LETTERS AND PAPERS

REVISITING THE DERRIDA AFFAIR WITH

BARRY SMITH

BARRY SMITH, INTERVIEWED BY JEFFREY SIMS

Centre for the Study of Religion
University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

PREFARATORYREMARKSBY JEFFREY SIMS

In 1982, Priit J. Vesilind asked the Mayor of East Berlin, Erhard
Krack, a question of political and ethical importance:
'What would happen if the Wall were taken down?' ...
'What you are asking,' he replied with agitation, 'is a philo-
sophical question. Let us get back to reality."
Ten years later, in 1992, conspicuous intellectual differences
exposed Cambridge University to the scrutiny of the academic
world, as well as to the free press. Conscientous objection from
Professor Barry Smith and 18 others ensured a period of debate in
the English press pertaining to issues of academic freedom, and
academic responsibility. My own philosophical interests led me to
investigate the letter which Smith submitted to The Times
(London) letters page, 9 May, 1992, along with eighteen other sig-
natures from renowned philosophers, each objecting to the hon-
orary degree which Cambridge was about to award Jacques
Derrida.
On the more obvious front, Smith's letter to The Times is con-
gruent with the efforts of four senior dons who announced a 'non-
placet' vote when the proposed degree was originally announced in
March, 1992. The declarations came from David Hugh Mellor, Ian
Jack, Raymond Ian Page, and Henry H. Erskine-Hill. As will

Sophia Vo138 No 2 1999, September-October. 142

 become clearer, though, when the senior members of Cambridge
had gathered in March to discuss their honorary degrees for that
year, Barry Smith had a gathering of his own to attend in Budapest.
Here was an international conference, sponsored by the Hegeler
Institute, held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Many of the
conference papers were later collected and edited by Smith in a
book for the Monist Library of Philosophy, titled, Philosophy And
Political Change In Eastern Europe. 2 We will note that the interests
which had originally spawned the organization of this conference,
and of this book, also became Barry Smith's chief motivation for
entering into the 'affair' which was just then developing at
Cambridge.
While Smith's letter has been esteemed for its sober defence
of philosophy, it has also been viewed as rather notorious by
Derrida and postmodern sympathizers. More recently, John D.
Caputo refers to Smith's letter on at least two ocassions. First, in
his book, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, and then
more thoroughly in, Deconstruction In A Nutshell, both pub-
lished in 1997. 3 Aspects of the latter work will be depicted in the
closing remarks below. Caputo and others have shown that
although the events in question happened in 1992, there has
been ongoing interest in Barry Smith's letter to The Times.
Smith's letter has been referred to on a number of different occa-
sions (annually) since its publication in The Times in 1992, but
it ocurred to me that few of us had heard from Smith himself as
to why the letter was drafted. This presentation may provide for
further insight into issues which influenced our intellectual
interests at the beginning of the decade, and must continue to do
so where the various boundaries within philosophy and phe-
nomenology are at issue.
Without pre-empting the details of Barry Smith's forthright
letter, I will save further discussion for my concluding remarks.
After having contacted Smith at the State University of New York
at Buffalo, we agreed to meet and discuss the matter in more detail.
What follows are my inquiries, and his account, of his letter to The
Times letters page, 9 May, 1992.

143
INTERVIEW WITH BARRY SMITH

December 15th, 1997

How are we to understand the background to the letter which, you,
Barry Smith, published in The London "lqmes letters page, 4 May
9tb, 1992, obiecting to Cambridge University, England awarding
Jacques Derrida an honorary degree?
I will tell you something about my background - perhaps that
will help you to understand the letter. I read mathematics and phi-
losophy as an undergraduate in Oxford, where my philosophical
studies were of a more or less straightforwardly British analytical
sort, focusing on the philosophy of mathematics and logic. The pro-
fessor that I was most taken with at Oxford was Michael Dummett.
Although I didn't agree with everything he said, he was the most
impressive figure there because he was the most passionate of all the
intelligent Oxford philosophers - he didn't treat philosophy as a
game. In part because of Dummett's influence I became interested
in Continental philosophy: I associated Frege with Germany. I read
a lot of French philosophy originally, and then some German phi-
losophy, and I gradually gravitated towards Austria and Eastern
Europe.

When you suggest that Dummett did not 'treat philosophy as a

game" could you be more specific? Who, or, what kinds of philos-
ophizing, are you thinking o~. I somehow doubt that you feel this
way towards Wittgenstein, for example.
Some, at least, of the philosophy dons at Oxford gave the
impression - castigated by Ernest Gellner in his Words And Things
- that philosophy is a time-filling activity of a sort suitable for gen-
tlemen. Wittgenstein, of course, falls well clear of this group, but the
same cannot be said of some of his followers.

What exactly were you reading in terms of French thought?

Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Camus - nothing out of the
ordinary for that period. But I rapidly became more and more inter-
ested in Central and Eastern European philosophy, and more specif-
ically in Austrian philosophy. Over the years I became friendly with

144
quite a number of philosophers in Eastern Europe. I collaborated
with a number of people in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic
(as it is now called), and I travelled a lot there, as well as in Austria
and Germany. I later obtained a job at the University of Manchester.
Actually, I inherited the position of my former supervisor, Wolfe
Mays. Manchester was at that stage practically speaking the only
university in England where phenomenology was studied. Wolfe is
still alive, and he is still the editor of the Journal of the British
Society for Pbenomenology. Now, of course, there are many more
English philosophers interested in Continental thought, but at that
stage there was just him and a very few others.

H o w long did you remain in Manchester, tben?

I worked in Manchester for ten years, but again, I spent quite
a bit of time travelling in Europe and I had a number of regular vis-
itors from Europe while I was working in England.
In that period - the seventies and early eighties - there were
many young philosophers in Eastern Europe who were truly excit-
ed about philosophical ideas, and who were just then learning for
the first time about some of the best things which philosophy has to
offer. In Prague or Warsaw or Ljubljana there was a new atmos-
phere of philosophical enthusiasm. You could really argue philo-
sophically and about philosophy. My book, Austrian Philosophy, s
grew out of my work in this period. It is a study of the leading fig-
ures in the philosophy in central and Eastern Europe over the last
hundred years. It begins with Brentano and includes also some dis-
cussion of the Vienna Circle. But its main focus is philosophy in
Prague and Cracow, Graz and Lemberg. Many of my other publi-
cations, too, have been devoted to the rich contributions of Eastern
European philosophy, among which I include not only the work of
Polish philosophers such as Ingarden and Leniewski, but also that
of Husserl, Carnap, Mach, and phenomenologists such as Patocka.

In light of the fact that you are intimately connected with the pbe-
nomenological movement in this way, as well as the co-editor of the
Cambridge Companion to Husserl (199S), it should not surprise us
that you might object, not only to Derrida's honorary degree, but to
his reading of Husserl as well.

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 Yes. Certainly some of the many criticisms of Derrida's work
are not based on a scholarly understanding of the relevant literature
to which Derrida is reacting. But I have endeavored to be a serious
critic of Derrida. I have taken the trouble to read his work - though
in this respect I bow to the superior wisdom of scholars such as
Kevin Mulligan and J.Claude Evans. I think that Claude Evans'
book, Strategies of Deconstruction, on Derrida's reading of
Husserl, is a brilliant expos~ of Derrida's shoddy way with texts. 6
Mulligan's essay, 'How Not to Read: Derrida on Husserl,' drives
the point home even further and it is a strange fact that the Derrida
industry has still not replied to Mulligan and Evans.

You just mentioned your supervisor Wolfe Mays. As I recall, he

published a review of Derrida's La Voix et le ph6nom~ne. 7 He
praised Derrida for "this lucid little book' and commented on its
"clarity.' Yet you charge Derrida with a lack of clarity and rigour
and this, it seems, is the hallmark of your letter to The Times. Was
there much discrepency between yourself and Mays when it came
to the assessment of French (or Continental) thinking?
You must bear in mind that Mays came to Continental philos-
ophy at a time when it was still almost unknown in the English-
speaking world. Like Marvin Farber in the United States, he adopt-
ed a welcoming stance towards French and German thought in gen-
eral. Over time, however, philosophers could choose what is of value
in the work of different philosophers, irrespective of their national
origin. And this also means they can reject what is bad or harmful.
There is, incidentally, a counterpart to the earlier welcoming stance
to all that is Continental in the similar welcoming stance to all that
is analytic on the part of some German philosophers.

And you have lectured on, for example, Heidegger, have you not?
I have taught courses on Continental philosophy, on
Contemporary European Thought, and these courses have included
large sections on Heidegger. I think Heidegger is an important
thinker, for all his faults. But it was Roman Ingarden who was my
first real discovery among the Continental philosophers. 8 I per-
suaded my tutor in Oxford to let me work for a whole term on
Ingarden. Ingarden is, after Tarski, the most prominent Polish

146
philosopher of the twentieth century. He wrote a series of important
works on aesthetics and ontology which are well respected by lead-
ing phenomenologists, though most of his major philosophical
works on ontology or metaphysics are, unfortunately, still not
translated into English. This is one of the reasons why people are
more aware of Heidegger than they are of Ingarden.

I wonder to what degree, and in what way, you connect Heidegger's

beatry tbougbt with Derrida's "play'? What sort of distinctions will
you allow, or make, between Heidegger and Derrida?
Well, Heidegger is, first of all, the more original thinker. There
is, leaving aside a lot of meaningless banter, and even with the best
of intentions, very little in Derrida that you cannot find already in
Heidegger or Nietzsche. There is a wonderful book, entitled French
Philosophy of the Sixties, written by two French philosophers, Alain
Renault and Luc Ferry (1990) which is a thorough treatment of con-
temporary French philosophical obscurities. One of its aims is to
show how much of the latter originates in Nietzsche. Derrida seeks
to deconstruct familiar binary opposites, such as that between seri-
ous and playful (recall Nietzsche! Joyful Science). Nietzsche, we can
say, had interesting and original things to say about this opposition,
and he said them in full Germanic seriousness. Heidegger's dis-
paraging of what he calls 'everydayness' and of modern technology
is, I believe, pernicious, but there is at least a discernible value-sys-
tem underlying it. In the case of Derrida, one knows that even if one
makes the effort to penetrate to the putative core of his verbose
denunciations of everything phallo logo centric, one will find noth-
ing there. It may be fun for clever people to deconstruct the opposi-
tion between honesty and dishonesty, between originality and pla-
giarism, between sanity and insanity, between good literature and
trash, and between truth and castration. But it is less fun to see the
effects of such intellectual shananigans in the wider society.

Does not Heidegg~r still bare a good deal of respect for the prob-
lematic "interpretation" of science, and the role that science plays
in philosophizing? I am thinking of, for example, his Marburg lec-
tures, ca. 1928 and other works to do with issues of logic and tbe
human sciences.

147
 The phenomenological movement before Heidegger was still
firmly part of scientific or seriously, argued philosophy. It was based
on reason and argument, and a philosophical concern with issues of
logic. This scientific phase of phenomenology is illustrated in the
work of Husserl and Ingarden, Reinach, Pfiinder, Daubert and
Geiger. But it was brought to an end by Heidegger. Today, of course,
there are a number of analytic philosophers who are working on
Husserl and other Continental figures, and who are bringing to life
once more a scientific attitude to the problems of phenomenology.
Analytic philosophy, I believe, has the right method, though it was
especially in its earlier phases often associated with reductionism
and nominalism. The best contemporary analytic philosophers take
the method, which is clarity of thought and respect for logic and sci-
ence, and apply it to metaphysical and epistemological issues inde-
pendently of these earlier reductionistic associations.

Yet some might also argue that analytic philosophy treats science as
a tbeoreticalgame or puzzle - far removed from human or existen-
tial realities. Roman Ingarden was perhaps tbe first to argue that
tbe verification principle of the logical positivists was itself unveri-
fiable, and therefore meaningless by its own conditions. How mucb
c a n we expect from science and logic to guide our moral and aes-
thetic sensibilities?
My approach to these matters, which is in the spirit of the
early realist phenomenologists, is as follows. Every subject matter,
be it that of numbers, or values, or mental experiences, admits of a
rigorous descriptive treatment on its own terms (admits of an ontol-
ogy, if you grant me this term). An ontology of human actions or of
works of art is not designed to guide our moral or aesthetic sensi-
bilities. Human actions and moral sensibilities are of course con-
nected, as also are works of art and aesthetic sensibilities. And the
ways they are connected are themselves susceptible to ontological
investigation. But the results of such investigations are not designed
to guide our sensibilities.

Perhaps now is a good time to examine just bow the "Cambridge

Affair" figures in the pbilosopbical worm you bave been speaking
or?.

148
 I was very much oriented around European concerns when I
wrote the letter. I was associated with Buffalo at that time, but not on
a full-time basis. After the letter was published I began to think about
moving full-time to the United States. But if you will notice, the
address on the letter is Liechtenstein, which was at that time my home.
When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, everything
changed. Eastern European philosophers were able to travel much
more easily, and they were able to read whatever they wanted. All
sorts of new publishing ventures were set up with lots of hastily
assembled plans to translate hitherto unavailable works of Western
philosophy into Russian, Polish, or Czech. It was, as you can imag-
ine, a very exciting time. But there was unfortunately one phenom-
enon which made itself strongly felt in all of these countries, includ-
ing Russia, in the period in question. This was the assumption that
the Communist world view, with all of its evils - recall the
Heideggerian theory of the equivalence of Communist, National
Socialist and American technocratic civilizations - represents in
some sense the culmination of the scientific worldview of Western
rationalistic philosophy. Thus it was held that if you reject
Communism, then you have to reject truth and reason also, because
Communism is all of this and more. The end of Communism signi-
fies also the end of Western reason which must be replaced by one
or another wholly different form of thought - in fact with one or
another form of nihilism. As a result, one of the first phenomena to
spread like wildfire through Eastern European intellectual circles
when the Berlin Wall came down was Derrida. Derrida's work was
translated into all of the Eastern European languages almost
overnight. He was awarded prizes, invited to lecture - he was a star
- people adopted and aped his views unquestioningly. The Prague
philosopher, B~lohradsk defended a nihilist view very similar to that
of Derrida on the grounds I have just described, a view very effec-
tively summarized in Jan Paulik's essay in the volume Philosophy
and Political Change in Eastern Europe.

Namely, the view that the fall of Communism also represents the
fall of Western philosophy, truth and reason?
Yes. And during this time I would remonstrate with my
friends in Eastern Europe insisting that they, or their compatriots,

149
 were making a mistake, and that to reject Communism does not
mean to reject the entire edifice of Western reason. They them-
selves had impressive native philosophical cultures of their own,
independent of the tradition of Hegel, Marx, Lenin and Lukfics.
Carnap spent much of his early career in Prague; Twardowski,
Leniewski, Tarski constituted an impressive tradition in Lemberg
and Warsaw; Christian von Ehrenfels, the inventor of Gestalt
Psychology, was a leading philosopher in Prague for many decades,
and so on. So I tried to convince them that they should look to
their own traditions, if only on grounds of sheer curiosity. I would
then add, in support of all of this, that some of the best philosophy
that is being done in the world at that time was being done in
England - and that in England and in English-Language philoso-
phy, Derrida was not taken seriously at all. England, I thought, still
enjoyed a healthy philosophical environment, one that had not
been swayed at all by the verbosity of Derrideanism. Thus I was
quite taken aback when I saw a small announceent in The Times
that Cambridge University had offered Derrida an honorary
degree. I became incensed by this. I had friends in Cambridge who
held views similar to mine, and I was working to some degree in
tandem with some of the people in Cambridge on the non placet
side, though I was clearly concerned not to do anything that might
have undermined their own efforts. So I drafted the letter and set
about assembling the signatures - quite a difficult business given
that the vote was to take place within a matter of days. But again,
I was at that time passionately concerned for the state of philoso-
phy in Eastern Europe, and I think that I had good reason for this
concern. In a piece entitled, 'The New European Philosophy,'
which appears as a short epilogue to the volume, Philosophy and
Political Change m Eastern Europe, I discuss the role of philoso-
phy in the reform movements of the late eighties in different
Eastern European countries. My piece addresses the question:
'what should Eastern European philosophers do, now that they are
at last free to choose a tradition from a much wider range of
options? Should they remain loyal to native traditions? Should
they join one or other of the larger traditions such as, for example,
that of France, or Germany, or America?' My answer, very rough-
ly, is that Eastern and Central Europe has a set of rich philosophi-

150
cal traditions of its own, a tradition that, with the inevitable wan-
ing of the influence of Francophone philosophy of the sort peddled
by M. Derrida, is predestined to join ancient philosophy and the
philosophy of British empiricism as an important precursor of con-
temporary analytic philosophy.

13 o f the 18 signatures which you gathered came from European

scholars. How many people, roughly, did you ask to sign the letteg,
and were American signatures harder to come bye.
I should say that I tried to make contact with some 30 peo-
ple. Searle was an obvious candidate given his published criticism
of Derrida's incoherence, but I couldn't get a response from him in
time. Roderick Chisholm was another person that I especially
wanted to have on the list but he refused. His argument was that
America should not serve as the world's police force, and that was,
in fact, the main reason why people declined to sign the letter: they
did not want to interfere. I have a number of friends in Paris who
I know denounce Derrida as much as I do, and I was hoping to get
more French signatures. But we have to keep in mind that some of
them are neighbors of Derrida; they see him regularly in the build-
ing where they work. One leading French thinker, Ren6 Thom,
signed. Incidently, John Caputo's recent attacks on the letter in his
book Deconstruction in a Nutshell, are based on the suggestion
that the signatories of the letter - which included not only
Armstrong but also Quine - were attempting to simulate a fake
eminence.

What about Jacques Bouveresse? He is a significant French

philosopher working on the likes of Wittgenstein and post-analyt-
ic thinking. Was be asked to sign the letterq.
There is no love lost between Bouveresse and Derrida. (The
former, incidently, is currently giving lectures on the topic of
Austrian philosophy in the Coll~ge de France.) Suffice it to say that
there were short-term reasons why prominent French analytic
philosophers were not then in a position to sign the letter, for reasons
having to do with the work of a committee on the teaching of phi-
losophy in schools on which both Derrida and Bouveresse held
prominent positions.

151
Derrida also suggested that your letter was motivated, in part, by
an earlier attempt made by Ruth Barcan Marcus, who twenty
years before bad written a letter to the French government protest-
ing his appointment to the International College of Philosophy. To
what extent, if any, are these two affairs related?
There have been a number of situations where Derrida has
been under attack by Anglo-American philosophers. The affair
involving Barcan Marcus is only one such case. She was, I believe,
asked by the French authorities to write a report on plans laid out
by the International College of Philosophy in Paris. She said the
plans were a bad idea and gave reasons for her view. These reasons
were taken by Derrida to be a personal attack on himself. This is a
characteristic all too commonly encountered among French
thinkers of a certain sort. If you criticize their arguments, or their
projects, or their strategies, or their theses, they take this to be an
attack on their person. The same phenomenon is illustrated in the
recent reactions of Julia Kristeva to criticisms of the misuse of sci-
ence in her work by Bricmont and Sokal. 9 This feature is not so
often encountered in English or American philosophy. But certain-
ly Barcan Marcus did not help me in any way. I didn't have any con-
tact with her until after I had completed writing the letter, though
she is included as one of the signatories of the letter and I admire
her earlier intervention.

Perhaps the personal attacks you speak of are felt more readily in
philosophies which are existentially motivated as opposed to those
which are scientifically and mathematically oriented? I do not sug-
gest that these orientations are mutually exclusive, but that they do
help to dig the trench between, for example, Anglo-American and
Continental philosophy.
This may well be true, and I think it is clear where my sym-
pathies lie. I do however see some validity in the thesis that ana-
lytic philosophers have paid too little attention to certain sorts of
problems more prominently dealt with by their existentialist
counterparts. Now with respect to Derrida, I don't think that you
can even begin to formulate a defence of Derrida by saying that
he is trying to save metaphysics from the rigorous nature of ana-
lytic philosophy. That just does not fit, and it does not fit for this

152
reason most of all: just as analytic philosophy has witnessed a
renaissance in recent years of work in political philosophy, soci-
ety, ethics, theories of justice, and these areas of human inquiry,
so in recent years has analytic philosophy experienced a revival of
metaphysical theorizing. Analytic metaphysics is probably the
most vibrant branch of analytic philosophy that there is today.

In any case, it seems odd that a symbol o[ the cold w a r - the Berlin
W a l l - could be identified so haphazardly with Western rationali-
ty. How do you account [or the exaggerated association o[
Communism with Western rationality?
Remember, the view which B~lohradsk in Prague was
defending, a view very much in the air at the time the Wall col-
lapsed, to the effect that Communism is part of, is indeed the cul-
mination of, the Western scientific world view. Philosophy as a
whole is hereby filtered through the Marxist canon: the history
of Western reason, and the Western scientific enlightenment has
as its central axis a line, beginning with Kant, Fichte, and Hegel,
of which Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Luk~ics, etc. represent the
continuation, with the French (but never the Scottish)
Enlightenment (les Lumibres) ocassionally being thrown in for
good measure. From this perspective it is, of course, very easy to
confuse Western reason, on the one hand, with the Communist
philosophical tradition on the other. If, now, Communism is
repudiated in the streets, then it is easy to move on to the thesis
that Western reason is also repudiated - that you should give up
Western reason. Now, the young philosophers of Eastern Europe
are not going to become adherents of the Peruvian Shining Path,
so Derrida, and other forms of irrationalism begin to seem very
appealing. Consequently, the letter which I submitted to The
Times pulled a number of people out of the woodwork and
caused them to write down their own views about the subject;
some of them made important points that I would have liked to
have made. For instance, that if you eliminate truth and reason -
if you eliminate argument then naked power is going to be the
-

only thing left over as the means by which decisions can be made
in society.

153
 The vote was held on May 16tb, and your letter appeared in The
Times on Saturday, 9 May, 1992. Were time and space constraints
imposed upon you, and wbat constraints did you perhaps [eel in
general?
The newspaper was very careful not to print anything that
could become the basis of a law suit, so I was on the phone for long
periods with The Times" lawyer going through the final draft, word
for word. The original version was much stronger, but I think the
end result is still quite effective. If the letter seems a bit over-careful,
that is the reason. The intent of the letter was to criticise the content
and method of Derrida's work and the fact that we used the press to
do this, rather than a scientific journal, does not seem to me to be
very relevant given that the reason we were doing this had to do with
a certain sort of public event where the press was properly involved.
The press was, in any case, recording the event. Of all the writings
about this 'affair' it seems that this letter brought forth the most
responses. But of course the affair itself was the major stimulus to all
the media interest, and the letter was responsible for only one small
tributary in a much greater river of print. The letter was reprinted in
many newspapers with translations into several European lan-
guages. The text spread as far as Sydney, Australia, where David
Armstrong, one of my signatories, as well as being an analytic
philosopher of world renown, is something of a local hero.

The letter was also reprinted in a slim, and animated book, called,
Derrida For Beginners? ~ Derrida, of course, finds the letter uncare-
fuL He bas alluded to tbe idea that you and others were meddling
in the internal affairs of Cambridge University. What affiliations
bare you bad, or do you bare, witb Cambridge, and bow do you
respond to this accusation?
This suggestion was made also by some of the people I
approached who did not want to sign the letter. The danger was
that the letter might make people vote for Derrida, just because they
were irritated by it. I did some careful thinking about this problem
before making a final decision to proceed. To see why I did agree to
go ahead, we need to go back to the first part of your question. I
studied in Oxford, but I have a number of friends in Cambridge. I
am also (pompous and old-fashioned though this might sound)

154
someone who believes that there are times when you need to go into
battle for what is right. Why is Derrida's influence important? This
influence has confined itself, after all, almost exclusively to depart-
ments of English Literature, of Comparative Literature, of Film
Studies, and the like. It is not something that is taken seriously in
the wider world, though it is worth bearing in mind that students
in those departments, the followers of deconstructionist 'theory',
become the English teachers of the future. We can presume that they
will have little interest in encouraging schoolchildren under their
care to acquire a love of literature or a respect for the rules of gram-
mar. People won't die, of course; but there is something like a spir-
itual death, as when a psychopath throws acid at a Rembrandt
painting. It not for nothing that Derrida has been accused of ter-
rorist obscurantism.

What would be your views, then, on the commensurability (or not)

between literature and pbilosopby?
If you read Roman Ingarden's The Literary Work of Art, you
have a fair summary of my view on this matter. I think he is exact-
ly right, and this work was one of the most important influences in
my own philosophical development. The literary work, Ingarden
shows, is an object of rigorous philosophical investigation in its
own right, as are literary genres, the relations between work,
author, readers, borderline cases of the literary work, the linguistic
meanings conveyed by literary works, the aesthetic qualities of lit-
erary works, and the metaphysical qualities characteristic, for
example, of tragic or comic works.

In a similar vein, what differences do you see between what is now

so often called "theory" and what is called "philosophy'?
Well, if you go to very many universities in North America
today, including my own university, you'll find many departments
devoted to 'Comparative Literature.' You will also find 'Critical
Theory Institutes' and 'Humanities Centers' which contain shad-
ows of other more traditional departments within the university.
They treat works of philosophy - or it might also be works of
jurisprudence, history, politics, or theological and religious works,
or nowadays even medical works - not as works of philosophy,

155
law, theology, religion, or medicine, but as texts.., as works of lit-
erature. And this has become quite an 'industry.' There are proba-
bly more philosophical texts read in Comparative Literature
departments in the United States than in most philosophy depart-
ments. But as far as philosophy is concerned, these shadow practi-
tioners often have little notion of what philosophy is, or of what a
philosophical argument or thesis is, and they have no training in
the history of philosophy. Rather they have their own methods,
many of which stem from a cancerous form of Derridian thought
which they apply to 'texts.' It's like somebody taking an interest in
sailing boats without ever knowing that there is such a thing as
water. They have sailing boats, and they polish them, and they
raise and lower the mast, and so on. But there is no understanding
of what the sailing boats are for and as a consequence of this they
never venture near water.

Wateg, then, is the extra-linguistic referent which indicates a worm

beyond the text?
Yes, although even to put it that way is still to imply that there
are two worlds: the world of the text over here and the world of
reality over there. If that is what is meant then that is also a flawed
view of the matter.
Is tbis dualistic view not also prevalent in much of analytic phi-
losophy, and does it not stem, in part, from the linguistic turn?
Yes, the same flawed view is present there also. The linguistic
turn was a bad mistake and even the more recent cognitive turn was
a bad mistake. As Husserl himself said, we need to go back to the
things themselves, including we ourselves as part of the world of the
things and thingly structures. In other words, what we need is an
ecological turn which is neither linguistic nor cognitive. We need to
see human beings as embrangled with other physical and biological
objects in a single world.

Derrida called your involvement an "infringement of Academic

Freedom," never before witnessed. In anotber passage be referred to
it as a "loss of self-controL'Although Derrida is often prone to such
exaggerations, is tbere any trutb to tbe idea that aspects of acade-
mic freedom are being compromised by your letter?.

156
 With respect to the issue of academic freedom, I believe that we
need to think more carefully about the responsibilities which go
hand in hand with the rights that academic freedom brings. These
responsibilities are listed by the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) as including: the careful use of the scientific
method and reasoned argument in the search for truth. H I believe
that there is a shirking of these responsibilities in the writings of
those such as Derrida, who deny the basis of truth, reason and the
scientific method, upon which Western institutions of higher learn-
ing are founded. Derrida and his followers claim a right to academ-
ic freedom, but they deny the very possibility of academic responsi-
bility.

Did you do anything else, beyond the letter itself, to dissuade

Cambridge voters from giving Derrida his degree? For example,
radio or lectures?
I was approached by the BBC for a short interview, but that
was a day or so after the vote. The only thing I did during the cam-
paign was write the letter and collect the signatories. I didn't make
any phone calls to try and persuade people to change their vote.
Some of my English friends did this - people who had close con-
tacts with Cambridge - but at that time I was far away in the mid-
dle of Europe, though I did follow the media response as best I
could. I toyed with the idea of writing a second letter, along the
lines of: 'Cambridge University is to be congratulated for a wise
decision. It has determined that M. Derrida is worth 2/3rds of an
honorary degree.' After the affair was over I gave several different
lectures which comprised a series of arguments against Derrida.
One of these was titled 'Jacques Derrida: Writing to Death.' I also
gave a series of public lectures in Buffalo entitled 'Continental
Drift: T h e Decline of European Philosophy from Brentano to
Derrida.'

Because you are the editor of The Monist, your letter appears to
represent the intent of this publication. How would you describe
the basic intent of The Monist, and what are the polemical limits
of this journal?

157
 The Monist does not defend any specific line or tradition.
It describes itself as an 'International Quarterly Journal of
General Philosophical Inquiry,' and the emphasis is on the word
'general.' It differs from most other journals insofar as each
issue is devoted to some special topic, and each issue has a spe-
cial advisory editor who helps me put the issue together. I have
a very wide focus. For example, we have published issues on
highly technical, mathematical topics, on death, on Analytical
Thomism, and most recently, on the topic: 'Continental
Philosophy: For & Against.'
To the degree that The Monist has become more polemical
under my editorship, it has done so through issues which take both
sides of an argument. In 1994 I published a polemical issue on
'Feminist Epistemology: For and Against.' One half of the issue con-
sists of papers arguing (roughly) that women's contribution to sci-
ence has been neglected in part because of 'bad' philosophy of sci-
ence - because of an inadequate epistemology - and that 'good'
epistemology would enable women to reveal their true scientific
greatness. The other half consists of papers by those who see science
and the philosophy of science in terms which are quite independent
of gender, and of gender issues. I believe the issue, for all its polem-
ical character, gives a reasonable presentation of both sides of the
problem.

It might be interesting to note who, or what kinds of people,

Barry Smith might consider for an honorary degree in philoso-
phy, and bow you [eel about the concept o[ an bonorary degree
in general?
I believe the only rule one needs is rather simple. If hon-
orary degrees are to be awarded, then only in those circum-
stances where the faculty in the relevant discipline are themselves
overwhelmingly convinced that the candidate deserves an honour
of this sort.

Your letter was written in 1992, and it is now 1997. What do you
perceive to be the state o[ affairs in Eastern European circles today
and have you been able to perceive any immediate effects from
your letter and lectures over the past five years?

I58
 Eastern European philosophy is gradually becoming merged
into the various strands of European philosophy, including the ana-
lytic strand, but also including much else. There are still few Eastern
European philosophers who are taking the trouble to study their
own native traditions of exact philosophy; but this is not, I think, a
consequence of Derrida. It has to do in part with a lack of local
resources, which leads the best young philosophers in these coun-
tries to seek careers elsewhere. In Eastern Germany it has to do with
the way in which West German philosophers have overwhemingly
been appointed to newly vacant positions.

As you saw it at that time, what was to be gained from this

endeavor, and, given that the degree was awarded, has anything
been lost ~.
What was to be gained? We laid down a marker, a signal,
which we know gave hope to some, and made others recognize that
not everyone was going to buy into the very questionable proce-
dures behind Derrida's honorary degree. Future administrators will
be wary before engaging in similar tactics (in this case, that of pack-
ing the honorary degrees with non-philosophers and failing to sub-
mit Derrida's nomination to the philosophers at an early stage).
Many minds have been corroded by Derridean acid. Many of these
minds enjoy tenured positions in English Literature departments in
universities throughout the English-speaking world. There will, as a
result, be a sort of hangover to be dealt with for many years to
come. Already however one is beginning to see signs of the usual
phenomenon when a sectarian movement gains power - the move-
ment splits into warring sub-factions. I don't think that English
Literature departments are very happy places at the moment. For a
time it was still just funny to talk about phallologocentrism in
Plato's hymen, but not all of this is funny today and the humanities
generally are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit students into
their courses. Was anything lost? Not much actually. The Times'
Letters Page is geared precisely towards issues such as this. It is a
noble and venerable institution with which I am proud to have been
associated.

159
 REMARKS BY JEFFREY SIMS
In Deconstruction In A Nutshell, John Caputo is ready to celebrate
the idea that many of those found on Smith's list of signatories may
not have even read Derrida adequately) 2 This might be a reasonable
concern, although it may be difficult for Caputo to know just how
much of Derrida these philosophers have actually read. Clearly, as
Barry Smith points out, some have read more of Derrida (J. Claude
Evans, John Searle, and Kevin Mulligan) while others admit to hav-
ing read less. The issue at hand has much to do with the trajectory
of phenomenology instigated by Husserl and taken up through
Heidegger and his French legacy, as well as the phenomenological
realists of which Smith is an integral part. Thinkers such as Calvin
Schrag 13 and Bruce Wilshire have also attempted to show that
Derrida's reading of Husserl may not add much insight to the wide-
spread conversation spawned by the Husserlian tradition. As
Wilshire writes of Derrida's school, 'Much 'deconstructionist'
thinking in English and literature departments in the U.S. has
proven to be little more than a fad, for caught up in a jargon it has
lost touch with the very tradition which lent it sense and direction:
the recuperation of vital possibilities of philosophical growth and
coherence in the positions of past Continental thought. 't4 The 'sense
and direction' which Wilshire makes reference to is really the key
element in this debate and is without question one reason why
Smith felt compelled to get involved.
Caputo expresses moral indignation at 'the very idea!' that
Smith could intervene in affairs which have little to do with him, or
Liechtenstein (where Smith was a Professor of Philosophy at the
International Academy of Philosophy from 1989-93)/s Caputo
writes, 'To begin with, we may ask, who had appointed the signato-
ries protectors of Cambridge University?...Are the dons not adult
enough to be able to make up their own minds? '16 Much of this seems
rhetorical, however, for it is far from clear that intellectual confusion
exhibits a lack of adulthood. During the events of the Cambridge
affair in 1992, Michael W. Miller reported, 'A Marxist social histori-
an came by for tea and told us that his phone had been ringing all
week with bewildered chemists and physicists seeking advice on how
to vote that Saturday. '17 So I suppose the answer is that, indeed, many

160
 of the dons were confused, not because they lacked 'adult' intellectu-
al maturity, as Caputo suggests, but because the issue of Derrida and
philosophy is less than self-evident to many. Here the dons sought the
expertise of others already involved in the debate.
From the perspective of Continental philosophy, missing in the
entire debate between post-analytic realism and deconstructionism
are the contributions of Hans-Georg Gadamer whose own post-
Heideggerian work has been suppressed by Derridean deconstruc-
tion. Any attempt at philosophical bridge building is thwarted so long
as we let Caputo convince us that deconstruction, in its exploration
into the 'meanings and use of words' makes for a better analytic phi-
losophyJ s The Gadamerian question of language, its universalizing
character; its capacity to make meaningful reference to the world is all
overshadowed and downplayed by Derridean semiotics. One might
imagine that where Continental philosophers hope to engage active-
ly in the practical questions of science and language, Gadamer's work
makes better sense than does deconstruction. Seldom does Derrida
engage in the intersubjective realms of philosophy which lie between
his own deconstruction and any other philosophical tradition. This
indifference was evident at the Goethe Institute in Paris in 1981 when
those interested in Gadamer's philosophical hermenentics attempted
to dialogue with deconstructionism. Here, some of us may recall
Derrida's 'manifestly bored and condescending response to
Gadamer's attempt to understand, criticize, and enter into dialogue
with deconstruction. '19 The aim of this conference was to seat decon-
struction at the same table with those interested in Gadamer's philo-
sophical hermeneutics. It seemed reasonable enough, since both
schools stem from similar sources, namely Husserl and Heidegger
However, the following comment from Derrida which came at the
outset of the preceedings sounded more like 'closing remarks' on any
form of dialogue. They did not sound like remarks from a philoso-
pher who is sincerely interested in the views of his colleagues; even
those who share a familiar background:
During the lecture and ensuing discussion yesterday evening, I
began to ask myselfif anything was taking place here other than
improbable debates, counter-questioning, and inquiries into
urdindable objects of thought - to recall some of the formula-
tions we heard. I am still asking myself this question.2~

161
 Derrida's reaction to Barry Smith's letter was even more inter-
esting, but no less rhetorical. It is reminiscent of his 1987 response
to the exposure of Paul de Man's anti-semitic war-time journalism
published between 1939-43. 21 Derrida tells us that de Man, under
considerable politico-philosophical pressures, as well as the influ-
ence of his uncle Henri de Man, was a victim of media temptation.
' N o doubt [writes Derrida] flattered to see himself entrusted with
the literary and artistic column of a major newspaper, even if he
owed this fortune (or misfortune) to his uncle Henri de Man, a
young man of 22 did not resist temptation. 'z2 This temptation also
resonates in Derrida's fundamental reaction to Smith's letter to The
Times, except that in this case the alleged "temptation of the media'
is made to seem even more serious than the ultimate 'undecidabili-
ty' of the de Man affair. When speaking of Smith and the others,
Derrida takes on an accusative tone which at the same time,
appears to lay out the rules and regulations for the academic use of
the media:
What certain academics should be warned against is the
temptation of the media. What I mean by this is not the nor-
mal desire to address a wider public, because there can be in
that desire an authentically democratic and legitimate politi-
cal concern. On the contrary, I call temptation of the media
the compulsion to misuse the priviledge of public declaration
in a social space that extends far beyond the circuits of nor-
mal discussion. Such misuse constitutes a breach of confi-
dence, an abuse of authority - in a word, an abuse of power.
The temptation of the media actually encourages academics
to use the media as an easy and immediate way of obtaining
a certain power of seduction, sometimes indeed just power
alone. It enourages them to appear in the media simply for
the sake of appearing, or to use their professional authority
for purposes which have as little to do with the norms of
intellectual research as they have with political responsibility.
This temptation of the media encourages these intellectuals to
renounce the academic discipline normally required 'inside'
the university, and to try instead to exert pressure through the
press and through public opinion, in order to acquire an
influence or a semblance of authority that has no relation to
their own work. z3

162
 Much of this is simply distorted and rhetorical, for it is very
difficult for some of us to imagine just what, in fact, the 'circuits of
normal discussion' means to a postmodern thinker after all that
Derrida has told us about radical de-centering in the past thirty
years. It is difficult to understand why Smith's letter to The Times
represents an emphatic breach of confidence, an abuse of authority,
or an abuse of power, or why this bears 'no relation to [the signa-
tories'] work.' Derrida writes emphatically about the 'norms of
intellectual research' as if postmodernism has somehow demarcat-
ed the playful imagination of textual extravagances from the sort of
imagination that diligently seeks the disclosure of new knowledge
and further philosophical understandings.
We must also keep in mind that Smith's letter is not a mani-
festo presented to the English government, nor is it Smith and oth-
ers wanting to 'appear in the media simply for the sake of appear-
ing.' This seems no more than a convenient accusation with little
evidence to substantiate this claim. Quite contrary, the letter repre-
sents a philosophical position within the context of related events,
printed in a Saturday newspaper. As Barry Smith carefully points
out, the circuits of normal discussion were already in place owing
to D. H. Mellor and others in Cambridge when he entered into the
debate and Smith reminds us, "The Times" Letters Page is geared
precisely towards issues such as this.'
Here, Derrida loses sight of one important difference between
French and English philosophical cultures. Institutions like The
Times' Letters Page are very much English counterparts to the
French idea of the philosophe engage. Ved Mehta once described
the Letters page as a street where thinkers are able to stay in touch
with the politico-philosophical developments in England. It is a
street where the 'circuits of normal discussion' are deprived of their
usual stability and one should not expect to find mere salutations
here. How a deconstructionist could not appreciate the freedom
that this avenue provides is perhaps slightly ironic. Ved Mehta
once described the turbulence which The Times" Letters page
endures:
I've spent some happy years in Oxford, and to keep in touch
with England I read her newspapers. I am most at home with
the Guardian, but I also like to look at the correspondence

163
 columns of The Times, where, in an exception to The Times tra-
dition of anonymity, the writers are identified by name and
speak directly to the reader. I relish a contest of words, and The
Times page of letters becomes for me a street where I can stroll
each morning and see the people of England - lords and com-
moners - shake hands, spit at each other, and set off verbal bar-
rages. I began taking this engaging daily walk during my under-
graduate years at Balliol College, Oxford, and I've kept up the
habit, whether I have found myself in Paris, Damascus, New
Delhi, or New York. One autumn day in 1959, as I was taking
my intellectual promenade...24

Enter the dispute over Ernest Gellner's, Words & Things, a

controversial book which Gilbert Ryle refused to review for the
English journal, Mind, and which attacked the idea of linguistic
therapy, or the dissolution of philosophical problems. And like
Gellner's critique of the Ordinary Language school in Oxford,
deconstructionism now wants to assume the vacant position left by
the 'Night Watchman' who will protect us from all abuses of lan-
guage, including, I suppose, Smith's letter to The Times. It is not too
difficult to think of deconstructionism while reading the following
remark made by Gellner:
Linguistic Philosophy is conceived not merely as a therapy or
euthanasia, but also as prophylaxis, and as a prophylaxis
against a necessarily ever-present danger. The disease it wards
off is inherent in language: all language users will ever be tempt-
ed to misinterpret the various uses of their language in terms of
each other... This is the Night Watchman theory of philosophy:
it has no positive contribution of its own to make, but must ever
be on guard against possible abuses that would interfere with,
confuse, genuine knowledgeY

Political and philosophical concerns in Eastern Europe,

then, are what p r o m p t e d Smith to write his letter to The Times,
as well as a concern for the traditional problems of phenomenol-
ogy. The association of Western reason and Communism, for
example, is to most of us, a questionable one, but one that finds
support in the postmodern assumption that where oppressive
politics are found, so too will Western rationality (logocentrism)
be found beneath it all. Seldom does Derrida critically analyze

164
('deconstruct') his own rhetorical use of words such as totalitar-
ian, mastery, or envelopment. That a totalitarian regime operates
with a unifying structure, and feigns authenticity, no one doubts,
but that philosophy's comprehensive scope and critical regiment
are thus equatable to oppressive rationalizations is quite another
assertion. It could be reasonably argued that the history of phi-
losophy, with all of its structure, has been more liberating than
oppressive, so long as we do not ignore the interplay between
structure and creativity. This distinction seems never to be borne
out by deconstructors, now so concerned to become the 'Night
Watch' of our philosophical language. Kantian studies, from
pragmatic, Continental, and analytic quarters would suggest that
we can have (select and argue) our philosophical differences
without bowing to the extreme therapy, or totalizing agenda, of
deconstructionism. There must still be more left to philosophy
than 'improbable debates, counter-questioning, and inquiries
into unfindable objects of thought.' Consequently, while Derrida
is only mildly interested in the greater scope of philosophy, the 2
/3rds vote which Smith speaks of becomes a charitable gesture
indeed. Apart from Derrida's uncharitable reading of philosophy,
he has benefited from one of philosophy's finest qualities: an
empathetic Principle of Charity extended to him at Cambridge,
England, in 1992.

APPENDIX A
From The Times (London) Letters page, May 9, 1992.
Derrida degree a question of honor
From Professor Barry Smith and Others
Sir, The University of Cambridge is to ballot on May 16 on
whether M. Jacques Derrida should be allowed to go forward
to receive an honorary degree. As philosophers and others who
have taken a scholarly and professional interest in M. Derrida's
remarkable career over the years, we believe that the following
might throw some needed light on the public debate that has
arisen over the issue.
M. Derrida describes himself as a philosopher, and his

165
writings do indeed bear some of the marks of the writings in
that discipline. Their influence, however, has been to a striking
degree, almost entirely in the fields outside philosophy - in the
departments of film studies, for example, or French and English
literature.
In the eyes of philosophers, and certainly among those
working in leading departments of philosophy throughout the
world, M. Derrida's work does not meet accepted standards of
clarity and rigotm
We submit that, if the works of a physicist (say) were sim-
ilariliy taken to be of merit primarily by those working in other
disciplines, that would in itself be sufficient grounds for casting
doubt upon the idea that the physicist in question was a suitable
candidate for an honorary degree.
M. Derrida's career had its roots in the heady days of the
1960's and his writings continue to reveal their origins in that
period. Many of them seem to consist in no small part of elab-
orate jokes and the puns 'logical phallusies' and the like, and M.
Derrida seems to have come closer to making a career out of
what we regard as translating into the academic sphere tricks
and gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists or of the concrete
poets.
Certainly he has shown considerable originality in this
respect. But again, we submit, such originality does not lend cre-
dence to the idea that he is a suitable candidate for an honorary
degree. Many French philosophers see in M. Derrida only cause
for silent embarassment, his antics having contributed signifi-
cantly to the widespread impression that contemporary French
philosophy is little more than an object of ridicule.
M. Derrida's voluminous writings in our view stretch the
normal forms of academic scholarship beyond recognition.
Above all - as every reader can eaily establish for himself (and
for this purpose any page will do) - his works employ a written
style that defies comprehension. Many have been willing to give
M. Derrida the benefit of the doubt, insisting that language of
such depth and difficulty of interpretation must hide deep and
subtle thoughts indeed.
When the effort is made to penetrate it, however, it
becomes clear, to us at least, that, where coherent assertions are
being made at all, these are either false or trivial.
Academic status based on what seems to us to be little more

166
 than semi-intelligibleattacks upon the valuesof reason, truth, and
scholarship is not, we submit, sufficientgrounds for the awarding
of an honorary degreein a distinguisheduniversity.
Yours sincerely,
Barry Smith
(Editor, The Monist).

SIGNATORIES: Hans Albert (Universityof Mannheim), David

Armstrong (Sydney), Ruth Barcan Marcus (Yale), Keith
Campbell (Sydney), Richard Glauser (Neuchatel), Rudolph
Hailer (Graz), Massimo Mugnai (Florence), Kevin Mulligan
(Geneva), Lorenzo Pefia (Madrid), Willard Van Orman Quine
(Harvard), Wolfgang R6d (Innsbruck), Edmund Ruggaldier
(Innsbruck), Karl Schuhmann (Utrecht), Daniel Schulthess
(Neuchatel), Peter Simons (Salzburg), Ren~ Thom (Burs-sur-
Yvette), Dallas Willard (Los Angeles),Jan Wolenski (Crackow).

Internationale Akademie fiir Philosophie, Obergrass 75,

9494, Schaan, Liechtenstein,
May 6, 1992

NOTES
1 Priit J. Vesiland, 'Two Berlins: A Generation Apart,' in
National Geographic, vol. 161, no. 1, January 1982, p.4.
2 B. Smith, editor, Philosophy And Political Change In Eastern
Europe. Illinois: The Hegeler Institute, 1993.
3 John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida:
Religion Without Religion. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1997,
and Deconstruction In A Nutshell: A Conversation With
Jacques Derrida. New York: Fordham UP, 1997.
4 See Appendix A.
5 B. Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz
Brentano. Chicago: Open Court, 1994.
6 J. Claude Evans, Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida And
The Myth Of The Voice. Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Press, 1991.
7 The Review appears in, Philosophy: The Journal O[ The

167
 Royal Institute of Philosophy. 49: 77-79, 1969.
8 Roman Ingarden studied under Edmund Husserl in Freiburg.
His work in aesthetics sees art as a unified experience of vari-
ous phenomenal strata. His principal work, The Literary
Work of Art, has been translated into English by Ruth Ann
Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson. Evanston: Northwestern,
1973.
9 Bricmont and Sokal, Impostures Intellectuels. Paris: 1997
10 Derrida For Beginners. Jeff Collins and Bill Mayblin.
Cambridge: Icon Books, 1996, pp.8,9.
11 A revised 'Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure,' can be found in Academe: Bulletin Of The American
Association Of University Professors, May-June 1990, p. 37.
12 J. Caputo, Deconstruction In A Nutshell, New York:
Fordham, 1997, p.40.
13 See, C. Schrag, Philosophical Papers. Albany: SUNY, 1994, p.
245.
14 B.Wilshire, The Moral Collapse of the University:
Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation. Albany: SUNY, 1990,
p. 157.
15 It is strange that Caputo should object to Smith signing the let-
ter from Liechtenstein when it is clear enough (a) The Times
itself imposes this form on any letter with several signatories,
and (b) that this is where Smith was working at the time of the
Cambridge affair.
16 J. Caputo, Deconstruction In A Nutshell, p. 38.
17 In, The Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1992.
18 J. Caputo, Deconstruction In A Nutshell, p. 41.
19 J.Claude Evans, Strategies of Deconstuction: Derrida And The
Myth Of The Voice. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1991, p.
xviii.
20 J. Derrida, 'Three Questions to Hans-Georg Gadamer,' in
Dialogue & Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida
Encounter. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds.
Albany: SUNY, 1989, p. 52.
21 In two volumes, the first dealing with a collection of Paul de
Man's wartime journalism (1939-43), and the second with
scholarly responses to this journalism. See, Wartime

168
 Journalism, 1939-43 by Paul de Man, Werner Hamacher, Neil
Hertz, and Thomas Keenan eds., Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1988, and Responses: On Paul de Man's
Wartime Journalism, W. Hamacher, N. Hertz, and T. Keenan,
eds. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
22 J. Derrida, in Responses. Hamacher, Hertz, and Keenan, eds,
1989, p. 132.
23 Reprinted in E. Weber's, Points...Interviews, 1974-1994.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995, p. 401-02.
24 V. Mehta, The Fly and the Fly-Bottle: Encounter With British
Intellectuals. Baltimore: Penguin, 1961, p. 11.
25 Ernest Gellner, Words & Things: A Critical Account Of
Linguistic Philosophy And A Study In Ideology. London:
Victor Gollancz, 1963, p. 20. See also, E. Gellner's other
works directed against the idea of cognitive therapy, in,
Postmodernism, Reason, and Religion, New York: Routledge,
1992, and The Psychoanalytic Movement: The Cunning of
Unreason. London: Fontana, 1993.

169