Facts:
-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde
and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie
Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.
-SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,
specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the
members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the
questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy.
-The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to
whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violation of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church
and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its
discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election
to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."
-The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to
this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court
owing to these facts.
-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.
Issues:
In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velarde’s issues and divided it into 2 groups:
Procedural Issues
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?
3.Did respondents have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and
the Rules of Court?
2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing
candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?
(Not answered in the affirmative)
Decision:
Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for
Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Holding:
Procedural Issues:
1. NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitute a jusiciable controversy. Why?
a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed
by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter.
b.It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties
c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights. It merely sought an opinion of the trial
court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.
The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents
below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular
candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
2. NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of
another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission
that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the
latter.
3. NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.
Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate
that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.
Substantive Issues
1. NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
basis therefor.
Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that :
“A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in
writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on
which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.”
The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the contsitution. This was
evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and
fair play.
In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing
and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if
any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points
of law with which he disagrees.
The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of
the court’s findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the
nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing
procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion
on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her “Decision”
with the clause “SO ORDERED.”
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable
to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning.
It was truly obvious that the RTC’s Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its
failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual
findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in the future, if
there is no point of factual comparison?).
Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed
Decision. Stating “Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear
violation of the separation clause.”
The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of
the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to
the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as
required of a dispositive portion.
The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where the resolution of the
Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or
controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented
therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may
be confusing
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the
dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.
The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to
the Petition. Neither does it grant proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive
portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are
a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.
2. It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional
principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only
if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (So no answer)
Chavez vs PCGG
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998
Facts: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task
of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a
“debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no
showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And
even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed
terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Issues: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against respondents’
argument that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
are not yet effective and binding
Held: Yes.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon
the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized
restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent
PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any
proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-
gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.
FACTS:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on
August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said
Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to
perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation
No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Then, the
President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people
for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite
for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
Then Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds,
inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of
such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots
to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for
the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no
freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of
the contents thereof.”
The President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081,
for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. He then announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No
formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued,
directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further
notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of
December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of
free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. The
Congress then scheduled to meet in regular session and since the main objection to Presidential
Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the
formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among
others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more
imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
The petitioners in Case G.R. No.
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be
decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
Then the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on
said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior
thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948
riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional
respondents,” praying:
“… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on
Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the
Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National
Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies,
subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task,
from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they
were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15,
1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
On the same date, the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-
35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,”
and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being
heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this
opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was
delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the
President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the
parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on
and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the
Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and
their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution
not found in the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue
Javellana, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a class suit, for
himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated,” was amended on or about
January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite
cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced “the immediate implementation of the
New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including,” and that the latter “are acting without,
or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution” upon the ground: “that
the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority
to create the Citizens Assemblies”; that the same “are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution …”; “that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino
people of the proposed Constitution”; and “that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution
was not a free election, hence null and void.”
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and
therefore non-justiciable, question?
2. Whether the Constitution has proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified
validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional
and statutory provisions?
3. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution has acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people? (acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or passiveness.
Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)
4. Whether petitioners are entitled to relief?
5. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force?
HELD:
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity
of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and
Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the
second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is claimed there
has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there
has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of
respect to the people’s will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with.” Justices Makasiar,
Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and “beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry.
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article
XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an
election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has
been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts
regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies,
specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the
requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize
as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering
as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed
in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal
sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so
they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect,
which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.”
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their
view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid
ratification.
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the
people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions
to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has
elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the
freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.” 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that
“Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the
people have accepted the Constitution.”
4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice
Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that “(T)he effectivity of the said
Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve
which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are
relevant and unavoidable.” 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted
to deny respondents’ motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of
the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by
virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast
no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state
with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice
and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed.
This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect.
