Criminal Procedure │ Legal Research 1

Criminal procedure
Q: Define Criminal Procedure.
A: It is the method prescribed by law for the apprehension and prosecution of persons accused
of any criminal offense and for their punishment in case of conviction. (Clark’s Criminal
Procedure, p.1)
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE PHILIPPINES
Remember our criminal procedure is patterned after the U.S. law. So let’s trace its origin: The
first law on criminal procedure is General Order No. 58 promulgated on April 23, 1900 by Major
General Otis of the U.S. Armed Forces. That went on up to 1940 The Old Rules of Court. After
that is the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Next is the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
wasamended 3 years later, and again amended on 1991 (on Rule 114).And finally the most
thorough amendment which took effect last December 1, 2000 – the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. So that is now the present law.
NEWLY PASSED LAWS FROM 2017-2018
A.M. No.15-06-10-SC REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES

It is trite, but bears repeating: justice too long delayed is justice denied.
Our government has enacted several measures to somehow address the issue of judicial delays,
the recent one of which is the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, which
took effect on September 1, 2017.
Objective:
 To protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to speedy disposition of their
criminal cases
 To reinforce and give teeth to existing rules on criminal procedure and other special
rules prescribing periods for court actions and those that promote speedy disposition of
cases;
 To introduce innovations and practices for the benefit of the parties.
These Guidelines shall apply (1) to all newly-filed criminal cases (including those governed by
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights Cases,
and Criminal Cases cognizable by Family and Commercial Courts) in the First and Second Level
Courts, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals, as of effectivity date, and (2) to
pending criminal cases with respect to the remainder of the proceedings.
CASES RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:

G.R. No. 224162, November 07, 2017

JANET LIM NAPOLES, PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(THIRD DIVISION), RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons,
including Napoles, former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) and his former Chief of Staff,
Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes (Reyes). In its report, the NBI recommended to prosecute
Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and several other named individuals for the crime
of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080, as
amended, for essentially misappropriating former Senator Enrile’s Priority Development
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Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were

selected without the required bidding procedure.

In an Information, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald

John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the
prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly
assailed the credibility of the State witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistleblowers)
as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter
alios acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these whistleblowers are
inadmissible against her.

In view of Napoles’ application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Carmencita N. Delantar, then
Director in the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); (b) Susan P. Garcia, an
Assistant Commissioner in the Commission on Audit (COA), and the former Director of
the Special Audit Office; (c) Ryan P. Medrano, the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer from the FIO, Office of the Ombudsman; (d) Marina Cortez Sula, former employee
of Napoles; (e) Mary Arlene Joyce Baltazar, former bookkeeper for JLN Corporation; (f)
Merlina P. Suñas, former employee of Napoles; (g) Benhur K. Luy, former finance officer
of Napoles; and (h) Ruby Chan Tuason, former Social Secretary of former President Joseph
E. Estrada.

The prosecution likewise presented the following supposed beneficiaries of former

Senator Enrile’s PDAF projects, all of whom identified their respective sworn statements
before the Sandiganbayan. The defense also stipulated that: (a) the witnesses occupied
their respective positions at the time material to the case; (b) they were unaware that
their respective municipalities were recipients of livelihood projects from former Senator
Enrile’s PDAF; (c) they did not receive any agricultural package or livelihood training from
former Senator Enrile, the implementing agencies of his PDAF, or from any NGO; and (d)
they did not sign or prepare any acknowledgment receipt or liquidation documents
pertaining to the transactions. Furthermore, the prosecution presented another group of
beneficiaries, whose testimonies were subject of the same stipulations. After the
conclusion of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested that
she is not presenting any evidence for her bail application.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles’ application for bail.

HELD:
While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of the
accused, those charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of
guilt is not strong:

Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)

The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong
evidence of guilt on the part of the accused. The trial court may also deny the application
for bail when the accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the prosecution’s evidence on
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the guilt of the accused. In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the
parties’ evidence at a hearing duly scheduled for this purpose. The prosecution and the
accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove their respective positions: on the
part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, and on
the part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary and limited to the
determination of the weight of evidence for purposes of granting or denying bail. The
denial or refusal must be supported by a summary of the prosecution’s evidence.

In Cortes v. Catral, this Court laid down the following duties of the trial court in cases of
an application for bail:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Sections 7 and 8, supra).

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied. Since Napoles was
charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. This
was the burden that the prosecution assumed in the subsequent hearings that followed
the filing of Napoles’ Petition for Bail before the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the
Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of
the prosecution and the defense. At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are
limited to the determination of whether there is a strong presumption of Napoles guilt.
It is merely a preliminary determination, and the Sandiganbayan may deny admission
to bail even when there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles.

As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan may
deny the application for bail on evidence less than that required for the conviction of
Napoles. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan “does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may
be therein offered and admitted.” It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the bail
hearing is to determine whether the accused is entitled to provisional liberty before
conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well as from the trial court,
effectively defeats the purpose of the proceeding.

ALTABANO- RUIZ V. PICHAY (2018)

FACTS: Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery case pending in MTCC of Cavite.
Paran was apprehended in his residence in QC by Paranaque officer by virtue of warrant
of arrest by Judge Mapili. He was detained for several days in Paranaque station. Paran
filed an application for bail in Paranaque approved by Judge Pichay after his posting of
cash bond. On the other hand, Ruiz voluntarily surrended before Judge Mapili and was
temporarily released upon cash bond as well. Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay has no
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authority to approve Paran’s application for bail since the latter already has a pending
criminal case for adultery in another court, and was actually arrested in QC which was
outside Pichay’s territorial jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pichay had no authority to approve Paran’s application for
bail

HELD: Indeed, the only circumstance where Judge Pichay can exercise authority to rule
on Paran’s bail application is if the latter, who was detained in Parañaque City, was not
yet charged with a criminal offense in another court, pursuant to Section 17(c),9 Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

However, in the instant case, there was already a pending criminal case against Paran
before the MTCC, Trece Martires, Cavite as shown in the Certificate of Detention10
attached in Paran’s application of bail. In fact, Paran’s arrest was by virtue of a warrant
of arrest issued by Judge Mapili of the MTCC, Trece Martires City. More importantly,
Judge Pichay likewise failed to prove that there was no available judge to act on Paran’s
application of bail in the said respective courts. Clearly, Judge Pichay’s approval of
Paran’s bail constituted an irregularity arising from his lack of the authority to do so.

Judges should ensure strict compliance therewith at all times in their respective
jurisdictions.14 Judge Pichay cannot excuse himself from the consequences of his action
by invoking good faith. As a judge, he must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands
as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Since Judge Pichay
presides over MeTC-Br. 78 in Parañaque City, his territorial jurisdiction is confined
therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and issue corresponding release orders
in a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction, constitute ignorance of the
law so gross as to amount to incompetence.