G.R. No.

193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the
criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed
as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14
Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states
that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive,
refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14)
year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent
filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19
Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the
accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to
a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively
established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child,
notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such
support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the
accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition
with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one
that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of
law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by
this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and
resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in
the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we
do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine
laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they
are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already
enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not
disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT
and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to
wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his
child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is
a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has
been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings
based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her
son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst
never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he
is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would
be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,*

Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23
July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for
the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter.
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon.
On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as
well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval.3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards
Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 19874 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net
hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.5
cräläwvirtualibräry

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 19886 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half.7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated
in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9 cräläwvirtualibräry

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the
proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on
established facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule.11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.12 Reading between the
lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in
her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that
the case be set for hearing.14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the
issue on her citizenship.15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing
but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
"Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines."16 It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction.
We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as
the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the
original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy
thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
answered that she was since 1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo
was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err
in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22
April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship.20
cräläwvirtualibräry

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,21 the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter
and issue.22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions
filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of
titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to
declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void
its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-

appellee, vs. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY
LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.

Jose D. Cortes for appellants.

Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose,
presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward
Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.
library
chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23,
1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings:

According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a
citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located.
This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the
Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen
of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that
state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal
intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he
was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That
is his exclusive personal right.chanroblesvir tualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit
A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby
appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters
testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and
performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).

It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The executor
filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of
the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and
Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of
testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2)
the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs.
M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of
mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his
(testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in
three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine
Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000; chanrobles virtual la w library

It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all
shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To
his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been
deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should
be entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is
argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the
testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a
nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz.,
(Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and
Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow
on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose
of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his
or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's
debts.

Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the
testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19,
1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as
Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On
December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from
the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297,
Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists no
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce
was issued. As already and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained
therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C.
Bohanan during their converture. chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married
on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in
1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of
the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife
exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no
conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no
longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who
had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given
their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of
the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the
estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid? chanrobles virtual law library

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as
to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which
is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator
was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his
permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is
whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the
laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied
Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of
partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to
do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. - An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . .
(Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was
introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II,
and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws presented by the counsel
for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). chanroblesv irtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions
are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated
above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at
bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. chanroblesv
Testate Estate of C.O. Bohanan, et al. vs. Magdalena C. Bohanan, et al.
G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
106 SCRA 997

FACTS:
C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of Nevada executed a last will and
testament in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada on April 23, 1944 in Manila. The
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909. He secured a divorce
which was granted to him on May 20, 1922. Sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married
Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator in 1944.

On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate the last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan. The Philippine Trust Company
was named as the executor of the will.

The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the
provisions of the will, the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator’s grandson Edward George Bohanan,
which consists of several mining companies;
(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister,
Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of
shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator’s grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary
Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah
Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.

Claiming having been deprived of the legitime, the respondents, the wife Magadalena C.
Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of
the estate in the manner that:
out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the
testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining
companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of
only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
ISSUE 1? Is the wife entitled to a legitime?
No. The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of
Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his
or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s
debts.
Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found that there existed no community
property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued.
This order was already final and executory and she had not appealed therefrom.

ISSUE 2: Are the testator’s children entitled to a legitime in accordance with the laws of
the forum?
No. In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, New
Civil Code legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property and the country in which it is found. It is therefore the Law of Nevada
which will govern the disposition of the properties of the testator but this foreign law must first
be proved as our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of Nevada
were not introduced in evidence by the executor’s at the hearing of the project of partition. It is
Magdalena C. Bohanan, upon her motion for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, who
introduced in evidence the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. Said
laws presented by the counsel for the executor was admitted by the Court. Also the children of
the testator, did not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section
9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice by the court, without
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
The order of the court approving the project of partition was affirmed.

NOTES:
How are foreign laws proved?
Foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules,
which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . .
(Rule 123).
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY,

petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS,
respondents.

Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay

Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing
agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972,
GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for
which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and
reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren
and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and
General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report,
petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and
ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to
leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the
forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a
"swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to
submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime

report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col.
Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding
Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to
be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum

suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document
Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous
transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his
previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks
and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias.
The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the
fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete,
petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification
of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other
criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through
Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the
Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge
Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of
the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the
fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who,
however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from
petitioners that his employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed
the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners'
appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed
the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of
the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a
compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company
(RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a
letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming
illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages,
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to
the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of
damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed
the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to
private respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful
exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive
manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the
Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some
basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The
framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated
the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental
precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach
its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among
these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of
law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent.
This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of
the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May
18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is
no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19
whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g.,
Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand
Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94
SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General
Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA,
G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or
Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each
case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right
that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must
now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions,
petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that
he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to
said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners
do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon
uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that
an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate
action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave.
Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly
uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave.
Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are
the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the
police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the
statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without
basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has
already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to
the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088,
August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R.
No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the
instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to
dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts
were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work.
Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal
complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken
against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just
confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he
landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the
other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements
about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal
dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO
sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment
with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer
period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be
held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners,
however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers
of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal
obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the
latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible
dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty
and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act,
reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two
years from the time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against
Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution
and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking
justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect
in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which
defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free
resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v.
Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not
be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April
30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016,
May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints
should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To
do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the
courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536
the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and
attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six
criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately
by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly,
the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution
[Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere
dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages
for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the
complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961,
1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad
faith in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:

xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a

total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru
falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of
the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of
correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of
evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the
Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of
the cases. As above adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the
Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was
frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving
civilians to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the
findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila
Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the
fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the
lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and
although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a
supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been
gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city
Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code,
so much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed,
with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in
one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is
evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case
against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants
would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that
the criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed
by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed,
which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the
fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly
filed one hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed
against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made
by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be
filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made
to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the
haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the
pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry,
the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY,
coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other
conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six
criminal complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint
filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making
a computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo,
pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners
have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner
in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and
the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias
as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which
resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds
that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was
reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the
principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage
that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his
having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the
defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable
[Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also
Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-
18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case.
It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss
Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a
legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage
incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by
petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already
ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653,
that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article

2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled
that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is
its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with
bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been
committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary
damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

HSBC v. CATALAN G.R. NO. 159590

October 18, 2004 G.R. NO. 159591 October
18, 2004 Abuse of Rights, Suability of the
Drawee for Tortious Acts
June 5, 2019

FACTS:
Catalan filed before the RTC, a complaint for sum of money with damages against petitioner
praying that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE be ordered to pay P20,864,000.00 representing the
value of the five checks issued by Thomson to respondent.

The checks when deposited were returned by HSBANK purportedly for reason of “payment
stopped” pending confirmation, despite the fact that the checks were duly funded, and that
Thomson has demanded the bank to pay the same. Catalan alleged in the complaint the gross
inaction of HSBANK on Thomson’s instructions, as well as its evident failure to inform Catalan
of the reason for its continued inaction and non-payment of the checks. Catalan invoked Article
19 of the Civil Code as basis for her cause of action.

HSBANK & HSBC TRUSTEE filed Motions to Dismiss.

The RTC denied the two motions to dismiss.

HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition with the
CA.

The CA dismissed the two petitions for certiorari.

Hence, the present petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the payee may sue the drawee bank based on tort under Art. 19 of the New Civil
Code.

RULING:

Yes, the payee may sue the bank under Art. 19.

In order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements must concur, to wit: (a)
that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.

It is evident that Catalan is suing HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE for unjustified and willful
refusal to pay the value of the checks.

HSBANK claims that Catalan has no cause of action because under Section 189 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, “a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of
the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless
and until it accepts or certifies it.”

However, HSBANK is not being sued on the value of the check itself but for how it acted in
relation to Catalan’s claim for payment despite the repeated directives of the drawer Thomson to
recognize the check the latter issued.
Anent HSBC TRUSTEE, it is being sued for the baseless rejection of Catalan’s claim. When
Catalan went to the extent of traveling to Hongkong to deliver personally the checks, HSBC
TRUSTEE summarily disapproved her claim with nary a reason.

Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as
female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is
denied.

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which
reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao
City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No.
26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the
fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were
destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958,
Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and

Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic)
Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944

issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of

the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay
Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that
were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila,
started only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
 e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol,
that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of
Birth of Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March

1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but
was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence
to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when

he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with
one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha
and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the
Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad
faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio;
hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as
Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed
by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn
the validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing
was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial
court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise,
issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of
1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way
of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage
between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in
Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said
proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4)
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented
by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo
v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the
fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility
of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying
on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua
Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void
from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of

Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review
on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned
with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x
x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage
is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences,
and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may,
thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The
Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. ALBIOS G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage
was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even
arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court
even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for
lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had
no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship
in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the
case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest
as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties
here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because
it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices
of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence. None of these are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM,
Respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28,
1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.2

The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;3
Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and
Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither
property nor debt.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature
wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a
clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with
whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned
to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even
considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would
only return to the country on special occasions.

Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a
petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a
newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could
not be found in the Philippines.7

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist
who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions
and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to
live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations
of marriage.8

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B.
DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are
hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in
lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights
previously acquired by creditors.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.9

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that –

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE

ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE

BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A

CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.

The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.10

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11
Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in
its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence
submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically,
does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term
"psychological incapacity?"

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons
with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.13

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very
complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case,
respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four
children.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under
Article 5517 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article
36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve
the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged
with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court.1âwphi1 We cannot
deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably,
there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answers to every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with petitioner’s marital
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DAVID B. DEDEL v. CA, GR No. 151867, 2004-01-29

Facts:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel... and... the exchange of
marital vows before the City Court of

Pasay on September 28, 1966.

he civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature
wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a
Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a
clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and... with
whom she had two children.

Thereafter, on December 9, 1995,... Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with
their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.

Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a
petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of

Makati City, Branch 149.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that

Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa

Ibrahim to live with petitioner.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General... appealed alleging that

ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN

PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.

LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION

HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE
MOLINA CASE.

The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11]
Hence, the instant petition.

Issues:

does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the... term
"psychological incapacity?"
Ruling:

In this case, respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such... an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.

Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the
grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are
circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide... the specific answers
to every individual problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioner's marital predicament, our
first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No... costs.

Principles:

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article

46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility... of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015

GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner,

vs.
MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution2 issued on August 7,
2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3
dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil
Case No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary
Grace Parel-Vifias (Mary Grace) as null and void.

Antecedents

On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in
civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant,
however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s
death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.

The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a
production engineer.

Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition
was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to
regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night
life, and drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to
perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn,
Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind
courtship.6

Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom
she delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She
was self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she
showed indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found
out that she left for an overseas employment in Dubai.7

Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken
family and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must
have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life.8

To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a
psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found
him as "amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy
heterosexual relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had
gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back
in college.

Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle
class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the
time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically
involved with another man.10

According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the
couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and
family-oriented.11

Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded
on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.12

In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:

The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave, permanent and
chronic in proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already been
deeply embedded within her system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood
years. Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-
]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.

Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration and
lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,]
which utterly distorted her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting marital
relationship. Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of
entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened
sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is
too headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay
close attention to what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for
power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often
subjected to her control.x x x She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at
night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the
present time. x x x.

The root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality aberration can be said to have emanated from the
various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,]
which is the crucial stage in the life of a person as thisis the time when the individual’s character
and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and
tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such
fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,]
who were supposed to bethe first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a
domineering character as she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the
laxity she had from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the brood.
She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards to making decisions and always
mandates people to submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and]
has certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature
roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on with her life,
she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-advised things even if she isamply aware of
the depravity of her actions.

The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already

inher system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining
ours)

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through
her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings
before the RTC.

During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence.
Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the
exact opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his work.15 On her part, Dr.
Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological report dated December 29, 2008.

Ruling of the RTC

On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage between Glenn
and Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC
cited the following as grounds:

The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the petition.
Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the
parties, it is best that the legal bond between them be severed.

The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with
[Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and
who does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the
year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it
not for the insistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his wife. The law
provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity. x x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary
on what it really means. x x x.

From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the
basic marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best
to have their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x,
unmindful of her marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with
sufficient authority to speak on the subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn],
and was able to gather sufficient data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This
[Narcissistic] personality disorder of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so
grave and so permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal
incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before the marriage and
was only manifested after. It has become grave, permanent and incurable.17 (Underlining ours
and italics in the original)

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the
RTC in its Order18 dated December 1, 2010.

The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA

On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary
Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling
her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary
Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr.
Tayag’s statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC
resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions sansdetails. Besides, what psychological
incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant
case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were
shown, but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to
assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a psychological illness.19

Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and
declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated
the reasons below:

In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, asso expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
psychological condition must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.

In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature,
and irresponsible which made her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He
likewise alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually
left him to work abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a
case of psychological incapacity on her part.

While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who
conducted a psychological examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was conducted
only on him and no evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in determining the

psychological incapacity of a person as she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate
the psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field of study of behavior.
Although the psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she makea conclusion as
to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted that she was not able to examine the
respondent[,] hence, the information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving.
Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root causeof the spouse’s psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriageand shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential
obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family
Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition,
established by evidence and explained in the decision.

Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish the root cause of
the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We
reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c)
sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.

Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, has this to say:

"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological– not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,]
nevertheless[,] suchroot cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists."

The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves". It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party evenbefore the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.

From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the
obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.

Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours
and emphasis and italics in the original)

The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration22 filed by Glenn.

Issue

Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence
exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.

In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
should be judged according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge should pains takingly examine the factual
milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.23
Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non
requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist
before a marriage could be declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is
sought, his or her testimony should be considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the findings
of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.27

In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise
for our consideration are mere reiterations of the matters already resolved by the CA.28

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition lacks merit.

The lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a psychologist or

psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito,
and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing,
strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai
and is romantically-involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of
communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the
other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While
Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not
necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:

In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling
toperform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this
cited case.

In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was
doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x
x Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In
fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going
steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.

x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume

basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and
not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted,
underlining ours and emphasis in the original)

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years
from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under
one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their home in 2006 indicates either
a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with
her husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s
testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn.
Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary
Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof on
the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before
they got married, they saw each other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and
well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded.1âwphi1 Rumbaua34 provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz:

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose
bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does notdisqualify
the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she
did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
responded to the doctor’s probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
"believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." x x x.

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to

warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of
the respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show
that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal
of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as
a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our
mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.

xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the
time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage.
Neither did she adequately explain howshe came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition
was grave and incurable. x x x

xxxx

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition
except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but
disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can besaid to be suffering
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and
incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the
disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based
on what the petitioner related toher. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given
credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this
case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on orabout
the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appearto us
to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the
petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the
nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life
were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the
better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through
studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence
fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for
example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent
to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure,
these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological
incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital
developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations omitted and
underlining ours)

In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status as the eldest among
her siblings,36 her father’s being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a
housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the supposed
psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s
marriage.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses
who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does
not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court also
commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and
Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

GLENN VIÑAS, vs. MARY GRACE

PAREL-VIÑASG.R. No. 208790, January
21, 2015
Psychological incapacity; Testimony of Expert Witness

FACTS:

Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Glenn soug
ht professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychol
ogist. The doctor found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a
mature and healthy heterosexual relationship.” On the other hand, Mary Grace’s personality was
assessed through the data gathered from Glenn and his cousin and diagnosed her to be suffering f
rom a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-
social traits. The doctor then concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded
on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recomme
nded the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lack of personal examination or assessment of a psychologist or psychiatrist i

s fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage.

RULING:

No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psych
iatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. If the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual med
ical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the case of Mary Grace, how
ever, the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity, incurabi
lity of Mary Grace’s condition and that it existed at the inception of marriage.

Moreover, while the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair g
auge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect
to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psy
chological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different f
rom admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

ROBERT F.MALLILINv. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN & REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 192718, 18 February 2015, SECOND DIVISION,
(Mendoza, J.)Sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity. The petitioner must be able to establish that the
respondent’s unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state. Robert and Luz were married on 1972. In
1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Robertdisclosed that Luz was already living
in California, USA, and had married an American. He alsorevealed that
when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another
boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz
had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by
the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room
because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who
prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes
because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and
looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated
different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with
male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors;
(7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6)
she would contract loans without his knowledge. In addition, Robert
presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva),
Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center. While the
case was pending before RTC, Robert filed a petition for marriage
annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal) which was granted and, later
on, affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT). The
RTC declared the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Luz. The State, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which, later
on, reversed the RTC decision.ISSUE:Did the totality of the evidence
adduced by Robert provethat Luz ispsychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code?
UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015RULING:No.The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse. Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's
duties is another.Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were
considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36.
To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity. The psychological report of Villanuevawas
insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. There was nothing
in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or
was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her
psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-
serving information provided by Robert. The decision of the Metropolitan
Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. The
Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.To consider
church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36
would be legislating from the bench.

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.

ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

 G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

Read the 2011 Kalaw v. Fernandez case digest HERE.

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied
on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of
time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint
for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was
indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with
regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this
case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to
be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not
be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt
its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no
case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on
the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed,
the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth
diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be

personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence
showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the
record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as

conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence
to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional

temperaments
 The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it
was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a
merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate
basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently
and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of
Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses
because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be
disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages,
for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant
should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at
the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she
would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions
would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted
on her family life, particularly on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did
not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them
to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Republic v. Orbecido
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2 children. The wife went to the
United States to work. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized
as an American citizen, obtained a divorce decree and married another man.

Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and
recognized in the Philippines

RULING:

Yes, the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the lattertoremarry.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of
Orbecide that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his
favor. Thus, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

Held:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact.”
 Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of

marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
“family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations.

Bayot v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.155635, 7 November 2008

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa.
They had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which
resulted to judgment ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal
properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological
incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to
the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the
spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an
American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains
to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the
principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still
may be, a holder of American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and represented
herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate,
when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized
as a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is
secured abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did
not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal
from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that
Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of
them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when
he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa,
the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story
as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign
a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign
the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.
[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by
[Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground
that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court
further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil
Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article
718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab
initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE

VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS

MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ,
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as
his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33
(3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues
in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of
five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article
76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved
in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material
fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as
one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes
that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow
an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that
it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may
be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability,
if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then
Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony
was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and
Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the
ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals
the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit
of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of
valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper
because they started living together five months before the celebration of their marriage. That
according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall
be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means
that a five years period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would
lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly,
it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson
is void ab initio.

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order3 dated
December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa
Cantor’s husband, presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime
in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability
to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s
expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from
Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death,
docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry
was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law,
her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding
Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a
hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the
petition in court.

The Ruling of the RTC

After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring
Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the former
receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated
December 15, 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor
is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5

The Ruling of the CA

The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision,
the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s
part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.7

The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The
petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of
trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of
the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial
proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory
(hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they
are not subject to review on certiorari.

The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct
the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s
attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search
conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of
the Family Code.

The Issues

The petition poses to us the following issues:

(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial
courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article
41 of the Family Code; and

(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition.

a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Court’s Judgment in the Judicial

Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable

The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall
be immediately final and executory.

Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the
dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as
against the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter
how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary
proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v.
Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate of
Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order
the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of

law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege."
Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in
summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor
in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no
right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]

Certiorari Lies to Challenge the

Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code

A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved
party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.

As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not
automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of
where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and
where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case
of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code:

"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
and three of the same title. It states:

"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]

Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.

b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief

The Essential Requisites for the

Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.12

The Present Spouse Has the Burden

of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of
the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13

Declaration of Presumptive Death

Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had
occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial
differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil
Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The
Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news
that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of
the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15

The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case
basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of
the following relevant cases is warranted:

i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the
present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was
already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted
of the following:

(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;

(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;

(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among
his friends;

(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls
during his free time;

(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and

(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.

Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court
found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only
reported his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.

The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded
belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.18

ii. Republic v. Granada19

Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded
belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the
present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the
absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of
the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from
other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

iii.Republic v. Nolasco21

In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted
of:

(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;

(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis
that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his
wife had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she
was dead.

iv.The present case

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1âwphi1 It can be inferred
from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory
therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as
her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus
considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities
to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in
which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a
present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very
least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of
the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form
a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."

Strict Standard Approach Is

Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage

In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying
their marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a
tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and
should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized that:

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this
Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse
must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had
been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family
Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the
family’s foundation25 and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic social institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to uphold the
sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:

[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following
basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution.

Strict Standard Prescribed Under

Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently,
the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It
is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the
court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the
present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The
decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her
criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage,
it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially
declared presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts.
We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the
sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard
necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the
strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Republic v. Iyoy
G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals. CrasusIyoy was
married to FelyIyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to five children. FelyIyoy eventually
left for the States to provide for their family in 1984 and in lessthan a year sent Crasus
documents to sign with regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasus eventually found out that
Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship has conceived of a child. Crasus
eventually questioned the validity of Fely’s subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals in
deciding this case sided with Fely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and
recognized in the Philippines.

RULING:

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. Basing from the
facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a
year after. This means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that,
Fely is not yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and therefore she does
not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered as subsisting. The Civil
Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and status are governed by
Philippine laws regardless of where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted
by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the Philippines.

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS

VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW.”

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1
affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent
Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of
nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely
a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged
in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had
enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent
Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus,
she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had
to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she
denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the
law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently
living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to
Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded
both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1)
his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City,
on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s
surname, Micklus.9

Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that
it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed
to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14
considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.

As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in
another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for
that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will
and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of
the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the
marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there
is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law
and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its
Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his
reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS

VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although
the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce
abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.
26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to
the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does
not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent
and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial
court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds –

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute

psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18

In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases,
this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated…21

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.22

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23
which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname.
Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had
such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of
marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.27

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment
of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American
family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If
the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of
this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than
the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at
bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the
Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48
provides –

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor
General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked
to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to
the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated
to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case
to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State…37

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003,
should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General
to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of
the said Rule are reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from
the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in
support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse
of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without
the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed
by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code.
While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what
is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.39

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.

SO ORDERED.