G.R. No.

217126-27 attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building
NOVEMBER 10, 2015 project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN V. COURT
OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR. On March 10, 2015, a preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency
FACTS: of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension
During the first term (June 30, 2010 up to June 30, 2013) of Makati Mayor Jejomar of a public officer are present, finding that the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was
Erwin Binay, Jr., he allegedly performed the following acts: strong. Their continued stay in their respective offices give them access to public records
and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may
On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase III of the Makati prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. Consequently, the
Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through
consequently, executed the corresponding contract on September 28, 2010, without the Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive
required publication and the lack of architectural design, and approved the release of funds suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.
therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;
(2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011; (3) P92,775,202. On February 25, 2011; (4) On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of
P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011; (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011; and (6) the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.
P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011; On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase IV of the Makati praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay,
Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
contract on August 18, 2011, without the required publication and the lack of architectural attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases
design, and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases
P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11; (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011; (3) III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a
P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011; (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012; and (5) second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering
P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012; the administrative cases against him moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated April 6, 2015 granting Binay,
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase V of the Makati Jr.'s prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction which further enjoined the implementation
Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an
contract on September 13, 2012, without the required publication and the lack of ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive
architectural design, and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.
P32,398,220.05 and P30,582,629.30 on December 20, 2012.
He was re-elected as Mayor of Makati City during the May, 2013 elections. Hence, this petition by the Ombudsman
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas
"Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public ISSUE:
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati accusing them of Plunder and Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION enjoining the implementation of the preventive
Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine.
of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal RULING:
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to The “Aguinaldo” or “Condonation” or “Forgiveness” doctrine, which condones the
conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary administrative liability of an elected official for an act committed during his previous term by
complaint, if warranted. Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the reason of his re-election, is hereby set aside since it is in violation of the accountability
1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them provision of the Constitution. Section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
Documents (OMB Cases). efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities

1
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct." Without
envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove
vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy.
Based on the 1987 Constitution the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of bases.To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by
influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
an "independent" office. Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no
Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official
notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
accountability of public officers. offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an It must be pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court's abandonment of the
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against part of the legal system of the Philippines.
him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed G.R. No. L-45081
or dismissed. This is the penalty. The CA Resolution which directed the issuance of the JULY 15, 1936
assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos JOSE A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, et al.
. The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly FACTS:
impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for
relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013. Moreover, the CA the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. Tayabas.
beyond his first term , Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on
the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, wherein the On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
condonation doctrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made after the member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts number of votes.
executed before said re-election.
Condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. On December 8, 1935, the
offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense." The herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
condonation doctrine - which connotes complete extinguishment of liability is not based against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district
decided under the 1935 Constitution. In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified
elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-
elected to the same position in 1955. As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that ISSUE:
time, the Supreme Court resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance over electoral protests. - NO
matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional
provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of HELD:

2
 Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between fiscal autonomy. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the
department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the
judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. The power of judicial review is limited to Executive on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This
mota presented. authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse
(which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3,
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and Article VIII.
that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll
the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of autonomy in the following manner: "as envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy
the Electoral Commission might prescribe. enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their
Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority needs require."
under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether
the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the 706 SCRA 502
purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition for a writ of OCTOBER 1, 2013
prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/ CLARIFICATION
petitioner. So ordered.
FACTS:
678 SCRA 1
JULY 31, 2012 Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T.
RE: COA OPINION Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative
Services of the Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on the applicability to the
FACTS: Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
In June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission No. (RA) 10154 which states:
on Audit (COA) issued an opinion which found that an underpayment amounting to
P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service
Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from
Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased the Office of the President.
vehicles.
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in
ISSUE: the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. As such, it
Whether or not COA erred when it issued its June 8, 2010 opinion. oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative
action against them for any violation thereof. As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody
HELD: records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel.
The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted
fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This ISSUE:
authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in Whether or not section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. (RA) 10154 apply to retiring employees of the judiciary. - NO

3
 what law is given a set of facts, but it does not have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do
HELD: not have the power of the purse. “Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the
In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision – which requires retiring budget of the judiciary should not go below the appropriation for the previous year, it is
government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of beholden to the Congress depending on how low the budget is.” The Judiciary Development
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to Fund, used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this
employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s court on a quarterly basis. The financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court
constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, website. “Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional
retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the design, it is a co-equal department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament,
pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC our arguments are legal, not political. We are best when we lay down all our premises in
clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state the finding of facts, interpretation of the law and understanding of precedents. We are not
policy of RA 10154. trained to produce a political statement or a media release.”
WHEREFORE, the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of
Administrative Case from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of For this reason, we appreciate petitioner’s concern for the judiciary. It is often only through
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is declared the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the
INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary. political sphere. Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But
his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a
UDK-15143 proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in Congress. There,
JANUARY 21, 2015 he may discover the representatives and senators who may have a similar enthusiastic
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law. WHEREFORE, the
FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT petition is DISMISSED.
FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.
GR NO. L-45685
FACTS: NOVEMBER 16, 1937
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING
Fund and replacing it with the “Judiciary Support Fund.” Funds collected from the proposed CORPORATION V JOSE O VERA
Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall
determine how the funds will be used. FACTS:
The information of Mariano Cu Unjieng was files with the Court of First Instance of Manila
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation was
compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the the private prosecutor at that time.
perceived hostility of Congress. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is “a Filipino
citizen, and a concerned taxpayer.” He filed this petition as part of his “continuing crusade On January 8, 1934, The Court of First Instance in Manila rendered judgement of conviction
to defend and uphold the Constitution” because he believes in the rule of law. He is sentencing Unjieng for an indeterminate penalty.
concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority
Development Assistance Fund case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement Acceleration On November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221,
Program12 case on July 1, 2014. Unjieng filed an application for probation. He stated in his petition that he is innocent of the
crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe
ISSUE: good conduct in the future. On April 5, 1937, the court of first instance of Manila, seventh
Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance over the JSF/JDF issue. - branch, Judge Jose O Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing.
NO
The Petitioners filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging among other things, the Act
RULING: No. 4221.
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject
to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before The petitioner’s contention was the respondent judge lacks the power to place the
this court may take cognizance of the case. For this court to rule on constitutional issues, respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation because under Section 11 of Act No. 4221,
there must first be a justiciable controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a “The said Philippine legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines”
violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The Therefore, it nowhere states that Section 11 of Act No. 4221 is to be made applicable to
judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that courts have power to declare chartered cities like the City of Manila. They further added that Act No. 4221 should be

4
declared unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause by only specifying OCTOBER 19, 2010
the provinces and not the entire Islands. ERNESTO FRANCISCO JR & HIZON v. TOLL REGULAR BOARDS

The respondent’s contention to dismiss the case was that upon the hypothesis that this FACTS:
court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the question as President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public
whether or not the execution will lie, the Supreme Court nevertheless cannot exercise said improvements. PD 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public
jurisdiction. improvements. The same decree created the Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the
power to enter into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways;
ISSUE: grant authority to operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC)
Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction to properly decide on the constitutionality of and fix initial toll rates as well as adjust it from time to time after due notice and hearing.
Act No. 4221 PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine National Construction Corporation for a period
of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and South Luzon
RULING: Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the PNCC a franchise over
“The constitutionality if an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX.
the question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government
determination of the case, the constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.” Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint venture agreement with
private entities without going into public bidding. On February 1994, the DPWH together
Constitutional Challenge requires: with other private entities executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in
The Question is properly raised (Locus Standi) the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into a financial and technical JVAs
The Question is presented in appropriate cases (Timeliness) with entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas. Several Supplemental Toll
The Question is necessary to a determination of the case (Justiciability) Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX
The Constitutionality must be the very Lis Mota presented (Lis Mota) Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects. Petitioners seek to nullify the various
STOAs and assail the constitutionality of Sections 3(a and d) of PD 1112 in relation to
Here, Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they vested the TRB the power to issue, modify, and
Locus Standi promulgate toll rate changes while given the ability to collect tolls.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, ISSUES:
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without the saying that of Act No. 4221 Whether or not there is an existence of an actual controversy, its timeliness and the locus
really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present standi to sue.
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Whether or not the TRB can enter into TOAs and promulgate toll rates and rule on petitions
for toll rate adjustments.
Timeliness Whether or not TRB committed grave abuse of discretion.
The court will take cognizance of the facts that the Probation Act is new addition to our
statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts HELD:
Petition is denied for lack of merit. The court held in the following issues:
Justiciability Yes. Petitioners Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and/or mere users of the tollways or
That persons accused and convicted of Crime of City of Manila have applied for probation; representatives of such users, do not fit the requisite standing. While this is so, the Court is
that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of to relax the rule on locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public interest
the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Unjieng has been at large involved in the implementation of the laws on the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex used
for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court daily by hundreds of thousands of motorists. And the petition for prohibition on the TRB
on the constitutional question. makes an actual case that is timely for judicial review.
Yes. TRB, as an administrative body, is vested with powers on toll regulations and is better
Lis Mota equipped technically to decide administrative questions. Courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of
multiplicity of suits, string reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act. administrative functions.
No, 4221 be resolved. No. It is not for courts to look into the wisdom and practicalities behind the exercise by the
TRB of its contract-making prerogatives under P.D. Nos. 1112, 1113 and 1894, absent proof
GR NO. 166910 of grave abuse of discretion which would justify judicial review. The implementation of the

5
initial toll rates and/or the adjusted toll rates for the SMSS, expanded NLEX and SLEX, as privatization of power plants in a manner that ensures the reliability and affordability of
authorized by the separate TRB resolutions. electricity in our country pursuant to the EPIRA is an issue of paramount public interest.

GR NO. 212686 Yes. PSALM’s grant for SPC the right to top under the LBGT-LLA contravenes the policy on
SEPTEMBER 28, 2015 competitive public bidding. The court ruled that SPC's right to top under the LBGT-LLA is
OSMENA v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT void as it is not founded on the said lessee's legitimate interest over the leased premises.
CORPORATION Also, whatever initial gain from the higher price obtained for the NPPC compared to the
original bid price of TPVI is negated by the fact that SPC's right to top had discouraged
FACTS: more potential buyers from submitting their bids, knowing that even their most reasonable
The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp. (PSALM) conducted a bidding for bid can be defeated by SPC's exercise of its right to top. Attracting as many bidders to
the sale of Naga Power Plant Complex (NPPC) power plant. Bidders were Therma Power participate in the bidding for public assets is still the better means to secure the best bid for
Visayas Inc. and SPC Power Corp. Therma Power won. PSALM issued a notice of award to the Government and achieve the objective under the EPIRA to private NPC's assets in the
Therma Power but subject to the condition that SPC will not exercise its right of first refusal. most optimal manner.
Then SPC exercised its right of first refusal by proposing to PSALM that it will execute lease G.R. NO. 165109
agreement and purchase agreement over the NPCC power plant. PSALM and SPC executed DECEMBER 14, 2009
said agreements and PSALM cancelled the notice of award. MAMBA v. LARA
Petitioner argues that the right of first refusal is upheld only in cases where the holder of
such right holds an existing, or at least, a vested interest in the object for which the right is FACTS:
to be exercised. Thus, even if SPC has a legal interest in the vicinity lots, its right to top can The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing Governor Edgar
no longer be exercised because it is not operating the Naga LBGT itself. Also, petitioner R. Lara to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial
uses the policy requiring competitive public bidding in all government contracts. Petitioner advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of
contends that by granting SPC the right to top, PSALM violated the express provisions of the governor without cost and commitment. It also ratified the Memorandum of Agreement
R.A. No. 9136 (EPIRA Law) and R.A. No. 9184 (Procurement Law) on public bidding by (MOA) entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation which provides that
failing to maintain bidders on equal footing. the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time
fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated. In addition, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
ISSUES: authorized Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or agreements pertinent to
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy and was it timely filed. the flotation of the bonds of the provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500
Whether or not petitioner possess legal standing to institute the present action questioning million for the construction and improvement of his priority projects, including the
the validity of SPC's right to top. construction of the New Cagayan Town Center, to be approved by the Sangguniang
Whether or not PSALM gravely abuse its discretion in allowing SPC's exercise of the right to Panlalawigan. Subsequently, Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation,
top under the LBGT-LLA. giving to the latter the planning, design, construction and site development of the town
center project.
HELD:
Yes. The Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly directs the Judiciary, as a Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a Petition
matter of power and duty, not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining
legally demandable and enforceable but, to determine whether or not there has been a Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents. The RTC, however, dismissed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any their petition on the grounds that the (1) petitioners have no locus standi to file a case as
branch or instrumentality of the government. Thus, the court has the duty to take they are not party to the contract and (2) that the controversy is in the nature of a political
cognizance of allegations of grave abuse of discretion in this case, involving the sale by question, thus, the court cannot take cognizance of it.
PSALM of a power plant, which supposedly contravenes the policy on competitive public
bidding. ISSUES:
Whether or not the controversy is in the nature of a political question.
Yes. Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter
of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, RULING:
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is No, the controversy is not a political question but a justiciable one.
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest." When the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. The

6
A political question is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their incidences of "fish kill"32 observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And
sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the executive branch of the government to which they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because
full discretionary authority has been delegated. public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the
issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
A justiciable question on the other hand, calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies wherein there are rights involved which are legally demandable and Respondents contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals have no legal standing to
enforceable. It is one which is proper to be examined or decided in courts of justice file the present petition and that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the
because its determination would not involve an encroachment upon the legislative or various laws cited in the petitions.
executive power.
ISSUES:
In simple terms, a political question refers to the wisdom, while a justiciable question refers Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing
to the legality of the acts complained of. Whether or not President Arroyo may be impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner.
Whether or not SC-46 is unconstitutional.
The issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the acts
complained of. Thus, the Supreme Court found the instant controversy within the ambit of RULING:
judicial review. Besides, even if the issues were political in nature, it would still come within No. In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the
their powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon them by Section 1, Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as
Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave real parties in interest.
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government. SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
G.R. NO. 180771 environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which
APRIL 21, 2015 shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. REYES all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
FACTS: general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
This is a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin
respondents from implementing Service Contract 46 (SC-46) and to have it nullified for There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and
willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution, which allowed the exploration, feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric
development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for
passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed
to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology
Petitioners collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the for themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living things.
toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters
in and around the Tañon Strait allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging No. A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be
that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations." Also impleaded as an unwilling
co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and SECTION 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be
stated in the complaint.
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon
Strait, petitioners aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the
catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic action but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through
survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the summons or other court processes. Petitioners should not take it upon themselves to simply
fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish imp lead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. The unwilling party's name cannot
catch" to the destruction of the "payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent. This places the
"artificial reef."31 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the

7
unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied due process, as such would be a denial of however, FPIC denied the incurrence of liability by shifting the blame on the construction
due process. activities on the roads surrounding West Tower.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co- On November 15, 2010, the West Tower Condominium Corporation interposed the
equal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce present petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West
policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by Tower and also in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal,
petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the Makati City. West Tower Corp. also contends that it is joined by the civil society and other
contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case. people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who all
have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the gravity of the environmental
SC-46 is unconstitutional because it violates Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution. issues that are at play.

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other ISSUES
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest; and
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or rehabilitate the affected environment.
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable RULING
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action
limit of the grant. must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. In other words,
the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino invoke the... jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially
citizens. ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest.
G.R. NO. 194239 In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the
JUNE 16, 2015 condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their
WEST PHILIPPINE CORPORATION v. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical
CORPORATION power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still
not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of
FACTS: West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
Before the Court is the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan filed following the There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its
leak in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition.
City. The respondent FPIC, has operated two pipelines since 1969, namely, the White Oil While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as
Pipeline System (WOPL) and the Black Oil Pipeline System (BOPL). The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the
instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and
However in May 2010, a leakage was suspected from the pipelines after some deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or...
residents of the West Tower Condominium (West Tower) began to smell gas within the users.
premises of the condominium. The petitioner FPIC, initially disowned any possible leak from Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of
its oil pipeline. juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines,
Subsequently on October 29, 2010, FPIC finally admitted that the source of the Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc.,
aforementioned leak is the WOPL, which has already been closed back in October 24, 2010, Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati
Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners

8
in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the
adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution. resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan government agencies and FPIC.
under Sec. 1, Rule 7[45] of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the
require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental... disaster. The rule clearly Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014
allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations
a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.Thus, as parties to of... the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests
the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court, proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results
including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC
on the WOPL. Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of to resume the... operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a
contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards the finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is
substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other recommendations irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of
of the CA, with a few... modifications. the WOPL may be... ordered.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance
the WOPL’s Commercial Viability with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that
To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL’s...
into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited
regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL. Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) the resumption of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the
regular cleaning scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) DOE of its proposed activities and timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming
tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years; from the DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial
(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the
also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely
leak tightness test, also known as segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d) through a... short-form integrity audit,[56] that the factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can
inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f) be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural integrity has not yet been
Pandacan segment replacement.[47] Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution.
the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI... inspections through Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to
magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.
pipeline and check it for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and G.R. NO. L-21450
insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, APRIL 15, 1968
considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY et al.
system is free... from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that
FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial FACTS:
operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of On July 19, 1948, barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as
the adoption by FPIC of... the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the the Judiciary Act of 1948, the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil
entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and Case No. R-660 in the CFI of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated. Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1, 908, with legal interest thereon from the date
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs.
FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed
it proper to require said certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against
case... requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond
other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the
pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, Surety, on the 31st of the same month. After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court
DOE Secretary Carlos rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and
executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the

9
defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of office. Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM
of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office.
the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount ISSUE:
due under the judgment. In the case at bar, can the Supreme Court exercise its power of judicial review?

ISSUE: RULING:
Whether or not the CFI of Cebu had jurisdiction over the case at bar because of No. The Court can only exercise its power of judicial review if the following requisites are
the Judiciary Act of 1948. - NO present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal
and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)
RULING: recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
True that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by question is the lis mota of the case.
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the
case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, we are of the In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents' appointments is not the lis
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of
the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition -
a quo warranto against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, action for quo warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take respondents is rendered completely unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according and/or prohibition does not alter the essential character of the petitioner's action since he
to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It does not even allege that he has a personal and substantial interest in raising the
failed to do so. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are concerned.
that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in Furthermore, the requisite for a cause of action does not exist, for the following reasons:
the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only On the nature of the petitioner’s appointment:
patent but revolting. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such A staggered term of office is not inconsistent with an acting appointment;
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. It was further said that the question R.A. No. 6975 does not prohibit the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in
whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties filling up vacancies in the NAPOLCOM;
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because The petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was permanently appointed; and
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy. On the right of the petitioner to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent
Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner:
G.R. NO. 191560
MARCH 29, 2011 An acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee.
GENERAL v. URRO
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
FACTS:
G.R. NO. 170139
Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, and Certiorari AUGUST 05, 2014
and/or Prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCIES. V. JOY CABILES
(TRO) and/or preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Luis Mario General The petitioner seeks to
declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de Guzman FACTS:
and Eduardo U. Escueta as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
and to prohibit then Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Department of Interior and agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
Local Government (DILG) Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the respondents' oath application for a quality control job in Taiwan.

10
Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a one year employment contract Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due
for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling
her to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract. Joy change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent. The Court
was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice,
that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her G.R. No. 217456
salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation." Joy claims NOVEMBER 24, 2015
that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of MARILOU S. LAUDE et al. vs. HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE et al.
NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission FACTS:
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. She asked for On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the Celzone Lodge on
the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph
salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as Scott Pemberton (Pemberton).
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against On October 15, 2014, a Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S.
petitioner and Wacoal. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed Labor Arbiter’s Laude, against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor.
decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the On October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general
reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees. headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

ISSUE: A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014. Pemberton
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal surrendered personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde (Judge Ginez-Jabalde) on
dismissal. December 19, 2014, and he was then arraigned. On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed
an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
RULING: Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage.
Yes. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary
should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment On December 23, 2014, respondent judge denied petitioners' Urgent Motion for lack of
contract. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this merit. Petitioners argue that the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is an assertion of their
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and right to access to justice as recognized by international law and the 1987 Constitution
substantive due process. A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a
law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; ISSUE:
it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.” The Court said that they are aware that Whether or not it is unconstitutional for the Courts to refuse to put Pemberton in the
the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” custody of Philippine jail authorities. - NO
was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010. RULING:
The VFA "grants primary jurisdiction to Philippine authorities", in this case, Pemberton's
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government handover specifically to the Olongapo City Jail is unnecessary. Nothing in the Constitution
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the prohibits agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction
existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of
any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to
with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent enter another State's territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines
with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared Applying the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g.,
reverse conclusion. The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA. It is clear that

11
the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and HELD:
detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover NO. Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is not unconstitutional. Petitioner anchors his challenge on
detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in the belief that because the
carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention Ombudsman and the deputies have the same rank and salary as the chairman and the
shall be "by Philippine authorities. The VFA does not specify the place of an accused members of the constitutional commissions, their term of office, following the Court’s
American personnel's confinement. The issue of custody is thus "best left to the discretion disquisition in Gaminde case, shall always be seven years counted from 2 February 1987
of the trial court. In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing trial, in Camp and seven years thereafter, and not the full term of seven years. However, the Office of the
Aguinaldo. As long as the present arrangement neither renders it difficult for Pemberton to Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission. A commission is defined as “a board or
appear in court when he is required nor impairs Judge Ginez-Jabalde's authority to try the committee officially appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain
case, the trial court may validly decide for Pemberton to remain where he currently is. jurisdiction of a public nature or relation.” Office of the Ombudsman, albeit composed of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of Ombudsman to be known as Tanod bayan, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, the
grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. Deputy for the Visayas, the Deputy for Mindanao, the Deputy for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Office (MOLEO), and the Special Prosecutor, is not a collegial body. The
G.R. NO. 232131 Ombudsman and the deputies do not resolve cases by a majority of all its members but
APRIL 24, 2018 rather are confined within the sphere of their respective jurisdiction.
IFURUNG VS. CARPIO-MORALES
Additionally, the constitutional commissions observe the appointment in regular rotational
FACTS: plan which is seven, five and three years which cannot apply to the Office of the
On July 25, 2011, Conchita Carpio Morales was appointed to a seven-year term following Ombudsman because the Ombudsman and the deputies do not make a collegial body thus,
the resignation of then-ombudsman Merceditas Guiterrez who resigned on May 6,2011 to making it implausible to apply the regular rotation or cycle in its membership. The
avoid impeachment trial in the Senate over allegations of incompetence and inaction on Ombudsman and the deputies, in contrast to the constitutional commissions, do not decide
various cases. Merceditas Guttierez left an unexpired term until November 30,2011. by a majority vote of all its members any cause or matter brought before the Office of the
Ombudsman. To stress, the Ombudsman and the deputies have their respective jurisdiction;
Ifurung argued that Respondent Morales and her deputies must vacate their post for hence, they could not have common responsibility relative to the discharge of their separate
supposedly overstaying as they must serve only the unexpired term of their predecessor. He and distinct functions.
alleges that Sec. 8 (3), in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A No. 6770 also known as the Ombudsman
due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman ISSUE ON TRANSGRESSION. Sec 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with Sec. 11, Art. XI of
and his deputies, the newly appointed Ombudsman and his deputies shall be appointed to a the 1987 Constitution.
full term of seven years, contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution. He avers that like all constitutionally created positions, i.e., President, Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the ombudsman and his Deputies
Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and Members of the shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional
Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during
Commission on Audit (COA), the successor to the positions of the Ombudsman and deputies term of office.
should serve only the unexpired term of the predecessor. Hence, petitioner insists that the
incumbent Ombudsman and deputies have been overstaying in their present positions for In Sec. 10, Art. XI, the undeniable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to
more than two years considering that their terms have expired on 1 February 2015. “To provide that the rank and salary of the Ombudsman and his deputies shall be the same as
allow them to stay in the said positions one day longer constitutes a continuing affront to that of the chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional commissions and does
the 1987 Constitution, unduly clips presidential prerogatives, and deprives the nation of the not include the “term of office”.
services of legitimate Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman.”
While Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman and his
ISSUES: Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be
Whether Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of RA 6770 also known as Ombudsman Act of 1989 qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from
is unconstitutional for being outright transgression of Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 8 and 10 of office. The quoted provision of the Constitution is clear and explicit; (a) the Ombudsman
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution; and and the deputies shall serve the term of seven years; (b) that the Ombudsman and the
deputies shall not be reappointed; and (c) the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not run
Whether all individual respondents should be declared as de facto Ombudsman and for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. Sec. 11,
Deputies Ombudsman as all these positions are vacant. Art. XI by itself is clear and can stand on its own. Notably, the framers plainly provided for a
seven-year term of the Ombudsman and the deputies. For sure, nowhere in the Constitution

12
can it be gathered that the appointment to any vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and Petitioners then pray that the provisions they have challenged be declared null and
the deputies shall be only for the unexpired term of predecessor. This can only mean that it void for being violative of the Constitution.
was the intent of the framers that the appointment to the positions of the Ombudsman and
the deputies, whether it be for the expired or unexpired term of the predecessor, shall ISSUE:
always be for a full term of seven years. Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that in case of Whether or not the Courts have jurisdiction over the case at bar provided that the
death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the Ombudsman, the new petitioner’s case falls clearly within the primary jurisdiction of COMELEC as provided for in
Ombudsman shall be appointed for a full term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3), R.A., No. 6770 is section 2 Article XII- C of the Constitution.
consistent with Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution in so far as it provides that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve for a term of seven years. RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Courts have discretion in the matter specifically
NO. To summarize, pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is only as to the on the adherence to the strict procedural standards, citing the cases of Tinio v. Mina (26
rank and salary that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same with the chairman SCRA 512 of 1968), Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 OF 1970), and Gonzales v. COMELEC (27
and members, respectively, of the constitutional commissions. Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI SCRA 835 of 1969) for reasons of paramount public interest involved and the proximity of
of the 1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy for the positions of the elections.
Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a result of the expiration of the term or death,
resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the successor shall always The Supreme Court also held that there is clear invalidity of the questioned
be appointed for a full term of seven years. provisions. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.
Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared
term office of the first appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2 invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.
February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their date of appointment.
612 SCRA 193
Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full term of seven years 2010
from their date of appointment unless their term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT
or permanent disability. Petition is dismissed. SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES

G.R. NO. L – 52245 FACTS:

JANUARY 22, 1980 The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned
DUMLAO v. COMELEC or controlled corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court.
The said provision states:
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
respondent COMELEC specifically questioning the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local
52 section 4 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process laid government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
down by the Constitution. independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees.

Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of However, all court actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the provincial, city
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. He or municipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991
alleges that the mentioned provisions are directed insidiously against him, and that the shall be exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees.
classification provided therein is based on “purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation.” The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):

On the other hand, petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr., both taxpayers and SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the
registered voters, also assail the validity of specific provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved
52, and 53 regarding prohibition of candidacy of a person convicted of a crime and and maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits
accreditation of some political parties by COMELEC. under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the
GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency
of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act.

13
Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues of legal fees does not take away the capacity of the GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a
including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, means by which that capacity may be implemented.
fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, modified by Congress.
superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.
G.R. NO. 224302
The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings NOVEMBER 29, 2016; FEBRUARY 21, 2017; AND AUGUST 8, 2017
instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, JUDGE PHILIP AGUINALDO V. PRESIDENT BENIGNO AQUINO
charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39. The GSIS further contends that the right of
government workers to social security is an aspect of social justice. The Court has the FACTS:
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special
rights, including the right to social security, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to court called the Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges
promulgate such rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Court to recognize and allow the to be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
exercise of the right of the GSIS "to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers
legal fees." and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations.

President Marcos also issued Presidential Decree No. 1606, which elevated the rank of
ISSUE: the members of the Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the
Whether or not the Congress may exempt the Government Service Insurance System Justices of the Court of Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three
(GSIS) from legal fees imposed by the Court. divisions of three Justices each. Republic Act No. 7975 was approved into law a few months
later and it increased the composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices
RULING: who would sit in five divisions of three members each. Republic Act No. 10660, recently
No. The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption enacted on April 16, 2015, created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three
of the GSIS under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions. On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and
Effectively, the GSIS wants this Court to recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted
modify a rule of procedure promulgated by the Court. However, the Constitution and on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or recommendations for the
jurisprudence do not sanction such view. six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. After screening and
selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in six
The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015.
essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take The nominees were grouped into several lists like for 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st with
away a right but simply operates as a means to implement an existing right. In particular, it five (5) nominees for each group. President Aquino appointed justices to the vacant
pertains to the procedural requirement of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a positions, but he did not pick the appointees from the groups concerned but instead he
pleading or any application that initiates an action or proceeding. appointed justices from one group to another position. Petitioners who were listed in the
group for the 17th Justice questioned the appointments. They contended that the President
The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in could only choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists for each specific
support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct vacancy and no other and the appointment made in digression of this procedure is a
from that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, violation of the Constitution.
powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. Its capacity to
sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power which involves the The JBC successively filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition
exemption that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members. Indeed, even of the Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
the GSIS acknowledges that, in claiming exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017. The Court, in a Resolution
asking that rules be made to enforce the right to social security of its members but that the dated February 21, 2017, denied both Motions.
Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS "to seek relief from the courts of justice sans
payment of legal fees." However, the alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The payment On November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc declared the group of nominees by the
Judicial and Bar Council unconstitutional, and the appointments of respondents Associate

14
Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four that, the Court inspected the constitutional provision that states the composition of the
other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as valid. Judicial Bar Council, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: In Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines states that a
Whether or not the grouping done by the Judicial Bar Council is constitutional Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
RULING: representative of Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
The Court settles to deny for the lack of merit in regards to the Motion for professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
Reconsideration of the Resolution and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the private sector.
Resolution of the Judicial and Bar Council dated February 21, 2017.
With this analysis, the Court, in a decision dated July 17, 2012, announced the
The power to approve of the Judicial Bar Council cannot be used to limit the practice of having two representatives from Congress with one vote each in the Judicial Bar
President's power to appoint as the latest entitlement to choose someone whom he/she Council unconstitutional. The Court expressed that the use of the singular letter "a" before
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still important. Moreover, as "representative of the Congress" in the aforementioned provision is unambiguous and
long as the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC until the end, the concludes no place for any other construction or interpretation. The same is expressive of
appointment is valid. President Aquino was not required to appoint one new Sandiganbayan the framers' intent that Congress may designate only one representative to the Judicial Bar
Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the Council.
group of nominees into the six shortlists intrude on President Aquino's power to appoint
members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for In light of Chavez case, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational
the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. representation, which the House of Representatives will represent Congress from January to
June and the Senate from July to December. This is now the current practice in the JBC.
President Aquino validly exercised his optional power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he ignored the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the On December 2016, petitioner Reynaldo Umali, the Chairman of the House of
different vacancies. Such act did not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution Representatives, cast his votes for the selection of of Supreme Court Justices. With him
which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by being from the House of Representatives, his votes were not counted by the Judicial Bar
the JBC for every vacancy. Council.

The President is not required by the clustering or grouping of nominees by the JBC ISSUES:
and may consider as one the separate shortlists of nominees simultaneously submitted by Whether or not the on-going practice of the Judicial Bar Council in allowing only one
the JBC. The requirements and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and member of Congress to represent the department during deliberations is unconstitutional
responsibilities are the same for all the vacant posts in a collegiate court; and if an Is this six-month rotational representation in the Judicial Bar Council constitutional? Does it
individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also qualified for all the debilitate the bicameral system of Congress?
other vacancies.
RULING
G.R. No. 228628 No. The Judicial Bar Council is just following the provisions stated clearly in Section 8
JULY 25, 2017 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Chavez case.
UMALI V JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL
The Court ruled that the Judicial Bar Council’s action was ministerial in function,
FACTS: considered that Judicial Bar Council did not act with any decision. The Judicial Bar Council is
Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on merely performing in an authorized manner. Or else, that would be a voluntary act.
Justice, questions the current practice of six-month rotational representation of Congress in Moreover, the petition is rendered moot as the two recently vacated Associate Justice
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unjustly denies both Houses of Congress of their full positions that have already been occupied.
participation. The said practice was approved by the JBC in light of the ruling in Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council. The six-month rotational representation in the Judicial Bar Council is constitutional. It
does not debilitate the Congress itself. As a result, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
As an overview, in that case, the constitutionality of the practice of having two
representatives from both houses of Congress with one vote each in the Judicial Bar Before going into the above-stated issues, the Court distinguished that the petition
Council, consequently, increasing its membership from seven to eight, was dared. With was essentially filed because of the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in the Judicial Bar

15
Council En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 held for the purpose of settling demand letters were subsequently sent to MOELCI. David then filed a complaint for specific
who will be the possible replacement of the said retiring Associate Justices of the Supreme performance with damages in the RTC.
Court Perez and Brion, whose retirements were set on December 14 and 29, 2016,
respectively. ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale.
As a rule, courts do not provide moot questions considering that all the arguments Whether or not there was a delivery that consummated the contract.
that once again boil down to the proper interpretation of the 1987 Constitution on
congressional representation in the Judicial Bar Council, mootness cannot put an end to the RULING:
petition. Yes, Rada and Jimenez signed a contract as “Conforme”, there was consent on part of
David to transfer the ownership of the transformer to MOELCI in exchange for the price.
Therefore, this Court resolves the issues in seriatim. The legal standing of each The document though appearing to be a mere proposal is not what it seemed. The contract
member of Congress is clear that each member has a legal standing or locus standi to sue is considered a perfected contract of sale not a contract to sell.
even without an enabling resolution. Moreover, the precedent case of Chavez continues to
guide the bench in keeping with the requirement to maintain stability in the law. The Yes, MOELCI, arguing that there was no delivery stated that the bill of lading though
doctrine is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and stamped “released” was not conclusive since there was no indication that the goods were
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. released to MOELCI. CA affirmed that there was no delivery indeed but the SC disagrees,
MOELCI thru Engr. Rada agreed to the proposal of David regarding the payment of freight.
In this case of Chavez, it cannot simply be regarded as an incorrect application of In the case of Behn, Meyer & Co. v Yangco it is pointed out that specification in a contract
the questioned constitutional provision for it just applies the clear mandate of the law, that regarding payment of freight can be taken to indicate the intention of the parties with
is, Congress is entitled to only one representative in the Judicial Bar Council in the same regards to the place of delivery. For this reason, if the buyer is to pay the freight it is
way that its co-equal branches are. reasonable to conclude that upon the point of shipment the ownership is transferred to the
buyer. There is enough conclusive evidence that the goods were delivered.
As the Court stated in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
is clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous. Therefore, it needs no further construction or G.R. NO. 176951
interpretation. In the rules of statutory construction, it has been repeatedly declared by this NOVEMBER 18, 2008
Court that where the law speaks in clear and explicit language, there is no room for LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC
interpretation, only application.
FACTS:
G.R. NO. 194785 In an effort to restrain the “mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities to secure a
JULY 11, 2012 larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite municipalities being incapable of
DAVID V. MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. fiscal independence, the Congress enacted into law RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. The law was enacted during the 12th Congress, the law provides
FACTS: that the annual requirement income for conversion of a municipality into a city would be
VSD Electric Sales with office located in Ozamis City, is a company engaged in supplying P100 million from P20 million. Before the enactment of RA 9009, there were 57
electrical hardware including transformers for rural electric cooperatives like MOELCI. In municipalities with cityhood bills pending wherein the Congress enacted into law converting
Quezon City, the proprietor Virgilio S. David met with MOELCI’s General Manage, Engr. 33 municipalities into cities. Of the 24 municipalities, 16 municipalities through their
Reynaldo Rada, to solve MOELCI’s power shortage problem wherein David agreed to supply respective sponsors pleaded for the exemption of the said municipalities from RA 9009
the 10 MVA power transformer. Engr. Rada and Director Jose Jimenez, in-charge of wherein the cityhood bills lapsed into law after the Presidents non-action. Petitioners filed
procurement, returned to Manila to present the board resolution affirming the purchase of the petition stating that RA 9009 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as
the said transformer. David, in exchange had a proposal which he would usually give to his the violation of equal protection clause.
clients, the transformer together with its accessories, valued at P5,200,000.00 would be
shipped and the costs would be shouldered by the buyer, it is also stipulated that 50% ISSUE:
should be paid as down payment and the balance be paid after delivery, wherein Engr. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the Constitution and the equal protection clause.
Rada and Director Jimenez agreed. The Board Resolution however stated that the
transformer be financed by the National Electrification Administration but there was no RULING:
immediate action, Engr. Rada then requested David to deliver the transformer without the Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and equal protection clause. It is
down payment, wherein David agreed provided that MOELCI would pay interest at 24% per stated in the Constitution that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria
annum, also stated in the bill of lading. After no payment was made after several months, established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. Congress should follow

16
the Local Government Code, all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into city. Cityhood Laws, as enacted by the Congress is a clear Further, RTC branch 5 ordered the return of all amounts paid by respondent Colon
violation of the Constitution. Heritage to FDCP by way of amusement tax as sections 13 and 14 were already declared as
unconstitutional, subscribing to the rule that an “unconstitutional act is not a law, and it
G.R. NO. 203754 confers norights, it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
JUNE 16, 2015 inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.” But according to the doctrine of operative
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL v. COLON HERITAGE REALTY fact, the mere existence of a statute before it was rendered unconstitutional is an operative
fact and that its legal effects and consequences cannot just be ignored. Such amounts were
FACTS: already remitted to FDCP before RA 9167 was declared unconstitutional, thus, the Court did
These are consolidated petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the not order such refund in its modified decision. Additionally, cinema proprietors who failed to
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decisions of Regional Trial Court Branches 5 and remit said amusement taxes to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of finality of the Decision
14. are obliged to remit the same, without surcharges, to petitioner FDCP under the doctrine of
operative fact.
RA 9167 created the Film Development Council of the Philippines, with its sections 13 and
14 containing provisions involving tax treatment of films graded “A” or “B.” The said G.R. NO. 171101
provisions awards privileges to producers who are graded “A” or “B” on the films that they NOVEMBER 22, 2011
produced. The privileges granted are “equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and HACIENDA LUISITA v. PARC
collected on said graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines.” These were to be collected FACTS:
as amusement taxes by the Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP), who, in The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco) acquired a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-
turn, shall award them to the producers. industrial-residential (Hacienda Luisita) located in Tarlac from Compañia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In order that Tadeco pay in full the purchase price, the
This law was then assailed as its sections 13 and 14 was “contrary to basic policy GSIS extended loan with the condition that the corporation shal subdivide the lots and
in local autonomy that all taxes, fees, and charges imposed by the LGUs shall accrue distributed to tenants at cost. As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase
exclusively to them,” according to Article X, section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, as the funds price for the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita. On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration
raised and collected by Cebu City are then transferred to FDCP and are awarded to private filed a suit before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Tadeco, et al., for them to
persons. surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR, now the
Department of Agrarian Reform [DAR]) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at
ISSUE: cost. Respondent, Tadeco or its owners alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have
Whether or not RTC branches 5 and 14 gravely erred in their decisions declaring tenants, besides which sugar lands––of which the hacienda consisted––are not covered by
sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid for being unconstitutional. existing agrarian reform legislations. As perceived then, the government commenced the
case against Tadeco as a political message to the family of the late Benigno Aquino, Jr.
RULING: Eventually, the Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda
The decisions of RTC branches 5 and 14 on ruling sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).On July 22,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. 1987 after the ouster of the Marcos regime, Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) as
the highest policy-making body that formulates all policies, rules, and regulations necessary
With RTC branch 5 rendering RA 9167 as void in its entirety, it could be disputed for the implementation of CARP was established under the government of President
that if a part of the law is viewed to be invalid because of its unconstitutionality, and the Corazon C. Aquino. The appealed case was dismissed with the condition that TADECO shall
rest of the law is not declared as such, then it should remain in force and effect if this said obtain Stock Distribution Plan for corporate landowners. To comply to such condition
law contains a separability clause, and in this case, RA 9167 has. TADECO organized a spin-off corporation, Hacienda Luisita Incorporated (HCI) to facilitate
the stock distribution plan. On May 11, 1989, the Stock Distribution Option Agreement
Moreover, upon inspection of the other provisions of RA 9167, with the exclusion (SDOA), styled as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered into by Tadeco, HLI,
of sections 13 and 14, the said law can stand alone and are not mutually dependent on the and the 5,848 qualified Farm-workers Beneficiaries (FWBs).The SDOA was approved by
said excluded provisions. The separability clause is then applicable. Furthermore, the PARC. Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75
remaining provisions can survive on their own and that they “mandate other matters like a hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita. In effect the FWBs are part
cinema evaluation system, an incentive and reward system, and local and international film owners of this lot that are owned by the corporation as stockholders. The issue arises when
festivals and activities” all for the promotion of the local film industry and the patronage and HLI disposed 300 hectares in the name of LIPCO and RCBC. Two petitions was filed by
furtherance of Filipino talent. herein private respondents to the DAR revoking the SDOA approved by PARC on the ground

17
that HLI violated the rationale of the SDOA’s terms. The Secretary of DAR recommended to
the PARC the revocation of the SDOA of HLI. PARC revoked the SDOA through the assailed In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and
Resolution No. 2005-32-01. capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also
stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of
ISSUE: the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS PARC AND SECRETARY PANGANDAMAN HAVE (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file
JURISDICTION, POWER AND/OR AUTHORITY TO NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE OR RESCIND employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner
THE SDOA. concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law,
WHETHER OR NOT SEC. 31 OF RA 6657 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL respondents’ implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except
HELD: through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 the authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.
corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC
also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal
that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony
PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, with other provisions of the same law, such as “fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP,”
is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic and the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish professionalism and excellence at all
postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed. levels in accordance with sound principles of management.”
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon
the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity
when the following essential requirements are first met, to wit: of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and
(1) there is an actual case or controversy; real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
party or one with locus standi; and national government.
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar. ISSUE:
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality will not Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of
be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate the constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”
case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional RULING:
question should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the
constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made constitutional infirmities. Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored. classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class. That the provision was a product of
G.R. NO. 148208 amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its
DECEMBER 15, 2004 validity.
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. The enactment, however, of subsequent laws - exempting all other rank-and-file employees
of gfis from the ssl - renders the continued application of the challenged provision a
FACTS: violation of the equal protection clause.
The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power, we hold
respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs
7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. A statute valid at one time may become

18
void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical and thumbmarks of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) on the
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former envelope containing them; (5) one ER lacks the name and signature of the poll clerk on the
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. second page thereof; (6) one ER lacks the number of votes in words and figures; and (7)
four ERs were prepared under duress and intimidation.
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. On 13 May 2004, the MBOC overruled petitioner objections and included the disputed ERs in
Esteban upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation the canvassing of votes. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC the unfavorable ruling of the
being a valid exercise by the State of its police power - but also ruled that the continued MBOC on his objections to the ERs in question. His appeal was docketed as SPC Case No.
enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the 04-087 and was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
subsequent changes in the country’s business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was
set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the Despite the pendency of SPC Case No. 04-087 with the COMELEC First Division, the MBOC
oppression of the creditors. proclaimed respondent Muñoz as the winning candidate for municipal mayor of Camalig,
Albay, on 19 May 2004.
Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 =
consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso. The prior view on the On 21 May 2004, petitioner Baldo filed with the COMELEC a Petition seeking to annul, for
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between being premature, the proclamation of respondent Muñoz as the municipal mayor of
the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were Camalig, Albay. The Petition was docketed as SPC No. 04-124 and was again raffled to the
substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes. COMELEC First Division.

The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress ISSUE/S:
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. 1.) Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack and excess of its
The challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised jurisdiction when it affirmed the assailed rulings of public respondent MBOC in the 26
precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of contested election returns for precinct nos. 99a, 93a, 175a, 106a, 95a, 127b, 40a/41a, 24a,
persons similarly situated. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality 8a, 57a, 6a/6b, 54a/54b, 141a, 71a/71b, 72a, 132a, 145a, 171a/171b, 39a, 112a,
but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and 137a,/133a, 19a, 44a, 154a, 47a, 86a; and 2.) Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue discretion amounting to lack and excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the inclusions of
preference cannot be allowed, for equal protection and security shall be given to every the said returns in the official tally, as the same are materially and fatally defective, which
person under circumstance which, if not identical are analogous. are proper grounds for a pre-proclamation controversy within the ambit of section 243 (b)
of the omnibus election code.
G.R. No. 176135
JUNE 16, 2009 RULING:
CARLOS IRWIN G. BALDO, JR. v. COMELEC 1.) NO. On 12 September 2006, the COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution in SPC No.
04-087: The appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the election returns
FACTS: for Precinct Nos. 127B, 40A/41A, 24A, 8A, 57A, 6A/6B, 54A/54B, 141A, 71A/71B, 72A, 19A,
A Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks the review of 44A, 154A. 47A, 86A, 132A, 145A, 171A,/171B, 39A, 112A, 137A/133A, 99A, 93A, 175A,
the Resolution dated 8 January 2007 of the COMELEC, affirming the Resolution dated 12 106A, 95A, which were either not included or which were temporarily tallied in a separate
September 2006 of the COMELEC First Division in SPC Case No. 04-087, which dismissed statement of votes and are hereby DIRECTED to be INCLUDED into the OFFICIAL TALLY in
the appeal, filed by the petitioner, of the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers order to determine the total number of votes actually received by the candidates for mayor
(MBOC) of Camalig, Albay, to include in the canvassing of votes the election returns (ERs) in the municipality.
objected to by petitioner.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Camalig, Albay is ORDERED to immediately convene
Petitioner and respondent Rommel Muñoz (Muñoz) were candidates for the position of with proper notice to the parties, for the purpose of including in the official canvass the
municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay in the 10 May 2004 local elections. At 6 p.m. of 10 May contested election returns and/or transferring into the official tally the results of the
2004, the MBOC convened to begin the canvass of the ERs. precincts which were temporarily tallied, compute the complete results from ALL the 134
precincts which functioned in Camalig, Albay, in the May 10, 2004 elections and forthwith
During the canvass proceedings on 11 May 2004, petitioner objected to the inclusion of 26 PROCLAIM the winning candidate for mayor of Camalig, Albay. Premises considered, the
ERs from various precincts based on the following grounds: (1) eight ERs lack inner seal; Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to AFFIRM the Resolution of the
(2) seven ERs lack material data; (3) one ER lacks signatures; (4) four ERs lack signatures Commission (First Division) with the MODIFICATION that the board of election inspectors

19
concerned in Precinct No. 127B be summoned by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Camalig, Albay, to complete the necessary data in the election returns of the said precinct. RULING:
The Court holds that the Regional Trial Court can take cognizance of the injunction
2.) Petition is DISMISSED for being MOOT. While the instant Petition is pending, national complaint, which “is a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant,
and local elections were held on 14 May 2007, and the winners therein assumed office by 1 perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance of a specific act, or
July 2007. In said elections, Baldo won and is now serving as the municipal mayor of his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act.”
Camalig, Albay. Therefore, the term of office for the seat of municipal mayor of Camalig,
Albay being contested had already expired on 30 June 2007, rendering the instant Petition It is the POEA which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
moot. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties pre-employment cases which are administrative in character involving or arising out of
or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a violations of recruitment regulations, or violations of conditions for the issuance of license to
moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to recruit workers. On the other hand, the remedy of an appeal/petition for review of an Order
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment issued by the POEA in the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction is lodged exclusively with the
thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be DOLE Secretary. However, nothing in EO 247 and the 2002 POEA Rules relied upon by the
enforced. Since the present Petition is grounded on Baldo’s specific objections to the 26 ERs Republic provides for the grant to a recruitment agency of an injunctive relief from the
in the previous local elections, no practical or useful purpose would be served by still immediate execution of penalties for serious offenses. Thus, they do not deprive the courts
passing on the merits thereof. of the power to entertain injunction petitions to stay the execution of a POEA Order
imposing such penalties.
G.R. NO. 198426
SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
REPUBLIC V. PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT G.R. NO. 178830
JULY 14, 2008
FACTS: SUPLICO v. NEDA
An Order of the POEA was issued to Principalia and Management Personnel
Consultants, Inc. (Principalia), a recruitment agency, because the POEA found out that they FACTS:
have collected from complainant Alejandro Ramos an excessive fee. It was thus declared to The Legal Service of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has
have violated the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, a serious offense which carries the informed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the Philippine Government’s decision
penalty of cancellation of license for the first offense. POEA immediately cancelled its not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project. That said, there is no
license based on POEA Rules. more justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to resolve. The public respondents
respectfully pray that the present petitions be dismissed.
Principalia then filed with the RTC of Mandaluyong City a Complaint for Injunction
with Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary The petitioners, in their respective replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. Principalia contended that the immediate cancellation not a sufficient basis that the deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo
of its license not only deprived it of due process but also jeopardized the deployment of that the petition has become moot, the Court may still take cognizance thereof to educate
hundreds of overseas Filipino workers. the bench and the bar. Further, because of the transcendental importance of the issues
raised, the Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.
In the meantime, Prinicipalia appealed with the Office of the Secretary of
Department of Labor and Employment.
ISSUES:
The POEA then filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss based on the grounds of Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President GMA.
lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies and forum-shopping. Whether or not Court take cognizance of the case despite its apparent mootness.
According to it, (1) it is DOLE Secretary and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over cases
assailing POEA Orders which direct the cancellation of license of a recruitment agency; (2) RULING:
assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction, Prinicipalia nevertheless failed to exhaust I. Under Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory for the Court to take judicial notice of the
administrative remedies since it failed to first seek recourse from the DOLE; and (3) official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our
Principalia committed forum-shopping when it also later appealed with the DOLE. government. It is further provided in rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the
foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation
ISSUE: by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of
Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the injunction case. October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive

20
department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of The Court is of the opinion that it has, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider
evidence. and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. The term “political question”
connotes, a question of policy. It refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution,
II. Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court Government.”
ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are
Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado. called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate,
as members of the SET, upon nomination by Senator Primicias, violates the constitutional
In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
to prevent the implementation of the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual nomination of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. This is
considerations. Except for the determination of whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
preliminary injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this petition do not call for a choice of members of the SET. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory provision. limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
because of mootness and because their resolution requires reception of evidence which therewith.
cannot be done in an original petition brought before the Supreme Court.
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC
G.R. NO. L-10520 JUNE 13, 2012
FEBRUARY 28, 1957 RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
TAÑADA V. CUENCO NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
FACTS: JUDICIARY
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate upon nomination of senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of
the Nacionalista Party (NP), chose senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano FACTS:
Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Then, upon nomination of In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine
petitioner Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets,
Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon the nomination of Senator Primicias on Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also
behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, chose respondents Cuenco and Delgado, requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the
an NP member, as members of the SET. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on
appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco and Delgado. government officials.

Petitioner prays, among others, that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued In her Letter, dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher- writer also of the PCIJ,
directed to respondents, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA),
hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the SET. for the same above-stated purpose.
Likewise, he prayed that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the
aforementioned public offices in the SET and that they be altogether excluded and making The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009. On the same
the preliminary injunction permanent. On the other hand, respondents, allege, by way of day, the Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the policy on
special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of requests for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend appropriate
jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the action on such requests.
SET.
On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-
ISSUE: Nazario submitted its Memorandum dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution dated
Whether or not the is a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction. November 16, 2009, recommending the creation of Committee on Public Disclosure that
would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
RULING: with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of
members of the Judiciary.

21
 Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis-à-vis the various requests made, the Court
Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of
Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed. Most are for the the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and
purpose of updating their database and using it as material for news and media in prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the
preparation for the 2013 elections. guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.

Pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court, upon The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit
recommendation of the OCA, issued its Resolution dated October 13, 2009, denying the motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and
subpoena duces tecum for the SALNs and personal documents of Justice Roland B. Jurado their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves
of the SB. The resolution also directed the Ombudsman to forward to the Court any with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The
complaint and/or derogatory report against Justice Roland B. Jurado, in consonance with moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s
the doctrine laid down in Caiobes v. Ombudsman. Upon compliance by the Ombudsman, responsibility and lookout. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the requests.
the Court, in its Resolution dated February 2, 2010, docketed this matter as a regular
administrative complaint. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE
ATTENDANCE OF COURT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER
ISSUE: THE SUBPOENAS OF FEB 10, 2012 AND THE VARIOUS LETTERS OF
Whether the court has a reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25, 2012,
Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary. FEBRUARY 14, 2012

RULING: FACTS:
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is relevant in the issue of public disclosure of SALN The Prosecution panel manifested in a compliance that it would present about 100
and other documents of public officials, viz: witnesses and almost thousands of documents to support matters internal to the court for
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be the impeachment proceedings of then Chief Justice Corona. Witnesses compelled to testify
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official in said matters include Justices, officials and employees of the Supreme Court.
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be Letters were sent to the Supreme Court requesting for the examination of records,
provided by law. issuance of the certified true copies of the rollos, agenda and minutes of the deliberations
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional provision, the of several decided cases for the impeachment complaint. Subpoena Ad Testificandum et
Court, in the landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., elucidated on the import of the Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum were also issued to the Clerk of Courts.
right to information in this wise:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the ISSUE:
people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within Whether or not the court is bound to comply with the manifestation of the
the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the Prosecution panel
inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of
those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office is a public HELD:
trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records "create a hierarchy
power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern of rights that protect certain confidential relationships over and above the public's
is denied evidentiary need or right to every man's evidence. Accordingly, certain information
Thus, while “public concern” like “public interest” eludes exact definition and has contained in the records of cases before the Supreme Court are considered confidential and
been said to embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, are exempt from disclosure. To reiterate, the need arises from the dictates of the integrity
either because such matters directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters of the Court's decision-making function which may be affected by the disclosure of
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, the Constitution itself, under Section 17, information. Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the
Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern disclosure of the result of the raffle of cases, the actions taken by the Court on each case
and interest. In other words, a “duty to disclose” sprang from the “right to know.” Both of included in the agenda of the Court's session, and the deliberations of the Members in court
constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, the sessions on cases and matters pending before it.
duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the
manner provided by law. Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication. Section 2, Rule
10 of the IRSC provides that court sessions are executive in character, with only the

22
Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to
disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by the due process.
Court.
ISSUE:
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence prohibiting the revelation of Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
confidential or "secret" information that causes damage to public interest even in judicial
and other proceedings such as the sui generis impeachment trial. As far as the Court is HELD:
concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings are duty-bound to observe NO. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-
the privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
of justice were to be preserved - i.e., not even Members of the Court, on their own and violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
without the consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters covered by the conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
prohibitions and exclusions, particularly with respect to matters pending resolution before certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
the Supreme Court. To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
to testify on matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions of the Court, in the penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application;
exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused,
situation where the testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
functions and duties.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
G.R. NO. 148560 used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do
NOVEMBER 19, 2001 we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to
FACTS: so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
On April 4, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
eight (8) separate Informations alleging then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada for the the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
violation of RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by
RA 7659. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
The petitioner (Joseph Estrada) then filed for an Omnibus Motion wherein he application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
raised that there’s a lack of preliminary investigation, there should be a respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and he should be given opportunity to prove targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
lack of probable cause. On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan, issued a Resolution finding discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants muscle.
for the arrest of the accused." And on June 25, 2001, petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Sandiganbayan. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is
obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these
The petitioner contends that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional on the grounds factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and
that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning
and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's
The petitioner also bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the

23
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e.,
that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

G.R. NO. 191002 The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
APRIL 20, 2010
DE CASTRO VS. JBC Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
FACTS: except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
These are consolidated cases which trace their genesis to the controversy that has therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010,
or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Article VIII, that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof"
from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
vacancy." fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of occurrence thereof.
the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the
office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution. framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement. Conformably with its reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
existing practice, the JBC "automatically considered" for the position of Chief Justice the five
most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
Nachura. easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its
list of nominees for the position due to the controversy now before us being yet unresolved. G.R. No. 202242
April 16, 2013
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme FACTS:
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article Petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article
VIII of the Constitution. VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the
JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress
ISSUE: with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement The exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive
prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. The Malolos
HELD: Constitution and the 1935 Constitution vested the power to appoint the members of the
YES. The prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Then, under the 1973 Constitution, with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers

24
in one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter
another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that
the condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
disqualifications. and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would
it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
the President. reliance upon a law creating it.

ISSUES: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit G.R. NO. 213181
of the 1987 Constitution. AUGUST 19. 2014
JARDELEZA vs SERENO
RULING:
Yes, the practice of JBC in performance of its functions runs counter to the letter and spirit FACTS:
of the 1987 Constitution. With the retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) the
Judicial Bar Council (JBC) announced the opening for application or recommendation for the
Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken vacated position.
"by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately." Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice- Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the Philippines wrote a letter to JBC nominating
President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Francis H. Jardeleza (petitioner), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said
Congress, voting separately." Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews.
by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." In
all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted incumbent JBC member, Justice Lagman, who informed him that during the meetings held
upon by its two Houses. on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno, manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014,
two (2) Houses. Whether in the exercise of its legislative or its non-legislative functions during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a state of
war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, and Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
impeachment, the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to
considering the interplay between these two Houses. compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice
vice Associate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in
Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him,
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the
Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in ISSUE:
furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. Whether or not the court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the
subject petion and certoriari; and whether or not petitioner Jardeleza may be included in
The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the the shortlist of nominees to submitted to the president
regular members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress. RULING:
The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case. Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was

25
given supervisory authority over it. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress,
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme ISSUE:
Court, and a representative of the private sector. This supervision is the power of oversight Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-
or authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional
However, the petitioner can only file for certoriari and not for mandamus.
Certiorari is proper remedy to question act of branch or instrumentality of government on RULING:
ground of grave abuse. The JBC’s five-year service requirement to apply to second-level courts is
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the constitutional.
application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
to due process. The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
power over the collective will of a majority. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
the JBC’s discretion in the selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" judiciary. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures
Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to
be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the The Court also noted on the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council or the JBC-009 Section 1,
shortlist submitted to the President Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides the Additional criteria for nomination to the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan stating that:
G.R. NO. 211833
APRIL 7, 2015 ”As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a judge of Regional
VILLANUEVA vs JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL Trial Court, except when he has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter
alia, impressive scholastic or educational record and performance in the Bar examinations,
FACTS: excellent reputation for honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least very
The petitioner, Ferdinand R. Villanueva, was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.”
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. He applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur. applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority
to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate.
However, the petitioner was not included in the list of candidates for the said
stations. The petitioner seek for reconsideration in his non-inclusion in the list of considered G.R. NO. 191002
applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature MARCH 17, 2010
examination. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
The decision excluding the name of the petitioner was upheld since the JBC's long-standing
policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, FACTS:
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since Multiple cases was field with the controversy from the forthcoming compulsory requirement
the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 which was seven days after the presidential
election. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions called for either the
The petitioner argued that (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or
RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year petition was filed for reconsideration of the March 17, 2010 decision, the said decision
requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of
Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato
Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557[5] S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the
should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that he incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec.

26
15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an
members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar
controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela Council (JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent
ruling. any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-
barred; and that respondent was and is a person of proven integrity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on ISSUES
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII? Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction to oust Sereno, an impeachable officer
through quo warranto.
RULING: Whether or not a sitting Chief Justice can only be removed by impeachment and not by quo
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by warranto.
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow Whether or not filing of SALNs bears no relation to the Constitutional qualification of
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a integrity.
rectification.
Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, RULINGS
insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self- Yes. Under the Sec. 5, Article VIII of the 19787 Constitution, the Supreme Court has an
contradiction at its worst. the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII authority to exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, ministers and consuls, and over petitions
construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Section 5 of Article
encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Had the framers intended to VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only to certain public officials or
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members that excludes impeachable officials therefrom.
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the Also, the Court cited the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the and Estrada v. Desierto whereas the Court assumed jurisdiction over a quo
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 warranto petition that challenged Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency which
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition clearly demonstrates that the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction extends to impeachable
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before officers.
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in
Thus, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality. paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge
of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable
G.R NO. 237428 officers. With this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the
MAY 28, 2018 Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
REPUBLIC vs. SERENO
This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over quo
FACTS warranto petitions. And as Estrada and the PET Rules show, impeachable officers are not
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno’s (respondent) Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration immune to quo warranto actions. Such privilege finds no justification either in law, as
of the Court's Decision dated May 11, 2018, the dispositive portion of which granting the impeachable officers are treated without distinction under the impeachment provisions of
Petition for Quo Warranto. Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is the Constitution, or in reason, as the qualifications of the Chief Justice are no less important
found disqualified from and is guilty of unlawfully holding and exercising the office of the than the President's or the Vice-President's.
Chief Justice. The Court disposed of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard
by an impartial tribunal. She reiterates that the six (6) Justices ought to have inhibited No. Although we have the Section 2 of the Article XII of the Constitution which read as:
themselves on the grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of disputed Sec 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
evidentiary facts, and of having acted as a material witness in the matter in controversy. Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
Respondent also argues denial of due process when the Court supposedly took notice of office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
extraneous matters as corroborative evidence and when the Court based its main Decision bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
on facts without observing the mandatory procedure for reception of evidence.

27
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. G.R. NO. 224302
The Section above however does not preclude a quo warranto action questioning NOVEMBER 29, 2016
an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. Lack of qualifications for HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
appointment or election is evidently not among the stated grounds for impeachment. It is,
however, a ground for a quo warranto action over which the Court was given original FACTS:
jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. RA No. 10660 was enacted on April 16, 2015, creating two more divisions of the
Furthermore, Section 2 of Article XI cannot be read in isolation from Section 5(1) Sandiganbayan with three justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions. On July
of Article VIII of the Constitution which gives this Court its quo warranto jurisdiction, or 20, 2015, the Judicial Bar and Council published in the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily
from Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Constitution which designates the Court as Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or
the sole judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President. recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate justice of the
The grant of jurisdiction was not confined to unimpeachable officers. In fact, under Sandiganbayan. After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President
Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII, this Court was expressly authorized to pass upon the Aquino six shorlists contained in six separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015.
qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Thus, the proscription against the
removal of public officers other than by impeachment does not apply to quo President Aquino issued on January 20, 1016 the appointment papers for the six new
warranto actions assailing the impeachable officer's eligibility for appointment or election. Sandiganbayan Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz; (3)
respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega; (5) Justice Karl B.
Determining title to the office on the basis of a public officer's qualifications is the Miranda; and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses. The appointment papers were transmitted on
function of quo warranto. For this reason, impeachment cannot be treated as a substitute January 25, 2016 to the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took their oaths of
for quo warranto. office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge.

Quo warranto should be available to question the validity of appointments Petitioners argued that the president violated Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
especially of impeachable officers since they occupy the upper echelons of government and for not appointing anyone from the shortlist submitted by the JBC for the vacancies.
are capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy.
ISSUE:
Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional remedy prescribed to Whether or not the President violated Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in
adjudicate and resolve questions relating to qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to appointing Justice Musngi and Econg as Associate Justices for the Sandiganbayan.
public office. There is nothing in our Constitution that says that impeachable officers are
immuned, exempted, or excluded from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be RULING:
determined therein is the status of an officer as such. No. The President did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the six vacancies for
No. SALN is not only a requirement under the law, but a positive duty required from every the Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
public officer or employee, first and foremost by the Constitution. provides that; “the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
Integrity, as what this Court has defined in the assailed Decision, in relation to a and Bar Council for every vacancy.”
judge's qualifications, should not be viewed separately from the institution he or she
represents. Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral standards and The president is not limited to appoint only from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by
obedience to laws and legislations. Integrity, at its minimum, entails compliance with the the JBC for each specific vacancy. It should be stressed that the power to recommend of
law. the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s
prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in
The SALN laws were passed in aid of the enforcement of the Constitutional duty to the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone
submit a declaration under oath of one's assets, liabilities, and net worth. Offenses against nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. The court finds herein that the President
the SALN laws are not ordinary offenses but violations of a duty which every public officer was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six
and employee owes to the State and the Constitution. shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six
shortlists encroached on President Aquino’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary from
The Court stated that violation of SALN laws, by itself, defeats any claim of all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of
integrity as it is inherently immoral to violate the will of the legislature and to violate the Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Constitution.

28
GR NO. 182926 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
JUNE 22, 2015 offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
NAVAJA v DE CASTRO within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
FACTS: committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent DKT with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it. committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment on the ground G.R. No. 217126-27
that none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document NOVEMBER 10, 2015
occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN V. COURT
case due to improper venue. OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.

ISSUE: FACTS:
Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over the instant During the first term (June 30, 2010 up to June 30, 2013) of Makati Mayor Jejomar
criminal case due to improper venue. Erwin Binay, Jr., he allegedly performed the following acts:

RULING: On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase III of the Makati
The petition lacks merit. Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and
Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in consequently, executed the corresponding contract on September 28, 2010, without the
Cebu City, is a question of fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is required publication and the lack of architectural design, and approved the release of funds
not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re- therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;
examination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial.26 In certain exceptional (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011; (3) P92,775,202. On February 25, 2011; (4)
cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues, viz: P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011; (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011; and (6)
P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;
When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase IV of the Makati
When there is grave abuse of discretion; Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; contract on August 18, 2011, without the required publication and the lack of architectural
When the findings of facts are conflicting; design, and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1)
When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11; (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011; (3)
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011; (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012; and (5)
When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court; P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;
When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase V of the Makati
When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding
are not disputed by the respondent; contract on September 13, 2012, without the required publication and the lack of
When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and architectural design, and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of
contradicted by the evidence on record; or P32,398,220.05 and P30,582,629.30 on December 20, 2012.
When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, He was re-elected as Mayor of Makati City during the May, 2013 elections.
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas
"Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present. officers and employees of the City Government of Makati accusing them of Plunder and
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction

29
of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). RULING:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal The “Aguinaldo” or “Condonation” or “Forgiveness” doctrine, which condones the
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to administrative liability of an elected official for an act committed during his previous term by
conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary reason of his re-election, is hereby set aside since it is in violation of the accountability
complaint, if warranted. Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the provision of the Constitution. Section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them
with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Documents (OMB Cases).
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati. Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional
vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority
On March 10, 2015, a preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy.
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency
of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
of a public officer are present, finding that the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the
strong. Their continued stay in their respective offices give them access to public records Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the
and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and
prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. Consequently, the influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it
Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through an "independent" office. Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the
Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a
suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same. notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both
constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of accountability of public officers.
the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.
On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA- Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay, from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is
I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed
III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a or dismissed. This is the penalty. The CA Resolution which directed the issuance of the
second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos
the administrative cases against him moot and academic. . The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated April 6, 2015 granting Binay, nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly
Jr.'s prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction which further enjoined the implementation impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City
of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013. Moreover, the CA
suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos. observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr.
Hence, this petition by the Ombudsman. beyond his first term , Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on
the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, wherein the
ISSUE: condonation doctrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made after the
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION enjoining the implementation of the preventive executed before said re-election.
suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine. Condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an
offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense." The

30
condonation doctrine - which connotes complete extinguishment of liability is not based power. In the landmark case ofAngara v. Electoral Commission,Justice Jose P. Laurel
on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In
decided under the 1935 Constitution. In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was fact,Angarapointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government."
elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re- And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of
elected to the same position in 1955. As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
time, the Supreme Court resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the
matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional
provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct." Without
going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that: GR No. 160568
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove SEPTEMBER 15,2004
one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe. CSC V POBRE

Based on the 1987 Constitution the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal FACTS:
bases.To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former government official who retired from the
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 government service three times. On his third retirement, respondent Pobre claimed
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's payment of his terminal leave based on his highest monthly salary as PRC chairman but to
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by be reckoned from the date he first entered the government service as budget examiner in
the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective the defunct Budget Commission in 1958. He invoked Section 13 of Commonwealth Act 186.
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no Doubtful of the legality of the claim, successor PRC chairperson Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official sought the opinion of two constitutional commissions, petitioner CSC and the COA.
elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an Doubtful of the legality of the claim, successor PRC chairperson Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative sought the opinion of two constitutional commissions, petitioner CSC and the COA.
offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Respondent Pobre sought reconsideration of the above resolution. On February 19, 2002
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos. the CSC issued Resolution No. 02-0236 denying his motion, with the modification, however,
It must be pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court's abandonment of the that the computation of his terminal leave benefits should include his service as PRC
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial associate commissioner Dissatisfied with the resolution, respondent Pobre elevated the case
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review.
part of the legal system of the Philippines. In a decision dated March 31, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the resolutions of
petitioner CSC and declared that it was the COA, not petitioner CSC, which had jurisdiction
G.R. No. 191618 to adjudicate respondent Pobre’s claim for terminal leave benefits.
NOVEMBER 23, 2010
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction to pass upon the respondents claim?
FACTS:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral RULING:
Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the No. The respondent CSC’s stance, however, that it is the body empowered to
Constitution. determine the legality of claims on leave matters, to the exclusion of COA, is not well-taken.
While the implementation and enforcement of leave benefits are matters within the
ISSUE: functions of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government, the duty to
Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as members of the examine accounts and expenditures relating to leave benefits properly pertains to the COA.
presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the CSC cannot claim an
VIII of the 1987 Constitution exclusive domain simply because leave matters are also involved.

RULING: The COA, the CSC and the Commission on Elections are equally pre-eminent in their
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a respective spheres. Neither one may claim dominance over the others. In case of conflicting
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial

31
rulings, it is the Judiciary which interprets the meaning of the law and ascertains which view Code, the Chairman of COMELEC is vested with the power to make temporary assignments,
shall prevail. rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Law. In
the exercise of this power, the chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the
G.R. NO. 149036 COMELEC en banc. Matibag, having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting
APRIL 2, 2002 capacity, and not possessed of the necessary qualifications to hold the position of Director
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO IV, petitioner has no legal basis is claiming that her reassignment was contraty to the Civil
Service Law.
FACTS:
COMELEC appointed Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag as Acting Director IV of COMELEC’s The provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 requiring due notice and hearing
Education and Information Department (EID) on February 2, 1999 and was renewed on before any transfer or reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day,
February 15, 2001 in a temporary capacity. President Arroyo appointed, ad interim, refers only to COMELEC field personnel and not to head office personnel like Matibag. Under
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners on March 22, the Revised Administrative Code, the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically
2001 and each has a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. The ad vested with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. COMELEC Resolution No.
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were renewed on June 1, 2001, June 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should
8, 2001 and September 6, 2001. carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300
to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman issued a memorandum dated April 11, 2001 banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution
designating Velma J. Cinco, Director III of EID as Officer-in-Charge of EID and reassigning utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to
Matibag to the Law Department. Matibag requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second
Director IV of EID and her reassignment to the Law Department citing CSC Memo Circular approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
No. 7 dated April 10, 2001 reminding heads of government offices that transfer and detail The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or
of employees are prohibited during the election period from January 2 until June 13, 2001. reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayo’s order
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001 citing COMELEC reassigning Matibag from EID to the Law Department is legal and with authority.
Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000 stating as an exception to the election ban,
giving powers to the COMELEC Chairman to appoint, hire new employees or fill new G.R. NO. 158791
positions, when necessary in the effective performance of its mandated functions during the JULY 22, 2005
prohibited period. CSC VS. DBM

During the pendency of complaint before the Law Department, Magliba filed a FACTS:
petition at SC questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, The Civil Service Commission files for petition for mandamus with the Supreme
Borra and Tuason as chairman and commissioners of COMELEC. Magliba claims that the ad Court to compel the Department of Budget and Management to release the balance of its
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on budget for fiscal year 2002. CSC claims that its total allocations for its Central Office
the independence of COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments considering all fund sources amounts to P285,660,790.44. CSC only received
and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Magliba also assails as illegal her P279,853,398.14, leaving an unreleased appropriation of P5,807,392.30. CSC claims that
removal as Director IV of EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. such unreleased appropriation was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its “no
report, no release” policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their
ISSUE: submission of documents provided under NBC478 or the Guidelines on the Release of
Whether or not Benipayo’s removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of EID and FY2002 Funds.
her reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done
without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body? CSC contends that the “no report, no release” policy of DBM does not apply to
independent constitutional bodies because it violates the principle of fiscal autonomy. DBM
RULING: justifies that the delay in the release of CSC’s budget was not due to any failure on the
No, the removal from current position and reassignment of the petitioner is legal and with submission of required reports but due to shortfall in revenues.
authority.
ISSUE:
SC ruled that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman and has full authority to
exercise all the powers of that office for as long as his ad interim appointment remains Whether or not the “no report, no release” policy of DBM may not be validly
effective. Under Section 7(4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revised Administrative enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy?

32
 under Commonwealth Act 657 (June 21, 1941) or from the appointment of the first
RULING: Chairman (May 13, 1941).
YES, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy.
The point to be emphasized is that the terms of all Commissioners appointed under the
Enforcement of such violates Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution. Section 5 Constitution began at the same instant and that, in case of a belated appointment, like that
states that the commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall of Enage, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the
be automatically and regularly released. Automatic release of approved annual appointee must be counted against the latter. No other rule could satisfy the constitutional
appropriations to a constitutional commission vested with fiscal autonomy means that said plan.
funds must be given to such office without any condition. As for DBM’s contention of
withholding funds due to shortfall in revenues is not accepted. Section 63 of R.A. 9162 or Of the three starting dates given above, we incline to prefer that of the
GAA FY2002 generally allowed retention or reduction of appropriations for an office when organization of the constitutional Commission on Elections under C.A. 657, on June 21,
there is an unmanageable budget deficit, with the exception in Section 64 from such rate 1941, since said act implemented and completed the organization of the Commission that
the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there under the Constitution "shall be" established. Certainly the terms cannot begin from the first
was a revenue shortfall as DBM claimed, it could not withheld full release of appropriation appointments, because appointment to a Constitution office is not only a right, but equally a
without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of duty that should not be shirked or delayed (Art. IX-A Sec. 1).
FY2002 GAA.
On the basic tenets of our democratic institutions, it can hardly be conceded that the
G.R. NO. L-8684 appointing power should possess discretion to retard compliance with its constitutional duty
MARCH 31, 1955 to appoint when delay would impede or frustrate the plain intent of the fundamental law
REPUBLIC V. IMPERIAL (Art. IX-C Sec. 1(2)). Ordinarily, the operation of the Constitution cannot be made to
depend upon the Legislature or the Executive, but in the present case the generality of the
FACTS: organizational lines under Article X seems to envisage prospective implementation.
The Solicitor General instituted a quo warranto proceeding against Imperial and
Perez testing the legality of their continuance in office as Chairman and Member, The legal terms of office of the respondents Imperial and Perez have not as yet
respectively, of the Commission on Elections. expired thus the petition for quo warranto is hereby dismissed.

Upon the death of the Chairman De Vera on August 1951, respondent Imperial was G.R. No. 203833
appointed Chairman of the Commission to succeed the former provided that he was to MARCH 19, 2013
serve "for a term expiring July 1960". SEVILLA vs. COMELEC

Respondent Perez was appointed Member of the Commission on December 1949, for "a FACTS:
term of nine years expiring on November 1958" in succession of Member Enage upon Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
expiration of his term. Wherefore, the Solicitor General concludes that the respondents Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Commissioners Imperial and Perez have ceased to have any legal or valid title to the Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the
positions and their positions should be declared vacant. winner with a total of 7,354. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the
MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in
ISSUE: all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total number of the
Whether or not the reappointments and term of offices of the respondents are protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots.
valid.
Sevilla argues that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it entertained
RULING: So’s petition despite its loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a quo’s
The reappointments and term of offices of the respondents Imperial and Perez are dismissal order became final and executory due to So’s wrong choice of remedy. He also
valid. asserts that the dismissal of the election protest was proper.

It would be really immaterial whether the terms of the first Commissioners In his Comment, So contends that the petition was filed prematurely. He
appointed under the Constitutional provision should be held to start from the approval of emphasizes that the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc was not a majority
the constitutional amendment (December 2, 1940), the reorganization of the Commission decision considering that three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for
reconsideration and the three others voted to grant the same. So notes that the assailed

33
October 6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only by six (6) Commissioners because evaluation of the issues and arguments already on hand only by the members of the
the 7th Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President at that time. tribunal, without the participation of the parties.
Considering that the October 6, 2012 Resolution was not a majority decision by the
Comelec en banc, So prays for the dismissal of the petition so that it can be remanded to G.R. NO. 199082
the Comelec for a rehearing by a full and complete Commission. SEPTEMBER 18, 2012
ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ISSUE:
Whether or not the October 6, 2012 Resolution en banc was not a majority decision. FACTS:
Whether or not the Resolution should be remanded to the Comelec for a rehearing. On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
RULING: National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee and the
1). Yes. The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it Fact-Finding Team are composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec.
is not a majority decision required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "each Commission shall The Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14,
decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought before it within 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution." Pursuant to this were indeed perpetrated. Twenty-six (26) persons, including petitioners GMA and Abalos,
Constitutional mandate, the Comelec provided in Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules were recommended for preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for manipulating the
of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or election results in Maguindanao. Several persons were also recommended to be charged
ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.: Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. - (a) When administratively, while others, including petitioner Mike Arroyo, were recommended to be
sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the subjected to further investigation. After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others,
ruling. should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before
Comelec Second Division’s findings on the basis of the three concurring votes conversely; it the Supreme Court.
also did not overturn the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the three dissenting as
either side was short of one (1) vote to obtain a majority decision. ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.
2). Yes. In case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the Comelec
en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where RULING:
parties are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or Yes. Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
arguments and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their functions of the Comelec. Paragraph (6) thereof vests in the Comelec the power to: file,
case. Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: Section 6. Procedure if upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in malpractices. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election
the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is
affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and
honest conduct of elections.
Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to
court’s or administrative board’s attention any error, omission, or oversight in first The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in
consideration. A retrial of issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and opportunity Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
for them to be heard." But as held in Samalio v. Court of Appeals, A formal or trial-type Under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the
controversy at hand. Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the Comelec and as amended by Section 43 of R.A. No. 9369 states that instead of a mere
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further delegated authority, the other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now
clarifying and amplifying their arguments; whereas, a re-consultation involves a re- exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of all

34
election offenses and to prosecute the same. It is, therefore, not only the power but the audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is
duty of both the Comelec and the DOJ to perform any act necessary to ensure the prompt exclusive.
and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the
COA's findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least
insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. The mere fact that private
G.R. NO. 88435 auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine
JANUARY 16, 2002 and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its
findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent
FACTS: private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual
In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President scrutiny of a COA audit.
Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan in the
amount of US$310 million. The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine There is another constitutional barrier to the COA's insistence of exclusive power to
economy, at that time suffering severely from the financial crisis that hit the country during examine and audit all government agencies. The COA's claim clashes directly with the
the latter part of the Marcos regime. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank Central Bank's constitutional power of "supervision" over banks under Section 20, Article XII
required the Philippine government to rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with of the Constitution. However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent jurisdiction over
huge non-performing loans. government banks, the COA's audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA
is the constitutionally mandated auditor of government banks. And in matters falling under
On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 the second paragraph of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA's jurisdiction is
amending the Central Bank's Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial exclusive. Thus, the Central Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of
Intermediaries, in line with the government's commitment to the World Bank to require a government banks since this function belongs exclusively to the COA.
private external auditor for DBP. Thus, on December 5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor
issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124. On January 8, 1987, the Philippine government and G. R. NO. 180989
World Bank negotiating panels reached final agreement on the private audit of the DBP. FEBRUARY 7, 2012
DELA LLANA v. CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION ON AUDIT
However, a change in the leadership of the COA suddenly reversed the course of
events. On April 27, 1987, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo, wrote the Central FACTS:
Bank Governor protesting the Central Bank's issuance of Circular No. 1124 which allegedly This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the
encroached upon the COA's constitutional and statutory power to audit government issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987
agencies. Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 89-
299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial transactions. Petitioner
ISSUE: alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular,
Whether or not the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D
examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external of the 1987 Constitution.3 He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA,
auditors under any circumstance. serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed.

RULING: Respondents argue that the Petition must be dismissed, as it is not proper for a petition for
The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA certiorari, considering that (1) there is no allegation showing that the COA exercised judicial
enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, or quasi-judicial functions when it promulgated Circular No. 89-299; and (2) there is no
including the DBP. The COA contends this is similar to its sole and exclusive authority, convincing explanation showing how the promulgation of the circular was done with grave
under the second paragraph of the same Section. The bare language of Section 2, however, abuse of discretion. Respondents aver that the circular is valid, as the COA has the power
shows that the COA's power under the first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its under the 1987 Constitution to promulgate it.
authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive." There is a
significant reason for this marked difference in language. The clear and unmistakable ISSUE:
conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and Is it the constitutional duty of COA to conduct a pre-audit before the consummation of
audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its government transaction?

35
RULING: measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service
No. There is nothing in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution that requires the embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government,
COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to which
The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, herein petitioner belongs as a uniformed member of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with
state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers
inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies
special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory connected with the examinations. To carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No.
duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its
with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies. It is
the scope of its audit and examination. clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary
investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the
G.R. NO. 179370 petitioner.
NOVEMBER 19, 2009
CAPA BLANCA V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 670 SCRA 579
2013
FACTS: FUNA Vs. VILLAR
The CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII (CSC Caraga) informed PO1 Capablanca
about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on July 28, 2000. FACTS:
According to the CSC, the picture and signature in the the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) were In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa
different from the picture and signature appearing in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS). The challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the
CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged examination irregularities Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a judgment issue "declaring the
constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie evidence was established. unconstitutionality" of the appointment.

Petitioner failed to appear on the scheduled Preliminary Investigation but was represented Following the retirement of Guillermo N. Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth
by counsel who moved to dismiss the proceedings. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
which has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated
officers to the exclusion of the CSC, pursuant to Civil Service Commission v. Court of and appointed as Chairman of the COA, later confirmed on June 11, 2008 by the
Appeals. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted on July 28, 2000 was void. Moreover, he alleged Commission on Appointments. He was to serve as Chairman of COA until the expiration of
that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in
and/or NAPOLCOM. this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship,
insists that his appointment as COA Chairman gave him a fresh term of seven (7) years
The CSC Caraga held that since petitioner submitted a CSC Career Service Professional which is yet to lapse. He alleged that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February
eligibility and not a NAPOLCOM eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent status, 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that
then the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. The appellate court position.
held that pursuant to the CSC's constitutional duty to protect the integrity of the civil service
system, it acted within its authority to investigate irregularities or anomalies involving civil ISSUE:
service examinations, and to ascertain whether a prospective civil service appointee is Whether or not Villar's appointment as COA Chairman after serving 4 years of his 7-year
qualified in accordance with all the legal requirements. Hence, this petition. term as COA Commissioner is constitutional under Sec.1 (2), Art. IX of the Constitution.

ISSUE: HELD:
Does CSC Caraga have jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of
administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such
irregularity? chairman has expired, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to Sec.1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt

36
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment barred under the Constitution.
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the acting capacity.
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity. 742 SCRA 166
2014
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment FUNA vs. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III et al.
as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7-year term from February 2008 to February
2015 given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past FACTS:
pronouncements made by this Court, starting in De Vera, then Imperial, Visarra, and finally On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque as
Matibag. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment on
"reappointment," there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA February 3, 2010. On February 22, 2010, President Arroyo issued E.O. 864. Petitioner
member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the
term of more than 7 years. independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be protected from outside
influences and political pressures due to the significance of its government functions.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz: Petitioner posits that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate
the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions (COA, CSC, other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a Board
COMELEC), after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their
lesser period is void and unconstitutional. employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations.

The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of ISSUE:
the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system Whether or not the Duque’s designation as member of the Board of Directors/Trustees of
prescribed by the Constitution. various GOCC’s violates the constitutional prohibition against the holding of multiple offices
for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions. - YES
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but RULING:
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides that “No Member of a
the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment.
Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment. instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries”.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or the
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries”. While all other
and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that "reappointment" their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to

37
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. under the Constitution; and
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective
governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. the COA for audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.\

GR NO. 193462 MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality as it is merely incorporated under the
FEBRUARY 4, 2014 Corporation Code and the Philippine government has no ownership over the same. Despite
FUNA vs. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE (MECO) and the its private origins, MECO is operating under the policy supervision of the DTI, because it
COMMISSION ON AUDIT was "entrusted" by the government with the "delicate and precarious" responsibility of
pursuing "unofficial" relations with the people of a foreign land whose government the
FACTS: Philippines is bound not to recognize.
Pursuant to a Joint Communiqué, the Philippine Government recognizes the Government of
the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and that it fully
understands and respects the position of the Chinese Government that there is but one
China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory. Maintaining ties with Taiwan
is permissible by the terms of the Joint Communiqué, however, the Philippines and Taiwan
had to course any such relations thru offices outside of the official or governmental organs.

The MECO was incorporated to oversee the rights and interests of OFWs in Taiwan;
promote the Philippines as a tourist and investment destination for the Taiwanese; and
facilitate the travel of Filipinos and Taiwanese from Taiwan to the Philippines, and vice
versa.

Upon inquiry, petitioner was informed that the COA had never audited and examined the
accounts of MECO. Thus, he filed the instant petition for mandamus. Petitioner posits that
by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA is neglecting its duty under Section
2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide GOCC
or government instrumentality. The MECO emphasizes that categorizing it as a GOCC or a
government instrumentality can potentially violate the country’s commitment to the One
China policy of the PROC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA is mandated to audit the accounts of the MECO.

RULING:
COA is not mandated to audit the accounts of the MECO.

Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the "power,
authority and duty" to "examine, audit and settle" the "accounts" of the following entities:

The government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities;

GOCCs with original charters;

GOCCs without original charters;

38