Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5599 March 22, 1910

JOHNSON, J.:
An original action in this court for the writ of
mandamus against the defendant to compel
him to register a certain certificate of title in
accordance with the provisions of section
122 of Act No. 496 of the Philippine
Commission.
The petition presented by the plaintiff is as
follows:
1 That plaintiff is a citizen of the United
States of America, of age, and a resident of
the city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that
defendant is, and at all times herein
referred to has been, an officer of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, to
wit, the acting register of deeds of the
subprovince of Baguio in said subprovince.
II That plaintiff, in accordance with the laws
of the Philippine Islands, has located a
mineral claim on public and unoccupied
land in the barrio of Bua, municipality of
Itogon, subprovince of Benguet, has
complied with all the requirements of law
precedent to the issue of a patent in favor
of plaintiff, and that a patent for the said
mineral claim has been issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands for
said mineral claim in the name of plaintiff
and filed by the official who issued said
patent with defendant as register of deeds
of the subdivisions of Benguet; that the said
mineral claim is known and recorded as the
"Ultimo Mineral Claim," and is fully and
adequately described in the aforesaid
patent.
III That plaintiff has paid to defendant P6,
Philippine currency, as fees for the issue of
certificate of title in favor with the aforesaid
patent, and has demanded of defendant
that the latter issue such certificate; that
defendant neglects and refuses to issue
such certificate, unless and until plaintiff
shall pay to defendant one-tenth of one per
cent of the value of plaintiff's aforesaid
mineral claim for an assurance fund and
shall file with defendant sworn declarations
of three disinterested persons that the value
fixed by plaintiff is fair; that plaintiff has
refused to pay any sum whatever for an
assurance fund and has refused to file such
sworn declarations or to fix a value, and
upon such refusal has again demanded of
defendant that he issue a certificate as
aforesaid; that defendant thereupon refused
and continues to refuse and neglect to
issue to plaintiff a certificate of title for the
mineral claim aforesaid.
IV That plaintiff has no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of
law, other than a writ of mandate to be
issued to defendant commanding him
forthwith to enter a certificate of title in the
name of plaintiff for the aforesaid mineral
claim and issue an owner's duplicate
therefor the plaintiff.
Wherefore, plaintiff prays that judgment be
entered granting a peremptory order
against defendant, commanding him,
immediately after the receipt of such order,
to enter a certificate of title in accordance
with the provisions of section 122 of Act No.
496 in the name of plaintiff for the "Ultimo
Mineral Claim," as described in the patent
issued in plaintiff; and plaintiff further prays
that he be given judgment against
defendant for his costs herein.
To this petition the defendant presented a
demurrer, basing the same upon the
following reasons:
1 Because it appears from the complaint
that the plaintiff has not done all that is
required by the provisions of the Land
Registration Act to entitle him to demand
the registration of the patent and the entry
of the certificate of title and the issuance of
an owner's duplicate certificate under
section 122 of said Act.
2 Because it appears from the complaint
that the plaintiff has refused to pay the one-
tenth of one per centum of the fair value of
the land or any sum whatever for the
assurance fund, which by section 99 of said
Land Registration Act, as amended, is
expressly made payable to the register of
deeds upon the original registration of any
land under said Act.
3 Because it does not appear from the
complaint that the defendant has unlawfully
neglected or refused to perform any at
which the law specially enjoins as a duty
resulting from his office as register of
deeds, or that he has unlawfully excluded
the plaintiff from the use and enjoyment of
any right to which he is entitled, and it does
not appear that the duty is specially
enjoined upon the register of deeds to
register a patent to public land and enter a
certificate of title thereto and issue an
owner's duplicate certificate without the
payment to him of the one-tenth of one per
centum of the assessed or fair value of the
real estate at the time of such original
registration.
The petitioner claims that he has complied
with all the requirements of law precedent
to the issuance of a patent in his favor and
that a patent for a mineral claim has been
issued by the Government of the Philippine
Islands to the plaintiff and has been filed by
the official who issued said patent with the
defendant as register of deeds of the
subprovince of Benguet. This patent was
filed with the register of deeds of the
subprovince of Benguet for registration in
accordance with the provisions of section
122 of Act No. 496. It is alleged by the
petitioner that the register of deeds refused
to register such patent unless and until he
should pay the fee provided for in section
99 of Act No. 496. The question presented
to the court by the demurrer is whether or
not it is the plain and specific duty of the
register of deeds to register said patent
without demanding the fee provided for in
section 99 of said Act No. 496.
Section 37 of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, provides how persons, associations,
or corporations may secure patents to
mineral claims.
Section 122 of Act No. 496 (which Act is
known as the Act providing for the
registration of lands under the Torrens
system) provides that "Whenever public
lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to
the Government of the United States or to
the Government of the Philippine Islands
are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or to public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act and shall become
registered lands."
Section 73 of Act No. 926 provides that
patents to public lands shall be issued "in
the name of the United States and the
Philippine Government under the signature
of the Civil Governor; but such patents
(patents to public lands) or certificates shall
be effective only for the purposes defined in
section 122 of the Land Registration Act
(No. 496), and the actual conveyance o the
land shall be effected only as provided in
said section."
That part of section 122 (Act No. 496) to
which said section 73 (Act No. 926) refers it
as follows:
The deed, grant, or instrument of
conveyance from the Government to the
grantee shall not take effect as a
conveyance of bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the
Government and the grantee and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register
of deeds to make registration. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the lands, and in all
cases under this Act (No. 496) registration
shall be made in the office of the register of
deeds for the province where the land lies.
The fees for registration shall be paid by the
grantee. After due registration and issue of
the certificate and "Owner's duplicate," such
land shall be registered for all purposes
under this Act.
The petitioner contends that the only fee for
registration which he is required to pay is
the fee of $3 (P6) provided for in section
114 of Act No. 496.
The respondent contends that all patents
and certificates granting "public lands"
issued by the Government of the United
States or the Government of the Philippine
Islands, in order to be registered in
accordance with the provisions of section
122 (Act No. 496), the holder thereof must
pay the fee provided for in section 99 of
said Act.
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission
provides for a system of registration of land
titles under a system popularly known as
the "Torrens system." said Act provides for
the registration of titles to lands held by
i n d i v i d u a l , o r, i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e
registration of titles to lands which have
already been granted by the State to private
persons. Section 19 provides who may
make application for registration of title.
Section 21, as amended by Act No. 809,
provides the form of application. sections
29 and 41 provide for the registration or
recording of the decree of the court granting
the registration of the title under said Act.
Section 99 provides that in the original
registration or recording (meaning simply
the first registration under the "Torrens
system") that there shall be paid to the
register of deeds one-tenth of 1 per cent of
the assessed value of the real estate, on
the basis of the last assessment for
municipal taxation, as an assurance fund.
Act No. 700 of the Philippine Commission
provides for the method of ascertaining the
value of the land, in case the same has not
been theretofore assessed for taxation.
Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission
provides for the issuing of patents to public
lands in six different cases, as follows: First.
Sections 1 to 9, for patents to homesteads
on the public domain.
Second. Sections 10 to 21, for sales of
portions of the public domain.
Third. Sections 32 to 35, for leases of
portions of the public domain.
Fourth. Sections 32 to 35, for free patents
to individual settlers on portions of the
public domain.
Fifth. Sections 36 to 53, for the reservation
of town sites.
Sixth. Sections 54 to 67, for unperfected
titles and Spanish grants and concessions
of the public domain.
In each of the above grants or patents
issued in accordance with the provisions
applicable thereto no provision whatever is
made for the payment of a fee for the
registration of the patent, except under the
patent granted for unperfected titles and
Spanish grants and concessions of the
public domain, where, in section 57 (Act
No. 926), we find this provision:
The fees provided to be paid for the
registration of lands under the Land
Registration Act (No. 496) shall be collected
from applicants under this chapter, except
that upon the original registration of the
land claimed hereunder no fee shall be
required for the assurance fund.
We believe that this exception is significant
of the fact that it was the intention of the
lawmaking body to require the payment of
the fees for the registration of patents to
public lands issued under the provisions of
said Act No. 926. This view is emphasized
by the fact that section 199 (Act No. 496)
expressly provides that all patents to public
lands shall be brought forthwith under the
provisions of the Act providing for the
registration of the land under the "Torrens
system." Had it been the intention of the
lawmaking body — as the petitioner claims
— not to require the payment of one-tenth
of 1 per cent by the holder of a patent to
public land for the registration of the same,
then why did the Commission expressly
relieve the holder of a patent to a portion of
the public domain (of unperfected titles and
Spanish grants and concessions) from the
payment of this fee, when at the same time
they had brought all patents to public lands
under the provisions of Act No. 496?
It will be noted by comparing section 41 of
Act No. 496 with section 122 of the same
Act, the former relating to the registration of
titles to private lands and the latter to the
registration of public lands, that the
procedure, after the decree, in the first
instance, is granted by the court, and the
patent, in the second, by the Governor (see
section 73, Act No. 926) is substantially the
same. It is as follows. Section 41 provides
"Immediately upon the entry of the decree
of registration the clerk shall send a
certified copy thereof, under the seal of the
court, to the register of deeds for the
province, or provinces, or city in which the
land lies, and the register of deeds shall
transcribe the decree in a book to be called
the 'Registration Book,' . . . . The entry
made by the register of deeds in this book
in each case shall be the original certificate
of title, and shall be signed by him and
sealed with the seal of the court. . . . The
register of deeds shall in each make an
exact duplicate of the original certificate,
including the seal, but putting on it the
words 'Owner's duplicate certificate,' and
deliver the same to the owner or to his
attorney duly authorized."
Section 122 in part provides "It shall be the
duty of the official (the Governor-General)
issuing the instrument of alienation, grant,
or conveyance in behalf of the Government
to cause such instrument, before its
delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the
register of deeds for the province where the
land lies and to be there registered like
other deeds and conveyances, whereupon
a certificate shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land, and an 'Owner's
duplicate certificate' issued to the grantee."
It will be noted also that section 122
provides that this patent, "before its delivery
to the grantee," shall be filed with the
register of deeds . . . "to be there registered
like other deeds and conveyances."
What does the phrase "like other deeds and
conveyances," when applied to these
patents and the registration of the same,
mean? It can only means titles issued
under said Act No. 496. It can not be
construed to apply to titles given or
executed between private parties, for the
reason that registration under the "Torrens
system" makes no effort to change the
method of transferring or registering titles
granted by or to private person, nor for the
issuance of an "Owner's duplicate
certificate."
It will be noted further that after the patent
is filed with the register of deeds for the
proper province, that a certificate shall be
entered as in other cases of registered
land, and an "Owner's duplicate certificate"
issued to the grantee. This provision of said
section 122 shows clearly that the phrase in
said section "To be there registered like
other deeds and conveyance" must
necessarily refer to "other deeds and
conveyances issued in accordance with the
provisions of law granting "Torrens titles.'"
All these Act must be construed together. If
we were to construe section 41 alone (Act
No. 496) we might conclude that the
register of property would be compelled to
register a private title or title to private lands
granted under said Act without the
collection of any fee or fees whatever. This
section, read alone, seems to be mandatory
in its terms. It says nothing about the
collection of fees; yet no one contends that
the fees provided for in section 99 of said
Act must not be paid before the owner of
the "original title" is entitled to the
certificate.
Section 122 provides that the register of
deeds must collect the fees. To what does
the word "fees" apply? Section 57 of Act
No. 926 that the fees provided for the
registration of lands, under the Land
Registration Act, shall be collected from the
applicants, except that no fee shall be
required for an assurance fund.
Section 114 of Act No. 496 as amended by
section 7 of Act No. 1648, as well as by
section 11 of Act No. 1699, provides what
fees shall be collected in the course of the
proceedings for the registration of titles
under the "Torrens system" and the amount
in each case. This section (114) with its
amendments read alone might be
construed to include or cover all fees. It will
be noted, however, that all these fees are
for services actually rendered by the
officers of the Court of Land Registration or
by the register of deeds of the province,
etc., while the fee under section 99 is not
for services at all, but for the purpose of
creating an "assurance fund."
The applicant admitted, by paying the fee
for recording or registering his patent, that
section 114 of Act No. 496, as amended,
was applicable to a patent for public lands.
An examination of section 114, as
amended, shows that the only fees
collectible are fees for services actually
rendered by employees of the Government.
Section 6 of Act No. 1699 provides that all
fees for the services of the clerk of the
Court of Land Registration shall be
deposited in the Insular Treasury, and all
fees payable for the services of the register
of deeds, etc., shall be deposited in the
provincial treasury, or in the case of the
register of the city of Manila, then they shall
be deposited in the Insular Treasury.
These funds are not available for the
payment of any damages which may result
to the real owner of property by reason of
an illegal or improper registration under the
"Torrens system" in the name of another,
not the real owner. (See secs. 100, 101,
102, and 103, Act No. 496.)
The "assurance fund" is created for the
purpose of paying any damages which may
result from an improper or illegal
registration. All the people of the Philippine
Archipelago may be taxed for the purpose
of paying these damages if the "assurance
fund" is not sufficient. (Sec. 103, Act No.
496.) A large portion of the lands of the
Archipelago still belong to the public
domain. All original patents granted thereto
are given the advantage and protection of
the provisions of Act No. 496. Why should
the future holders of these original patents
be entitled to the protection of this law
without sharing its burdens? We believe
that when the legislative department of the
Government provided that "Whenever
public lands in the Philippine Islands, . . .
are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or to public or to private
corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act
(No. 496) and shall become registered
land," thereby giving the holder of these
original patents the benefit of said Act (No.
496), it intended also to impose upon such
grantees the burdens of said Act. But in
reply to this consideration we are met with
the question, Why should the Government
require a fund to insure against its own
acts, thereby implying that there is no
possibility of mistakes occurring in the
granting of these patents and that there is
no possibility of the occurrence of
damages? The, literally, hundreds of cases
which have been brought in the courts of
the United States to set aside original
patents granted by the Government which
have been secured by fraud, mistake, etc.,
are a complete answer to this contention.
We are of the opinion and so hold that
when the legislative department of the
Government provides in section 99 of Act
No. 496 that "Upon the original registration
of land under this Act," etc., "there shall be
paid to the register of deeds one-tenth of
one per cent of the assessed value of the
real estate," etc., "there shall be paid to the
register of deeds one-tenth of one per cent
of the assessed value of the real estate,"
etc.; and when it provided that "Whenever
public lands," etc., "are alienated, granted,
or conveyed," etc., "the same shall be
brought forthwith under the provisions of
this Act" (sec. 122, Act No. 496), that it
intended to bring all future titles granted to
public lands immediately under the "Torrens
system" and that such holders, in order to
secure the registration of such titles, should
make a contribution to the "assurance
fund."
It not being the clear and specific legal duty,
therefore, of the defendant to register the
patent in question without requiring the
payment of the fee provided for in section
99 of Act No. 496, the demurrer is hereby
sustained with costs, and the petitioner is
hereby given ten days from receipt of notice
of this decision in which to amend his
petition, if he so desires. If the petition is not
amended within ten days, then let a
judgment be entered with costs denying the
issuance of the writ of mandamus prayed
for in said petition. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
In this dissenting opinion I shall discuss the
case at bar in two aspects. On the first
place, upon the plain provisions of the laws
invoked in support of the majority opinion,
the plaintiff is entitled to the writ prayed for.
In the second place, if those laws means
what the majority of the court claim they do,
then they are utterly and irremediably in
violation of the express provisions of the
Philippine Bill, and, therefore, null and void.
First, as to the plain provisions of the laws:
After full compliance on his part with the
provisions of the mining laws, there was
issued to plaintiff a patent for the "Ultimo"
mineral claim, in the subprovince of
Benguet. This patent, instead of being
delivered personally to the plaintiff, was, in
accordance with section 122 of Act No. 496,
sent to defendant as register of deeds of
the province where the patented land is
situated. That section is as follows:
Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the
United States or to the Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and
shall become registered lands. It shall be
the duty of the official issuing the instrument
of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf
of the Government to cause such
instrument, before its delivery to the
grantee, to be filed with the registered like
other deeds and conveyances, whereupon
a certificate shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land, and an owner's
duplicate certificate issued to the grantee.
The deed, grant, or instrument of
conveyance from the Government to the
grantee shall not take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the
Government and the grantee and as
evidence of authority to the clerk or register
of deeds to make registration. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the lands, and in all
cases under this Act registration shall be
made in the office of the register of deeds
for the province where the land lies. The
fees for registration shall be paid by the
grantee. After due registration and issue of
the certificate and owner's duplicate such
land shall be registered land for all purpose
under this Act.
Plaintiff paid to the defendant P6 to cover
the fees for registration, raising no question
as to whether any fees may lawfully be
required of him, nor as to the amount
thereof, and desiring only to cover the full
amount that defendant may lawfully be
entitled to charge for entering a certificate
of title and issuing a duplicate thereof to the
plaintiff. Defendant now requires of plaintiff
a further payment of one-tenth of 1 per cent
of the value of the patented land for an
issuance fund, and requires plaintiff to file
the affidavits of three disinterested persons
for the purpose of showing that the value
fixed by plaintiff is just. Defendant doubtless
relies for such requirement upon section 99
of Act No. 496, which, as amended by Act
No. 700, reads as follows:
Upon the original registration of land under
this Act, and also upon the entry of a
certificate showing title as registered
owners in heirs or devisees, there shall be
paid to the register of deeds one-tenth of
one per centum of the assessed value of
the real estate on the basis of the last
assessment for municipal taxation, as an
assurance fund.
In case land is subdivided subsequent are
had as to a portion only of such land, the
value of such portion, for the purposes of
this section and for the payment required by
paragraph four of section one hundred and
fourteen, shall be fixed by agreement
between the applicant and the tax collector
of the city or province where the land is
situated and shall be proportioned to the
value such land bears to the whole tract
assessed. In case of disagreement
between the tax collector and the applicant
as to the value of the land, the question
shall be submitted to the court for decision.
Where land sought to be registered has not
been assessed for taxation, its value, for
the purposes of this Act shall be its market
value, for the purposes of this Act shall be
its market value, and the applicant shall file
with his application the sworn declaration of
three disinterested persons that the value
fixed by him is to their knowledge a fair
valuation.
The court is authorized to increase the
valuation as fixed under the two preceding
paragraphs should it appear upon the
hearing that the value stated in the
application is too small.
The issue is therefore this: Defendant
contends that his registration of the patent,
entering of the certificate, and issue of the
duplicate, under section 122, constitutes
"the original registration of land under this
Act," as the phrase is used in section 99;
while plaintiff maintains that "the original
registration of land under this Act" does not
embrace the proceedings of a register of
deeds under section 122.
It is apparent that sections 99 to 107 of the
Land Registration Act provide in effect an
insurance of titles, and that the payment of
one-tenth of 1 per cent upon original
registration is practically a premium for
such insurance.
Act No. 496 provides two ways in which
land may be brought under the Torrens
system. The first way is by judicial
proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration, terminating in the decree of
that court. The second way is by
proceedings purely administrative taken
upon the alienation of public lands. The first
method is provided for in sections 19 to 49;
the second by section 122. I submit that
only the first method, that is, registration
upon a judicial decree, is meant by the
phrase "original registration," as employed
in section 99.
If it should appear that the phrase "original
registration" is used with a particular
meaning in previous sections of Act No.
496, then it may fairly be assumed that it is
used with the same meaning in section 99.
Sections 19 to 49 of the Act, covering
judicial proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration, are grouped under the general
heading "original registration." Again
examining section 99, as amended by Act
No. 700 indicate clearly that "original
registration," as used in that section, refers
only to registration upon judicial decree,
and that the insurance premium is to be
paid only for a judicial proceeding. Where,
for instance, registered land has not been
assessed for taxation, its market value must
be stated by the applicant in his application,
and this must be accompanied by three
disinterested affidavits confirming the value
fixed by the applicant. And so, where land
has been subdivided since the last
assessment, the tax collector and the
applicant shall agree upon the assessment
value of the parcel sought to be registered.
Upon reference to the sections under the
head of original registration, we find that
"applicant" is term used for the petitioner in
the Court]of Land Registration, and
"application" is the technical name for his
petition. The form of application contained
in section 21, in its second clause, provides
for fixing the value. All this is entirely
inapplicable to the registration upon the
alienation of public lands. "Applicant" and
"application" unquestionably refer to the
party and to his pleading in the Court of
Land Registration; and although public
lands, previous to the issue of patent, are
not assessed for taxation, there is no
provision under the mining laws whereby
the locator of a mineral claim is required at
any stage of the proceedings to fix the
affidavits of three disinterested persons that
the value fixed by the plaintiff is fair. This
requirement is evidently based upon
section 99 as amended, and its
inapplicability is evident from the fact that
plaintiff has never fixed any value, as that
was wholly unnecessary in the proceeding
he took.
Again, section 99, as amended, provides
that in case of a subdivision after the last
assessment, if there is disagreement
between the tax collector and the applicant
the questioned shall be submitted to the
court for decision; and that if the value fixed
by the applicant should appear, upon the
hearing, too small, the court is authorized to
increase it. This indicates beyond a
question that section 99 has reference only
to "original registration," that is to say, to
registration upon a decree of court. In the
proceedings by this plaintiff for a title to his
mineral claim, no court has intervened.
An examination of section 122 of the Land
Registration Act confirms the interpretation
which I have given to section 99. It is there
provided that upon the filing with the
register of a patent for public land, it shall
be "registered like the other deeds and
conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall
be entered as in other cases of registered
land." There is no provision in the Land
Registration Act for a payment to the
insurance fund upon the registration of
deeds and conveyances. Such payment is
made only upon "original registration" (with
the single exception of the registration of
inheritances and devises). Registration
upon a judicial decree, under sections 19 to
49, is a ratification of an existing title; while
a registration under section 122, as in the
case of "other deeds and conveyances," is
the certification of a new title to the grantee.
Registration, under section 122, is therefore
analogous to the entry of a certificate under
section 57, rather than to the entry of an
original certificate under sections 41 and
42.
Again, section 122 provides: "The fees for
registration shall be paid by the grantee." It
is clear that the insurance premium
provided for in section 99 is not a fee in any
real sense, and it would seem to be equally
clear that if the legislature had intended to
require a patentee of public lands to pay the
insurance premium, section 122 would
have so stated.
That the Philippine Commission understood
the phrase "original registration under this
Act" meant only registration upon a decree
of the Land Court, as distinguished from
registration upon the issue of a patent, is
also apparent from an examination of Act
No. 926, the Public Land Act, enacted in
pursuance of the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. The Public Land
Act provides for the alienation of the public
domain in six several ways: homesteads on
the public domain; sales of portions of the
public domain; leases of portions of the
public domain; free patents to native
settlers; town sites; and unperfected titles
and Spanish grants and concessions. It
provides that unperfected titles and Spanish
grants shall be perfected by proceedings in
the Court of Land Registration leading to a
decree and the issue of a certificate thereon
(sec. 63 of Act No. 926). All the other
methods of alienation are administrative
proceedings under the direction of the
Bureau of Lands, and lead to the issue of
patents which are to be converted into
certificates of title in accordance with the
provisions of section 122 of Act No. 496
(see sec. 73 of Act No. 926). There can be
no reason why an insurance premium
should be collected from native settlers
entitled to free patents, and none from
applicants for the perfection of incomplete
Spanish grants; and yet we find that by the
last sentence of section 57 of Act No. 926
the latter class are specifically exempted
from the payment of this insurance
premium. It must, therefore, have been the
understanding of the Commission that
specific exemption was unnecessary in the
case of persons obtaining patents through
the Bureau of Lands, for the reason that the
issue of certificates upon such patents is
not included in "original registration," as
used in section 99 of Act No. 496, and that
such exemption was necessary in cases
where the certificates were issued upon a
decree of the Court of Land Registration.
I have thus stated affirmatively the
argument in a general way deducible in
favor of plaintiff's case from the plain
provisions of the laws invoked to sustain
the majority opinion in this case. I now
propose, in an amplification of those
arguments, to examine the positions
successively taken by the court in its
opinion as it advanced the final conclusion.
It must be borne always in mind that the
court in its opinion is continually comparing
two proceedings, one a purely
administrative proceeding for a patent to
public lands, that is, a proceeding to obtain
title, and the other a purely judicial
proceeding to register a title already
acquired; and by such comparison drawing
the conclusions upon which its judgment is
based. The court quotes as the basis of and
reason for its decision no law but the Public
Land Law (No. 926) and the Torrens Law
(No. 496), the one providing for the
administrative proceeding for a title and the
other the judicial proceeding for a title and
the other the judicial proceeding upon a title
already acquired. The decision admits, in
effect, that the provisions of the Public Land
Law (No. 926), the law which provides how
and under what conditions a patent to
public lands may be obtained, do not
expressly require an insurance premium to
be paid as a part of such proceeding, in
other words, that the payment of an
insurance premium or assessment is not,
under said law, a part of the proceeding, a
condition precedent to obtain title. This
admission is unquestionably in accordance
with the fact. Nowhere in said law is there
the slightest mention of the insurance
premium or assurance fund. The opinion
also admits, in the same way, that the
provisions of the Torrens Law (Act No. 496),
which require the payment of an insurance
premium or assessment as a condition
precedent to the registration of title, do not
expressly require the payment of such
premium or assessment in proceedings
under the Public Land Law. This admission
is also unquestionably in accordance with
the fact; for nowhere expressly requiring the
payment of an insurance assessment in
proceedings to obtain a patent to public
lands. This is necessarily so. If it were not,
there would have been no cause of this
character here and these opinions would
not have been written. The provision
requiring payment would have been
expressed and no question concerning the
necessity of its payment could have arisen.
As a result of this, the necessity for such
payment must be interpreted, construed,
spelled, implied out of the law, or the
payment can not be required. That is what
the court has done. It has compared and
analyzed and inferred and deduced in order
to require the payment.
It is a universal maxim of statutory
construction that where the meaning of a
statute is doubtful, the construction most in
accordance with reason and justice should
be adopted; for it will not be presumed that
the legislature contemplated unreason or
injustice. The construction given by the
court to the statutes involved in the case at
bar is, in my humble judgment, unjust and
unreasonable. I have so much confidence
in the judgment of my associates and so
little in my own that only the sternest
necessity, as I regard it, induces me to
dissent from the decision of the court in this
case. If the decision did not involve, in my
humble judgment, a misapprehension of the
nature and purposes of the Torrens Law,
and an opposition to the policy of the
Government in relation to the public lands, I
would not permit myself to dissent.
The sole question is whether an individual
who has purchased from the Government a
portion of its public land and paid to the
Government the value thereof as fixed by
law, shall then be required, before he can
register the deed which the Government
has given him, to pay to the Government a
further sum to insure the very title which the
Government has just given him. In other
words, must a vendee for full value himself
protect the title of the vendor? That is to
say, must the vendee, in the absence of his
agreement to do so, warrant the title of the
vendor? The decision of the court in this
case says "yes." For this reversal of every
principle of law and justice relating to real
estate uninterruptedly applied in every part
of the civilized world from Justinian to
Blackstone and from Blackstone to
Washburn, some solid reason ought to be
given. Such reason can not justly be
construed by tortuous process out of a
doubtful situation. It should not be
necessary to spend pages in confrontation
of laws, in comparison of phraseology, in
interpretation and substitution of words and
sentences, in close and intricate analysis, in
strained construction and uncertain
interpretation, in order to find such reason.
It should, in fairness and in justice, be so
clear and plain as to leave absolutely no
room for doubt. It is an invariable rule of
statutory construction and interpretation, as
I have said before, that a statute will never
be construed so as to work injustice. To
produce such a result the terms of the law
must be so plain as to require no
construction.
The plaintiff in this case bought mining
lands of the Government. He paid the full
purchase price therefor. The Government
granted him a patent. When it was sought
you record this patent in the office of the
register that functionary refused to register
it, unless the plaintiff should pay to the
Government a certain sum to warrant the
validity of that title.
It may be said, as the opinion indicates, that
the payment to the assurance fund is not to
protect the patentee, but the person who
may be injured by the bringing of the
patentee's title under the Torrens Law; that
it is not the benefit to the patentee but to
the person injured by the operation of the
law which is the basis of the requirement to
pay. But the instant reply is that if the
person who pays gets no benefit, why
should he pay? It is unjust, unfair, if not
absolutely unconstitutional, to require one
to part with his property without
consideration. No law may compel one to
pay money solely to benefit some one else.
He must be the one benefited if he pays.
The only legal basis upon which the Torrens
Law can stand is that the one who pays is
the one who benefits. If, on the other hand,
it be held that the patentee is benefited by
the payment in that his title is thereafter
absolutely guaranteed, that the land itself
can never be taken away from him by
reason of defects in the Government's title,
the reply comes that the patentee, having
paid the full consideration required by the
Government, and having obtained title from
the Government, his title is already
guaranteed. Can a title be better
guaranteed than by having the Government
itself back of it? What more can the Torrens
Law offer by way of a warranty than the
power and resources of the Government
itself? nothing whatever. The Government
may repeal the Torrens Law utterly and
apply the assurance fund to other
purposes, but it can not, except by the
odious and infamous process of
repudiation, escape its contract with a
patentee to protect his title. When the
patentee paid P25 per hectare, the full
purchase price of the public land bought as
fixed by law, he then and there paid the full
consideration for a warranty of title. It could
not have been intended that he pay a whole
purchase price and get half a title. It could
not have been presumed that he should
pay a sound price and get an unsound title.
The Government which rigidly enforces the
maxim that a sound price imports a sound
article among its citizens can not in
decency refuse to apply that doctrine to
itself. This being so, what is there of equity,
fairness, or justice in the requirement that
the patentee in this case shall again pay for
the protection of his title? Why should he
pay twice for the same thing?
But it may be said that the Government's
warranty of title on the sale is merely a
covenant running with the land and does
not insure to the patentee the land itself;
that section 122, by bringing the title under
the Torrens Law, insures that the patentee
shall retain the land itself whatever the
defect in the Government's title may have
been; and the patentee, being thus assured
of something more than he would get under
a covenant of warranty, should pay for it. In
reply it may be noted, in the first place, that
the fact that the land itself is assured to the
patentee constitutes in the law no greater
consideration that the covenant of warranty.
In the eyes of the law the one is as valuable
as the other. Moreover, it should be
observed that inasmuch as section 122
provides that the issuance and delivery of
the patent do not actually transfer the title
but operate merely as a contract between
the Government and the patentee, and that
the operative act to transfer the title is the
registration, it is evident that the assurance
assessment is paid while the title is yet in
the Government. Why, then, is the
Government not justly the one to pay this
assessment, if anyone is to pay it? If
anyone is being injured, he is that one, and
he is injured by reason of the Government
selling lands which do not belong to it. The
patentee pays and gets for such payment
absolutely nothing in the eye of the law that
he did not already have.
It should be noted, also, that the payment to
the assurance fund, under the Torrens Law
itself, is purely voluntary. One is not obliged
to apply for the registration of his title under
that law. It is wholly optional. One may
leave his title as it was before the passage
of that law. The Legislature, in enacting that
law, was very careful not to make
registration cumpolsary. One may assume
the risk himself. It was very careful also to
provide that no title should suffer by reason
of a failure to register. Under the holding of
the court in this case, however, no choice is
left to a patentee. He must come under that
law willy nilly. He must pay whether he will
or not. It is of no significance that he is
satisfied with the title the Government given
him and wishes no further guaranty than
the Government itself. It is of no
consequence that he is willing to assume
the risk himself. He must take what the law
offers whether he will or not, and whether it
really benefits him or not; and he must pay
for it, too. I maintain that such a
construction is unfair and unjust. There is
no reason whatever why one who comes
under the Torrens Law by virtue of having
purchased land from the Government
should be obliged to pay, while all other
owners or purchasers of real estate may
pay or not as they please. One who
purchases public lands is assisting in
carrying out a great Government program,
that of the development of the resources of
the Islands. It is the manifest purpose of the
Insular Government to exploit the great
mineral wealth of this country; to induce as
many deserving persons as possible to take
up homesteads; to develop the wealth of
the forest; in short, to make earth, field, and
forest yield up their riches. To fasten upon
every person who desires to enter with
heart and hand into this scheme of the
Government an obligatory payment as a
condition precedent to such cooperation is,
to the extent of the obligation, to present an
obstruction and a hindrance in the way of
the Government's policy.
Moreover, the Torrens Law, by its very
terms, applies only to titles already
acquired. It does not apply to the process of
acquiring title. It simply registers a title
already vested. It does not pretend in any
way to make compliance with any of its
provisions a condition precedent to the
vesting of a title. It begins to operate only
after the title is vested. Section 19 of that
law provides, in part:
Application for registration of title may be
made by the following persons, namely:
First. The person or persons claiming,
singly or collectively, to own the legal estate
is fee simply.
By section 21 the application must contain
the statement that the applicant is "the
owner in fee simply (or by possessory
information)"of the land the title to which is
to be registered. That is to say, that before
one is allowed even to initiate the
proceedings by which the title is registered,
he must be the owner of the premises or
have such interest therein as law requires.
The purpose of the law is to insure or
assure a title already vested. It was never
intended to be a means of obtaining title or
to be a step in or a part of the proceedings
by which that title was obtained. This being
so, section 122, Act No. 496, has no such
significance or meaning as is given to it by
the opinion of the court in this case. That
section provides:
Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the
United States or to the Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall e brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and
shall become registered lands. It shall be
the duty of the official issuing the instrument
of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf
of the Government to cause such
instrument, before its delivery to the
grantee, to be filed with the register of
deeds and conveyances, whereupon a
certificate shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land, and an owner's
duplicate certificate issued to the grantee.
The deed, grant, or instrument of
conveyance from the Government to the
grantee shall not take effect as a
conveyance to bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the
Government and the grantee and as
evidence of the authority to the clerk or
register of deeds to make the registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative
act to convey and affect the lands, and in all
cases under this Act registration shall be
made in the office of the register of deeds
for the province where the land lies. The
fees for registration shall be paid by the
grantee. After due registration and issue of
the certificate and owner's duplicate such
land shall be registered land for all
purposes under this Act.
It provides, as is seen, that "whenever
public, lands . . . are conveyed . . . the
same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become
registered lands." This unquestionably
means that the instant the sale is
completed that instant they become
registered lands; that when one proceeding,
namely, the administrative proceeding for a
patent under Act No. 496. But it
emphatically does not say that any
proceeding or any payment which is a
condition precedent to that registration
under the Torrens Law shall also be
indispensable to the proceeding under the
Public Land Law. When a proceeding under
the Public Land Law is complete that is an
end of it. It can not, without express
provision of law, be opened in order to put
in another condition to the completion of the
proceedings. The evident intention of that
section, as it also of the Public Land Law,
Act No. 926, is to keep the two proceedings
wholly separate and distinct while they are
in progress. Each one shall proceed
according to its own law, taking its own
forms, pursuing its own methods, involving
its own costs and expenses and providing
for its own fees and disbursements. The
two proceedings, as such, never touch,
never come in contact. They are never
involved with each other until both are fully
terminated. Even then they do not touch.
They simply have the same result by
express provision of law; and that provision
of law does absolutely nothing else than to
affect results. It does not affect or touch
proceedings to obtain results. That this is
the intention of section 122 is apparent from
the provision of the Public Land Law, Act
No. 926. Under that law public lands may
be patented for any one of six different
purposes. There is a separate and distinct
proceeding required in each case. Each
proceedings is complete in itself. The law
states specifically and in detail what the
applicant must do and what he must pay to
obtain a patent. It also states that when he
has done those things his patent shall be
issued to him. He has done everything that
the law requires. He has paid his full
consideration. The proceedings is then
complete in all of its essential features.
Nothing remains to be done but to record
the patent. This is purely a clerical matter in
no sense affecting the essentials of the
proceeding. but even this the patentee is
not required to do. Section 122 expressly
provides that the official shall cause the
patent to be registered. It says: "It shall be
the duty of the official issuing the instrument
of alienation . . . to cause such instrument,
before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed
with the register of deeds for the province
where the land lies and to be there
registered like other deeds and
conveyances . . . ."
The quotation clearly concedes that the
patentee has done all that the law requires
him to do in order to bind the Government
legally and morally to give him a title. The
reminder, whatever it is, must be done by
the Government itself. That title, having the
Government back of it, is as good as it can
be. Nothing can be added to it; nothing can
be taken away from it. He stands upon the
proceedings he has taken, upon
consideration he has paid, and justly
demands his title.
But, says the opinion of the court, and this
is the central point of the decision, section
122 provides that "the fees for registration
shall be paid by the grantee;" and then
asks, in substance, "does this not mean
that he shall pay the insurance fund
assessment, and if not, why not?" The
answer is "no;" and the reason is that the
plain and unmistakable language of the
section shows clearly that no such thing
was intended or thought of. The section
says that he shall pay the "fees for
registration," not an assurance fund fee or
assessment. The phrase "fees for
registration" means what it says. It is an
expression well known to the law. It has a
known and definite signification. It is a fee
for registration, not for insurance. It is
something paid to a Government official for
services performed by that official for the
benefit of the payer and not a thing paid to
the Government in trust for someone that
the Government has unjustly deprived of
his property. It is a payment for valuable
services rendered to the payee and not to
purchase immunity for the Government or
some one else for its or his unjust and
spoilative acts committed against another.
To hold that the expression "fees for
registration" includes an assessment for an
insurance is to violate language and rob it
of its significance.
Moreover, if anything more were needed to
demonstrate the error involved in the
construction given to said phrase by the
court, it will be found in section 114 of the
same Act. Act No. 496 is divided into
headings, such as "Assurance fund,"
"Powers of Attorney," "Lost Duplicate
Certificates," "Adverse Claims," Surrender
of Duplicate Certificates," etc. One of the
divisions is headed in capital letter, "FEES
F O R R E G I S T R AT I O N . " U n d e r t h i s
headings comes every charge which may
be made, as a fee, from the beginning of
the proceedings to its close. That section
reads:
FEES FOR REGISTRATION.
SEC. 114 Fees payable under this Act shall
be as follows:
For every application to bring land under
this Act, including indexing and recording
the same, and transmitting to the clerk,
when filed with the register of deeds, three
dollar.
For every plan filed, seventy-five cents.
For indexing any instrument recorded while
application for registration is pending,
twenty-five cents.
For examining title, five dollars and one-
tenth of one per centum of the value of the
land, as fixed by the last preceding
valuation for the purposes of taxation.
For each notice by mail, twenty-five cents
and the actual costs of printing.
For all services by a sheriff or other officer
under this Act, the same fees as are now
provides by law for like services.
For each notice by publication, twenty-five
cents and the actual cost of publication.
For entry of order dismissing application, or
decree of registration, and sending
memorandum to register of deeds, one
dollar.
For copy of decree of registration, one
dollar.
For entry of original certificate of title and
issuing one duplicate certificate, three
dollars.
For making and entering a new certificate of
title, including issue of one duplicate
certificate, one dollar.
For each duplicate certificate, after the first,
fifty cents.
For the registration of every instrument,
whether single or in duplicate or triplicate,
including entering, indexing, and filing the
same, and attesting registration thereof,
and also making and attesting copy of
memorandum on one instrument or on a
duplicate certificate when required, one
dollar and fifty cents.
For making and attesting copy of
memorandum on each additional
instrument or duplicate certificate of
required, fifty cents.
For filing and registering an adverse claim,
three dollars.
For entering statement of change of
residence or post-office address, including
indorsing and attesting the same on a
duplicate certificate, twenty-five cents.
For entering any note in the entry book or in
the registration book, twenty-five cents.
For the registration of a suggestion of death
or notice of bankruptcy, insolvency, or
analogous proceeding, twenty-five cents.
For the registration of a discharge or
release of mortgage or other instrument
creating an incumbrance, fifty cents.
For the registration of any levy, or of any
discharge or dissolution of any attachment
or levy, or of any certificate of or receipt, for
the payment of taxes, or notice of any
pending action, or a judgment or decree,
fifty cents.
For indorsing on any mortgage, lease, or
other instrument a memorandum of
partition, one dollar.
For every petition filed under this Act after
original registration, one dollar.
For a certified copy of any decree of
registered instrument, the same fees as are
provided by the Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions and Special Proceedings for clerks
of Courts of First Instance for like services.
In all cases not expressly provided for by
the law the fees of all cases public officers
for any official duty or service under this Act
shall be at the same rate as those
prescribed herein for like services:
Provided, however, That if the value of the
land sought to be registered does not
exceed one hundred dollars the fees
payable for the application to bring land
under this Act and for indexing and
recording instruments while application for
registration is pending, for examining title,
for notices by mail or by publication, for
services by sheriff or other officer, for entry
of order dismissing application or decree of
registration, and for entry of original
certificate of title and issuing one duplicate
shall be ten dollars.
Certainly the necessity of a payment to the
insurance funds is not found here.
The Public Land Law requires the payment
of no fees whatever except in cases of
"unperfected titles and Spanish grants and
concessions," and to establish the titles in
those it is required by the law that the full
and complete proceedings under the
Torrens Law must be taken. In those cases
the same payments are made as in the
regular proceeding, except that to the
assurance fund. In this law, then, there is
no provision for fees which can possibly be
construed to include a payment to the
assurance fund.
Moreover, section 122 provides, as we
have seen, that the patent shall be
"registered like other deeds and
conveyances." These words, "deeds and
conveyances," certainly can not mean the
certified copy of the court's final decree in
the judicial proceeding under Act No. 496,
which is the instrument transmitted by the
clerk of the court to the register of deeds in
the province where the land lies, to be there
registered as the final act of the proceeding;
for the reason that neither such certified
copy of the final decree nor the final decree
itself is a "deed" or "conveyance." As I have
said before, it transfers no title whatever; it
conveys nothing. The person instituting the
proceedings had title before he began. He
was the owner before he made the
application. He must be such under the law.
The words "deed," "conveyance" means
unquestionably an instrument which
transfers a title to or interests in real
property from one person to another.
Inasmuch as the registration of title under
the Torrens Law transfers absolutely
nothing, such registration can not possibly
mean "deeds and conveyances" as those
words are used in section 122. This is a
complete reply to that portion of the opinion
which, after quoting from section 122 the
words "to be there registered like other
deeds and conveyances," says: "What does
this phrase 'like other deeds and
conveyances,' when applied to these
patents and the registration of the same,
mean? It can only mean titles issued under
said Act. No. 496." The fundamental error
embedded in this quotation, and it runs all
through the decision, is that the Torrens
Law grants or "issues titles." The law does
nothing of the kind. It guarantees a title
already "issued" or vested. As I have said
repeatedly, the very first condition
precedent to the institution of the
proceeding under that law is that the
applicant must be the owner; and that law
specifically provides that if, during the
proceedings, it appears that he is not owner
the proceedings must be dismissed. The
law simply confirms irrevocably a right
already vested. The state, and it is the state
acting through the law, can grant no rights
which it does not have, can issue or grant
no title which it does not possess. Its very
purpose in promulgating the Torrens Law
was to confirm a title which a court should
find, after a judicial trial in an ordinary
action, to have been legally vested in the
applicant at the time the action was
instituted. It confirms, not grants. It
guarantees, not transfers. Section 38
provides:
If the court after hearing finds the applicant
has title as stated in his application, and
proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation and registration shall be
entered . . . .
Therefore, when section 122 used the
words "to be there registered like other
deeds and conveyances" it did not, by said
words, in any sense refer to the final
decree, or a certified copy thereof, as
defined in the Torrens Law. It simply meant
that the patent inasmuch as it is a deed or
conveyance, should be registered or
recorded in the same manner as any other
deed or conveyance. That patent granted
and transferred a title, an ownership, in
exactly the same manner as would a deed
of conveyance between John Doe and
Richard Roe. Why, then, should it be
recorded differently or under a different
law?
All this foes to show simply that the Torrens
Law has absolutely nothing to do with the
proceedings for a patent under the Public
Land Law. Section 122 simply provides
what shall be the effect, the result, after the
proceedings are terminated.
Entering upon the second phase of the
question, I am of the opinion that section
122 of Act No. 496, if it means what the
majority of the court conclude it means, is in
violation of the Act of July 1, 1902.
It must be remembered, first of all, that the
land involved in this action is mineral land.
It must be borne in mind also that the only
law in force in the Philippine Islands which
has to do with the sale of mineral lands is
the Act of July 1, 1902.
It is of the very greatest importance also to
note that the Public Land Law is wholly
inapplicable by express provision to the
sale of mineral lands.
This inapplicability was lost sight of by the
court in its decision. The opinion attempts to
show that the Public Land Law is applicable
to the case at bar, and for that purpose
refers to said law as follows:
First. Sections 1 to 9, for patents to
homesteads on the public domain.
Section 1, referred to, provides (the italics
are mine):
SECTION 1 Any citizen of the Philippine
Islands, or of not exceeding sixteen
hectares of unoccupied, unreserved,
unappropriated agricultural public land in
the Philippine Islands . . . . may, as
hereinafter provided, enter a homestead,
unappropriated agricultural public land in
the Philippine Islands . . . .
Section 2, referred to, provides for the form
and contents, of the application for
homestead, and says that one of the
necessary allegation in the application shall
be, "that the land applied for is nonmineral,
does not contain valuable deposits of coal
or salts, is more valuable for agricultural
than forestry purposes and is not occupied
by any other person."
The opinion further says:
Second. Sections 10 to 21, for sales of
portions of the public domain.
Section 10, referred to provides:
SEC. 10, Any citizen of the Philippine
Islands, or of the United States, or of any
insular possession thereof, or any
corporation or like association of persons
organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, or of the United States or of any
State, Territory, or insular possession
thereof, and authorized to transact business
in the Philippine Islands, may purchase any
tract of unoccupied, unappropriated, and
unreserved nonmineral agricultural land in
the Philippine Islands . . . .
Section 12 contains the requirement that
the application must show affirmatively that
the land applied for is nonmineral.
The opinion further says:
Third. Section 22 to 31, for leases of a
portion of the public domain.
Section 22, referred to, provides:
Any citizen of the United States, . . . may
lease any tract of unoccupied, unreserved,
nonmineral agricultural public lands . . . .
Section 24 requires that the application for
the lease must contain the statement that
the land is "nonmineral in character."
The opinion further says:
Fourth. Sections 32 to 35, for free patents
to individual settlers on portions of the
public domain.
These sections constitute Chapter IV of the
Public Land Law. Said chapter is headed:
"Free Patents to Native Settlers." Section
32 provides:
Any native of the Philippine Islands now an
occupant and cultivator of unreserved,
unappropriated agricultural public land, as
defined by the Act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two, who has
continuously occupied and cultivated such
land . . . since August first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight; or who, prior to
August first, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, continuously occupied and cultivated
such land for three years immediately since
July fourth, nineteen hundred and two, until
the date of the taking effect of this Act, an
occupant and cultivator of such land, shall
be entitled to have a patent issued . . . .
Section 33 requires that the petition
presented under this chapter shall show
that the applicant is a native of the
Philippine Islands.
The opinion further says:
Sixth. Section 54 to 67, for unperfected
titles and Spanish grants and concessions
of the public domain.
These sections compose Chapter VI of said
Public Land Law. It is headed: "unperfected
titles and Spanish Grants and
Concessions."
Section 54 provides:
The following-described persons or their
legal successors in right, occupying public
lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles to such lands have
not been perfected may apply to the Court
of Land Registration of the Philippine
Islands for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
to wit:
1 All persons who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States
had fulfilled all the conditions required by
the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the
Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of public
lands, including the payment of the
purchase price, but who failed to secure
formal conveyance of title;
2 All persons who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United
States, having applied for the purchase of
public lands and having secured a survey,
auction, and an award, or a right to an
award, of such lands, did not receive title
therefor through no default upon their part;
3 All persons who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United
States, having applied for the purchase of
public lands and having secured a survey
and award of same, did not, through
negligence upon their part, comply with the
conditions of full or any payment therefor,
but who after such survey and award shall
have occupied the land adversely, except
as prevented by war or force majeure, until
the taking effect of this Act;
4 All persons who were entitled to apply
and did apply for adjustment or composition
of title to lands against the Government
under the Spanish laws and royal decrees
in force prior to the royal decree of
February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four, but who failed to receive title
therefor through no default upon their part;
5 All persons who were entitled to a
gratuitous title to public lands by
'possessory proceedings' under the
provisions of articles nineteen and twenty of
the royal decree of the King of Spain issued
February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four, and who, having complied with
all the conditions therein required, failed to
receive title therefor through no default
upon their part; and
6 All persons who by themselves or their
predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred
and two, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the taking effect of this Act,
except when prevented by war or force
majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraphs
one, two, three, four, and five of this section
must establish by proper official records or
documents that such proceedings as are
therein required were taken and the
necessary conditions complied with:
Provided, however, That such requirements
shall not apply to the fact of adverse
possession.
SEC. 55 All persons claiming title to
Government lands not coming within the
classes specified in the preceding sections
are excluded from the benefits of this
chapter.
SEC. 56 Any person or persons, or their
legal representatives or successors in right,
claiming any lands or interests in lands in
the Philippine Islands, under the provisions
of this chapter, and who now desire or claim
the right to have such title perfected, must
in every case present an application in
writing to the Court of Land Registration
praying that the validity of the alleged title
or claim be inquired into and that a
certificate of title issue to them under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act for
the lands claimed.
SEC. 57 Such claims and applications shall
conform as nearly as may be in their
material allegations to the requirements of
an application for registration under the
provisions of sections twenty-one and
subsequent sections of the Land
Registration Act, and shall be accompanied
by a plan of the land and all documents
evidencing a right on the part of the
applicant to the lands claimed. The
applications shall also set forth fully the
nature of the claim to the land, and when
based upon proceedings initiated under
Spanish laws shall particularly state the
date and form of the grant, concession,
warrant, or order of survey under which the
claim is made; by whom such grant,
concession, warrant, or order of survey was
made; the extent of the compliance with the
conditions required by the Spanish laws
and royal decrees for the acquisition of
legal title, and if not fully complied with the
reason for such non-compliance, together
with a statement of the length of time such
land or any portion thereof has been
actually occupied by the claimant and his
predecessors in interest; the use made of
the land, and the nature of the inclosure, if
any. The fees provided to be paid for the
registration of lands under the Land
Registration Act shall be collected from
applicants under this chapter, except that
upon the original registration of land
claimed hereunder no fee shall be required
for the assurance fund.
SEC. 63 All proceedings under this chapter
involving title to, or interest in, land shall be
conducted and considered as an
application for registration of such land, and
the final decree of the court shall in every
case be the person entitled to the property
under the procedure prescribed in section
forty-one of the Land Registration Act.
From these provisions it is perfectly plain
that Act No. 926 has absolutely nothing to
do with the sale of mineral lands. It is
equally plain from the provisions of that Act
that section 122 of Act No. 496 has
absolutely nothing to do with the sale of
mineral lands, inasmuch as the "public
lands" referred to in section 122 are the
same kind of public lands described in Act
No. 926. Section 73 provides:
All patents or certificates for lands disposed
of under this law shall be prepared in the
Bureau of Public Lands and shall issue in
the name of the United States and the
Philippine Government under the signature
of the Civil Governor; but such patents or
certificates shall be effective only for the
purposes defined in section one hundred
and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act
and the actual conveyance of the land be
effected only as provided in said section.
Nothing could be clearer than that section
122 in its reference to public lands means
the same kind of public lands described in
Act No. 926. Section 122 touches public
lands only through paragraph 73. It ought to
be self-evident that it refers only to such
lands as the Insular Government has power
and jurisdiction to convey.
Moreover, from the provisions of the Act of
July 1, 1902, it is beyond question not only
that section 122 has absolutely no relation
to mineral lands but also that it can have no
such relation. To demonstrate this it is
necessary to quote those provisions of said
Act touching this matter:
SEC. 12 That all the property and rights
which may have been acquired in the
Philippine Islands by the United States
under the treaty of peace with Spain,
signed December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight, except such land or other
property as shall be designated by the
President of the United States for military
and other reservations of the Government
of the United States, are hereby placed
under the control of the Government of said
Islands, to be administered for the benefit of
the inhabitants thereof, except as provided
in this Act.
SEC. 13 That the Government of the
Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions
of this Act and except as herein provided,
shall classify according to its agricultural
character and productiveness, and shall
immediately makes rules and regulations
for the lease, sale, or other disposition of
the public lands other than timber or
mineral lands, but such rules and
regulations shall not go into effect or have
the force of law until they have received the
approval of the President, and when
approved by the President they shall be
submitted by him to congress at the
beginning of the next ensuing session
thereof, and unless disapproved or
amended by Congress at said session they
shall at the close of such period have the
force and effect of law in the Philippine
Islands: Provided, That a single homestead
entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in
extent.
SEC. 14 That the Government of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered to enact rules and regulations
and to prescribe terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their title to public
lands in said Islands, who, prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, had fulfilled all or some of
the conditions required by the Spanish laws
and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain
for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet
failed to secure conveyance of title; and the
Philippine Commission is authorized to
issue patents, without compensation to any
native of said Islands, conveying title to any
tract of land not more than sixteen hectares
in extent, which were public lands and had
been actually occupied by such native or
his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth
of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight.
SEC. 15 That the Government of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered, on such terms as it may
prescribe, by general legislation, to provide
for the granting or sale and conveyance to
actual occupants and settlers and other
citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands, of the United
States in said Islands as it may deem wise,
not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one
person and for the sale and conveyance of
not more than one thousand and twenty-
four hectares to any corporation or
association of person: Provided, That the
grant or sale of such lands, whether the
purchase price be paid at once or in partial
payments, shall be conditioned upon actual
and continued occupancy, improvement,
and cultivation of the premises sold for a
period of not less that five years, during
which time to purchaser or grantee can not
alienate or encumber said land or the title
thereto; but such restriction shall not apply
to transfers of rights and title of inheritance
under the laws for the distribution of the
estates of decedents.
The preceding sections are those under
which the Government of the Philippine
Island found authority to past Act No. 926.
They have nothing to do with mineral lands.
SEC. 20 That in all cases public lands in
the Philippine Islands valuable for minerals
shall be reserved from sale, except as
otherwise expressly directed by law.
SEC. 21 That in all valuable mineral
deposits in public lands in the Philippine
Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are
hereby declared to be free and open to
exploration, occupation, and purchase, . . .
by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands: Provided, That when on any lands
in said Islands entered and occupied as
agricultural lands under the provisions of
this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits
have been found, the working of such
mineral deposits is hereby forbidden until
the person, association, or corporation who
or which has entered and is occupying such
lands shall have paid to the Government of
said Islands such additional sum or sums
as will make the total amount paid for the
mineral claim or claims in which said
deposits are located equal to the amount
charged by the Government for the same
as mineral claims.
SEC. 36 That the United States Philippine
Commission or its successors may make
regulations, not in conflict with the
provisions of this Act, governing the
location, manner for recording, and amount
of work necessary to hold possession of a
mining claim, subject to the following
requirements:
On each claim after the passage of this Act,
and until a patent has been issued therefor,
not less than one hundred dollars' worth of
labor shall be performed or improvements
made during each year: Provided, That
upon a failure to comply with these
conditions the claim or claim or mine upon
which such failure occurred shall be open to
relocation in the same manner as if no
location of the same had ever been made,
provided that the original locators, their
heirs, assigns, or legal representatives
have not resumed work upon the claim after
failure and before such location. Upon the
failure of any one of several coowners to
contribute his proportion of the
expenditures required thereby, the
coowners who have performed the labor or
made the improvements may, at the
expiration of the year, give such delinquent
coowner personal notice in writing, or notice
by publication in the newspaper published
nearest the claim, and in two newspapers
published at Manila, one in the English
language and the other in the Spanish
language, to be designated by the Chief of
the Philippine Insular Bureau of Public
Lands, for at least once a week for ninety
days, and if at the expiration of ninety days
after such notice in writing or by publication
such delinquent shall fail or refuse to
contribute his proportion of the expenditure
required by this section his interest in the
claim shall become the property of his
coowners who have made the required
expenditures. The period within which the
work required to be done annually on all
unpatented mineral claims shall commence
on the first day of January succeeding the
date of location of such claim.
SEC. 37 That a patent for any land claimed
and located for valuable mineral deposits
may be obtained in the following manner:
Any person, association, or corporation
authorized to locate a claim under this Act,
having claimed and located a piece of land
for such purposes, who has or have
complied with the terms of this Act, may file
in the office of the provincial secretary, or
such other officer as by the Government of
said Islands may be described as mining
recorder, upon the filing of such application,
plat, field notes, notices, and affidavits, shall
publish a notice that such an application
has been made, once a week for the period
of sixty days, in a newspaper to be by him
designated as nearest to such claim and in
two newspapers published at Manila, one in
the English language, to be designated by
the Chief of the Philippine Insular Bureau of
Public Lands; and he shall also post such
notice in his office for the same period. The
claimant at the time of filing his application,
shall file with the provincial secretary or
such other officer as by the Philippine
Government may be described as mining
recorder a certificate of the Chief of the
Philippine Insular Bureau of Public Lands
that five hundred dollars' worth of labor has
been expended or improvements made
upon the claim by himself or grantors; that
the plant is correct, with such further
description by such reference to natural
objects or permanent monuments as shall
identify the claim, and furnish an accurate
description to be incorporated in the patent.
At the expiration of the sixty days of
publication the claimant shall file his
affidavit, showing that the plat and notice
have been posted of publication. If no
adverse claim shall have been filed with the
provincial secretary or such other officer as
by the Government of said Islands may be
described as miming recorder at the
expiration of the sixty days of publication, it
shall be assumed that the applicant is
entitled to a patent upon the payment to the
provincial treasurer or the collector of
internal revenue of five dollars per acre and
that no adverse claim exists, and thereafter
no objection from third parties to the
issuance of a patent shall be heard, except
as it be shown that the applicant has failed
to comply with the terms of this Act:
Provided, That where the claimant for a
patent is not a resident of or within the
province wherein the land containing the
vein, ledge, or deposit sought to be
patented is located, the application for
patent and the affidavits required to be
made by his, her or its authorized agent
where said agent is conversant with the
facts sought to be established by said
affidavits.
SEC. 49 That as a condition of sale of the
Government of the Philippine Islands may
provide rules for working, policing, and
sanitation of mines, and rules concerning
easements, drainage, water rights, right of
way, right of Government survey and
inspection, and the other necessary means
to their complete development not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
and those conditions shall be fully
expressed in the patent. The Philippine
Commission or its successors are hereby
further empowered to fix the bonds of
deputy minerals surveyors.
SEC. 51 That all patents granted shall be
subject to any vested and accrued water
rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs
used in connection with such water rights
as may have been acquired under or
recognized by the preceding section.
SEC. 52 That the Government of the
Philippine Islands is authorized to establish
land districts and provide for the
appointment of the necessary officers
wherever they may deem the same
necessary officers wherever they may
deem the same necessary for the public
convenience, and to the further provide that
in districts where the land offices are
established proceedings required by this
Act to be had before the provincial officers
shall be had before the proper officers of
such land offices.
SEC. 57 That in case of conflicting claims
upon coal lands where the improvements
shall be commenced after the date of the
passage of this Act, priority of possession
and improvement, followed by proper filing
and continued good faith, shall determine
the preference right to purchase. And also
where the improvements have already been
made prior to the passage of this Act,
division of the land claimed may be made
by legal subdivisions, which shall conform
as nearly as prcaticable with the
subdivisions of land provided for in this Act,
to include as near as may be the valuable
improvements of the respective parties. The
Government of Philippine Islands is
authorized to issue all needful rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of this and preceding sections
relating to mineral lands.
SEC. 59 That no Act granting lands to
provinces, districts, or municipalities to aid
in the construction of roads, or for other
public purposes, shall be so construed as to
embrace mineral lands, which, in all cases,
are reserved exclusively, unless otherwise
specially provided in the Act or Act making
the grant.
SEC. 60 That nothing in this Act shall be
construed to affect the rights of any person,
partnership, or corporation having a valid,
perfected mining concession granted prior
to April eleventh, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, but all such concessions shall
be conducted under the provisions of the
law in force at the time they were granted,
subject at all times to cancellation by
reason of illegality in the procedure by
which they were obtained, or for failure to
comply with the conditions prescribed s
requisite to their retention in the laws under
which they were granted: Provided, That
the owner or owners of every such
concession shall cause the corners made
by its boundaries to be distinctly marked
with permanent monuments within six
months after this Act has been promulgated
in the Philippine Islands, and that any
concessions the boundaries of which are
not so marked within this period shall be
free and open to explorations and purchase
under the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 61 That the mining rights on public
lands in the Philippine Islands shall, after
the passage of this Act, be acquired only in
accordance with its provisions.
These are the only provisions of the Act of
July 1, 1902, which touch the question of
mineral lands. From these provision we
see.
1 That there is provided a complete
proceeding for the sale of mineral lands.
Nothing whatever essential to the
proceeding is omitted or left to be done by
others. The proceeding provided for is
absolutely complete from the "staking" of
the claim to the issuance of the patent.
2 That the Government of the Philippine
Islands is prohibited in express terms from
intervening in any way in the proceeding
except in a manner wholly clerical or
mechanical. Every line of the law leads
invariably to this conclusion. Section 36
provides that the Philippine Commission
"may make such regulations, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
governing the location, manner of
recording, and amount of work necessary to
hold possession of a mining claim, subject
to the following requirements:" The
following section then provides fully the
amount of work required, when it shall be
performed, and what shall be the result in
case it is not performed as required.
Section 37 provides expressly how a patent
for mineral lands shall be obtained. It sets
out the requirements fully and in detail and
provides that after complying with the
conditions in that section expressed, the
applicant "shall thereupon be entitled to a
patent for the land, in the manner
following:" The section then provides that
the applicant shall file certain notes,
notices, affidavits, and certificates; that a
certain notice shall be published and posted
for sixty days; that after such time "it shall
be assumed that the applicant is entitled to
a patent upon the payment to the provincial
treasurer or the collector of internal revenue
of five dollars per acre and that no adverse
claim exists, and therefore no objection
from third parties to the issuance of a
patent shall be heard, except it be shown
that the applicant has failed to comply with
the terms of this Act."
3 That the applicant and the Government of
the United States (not the Philippine
Government), by these provisions, enter
into a special relation, the one making an
offer to sell lands and the other named
therein; that the terms of that offer are set
forth fully in those provisions; that it clearly
and explicitly appears therefrom what the
applicant must do, and all he must do, to
obtain his patent; that it is plainly set forth
what shall be the result of a performance of
the conditions. Now, while I have no doubt
that the Philippine Government has full
power, as stated in section 57, to make
"rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of this and the
preceding sections relating to mineral
lands, " it must carry those provisions into
effect, not change them, nor insert new
provisions, nor add new, other or different
provisions or conditions onerous to the
applicant. The terms of the offer are fixed
by the United States. None may take away
or add to them. It is undoubtedly proper for
the Philippine Government to require the
patent to be recorded in a particular place
and to say who shall pay the recording fee.
But it has no right to say that the patentee
shall do other things and pay other moneys
as a condition precedent to obtain title,
when the Government of the United States
has stated specifically that he shall be
entitled to a patent, a title, when he has
done the things and paid the moneys
specified in that Act. In other words, the
Government of the United States, through
the statute, says to the applicant: "You do
the things which we specify herein and I will
give you a perfect title to certain mineral
lands." The applicant meets fully the
conditions named in the offer of the
Government. Whereupon the Government,
on its part, issues the title. But at this point
the Philippine Government, by section 122
of Act No. 496, steps in and says: "That title
you have just received from the United
States is not a title or patent at all. It is not
what the Government of the United States
represented it to be. It does not have at all
the effect which the United States said that
it should. It 'shall not take effect as a
conveyance to bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the
Government and the grantee; the act of
registration shall be the operative act to
convey the lands.' Before you can have a
title, a patent, you must pay the Insular
Government an assessment for issuance, a
sum of money to guarantee the title which
the Government of the United States
already guarantees. The Government of the
United States was mistaken when it said
that all you had to do obtain a perfect title
was to perform the conditions specified in
the Act of July 1, 1902. We have one other
condition to add, one that the Government
of the United States neglected to impose,
and if you dont meet this condition also, we
shall declare the proceedings had between
you and the Government of the United
States, in effect, nugatory."
It needs no argument to demonstrate that
the Insular Government has no power to
alter in a material way a statute of the
United States (U.S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. Rep.,
7) or add to anything whatever to those
conditions laid down by a statute of the
United States as being by the terms of said
statute the only conditions required to be
met in order to obtain a title to public lands.
If the Insular Government may add one
material condition, it may add others, and
thus change entirely the relation,
established between the Government of the
United States and the applicant. The right to
alter is the right to abrogate. If section 122
is operative as to mineral lands in the
manner claimed by the court, then the
Insular Government has changed so
essentially the proceedings for a patent to
mineral lands, provided in the Philippine
Bill, as to destroy the vested rights of one
who has done his work and paid his money
in reliance upon a promise of the United
States Government.
Moreover, the Act of July 1, 1902, provides
that third parties who prior to the sale had
an interest in the mineral lands sold and
who were threatened with an unjust and
illegal deprivation of such interest by reason
of the applicant's failure to comply with the
terms of the Act, may come in even after
the issuance of the patent and set aside the
proceedings, recovering the land itself in a
proper case. Section 122, however, by
bringing the title to mineral lands under the
Torrens Law, effectually and irrevocably
cuts off the rights of the third parties thus
guaranteed by the Philippine Bill. Under the
conception of the court after the registration
under section 122 the title to the lands
becomes absolutely secure not only against
all persons who had the rights in the land
before the registration, but also against the
Government of the United States itself. So
that, after the lapse of one year, no matter
how flagrant and vicious may have been
the fraud practiced upon the Government of
the United States or upon any other
interested party by the patentee in obtaining
his patent, the Government of the United
States, as well as the party, is, by section
122, absolutely prohibited from disturbing
him in the enjoyment of his tainted title. If
the Insular Government can not protect him
as fully as it does all others who bring their
lands under the Torrens Law, it has no right
to take the money. It protects all others from
their vendors as well as other persons. It
should protect the applicant in the same
way.
4 T h a t t h e o ff i c e r s o f t h e I n s u l a r
Government who participate in the
proceedings for the sale of mineral lands do
so as agents of the Government of the
United States rather than of the Insular
Government.
It is a question of extreme doubt whether a
person injured by the sale by the United
States Government of a mineral claim to an
applicant would have the right to resort to
the assurance fund. Section 101 of Act No.
496, as amended by section 12 of Act No.
1699, would need to be strained to the
breaking point in order to include within its
terms such person.
It is also a matter of some doubt whether
the purely administrative proceeding
followed in cases of sales of mineral lands
affords that due process of law to those
persons who have an interest in the lands
conveyed which is required before one may
be deprived of his property to the extent
provided in the Torrens Law. It is certainly
widely different from the proceedings
followed under said Act No. 496.
In view of all this I am confident that the
Philippine Government never intended that
section 122 of Act No. 496 be given the
meaning accorded it by the decision of this
court.
Giving section 122 all the signification
which it was intended to have, it simply
requires that a patent to mineral lands shall
be registered "like other deeds and
conveyances." The provisions of the law
are express and mandatory, leaving no
discretion whatever in the register of deeds.
This is apparent and clear on reading the
section. (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch.,
172.) While the section provides that the
official shall cause the patent to be
registered, I am of the opinion that the
patentee has a sufficient interest to compel
the registration.
The mandamus should be issued.