1. The CIR's jurisdiction was limited by RA 875 to specific labor disputes, excluding this case which involves a stevedoring contract dispute.
2. The 3-year winding up period under corporation law was only to settle SMC's affairs after dissolution, not to continue its business by enforcing prior contracts.
3. The decision cannot be enforced against the current vessel owner, Royal Lines, since it was not made a proper party to the case.
1. The CIR's jurisdiction was limited by RA 875 to specific labor disputes, excluding this case which involves a stevedoring contract dispute.
2. The 3-year winding up period under corporation law was only to settle SMC's affairs after dissolution, not to continue its business by enforcing prior contracts.
3. The decision cannot be enforced against the current vessel owner, Royal Lines, since it was not made a proper party to the case.
1. The CIR's jurisdiction was limited by RA 875 to specific labor disputes, excluding this case which involves a stevedoring contract dispute.
2. The 3-year winding up period under corporation law was only to settle SMC's affairs after dissolution, not to continue its business by enforcing prior contracts.
3. The decision cannot be enforced against the current vessel owner, Royal Lines, since it was not made a proper party to the case.
1. The CIR's jurisdiction was limited by RA 875 to specific labor disputes, excluding this case which involves a stevedoring contract dispute.
2. The 3-year winding up period under corporation law was only to settle SMC's affairs after dissolution, not to continue its business by enforcing prior contracts.
3. The decision cannot be enforced against the current vessel owner, Royal Lines, since it was not made a proper party to the case.
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1/ 2
205
CEBU PORT LABOR UNION VS. STATES MARINE CORP.
(1957) It appears that M/V Bisayas, formerly owned by Elizalde & Co, was sold to the States Marine Corporation and G.R. No. L-9350 | 1957-05-20 later purchased by the Royal Lines, Inc., which renamed it the M/V Melliza. Subject: RA 875 has limited the jurisdiction of the CIR to The case was originally appealed by the respondents to specific cases; 3- year period allowed by the corporation the Court of Appeals but the latter certified the same to law is only for the purpose of winding up its affairs; the Supreme Court on the ground that it involves a Decision cannot be enforced against those not made question of jurisdiction. proper parties to the case Held: Facts: RA 875 has limited the jurisdiction of the CIR to specific In 1953, the Cebu Port Labor Union (CBLU), a duly cases registered labor association, filed a petition with the CFI Cebu for "recognition of stevedoring service and 1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 granting injunction" against the States Marine Corporation (SMC) "broad" jurisdiction to the Court of Industrial Relations and respondents (Tura et al.). The petition claimed CBLU (CIR) was curtailed by the passage of Republic Act No. was awarded a contract for the exclusive right of loading 875, known as the Industrial Peace Act , approved on and unloading of the cargoes of the vessel M/V Bisayas June 17, 1953, so as to limit the jurisdiction of the CIR to formerly owned by Elizalde & Co., though at the time of certain specific cases to the exclusion of the others. the filing of the petition it was owned and operated by SMC. 2. The jurisdiction of the CIR has been limited to the following cases: (1) when the labor dispute affects an M/V Bisayas would soon resume its voyage and it came industry which is indispensable to the national interest to the knowledge of CBLU that the stevedoring work will and is so certified by the President to the industrial be given by SMC to the other respondents in violation of court; (2) when the controversy refers to minimum the agreement between Mr. Gotianuy, Manager of SMC, wage under the Minimum Wage Law; (c) when it and Mr. Cababajay, President of CBLU. CBLU, therefore, involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued Labor Law; and (4) when it involves an unfair labor against SMU. practice. CFI Cebu ordered ex parte the issuance of the writ of 3. The present controversy is not one of the cases preliminary injunction. On the Sheriff's return of service enumerated above cognizable by the Court of Industrial of the writ of injunction, there was a note of this tenor: Relations. Hence, the CFI acted rightly in maintaining "States Marine Corp. was dissolve on Oct. 17, 1952" that it had jurisdiction to try and decide this case. Respondents (Tura et al.) filed a motion to dismiss on 3- year period allowed by the corporation law is only the ground that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the for the purpose of winding up its affairs subject matter of the action since the case involves an action of a labor union against management and 4. CBLU seeks to enforce the stevedoring agreement therefore falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the entered into by CBLU and the Elizalde & Co. and Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). subsequently enforced and continued by SMC. However, when the petition was filed on September 12, The CFI denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that it 1953, the States Marine Corporation was no longer in had jurisdiction over the case. After trial, the CFI existence. recognized CBLU as the party with authority to render services of loading and unloading the cargoes on the 5. CBLU relied on the provision of Section 77 of the M/V Melliza (formerly the M/V Bisayas). The CFI found Corporation Law in its stand to include the said that Mr. Joseph Gotianuy, President of the Royal Lines corporation as party respondent. Said Section 77 reads: (the company operating the M/V Melliza) agreed verbally to award the stevedoring work to CBLU. Such "SEC. 77. Every corporation whose charter expires by its agreement was made orally because it was not the own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, practice to put such kind of agreement in writing. or whose corporate existence for other purposes is Document1 Page 1 of 2 205 terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and of enabling it gradually to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established."
6. The idea clearly manifested in the limitation "but not
for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established" is that the 3- year period allowed by the corporation law is only for the purpose of winding up its affairs. It appearing that States Marine Corporation was already dissolved at the time said petition was filed, and the vessel subject of the agreement having changed hands, [SMC] cannot be compelled now to respect such agreement specially considering the fact that it cannot even be made a party to this suit (Sec. 1, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court).
Decision cannot be enforced against those not made
proper parties to the case
7. CBLU contends that it seeks the enforcement of the
agreement entered into by Joseph Gotianuy as manager of the Royal Lines, Inc. We must bear in mind the provision of Section 7 of Rule 3, regarding indispensable parties, and that the Royal Lines, Inc., has not been made a party to this case. The decision making the award in favor of CBLU [not] enforceable against the States Marine Corporation cannot now be altered to suit CBLU's defense by interpreting it to include those who should have been the real parties in interest.