cases: In G.R. No. 78053, Executive Order No. 117 reorganizing the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports issued on January 30, 1987; In G.R. No.
78525, Executive Order No. 120 reorganizing the Department of Tourism issued on
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 January 20, 1987; In G.R. No. 81197 Executive Order No. 297 reorganizing the O ce of
the Press Secretary issued on July 25, 1987; In G.R. No. 81495 Executive Order No. 128
reorganizing the Department of Science and Technology issued on January 30, 1987; In
G.R. No. 86504 Executive Order No. 125 reorganizing the Department of Transportation
and Communications issued on January 30, 1987; In G.R. No. 86547 Executive Order
No. 116 reorganizing the Department of Agriculture issued on January 30, 1987; In G.R.
No. 88951 Executive Order No. 122 abolishing the O ce of Muslim Affairs and Cultural
Communities and the Philippine Pilgrimage Authority issued on January 30, 1987; and
in G.R. No. 89427 Executive Order No. 119 reorganizing the Department of Health
issued on January 30, 1987.
As stated in Dario v. Mison, et al. (G.R. No. 81954 and related cases, August 8,
1989, p. 23) there is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in
any branch or agency of Government. Pursuant to the Provisional Constitution and the
various Executive Orders issued by the President when she was the sole law-making
authority, the different Departments of Government were authorized to carry on
reorganization programs.
From the very start, however, the nature and extent of the power to reorganize
were circumscribed by the source of the power itself. The grant of authority was
accompanied by guidelines and limitations. It was never intended that department and
agency heads would be vested with untrammelled and automatic authority to dismiss
the millions of government workers on the stroke of a pen and with the same sweeping
power determine under their sole discretion who would be appointed or reappointed to
the vacant positions.
Thus, under Proclamation No. 3, Article II, Section 1(a), reorganization was
mandated by the People to "eradicate unjust and oppressive structures." Where the
fabric was sound or the new agency head could not devise anything better, it must be
retained. The mandate was also intended to remove "all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime." Under this mandate, the mass of lowly employees in the bottom
rungs of the governmental hierarchy, ordinarily constant and apolitical, were not
intended to be summarily dismissed unless basic reasons outweighed or overcame the
rights to their jobs built up so laboriously over the years.
Article III, Section 1 of the same Proclamation added another guideline — "priority
shall be given to measures to promote economy, e ciency, and the eradication of graft
and corruption."
The promotion of simplicity, economy, and e ciency is the usual standard which
enables a delegation of powers in reorganization statutes to pass the test of validity.
When the President set the standard of economy, e ciency, and the eradication of
graft and corruption, she did not come up with novel standards to be followed by her
alter egos in the implementation of the reorganization program.
We have ample jurisprudence on the matter, in Urgello, et al. v. Osmeña, Jr., 9
SCRA 317 [1963], this Court made it plain that the creation of new positions with
increases in salaries and with the same duties as those abolished is inconsistent with
the ostensible purpose of economy and e ciency. Similar rulings were made in
Abanilla, et al. v. Ticao, et al., 17 SCRA 652 [1966]; Cruz, et al. v. Primicias, Jr., et al., 23
SCRA 998 [1968]; Briones v. Osmeña, Jr., 104 Phil. 588 [1958]; and Ocampo, et al. v.
Duque, 16 SCRA 962 [1966]. On the other hand, the bona de rule was followed in Arao
v. Luspo, 20 SCRA 722 [1967]; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]; Llanto v.
Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599 [1966]; Facundo v. Pabalan, 4 SCRA 375 [1962]; and Maza v.
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 Ochave, 20 SCRA 142 [1967]. There were ample precedents to guide the respondent
public officers in these cases.
No speci c causes for removal were given in the Provisional Constitution. The
President, therefore, felt constrained to issue particulars to guide those who would
implement the policy.
We had occasion to pass upon this issue and stated:
"Although the Provisional Constitution did not require any ground or
cause for removal as above pointed out, the Government, in an act of auto-
limitation and 'to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel in the Career
Civil Service whose quali cations and performance meet the standards of
public service of the New Government', issued Executive Order No. 17 dated 28
May 1986 (82 O cial Gazette 2423 [2 June 1986]) which enumerated certain
grounds for the separation or replacement of elective and appointive o cials
authorized under Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. . . ." (Radia v.
Review Committee Under Executive Order No. 17, et al., 157 SCRA 749, 753
[1988]).
Executive Order No. 17 was issued on May 28, 1986, long before the present
Constitution was rati ed and adopted, "in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving o cials and employees, particularly in the career
civil service . . . and to ensure that only those found corrupt, ine cient, and undeserving
are separated from the government service." (82 Official Gazette 2423, June 2, 1986).
The President's concern embodied in Executive Order No. 17 was also shown by
that other great department of Government, namely Congress.
The cause of those who have been reorganized out of o ce has been taken up
by their elected representatives. On March 1, 1988, the Senate of the Philippines
passed a unanimous resolution with two abstentions expressing the Senate's concern
over the plight of government officials and employees who were dismissed without just
cause. Signi cantly, Senator Santanina Rasul, chairperson of the Senate Committee on
the Civil Service, divulged that reorganization has resulted in the creation of an even
bigger and fatter bureaucracy. The Senate urged the suspension of the then on-going
reorganization of government o ces pending remedial legislation. (Manila Bulletin,
March 2, 1988, p.i.).
Earlier, the House of Representatives has also introduced a bill for the setting up
of clear-cut policies and guidelines on reorganization to protect the security of tenure
of civil servants. (Manila Bulletin, October 5, 1987, p. 14)
These efforts led to the enactment on June 10, 1988 of Republic Act No. 6656
"AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION."
The law reiterated the established and valid causes for removals incident to a
bona- de reorganization and itemized some circumstances constituting evidence of
bad faith in a non-bona fide reorganization.
Section 2 of the law provides:
"SEC. 2. No o cer or employee in the careers service shall be
removed except for a valid cause and alter due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona de reorganization, a
position has been abolished, or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or
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 other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or
some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad
faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim
for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
"(a) Where there is a signi cant increase in a number of positions in
the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
"(b) Where an o ce is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is created;
"(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less quali ed in terms
of status of appointment, performance and merit;
"(d) where there is a reclassi cation of o ces in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassi ed o ces perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices;
"(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in
Section 3 hereof."
Republic Act No. 6656 states the policy of the law and provides for the
retroactivity of its provisions even in reorganizations already effected.
It provides:
"SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the
security of tenure of civil service o cers and employees in the reorganization of
the various agencies of the National Government and of local governments,
state colleges and universities expressly authorized by law, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, without
sacri cing the need to promote morale, e ciency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service pursuant to Article IX, B,
Section 3 of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall
implement reorganization schemes within a speci ed period of time authorized
by law.
"In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all
departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders
promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the
approval of this Act within which to implement their respective reorganization
plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Signi cantly, Republic Act No. 6656 also repealed all laws, rules and regulations
and part thereof inconsistent with its provisions. (See Section 13)
The Solicitor General, in his consolidated memorandum, argues that traditional
concepts of civil service law should not apply. He states that the government overhaul
is a direct exercise by the sovereign people of police power. In what he calls
"progressive reorganization," separations from the service may be effected without
cause because "the mandated reorganization itself is the cause."
There is no dispute over the power to reorganize - whether traditional,
progressive, or whatever adjective is appended to it. However, the essence of
constitutional government is adherence to basic rules. The rule of law requires that no
government o cial should feel free to do as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere
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 intentions and conscience to guide him. The fundamental standards of fairness
embodied in the bona de rule cannot be disregarded. More particularly, the auto-
limitations imposed by the President when she proclaimed the Provisional Constitution
and issued executive orders as sole law maker and the standards and restrictions
prescribed by the present Constitution and the Congress established under it, must be
obeyed. Absent this compliance, we cannot say that a reorganization is bona-fide.
The public respondents (who are petitioners in some cases) argue that they have
followed standards. However, the standard they present is derived from the typical
grant of rule-making authority found in all the questioned Executive Orders, to wit:
"The Minister shall issue such rules, regulations, and other issuances as
may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of
this Executive Order."
The alleged standard — "ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of
this Executive Order" — is no standard. Under the public respondents concept, their
standard is a roving commission giving the executive o cer unbridled discretion to do
as he pleases as long as, in his belief, his act effectively implements the executive
order. As earlier mentioned, the standards are found else where in the governing
charters in su ciently clear and ample language. The grant of quasi-legislative power
to implement the reorganization is bound by these standards. Unfortunately, the public
o cials concerned have misread the instructions and decided to implement
reorganization according to their full discretion in a manifestly invalid manner.
Article XVIII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
"Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service
not for cause but as a result of reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the rati cation of this
Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement
and other bene ts accruing to them under the laws of general application in
force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the
employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any
of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to
career o cers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had
been accepted.
To justify the challenged reorganization measures, the Solicitor General nds in
the "not for cause" separations from the service and the "reorganization following the
rati cation of this Constitution" ample powers assumed by the public respondents and
petitioner officials in these cases.
The resolution in Jose v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78435, (unsigned resolution dated
August 11, 1987) is cited to justify the termination without cause of the services of the
o cers and employees involved in the instant cases. The Solicitor General argues that
the usual invocation of the right to security of tenure is precluded by the constitutional
provision. The Government relies on Jose v. Arroyo where we stated:
"The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of
the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service
employees security of tenure overlooks the provision of Section 16, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize the removal of career civil
service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant
to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following
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 the rati cation of this Constitution. By virtue of said provision, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may
continue even after the rati cation of the Constitution and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such
organization." (Jose v. Arroyo, supra)
The above arguments have been laid to rest rst in the case of Palma-Fernandez
v. dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751 (1988), where we ruled:
"The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of
o ce ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of
her duties merely in a hold-over capacity and could be transferred to another
position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of
a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and
would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution),
but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective
(De Leon, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August
1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure
govern." (at p. 757)
The Court was more emphatic in the seven (7) petitions collectively known as the
Dario v. Mison cases (supra).
First, the Arroyo v. Jose ruling is obiter dictum because Leonardo Jose's petition
was "clearly premature, speculative, and purely anticipatory." There was no
reorganization yet.
Second, Arroyo v. Jose is an unsigned resolution where the nuances of the
Court's pronouncements cannot possibly be ventilated as in a full-blown decision like
Palma-Fernandez.
And third, Palma-Fernandez is a later ruling which, in case of an inconsistency
(actually more imagined than real), supersedes the earlier dictum. (Dario v. Mison, supra
at pp. 46-49)
We explained in these precedent-setting Dario v. Mison cases:
"As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution
allude to two stages of the reorganization, the rst Proclamation No. 3 — which
had already been consummated — the second stage being that adverted to in
the transitory provisions themselves — which is underway. Hence, when we
spoke, in Arroyo of reorganization after the effectivity of the new Constitution,
we referred to the second stage of the reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot be
said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom Constitution to its
1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandes (or
Esguerra).
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987
Constitution is not as stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas
the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a
purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization inferred under the new
Constitution because precisely, the new Constitution seeks to usher in a
democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that Section 16
is an exception to due process and no-removal — 'except for cause provided by
law' principles enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution. (Article III, Sec. 1,
and Art. IX (B), Sec. 2 (3) which may possibly justify removals `not for cause,'
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 there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former Constitution
left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that removals
'not for cause' must be a result of reorganization. As we observed, the
Constitution does not provide for automatic' vacancies. It must also pass the
test of good faith — a test not obviously required under the revolutionary
government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic
societies and in this government under a democratic charter."
And only recently, this Court promulgated the decision in Floreza v. Hon. Jaime
Ongpin, et al., G.R. No. 81356 and the related case of Floreza v. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 86156, February 26, 1990 where we declared the dismissal
pursuant to a reorganization invalid and ordered the petitioner's reinstatement to his
former position.
A typical provision in all these challenged executive orders is the "hold-over"
status of every single employee of the departments as a result of the implementation
of the reorganization. One such provision would be section 24 of Executive Order No.
117 reorganizing the DECS, to wit:
"SEC. 24. New Structure and Pattern. — Upon approval of this
Executive Order, the o cers (the term o cer as used in this Executive Order is
intended to be within the meaning of the term 'o cial' as used in the Freedom
Constitution and the succeeding Constitution) and employees of the Ministry
shall, in a hold-over capacity continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and bene ts unless in
the meantime they are separated from the service pursuant to Executive Order
No. 17 [1986] or, Article III of the Freedom Constitution." (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the above provision, around 400,000 school teachers, janitors, clerks,
principals, supervisors, administrators, and higher o cials were placed on "hold-over
status." When a public o cer is placed on hold-over status, it means that his term has
expired or his services terminated but he should continue holding his o ce until his
successor is appointed or chosen and has quali ed. (See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76
Phil. 12 [1946]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 78053 argues against the "hold-over" feature of the
challenged order in this manner:
xxx xxx xxx

". . . To reduce four hundred thousand o cers and employees most of

them permanent, to holdover status preparatory to their eventual separation
from the service many of them beyond middle age and too late to start a new
career, is not only tyranny but cruelty of the rst magnitude. Reorganizations
can be accomplished without disruption of family life, so well respected and
protected by the 1986 (sic) Constitution when it says with honor and pride, `The
State recognizes sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.' Moreover, this step is not in
keeping with the mandate of the Freedom Constitution which tasks the
President to make effective the guarantees of human rights against violations
thereof." (Rollo, G.R. No. 78053, p. 5)
We view it, however, as a graphic illustration of the noncompliance with the bona-
de rule in reorganizations. In answer to questions posed during the oral arguments in
these cases, the Solicitor General stated that there were persons other than Division
Superintendent Francisco L. Mendoza who were not reappointed. As far as can be
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 gathered from the records, however, it appears that out of 400,000 dismissed
employees only one has chosen to come to this Court. Any others seem to have
welcomed or accepted their forced retirement as they did not join the petitioners in
these consolidated and other related cases. If everybody was going to be reappointed,
except Mr. Mendoza and the relatively few unknown others who did not join in these
reorganization cases and who would have retired if allowed to do so, what was the
point in dismissing and then placing such a tremendous number of persons on hold-
over status?
An examination of the facts of these cases invariably shows that the bona- de
rule has been ignored or disobeyed. Except in the O ce of the Press Secretary, there
have been signi cant increases in the number of positions in affected Departments and
agencies thus belying the claims of economy. O ces have been abolished but in their
stead, o ces performing substantially the same functions have been created. In some
cases, e.g. the Science Promotions Institute in the Department of Science and
Technology an o ce has been divided into two or more o ces with a greater number
of employees performing the same functions. Incumbents have been replaced by
persons less quali ed in terms of status, performance, and merit as in the Department
of Tourism where a driver with 27 years government service, a messenger with 14
years, bookkeepers, and others with citations and honors have been replaced by
appointees with lesser qualifications and seniority.
It is a paramount principle in Public O cers' Law that the power to abolish public
o ces vested in the legislature is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations that it be
exercised in good faith, should never be for personal or political reasons, and cannot, be
implemented in a manner contrary to law. (Cruz v. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998 [1968]; Maza
v. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142 [1967]; Abanilla, et al. v. Ticao, et al., 17 SCRA 652 [1966];
Ocampo, et al. v. Duque, et al., 16 SCRA 962 [1966]; Llanto v. Ali Dimaporo, et al., 16
SCRA 599 [1966]; Arao v. Luspo, 20 SCRA 722 [1967]; Guillergan, et al. v. Ganzon, et al.,
17 SCRA 257 [1966]; Urgelio v. Osmeña, Jr., 9 SCRA 317 [1963]; Alipio v. Rodriguez, 9
SCRA 752 [1963]; Briones, et al. v. Osmeña, Jr., et al., 104 Phil. 588 [1958]; and Gacho,
et al. v. Osmeña, Jr., etc., et al., 103 Phil. 837 [1958]).
Speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court was very emphatic in Cruz v.
Primicias, Jr., supra that an abolition which is not bona- de but is merely a device to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees is null and
void.
These principles were reiterated in De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982])
where we sustained a bona-fide reorganization, to wit:
"Nothing is better settled in our laws than that the abolition of an o ce
within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from
no in rmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. (23
SCRA 998) reiterated such a doctrine. 'We nd this point urged by respondents,
to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved but the validity of the abolition of their o ces. This is a legal
issue that is for the courts to decide. It is a well-known rule also that valid
abolition of o ces is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. And of
course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to
hold o ce . . . As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an o ce does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be
valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." (at pp. 321-322).
As in the Dario v. Mison cases, we disregard the procedural roadblocks which the
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 parties on either side have tried to erect against each other:
"The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue, (This
was raised by the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 86241. Failure to
exhaust administrative remedies was raised in G.R. Nos. 81954 and 81917 by
the Solicitor General) and other technical objections, for two reasons, `[b]ecause
of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public
service', (Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. 79974, December 17, 1987, 153 SCRA 549,
551-552) and because of the serious implications of these cases on the
administration of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants."
(G.R. No. 81954 and related cases, August 8, 1989, pp. 23-24)
III
In G.R. No. 78053, it is apparent that the petitioner's termination as Schools
Division Superintendent of Surigao City was pursuant to the public respondent's view
that under Section 24 of Executive Order No. 117 all incumbent o cials/personnel of
DECS were on hold-over status unless advised otherwise.
The dismissal of all employees and their being placed on hold-over status is
particularly objectionable in the DECS. There could have been no intention to get rid of
hundreds of thousands of school teachers. The use of "reorganization" even under the
concept advocated by the Solicitor General appears trivial if not unnecessary. Division
Superintendents usually start as classroom teachers and move up to principals, district
supervisors, and assistant superintendents usually over more than thirty years of
service before appointment as Division heads. At each rung of the promotional ladder,
there are qualifying examinations and rigid background checks. The big number of
competitors insures some degree of safeguards against abuses. To use
"reorganization" of the biggest Department in the government in order to avoid the
hassles of bringing administrative charges against Mendoza and perhaps a few other
alleged persona-non-gratas like him is precisely what this Court rejects when we apply
the bona- de rule. One does not burn down a house if his purpose is to roast alleged
pests.
The petitioner was appointed in a "PERMANENT STATUS" besides having a rating
of 79% for the rating period of May 1986 to April 1987, which is considered "Very
Satisfactory" under the "Rating Sheet for Key MEC O cials." There was grave abuse of
discretion when the petitioner's services were terminated by a mere letter-order on the
justi cation that the petitioner, together with the entire personnel of the DECS, was only
in a hold-over capacity. If the petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to
le charges against him instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over status in order
to run after him.
In G.R. No. 78525, the public respondents justify the termination of the
petitioners as follows: 1) as regards seventeen of the petitioners, they were previously
employed in the abolished Bureaus (Tourism Services and Bureau of Tourism
Promotions). Therefore, the public respondents argue that since the positions of the
seventeen petitioners were abolished, they can not claim impairment of their right to
security of tenure; 2) as regards the remaining petitioners, the public respondents
argue that although their positions were not abolished, their separation from the
service without cause is also valid pursuant to Section 16, Article XVIII, 1987
Constitution and the case of Jose v. Arroyo, supra.
The public respondents maintain that due process was observed since the
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 petitioners were evaluated in accordance with the criteria in Section 27 of the Civil
Service Act giving them examinations to determine their competence and/or having
them interviewed by their superiors and/or civil service commissioners or personnel
specialists and/or requiring them to submit self-evaluation reports; and/or referring to
their personnel records.
As we stated earlier, ritual invocation of the abolition of an o ce is not su cient
to justify the termination of the services of an o cer or employee in such abolished
o ce. Abolition should be exercised in good faith, should not be for personal or
political reasons, and cannot be implemented in a manner contrary to law. "Good faith,
as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the
facts of each case." (Dario v. Mison cases, p. 50).
If an executive department is bloated with unnecessary employees, there can be
no objection to a law abolishing the useless or non-essential items. In the instant case,
however, all items, including the essential ones, were declared vacant. There is
absolutely no showing that the positions of tourism eld coordinator, bus driver,
bookkeeper, accounting clerk, librarian, nurse, telephone operator, messenger in fact,
any of the items occupied by the petitioners — are unnecessary and must be chopped
off.
In the case of Rama v. Court of Appeals, (148 SCRA 496 [1987]), we ruled:
. . . It is an undeniable fact that the dismissed employees who were
holding such positions as foremen, watchmen, and drivers, suffered the
uncertainties of the unemployed when they were plucked out of their positions.
That not all of them testi ed as to the extent of damages they sustained on
account of their separation from their government jobs, cannot be used as a
defense by the petitioner. Su ce it to state that considering the positions they
were holding, the dismissed employees concerned belong to a low-salaried
group, who, if deprived of wages would generally incur considerable economic
hardships.

xxx xxx xxx

Apropos the practice of victorious politicians to remove government
employees who did not support them in their campaign for o ce, this Court has
said: `There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local elective
o cials, upon assumption to o ce, wield their new-found power
indiscriminately by replacing employees with their own proteges regardless of
the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should
not be taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts.' (Nemenzo v.
Sabillano, L-20977, September 7, 1968, 25 SCRA 1)
The rule does not apply to local o cials alone. It is even more true for national
o ces. It would be the height of naivete to presume that in the rapid lling up of
several hundred vacated positions, no personal or political considerations would creep
into the selection process. The civil service law was evolved as a reaction to the spoils
system.
The petitioners are employees of the Department of Tourism holding permanent
positions. Most of them have served the government for extended periods, from twelve
(12) years to twenty-seven (27) years. No one of them has a pending administrative
charge. Many of them have received numerous citations, awards, and honors for
meritorious services. The public respondents have given no individual reasons for each
of the affected employees as to why they are being dismissed from their employment
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 except to emphasize in a general manner the existence of near absolute power to cut
off their means of livelihood.
The lip service paid by the respondents to due process whereby supervisors who
were themselves later dismissed, were ordered to give "evaluations" on the
performance of the laid off personnel is no substitute for more regular procedures in
getting honest to goodness results. The advice sought from "Personnel Specialists" of
the Civil Service Commissioners, who should have known better than to participate in a
violation of the rules their agency espouses is only window-dressing for what this Court
called in Cruz v. Primicias, supra as a "subterfuge resorted to for disguising an illegal
removal of permanent civil service employees." The employees are terminated without
being given reasons for their dismissal. Only the appointing authority knows why
employees are no longer reappointed.
The circumstances are different in G.R. No. 81197 led by personnel in the O ce
of the Press Secretary.
As earlier stated, out of 770 regular employees of the Bureau of Broadcast and
Radyo Ng Bayan, only 333 employees were retained in the new and merged o ce of
Bureau of Broadcast Services. The intent to abolish unnecessary items and to keep
them abolished has not been satisfactorily refuted by the petitioners.
Fifteen petitioners hold temporary appointments. There is no showing way these
15 employees should be exceptions to the established rule that persons holding
temporary or casual appointments do not enjoy the security of tenure extended to
permanent personnel.
The Solicitor General in his Consolidated Memorandum led on March 10, 1989
manifested:
"Subsequently, or on January 19, 1988, a Supplemental Petition was led
by all the above.
"In the meantime, during the pendency of the instant case before this
Honorable Court, the OPS requested the Budget O ce for a supplemental or
additional plaintiffs, which has been recently approved on January 25, 1989.
Also, the present status of all the 84 petitioners is as follows:
"(a) 61 petitioners have already availed of separation benefits.
"(b) 3 petitioners have already availed of separation benefits.
"(c) 1 petitioner is likely to apply for separation bene ts after being
cleared by COA of her property accountability.
"(d) 6 petitioners are not expected to avail of separation bene ts for
being contractual employees.
"(e) 1 petitioner (Romulo Salcedo) has already been reinstated out of
deference to a Resolution of the Civil Service Commission, whose jurisdiction
OPS had doubted. At any rate, Salcedo passed the OPS exams/interviews, but
could not previously be accommodated due to limited number of positions
under new staffing pattern.
"(f) 1 petitioner is presently serving as volunteer in anticipation of a
position under the requested supplemental plantilla (now approved).
"(g) 10 petitioners are performing duties in hold-over capacity
likewise in anticipation of a position under the supplemental plantilla (5 of these
10 petitioners disclaim having authorized their inclusion as petitioners in the
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 instant case).
"(h) 1 petitioner (Corazon Carluen) had accepted a position lower
than the position of radio production announcer which she applied for but for
which she was shown not to be qualified.
"On January 24 and 31, 1989 when the instant petition was scheduled for
oral arguments before this Honorable Court, neither petitioners nor their counsel
appeared, the case for all intents and purposes having become moot and
academic.
"Thus, on the bases alone of aforesaid developments during the
pendency of the instant petition, dismissal of the instant petition is warranted.
"In any event, the instant petition is without merit in the light of the
progressive reorganization undertaken by the sovereign people in the aftermath
of the EDSA Revolution." (Rollo of G.R. No. 81197, pp. 71-73).
On February 13, 1990, we issued a resolution, to wit:
"For failure of Atty. Alfredo V. Zerrudo, Jr., counsel for petitioners in G.R.
No. 81197 to comply with the resolutions of (a) April 12, 1988 which required
among other things, the parties to le their respective memoranda, (b)
September 6, 1988, requiring aforesaid counsel to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for failure to le memorandum
and to comply with the resolution of April 12, 1984 and (c) November 8, 1988
which imposed on Atty. Zerrudo, Jr., a ne and required him to comply with the
resolution of September 6, 1988, the Court Resolved to (d) ORDER THE ARREST
of aforesaid Atty. Alfredo V. Zerrudo.
xxx xxx xxx"
Not only did the petitioners fail to appear during the hearings and fail to le the
required memorandum but up to this time, we have not heard anything from them.
Apparently, the petitioners have lost interest in prosecuting the instant case in view of
the supervening events stated by the Solicitor General.
In G.R. No. 81495, the petitioners raise the following arguments: (1) The 1987
Constitution, in its section 16, Article XVIII justifies the dismissal of career civil servants
not for cause: (2) Executive Order No. 128 does not violate security of tenure but
merely allows employees to continue on a "hold-over" capacity, (3) The ruling in Jose v.
Arroyo supra states that a reorganization may continue even after the rati cation of the
Constitution and dismissal without cause as a result of such reorganization are valid.
We have discussed earlier why these arguments are not well-taken. In the Mison
cases, we categorically stated that section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
does not sanction indiscriminate dismissals without cause.
We have also discussed why the "hold-over" status of all employees/o cers
provided for in the executive orders reorganizing the various departments in
government cannot be ordered and implemented during the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution (which was on February 2, 1987). Civil service eligibles can no longer be
removed without cause as they already enjoy the constitutional right to security of
tenure. This was the ruling in the Palma-Fernandez v. de la Paz decision and the Dario v.
Mison cases which clari ed and tempered the abbreviated language of the Jose v.
Arroyo decision cited by the petitioners.
In G.R. No. 81928, the issue involves the validity of the abolition of the o ce of
the petitioner. The petitioner maintains that the abolition of the Science Promotion
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 Institute (SPI) and the consequent creation of two o ces namely the Science
Education Institute (SEI) and the Science and Technology Information Institute (STII)
pursuant to Executive Order No. 128 was not effected in good faith. The petitioner
contends that the SPI has not been abolished but merely split into two (2) o ces
whose combined functions are substantially identical with the functions of the SPI.
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the two newly created o ces provide for
thirteen (13) management positions which is more than the number of said position in
the SPI.
Section 4, Republic Act No. 770 which enumerates the functions of SPI reads:
"SEC. 4. The purposes of this Corporation (SFP, subsequently
renamed and converted to SPI) shall be:
"a) To initiate, promote, stimulate, solicit, encourage and support
basic and applied scienti c research in the mathematical, physical, medical,
biological, engineering and other sciences, by means of grants, loans and other
forms of assistance to qualified persons and institutions applying for the same;
"b) To award scholarships and graduate fellowships in the
mathematical, physical, medical, biological, engineering and other sciences;
"c) To foster interchange of scienti c information among scientists
here and abroad;
"d) To aid in the establishment of adequate scienti c laboratories;
and,
"e) To encourage, protect and aid in the organization of science
clubs and societies in the schools and colleges of the Philippines. (Sec. 4, RA
No. 770).
Sections 26 and 27 of Executive Order No. 128 which enumerate the functions of
the SEI and STII respectively read:
"SEC. 26. Science Education Institute. — There is hereby created the
Science Education Institute, which shall have the following functions:
"a) Undertake science education and training;
"b) Administer scholarships, awards and grants;
"c) Undertake science and technology manpower development;
"d) Formulate plans and establish programs and projects for the
promotion and development of science and technology education and training
in coordination with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and other
institutions of learning in the eld of science and technology . . ." (Sec. 26, EO
No. 128)
"SEC. 27. Science and Technology Information Institute . — There is
hereby created the Science and Technology Information Institute which shall
have the following functions:
"a) Establish a science and technology databank and library;
"b) Disseminate science and technology information; and
"c) Undertake training on science and technology information . . ."
(Sec. 27. EO 128).
We nd no substantial differences between the functions of the two newly
created o ces and those of SPI. Indeed, their functions are similar in the promotion,
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 encouragement, and support of the development of science and technology. The public
respondents' contention that the functions of two newly created o ces are not
substantially similar to those of SPI is untenable.
Pursuant to section 2, Republic Act No. 6656 this circumstance . . . where an
o ce is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created .
. ." is considered as "evidence of bad faith in the removal made as a result of
reorganization giving rise to a claim for reinstatement . . ."
Moreover, there is merit to the petitioner's contention that there is an increase in
the number of management positions from nine (9) of SPI to the thirteen (13) of the
STII and SEI.
This increase violates RA 6656 in that ". . . where there is a signi cant increase in
the number of positions in the new sta ng pattern . . .", these circumstances ". . . may
be considered as evidence of bad faith . . ."
The respondent contends that the petitioner was terminated as a result of the
reorganization. The petitioner alleges that he was separated in view of his refusal to
comply with the alleged anomalous demand of the respondent to turn over SPI funds to
the DOST proper. Since vestiges of bad faith as de ned by statute and this Court
surrounded the abolition of his o ce, the petitioner should be reinstated and be given
an equivalent position in either the STII or SPI.
In G.R. No. 81998, the Solicitor General in this consolidated Memorandum
manifests:
"In the case, there is actually no reorganization involved. Petitioner
Rogelio Bustamante, who appeared in his own behalf and for his co-petitioners
ADMITTED in open court during the oral argument on February 1, 1989 that not
one of the petitioners was removed from his or her position. Otherwise stated as
of the dates the original and supplemental positions were led no employee has
as yet been removed, replaced or reorganized out.
"It is respondents' submission that even if it is assumed that petitioners
would eventually be removed from their positions as a result of the
reorganization of the Department of Agriculture pursuant to Executive Order No.
116, still petitioners' grievance has no legal or constitutional mooring in the light
of the pronouncement of this Honorable Court in Leonardo A. Jose v. Joker P.
Arroyo, et al. . . ."
We apply the principle earlier stated that the case of Jose v. Arroyo, supra has
been superseded by the Palma-Fernandez v. de la Paz (supra) and the Dario v. Mison
(supra) cases to the effect that after February 2, 1987 civil service eligibles in the
government service enjoy the constitutional right to security of tenure. The petitioners,
therefore, can not be removed by mere notices of termination, without due notice and
hearing and not knowing the valid grounds for the termination of their services.
In G.R. No. 86504, the petitioner who was then the Secretary of the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) considered the respondents to be
holding their positions in a hold-over capacity pursuant to section 20 of Executive Order
No. 125. Under this premise, the petitioner declared all positions of the department
vacant including those of the respondents and thereafter extended new appointments
as part of the reorganization of the department.
This is, therefore, another case where the hold-over procedure is used as a
justification.
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 The record shows that before reorganization, the respondents and Aureliano de
Leon were o cers of the Bureau of Telecommunications (BUTEL) holding the following
items: (1) Respondent Austria was the Chief of the National Telegraphic Transfer
Service (NTTS) (Range 75) since March 16, 1984; (2) Respondent Gervacio was
Administrative O cer V (Chief of the Administrative Division) (Range 73) since
September 1982; and (3) Aureliano de Leon was Administrative O cer III (Range 70).
He was under Gervacio's supervision as Chief of the Supply Unit.
BUTEL was retained under the reorganizational scheme of the department. The
name of the agency was only changed to Telecommunications O cer (TELOF). The
item of NTTS Chief was retained. As regards the position of Chief of the Administrative
Division, the petitioner claims that the Administrative O cer V (Range 73) position was
abolished and in its stead there was created the position of Administrative Chief II
(Range 75). Evaluations to the new positions started after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution.
Parenthetically, the petitioner was incorrect in holding the position of Austria as
NTTS Chief vacant. At the time Austria was transferred to another position, Austria
already enjoyed the constitutional right to security of tenure under the new Constitution.
Austria has been in the government service for forty-three (43) years and was nearing
retirement (he was 63 years old) at the time he was transferred to another position
lower in rank (Administrative O cer I Range 64) which the petitioner admits to be a
demotion. Certainly, this is contrary to the resolution of the DOTC-RAB to the effect that
"the Board resolves to direct the Telecommunications O ce and the Department's
Selection and Placement Committee to consider Mr. Austria in the evaluation of the
candidates for the other Division Chief positions in the Telecommunications O ce xxx"
(p. 104, Rollo). Hence, we nd no plausible reason why he should be removed from his
position or transferred to a position lower in rank (Administrative O cer I ) which the
petitioner admits to be a demotion.
As regards the position of Chief of the Administrative Division, Gervacio was
already chief of the Division when it was abolished and then re-created with a salary
range two points higher. We a rm the respondent Civil Service Commission's (CSC)
ruling that Gervacio should be appointed as such and not Aureliano de Leon, to wit:
"Gervacio, on the other hand, should be appointed Administrative Service
Chief II. Although Aureliano de Leon meets the quali cations of the position, he
was merely an Administrative O cer III before the reorganization very much
lower than the position held by Austria and Gervacio. Gervacio not only meets
the quali cation standards for the position but also has retention score higher
than de Leon who was merely his supervise before the reorganization of
TELECOM. Moreover, his legal profession/expertise which is not possessed by
de Leon is a great asset of Gervacio in the performance of the functions and
duties of, as well as in meeting the challenges attendant to the Administrative
Service Chief II. Gervacio, therefore, has more advantages than de Leon in point
of service, quali cation, competence, training and years of government
experience in the job." (Rollo of G.R. No. 86504, p. 109)
Section 2, Republic Act No. 6656 provides that among the circumstances which
may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an
aggrieved party is . . . (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less quali ed in
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
The rule is that "the appointing person enjoys su cient discretion to select and
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 appoint employees on the basis of their tness to perform the duties and assume the
responsibilities of the position to be lled . . . Unless the law speaks in mandatory and
peremptory tone, there should be full recognition of the wide scope of such
discretionary authority." (Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. Civil Service
Commission, et al. G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989). In this case, an incumbent was
dismissed and his subordinate was appointed to his former o ce, in the course of the
reorganization program. Congress has stated the rule. We apply it.
G.R. No. 86547 is similar to G.R. No. 78525 in that: (1) the petitioner in G.R. No.
86547 (Secretary of Agriculture) and the respondent in G.R. No. 78525 (the Secretary
of Tourism) terminated the services of the employees in their respective departments
(respondents in G.R. No. 86547 and petitioners in G.R. No. 78525) for either of the two
reasons: (a) Abolition of the employees' positions or o ces, and (b) As regards the
employees whose positions were not abolished, their non-appointment is sanctioned
by the Executive Order reorganizing the department and which was recognized in the
Jose v. Arroyo case; (2) The affected employees were mostly from the low salaried
groups like clerks, shery aide, secretary, liaison o cer, carpenter, driver, security
guard, bookkeeper, information writer, and accounting clerks; (3) Some of the affected
employees perform necessary jobs, in the instant case like Soil Technologist, Fishery
Agent, Agronomist and Fishery Biologist; and (4) The affected employees were
terminated in their employment by mere notices of termination.
Under the circumstances, we nd no need to discuss the various arguments in
the petition. We apply our ndings and conclusions in G.R. No. 78525 to the instant
case.
In G.R. No. 88951, the petitioner assails the resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on the following grounds: 1) The termination of services of the
private respondents was brought about by the abolition of the o ces of OMACC and
PHILPA where they were employed pursuant to Executive Order No. 122; 2) The private
respondents cannot claim security of tenure pursuant to section 16, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution which is considered a "progressive" type of reorganization and to the
ruling in the case of Jose v. Arroyo (supra) ; and 3) The petitioner acted in good faith by
observing all presidential issuances, orders and memoranda on reorganization.
There is no need to discuss the merits of the rst two grounds. They have been
sufficiently discussed earlier.
But, was the reorganization of the Department done in bad faith?
After conducting hearings, the CSC stated the following:
"Memorandum Circular No. 10 dated September 2, 1986 of the CSC was
issued to 'effectively implement the reorganization in government o ces
particularly on the selection and placement of personnel and in order that the
best quali ed and most competent personnel in the career service are retained, .
. . .' This Circular prescribes that 'the o cials and employees shall be compared
on the basis of the status of their appointment, competence to perform their
duties and moral tness to discharge their responsibilities and, those who
squarely meet the quali cation requirements for the position in terms of
education, training and experience shall be preferred . . .' The records do not
show that appellants were evaluated for retention purposes in accordance with
the guidelines on reorganization.
"Moreover, the Unnumbered Memorandum of the President dated October
2, 1987 containing guidelines on the implementation of the Reorganization
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 Executive Orders provides that the ongoing process of government
reorganization should be conducted 'in a manner . . . that is sensitive to the
dislocating consequences arising from speci c organization . . . and that the
entire process of reorganization must be carried out in the most humane
manner possible.'
"Appellants were unceremoniously terminated by a memorandum order
of a mere Acting Assistant Executive Director even before the position structure
and sta ng pattern of the OMA were approved and prescribed by the
authorities as required by EO 122-A. Even in reorganization of government
agencies, career service employees are entitled to security of tenure. The instant
case involves government reorganization by way of abolishing one agency and
replacing it with another. Such being the case, the guidelines on placement of
personnel in reorganizing agencies must be complied with.
"Regarding those who have retired or were phased out and have already
received their separation bene ts, they are now estopped or deemed to have lost
their right, if any, to re-appointment. On the claim of the respondent that some
appellants are already employed in other government o ces, the records are
bereft of evidence to support the said allegation.
"Likewise, from the records, the following findings have been established:
"1. The acting Assistant Executive Director of the OMA has no power to
terminate the services of the former OMACC/PHILPA personnel;

"2. New employees who are not civil service eligibles have been
appointed to positions in the new staffing pattern of OMA; CSC approval of
these appointments is subject to the result of reorganization appeals;

"3. The positions involved are not con dential positions and
hence, not subject to the trust and confidence of the appointing authority;
"4. There is no substantial change in the mandate of the new
o ce, which is the OMA. Executive Order Nos. 6 and 122-A clearly
delineates the functions and responsibilities of OMA as envisioned by
Executive Order No. 6 and 122-A of President Corazon C. Aquino;
"5. The incumbents of OMACC and PHILPA are entitled to
security of tenure and therefore to reappointment in the newly created
agencies such as O ce on Muslim Affairs, O ce of Northern Cultural
Communities and Office of Southern Cultural Communities; and
"6. OMA did not observe the transparency requirement by
treating the OMA Plantilla of Personnel and sta ng pattern con dential."
(Rollo, G.R. No. 88951, pp. 58-60)

These ndings show that contrary to the petitioner's allegation, the termination
of the services of the private respondents was not done in good faith.
In G.R. No. 89427, the Solicitor General, instead of ling a Comment to the
Petition, led a Manifestation on December 23, 1989 stating therein that he was
informed by respondent Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon "that the papers for
the reinstatement of Dr. Villazor are now undergoing process in the Department and
said petitioner will be reinstated to his position as Assistant Provincial Health O cer."
The Solicitor General, therefore, manifests that the instant petition should be dismissed
for being academic.
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 This manifestation was opposed by the petitioner who claims that the
processing of his papers for reinstatement is not a reinstatement but simply a process
and until the petitioner is actually reinstated the instant case cannot be purely
academic.
Considering the manifestation and the opposition thereto, we rule that the
petition has indeed become academic. No useful purpose can be served by discussing
the issues as to whether or not the petitioner should be reinstated when the public
respondent by assuring this Court that the petitioner shall be restored to his former
position has recognized the petitioner's right to be given back the position earlier taken
away from him.
IV
One of the causes of instability constituting a clear deterrent to e ciency and
honesty in Government is the widespread and incessant reorganization of executive
departments and o ces, the abolition of all positions from the highest to the lowest
and the subsequent restoration and lling up of all the abolished items and new ones
that have been created.
Security of tenure, together with the merit and tness rule, is a basic feature of
the civil service scheme we have adopted in the Philippines. If established principles
protecting security of tenure are to be disregarded or waived, this can be done only on
the basis of clear constitutional grounds.
It is signi cant that in the charters or legislative authority for the exercise of
power — the Provisional Constitution of 1986, Executive Order No. 17, and Republic Act
No. 6656 — any reorganization in Government must follow the bona- de rule. There is
no basis in the above laws for indiscriminate dismissals. The executive implementors
of policy are required to abide by the intent and purpose stated in the grant of power, to
follow the guidelines set out for them and, in the words of the President "ensure that
only those found corrupt, ine cient, and undeserving are separated from the
government service."
We are constrained to set aside the reorganizations embodied in these
consolidated petitions because the heads of departments and agencies concerned
have chosen to rely on their own concepts of unlimited discretion and "progressive"
ideas on reorganization instead of showing that they have faithfully complied with the
clear letter and spirit of the two Constitutions and the statutes governing
reorganization.
The auto-limitations imposed by the President on herself have not been followed
by the alter egos. The members of Congress have spoken out on how any valid
reorganization should be conducted. Their voice should be heeded.
The Damocles sword of reorganization hanging over the heads of public servants
with every change of administration and sometimes with the change of agency heads
does not serve in any way the restoration of democracy, the eradication of graft and
corruption, and the rebuilding of con dence in the government if the bona- de rule and
the basic guidelines are not followed.
The justi cation implicit in all these purges, which is to rid the government of the
iniquitous vestiges of the past regime or of any regime for that matter is conceded. If
the purges were limited to policy making o cials, administrators, commissioners,
special assistants, directors and other high-ranking personnel there may be some legal
basis for their dismissal on a more or less summary inquiry into their shortcomings.
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 However, we fail to see how drivers, messengers, clerks and lower-level employees like
most of the petitioners who have been working at ordinary jobs for decades could in
any way be iniquitous vestiges of any regime. These low ranking employees, who had
nothing to do with martial law or hidden wealth, suffer the most from indiscriminate
firings.
The issues are not limited to the employees or the departments and/or agencies
of the government now before us. For any one who is affected, a termination notice is
the equivalent of capital punishment. A driver who has worked 27 years in the
government, a budget examiner for 25 years, a messenger for 14 years and many of the
other petitioners would nd it di cult to nd new employment after giving the best
years of their humble lives to the government service. And even for those who are re-
appointed, the damage to the civil service has been done. Instead of amassing credits
based on merit or tness, these employees will be thinking in terms of patronage, as to
who might be of help come the next reorganization. We stressed in the case of Meram
v. Edralin (154 SCRA 238 [1987]):
"The principles governing the integrity of the civil service are of universal
validity. As stated in the case of Hanley v. Murphy (255 P. 2d. 1, 4):

'. . . The civil service system rests on the principle of application of the
merit system instead of the spoils system in the matter of appointment
and tenure of o ce. (Barry v. Jackson, 30 Cal. App. 165, 169, 157 P. 828)
To that end the charter establishes a classi ed civil service system, with
exclusive power in the civil service commission to provide quali ed
personnel, for the various municipal departments and to classify or
reclassify positions according to prescribed duties. . . .'

Furthermore, civil service laws are not enacted to penalize anyone. They
are designated to eradicate the system of appointment to public office based on
political considerations and to eliminate as far as practicable the element of
partisanship and personal favoritism in making appointments. These laws
intend to establish a merit system of tness and e ciency as the basis of
appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better
government. (See Gervais v. New Orleans Police Department, 77 So 2d, 393; Civil
Service Board of City of Phoenix v. Warren, 244 P 2d 1157 citing State ex rel.
Kos v. Adamson, 226 Minn. 177, 32 N. W. 2d 281, 284)."
Only a scrupulous adherence to the bona- de rule will prevent the erosion of the
fragile foundations of the Philippine civil service. The development of a truly career and
non-partisan civil service is a must in sound developmental planning. Its achievement
will not be helped in any way by the kind of reorganization challenged in these petitions.
The wounds in icted by indiscriminate dismissals of all employees, even on those later
reappointed to their former positions, will take a long time to heal. If a person is
dismissed from his job, he should be informed of the reason. The reason should be in
the Civil Service Law or, at least, in the law authorizing the removal. The reason must
have a reasonable relationship to the employee's merit and tness for the job. He must
be given, before he is fired, an opportunity to show that the cause for removal does not
apply to him. Elementary principles of fairness and compassion are essential. Only then
can the reconciliation and unity so earnestly sought today be achieved.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:
1) In G.R. No. 78053, the petition is GRANTED. The LETTER-ORDER dated
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 MARCH 19, 1987 issued by the public respondent which terminated the services of the
petitioner is SET ASIDE. The successor of the public respondent, the former Lourdes R.
Quisumbing as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, is ordered to restore the
petitioner to his position as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City without
loss of seniority rights and with back salaries reckoned from the date of his
termination.
2) In G.R. No. 78525, the petition is GRANTED. All o ce orders and
memoranda issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 20 are declared null and void. The
public respondents or their successors are ordered to immediately restore the
petitioners to their positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries
computed under the new sta ng pattern from the dates of their invalid terminations at
rates not lower than their former salaries.
3) In G.R. No. 81197 the petition is DISMISSED for being MOOT and
ACADEMIC and for the failure of petitioners to prosecute their case.
4) In G.R. No. 81495, the petition is DISMISSED. Except in the cases of those
who have retired or opted to be phased out and who have received their separation and
retirement bene ts, the petitioners are ordered to retain the private respondents-
employees in the reorganized department under the new sta ng pattern with positions
and salaries comparable or equivalent to their former positions but not lower than their
former ranks and salaries.
5) In G.R. No. 81928, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated September
25, 1981 issued by the public respondent which terminated the petitioner's
employment is SET ASIDE. The public respondent or his successor is ordered to
reinstate and assign the petitioner to any position closest to his old position in either
the STII or SEI in terms of functions, duties, salary emoluments and privileges, and
without demotion in his rank, salary and privileges as of September 24, 1987 when the
invalid termination of services was effected.
6) In G.R. No. 81998, the petition is GRANTED. The public respondents or
their successors are ordered to return the private respondents to their positions with
compensation based on comparable or equivalent rates under the new sta ng pattern
but not lower than their former salaries.
7) In G.R. No. 86504, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned resolutions
of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued
on September 5, 1989 is lifted.
8) In G.R. No. 86547, the petition is DISMISSED. Except for those who retired
or opted to be phased out and who have received their separation and retirement
bene ts, the petitioner or his successor is ordered to return the private respondents to
their former positions or to positions of comparable rank in the reorganized
department without loss of seniority rights.
9) In G.R. No. 88951, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned resolutions
of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED.
10) In G.R. No. 89427 the petition is DISMISSED for being MOOT and
ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ .,
concur.
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 Melencio-Herrera, J ., I reiterate the grounds of my dissent in the Mison and
companion cases.
Narvasa, J ., I dissent on the grounds set forth in Mme. Justice Herrera's separate
opinion in Mison.
Feliciano, J ., I dissent for the reasons set out in Mme. Justice Herrera's
dissenting opinion in Dario v. Mison.
Padilla, J ., took no part; related to counsel for private respondents in G.R. No.
86547.
Griño-Aquino, J ., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C .J ., concurring and dissenting :

I write this separate opinion upon the sad realization that in the nal analysis, we
may have unwittingly frustrated our people's unmistakable clamor for a complete
reorganization of the government. 1 For in ruling as it did in these consolidated cases
(As in the Dario cases, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989), the majority has in no uncertain
terms set to naught the reorganization efforts not only in the various departments,
agencies and offices involved herein, but in the entire bureaucracy.
The majority would insist on distinguishing the reorganization process effected
under the Freedom Constitution from that which may be undertaken under the 1987
Constitution, with the self-defeating proviso that in the latter case, "civil service eligibles
can no longer be removed without cause as they already enjoy the constitutional right
to security of tenure. 2 Such fragmented view does not sit well with the law. It does not
take into account the various reorganization executive orders issued by the President
prior to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution precisely to ensure the continuity of the
reorganization process commenced under the Freedom Constitution and carried over
to the 1987 Constitution, or the recognition by the latter constitution itself of the
"reorganization following the rati cation of this Constitution, 3 which, to my mind,
cannot but mean the same reorganization contemplated under the Freedom
Constitution. Otherwise, the 1987 Constitution would have provided for an automatic
hold-over clause as did the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Such clause was, however,
deemed no longer necessary for the same has been provided under the Freedom
Constitution and the various reorganization executive orders.
Nor does the interpretation insisted upon by the majority jibe with reality. The
reorganization of a department with its numerous bureaus, o ces and sections is a
major undertaking. It entails intensive management study and audit, personnel
evaluation, formulation of new position structures and sta ng patterns, budget
allocation, etc., which steps necessarily take time to accomplish. With the Court's
pronouncement in these cases and the Dario cases, supra, cutting short the
reorganization process mandated by the people in the Freedom Constitution to
February 2, 1987, it is indeed doubtful whether any government department had fully
implemented its reorganization program, that is, if it had at all formulated one,
considering time constraints.
But by herein maintaining the basis of my dissent in the said Dario Cases, supra,
that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 continues even after the
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 rati cation of the 1987 Constitution, I nd myself concurring in the result obtained in
G.R. No. 78053.
Therein petitioner Francisco L. Mendoza was Schools Division Superintendent in
the then Ministry (now Department) of Education, Culture and Sports, with o cial
station at Surigao City. Pursuant to the government reorganization decreed under Art.
III of the Freedom Constitution, he was appointed to the same position with the same
place of assignment effective June 4, 1986. Sometime during the last week of March,
1987, he received, through the Regional Director, Region X, a letter-order dated March
19, 1987 signed by respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports Lourdes R.
Quisumbing, informing him of his separation from the service effective April 15, 1987. 4
Cited as basis for said personnel action was Executive Order No. 117 approved by
President Aquino on January 30, 1987.
The arbitrariness in this case is obvious. Even before Executive Order No. 117,
the law relied upon by respondent, was enacted on January 30, 1987, the government
reorganization mandated under the Freedom Constitution was already being
implemented. In fact, as aforesaid, said executive order as well as the other
reorganization executive orders were intended to prolong or extend the period of
implementing the reorganization program. Simply put, Executive Order No. 117 was a
mere continuation of the government reorganization being implemented at the time of
its enactment. Upon these considerations, there can be no plausible explanation why in
June, 1986, when the government reorganization was already being implemented,
petitioner was deemed quali ed to remain in the service, as evidenced by the issuance
of an appointment (actually a re-appointment) to him on a permanent status as Schools
Division Superintendent, yet barely ten (10) months after, he was suddenly found un t
to continue in o ce. The questioned personnel action becomes even more perplexing
when taken in conjunction with the performance rating of "Very Satisfactory" given to
petitioner during the period May, 1986 to April 1987, the very month he was considered
separated from the service. 5
I cannot, however, reconcile myself with the alacrity by which the majority would
attribute bad faith to the reorganization undertaken by some respondents (particularly
the Department of Tourism in G.R. No. 78525) based on standards established by a
subsequent law of doubtful constitutionality. 6 The principle is that good faith is
presumed while bad faith must be proved. The majority would reverse the rule despite a
showing, unrebutted by petitioners in G.R. No. 78525, that all personnel actions were
taken on the basis of interviews, evaluation of supervisors, performance and self-
appraisal of the employees, as well as recommendations of Civil Service
Commissioners, who were chided for not knowing any better "than to participate in a
violation of the rules of their agency." 7 Indeed, one is compelled to ask: if you can't rely
on the advice of experts, whom can you depend on?
The security-of-tenure argument accorded merit by the majority would hold
water under ordinary circumstances, but not under the exceptional factual milieu
obtaining in the cases at bar. The removal from o ce of petitioners, respondents in
some cases, was the result of the reorganization of the various executive departments
undertaken immediately after the installation of the Aquino government, at which time,
the people's clamor to promote e ciency and effectiveness in the delivery of public
service, rebuild con dence in the entire governmental system and eradicate graft and
corruption therein was at its highest. The need was so grave and serious, so basic and
urgent, that nothing less than extra-ordinary measures were called for. In the balancing
of interests, as between the very essence of a government as a machinery for the
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 common good and the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution to those in
government service, one must prevail. Since in our form of government, public o ces
are public trusts, and the o cers are servants of the people and not their rulers, the
choice is evident.
There is no gainsaying the initial di culty facing those who were displaced by
reason of the sweeping governmental reorganization. The government itself however,
has adopted such measures as to "soften the impact" by providing, among others, in its
Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders that in the event
of termination, the employees shall:
"a) be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Department of
Budget and Management. All departments who are recruiting shall give
preference to the employees in the list; and
b) continue to receive salary and bene ts until December 31, 1987;
and
c) be guaranteed the release of separation bene ts, within 45 days
from termination and in no case later than February 15, 1988." 8
We have also seen in these cases instances where the separated employees
were re-hired when items suited to their qualifications were available. 9
The traditional misconception on the role of the government as a haven of refuge
for the unemployed, the unquali ed and the unskilled must cease. If the value
reorientation of our people could be effected only through drastic and harsh measures,
as the recent government reorganization and streamlining appear to be, so be it. The
present government cannot and should not be burdened with excess personnel without
special talents whose indiscriminate recruitment into the government service was done
under the whim and caprice of a one-man ruler.
Footnotes
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Preamble and Article II, Section 1(a), Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986.

2. p. 50, Decision.
3. Section 16, Art. XVIII.
4. Exh. "B", Petition, p. 12, Rollo in G.R. No. 78053.

5. Exh. "C", Reply, p. 85, Rollo in G.R. No. 78053.

6. R.A. 6656.
7. p. 47, Decision.

8. par. 3.
9. e.g. G.R. No. 81197 Dolores Garcia, et al. vs. Hon. Teodoro C. Benigno, et al. and G.R. No.
89427 Conrado Villasor vs. Hon. Alfredo R.A Bengzon.

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