UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CHATTANOOGA
KARRY MARIE YEARWOOD, §
§
Plaintiff, § No. ____________________________
§
~v~ § JURY DEMAND
§
CITY OF GRAYSVILLE, §
CHIEF JULIE LYNN TANKSLEY, §
OFFICER KEITH WAYNE POST, and §
OFFICER LANDON TREW, §
In their individual and §
official capacities as agents §
and employees of the City §
of Graysville, §
§
Defendants. §
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, through counsel, for her causes of action will show the Court:
Introduction:
1. This is an action for money damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988 to redress the deprivation of rights secured to the Plaintiff by the Fourth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and for violations of the laws of the
State of Tennessee by the Defendants.
2. Plaintiff avers that the individually named Defendants Officer Keith Wayne Post
(“Post”), and Officer Landon Trew (“Trew”), worked in unison to conduct an unreasonable
seizure of Plaintiff’s person without probable cause and to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff in one
event to be further described herein.
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3. Plaintiff avers that the individually named Defendant Chief Julie Lynn Tanksley
(“Tanksley”) conducted an unreasonable seizure of Plaintiff’s person without probable cause and
to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff in another event to be further described herein.
4. Plaintiff also maintains that the individually named defendants committed these
violations and torts as a result of policies, customs, and/or procedures of the City of Graysville
(“City”).
5. In addition, Plaintiff avers that the individual defendants subjected Plaintiff to
mental anguish and emotional distress.
Jurisdiction and Venue:
6. This is an action to redress the deprivation of rights secured to Plaintiff by the
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and for violations of
Tennessee common law. Thus, this Court is vested with original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1343. As to the Plaintiff’s state claims, this Court has jurisdiction over the state claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1357 as they arise from the same case and same controversies.
7. Venue is proper in this Court, Chattanooga Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1391(B). All acts complained of occurred within Rhea County, a political sub-division of the
State of Tennessee, and physically located within the fourteen-county district of this Court.
a. Plaintiff is a resident of Rhea County, Tennessee.
b. To the best of Plaintiff’s knowledge, the individual defendants are residents of
Rhea County, Tennessee.
c. The City is a political sub-division of the State of Tennessee.
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The Parties:
8. At all times relevant to this cause of action, Plaintiff was a citizen of the United
States, and a resident of the State of Tennessee.
9. At all times relevant to this cause of action, the City was a political sub-division
of the State of Tennessee organized and existing under the laws of the State of Tennessee.
a. The City finances its police department and provides rules and
regulations for the operation of the police department.
b. The City provides oversight of the hiring, training, supervision, discipline,
and retention of all personnel in its police department.
c. The City is governed by a body known as the Graysville Board of Mayor
and Commissioners. (“Board”).
10. Specifically, and at all times relevant to this cause of action, the City is
responsible for the creation and maintenance of its police department (hereinafter and
alternatively identified as “GPD” or the “department”), which is a law enforcement agency
created under Tennessee state law and regulated by the laws of the State of Tennessee as to:
a. The training and certification of its law enforcement employees.
b. The safe treatment of persons seized and held within the custody of its
individual officers and agents.
c. Creation of rules and regulations to properly identify officers who have a
recurring pattern of misconduct or conduct that would place its
supervisory personnel on notice and the City on notice of officers who are
a threat to citizens within its jurisdiction.
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d. Creation of rules and regulations to properly investigate officers who have
a recurring pattern of misconduct or conduct that would place its
supervisory personnel on notice and the City on notice of officers who are
a threat to citizens within its jurisdiction.
e. And to not hire, retain, re-hire, or promote police officers who have a
recurring pattern of misconduct or conduct that would place its
supervisory personnel on notice and the City on notice of officers who are
a threat to citizens within its jurisdiction.
11. At all times relevant to this cause of action, the individual defendants were
employed by the City and acted under the color of law. In addition, the individual defendants
acted in their official capacities as agents, servants, and employees of the City as defined under
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-102.
12. Plaintiff sues the individual defendants in their individual and official capacities.
13. Plaintiff sues the City in its governmental capacity.
Factual Basis -Individual Defendants Trew and Post:
14. On December 26, 2018, Defendants Trew and Post conducted a traffic stop of a
vehicle operated by Plaintiff’s mother, Debbie Caraway (“Caraway”), and occupied by
Plaintiff’s minor nephew identified as D.N., and Plaintiff’s minor son identified as C.Y.
15. Trew and Post conducted the traffic stop near Plaintiff’s home.
16. Trew and Post arrested D.N. on what Trew and Post claimed was an arrest
warrant.
17. Plaintiff went out to get C.Y. (who was 4 years old) after Caraway called
Plaintiff to come and get C.Y.
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18. Plaintiff and Caraway requested of Post and Trew to show them the warrant.
19. Trew told Plaintiff that he had the warrant, and held up a piece of paper but
refused to show Plaintiff and Caraway the contents of the paper.
20. Plaintiff asked Trew, “were you not pounding on our door two weeks ago about
this?”
21. Without any lawful justification or any probable cause, Trew arrested Plaintiff for
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
22. Trew placed Plaintiff into Post’s police car, and Post transported Plaintiff to the
Rhea County Jail. At no time did Post intervene to prevent Trew from seizing Plaintiff.
23. On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff appeared before the Hon. Shannon Garrison on the
charges.
24. Plaintiff learned after the February 5, 2019 court date that Trew’s charges had
been subsequently dismissed.
25. Plaintiff also learned from Jana Bice (D.N. juvenile probation officer), that the
paper Post held up was an attachment that was not signed nor approved by any judicial officer or
judge.
Factual Basis -Individual Defendant Tanksley:
26. On March 31, 2019, Plaintiff had an altercation with two individuals (Jennifer
Cisco, (“Cisco”), and Clark Morris (“Morris”)) at the front yard of Plaintiff’s home. Caraway
was present and observed the altercation.
26. Plaintiff went inside her home and called for police to remove Cisco and Morris.
27. Tanksley arrived and told Cisco and Morris to leave, whereupon they left
Plaintiff’s property.
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28. Plaintiff had remained inside her home then entire time before Tanksley arrived
and while Tanksley engaged Cisco and Morris.
29. Once Cisco and Morris departed, Tanksley walked unannounced into Plaintiff’s
home and confronted Plaintiff as Plaintiff was seated on her couch.
30. Tanksley loomed over Plaintiff as Plaintiff remained seated on the couch, and
Tanksley falsely claimed she saw Plaintiff assault Caraway.
31. At this point, Kristy Ball (“Ball”), a friend of Plaintiff, arrived and attempted to
enter Plaintiff’s home upon Plaintiff’s request.
32. Tanksley demanded that Ball state her reason for being at Plaintiff’s home, and
Ball replied that she came over to visit her friend: Plaintiff.
33. Tanksley told Ball to leave, and then turned to Plaintiff and told Plaintiff to not
speak to Ball.
34. Plaintiff asked to speak with Caraway, and Tanksley refused Plaintiff’s request.
35. Plaintiff asked Tanksley why she came into the house, and Tanksley told Plaintiff
that Caraway told her (Tanksley) that Plaintiff assaulted Caraway. Caraway was standing
directly outside the front door, and overheard what Tanksley said to Plaintiff. Caraway told
Tanksley that she never told Tanksley anything of the sort.
36. At no time was Plaintiff outside while Tanksley was present.
37. At no time did Plaintiff assault Caraway, and Caraway never stated to Tanksley
that Plaintiff assaulted Caraway.
38. Without probable cause nor any other lawful justification, Tanksley told Plaintiff
to get dressed and said, “you’re going for a ride to jail.”
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39. Plaintiff was in her pajamas. Plaintiff was enduring a menstrual cycle and wanted
to get cleaned up before traveling to jail.
40. Tanksley then allowed Plaintiff to get into a shower, but Tanksley told Plaintiff
she would watch Plaintiff as Plaintiff showered and get dressed.
41. Tanksley then watched Plaintiff get undressed, watched Plaintiff shower, and
watched Plaintiff place a feminine hygiene product into her underwear as Plaintiff got into
clothes.
42. The entire time, Plaintiff felt humiliated and had no choice but to allow Tanksley
to observe every intimate moment.
43. Tanksley took Plaintiff to the Rhea County Jail and charged her with domestic
assault.
44. On April 12, 2019, the Hon. Shannon Garrison dismissed the charge Tanksley
brought against the Plaintiff.
Factual Basis-City Liability:
45. Based upon Plaintiff’s belief, Post began performing police officer duties for the
City on January 5, 2017 without Tennessee P.O.S.T. certification until sometime in September
2018 after Tanksley took action to get Post Tennessee P.O.S.T. certified by letter to the
Tennessee P.O.S.T. Commission dated June 27, 2018.
46. In a letter dated May 22, 2017 from District Attorney J. Michael Taylor to then
City Mayor Ted Doss, Mr. Taylor stated that his office “will not prosecute any pending or future
cases involving criminal charges wherein Chief Tanksley is either the prosecuting or evidentiary
witness.”
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47. Mr. Taylor cited the fact that the McMinn County (TN) Grand Jury indicted
Tanksley for two counts of Criminal Extortion growing from her official position with the
Calhoun (TN) Police Department.
48. Despite Mr. Taylor’s notice, the City continued and continues to employ Tanksley
as a Chief of Police.
49. The City allowed Post to perform arrest duties despite his lack of Tennessee
P.O.S.T. certification.
50. Prior to the City’s employment of Tanksley, the City (in 2008) employed Jason
Erik Redden (“Redden”) as the police chief.
51. Prior to the City’s employment of Redden as the police chief, Redden worked for
the City of Chattanooga (“Chattanooga”) as a police officer.
52. During his employment with Chattanooga, the Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”)
of the Chattanooga Police Department investigated Redden upon five separate complaints of
misconduct, two of which IAD declared unfounded, and the remaining three determined as
follows:
On 8-9-2004, Redden was alleged to have violated Chattanooga Police
Department policies and was untruthful in an internal affairs investigation. On 9-
15-2004, those charges were sustained and he was suspended for 14 days.
On 9-2-2004, Redden was accused of insubordination and to have violated
another policy. On 1-18-2005, those allegations were sustained and he was
placed on probation.
The last one was dated 5-7-2005, and it was alleged that Redden had behaved in
such a manner as to constitute “conduct unbecoming” and violated the ride along
policy. These disciplinary actions were sustained on 6-1-2005. This is the same
day he resigned and stated “dissatisfaction with job/working conditions.”
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53. Despite what Plaintiff avers was easy to obtain information from Chattanooga as
to Redden’s background, the City hired Redden as the City’s police chief.
54. From 2005 until 2014, Linda Michelle Horton (“Horton”) was the City Recorder
for the City. Part of her duties was to make recommendations to the City authorities regarding
personnel issues.
55. In August of 2013, City Mayor Ted Doss (“Mayor Doss”) reported to Horton that
a Rhea County citizen had lodged a complaint with the Rhea County Sheriff’s Office regarding a
situation in which her vehicle and money had been seized.
56. The citizen claimed and proved that the money seized from her was not appropriate
for forfeiture because it was documented to be inheritance money, as opposed to money used for
unlawful purposes.
57. Mayor Doss asked Horton to look into the situation. Horton conducted an inquiry
and concluded that Redden had committed acts of official misconduct. Horton’s suspicions were
bolstered by an audio recording made by another City officer (Shawn Shelton (“Shelton”)) where
Shelton spoke with Redden about taking action to cover-up his misconduct.
58. As a result of her investigation, Horton suspended Redden.
59. Horton then contacted the Rhea County District Attorney and the Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation, and advised them of her findings as to Redden’s suspicious and
unlawful actions.
60. After Horton suspended Chief Redden, the Board held an executive meeting, during
which they decided to remove Horton’s personnel authority over the police and fire departments
and instead transferred that authority to the Board.
61. The Board then removed Redden’s suspension and returned him as the Chief
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of Police.
62. Afterwards, the City retaliated against Horton. This retaliation, including removal
of Horton’s personnel authority over the police and fire departments, included:
a. Directing Horton to contact District Attorney Mike Taylor and tell him
that she (Horton) was not allowed to talk to his office unless the entire Board was
present for the conversation. As a result, she wrote a letter indicating as such, which
District Attorney Taylor rejected,
b. Terminating Horton’s employment. In her Separation Notice signed by the
Mayor Ted Doss of Graysville, the Mayor indicated that Plaintiff was fired
because, “Majority of Board did not appreciate her turning the Chief of Police in
for his criminal activity.”
63. Shortly after Horton’s termination, the TBI concluded its investigation of Redden
and the Rhea County Grand Jury indicted Redden with ten counts of official misconduct
involving the theft of money (including several counts greater than $1,000 and vehicles)
whereupon he was taken into custody.
64. Members of the Board personally provided the means for Redden to obtain bond
to be released from custody.
65. Given the criminal charges, the Board voted to lay off Redden, to enable him to
draw unemployment. However, several weeks later the Board voted 3-2 to re-hire Redden.
66. Redden eventually pleaded guilty to two counts of official misconduct, and was no
longer employed by the City.
67. The City’s hiring of Redden and Tanksley as police chief despite their histories of
misconduct, and the City’s refusal to immediately terminate Redden and Tanksley despite their
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indictments, constitutes a deliberate indifference to the public at large and created the
atmosphere that allowed the individual defendants in the case at bar to believe their conduct
would go unpunished and was the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages.
68. The City’s employment of Post as a police officer without proper P.O.S.T.
Commission certification reflects that the City did not care about the oversight of its police
officer employees.
69. The City’s retaliation of Horton establishes the City cares more about its officers
than the public at large, even when its officers persist in conduct that reflects inability to perform
duties, and malfeasance of performance and was the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s
damages.
70. Despite notification from District Attorney Taylor that his office would not
prosecute any criminal charges in which Tanksley participated in any way, the City continues to
employ her as the police chief, and thus establishes the City cares more about its officers than the
public at large, even when its officers persist in conduct that reflects inability to perform duties,
and malfeasance of performance was the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages.
Count One:
Violation of Civil Rights Under
Color of Law 42 U.S.C. §1983 –
Unreasonable Seizure without Probable Cause
December 26, 2018 Incident
71. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
72. Post, and Trew had no probable cause to seize the Plaintiff.
73. No reasonable law enforcement officer would have acted in this manner.
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74. In addition, the combined actions of Post, and Trew constituted a joint effort in
which they participated as equals.
75. The City’s continued employment of the individuals identified in the portions of
this Complaint titled in-part, “City’s Liability,” and the City’s failure to discipline the same
individuals in any meaningful manner, created an atmosphere that other City employees,
including Trew and Post, could act in the same manner, and thus not be punished in any
significant way.
76. The failures of the City as set forth in previous paragraphs constituted deliberate
indifference on the part of the City, created an environment that allowed the misconduct of Post
and Trew against Plaintiff, constituted a policy of the City, and was the direct and proximate
cause of Plaintiff’s damages, and needless physical and mental suffering.
77. Post and Trew acted under color of law and their negligence and intentional acts
along with the deliberate indifference of the City deprived Plaintiff of rights secured to her under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution to be free from
unreasonable seizures of her person without probable cause and without Due Process of Law.
78. Plaintiff sues Post and Trew in their official and individual capacities under this
Count. Plaintiff also sues the City under this count.
79. Post and Trew committed their unlawful acts against Plaintiff with actual malice
toward Plaintiff and with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the
constitutional rights of Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, actual damages,
and attorney fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
80. The omissions of the City constituted deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff and
with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the constitutional rights
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and statutory civil rights of Plaintiff. This failure constitutes deliberate indifference and was the
direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to damages, and
attorney fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
Count Two:
Violation of Civil Rights Under
Color of Law 42 U.S.C. §1983 –
Malicious Prosecution
December 26, 2018 Incident
81. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
82. Post and Trew had a non-delegable duty to refrain from making false criminal
charges against Plaintiff.
83. The Rhea County District Attorney General’s (“DA”) rapid dismissal of all
charges Post and Trew brought against Plaintiff supports Plaintiff’s claim of malicious
prosecution.
84. No reasonable law enforcement officer would have acted in this manner.
85. In addition, the combined actions of Post, and Trew constituted a joint effort in
which they participated as equals.
86. The City’s continued employment of the individuals identified in the portions of
this Complaint titled in-part, “City’s Liability,” and the City’s failure to discipline the same
individuals in any meaningful manner, created an atmosphere that other City employees,
including Trew and Post, could act in the same manner, and thus not be punished in any
significant way.
87. The failures of the City as set forth in previous paragraphs constituted deliberate
indifference on the part of the City, created an environment that allowed the misconduct of the
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individual defendants against Plaintiff, constituted a policy of the City, and was the direct and
proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages, and needless physical and mental suffering.
88. The individual defendants acted under color of law and their negligence and
intentional acts along with the deliberate indifference of the City deprived Plaintiff of rights
secured to her under the Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution to be free from
malicious prosecution and thus deprived Plaintiff of her right to the Due Process of Law.
89. Plaintiff sues Post and Trew in their official and individual capacities under this
Count and sues the City under this count.
90. Post and Trew committed their acts against Plaintiff with actual malice toward
Plaintiff and with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the
constitutional rights of Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, actual damages,
and attorney fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
91. The omissions of the City constituted deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff and
with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the constitutional rights
and statutory civil rights of Plaintiff. This failure constitutes deliberate indifference and was the
direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to damages, and
attorney fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
Count Three:
Violation of Civil Rights Under
Color of Law 42 U.S.C. §1983 –
Unreasonable Seizure without Probable Cause
March 31, 2019 Incident
92. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
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93. Tanksley had no probable cause to seize the Plaintiff. At best, Tanksley seized
Plaintiff on a misdemeanor that did not happen in Tanksley’s presence, which, under Tennessee
law, required Tanksley to obtain an arrest warrant.
94. No reasonable law enforcement officer would have acted in this manner.
95. Tanksley’s subsequent conduct by requiring Plaintiff to allow Tanksley to observe
Plaintiff shower and use a feminine hygiene product served no lawful purpose.
96. The City’s continued employment of the individuals identified in the portions of
this Complaint titled in-part, “City’s Liability,” and the City’s failure to discipline the same
individuals in any meaningful manner, created an atmosphere that other City employees,
including Tanksley, could act in the same manner, and thus not be punished in any significant
way.
97. The failures of the City as set forth in previous paragraphs constituted deliberate
indifference on the part of the City, created an environment that allowed the misconduct of
Tanksley against Plaintiff, constituted a policy of the City, and was the direct and proximate
cause of Plaintiff’s damages, and needless physical and mental suffering.
98. Tanksley acted under color of law and her negligence and intentional acts along
with the deliberate indifference of the City deprived Plaintiff of rights secured to her under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable
seizures of her person without probable cause and without Due Process of Law.
99. Plaintiff sues Tanksley in her official and individual capacities under this Count.
Plaintiff also sues the City under this count.
100. Tanksley committed her unlawful acts against Plaintiff with actual malice toward
Plaintiff and with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the
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constitutional rights of Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, actual damages,
and attorney fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
101. The omissions of the City constituted deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff and
with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the constitutional rights
and statutory civil rights of Plaintiff. This failure constitutes deliberate indifference and was the
direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to damages, and
attorney fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
Count Four:
Violation of Civil Rights Under
Color of Law 42 U.S.C. §1983 –
Malicious Prosecution
March 31, 2019 Incident
102. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
103. Tanksley had a non-delegable duty to refrain from making false criminal charges
against Plaintiff.
104. The Rhea County District Attorney General’s (“DA”) rapid dismissal of the
charge Tanksley brought against Plaintiff supports Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution.
105. No reasonable law enforcement officer would have acted in this manner.
106. The City’s continued employment of the individuals identified in the portions of
this Complaint titled in-part, “City’s Liability,” and the City’s failure to discipline the same
individuals in any meaningful manner, created an atmosphere that other City employees,
including Tanksley, could act in the same manner, and thus not be punished in any significant
way.
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107. The failures of the City as set forth in previous paragraphs constituted deliberate
indifference on the part of the City, created an environment that allowed the misconduct of
Tanksley against Plaintiff, constituted a policy of the City, and was the direct and proximate
cause of Plaintiff’s damages, and needless physical and mental suffering.
108. Tanksley acted under color of law and her negligence and intentional acts along
with the deliberate indifference of the City deprived Plaintiff of rights secured to her under the
Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution to be free from malicious prosecution and
thus deprived Plaintiff of her right to the Due Process of Law.
109. Plaintiff sues Tanksley in her official and individual capacities under this Count
and sues the City under this count.
110. Tanksley committed her acts against Plaintiff with actual malice toward Plaintiff
and with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the constitutional
rights of Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, actual damages, and attorney
fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
111. The omissions of the City constituted deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff and
with willful and wanton indifference to and with deliberate disregard for the constitutional rights
and statutory civil rights of Plaintiff. This failure constitutes deliberate indifference and was the
direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to damages, and
attorney fees pursuant to 42. U.S.C. §1988.
Count Five:
Malicious Prosecution
December 26, 2018 Incident
112. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
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113. The false charges Trew and Post brought against Plaintiff was without probable
cause and done with actual malice. The DA dismissed all the charges.
114. Trew and Post committed their acts with actual malice that allows Plaintiff an
award of substantial punitive damages.
115. Plaintiff sues Trew and Post in their individual capacities.
Count Six:
False Arrest
December 26, 2018 Incident
116. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
117. Trew and Post did not have any lawful basis to seize and arrest Plaintiff.
118. Post and Trew arrested Plaintiff with assistance from one another, and their
individual efforts combined was tantamount to a joint venture wherein Trew and Post
participated as equals to one another.
119. Trew and Posts’ joint actions against Plaintiff were the direct and proximate cause
of Plaintiff’s damages and mental anguish. Trew and Post committed their acts with actual
malice that allows Plaintiff an award of substantial punitive damages.
120. Plaintiff sues Trew and Post in their individual capacities.
Count Seven:
Malicious Prosecution
March 31, 2019 Incident
120. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
121. The false charge Tanksley brought against Plaintiff was without probable cause
and done with actual malice. The DA dismissed all the charges.
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122. Tanksley committed her acts with actual malice that allows Plaintiff an award of
substantial punitive damages.
123. Plaintiff sues Tanksley in her individual capacity.
Count Eight:
False Arrest
March 31, 2019 Incident
124. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
125. Tanksley did not have any lawful basis to seize and arrest Plaintiff.
126. Tanksley’s actions against Plaintiff were the direct and proximate cause of
Plaintiff’s damages and mental anguish. Tanksley committed her acts with actual malice that
allows Plaintiff an award of substantial punitive damages.
127. Plaintiff sues Tanksley in her individual capacity.
Count Nine:
Tort of Outrage
March 31, 2019 Incident
128. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates fully all averments stated in this Complaint as
if fully set out herein.
129. Tanksley did not have any lawful basis to seize and arrest Plaintiff, and then
observe Plaintiff shower and use a feminine hygiene product.
130. Tanksley’s against Plaintiff were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s
damages and mental anguish. Tanksley committed her acts with actual malice that allows
Plaintiff an award of substantial punitive damages.
131. Plaintiff sues Tanksley in her individual capacity.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants jointly and severally
and requests the following relief:
a. The Court to award compensatory damages in the amount of ONE MILLION
DOLLARS ($1,000,000) against all Defendants, and punitive damages in the amount of TWO
MILLION DOLLARS ($2,000.000) against the individual Defendants;
b. That the Court award attorney’s fees;
c. That the Court award costs, and discretionary costs;
d. Any other relief the Court may deem fit and proper;
e. Any other relief the Court may deem fit and proper pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988,
and
f. Allow a jury trial on all issues.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Robin Ruben Flores
ROBIN RUBEN FLORES
TENN. BPR #20751
GA. STATE BAR #200745
Attorney for Plaintiff
4110-A Brainerd Road
Chattanooga, TN 37411
423 / 267-1575 fax 267-2703
robin@robinfloreslaw.com
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