The findings of the company-designated physician do not always bind the courts in
determining the merits of compensation cases filed Filipino seafarers.
In most seafarer cases for disability or death benefits claims, one of the arguments often
raised by the companies or the insurance correspondents is that they are not liable to pay
benefits by pointing to the medical reports of the company-designated physician that the
seafarer’s illness is not work-connected, that he is fit to work or that the compensation is
limited to a lower amount based on a low disability grading. They point out that the POEA
mandated that the seafarer’s disability can only be assessed by the company-designated
physician considering that the latter had the time and the opportunity to constantly monitor
the health and physical condition of the seafarer
In the recent case of Magsaysay vs. Oliver Buenaventura ( G.R. No. 195878. January 10,
2018), the
seafarer met an accident wherein a mooring winch crushed his right hand.As a result,
he suffered a fracture of the right first metacarpal bone and open fractureof the right s
econd metacarpal bone, which required emergency surgical procedures both done in
Japan and he was later medically repatriated. After six months, the company doctor
declared him
fit to work after undergoing conservative management, continuousrehabilitation physiothe
raphy, and occupational therapy. He filed a case for disability benefits.
The Supreme Court denied the claims for disability benefits of the seafarer as it stressed
that failure to refer the conflicting findings between the company-
designated physician andthe seafarer's physician of
choice grants the former's medical opinion more weight andprobative value over the latt
er.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted that it does not mean that the judicial
bodies should adopt it hook, line and sinker as it may be set aside if it is shown that the
findings of the company-
designated physician have no scientific basis or are notsupported by the medical records
of the seafarer. The diagnosis of the company-
designated physician may be set aside if it is attended with clear bias, manifested byth
e lack of scientific relation between the diagnosis and the symptom or where the opinionis
not supported by the medical records.
.
The Court also pointed out in a case that “their findings cannot be taken as gospel truth”
due to the proliferation of obviously biased company doctors whose loyalty rests completely
upon the company they serve and these “are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of
petitioners and certainly could not be considered independent”(Wallem vs.NLRC 318 SCRA
623, United Philippine Lines, Inc. and/or Holland America Line, Inc., vs. Francisco D.
Beseril, 487 SCRA 249).
Findings of Personal doctor versus company-designated
physician
In most seafarer cases for disability or death benefits claims, one of the
arguments often raised by the companies or the insurance correspondents is that
they are not liable to pay benefits by pointing to the medical reports of the company-
designated physician that the seafarer’s illness is not work-connected, that he is fit to
work or that the compensation is limited to a lower amount based on a low disability
grading. They point out that the POEA mandated that the seafarer’s disability can
only be assessed by the company-designated physician considering that the latter had
the time and the opportunity to constantly monitor the health and physical condition of
the seafarer.
This issue was discussed by the Supreme Court in the recent 2015 case
ofPhilippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and Northern Marine Management Vs. Joselito A.
Cristino (G.R. No. 188638. December 9, 2015) wherein the Court said that the medical
opinion of the seafarer’s personal specialist doctor deserves greater evidentiary weight as
the company offered no other convincing proof to substantiate their arguments. The
company doctor and the seafarer’s personal doctor differed on their opinion on the work-
relatedness of the seafarer’s illness, melanocytes or malignant melanoma. The Court said
that the seafarer’s own oncologist was actively involved in his treatment and even
performed surgical procedure on him as opposed to the more basic medical management
provided by the company’s designated physician which were initially limited to the giving of
oral medication and wound dressing.
In various decisions, the Supreme Court clearly pointed out that the findings and
the disability grading of a company-designated physician could be set aside by the
Court in its determination of disability compensation (Philippine Transmarine Carriers,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 353 SCRA 47). The Court noted that “their findings cannot be taken as
gospel truth” due to the proliferation of obviously biased company doctors whose loyalty
rests completely upon the company they serve and these “are palpably self-serving and
biased in favor of petitioners and certainly could not be considered
independent”(Wallem vs.NLRC 318 SCRA 623, United Philippine Lines, Inc. and/or
Holland America Line, Inc., vs. Francisco D. Beseril, 487 SCRA 249). The Court also
considered the glaring apparent inconsistency in the company doctor's medical report
between the classification of claimant's disability and the fact stated that said claimant
had been unable to work for long period of time, which condition makes his disability
permanent and total (Crystal Shipping, Inc. vs. Natividad, 473 SCRA 559.)
In Seagull Maritime Corp. vs. Jaycee Dee et al (520 SCRA 109) the highest
tribunal explained that “courts are called upon to be vigilant in their time-honored duty to
protect labor, especially in cases of disability or ailment. When applied to Filipino
seamen, the perilous nature of their work is considered in determining the proper
benefits to be awarded. These benefits, at the very least, should approximate the risks
they brave on board the vessel every single day. Accordingly, if serious doubt exists
on the company-designated physician's declaration of the nature of a seafarer's injury
and its corresponding impediment grade, resort to prognosis of other competent
medical professionals should be made. In doing so, a seaman should be given the
opportunity to assert his claim after proving the nature of his injury. These evidences will
in turn be used to determine the benefits rightfully accruing to him. Nowhere in that
case (German Marine Agencies, Inc. did we hold that the company-designated
physician's assessment of the nature and extent of a seaman's disability is final and
conclusive on the employer company and the seafarer-claimant. While it is the
company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered a
permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to
seek a second opinion.”
In HFS Philippines vs. Pilar (585 SCRA 315), the findings of the independent
physicians were given more credence than those of the company-designated
physicians, the Supreme Court held that “the bottomline is this: the certification of the
company-designated physician would defeat respondent's claim while the opinion of the
independent physicians would uphold such claim. In such a situation, we adopt the
findings favorable to respondent. The law looks tenderly on the laborer. Where the
evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the
other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor consistent with the
principle of social justice.”
The POEA contract does not preclude the seafarer from getting a second opinion
as to his condition for purposes of claiming disability benefits. The Supreme Court
reiterated in the case of Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. vs. Mesina (697 SCRA
601) that "[w]hile it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the
seaman suffers a permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the
seafarer of his right to seek a second opinion," hence, the Contract "recognizes the
prerogative of the seafarer to request a second opinion and, for this purpose, to consult
a physician of his choice” (NYK-Fil Ship Management vs. Talavera, 571 SCRA 183;
Abante vs. KJGS Fleet Management Manila, et al, 607 SCRA 734). The Court stressed
that the company physician's assessment does not evince irrefutable and conclusive
weight in assessing the compensability of an illness as the seafarer has the right to
seek a second opinion from his preferred physician. (Maunlad Transport, Inc. vs.
Manigo Jr., G.R. No. 161416, June 13, 2008, citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. vs. Natividad,
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. vs.NLRC, 525 SCRA 42, Cadornigara vs. NLRC,
538 SCRA 363.)
In the case of Magsaysay vs. Laurel (694 SCRA 225) the disability provisions of the
POEA-SEC recognize the right of a seafarer to seek a second medical opinion and the
prerogative to consult a physician of his choice. Therefore, the provision should not be
construed that it is only the company-designated physician who could assess the condition
and declare the disability of seafarers. The provision does not serve as a limitation but
rather a guarantee of protection to overseas workers.
This principle is in line with the Supreme Court rulings that strict rules of
evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation considering the probability and
not the ultimate degree of certainty is the ultimate test of proof in compensation
proceedings (Barcenas vs. WCC 158 SCRA 314; NFD International Manning Agents,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486; Heirs of the late R/O Reynaldo Aniban vs. NLRC, 282
SCRA 377).