CRIMPRO RULE 114

Title GR No. 157331

ALVA v. CA Date: April 12, 2006
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
ARNOLD ALVA – Petitioners HON. COURT OF APPEALS – Respondents
Nature of the case: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the twin
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated 18 October 2002 and 19 February 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Arnold Alva. The CA, in the assailed resolutions, dismissed petitioner’s appeal of the trial courts judgment of
conviction for failing to post a new bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal.
FACTS
1. The present petition stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with having committed the crime of estafa.
2. On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order of the Warrant of Arrest issued on 18 July 1995 against petitioner in view
of the approval of his bail bond by Hon. William Bayhon, then Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila. Upon arraignment,
petitioner, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
3. On 4 May 1999, petitioner’s counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation praying for the resetting of the 5 May
1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTC’s decision to 17 June 1999 in view of the fact that said counsel already had a prior
commitment on subject date. The RTC granted the motion. The promulgation, however, was deferred only until 19 May 1999.
On 18 May 1999, petitioner’s counsel again moved for the deferment of the promulgation, due to prior "undertakings of
similar importance."
4. On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice. Claiming to be petitioner’s
representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the RTC a hand written medical certificate expressing petitioner’s
inability to attend the day’s hearing due to hypertension. In response, the RTC issued an Order directing the promulgation
of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner.
5. In its decision dated 25 March 1999, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.
6. Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, immediately following an original duplicate copy of the aforequoted
decision, a document entitled Personal Bail Bond dated 21 May 1999 issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed
to have been filed before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro on the face of said bail bond.
For such reason, petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction.
7. However, in an Order dated 25 May 1999, judgment was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the
bonding company that issued petitioner’s original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person
of petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be
forfeited.
8. Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, manifested to the RTC the return of
the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 "for the reason that the address of the accused (petitioner) is not
within our area of responsibility." Examination of the records of the case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his
address on record without informing the RTC.
9. On 26 July 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC which was not given due course for failure to
set it for hearing; thus, treating it as a mere scrap of paper. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC which was
likewise not given due course for the reason that it was filed out of time. Although petitioner filed MR dated 23 July 1999,
the Court considered it as a mere scrap of paper and was not acted upon as the same was not set for hearing, hence, it did not
stop the reglementary period to file appeal.
10. Petitioner filed anew a motion praying for the RTC’s categorical resolution of his 23 July 1999 MR, which was granted,
considering that the one who prepared the MR appears to be the accused himself, who may not appear to be a lawyer and
may not be conversant with the rules.
11. On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be
dismissed it appearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted. Petitioner filed a
Compliance, stating therein that he immediately posted a new bond for his provisional liberty and that the presiding judge of
the lower court, duly approved the new bond. A certified true copy of the bond was likewise submitted.
12. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for "appellant’s failure to post a new bond for his
provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive, and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court
had already expired." Undaunted, petitioner filed MR thereto seeking its reversal.
13. On 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the MR stating that the appellant has failed to submit himself under the
jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law since his conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail bond in
place when appellant took his appeal.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioners alleged failure
to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal— NO.
II. Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law despite the
posting of the subject bail bond— NO.
RATIO
I. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner impliedly withdrew his
appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory. Petitioner’s alleged failure to post a bail
bond on appeal is unimportant because he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. At the time petitioner filed his
notice of appeal and during the pendency, he remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, intrinsically addresses the foregoing prefatory matter. The RTC
is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a term of more than six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail
bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar circumstances.
Petitioner was convicted with imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 9 years and 1 day as minimum of prision mayor 17
years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Thus, the approval of petitioner’s application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC.
Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty and it would be premature to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific
Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that
petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of
Approval or any other court process acknowledging such document.
Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such application or, at the very
least, failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention
violative of respondent People’s right of procedural due process.
Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioner’s original bail bond is revealed by the Process Server’s Return, indicated
at the dorsal portion of the RTC’s Produce Order, indicating petitioner’s change of address without prior notice to the RTC.
II. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender; while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment
to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused escapes from the custody of
the law, but continues until the case is terminated. Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already
acquired jurisdiction over his person – when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged –
notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive.
As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CA, alas, we cannot say the same. Petitioner,
being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the
courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077,
which dismissed petitioners appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED. In this connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a
warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and for proper disposition of the case in line with the foregoing
discussion.
Notes
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of
his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party.