Law Enforcement Executive

FORUM
Police Administration
May 2007
 Law Enforcement Executive Forum
Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive Institute
Western Illinois University
1 University Circle
Macomb, IL 61455

Senior Editor
Thomas J. Jurkanin, PhD

Editor
Vladimir A. Sergevnin, PhD

Associate Editors
Jennifer Allen, PhD
Department of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration,
Western Illinois University
Barry Anderson, JD
Department of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration,
Western Illinois University
Tony Barringer, EdD
Division of Justice Studies, Florida Gulf Coast University
Lewis Bender, PhD
Department of Public Administration and Policy Analysis,
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville
Michael Bolton, PhD
Chair, Department of Criminal Justice and Sociology, Marymount University
Dennis Bowman, PhD
Department of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration,
Western Illinois University
Weysan Dun
Special Agent-in-Charge, FBI, Springfield Division
Kenneth Durkin, MD
Department of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration,
Western Illinois University
Thomas Ellsworth, PhD
Chair, Department of Criminal Justice Sciences, Illinois State University
Larry Hoover, PhD
Director, Police Research Center, Sam Houston State University
William McCamey, PhD
Department of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration,
Western Illinois University
John Millner
State Senator of 28th District, Illinois General Assembly
Stephen A. Morreale, DPA
School of Public Policy & Administration/Criminal Justice, Walden University
Gregory Boyce Morrison
Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Ball State University
Michael J. Palmiotto
Wichita State University
Frank Morn
Department of Criminal Justice Sciences, Illinois State University
Gene L. Scaramella, PhD
Dean of Criminal Justice Graduate Studies, Kaplan University
Wayne Schmidt
Director, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Editorial Production
Document and Publication Services, Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois

Production Assistant
Linda Brines

The Law Enforcement Executive Forum is published six times per year by the Illinois Law
Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive Institute located at Western Illinois
University in Macomb, Illinois.

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ISSN 1552-9908

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Disclaimer
Reasonable effort has been made to make the articles herein accurate and consistent.
Please address questions about individual articles to their respective author(s).

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

 Table of Contents
Editorial................................................................................................................... i
Vladimir A. Sergevnin

Police Administration
Police Consolidation Revisited: Implications for American Law
Enforcement.......................................................................................................... 1
Randy L. LaGrange

Problem-Solving Innovations in a Traditional Police Department

with Changes in Police Administration.......................................................... 11
Darrell D. Irwin
Cecil L. Willis

Force Continuums: Moving Beyond Speculation and Toward

Empiricism............................................................................................................ 27
William Terrill
Eugene A. Paoline, III

Cross-Precinct Analysis of Patrol Supervision: A View from

the Inside............................................................................................................... 33
Kimberly D. Hassell

In Law Enforcement We Trust: Ethical Attitudes and Behaviors of

Law Enforcement Officers and Supervisors.................................................. 51
Steven Klingaman

Higher Education in the Continuum of Training and Education and

Keeping Management/Leadership Training Relevant and Current:
From Supervisor to Chief.................................................................................. 73
Stephen A. Morreale
Robert W. McKenna
P. J. Ortmeier

Validating Higher Order Thinking in a Problem-Based Learning

Environment: A Strategy for Law Enforcement Training and
Evaluation............................................................................................................. 89
Wayne R. Carlson

Criminal Justice Career Fairs: Addressing Recruiting Challenges

Through Practitioner and Academic Collaboration..................................... 107
Gregory B. Morrison
Bryan D. Byers

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

 Law Enforcement Officers: Their Perception of Personal Safety and
Job Performance.................................................................................................. 125
Tony A. Barringer
David Thomas

911 and the Failure of Police Rapid Response................................................. 137

Peter C. Moskos

Re-Examining the Perceived Relations Between Police Officers and

Security Personnel............................................................................................... 151
Christopher L. Copeland
Rhonda R. Dobbs
Alejandro del Carmen

In the Wake of Political Turmoil: The Cherokee Nation

Marshal Service................................................................................................... 163
Michael R. Wilds
William Heck

Translational Research: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and

Practice................................................................................................................... 179
William Crawley
Frank Hughes
Lisa Dopke
Harry Dolan

Materials/publications are available through the Illinois Law Enforcement

Training and Standards Board Executive Institute.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

 Editorial
Although hundreds of articles are published on police administration in the criminal
justice informational market every year, it is relatively rare to find a selection that
blends theory, research, and best practices that law enforcement executives can use
for urgent practical applications. Most police administration books favor a specific
approach, which inevitably narrows the perspective and limits the positive impact
of new concepts and ideas. This issue of the Law Enforcement Executive Forum
contains articles that are interdisciplinary in content. The coverage of the effective
managerial tools is comprehensive and analytical.

The research field of police administration and management reflects the unique
demands and gaps faced by law enforcement organizations, but most of the
concerns concentrate on personnel, resources, and dynamic implications of new
departmental variables, ranging from politics to technology. As demonstrated in
this selection of articles, however, the most consistent police administration issue
today is change itself. Law enforcement administrators need to recognize, identify,
and manage change effectively and be prepared for many unknowns.

Modern police agencies are less conservative and less focused on keeping
traditional policies, models, and protocols. They are more open to innovations,
which enables them to be more effective in their mission and improve ties with
the community.

The articles that have been selected for this issue should meet the special needs of
those interested not only in current research of law enforcement administration,
but also in practical policing applications of academic findings. These articles will
aid law enforcement executives in enhancing the environment of the agency and
responding to various departmental challenges and expectations.

O God, give us serenity to accept what cannot be changed, courage to change

what should be changed, and wisdom to distinguish the one from the other.

– Prayer (1934), Reinhold Niebuhr

Vladimir A. Sergevnin, PhD

Editor
Law Enforcement Executive Forum

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 

ii Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
Police Consolidation Revisited:
Implications for American Law
Enforcement
Randy L. LaGrange, PhD, Professor, Department of Sociology & Criminal
Justice; Director, Criminal Justice Internship Program, University of
North Carolina–Wilmington

Introduction
A salient feature of the system of justice in the United States is its decentralized
organizational structure. To many historians, local autonomy and local control
of governmental services is the proud living legacy of the founding fathers who
were weary of a strong centralized government. Local governments handle a
multitude of tasks, including water and sewer, waste disposal, schools, building
regulations, zoning issues, fire protection, and so on. To add police protection to
the long list of local government responsibilities is hardly surprising. What may be
surprising, however, at least in retrospect from our present-day vantage point, is
the call for consolidation of local police departments. The President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) singled out American
law enforcement as being in need of fundamental reorganization. The report of
the President’s Commission called for improved law enforcement through the
consolidation of local police departments.

So, where are we today? Forty years after the President’s Commission heralded
the advantages of police consolidation, has American law enforcement followed
the sage advice of the Commission? With few exceptions, police consolidation
has not been embraced by police administrators, community leaders, or even
residents. To put it mildly, the President’s Commission got it wrong, or at least
vastly underestimated the organizational inertia impeding the fundamental
reorganization of local police departments.

This article revisits the issue of police consolidation with several goals in mind.
First, it reviews the issue of police consolidation and places it in a present-day
context. The article also identifies and discusses the driving forces behind the
consolidation issue 40 years ago and why those forces are much less potent today.
Finally, the article highlights alternatives to police consolidation that are of equal
or superior advantage. As we will see, because of dramatic changes in the way
American law enforcement conducts its business, small departments are no longer
organizationally disadvantaged.

The Case for Police Consolidation

The release of the President’s Commission report in 1967 was a turning point
in American criminal justice. President Lyndon Johnson commissioned a panel
of leading experts in 1965 to critically evaluate the justice system and make
recommendations. Released at the height of the urban disturbances of the 1960s,
the impressive ten-volume report was widely read, discussed, and debated,

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 

particularly the lead volume, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Many of the
recommendations found their way into various provisions of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1968. The report called for fundamental
improvements in the criminal justice system through better coordination of
police, courts, and correctional agencies. The President’s Commission resulted in
massive expenditures of federal money at the local and state levels through grants,
community action programs, and improved officer training and education (Wilson
& McLaren, 1977).

Volume Two of the President’s Commission, Task Force Report: The Police, highlighted
the need for significant improvement in law enforcement. The report charged
American policing on the whole as lacking consistent standards and goals. It also
criticized policing as ineffective, wasteful, and incapable of meeting the complex
needs of contemporary society. Of particular concern was the highly fragmented
nature of American law enforcement. As the report stated, “A fundamental
problem confronting law enforcement today is that of fragmented crime repression
efforts resulting from the large number of uncoordinated local governments and
law enforcement agencies” (1967, p. 68). The abundance of small, overlapping,
and disjointed local agencies did not fit the professional model envisioned by the
reformers. The commission flagged Detroit as an example of illogical duplication
of services—85 separate law enforcement agencies within the metropolitan area
of Detroit with nearly half of the agencies employing 20 or fewer officers. That
was 85 separate and distinct everything—headquarters, organizational structures,
budgets, policy and procedure manuals, maintenance staff, property rooms,
holding cells, and so on. Clearly, there must be a more efficient organizational
model to save money and at the same time improve police effectiveness.

The President’s Commission recommended that, where practical, small adjacent

agencies consolidate into a larger agency, thus increasing organizational resources
while minimizing unnecessary duplication of services. In the words of the
President’s Commission (1967b), “each metropolitan area and each county should
take action directed towards the pooling, or consolidation, of services through
the particular techniques that will provide the most satisfactory law enforcement
service and protection at the lowest cost” (p. 308). Adding urgency to the need for
police consolidation was similar criticism from other prestigious groups (Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971; Committee for Economic
Development, 1972; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, 1973). Police consolidation was an idea for which the time had come.

At least three factors helped push the consolidation issue. First, evidence then and
now makes a strong case that American law enforcement is highly fragmented and
decentralized. The President’s Commission cited 40,000 as the number of separate
law enforcement agencies in the United States. We know now that this number was
inflated. By today’s more refined and accurate method of counting, the number is
estimated at nearly 18,000—still a very large number. The average department has
around 10 sworn officers, and over 1,000 agencies have just one full-time officer
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002). Clearly, policing American society remains
the primary responsibility of small local departments. Indeed, most Americans
receive their fundamental law enforcement services from small local departments.
This basic fact has not changed over the years.

 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

A second factor pushing the consolidation issue was the dramatic rise in crime
in the 1960s, coupled with the urban unease and growing racial divide. These
factors converged to prompt a close inspection of the police. Police-community
relations were bad and appeared to be growing worse. Advisory boards and study
commissions sprung up everywhere to carefully investigate the root causes of
our many social ills. With regard to the police, the highly fragmented nature of
services seemed to call out for remedy. Moreover, the overall lack of consistent
standards that applied uniformly to all departments hindered the development of
the professional police model. Police consolidation was viewed as a necessary step
toward the creation of uniform standards across enforcement jurisdictions.

A third factor pushing the police consolidation issue was the reform movement,
referred to by Nice (1983) as the classic administrative perspective (p. 111). According
to this view, excessive fragmentation hinders efficient government operations
because of a number of problems: the existence of servicing units too small to achieve
economies of scale, inadvertent overlap resulting in unnecessary duplication of
services, and lack of professional personnel and minimal accountability to the
public. The “good government” reformers were thinking broadly about the merger
of entire units of government, with police protection as just one of many essential
government services to be consolidated. The consolidation advocates were mostly
middle and upper-middle class residents who sought to rationalize and improve
government services (Lyons, 1977). Chambers of Commerce, Leagues of Women
Voters, civic-minded organizations, and local newspaper editors often favored
governmental reorganization. Generally speaking, however, the average citizen
was less impressed with the reform agenda and frequently opposed efforts to alter
local governmental arrangements.

Police consolidation is often broached as part of a larger governmental merger, such

as the formal merger of city and county governments. Local police departments
merge in the process. Examples of such governmental mergers can be found in
Charlotte/Mecklenburg County (North Carolina), Miami/Dade County (Florida),
and Nashville/Davidson County (Tennessee). The legal, political, and economic
hurdles to merging entire units of local governments are huge, which in large part
accounts for how seldom city-county consolidation has occurred. Residents in
the Wilmington/New Hanover County (North Carolina) area have twice rejected
city-county consolidation at the polls. Interestingly, the biggest stumbling block to
merging the City of Wilmington with the County of New Hanover was reconciling
the consolidation of two police agencies—the Wilmington Police Department
and the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Department. Ferrell and Foster (1982)
document a similar dilemma in the city-county consolidation effort in Lafayette
Parish (Louisiana) in 1980. The final consolidation plan stipulated that the only
government agencies not to be merged were the Lafayette Police Department and
the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Department; the police department and the sheriff’s
department would continue to operate independently. The Lafayette Parish
consolidation plan was never implemented—voters defeated the proposal at the
polls.

The Waning Interest in Police Consolidation

Existing research evidence does not make a convincing case of the benefits of
consolidation (LaGrange, 1987). Claims that larger police departments utilize

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 

resources more efficiently are seldom supported. Indeed, one of the most powerful
arguments favoring the consolidation of essential governmental services is the
potential cost reduction due to economies of scale. Hirsch (1968) argues that
while the consolidation of some services like water and sewer or governmental
administration may reduce certain costs to taxpayers, the consolidation of police
services seldom saves money. On the other hand, Krimmel (1997) found that
the Northern York County (Pennsylvania), which was consolidated in 1974,
performed police services for less money than a comparison group of eight police
departments in nearby rural areas. At best, then, research on the financial benefits
of police consolidation has received mixed results.

Another stated benefit of consolidation also has not been supported: that larger
police departments provide better services than smaller departments. Larger police
departments may be able to provide a wider array of police services because they
have more resources and available personnel, but the quality of police services is not
necessarily better than that provided by small departments. The study by Ostrom,
Parks, and Whitaker (1978) strongly rebukes the “larger is better” argument. These
researchers carefully examined over 1,800 police departments in 80 regions of the
United States to determine whether the quality of police services was associated
with department size. They found no such link. Instead, the researchers discovered
“a much richer network of interrelationships among agencies, and a much higher
use of auxiliary services in general than we would have expected” (p. 3). Other
studies have found that the quality of police services in small to medium-sized
departments is at least equal to, and sometimes better than, the quality of services in
many large departments (Parks, 1976; Rogers & Lipsey, 1974).

As an indication of the “waning” interest in the topic of police consolidation, a

cursory check of the contents of 11 police textbooks published over the past
10 years (from 1997-2007) revealed that little attention was given to police
consolidation. To be sure, the “data” used here admittedly was only a convenience
sample of police and society and law enforcement texts held in my office or in
the offices of colleagues up and down the hallway. Though not exhaustive, the
sample was arguably representative of the types of texts available. Special-topics
books on community policing, police-community relations, or police deviance
were omitted. Also omitted were edited books of readings. The content analysis
of relatively recent textbooks in the field only identified three out of the available
11 books that had a discussion (i.e., a clear section devoted to the topic) of police
consolidation (LaGrange, 1998; Roberg, Novak, & Cordner, 2005; Walker & Katz,
2005). Although all of the eight remaining texts made mention of the fragmented
and decentralized nature of American policing (Bartollas & Hahn, 1999; Conser,
Russell, Paynich, & Gingerich, 2005; Gaines & Kappeler, 2005; Grant & Terry, 2005;
Langworthy & Travis, 2003; Manning, 1997; McCamey, Scaramella, & Cox, 2003;
Peak, 2003), the topic of police consolidation was not explored.

As another check on the waning interest in the topic, a search of the Criminal
Justice Abstracts using the key terms “law enforcement consolidation” and “police
consolidation” revealed few entries. In the past 10-year span (1997-2007), only four
published works appeared: one was a doctoral dissertation (Fisk, 2004), and the
other three were journal articles (Finney, 1999; Krimmel, 1997; Shernock, 2004).
Clearly then, the lingering residual interest in police consolidation is nothing like

 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

the flurry of research activity and debate of the 1970s in the wake of the 1967
President’s Commission.

Alternatives to Police Consolidation

The President’s Commission was a product of its time. Inspired by the turbulent
1960s—rising crime, elevated fear of crime, campus unrest, the civil rights
movement, urban unease, and the growing anti-Vietnam War sentiment—there
was a sense of urgency in the air. The task force that focused on the police was
looking for deep systemic roots to the problem. One factor that stood out to the
Commission was the highly fragmented and decentralized system of American law
enforcement. The Commission viewed this method of delivering police services
as fundamentally flawed. Criminals don’t respect jurisdictional boundaries of
police departments. When several dozen law enforcement agencies exist within
a single metropolitan area, as is often the case, coordinating effective enforcement
efforts in an efficient manner is impeded. When one further considers that crime
also frequently cuts across local, state, and federal jurisdictions, the obstacles to
optimal crime fighting increase substantially. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Commission recommended the consolidation of smaller police departments.

The President’s Commission could not have anticipated subsequent findings

that questioned the wisdom of police consolidation. As noted previously, studies
conducted in the 1970s demonstrate that larger police departments are not
necessarily better at delivering quality police services than smaller departments.
In addition, cost-benefit analyses of police services fail to lend clear and convincing
support for police consolidation.

Independent of consolidation research, there are other reasons that were not
apparent to the President’s Commission that greatly diminish the need for police
consolidation today (e.g., technological advances, multijurisdictional task forces,
and community policing).

Technological Advances
The astounding pace of technological developments over the past 40 years has
changed the face of American law enforcement. Technological advances affect
virtually every aspect of modern-day policing, and emerging technologies have the
potential to fundamentally revolutionize the future of police work (Foster, 2005). At
the forefront of the technological development, and what makes the consolidation
recommendation of the President’s Commission much less meaningful today,
is enhanced information exchange. Small departments in remote areas have the
same access to critical real-time information as the largest departments; therefore,
small departments are no longer at such a severe disadvantage. Moreover, the
shared cost of big-ticket items among several departments provides the benefits of
the latest technology at minimal expense.

This is not to say that American policing is fully “wired.” Police departments
adopt equipment and technological upgrades at differing rates (Foster, 2005). In
addition, many departments use their own information systems and databases,
which are not always compatible with other agencies. This clearly impedes
information exchange. Nonetheless, information availability and exchange is far

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 

better today than the situation observed by the President’s Commission years ago.
Further technological advances in the exchange of information are inevitable.

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Cooperative arrangements among two or more local police agencies
offer advantages similar to consolidation. Many areas have established
multijurisdictional task forces, such as a City-County Vice and Narcotics Unit
or a Gang Task Force, which pool the talent and resources of neighboring police
agencies toward a common crime problem. Shernock (2004) describes the
proliferation of multijurisdictional task forces in the 1990s as a form of “de facto”
police consolidation. Indirectly, cooperative interagency arrangements meet the
spirit of the President’s Commission recommendation to consolidate agencies in
order to improve police efficiency and effectiveness.

Joint operations among local, state, and federal agencies are an innovative
extension of the multijurisdictional task force. Project Exile was one such joint
venture. Started in Richmond, Virginia, in 1997, Project Exile was a no-nonsense
federal crackdown on gun law violators. The program engaged the cooperation and
support of local and state law enforcement agencies. Project Exile prosecuted gun
law violators in U.S. District Court because stiffer prison sentences were available
under existing federal law. The operation included numerous federal agencies (the
U.S. Attorney’s Office; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Marshals
Service; FBI) plus the local District Attorney, the Richmond Police Department,
and the Virginia State Police. Although highly controversial, Project Exile-type
operations were initiated in a number of urban centers in the late 1990s.

Community Policing
The President’s Commission could not have envisioned the emergence of
community policing. It began with the fear reduction studies in Flint (Michigan),
Newark (New Jersey), Houston (Texas), Newport News (Virginia), and elsewhere
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Researchers discovered a connection between old-
fashioned foot patrol and feelings of public safety. Wilson and Kelling (1982) added
the necessary conceptual foundation to community policing with their “broken
windows” theory. Support for community policing grew exponentially during the
1990s, and so did the financial incentives in the form of grants to local departments
through the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.

At its core, community policing fosters a genuine working relationship between

the police and the public. The optimal organizational structure under community
policing is more flat, decentralized, and democratic than the traditional command
structure. Thus, under community policing, large organizations with abundant
resources and personnel are not inherently superior to small departments that are
less-well endowed. What is most critical is whether a department is serving the
community effectively by being closely connected to citizens and their multiple
needs. Small departments can—and are—every bit as good as large departments
in this regard. Police consolidation would not necessarily improve American
policing; better police work and more professional police officers improve
American policing.

 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Currently, community policing has lost some of its momentum, not to mention
substantial financial support from the federal government in this post-9/11 period.
Nonetheless, many of the central tenants of community policing continue to be
implemented by police departments nationwide.

Conclusion
Widespread police consolidation as envisioned by the 1967 President’s Crime
Commission never materialized. Too many obstacles stand in the way of police
consolidation. And as it turned out, because of developments in American law
enforcement, large-scale consolidation has not been necessary. Research fails to
demonstrate that bigger police departments serve citizens any better than medium-
sized or small departments. Moreover, developments in American law enforcement
since the President’s Commission (e.g., technological advances, the abundance of
multijurisdictional task forces, and community policing) significantly diminish
the problems associated with our highly fragmented system of policing.

Police consolidation is organizationally painful. It creates political problems for local

governments (e.g., deciding what agency will be the primary law enforcement
agency, figuring taxes, making sure all residents benefit equally) and logistical
problems (e.g., purchasing new uniforms, repainting squad cars, merging
personnel, and refiguring rank and seniority). Areas that have tried consolidation
have frequently experienced morale problems, cost over-runs, troublesome
transition periods, and citizen disillusionment. Short of total consolidation of
entire departments, the partial consolidation of key services offers many of the
same advantages of consolidation without the immense organizational turmoil.

References
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. (1971). State-local relations
in the criminal justice system. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Bartollas, C., & Hahn, L. (1999). Policing in America. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2002). Census of state and local law enforcement agencies,
2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Committee for Economic Development. (1972). Reducing crime and assuring justice.
New York: Committee for Economic Development.

Conser, J., Russell, G., Paynich, R., & Gingerich, T. (2005). Law enforcement in the
United States (2nd ed.). Boston: Jones and Bartlett.

Ferrell, T. H., & Foster, B. (1982). Stopping short of merger: Obstacles to police
consolidation in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana. Journal of Police Science and
Administration, 10(1), 43-46.

Finney, M. (1999). Constituency preference and police consolidation: The case of

West Hollywood. Contemporary Economic Policy, 17(2), 235-242.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 

Fisk, T. L. (2004). A comparative study of factors related to adoption, management,
and impact of police consolidation and amalgamation in Norfolk County,
England, and Kent and Ottawa Counties, Michigan, United States. Dissertation
Abstracts International: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 65(3), 1108. (UMI No.
3124533)

Foster, R. (2005). Police technology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Gaines, L., & Kappeler, V. (2005). Policing in America (5th ed.). Southington, CT:
Anderson.

Grant, H., & Terry, K. (2005). Law enforcement in the 21st century. Boston: Allyn and
Bacon.

Hirsch, W. Z. (1968). The supply of urban public services. In H. Perloff & L. Hings
(Eds.), Issues in urban economics (pp. 477-526). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
Press.

Krimmel, J. (1997). The Northern York County Police consolidation experience:

An analysis of the consolidation of police services in eight Pennsylvania rural
communities. Policing, 20(3), 497-507.

LaGrange, R. (1987). The future of police consolidation. Journal of Contemporary

Criminal Justice, 3(1), 6-16.

LaGrange, R. (1998). Policing American society (2nd ed.). Chicago: Nelson Hall.

Langworthy, R., & Travis III, L. (2003). Policing in America (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Lyons, W. E. (1977). The politics of city-county merger. Lexington: University Press

of Kentucky.

Manning, P. (1997). Police work: The social organization of policing (2nd ed.). Prospect
Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

McCamey, W., Scaramella, G., & Cox, S. (2003). Contemporary municipal policing.
Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. (1973).

Report on the police. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Nice, D. C. (1983). An intergovernmental perspective on urban fragmentation.

Social Science Quarterly, 64, 111-118.

Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B., & Whitaker, G. P. (1978). Patterns of metropolitan policing.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing.

Parks, R. B. (1976). Police patrol in metropolitan areas: Implications for restructuring

the police. In E. Ostrom (Ed.), The delivery of urban services (pp. 261-283). Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage.

 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Peak, K. (2003). Policing America (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.

(1967). Task force report: The police. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.

Roberg, R., Novak, K., & Cordner, G. (2005). Police & society (3rd ed.). Los Angeles:
Roxbury.

Rogers, B. D., & Lipsey, C. M. (1974, Fall). Metropolitan reform: Citizen evaluations
of performances in Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee. Publius, 4, 19-34.

Shernock, S. (2004). The MJTF as a type of coordination compatible with both the
police consolidation and community policing movements. Police Practice and
Research, 5(1), 67-85.

Walker, S., & Katz, C. (2005). The police in America: An introduction (5th ed.). Boston:
McGraw-Hill.

Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982, March). Broken windows: The police and
neighborhood safety. Atlantic Monthly, 249, 29-38.

Wilson, O. W., & McLaren, R. C. (1977). Police administration (4th ed.). Boston:
McGraw-Hill.

Randy L. LaGrange, PhD, is a professor at the University of North Carolina–

Wilmington where he teaches courses in sociology and criminal justice and
serves as director of the criminal justice internship program. He received
his PhD in sociology from Rutgers University in 1983. He has published in
numerous journals on a variety of topics including police work, juvenile
delinquency, fear of crime, and comparative criminology. His current
scholarly interests focus on social control in the community and the influence
of participation in sports on adolescent behavior.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 

10 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
Problem-Solving Innovations in a
Traditional Police Department with
Changes in Police Administration
Darrell D. Irwin, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and
Criminal Justice, University of North Carolina–Wilmington
Cecil L. Willis, Professor, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice;
Assistant Vice Chancellor, University of North Carolina–Wilmington

“Community policing is the order of the day.”

– David Thacher

Community policing, with its focus on problem-solving, is one of the major innovative
reforms in policing. These community policing strategies are designed for, “delivery
of police services through a customer-focused approach, using partnerships to
maximize community resources in a problem-solving format to prevent crime, reduce
the fear of crime, apprehend those involved in criminal activity, and . . . improve a
community’s quality of life” (Ford, Weissbein, & Plamondon, 2003, p. 160).

Many large and small police departments have implemented a range of community
policing models with varying degrees of success.

While determining the impact on crime and violence and the improvement
of police-community relations of a new policing strategy are important, there
are other factors and issues critical to understanding this phenomenon. We
direct our attention to one municipal police department, which, over the span
of multiple police chief administrations, attempted to implement innovative,
problem-solving strategies. We examine the impact of incorporating community
policing and problem-solving strategies into a traditional police department
and report the continuity of the strategy over the span of multiple police chiefs
whose administrative styles vary. The obstacles faced by the Wilmington Police
Department (WPD), at the time of undergoing significant changes, are outlined
as well as how this experience may inform future efforts of police departments in
implementing new strategies.

Using a case study model to explore the impact of employing innovative strategies,
we review the literature on community policing, provide a detailed recent
history of the WPD, and assess its successes at putting into practice innovative
administrative enforcement strategies. Finally, based upon our experience as
researcher partners working with the WPD on a gun violence reduction grant,
we offer recommendations for the implementation of innovative enforcement
strategies in a traditional municipal department.

Literature Review
There are several models of community policing, but the central theme is to “build
meaningful partnerships for improving public safety” and police departments
are called on to “collaborate with practically everyone” (Thacher, 2001, p. 765).

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 11

The intellectual genesis for community policing is James Q. Wilson and George
Kelling’s (1982) work on the “broken windows theory” and Herman Goldstein’s
(1990) concept of “problem-solving.” These conceptual frameworks encourage the
police to address crime prevention from the perspective of the community, view
minor crimes and incivilities as overt symptoms of community problems, and
work collaboratively with the community to address them. In Wilson and Kelling’s
(1982) study, it was found that if the police and community residents do not fix
the area’s “broken windows,” then more serious and dangerous behavior will
increase. Goldstein (1990) argues that the police should work with the community
to identify the underlying problems that contribute to the aberrant behavior. In
brief, community policing is “proactive” while the traditional policing approach
is “reactive.” After years in a culture of “reactive” and traditional policing, it may
be difficult for a department to signal a change in its style of policing and easily
transition to a more “proactive” approach.

The effectiveness of community policing is somewhat uncertain based on extant

literature. Reviews of the effects of community policing include Smith’s (1986)
study of community effects on enforcement levels, Skogan and Hartnett’s (1997)
study of community policing in Chicago, and Eck and Spelman’s (1987) study of
problem-orientated policing. Skolnick and Caplovitz (2001) criticized new police
tactics found in the renewed focus on “quality-of-life crimes” from Wilson and
Kelling’s broken windows theory. They claim that several other factors strongly
contributed to the decline in crime and that the broken windows approach should
not get the credit. Key to the success of community policing is the community’s
perceptions of these police initiatives and how completely the police department,
from the chief to the street officer, accept and incorporate these community policing
values and goals in their enforcement efforts (Adams, Roe, & Arcury, 2002; Moore,
1992; PERF, 2004; Thacher, 2001). Reviewing 228 departments that have embraced
community policing, a 1996 survey conducted by the Police Executive Research
Forum found that many remained professional-bureaucratic and authoritarian
with little support for fundamental changes in their organizational structure
(Silverman, 1999).

Next, we will summarize the characteristics of crime in Wilmington, North

Carolina, and the history of the management of the WPD, including recent efforts
to incorporate innovative strategies. In addition, the implementation of the
“pulling levers” strategy first incorporated in Boston is reviewed as the innovations
introduced in Wilmington share the vision of Boston’s crime suppression initiative.
Finally, we compare this strategy to the core concepts of community and problem-
solving policing.

Crime in Wilmington
We reviewed the crime rate in Wilmington between 1990 and 2005 with a focus
on the 1999 to 2003 period when the “pulling levers” strategy hit the streets of
Wilmington. In 1992, the first new chief of police, Chief “W” (the seven chiefs of
police referred to in this article are assigned identifiers in place of their names)
since the early 1970s implemented the concept of community policing. We provide
a comparison of the crime rate in Wilmington from 1990, prior to the introduction
of community policing with the rates following the appearance of this new
strategy. Our focus is on violent crime rates and homicide rates because these

12 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

crimes challenged Chief “W” to begin innovative problem-solving policing in the
city of Wilmington.

The data shows that while the violent crime rate for North Carolina from 1990 until
2005 tended to decrease at a steady rate from 628.8 per 100,000 to 478 per 100,000,
the violent crime rate for Wilmington fluctuated. First, there was an increase from
1990 (1,201 per 100,000) to 1993 (1,353 per 100,000), and then Wilmington crime
saw a general decrease from 1993 to a low in 1995 (974) and an increase to 1,317
per 100,000 in 1998 to a steady decrease to 860 per 100,000 in 2005. Throughout
this time period, the violent crime rate in Wilmington continued to be significantly
higher, almost twice the state rate. Similarly, the murder rate for North Carolina
from 1990 to 2005 decreased from a peak of 12 per 100,000 in 1993 to 6.9 per 100,000
in 2005. By comparison, the homicide rate in Wilmington fluctuated erratically
over the time period with a peak of 21.9 per 100,000 in 1992 (up from a 9.3 rate per
100,000 in 1990) to a low of 3.5 in 1994 followed by an increase to 19.7 in 1997 and
remained in double digits until 2003 when the rates ranged between 5.6 and 8.9
through 2005. As with the violent crime rates, the Wilmington homicide rates were
often twice the state rate during the 1990-2005 comparison period; however, from
1990 to 2005, the homicide rate in Wilmington decreased from 15.9 per 100,000
to 10.8 per 100,000—roughly equal to the 1995 rate (11.9 per 100,000). The rate
in Wilmington (10.8) still exceeded the 2000 rate for North Carolina (6.9) (North
Carolina Department of Justice, 2005). Property crime rates in Wilmington were
less erratic yet were far greater than the statewide rate.

Gun violence rates in Wilmington during the late 1990s (when the violent and
homicide rates were at their highest) were concentrated in certain areas of the
city. For example, the WPD reported that during a 6-month period in 1999, 66% of
violent crimes (aggravated assaults, robberies, and homicides) occurred in public
housing or within a one-block radius of public housing. They also claimed that
there was a strong link between the violence rate and the local illicit drug market
(personal communication).1

Police reports also revealed that the greatest levels and greatest increases in crime
were concentrated in or near the public housing communities of Taylor Homes
and Creekwood. Taylor Homes has since been demolished. These are also areas
that had some of the greatest illicit drug activity. Moreover, some local justice
officials attribute the increase in violence to a “destabilized” drug market brought
on by enforcement efforts. Periodic “crackdowns” led to an unsettled local drug
market, causing increased competition for sales and conflict over control of the
territory. Essentially, during the 1990s, the violent crime rate in Wilmington bucked
the downward trend experienced both nationally and statewide. This anomaly in
violent crime rates led to the implementation of the “pulling levers” strategy in
Wilmington. We will address this strategy, crime rates, and its impact on the WPD
organizational structure in a later section. In the next section, we review changes
in police administration from the 1970s until 2005.

Wilmington Police Department Administration, 1970-2005

The city of Wilmington is located on North Carolina’s Cape Fear River on the
west and the Atlantic Ocean on the east. The city was founded in 1739 and was a
prosperous port and shipbuilding center for many years. After losing some major

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 13

industry in the 1970s, the city has experienced significant economic and population
growth in recent years. Between 1990 and 2003, the population increased from
55,530 to 94,000 or a growth rate of 62% (see http://census.state.nc.us). Major
employers include health and government institutions. The population is diverse
with African Americans making up 20% of the population.

A 2005 estimate of poverty in the city indicates that 16.8% of the population lived
below the poverty line (see http://census.state.nc.us). The per capita income of
city residents in 2005 was $24,895, which was 13th in the state and higher than the
statewide rate ($22,519). Slightly more than one in three residents (37.5%) are college
graduates, and almost 9 out of 10 (86.6%) residents are high school graduates—
both figures somewhat higher than the statewide numbers. In addition, about one
in five (19.5%) of city residents are African American, down slightly from the 1990
numbers. Also, about one in five residents (21%) are under 18 years of age, about
equal to the 1990 figures (22%). In short, Wilmington is a mid-size city with a
greater than average African American population (U.S. = 12.3%) and a poverty
rate (16.8%) that is greater than the national average (12.6%).

WPD and the Civil Rights Era

Currently, the WPD has about 300 employees, 252 of whom are sworn officers.
Nonprobationary officers are covered by the civil service commission. The department
is supported by a $19.1 million budget. According to the WPD website (see www.
wilmingtonnc.gov/tabid/153/Default.aspx), the department receives 140,000 calls
for service each year.

In the 1970s, demands for civil rights centered on a search for identity and
propelled Wilmington into the modern era. Former NAACP leader Benjamin
Muhammed, then known as Ben Chavis, a divinity student from Duke University
and activist, was asked to come to Wilmington and organize protests for inclusion
of black history curriculum in a local high school. Ultimately, bombings and other
violence occurred, and nine black men and one white woman were arrested and
accused of conspiracy in these incidents. The police were involved in these arrests
and prosecutions of what became known as the “Wilmington 10.” The primary
criticism for the handling of these incidents fell upon the District Attorney’s office
and its handling of their prosecution. For example, one of the witnesses, a young
man, was apparently given a bicycle by the DA’s office. All suspects were convicted
and sent to prison. A few years later, President Jimmy Carter’s campaign for
human rights abroad drew criticism because of the domestic imprisonment of the
“Wilmington 10” (see www.lib.unc.edu/ncc/ref/nchistory/feb2005/index.html).
Under pressure, then Governor Hunt reduced their sentences and ultimately, they
were released. Nonetheless, this event overshadowed relations between whites
and blacks and may have contributed to a general suspicion of the criminal justice
system in the black community. This atmosphere has contributed to difficult
relations between police officers and administrators and the black community
over the years.

Leadership and Management Styles of Wilmington’s Police Chiefs

The WPD was headed by Chief “B” from the early 1970s until his retirement
in 1991. The management strategy most applicable to the department during

14 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

his tenure is James Q. Wilson’s law enforcement strategy (1978). Chief “B”
was a strong supporter of education and the newly developed criminal justice
curriculum at the local university. He favored the bureaucratic professional model
of law enforcement and emphasized a more legalistic approach. Following the
relatively long tenure of Chief “B,” the WPD was managed by a succession of
police chiefs and acting chiefs. Between 1991 and 2005, WPD was headed by four
“permanent” police chiefs and three acting/interim police chiefs. During this time
period, attempts were made to incorporate innovative strategies of policing to
replace the more traditional or “legalistic” style of policing. These changes were
often met with resistance by rank-and-file police officers and some skepticism
within the local community.

Chief “W,” the new police chief hired in 1992, was an advocate of “community
policing.” Under his direction, mobile police stations were placed in various
sections of the community, and he pushed for a beat approach to policing in an
effort to establish rapport between the officers and the community. He reorganized
the police department around the community policing concept, formed a Career
Criminal Section that targeted criminals who commit the most crimes, and instituted
a uniformed anti-drug squad called the Problem Tactical Team. He divided the city
into four districts, each with a mobile office and permanently assigned officers to
these Neighborhood Area Base Station trailers. A significant portion of the officers
opposed these changes, and stickers with “Community Wellness” and a red slash
through the middle began to circulate around town (see www.bluelineradio.com/
wadmantimeline.html).

His tenure as police chief, which was marked with controversy, lasted 3 years,
from August 1991 to August 1994. Some claims surfaced that he was involved
in “Satanic” cults. There was no evidence of his involvement in any of these
nefarious activities, but the accusations were used to oppose his approach to
policing. Considered to be too soft on crime, several officers and organizations
in the department opposed him, including the Police Benevolent Association. He
took a number of controversial disciplinary actions, which many, if not most, police
officers opposed. His greatest support came from the black community who saw
his community policing approach—and his personality—as supportive of their
concerns and interests. The Reverend Keith Wiley, president of the local chapter
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, commented that Chief “W”
“. . . (built) a coalition between the black community and the police and that
was very helpful” (“No Reason,” 1994). During Chief “W’s” term, violent crime
increased until 1993 and then began to decrease while homicide rates were high in
1992, his first year, and decreased to a low in 1994.

Following his forced resignation in 1994, the deputy chief was promoted to
chief of police. Chief “S” was a long-time veteran of the police department who
moved up through the ranks. A 1970s graduate of the local university, he received
widespread support among the rank-and-file cops, the community leaders, and the
community. His period can best be characterized as a “laissez faire” period—no
new programs/strategies introduced—although he vowed to continue supporting
the “community policing” concept. Nonetheless, some of the mini-stations were
closed down. After 3 years, Chief “S” left in 1997 to head the local Basic Law
Enforcement Training (BLET) program at the local community college. Violent

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 15

crime rates had reached a low point in 1993 and continued to increase to a high in
1998, and homicide rates increased in 1997.

His replacement, Chief “C,” was hired in April 1997. He had been chief of police in
Virginia for several years prior to taking over WPD. His approach to policing can
best be summarized by the account found on the department’s website at the time:

The Department seeks individuals who will commit themselves to

community problem-solving. The goal of the Wilmington Police Department
is to establish a healthy community by targeting illegal drug activities,
violent street crimes, and other quality-of-life problems in neighborhoods.
The Department utilizes a mobile police precinct in delivering police services
throughout the city in an effort to make the city of Wilmington a better and
safer place to live, play, and work. . . .

The “problem-solving” approach under Chief “C” differs from that of the
“community policing” model of Chief “W.” Chief “C’s” was a proactive approach,
which attempted to incorporate “hot spot” and crime mapping analysis and a
COMSTAT approach. He also signed onto a federal task force approach, based on
the “pulling levers” strategy under the coordination of U.S. Attorney’s offices in
Raleigh. As the summary above suggests, his tenure focused more on the “problem-
solving” aspect of policing. Chief “C” was fired by the city manager after refusing
to resign in September 2003, following the controversial firing and reassignment
of some police officers in response to a complaint filed by a controversial city
council member, whose self-published book contained scathing criticism of the
Wilmington police (Fennell, 2003). During his tenure, the violent crime rate and
homicide rate began a downward trend through 2005.

This action and the ripple effect in the department and the local community led to
the city requesting an evaluation by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).
They completed their report in April 2004 and included several recommendations
concerning the implementation of the community policing model and a more
proactive approach. The deputy chief, Chief “T,” was appointed interim chief
of police in September 2003, and he served in this capacity until February 2004
when he left to take a position as chief of police at a department in the western
part of the state. Just prior to his departure in February 2004, a confidential memo
he had written was released to the media. This memo provided an extremely
candid and critical view of the department and its management staff. He wrote
that “I would describe the PD current status as coming apart at the seams . . .
(with) special interest groups . . . (in which) personal resentment pervades the
supervisory ranks. . . .” Among other actions, he recommends sensitivity training
for the department commenting that “our community is a powder keg waiting for
the right moment” (Fennell, 2004; also see www.bluelineradio.com/page1.html).
After Chief “T” left, another interim police chief, Chief “H,” was appointed from
within the ranks of the department. Chief “H” served, without pushing for any
major departmental changes, until August 2004 when the current police chief,
Chief “E,” was hired. Violent crime rates and homicide rates in Wilmington have
continued their downward trend to the lowest rates in years.

From 1991 to 2005, the WPD had been headed by four “permanent” police chiefs
and three interim chiefs for a total of seven chiefs over the 14-year period or an

16 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

average tenure of 2 years per chief. Some of these chiefs attempted to implement
innovative strategies, all of which fell under the rubric of community policing.
They ranged from the mobile police stations and career criminal section of Chief
“W” to the “pulling levers” and Safe Neighborhoods model of Chief “C” to the
Model Block Project and Maximum Uniform Deployment (MUD) strategies
introduced by current Chief “E.”

All chiefs made some reference to community policing or problem-solving

approaches although the strategies differed. For example, Chief “E” has
established Problem-Oriented Policy (POP) teams within the Patrol Operations
Division. In addition, the Model Block Project and the MUD programs consist of
the more intensive and concentrated deployment of police officers to high crime
and troublesome areas of the city. These are essentially proactive crackdown
approaches, which appear to be quite dissimilar to the problem-oriented policing
described by Goldstein. By contrast, the focus of community policing is “to
build meaningful partnerships for improving public safety. . . . (it) exhorts city
police departments to forswear their autonomy and collaborate with practically
everyone . . .” (Thacher, 2001).

In essence, the WPD, as a consequence of changes in administration and in the

community, has evolved, sporadically, from a legalistic model of policing to a
community policing model, originally resisted by the rank and file, through the
“laissez faire” period and to more recent problem-solving yet crime-fighting-focused
approaches implemented by the last two permanent police chiefs. Community
policing has moved from the department-wide initiative of the Chief “W” era to a
subunit within a division. The innovative strategies implemented since this period
have been focused on the proactive and strict enforcement approaches. Several
questions remain: How complete was this transition? Did bureaucratic inertia and
community reaction limit this transformation? How much of the policing in WPD
is the more traditional/legalistic model, and how much is the problem-oriented
version of community policing?

Traditional Versus Innovative Law Enforcement Strategies

The inherent tensions that exist between the more traditional, reactive law
enforcement strategies and the recent innovative strategies that range from classic
community policing to the extant versions of proactive policing are explored next.
The problem-oriented policing approach focuses on identifying the causes of the
problems and formulating responses to correct them. As such, it is an innovative
and nontraditional approach to controlling and preventing crime.

The more traditional, professional approaches, found earlier in the WPD, tended
to be reactive in their response to crime. Even the more “proactive” responses
have proven to have limited effectiveness (Sherman, 1997; Walker, 2001). For
example, crackdowns may only temporarily deter crime, which is offset by decay
and displacement (Mazerolle, Ready, Terrill, & Waring, 2000; Sherman, 1990). The
“announcement effect” of such efforts soon disappear, and the rate of criminal
behavior soon returns to “normal” (Walker, 2001). Recent nontraditional and
innovative approaches follow the recommendations of Wilson and Kelling’s
(1982) broken windows theory and Goldstein’s (1990) problem-solving approach,
addressing crime prevention from the community perspective. We will next

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 17

examine the problem-solving strategy that was implemented during the Chief
“C” era and discuss the challenges in successfully incorporating an innovative
enforcement model in a department marked by internal conflicts and a minority
community that is skeptical of police delivery of needed services.

Operation Ceasefire
Innovative policing strategies have often been embraced when found to be
successful elsewhere. Such is the case with Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. There
were two main components to Operation Ceasefire: (1) direct and intense law-
enforcement response directed toward the worst violent offenders and (2) general
deterrent effect on chronic offenders to stop their involvement in violent behavior
by providing them with alternatives to the violent lifestyle. The latter strategy
came to be known as the “pulling levers” strategy that clearly conveyed that every
“lever” legally available would be used to prosecute offenders if they continued
to engage in violent behavior (Kennedy, 1997). Violent offenders had failed to be
deterred by the traditional method of simply increasing the severity of sanctions,
when the certainty of the sanctions was, in fact, uncertain. Moreover, the state does
have tremendous sanctioning power that it can bring to bear on certain offenders
and certain areas, which could be effective if properly marshaled. Consequently,
Operation Ceasefire incorporated two major components: (1) “pulling levers”
in which they would respond to serious gang violence by “pulling every lever”
available on the gangs in question thus clearly communicating the consequences
of continued violence to the gangs and (2) “call-ins” in which gang members who
wanted to change their violent lifestyle were offered any assistance they might
need such as protection, drug treatment, and social services.

Research by David Kennedy (1997) revealed that many of the youth gang members
wanted to cease their participation in violent gangs but did not have an “out”—a
way to safely “escape” this lifestyle. Studies of the Operation Ceasefire program in
Boston show that it apparently had an impact on the rate of youth homicide, gun
use (less frequently used in crimes) and gun assaults (Braga et al., 1999).

These research findings led to other locales introducing this problem-solving

policing strategy. Similar strategies that are an adaptation or modification of
Operation Ceasefire have been implemented in several other communities across
the country, including Los Angeles; Indianapolis; Richmond; High Point; and
North Carolina, including Wilmington. We will discuss the Richmond and the
High Point programs next, as they are the most similar to the Wilmington effort.

Project Exile
Richmond, Virginia, had been experiencing rising crime rates, especially violent
crime for years. In the late 1990s, Richmond implemented two major programs:
(1) Blitz to Bloom and (2) Project Exile. Blitz to Bloom incorporated broken
windows theory with the crackdown strategy in an effort to reduce crime in
Richmond. The goal of the “blitz” phase was to reduce drug dealing and related
crime in the targeted area through a variety of proactive patrol activities, while
“bloom” referred to efforts at social intervention in these “blitzed” neighborhoods.
The Project Exile initiative concentrated on reducing gun violence by prosecuting
gun offenses in the federal system in which the sanctions are more severe, bond is

18 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

less available, and convicted offenders serve their sentences in federal custody. An
extensive public outreach and media campaign to educate citizens about lengthy
federal prison sentences for gun crimes and maximize deterrence also was a critical
component of Project Exile. The effectiveness of Project Exile is reported as mixed
with some research finding support (Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Baumer, 2005) and
other research finding little or no support (Raphael & Ludwig, 2003).

High Point Violent Crime Task Force

High Point formed the Violent Crime Task Force in 1997 to combat the persistently
high level of violent crimes in the area. The strategy included a coalition of 10 law
enforcement agencies and community partners that included 15 public assistance
agencies and 41 community groups. Preliminary analyses point toward success
of this program. For one, this strategy became a national model and was selected
by Vice President Gore’s Reinventing Government Partnership as an example
showcased at the Safe Cities Network conference. Indicative of the success in
High Point were significant reductions in homicides, gang-related homicides, gun
crimes, and drug-related crimes from 1997 to 1999.

Creation of a Firearm Violence Task Force

Wilmington would emulate the get-tough, crime-fighting Exile approach and
hope for the reduction of violence seen in High Point. Wilmington crime patterns
prompted the then U.S. Attorney, Janice Cole, to form a task force of local, state,
and federal officials to address the problem of gun-related violence. She was acting
upon authority developed in the presidential directive of March 20, 1999, when
President Clinton directed U.S. attorneys nationwide to develop an integrated
national firearms violence reduction strategy. Using the High Point program as a
model, Cole contacted representatives from all of these agencies and recruited the
criminal justice program at the University of North Carolina–Wilmington to serve
as research partners in this endeavor.

The task force, referred to as the Wilmington Task Force to Cease Firearm Violence
was formed in spring 2000 and continued in active operation until 2003. In
Wilmington, the community call-ins had begun in early 2001. Although viewed
as a proactive measure to address the violent crime problem, the calls-ins also had
troubles.2 A key feature of this approach is the clear communication (as in Operation
Ceasefire) that the illegal possession or use of a gun will not be tolerated. A
coalition of civic and business leaders worked with the police in posting messages
on television, billboards, and elsewhere that warned of the consequences of the
illegal use of guns. Results in early 2001 shows 196 persons were sentenced to an
average of 55 months of imprisonment.

The task force brought increased cooperation among all of the agencies involved
with the local police and ATF compiling a list of 14 violent offenders based
upon their rap sheets for the initial call-in. The list of offenders produced by
law enforcement brought complaints from their respective probation agents.
One offender was identified as one of Wilmington’s worst, yet he had a single
violent arrest. His probation officer reported that he was driven to the shooting
by hallucinations he suffered through a medication/alcohol combination and in
a paranoid shooting episode shot (but did not injure) a person and destroyed a

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 19

vehicle. The probationer was so distraught after being identified and put through
the call-in that he was suicidal, and it took 3 hours to calm him down afterwards.
He remained misidentified in both police and court lists as a targeted “violent
felon.” The mistakes on these listings caused the UNCW research team to question
the effectiveness of the Wilmington call-ins. Our observation is that the call-ins
were secondary to the focus of identifying, prosecuting, and sentencing the violent
gun offenders. As one local law enforcement official noted, “(our goal is to) flip
’em, dip ’em, and ship ’em.” From our observation, the innovative problem-
solving style in Wilmington fell short when the community resources component
was found to be not as strong as the Task Force to Cease Firearm Violence’s
enforcement efforts.

Lessons Gleaned from the Police Executive Forum Report (PERF)

Thacher (2001) notes how the core values of community policing often conflict with
the traditional values of law enforcement (e.g. autonomy, etc.). Moreover, police
values may not always be explicitly compatible with a community’s values. While
some scholars are skeptical of the ability to resolve these conflicts, others, among
them community and church leaders, lent support to innovative police strategies
that they perceived as reducing conflict. Thacher finds this key to creating an
“umbrella of legitimacy” through establishing an atmosphere of mutual trust and
respect between the police and the community (p. 769). In addition, these new
strategies must be compatible with diverse values and must not require either
party to sacrifice their core values (Thacher, 2001). The core values of the police
center around public safety, which focuses on serious crime, while community
groups tend to be concerned about “soft crime” and “disorder” or quality-of-life
issues. Police may tend to see the latter as “nuisance,” or “bull-shit” offenses that
are not worth their trouble to enforce.

This conflict of values was most salient during the Chief “W” era in which mobile
substations and foot patrols were instituted by the department. Thacher’s (2001)
comments are relevant to WPD when he notes, “. . . these abstract affinities
foundered when police lacked enthusiasm for the concrete concerns communities
brought to them” (p. 777). To the police, this is not real police work. Until the street
cop accepts this notion, community policing and problem-solving strategies will
struggle to be successful. Many departments have created separate and special
community policing units, which insulate the officers from the pressures to practice
traditional policing. These units provide “protected organizational spaces,” which
allow the department to respond to community demands (Thacher, 2001, p. 781).
Selnick (1957), in his book on leadership in organizations, writes such “precarious
values” need a degree of autonomy within the organization to allow them to take
root. While this approach is not without problems, such as tensions between the
neighborhood unit(s) and the patrol units, it does allow a police department to
establish positive relationships with the community.

There is some evidence that the core values of community policing and problem-
solving strategies did not take hold among the police officers at WPD. For example, the
PERF report found that, during meetings with community residents, many commented
that the, “officers were ‘out of touch’ with young people . . . (and) . . . some were
playing it loose on the streets,” conducting pat-downs and searches without adequate

20 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

justification (PERF, 2004, p. 15). In addition, several citizens indicated that problem-
solving and follow-up to citizen complaints about quality of life issues did not occur.

The PERF report notes that, while the department’s relationship with the community
is generally good, it could be better. The report also notes that while the police
are “responsive and reactive to calls, (they) do not appear to sustain a high level
of positive engagement within all their communities. A recommendation made
by PERF is that community policing by the department needs to be less reactive
and more proactive and ‘results oriented’” (p. 18). In their discussion of WPD’s
community policing division, PERF comments that this unit is more reactive
in nature than proactive. Furthermore, they note, “Though the department has
established a number of programs intended to engage the community, there are
no defined programs, strategies, or personal expectations, which incorporate the
community policing model in day to day operations” (PERF, 2004, p. 81). Among
the officers, community policing is considered a less than desirable assignment.
They also found that officers often complained that the “zero tolerance” policy
limited their discretion and was a waste of time to have to deal with nuisance
violations.

A survey of police personnel in spring 2006 as part of the WPD 2010 Strategic Plan
is instructive. Survey results point to skepticism among many police officers about
community policing and problem-solving approaches. While only 35% agree that
problem-oriented/community policing is the “most effective way of policing
the City of Wilmington as a whole,” it was chosen by a greater percentage than
traditional (call-response) and about equal to the “geographical/precinct model”
(36%). Also, about 39% chose “media/government TV” as the most effective
way to communicate with the public, more popular than “officer contact during
neighborhood patrols” (28%) and “community meetings” (15%).

Conclusion
Our contention is that the tension and stress brought by attempts to implement
a more “pure” community policing by Chief “W” were resolved by a movement
toward innovative yet more enforcement-based and crime fighting approaches
of the Operation Ceasefire and the recent MUD models and, in the latter years,
the compartmentalization of the COP unit. While COP and POP continued to be
part of the police vocabulary, our observation is that it was more talk than walk
or a “vocabulary of adjustment” (Cressey, 1958) in which the label, “community
policing” is used to identify any change in police strategy. Nonetheless, the internal
strife within the department, at least from 1992 until 2004, was not resolved by
a change in strategies or a movement from the original COP approach. Instead,
internal problems and problems with the community continued through the
successive police regimes until 2004. These problems hindered the ability to fully
and adequately implement strategies that may have made WPD a more effective
department. As a result, we see that the violent crime rates and the homicide rates
fluctuated erratically and did not reflect the more stable patterns found statewide
and nationally.3 While local and environmental conditions played a part, the
instability and internal problems of the organizational structure of the agency
proved problematic.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 21

Thacher (2001), in his analysis of community policing, identified three strategies that
police departments use to reconcile the conflicting values inherent in community
policing. Some departments used metaphors, such as “broken windows” to
synthesize the values of order maintenance and crime control. Others established
divided organizations in which they created special community policing units that
allowed the department to focus on both “soft crime” and “hard crime.” A third
approach was to seek a balance between these competing values by muting some
of the proactive policing authority. It appears that Chief “E” may be seeking to
address the organizational and structural problems inherent in WPD by utilizing
the second strategy. That, to date, has succeeded.

One point to keep in mind regarding the objectives of problem-solving policing

in traditional departments: unless the community has a great deal of prior trust
in the police, these new innovative approaches can exacerbate existing racial and
community-related problems. Although scholars do concede that new aggressive
police tactics have contributed to the decrease in gun homicide, these tactics may
come at a high price (Skolnick & Caplovitz, 2001). These innovative strategies often
involve a major restructuring of the police organizations, which can also have an
impact on their success (Adams et al., 2002; Moore, 1992; Thacher, 2001).

It will take the commitment of political leaders, police managers, and prosecutors
coupled with a strong concern from community leaders to adequately address
these long lived antagonisms. The key ways to stop it would be more sophisticated
data collection and analysis of arrests. This might involve moving towards goal-
orientated management processes that help to better track officers’ performance
and ensure management accountability. In addition, prosecutors must put a much
stricter standard on the “reasonable suspicion” rule that is often discarded in
“problem solving” efforts, such as the task force efforts discussed in this article.
Police management should focus on examples of ethical “community policing.” If
the community perceives police strategies to be misdirected, ultimately the police
are not going to contribute effectively to solving their community’s problems.

One final point: it is obvious from our review that a key obstacle to the successful
implementation of problem-solving strategies in WPD was resistance on the part of
a significant segment of the rank-and-file officers. Police management was unable
or unwilling to adequately address the cultural resistance to these innovative
strategies. One of the inherent strengths of the problem-solving approach is the
move from the “top-down” management model to a more participatory model.
Our observation is that from 1991 to 2005, management attempted to introduce
innovative strategies without changing the management structure. Rank-and-file
officers resisted because they were asked to change their essential philosophy and
approach to policing within the context of a traditional command structure. In
short, these innovations lacked an “umbrella of legitimacy” (Thacher, 2001).

22 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Endnotes
1
This pattern is similar to the Systemic Violence Model, which focuses on the drug
distribution system and how violence is a by-product of this system (White &
Gorman, 2000). These crimes include territorial fights and disputes; efforts to
protect users and sellers; “transaction-related” crimes; and third-party violence,
such as bystander shootings. While the available evidence suggests that the
systemic model does not account for all drug-related criminal activity, it does
account for most of the current violence related to the illegal drug market,
especially drug-related homicide.
2
There were other problems and issues related to this project. The U.S. Attorney,
Janice Cole, made several visits to Wilmington to discuss violence in the
community with local leaders; however, a major social faux pas was made when
the local leaders hosted the U. S. Attorney. On Monday, December 21, 1999, a
“secret meeting” with the U. S. Attorney was held in city council chambers.
The stated purpose of the meeting was to address the proposed Wilmington
Partnership to Cease Firearm Violence and its impact on the community. The
Task Force was comprised of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials,
including prosecutors. The WPD chief of police attended this meeting, but the
New Hanover County Sheriff was not invited (the sheriff and the U.S. Attorney
were both African American). The sheriff’s absence sparked controversy in the
local newspapers, which ran headlines stating, “Sheriff’s Absence Troublesome,”
“Sheriff Is Excluded from Meeting,” and editorials stating “Maybe Ray Charles
Should Be In Charge,” and the “Mystery of the Missing Sheriff.” The uninvited
sheriff took to the airwaves and was widely quoted as saying, “I am opposed
to closed door meetings.” The Wilmington Journal, an African-American-owned
newspaper, speculated that this was an effort by the Wilmington police chief to
have the sheriff report to him in a consolidated law enforcement agency. After
the Wilmington police received funding from the COPS program to hire 15 more
police officers, the Journal chided the city police department as being “diverted
from the areas of the community that sorely need it and using in a way that
the city manager, the mayor, the city council, the chief of police, and the U. S.
Attorney see fit—at the expense of the African American community in general,
and young black males specifically,” (“Maybe Ray Charles,” p. 2).
3
While no systematic analysis was conducted concerning the links between
these rates and changes in law enforcement strategies and organization, the
fluctuations did roughly mirror the changes in police regimes. They were
generally down during the Chief “W” years, up during the interim periods,
and down during the Chief “C” and “E” years. Clearly more analysis is needed
before drawing any firm conclusions.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 23

Bibliography
Adams, R. E., Roe, W. M., & Arcury, T. A. (2002). Implementing community-
oriented policing: Organizational change and street officer attitudes. Crime and
Delinquency, 48(3), 399-202.

Bayley, D. H. (1988). Community policing: A report from a devil’s advocate. In R.

Greene & S. D. Mastrofski (Eds.), Community policing: Rhetoric or reality? (pp. 225-
237). New York: Praeger.

Braga, A. A., Kennedy, D. M., Waring, E. J., & Piehl, A. M. (2001). Problem-oriented
policing: An evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency, 38(3), 195-225.

Braga, A. A., Weisburd, D., Waring, E. J., Mazerolle, L. G., Spelman, W.,
& Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem oriented policing in violent crime places:
A randomized controlled experiment. Criminology, 37(3), 541-580.

Cressey, D. (1958). The nature and effectiveness of correctional techniques. Law and
Contemporary Problems, 23(4), 754-771.

Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). Problem solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport
News. Washington, DC: PERF.

Fennell, B. (2003, September 9). Chief cease fired: City manager cites differing
philosophies. Wilmington Star-News, p. A1.

Fennell, B. (2004, March 1). Memo from interim police chief raises questions: City
council weighs in on problems in WPD. Wilmington Star-News, p. A1.

Ford, J. K., Weissbein, D., & Plamondon, K. (2003). Distinguishing organizational

from strategy commitment: Linking officers’ commitment to community policing
to job behaviors and satisfaction. Justice Quarterly, 20(1), 159-186.

Goldstein, H. (1990) Problem-oriented policing. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Kennedy, D. M. (1997). Pulling levers: Chronic offenders, high-crime settings, and

a theory of prevention. Valparaiso University Law Review, 31(2), 449-483.

Maybe Ray Charles should be in charge! Editorial. (1999, December 23). The
Wilmington Journal, p. A4.

Mazerolle, L., Ready, J., Terrill, W., & Waring, E. (2000). Problem-oriented policing
in public housing: The Jersey City evaluation. Justice Quarterly, 17(1), 129-158.

Moore, M. (1992). Problem-solving and community policing. In M. Tonry &

N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and justice: A review of research (modern policing), 15 (pp. 99-
158). University of Chicago Press.

No reason given; Wadman resigns as chief of police; Will receive $26,000 for
consulting deal. (1994, July 12). Wilmington Star-News, p. B1.

24 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). (2004, April 9). Evaluation of the
Wilmington, North Carolina Police Department. Washington, DC: PERF.

Raphael, S., & Ludwig, J. (2003). Prison sentence enhancements: The case of Project
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violence (pp. 251-286). Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.

Rosenfeld, R., Fornango, R., & Baumer, E. (2005). Did Ceasefire, COMSTAT, and
Exile reduce homicide? Criminology and Public Policy, 4(3), 419-450.

Sherman, L. W. (1990). Police crackdowns: Initial and residual deterrence. Crime

and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, 12, 1-48.

Sherman, L. W. (1997). Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Silverman, E. B. (1999). NYPD battles crime. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Skogan, W. G., & Hartnett, S. M. (1987). Community policing, Chicago style. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Skolnick, J., & Caplovitz, A. (2001). Guns, drugs, and profiling: Ways to target guns
and minimize racial profiling. Arizona Law Review, 43(2), 413-437.

Smith, D. (1986). The neighborhood context of police behavior. Crime and Justice:
A Review of Research (Communities and Crime), 8, 313-341.

Thacher, D. (2001). Conflicting values in community policing. Law and Society

Review, 35(4), 765-798.

Thatch, J. (1999, December 2). Sheriff McQueen is excluded from meeting. The
Wilmington Journal, p. A1.

Wadman’s timeline. (2004). Available online at www.bluelineradio.com/

wadmantimeline.html

Walker, S. (2001). Sense and nonsense about crime and drugs: A policy guide (5th ed.).
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

White, H. R., & Gorman, D. M. (2000, July). Dynamics of the drug-crime relationship.
The nature of crime: Continuity and change. Criminal Justice 2000. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Justice.

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WPD.

Wilson, J. Q. (1968). The varieties of police behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.

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safety. Atlantic Monthly, 249(3), 29-38.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 25

 Darrell D. Irwin, PhD, is an associate professor of criminal justice at
the University of North Carolina–Wilmington. Dr. Irwin earned his
PhD from Loyola University–Chicago. His research interests include the
linkage between drug use and gun violence, drug courts, and faith-based
programs serving criminal justice populations. He also has been involved
in international justice projects, including the U.S. Department of State’s
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP),
which provides law enforcement training and development to foreign law
enforcement agencies. He has presented crime prevention research at the
11th United Nations Congress on Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention in
Bangkok, Thailand. Dr. Irwin’s publications include a book, Case Studies of the
Use of Drug Testing in Corporations: Deviance in Large Organizations and articles in
The Justice Professional, The Journal of Drug Issues, International Criminal Justice
Review, and The Journal of Crime and Justice.

Cecil L. Willis is assistant vice chancellor for Academic Affairs and professor
of criminal justice at the University of North Carolina–Wilmington. He
earned his BS, MA, and PhD degrees from East Tennessee State University,
East Carolina University, and Virginia Tech University, respectively. His areas
of concentration are criminal justice theory, sociology of law, and criminology.
His professional experience includes 30 years as a faculty member, department
chair, and administrator. He has been principal or co-principal investigator
on several community-based research projects funded by local, state, and
federal agencies and organizations. He has presented papers throughout the
country and abroad and published more than 25 articles, book reviews, and
essays in professional publications.

26 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Force Continuums: Moving Beyond
Speculation and Toward Empiricism
William Terrill, PhD, Assistant Professor, School of Criminal Justice,
Michigan State University
Eugene A. Paoline, III, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminal
Justice and Legal Studies, University of Central Florida

Force Continuums
Police departments across the country have relied on various forms of force
continuums for several decades (Terrill, 2001). A standard force continuum
ordinally ranks varying levels of police force and citizen resistance in terms of
severity, with the explicit purpose of offering officers guidance on how to respond
when faced with noncompliant or aggressive citizens. Thus, continuum policies
attempt to more readily clarify what may be considered “objectively reasonable”
force as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor (1989).

One of the earliest continuums, the linear design, is modeled in the form of a
ladder or hierarchical steps. According to McEwen (1997), this type of “continuum
approach is to rely first on the officer’s presence to quell a situation, and if that
fails, to move to increasingly severe types of force” (p. 49). Another type of a
continuum structure is often referred to as a modified linear design in which subject
resistance is placed into one of several levels and force options for escalation (and
de-escalation) are presented within each level (see Connor, 1991). Other, more
nonlinear designs are laid out in matrix form or depicted by a wheel (see Hoffman,
Lawrence, & Brown, 2004). In the matrix approach, various forms of suspect
resistance are presented vertically along rows while various police responses are
offered on a horizontal axis. The wheel design is sometimes presented by a series
of concentric circles with the situation as the core (e.g., see the Ontario Model),
followed by an intermediate circle of suspect resistance behaviors, followed by an
outer circle displaying varying appropriate forms of police force given the type of
citizen resistance.

Regardless of what continuum approach a particular agency chooses to use (if any),
the placement of different forms of force within the continuum structure can vary.
For example, one department may place an Electro-Muscular Disruption (EMD)
weapon, such as the Taser, low on the continuum (e.g., right after verbal direction),
while another agency may place it high on the continuum scale (e.g., just before
deadly force). Of course, the implication is that some agencies view EMD use as
more of a “first resort,” while others encourage EMD use as a “last resort” before
turning to deadly force. Complicating matters further, some departments rely on
less specific types of continuum policies whereby force and resistance are referred
to only in vague terms and not categorized into specific levels, while others offer
very detailed policies that lay out many levels of both force and resistance.

In sum, force continuums are multidimensional in design and can vary in terms of
model type, as well as where various force tactics are placed within the continuum
framework. The exact nature of these diverse continuum policies, the merits of

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 27

utilizing such an approach, and whether one version is more beneficial over
another are presently unknown.

Debating the Utility of Force Continuums

As noted by Rogers (2001), there is clearly support within the law enforcement
field for adopting some type of a continuum approach within an agency’s policy.
In fact, such support is highlighted by Terrill and Paoline’s (2006) recent national
survey of police agencies, in which they found over 70% of the responding agencies
utilized some form of a force continuum within their written use-of-force policy.
There is some debate, however, as to whether force continuum policies actually
help or hinder officer decisionmaking and subsequent outcomes stemming from
forceful encounters with citizens. For example, Petrowski (2002) states, “[t]he force
continuum purports to provide a mechanical application when officers should be
making a subjective threat assessment” (see also Aveni, 2003). In addition, others
have argued that using a force continuum may open an agency up to a greater
likelihood of civil liability (Williams, 2002).*

Are Force Continuums Beneficial?

Although force continuum policies are specifically designed to provide officers
guidance toward controlling suspects with an appropriate degree of force,
previous research has generally neglected this area of inquiry, and no known
study has specifically investigated whether certain types of continuum policies are
more effective than others. In short, while force continuums are often embedded
within force policies, there is no empirical evidence that the approach actually
works in some manner. In other words, does a force continuum policy actually
guide officers in their force usage? Does a continuum policy enhance the level of
control an officer has on a suspect? What impact does a continuum policy have on
officer and suspect injuries, shootings, citizen complaints, and lawsuits for police
misbehavior? At present, one can only speculate or provide anecdotal accounts
as to whether the use of a force continuum leads to good practice with favorable
outcomes.

An Empirical Examination
Given the wide variation in force continuum policies, in both form (i.e., design)
and placement (i.e., tactics), combined with a lack of knowledge concerning
effectiveness, we are currently engaged in a study (Assessing Police Use of Force
Policy and Outcomes, funded by the National Institute of Justice) to investigate
the relationship between varying “types” of policies and a multitude of
outcome measures, including the extent to which different policies guide officer
decisionmaking; enhance the control of suspects; and/or affect injuries, shootings,
citizen complaints, and lawsuits. The goal is to determine, from an empirical
perspective, whether certain types of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to
police practitioners. It is our belief that studies examining any particular tactic

* Some agencies have removed any reference of a force continuum from their policy completely (Terrill &
Paoline, 2006). In some cases, however, departments that have done so still employ a force continuum
approach from a training perspective (i.e., the continuum is part of training officers but not part of the
formal policy itself).

28 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

or less-lethal technology (e.g., Taser), apart from the broader application of such
tactics within varying policy types, unnecessarily limit potential insight. It is the
merging of different policy types with varying tactics, which include less-lethal
technologies, that offers the most potential and ultimately useful information for
policy makers and practitioners.

The current phase of the study involves eight mid-size police agencies representing
each region throughout the country. Over the course of the next year, researchers
will spend nearly one month on-site at each agency gathering data, which
will consist of two primary components: (1) conducting an officer survey and
(2) analyzing official agency records.

The officer survey will offer data on how different policies are understood and
viewed by front line personnel. Hence, one of the goals is to assess the extent
to which officers believe their policy offers guidance when faced with potential
use-of-force encounters. Part of this process involves measuring officer knowledge
and awareness (or lack thereof) of their respective force policy. The aim is to tease
out the potential disconnection between organizational policy and actual policy
awareness, implementation, and usefulness. A second goal of the officer survey is
to examine the extent to which officers believe their policy actually permits them
to effectively establish or maintain control of suspects. For instance, there is no
previous research that has identified whether a linear continuum design offers
more control than a nonlinear or wheel-type design or that continuum approaches
are more effective at controlling suspects than noncontinuum approaches. In
addition, no evidence exists as to how and where various forms of less-lethal
technologies fit into varying types of policies, as well as the resulting effect on
control. Furthermore, it is possible that an officer may know his or her policy and
believe the policy offers guidance with respect to “what to do and when to do it.”
It is also conceivable, however, that while officers may feel certain policies are clear
and offer guidance, the policies are viewed as ineffective in terms of controlling
suspects.

In addition to the officer survey, researchers will collect and analyze a series of
agency records (e.g., use-of-force report data, citizen complaint data, arrest and calls
for service data, training data, civil litigation data) to determine whether certain
types of continuum policies, in both form (i.e., design) and placement (i.e., location
of tactics within the varying forms), reduce the number and extent of officer and
citizen injuries, police shootings, citizen complaints, and lawsuits. The research
team will also attempt to compare and contrast departments employing a force
continuum approach within their policy to departments that do not incorporate a
continuum design. In the end, the overarching purpose is to determine not only
whether certain types of policies (continuum-based or otherwise) lend themselves
more readily to issues of guidance and control, but also to discern the interplay
between issues of guidance and control while considering injuries, shootings,
complaints, and civil litigation.

Results from the study will permit a unique opportunity to compare the
benefits and drawbacks of the varying types of policy approaches being utilized
by a large number of police agencies throughout the country. For example,
departments employing a linear type of continuum policy may be compared with
departments using a matrix design. Similarly, agencies with no continuum policy

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 29

(e.g., departments with individual policies on chemical irritants or EMD usage)
may be compared with departments that do employ a continuum policy, and
even different types of continuum policies. Overall, findings from the study will
offer the ability to identify varying policy approaches (continuum or otherwise)
according to the identified outcomes measures (i.e., injuries, complaints, shootings,
lawsuits).

In conclusion, the Assessing Police Use of Force Policy and Outcomes study will offer
valuable insight on how varying types of policies actually influence the effects of
police use of force. Researchers have investigated how often the police resort to
nonlethal force (Adams, 1995), variation in the types of force officers use (Klinger,
1995), views toward force (Muir, 1977), determinants of force (Terrill & Mastrofski,
2002; Worden, 1995), and the number of officers and citizens involved in force
incidents (Langan, Greenfield, Smith, Durose, & Levin, 2001). It is now time to
examine the effect of continuum policy approaches on resulting outcomes. The
study’s findings will provide practitioners with a guide for policy making and
development. Police administrators will have something to which to refer when
making a decision to employ a force continuum approach (or not) within their
agency’s use-of-force policy. More specifically, they will have empirical policy data
associated with lower rates of injuries or citizen complaints. Moreover, they will
be able to discern which policy types offer officers greater degrees of control and
even those policies that might offer an enhanced level of control but lead to more
complaints and lawsuits. In sum, results from the study will permit informed
policy decisionmaking based on an independent empirical assessment, rather
than speculation and anecdotal accounts.

References
Adams, K. (1995). Measuring the prevalence of police abuse of force. In W. A.
Geller & H. Toch (Eds.), And justice for all: Understanding and controlling police
abuse of force (pp. 61-97). Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Aveni, T. J. (2003). Force continuum conundrum. Law and Order, 51(12), 74-77.

Connor, G. (1991). Use of force continuum: Phase II. Law and Order, 39(3), 30-32.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

Hoffman, R., Lawrence, C., & Brown, G. (2004). Canada’s national use-of-force
framework for police officers. The Police Chief, 71(10), 125-141.

Klinger, D. A. (1995). The micro-structure of nonlethal force: Baseline data from an

observational study. Criminal Justice Review, 20, 169-186.

Langan, P. A., Greenfeld, L. A., Smith, S. K., Durose, M. R., & Levin, D. J. (2001).
Contacts between the police and the public: Findings from the 1999 national survey.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

McEwen, T. (1997). Policies on less-than-lethal force in law enforcement agencies.

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management, 20(1), 39-59.

30 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Muir, W. K., Jr. (1977). Police: Streetcorner politicians. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Petrowski, T. D. (2002, October). Use-of-force polices and training: A reasoned

approach. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1-2.

Rogers, D. (2001). Use of force: Agencies need to have a continuum and officers
need to be able to articulate it. Law Enforcement Technology, 28(3), 82-86.

Terrill, W. (2001). Police coercion: Application of the force continuum. New York: LFB
Scholarly Publishing.

Terrill, W., & Mastrofski, S. D. (2002). Situational and officer based determinants of
police coercion. Justice Quarterly, 19, 215-248.

Terrill, W., & Paoline, E. A. (2006, November). Police use of force policy types:
Results from a national agency survey. Paper presented at the American Society of
Criminology, Los Angeles, CA.

Williams, G. T. (2002, June). Force continuums: A liability to law enforcement? The

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 14-19.

Worden, R. E. (1995). The “causes” of police brutality: Theory and evidence on police
use of force. In W. A. Geller & H. Toch (Eds.), And Justice for All: Understanding
and Controlling Police Abuse of Force (pp. 31-60). Washington, DC: Police Executive
Research Forum.

William Terrill, PhD, is an assistant professor in the School of Criminal

Justice at Michigan State University. He has directed several federally
funded research projects and is currently serving as principal investigator
for the Assessing Police Use of Force Policy and Outcomes project, sponsored
by the National Institute of Justice. Dr. Terrill has published numerous
scholarly articles on policing, crime in public housing, and systematic social
observation, as well as a book entitled Police Coercion: Application of the Force
Continuum. He earned his PhD in 2000 from the School of Criminal Justice at
Rutgers University in New Jersey.

Eugene A. Paoline, III, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department

of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida.
He holds a PhD in criminal justice from the University at Albany, State
University of New York. His research interests include police culture and the
use of coercion, occupational attitudes of criminal justice practitioners, and
theoretical development in criminal justice. He is the author of Rethinking
Police Culture (2001, LFB Scholarly Publishing) and has produced several
research articles that have appeared in various peer-reviewed journals. Dr.
Paoline is currently serving as co-principal investigator for the Assessing
Police Use of Force Policy and Outcomes project sponsored by the National
Institute of Justice.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 31

32 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
Cross-Precinct Analysis of Patrol
Supervision: A View from the Inside
Kimberly D. Hassell, PhD, Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin–
Milwaukee

I tell recruits, each precinct is its own little small town. You have certain
problems you handle in each precinct daily. They are all operated differently.
They are all little police departments inside one big department. The captain
is basically chief of this precinct.
– Officer assigned to Northeast Precinct

Introduction
Policing scholars have long held that environmental factors affect the prioritization
of police activities (Crank, 1990, 2003; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Davenport,
1999; Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 1968). Policing scholars, consequently, have turned
their attention to explaining the varying roles of external factors and the degree to
which these factors affect police behavior (Davenport, 1999). According to Crank
(2003), many examinations have focused on the effects of environmental factors on
organizations as a whole (Davenport, 1999; Katz, 2001; Zhao, Lovrich, & Robinson,
2001) or interorganizational fields (Zhao et al., 2001). Few have examined the role
of the precinct as a suborganizational level of analysis (Kane, 2003; Klinger, 1997).

The traditional levels of analyses used in police research include: individual,

situational, neighborhood, organizational and legal levels. The individual level of
analysis focuses on the characteristics of officers/supervisors that might influence
police patrol practices. The situational level of analysis centers on factors specific
to a certain situation/encounter and suspect/victim/complainant relationships.
The neighborhood level focuses on certain aspects of neighborhoods, such as the
degree of heterogeneity and social disorder. The organizational level focuses on
differences between subcomponents of organizations or organizations as a whole.
Finally, the legal level concerns the role of procedural and substantive law on
police behavior (Ricksheim & Chermak, 1993; Sherman, 1980). While factors at
all levels of analyses have emerged as important, this study finds that there is an
important point of intersection between all five levels of analyses: the precinct (See
the “Levels of Analysis in Studying Police Patrol Behaviors” figure).

This study extends current assessments of police behavior by investigating

variation in supervisory styles using the precinct as the suborganizational level
of analysis. More specifically, this study explores whether patrol officers perceive
that supervisory styles vary within a single organization at the precinct level of
analysis and, if so, which factors reportedly produce this variation. Triangulated
data sources used in this study include 434 hours of participant observation, both
structured and unstructured interviews with patrol officers, and review of official
agency documents.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 33

Levels of Analysis in Studying Police Patrol Practices

Legal Level

Individual Level Situational Level

Precinct Level

Neighborhood Level Organizational Level

Police Supervision and Patrol Practices

There has been limited research on the relationship between police supervision and
police patrol practices in the United States (Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002; Trojanowicz,
1980; Van Maanen, 1983). Some researchers have found that police supervisory styles
vary due to the dialectical nature of their job: first-line supervisors must manage
affairs with upper command while also managing relationships with subordinates.
Managing the inherent conflict in middle-management positions causes patrol
supervisors to define their roles differently, resulting in varying adaptations of
their supervision (Engel, 2001; Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 1983; Trojanowicz, 1980; Van
Maanen, 1983). Others have developed typologies of police supervisors, arguing
that morality and individual values and ideals produce variation in supervisory
styles (Engel, 2001; Muir, 1977). In addition, many have tested the influence of
supervisory styles on police patrol practices (Allen, 1982; Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003; Reiss, 1971; Smith, 2004), but these studies have produced mixed results
(Engel, 2001). Engel (2001) recently concluded that the “police supervision
literature is limited in scope and fails to answer many conceptual and empirical
questions regarding field supervision. This is especially true of questions regarding
differences in supervisory styles” (p. 343). The study presented in this article
adds to the literature on police supervision by examining whether patrol officers
perceive that supervisory styles vary within a police organization at the precinct
level of analysis.

The Role of the Precinct

Klinger (1997) first emphasized the role of the precinct as a viable suborganizational
level of analysis within police organizations, explaining that in larger jurisdictions,
patrol beats or districts (hereinafter referred to as districts) are grouped to form
separate territorial units with separate administrative/managerial structures.
These separate administrative structures are usually referred to as precincts. While
precincts are separate administrative structures, they are still connected to the
agency’s superordinate administrative/managerial structure. Larger jurisdictions,
therefore, coordinate control through the geographic assignment of responsibility
by first organizing into precincts and then, within that organizational framework,
into patrol districts (Klinger, 1997). Larger police organizations, therefore,

34 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

operate out of one central command; patrol operations are organized into
several precincts, each with a separate administrative command. Each precinct
within the department, therefore, represents an organizational boundary, which
by its very nature, creates distinct and relatively independent cultures within
the infrastructure of the police organization (Hawley, 1950, 1986; Klinger, 1997).
Klinger’s theoretical piece, Negotiating Order in Patrol Work, makes such a claim.
Other research has documented the viability of the precinct as a significant level of
analysis for understanding patrol behavior (Hassell, 2006a; Kane, 2003).

Based on prior research that patrol practices vary at the precinct level of analysis,
this study investigates whether supervisory styles vary between precincts as
well. As Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) emphasize, “Understanding how the police
precinct operates as a working social/administrative/operations unit is critical
to understanding the forces affecting the management and practice of police
work” (p. 256). This study investigates whether officers perceive that supervisory
styles vary within one police organization at the precinct level of analysis. More
specifically, this study investigates the following two hypotheses: (1) police patrol
officers will perceive that supervisory styles vary between the precincts and (2)
the variation in supervisory styles will be attributed to factors unique to each
precinct.

Methodology

Research Site
Midwestern Municipality (a pseudonym) is in the heart of the Midwestern
United States. According to the 2000 Census, the city population in 2002 was
approximately 400,000 persons. The racial breakdown of the city is predominantly
white (78.4%), with African Americans (13.3%) and Hispanics (6.1%) comprising
the two largest minority groups.1 The racial composition of sworn officers in the
Midwestern Municipality Police Department (MMPD) is 82% white, 11% African
American, 5% Hispanic, and 2% “other.”

The MMPD is nationally accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law

Enforcement Agencies and employs approximately 760 sworn police officers.
MMPD is organized into four precincts, with separate and distinct precinct
stations.2 Upper administration is centralized in one main headquarters as is the
investigation bureau. All special units are housed in the same headquarters, and
location, as well. In addition, booking procedures are handled at the headquarters,
and all reports and evidence are forwarded to the main headquarters for processing
and archival.

The precincts are organized geographically as Northwest Precinct (NW), Northeast

Precinct (NE), Southeast Precinct (SE), and Southwest Precinct (SW). Each precinct
is organized into two geographic command areas that are further subdivided into
nine individual districts. Three patrol crews are assigned to each shift, for a total
of nine crews per precinct. The patrol shifts for each precinct are organized into
three standard shifts: (1) A shift – overnight shift; (2) B shift – daytime shift; and
(3) C shift – afternoon shift. On each shift, one crew is permanently assigned to one
geographic area; the second crew is permanently assigned to the other geographic
area; and the third crew is a relief crew and works two days in each geographic area.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 35

Officers are not permanently assigned to individual districts; these assignments
are provided during roll call. The patrol workweek is established as a four-day
workweek (four days on and two days off). This means that on any given shift,
there will be two crews working in each precinct. All roll calls are handled in the
respective precincts for all shifts.

Each precinct has a separate precinct captain. In addition to the precinct captain,
each shift in each precinct has a lieutenant, for a total of three lieutenants for each
precinct. Each crew, additionally, is assigned its own sergeant, resulting in nine
sergeants assigned to each precinct. Each sergeant is assigned a crew of patrol
officers, which varies by precinct and shift. Official records obtained from MMPD
reveal that the largest crews are assigned to the afternoon shifts in the NE Precinct
while the smallest crews are assigned to the morning shifts in the SW Precinct.

Research Design
The research design is a multi-method ethnographic case study including
observational fieldwork, both structured and unstructured interviews, and official
documents obtained from MMPD. During field observation, I accompanied patrol
officers, systematically recording the following data: the nature of police-citizen
interaction (officer-initiated or citizen-initiated); the reason for the interaction; the
start time of interaction; the response time (time elapsed between time of call and
actual arrival); the number of officers involved; the disposition of interaction; and
the end time of the interaction. All observational notes were recorded with pen and
paper. Field observations spanned a 6-month time period, from July 2003 through
November 2003. Participation by the patrol officers was voluntary. During roll
calls, the sergeant would request volunteers who were willing to participate in
the research. Most patrol officers were aware of the study, as the observer met
with officers during roll calls at each shift in each precinct prior to the start of data
collection. The observation period totaled 434 hours of participant observation.

During field observation, unstructured interviews were conducted. These

interviews involved asking patrol officers to explain their decision-making
process and to discuss their feelings/thoughts about situations involving
discretionary decisions. Unstructured interviews were completed with 76 officers
across all four precincts. Since the study is a cross-precinct analysis, there is a
need for a standardized assessment to make valid comparisons across precinct
assignments. An 11-page questionnaire was designed to uncover police patrol
officers’ perceptions of precinct-level factors in order to investigate precinct-
level variation. Seventy-two structured interviews (based on the questionnaire)
were completed by 18 officers in each of the four precincts.3 A coding sheet was
developed based on the questionnaire responses, and data was analyzed both
qualitatively and quantitatively. Several questions from the questionnaire were
used in this analysis, and demographic variables documented officer sex, race,
age, years of police experience, and years of service with MMPD. Officers were
asked about persistent crime/deviance problems in their precincts as well as the
number of calls for service. Officers were also asked whether they believe that
supervisory styles vary by precinct. That is, officers were asked whether there
were precinct-level differences in supervisory styles produced by precinct-level
factors. Officers were then asked to explain their responses (i.e., what are the
precinct-level factors that produce precinct-level variation in supervisory styles?

36 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Why do you think there is precinct-level variation in supervisory styles?). In this
study, supervision refers to sergeants and lieutenants. Officers have more frequent
interaction with their sergeants and lieutenants and, based on past research, it
is assumed that supervisory styles influence patrol officer behavior (Engel, 2000,
2001, 2002; Hanniman, 2005; Engel, 2003). These responses were recorded with pen
and paper and later transcribed into Microsoft Access for query analyses and SPSS
for statistical analyses. Field observation notes also documented visible precinct-
level variation in supervisory styles, and findings from the analysis are included
in this examination.

Official agency documents, which included precinct-level statistical reports, were

collected in an effort to cross-reference data collected during the interviews. For
example, precinct-level statistical reports documented the type/nature of crimes as
well as the magnitude of their occurrence in each precinct. Precinct-level statistical
reports also documented population density. Prior evaluation reports provided
a basis for contextual/historical analysis, which informed on bidding processes,
geographic restructuring, relevant policies, and command structure changes.
Additionally, police union newsletters and departmental reports informed the
analysis; the newsletters corroborate the cultural tone of the organization, as it
was recorded by the observer.

Sample
Field observation was conducted with 76 patrol officers. Seventy-two structured
interviews were completed during field observation (18 completed questionnaires
in each of the four precincts).4 Seventy-three percent of the participating officers
were male while 27% were female. The overall composition of sworn officers in
MMPD is 80% male and 20% female. Eighty-seven percent of the sample identified
themselves as white, while 6% identified themselves as African American, 4% as
Hispanic, and 3% as other. These figures compare to the departmental racial/ethnic
population of sworn officers: 82% white, 11% African American, 5% Hispanic, and
2% as another racial/ethnic identity. The mean age of the participating officers is
34 (range of 23-53; standard deviation of 7). Officers participating in this study
ranged in their tenure at MMPD from one to 22 years, with a mean experience
level of 7.5 years (standard deviation of 6). Eighty-three percent of participating
officers have worked in other precincts: 61 officers have worked in SW, 47 in NW,
46 in SE, and 56 in NE Precincts. All participating officers were exposed to all
precincts during field training.

Precinct Descriptions

Southwest Precinct
The SW Precinct is one of the two largest (geographically) precincts with the
fewest number of patrol officers assigned. It is approximately three times the
geographic size of the smallest precinct. The precinct is a mix of residential and
business, including most of the city’s apartment complexes, three hospitals, the
local university, and the largest shopping mall in the city. The cluster of apartment
complexes within this precinct represents the densest part of the city. According to
MMPD statistical reports, the precinct has the lowest crime level with most calls for
traffic accidents, traffic hazard issues, and intrusion alarms. The residents of this

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 37

precinct are primarily middle- to upper-income non-Hispanic whites; the residents
of this precinct are the wealthiest in the city. The housing market ranges from
rental properties to the most expensive homes in the city. Data from unstructured
interviews with command staff indicate that many of the officers assigned to the
precinct are the most experienced officers in the department. The sergeants in this
precinct are also the most experienced with the most amount of time on the job.
According to the SW Precinct commander, the policing style within the precinct is
solely reactive; proactive policing is discouraged. The primary patrol responsibility
within the precinct is to answer the calls for service.

Northwest Precinct
The NW Precinct is the second largest precinct (geographically) with the second
fewest numbers of officers assigned (second to SW). The precinct is almost
three times the geographic size of the smallest precinct. The precinct is a mix of
residential and business, including two shopping malls, apartment complexes,
and one hospital. In addition, the precinct has an apartment complex that is part
of the scattered-site subsidized housing project. According to MMPD statistical
reports, the precinct has the second lowest crime level; like SW, most calls are for
traffic accidents, intrusion alarms, and civil disturbances. The demographics of
the precinct are mixed. The precinct is composed of two areas: (1) the 10-area and
(2) the 20-area. The 10-area is mostly middle- to upper-income white individuals
while the 20-area is composed of a blend of middle-income white individuals
lower-income African Americans, and impoverished Sudanese immigrants. Data
from unstructured interviews with command staff indicates that many of the
officers assigned to the precinct range from mid-level experienced officers (5 to 7
years of service) to newer officers. The sergeants vary from mid-level experienced
to newly appointed sergeants. According to the NW Precinct commander, the
policing style within the precinct is primarily reactive with a minor emphasis on
proactive policing. Patrol responsibilities within the precinct include answering
calls for service.

Northeast Precinct
The NE Precinct is one of the two smallest precincts (geographically) and has
the highest number of officers assigned. The precinct is primarily residential.
According to MMPD statistical reports, the NE Precinct has the highest crime level
within the city. On the first ride-along in the precinct, for example, there were
five armed disturbance calls within the first 15 minutes. It is also known among
the patrol officers as the most dangerous precinct, with respect to police officer
safety; the last four police officers killed in the line of duty were assigned to the NE
Precinct. The precinct is predominately composed of African American residents
with relatively few white persons residing within the precinct. The NE Precinct is
also the most economically deprived in the city. Additionally, according to officers
and newspaper accounts, there is a long history of racial conflict between residents
of the precinct and the police department. Data from unstructured interviews
with command staff indicates that the officers assigned to the precinct are a mix
of mid-level experienced officers (5 to 7 years of service) and newer officers. The
sergeants vary from mid-level experienced sergeants to newly promoted sergeants.
According to the NE Precinct commander, the policing style is both reactive and
proactive, with a heavy emphasis on proactive policing. The patrol responsibilities

38 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

within the precinct are answering calls for service and proactive law enforcement
activities.

Southeast Precinct
The SE Precinct is the second smallest precinct geographically and has the
second highest number of officers assigned (second to NE). The precinct is a mix
of residential and business, including the downtown area, which is the newly
renovated economic hub of the city. According to MMPD statistical reports, the
precinct has the second highest crime level with most calls for service for civil
and domestic disturbances, as well as gang- and drug-related activities. The
demographics of the precinct are mixed. The precinct is comprised of two distinct
areas: (1) the 50-area and (2) the 60-area. The 50-area is a mix of middle- to upper-
income white residents who live within the downtown area and lower-income
white and Hispanic residents. The 60-area is comprised primarily of lower-
income Hispanic residents. Data from unstructured interviews with command
staff indicates that the officers assigned to the precinct range from mid-level
experienced (5 to 7 years of service) officers to newer officers. The SE sergeants
vary from mid-level experienced to newly appointed sergeants. According to the
precinct commander, the policing style within the precinct is both reactive and
proactive, with a heavy emphasis on proactive policing in the 50-area. Patrol
responsibilities within the precinct include answering calls for service and
proactive law enforcement activities.

Findings
To test the hypothesis that patrol officers perceive that supervisory styles vary
by precinct, officers were asked during interviews whether supervisory styles
differed between the precincts. If officers answered affirmatively, they were asked
to explain their responses. When explaining their responses, officers were asked
to rely on their experiences in each precinct. The officers’ responses were analyzed
and grouped into two categories: (1) factors at the individual level of analysis and
(2) factors at the situational and neighborhood levels of analysis. Many officers’
responses included references to more than one factor. The analysis demonstrates
that 92% of participating officers (66 out of 72) do believe that supervisory styles
vary at the precinct level of analysis.

Individual Level of Analysis: Temperament, Personality, and Level of Experience

The interview data reveals that over half of all patrol officers (36 of 66) who
believe that supervisory styles vary by precinct reported that the supervisor’s
temperament and personality produce precinct-level variation in supervisory
styles. The officers stated that supervisors who want to be more active bid to
higher crime precincts (NE and SE); supervisors who want to be less active bid
to lower crime precincts (NW and SW). In essence, explained an officer assigned
to SE, “individual personality types are attracted to certain precincts.” An officer
assigned to SW reiterated this sentiment when he/she reported, “go-getters are
attracted to the eastern precincts.” An officer assigned to NE emphasized the point
by saying, “if a sergeant bids NE, they want to work and see their officers work.
They know police will need more supervisory approval, and they take care of
officers. In other precincts, sergeants get lazy.” Another officer assigned to NE

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 39

stated, “In SW, the sergeants are real laid-back and let officers do what they got
to do. Out here, sergeants and lieutenants make calls with you. It’s the difference
between being a leader or a follower.”

Other officers reported that the supervisor’s level of experience, or time on the
job, was an important factor in explaining precinct-level variation in supervisory
styles. Most officers reported that newer officers bid to work in the high-crime
precincts (NE and SE) and older officers, who have “done their time” in the high
crime precincts, bid to work in the low-crime precincts. The end result is that newer
and less experienced sergeants and lieutenants are concentrated in the high-crime
precincts during afternoon/evening shifts (C-shift) and overnight shifts (A-shift).
The more experienced sergeants and lieutenants are found in the lower crime
precincts and typically work during the day (B-shift). Official agency documents
obtained from MMPD validate these findings.

Several officers assigned to SW (the lowest crime precinct) discussed the differences
in supervisory styles based on level of experience. One officer (assigned to SW)
stated that such differences could be attributed to “the age and experience of the
supervisor. Younger supervisors are more hands on.” Another officer stated that
“newer sergeants usually work those areas [NE and SE Precinct areas] so they are
still in the officer role where they like to be on the street. In NE and SE, you still
hear command officers making traffic stops.” Another officer reiterated this point
when he/she said, “the two sergeants who are in SW are close to retirement and
don’t want to do anything. Sergeants in NE are out making traffic stops and are
more involved.” Finally, an officer currently working in SW detailed . . .

The SW sergeants have time on. They have been with [MMPD] for a lot
of years. In SE, NE, and NW [20-area NW], the sergeants tend to be less
experienced as sergeants out here. Out here, all sergeants have been on for a
number of years. SW sergeants don’t micromanage as much. They let officers
do their jobs. There is less intensive supervision in SW.

Officers assigned to NW (the second lowest crime precinct) also reported that
supervision varied according to precinct assignment and that variation was due
to level of experience. One NW officer said, “Time on at rank. In SW, the style is
less pessimistic, more materialistic. Rank is more important to senior officers than
younger officers. In NE, the sergeants are newer, just promoted, just came from
the street and understand the necessity of being more decisive and discretionary.”
Another officer conveyed . . .

SW has higher seniority sergeants and command. They are a lot more laid-
back and they [sergeants] didn’t want you to call a lot [did not want the
officers to call them with questions]. On NW C-shift [afternoon/evening
shift], you get younger sergeants and command staff, and they are more
hands on and by the book.

An officer, working in NW, also reported that there are differences between the
western and eastern precincts: “In eastern precincts, you are allowed a bit more
leeway out there. They don’t micromanage as much. NW [20-side] gets newer
sergeants, and they tend to micromanage more.” Finally, an officer said, “In NE,

40 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

the sergeant was on calls all the time with us . . . not quite as much in NW. [There
are] more experienced officers [in NW] so sergeants trust them [officers].”

Officers in the eastern precincts also remarked that the level of experience of the
command staff affects supervision. An officer assigned to SE said that “experience
on the job has a lot to do with it. A new, young supervisor is unsure how to handle
things. Then they go overboard and are strictly by the book.” An officer assigned
to NE reported, that “In NE, you get the sergeants who don’t want to be here to
those that still want to work . . . the sergeants are stuck in NE because they are
the lowest rung on bidding. The three sergeants with the most seniority work SW
C-shift.”

Situational and Neighborhood Levels of Analyses: Nature of Crime/

Deviance, Calls for Service, Culture of the Clientele, Citizen Expectations,
and Local Political Influence
Patrol officers reported that the differences in supervisory styles are also due to
precinct-level differences in the nature of crime and deviance in the precinct and
the nature of the calls for service. Although only 23 of 66 (35%) officers explicitly
identified the nature of the crime/deviance and calls for service as causing
variation in supervisory styles, the field observation notes cross-referenced the
strong relationship between the two.

For most officers, the major distinctions in the nature of crime and deviance and
calls for service are between the western (low-crime; NW and SW) and eastern
(high-crime; NE and SE) precincts. In the eastern precincts, officers explained,
the crime is more serious, the pace is quicker, and sergeants are more actively
involved in calls for service. In the eastern precincts, there is greater demand and
higher expectations of supervisors. In contrast, sergeants working in the western
precincts, according to participating officers, are more relaxed and laid-back due
to the infrequency of serious crime and calls for service.

One officer assigned to SW explained the impact that the nature of the calls for
service has on supervisory styles: “Supervisors are laid-back where there are fewer
calls. They are more relaxed in SW. They have a bigger call load and more serious
calls in the east.” Another officer from SW reiterated, “Some areas of town have
a higher crime rate so responses will be different.” An officer assigned to the SE
Precinct also reported on the relevance of the nature of calls for service: “Sergeants
are required to respond to certain calls, and more of those calls are in NE.” Finally,
an officer in NW commented, “Sergeants will be out more in the eastern sector.
More interactive with [his/her] crew. The entire east and at night. More stuff goes
on at night. The bad guys are night workers.”

Officers in the NE Precinct were stronger in their opinions about how the nature
of crime and deviance and calls for service impact supervisory styles. An officer
in NE stated, “A lot of supervisors out west are laid-back; it’s a more laid-back
environment out west.” Another officer assigned to NE concluded, “There is more
crime in SE and NE and so they [supervisors] are more strict on officer safety here.
In SE and NE, officers have to have riot helmets. This is not the case in NW and
SW.”

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 41

“In NW,” an officer in NE stated, “I never saw a sergeant. I never saw them
patrolling. In SE and NE, sergeants are always patrolling and [are] out and about.”
Finally, another officer assigned to NE reported, “In NE, you get the sergeants who
don’t want to be here or those that still want to work. Some sergeants are sick of
the ghetto . . . most sergeants don’t want to work NE because of the racial issues.
It is confrontational racism in NE.”

Eleven officers further reported that the culture of the clientele, citizen expectations,
and local political influence produce precinct-level variation in supervisory
styles. Again, the field observation notes cross-reference these findings from the
structured interviews. In MMPD, there is a strong interaction between citizen
demand, the nature of the crime and deviance in the precinct, and police patrol
practices. In the eastern precincts, for example, the level of crime and deviance
is not only more visible and violent, but the crime levels are higher than in the
western precincts. Citizens residing in the eastern precincts witness higher levels
of more serious crime and, as a result, are generally more permissive of aggressive
police patrol practices (e.g., foot pursuits, automobile pursuits, traffic stops,
enhanced security measures during traffic stops, etc.) than citizens residing in
the western precincts. In contrast, official agency documents uncover that local
political interest groups/politicians focus their censure on the aggressive police
responses in the eastern precincts, largely arguing that police patrol practices are
influenced by racial factors rather than the nature of the crime and calls for service.
In the western precincts, as officers and precinct commanders explained, where
crime is consistently relatively minor and expectations for police service are high,
police patrol officers are obliged to forsake traditional law enforcement practices
for more service-oriented assistance.

Officers in the NE Precinct reported on the role of politics and citizen expectations/
demands in varying supervisory styles. One officer in NE explained, when asked
why supervisory styles differed between precincts, “In NE, it is more of a politically
charged atmosphere. NE is subject to more questions. Racial tensions are high.
Command styles revolve around that.” Another officer assigned to NE simply
responded, “Politics dictate what happens.” An officer in SE also mentioned
citizen expectations and local politics as the reason for differences in supervision:
“They are more relaxed out west. I think it is because of the demographics of the
area and the type of business in the area. In SE, they spend a lot more attention on
the downtown area and what those businesses demand. There are no businesses
in NE.”

An officer assigned to SW detailed . . .

In NE, command officers show up on calls a little more. The NE and SE

community want to see command because those areas have newer officers.
Newer sergeants usually work those areas so they are still in the officer role
where they like to be on the street. In NE and SE, you still hear command
officers making traffic stops.

Officers further reported that policies, and enforcement of policies, vary between
the precincts. An officer assigned to SE said that pursuits (foot and automobile)
“will fly quicker in NE and SE than in NW and SW.” One officer explained why
he/she bid to the NW precinct rather than the NE Precinct. This officer said that

42 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

while doing field training in NE, during a traffic stop, a motorist fled and the field
training officer (FTO) insisted on a chase. This officer commented that supervisors
rarely approve pursuits in NW; in NE, on the other hand, supervisors expect
officers to respond more aggressively.

Patrol officers also reported that the manner in which departmental policies are
applied is different in each precinct. An officer assigned to SE reported . . .

Each precinct has a certain way of handling things. Also, there are differences
in command officers. Such as mayor’s complaints [parking complaints that
are reported to the mayor’s hotline]. In NW, the LT [lieutenant] was very
serious about mayor’s complaints. You have to check it several times. In SE,
if you check it one time, you are good.

Officers in SW noted that mayor’s complaints are more frequent in SW than NW:
”We get a lot of mayor’s complaints, more in SW than NW. Not many in NE.” As
an officer in SW explains . . .

Sergeants need to be [a] certain way . . . in each precinct. Need to be more

flexible in NE. Sergeants allow you to do more stuff in NE than out here. [There
are] more controlling command [officers] in SW due to public expectations
and politics within the department. Sergeants are on the streets more in NE.
Your sergeant will be there and be more involved and active in NE than SW.

An officer assigned to SW said, “The way the rules are applied and interpreted
varies. Rules are always the rules, but the way that they are put into practice has to
do with the command you belong to . . . Policy varies by precinct.”

Officers not only detailed varying applications of departmental policies but

explained how informal policies are created in each precinct. For example, an officer
assigned to SW described a new “informal” policy that was announced during
roll call. According to the officer, an officer working in SW stopped a motorist
for driving recklessly. The motorist was angered at receiving a traffic ticket on a
Sunday on his way to church. The motorist called the precinct and spoke to the
captain regarding the issue. The officer said that a new policy was announced in
the SW precinct mandating that officers make no traffic stops on Sundays during
church hours.

In NE, the racial tension is high, and the precinct is often the subject of local political
scrutiny and distinct policies. In NE, supervisors instructed officers to refrain from
wearing their department-issued uniform gloves (black leather gloves) when
responding to calls because they look “intimidating” to the African American
population. The racial issues between the precinct and the community are a high-
priority concern in NE and, in turn, shape supervisory styles and practices.

Discussion/Conclusion
The findings from this study suggest that the precinct is a viable and significant
suborganizational level of analysis. It is clear that most participating officers
perceived that supervisory styles vary within the police organization at the
precinct level of analysis. Furthermore, the officers identified factors at three

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 43

different levels of analyses, although many factors are interrelated between levels
of analyses, which converge to produce variation at the precinct level of analysis
(See “Levels of Analysis in Studying Police Patrol Practices” figure).

The findings of the study indicate that participating officers perceive that individual-
level factors are important as partial explanations of variation in supervisory styles.
This finding is sensible; there are few who would argue that individual-level
characteristics are insignificant. In addition, it would also be reasonable to conclude
that persons with aggressive personalities are attracted to increasingly volatile
work areas or that sergeants with more time on the job may desire to work in less
active precincts. What is particularly enlightening, however, is the unearthing that
personality, temperament, and level of experience converge to produce variation
at the precinct level of analysis. For example, concentrations of “hard-charging”
supervisors in high-crime precincts clearly influence supervision and, consequently,
police patrol practices; “hard-charging” supervisors are more apt to be permissive
of aggressive police tactics, even those tactics that may cross the line into the
extreme (Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002). Intensifying this pattern is the fact that newer,
less experienced supervisors are generally assigned to high-crime precincts (due to
personnel bidding policies), which has the potential to further restrict proper control
of police patrol behavior. Aggressive police behavior in high-crime areas is of much
concern among residents and policy makers. The concentration of less experienced,
uncompromising supervisors in these areas can only intensify these concerns.

The findings also demonstrate that factors at the situational and neighborhood levels
of analyses produce precinct-level variation in officers’ perceptions of supervisory
styles. Interview data, field observation notes, and official documents revealed that
the precinct-level variation in supervisory styles is attributable to the nature of the
crime and calls for service in each precinct. In the NE Precinct area, street-level
visible crimes (e.g., gang-related crimes, drugs, shootings, etc.) are more prevalent,
and officers perceive that supervisors are more aggressive. Similarly, in the SE
Precinct, street-level visible crimes and order maintenance crimes (e.g., prostitution,
public drunkenness, etc.) are widespread, and officers perceive supervisors to be
actively involved in the daily operations of patrol. In the SW Precinct, on the other
hand, most of the calls for service concern service-oriented matters, such as civil
disturbance calls (disagreements between neighbors), intrusion alarm calls, and
property and/or personal injury traffic accidents. Sergeants, consequently, are
perceived by their officers as not being as active or visible because most of the crimes
and calls for service are relatively minor (compared to the eastern precincts). Most
of the calls for service in the NW Precinct concern service-oriented matters, as well
as infrequent bursts of more serious street-level crimes (e.g., drugs, cuttings at local
bars/taverns, etc.). Sergeants in the NW Precinct are reportedly perceived as being
largely inactive (not patrolling and responding to calls for service) with moments
of vigorous activity. Not only do the findings indicate that police priorities (e.g.,
law enforcement, order maintenance, and service-oriented activities) vary between
precincts, but these priorities largely shape supervision.

Patrol officers in MMPD perceive that the culture of the clientele, citizen
expectations, and local political influences produce inter-precinct variation in
supervisory styles. In the NE Precinct (which has the city’s highest concentration
of African American residents) and SE Precinct (which has the city’s highest
concentration of Hispanic residents), racial and cultural tensions exacerbate the

44 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

inherent conflict in law enforcement. Supervisors must react, and officers perceive
them to react, because they are directly responsible for maintaining the legitimacy
of the institution of policing within their organizational context (precinct). As Van
Maanen (1983) clearly enunciated in his overview of first-line supervisors, . . .

Sergeants are expected by their superior officers to offer (among other

things) tangible proof to the public that police are internally accountable
. . . Sergeants are to be available to the public at large, thus displaying the
organization’s capacity to monitor performance of its members. While
ritualized occasions of performance appraisal serve this end to a small degree
. . . it is the daily rounds made by sergeants that make most salient and visible
the organization’s promise to control the activities of its employees. (p. 287)

Research demonstrates that when local political interest groups focus public
attention on racial tensions between the police and residents, the demand for
supervisory presence increases. The louder the public and political cries, as Van
Maanen implies, the more visible are the supervisors. Since the level of residential
segregation is high in many urban contexts (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002; Wilson,
1987), and if precinct boundaries generally reflect the same patterns (as they do in
MMPD), the suborganizational level of the precinct emerges as a crucial level of
analysis for explaining police behavior, including supervision.

These situational and neighborhood factors also reportedly affect the creation
and enforcement of policies in each precinct. According to officers, precinct
supervisors must react to the crime problems in their areas and adapt to the
expectations of citizen populations and local political groups. Because officers deal
with mass populations, and individual-level tailored responses are impractical,
precinct supervisors establish protocols for handling like situations (Lipsky, 1980).
Precinct supervisors respond by creating informal work rules that apply to specific
situations. As Lipsky (1980) uncovered in his fieldwork . . .

Ideally, and by training, street-level bureaucrats respond to the individual

needs or characteristics of the people they service or confront. In practice,
they must deal with clients on a mass basis, since work requirements prohibit
individualized service . . . Police officers should respond to the implications
of the presenting case; in reality, they must develop techniques to recognize
and respond to types of confrontations, and to process categories of cases
accordingly. (p. 504)

The creation and enforcement of these informal policies is primarily the

responsibility of precinct sergeants and lieutenants. This study indicates that
it is important to examine the policies, and enforcement of policies, within the
organization at suborganizational levels.

Although not explicitly reported by the officers, it is reasonable that factors at the
legal and organizational levels of analyses would produce variation in supervisory
styles. Laws specific to municipalities generate variation in police practices and
supervisory styles at the precinct level of analysis precisely due to situational
and neighborhood-level variables (e.g., more violent, street-level crime in eastern
precincts). It is also reasonable that organizational factors—bidding processes,

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 45

personnel allocation, mapping of precinct boundaries—would produce precinct-
level differences in supervision.

This study finds that the precinct is a significant level of analysis in explaining
officers’ perceptions of police supervision. The current study uncovers that the
standard levels of analyses converge at the precinct to produce a discrete unit of
analysis. Future research should test the external validity of this study’s findings
through replication and an explicit focus on supervision. This study involved one
police organization and relied on officers’ perceptions of variation in supervisory
styles. Furthermore, while research has demonstrated a link between supervisory
styles and patrol behavior, the findings are inconsistent and tenuous. Additional
research is needed to clarify the relationship between supervisory styles and patrol
behavior. As this study uncovers, additional research should employ the precinct
as a suborganizational level of analysis. Observing and analyzing behavior at the
precinct, whether at the line level or up the supervisory chain of command, can
offer us a glimpse into the dynamic world of law enforcement. This view from the
inside may offer clarity not yet achieved.

Endnotes
1
All references to race/ethnicity will follow the guidelines set forth by the United
States Census Bureau.
2
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics reports that the
national average number of separate and distinct precincts in large, municipal
police organizations is four, which strengthens the external validity of the
findings in the current study.
3
Statistical power analysis (SPA) was used to determine the appropriate sample
size. SPA takes advantage of the relationship among four variables involved
in statistics inference: (1) sample size, (2) significance criterion, (3) population
effect size, and (4) statistical power (Cohen, 1992; Weisburd, Petrosino, & Mason,
1993). In this particular study, because this is the first empirical deductive
assessment of precinct-level variation, it is expected that data analyses
would produce a large effect between each research group, or each precinct
(Cohen, 1992). Additionally, in criminal justice research, the standard alpha, or
significance level, is .05. As Cohen (1992) reports, to compare mean responses at
a large effect size across four groups using an alpha level of .05, the appropriate
sample size is 18 cases (in each group) (p. 158). For a multivariate analysis,
using the same effect size and alpha level, with nine independent variables,
the sample size would need to be at least 50 cases. Furthermore, in determining
the appropriate sample size, it is important to keep the number of cases in each
group similar. As Weisburd et al. (1993) explain, “. . . studies in which the sizes
of the groups examined are relatively similar are more powerful than those in
which the sizes of the groups are markedly different” (p. 350). For these reasons,
the total sample for the quantitative analysis in the current study is 72 officer
responses, or 18 officer responses in each precinct covering all patrol shifts.
4
Structured interviews were not completed with four participating officers;
therefore, only 72 structured interviews were conducted and included in the
analysis.

46 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

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Kimberly D. Hassell, PhD, is an assistant professor at the University of

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Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 49

50 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
In Law Enforcement We Trust:
Ethical Attitudes and Behaviors
of Law Enforcement Officers and
Supervisors
Steven Klingaman, MPA, Forensic Scientist in Drug Chemistry, Illinois State
Police, Division of Forensic Services

Introduction
The ethical values that law enforcement agencies exhibit can affect public
perceptions of the agency’s ability to protect and serve. The general public’s
perception is a result of the agency’s ability to demonstrate that the ethical values
they possess are a reflection of those possessed by the citizens. As public servants,
all law enforcement personnel are obligated to fulfill their duties in the best interest
of the public they serve. This obligation includes ethical responsibilities to both the
agency and the people. To the public, police officers must demonstrate a higher
level of ethical behavior due to their position of authority and power (Johnson &
Cox, 2005). The organizational values of an agency are instilled in its management,
which in turn ingrains it into subordinates. Any discrepancy between the values
and beliefs of a manager and those of the agency could have detrimental effects on
the subordinate. The focus of this article is to investigate the differences in ethical
behaviors among different levels of management and their impact on officers’
attitudes. By analyzing the responses to a National Institute of Justice survey of
law enforcement agencies, a better understanding of the ethical attitudes and
behaviors of law enforcement personnel can be achieved. The results will illustrate
the relationships, if any, that exist between the ethical attitudes and behaviors of
different levels of management and those exhibited by other law enforcement
personnel.

The ethical values of an agency can most readily be observed in those who have the
most contact with the general public. While the agency may have a strong ethical
responsibility to the public, the actual ethical values and behaviors exercised by its
personnel determine the perceptions of those they serve. Conflicting views about
right and wrong behavior by superiors can lead to confusion and misinterpretation
by subordinates. This, in turn, can lead to substandard performance and lack of
public trust.

By studying the relationships between the ethical attitudes of different levels of

management and officer attitudes, we will be able to identify whether or not a
difference of behaviors exists between these classifications of law enforcement
officers. It will also help to determine whether the level of management is related
to a person’s ethical behavior. A difference of behaviors can be an indicator of
possible conflicts and potential abuses by both management and the subordinates
who follow their orders. These differences can also have a considerable impact
on the organizational culture of an agency. Since the organizational culture of a
law enforcement agency is comprised of the interactions between administration,

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 51

supervisors, and line officers, any significant difference in the values and behaviors
that exists between these members of the same organization can result in internal
conflicts, corruption, and loss of public support. The literature review that follows
will assist in understanding the consequences and problems that are related to the
ethical differences that occur between levels of management and line officers and
the impact they can have on the culture of the organization.

Research and Literature Reviews

The perspective of law enforcement personnel can be viewed differently. Pollock
(1998) describes two perceptions of law enforcement officers, the first being
the “crime fighter,” which can be characterized as an enforcer of the law above
all, who believes that criminals are the enemy of the public. The public should
understand that the decisions made by law enforcement are for the good of the
community. The priority of law enforcement is crime control and order. The second
perspective Pollock (1998) describes is the “public servant.” As public servants,
law enforcement officers serve everyone. They are to protect all citizens and carry
out their duties without prejudice. Unlike the “crime fighter,” there are no enemies
unless one considers society as an enemy (Pollock, 1998).

The understanding of these two perspectives is important when assessing ethical

issues. The two perspectives may have different ethical values that are employed
in the decision-making process while on the job. It is this decision-making process
that makes the ethical training of all law enforcement officers so important. The
outcome of any situation is dependant upon the ethics, beliefs, attitudes, and
training of the officers responding. The ability to make the necessary decisions
that produce positive results comes from not only the officer but from the agency
he or she represents.

It is the view of the “public servant” that will be taken within the context of
this article. As a public servant, law enforcement personnel are committed to
the varying behavioral expectations that the general public demands from this
profession. These expectations are higher than those of any other profession
due to the power and authority a law enforcement officer possesses (Johnson &
Cox, 2005). This behavior is affected by different levels of authority as well as
the culture of the organization. Administrators, supervisors, and line officers all
contribute to the ethical behaviors of each other. The intensity of these contributions
varies depending upon the organization and situation. Collectively, the ethical
contributions of all personnel comprise the culture and environment in which law
enforcement is conducted.

The different ethical considerations that are contributed are a product of the
duties that each line officer, supervisor, and administrator must fulfill. Line
officers are exposed to confrontations with criminals and the public. Their values
and behaviors are most readily seen and tested on a daily basis. They must deal
with many problems and situations that require them to use the combination of
the ethical values learned in training, those derived from personal values, those
influenced by peers, and those that are expected by the public. They use their
discretion to handle ethical dilemmas that occur while on duty. Discretion, as
defined by Pollock (1998), is “the ability to choose between two or more courses
of behavior” (p. 151). This is influenced by an officer’s ethical values and plays

52 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

a more important role in decisionmaking than rules and regulations (Pollock,
1998). As members of a law enforcement organization, the attitudes and behaviors
that affect a line officer’s discretion are incorporated into the contributions to the
culture within the organization.

The contributions of administrative ethics help to set the tone of the organizational
culture of a law enforcement agency. This is where the policies and procedures
for the values of the organization must begin. Administrators are responsible for
developing the goals and guidelines that subordinate officers are to follow (IACP,
2001). Administrators must consider the reputation of the organization and the
public trust it must uphold. Unlike line officers, administrators are not faced with
the daily street-level decisionmaking that occurs, but they are still responsible for
the influences on those decisions. This is why such an importance is placed on the
ethical values of administrators. An administrator’s personal ethical values should
not interfere with his or her duty to the goals of the organization (Burke, 1989;
Thompson, 1992). Although these values can still influence ethical standards, it is
the combination of organizational responsibility, public perception, and political
influence that administrators often use to shape the organizational culture that
exists within a law enforcement agency.

Supervisors are the one classification that is caught in the middle. Their ethical
contributions to the organizational culture of the law enforcement agency
are derived from their personal beliefs as well a mixture of line officer and
administrative ethics. The supervisor’s duties are to ensure that the policies and
procedures implemented by administrators are carried out by subordinates and
that subordinates adhere to these policies and procedures while fulfilling their
duties to the public and the organization. Supervisory responsibility also extends
to playing the main role in the development and utilization of ethical values by
line officers (IACP, 2001; Peak, Glensor, & Gaines, 1999). Some supervisors, such
as sergeants, have more of a connection with line officers, which can affect their
attitudes towards ethical values. Paoline (2001) found that street supervisors often
have the same attitudes towards organizational environments as line officers. The
contributions of supervisors to organizational culture helps to bring together the
organizational values of the agency as set forth by administrators and the day-to-
day ethical values that are exercised by line officers. This “mediation” role between
labor and management is important in order for the organization to run smoothly
(Peak et al., 1999).

The classifications of officers used here are formed by levels of authority within
an organization. The levels of authority used in this study are line officers, first-
line managers, mid-level managers, and senior-level managers. These levels can
influence the attitudes and behaviors of other officers. The next sections will
discuss what shapes these different levels of authority and what role organizational
culture plays in shaping law enforcement agencies.

Level of Authority and Its Influence

As “street-level bureaucrats,” line officers must subscribe to a higher level of
behaviors just as other public officials (Lipsky, 1980; Raines, 2005). Since line
officers are the public representatives of a law enforcement agency, their behaviors
and decisions are under the most scrutiny. It is here that the ethical behavior and

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 53

reputation of the organization begins. It is important that officer recruits receive the
best possible ethical training so they may carry it with them not only throughout
their careers but out to the streets where it will be put to the test. Police training
often focuses on following rules and regulations and the conduct of officers
based upon these tenets. Control by policy, not by human behavior, is usually the
approach taken to train recruits. Concentration on policy over behavior can lead to
officers doing what is right out of fear of being caught rather than knowing what is
right or wrong (Johnson & Cox, 2005). Behavior that is not consistent with that of
the citizenry can result in the erosion of public confidence and lack of community
support.

It is the responsibility of the supervisors, as well as administrators, to ensure that

line officers who confront the public on a daily basis are trained in not only the
duties they perform, but also the moral and ethics reasons behind what they do
(IACP, 2001; Peak et al., 1999). It is at this level that a distinction of ethical behaviors
can exist within an organization. Supervisors who believe that certain actions
can be justified or kept from upper management may cross the line of unethical
behavior. The position of supervisor, whether it is for a small or large group, is a
position that can be described as line work while also being administrative.

First-line managers, such as sergeants and some corporals and lieutenants, are
viewed as a rank caught between management and line officer. Officers see them
as still tied to the street side of policing. Anyone above this level is viewed as being
out of touch with the streets. Higher ranks are considered to be more interested
in the political and economical interests than the safety of officers (Barker, 1999).
Line supervisors are caught in the middle of being told how things will be done
according to administrators and how things really are on the streets. Based on this
difference in perspective, a supervisor must use his or her judgment when making
decisions involving line officers and the public. Supervisors must win the respect
of their subordinates by not forgetting what it is like in the real world yet also
adhere to the management duties set forth by administrators.

Mid-level manager positions are considered to be more administrative and less

policing. Ranks such as captains and lieutenants can be considered mid-level
managers. These managers are responsible for carrying out the policies set forth
by senior-level managers. At this level, officers have begun to lose their “street
cop” attitudes and adopt the administrative view. Career mobility is a focus, and
greater loyalty and commitment to the organization increases (Barker, 1999). They
may build their reputations upon the reputation of the organization. Subordinate
to senior-level managers, it is the duty of the mid-level manager to make sure that
the policies set forth by their superiors are carried out and that the agency runs
smoothly. After all, their careers depend on it.

Good ethical training begins at the top. According to Thompson (1985),

“administrative ethics involves the application of moral principles to the conduct
of officials in organizations” (p. 555). An administrator, or senior-level manager,
must carry out the policies of their superiors who are usually people in political
positions. Senior-level managers often include ranks such as majors and colonels.
To do otherwise would not be ethical because this is the profession that people
choose by free will (Thompson, 1985). Administrators, although bound by their
duties of carrying out the policies set forth by their superiors, should make

54 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

every attempt to establish the highest of ethical guidelines for their personnel to
follow. Upper-management must take a leadership role in conveying the agency’s
overall quality of ethics to its officers. An ethical culture must start with upper-
management’s commitment to setting the ethical standard for the agency then
making sure it is carried out (O’Mally, 1997).

Administrators are responsible for setting the standard for organizational culture
in a law enforcement organization, and recruiting the right administrators is the
first step to a fulfilling this goal. Needless to say, law enforcement agencies strive
to attract highly qualified, ethical administrators. Still, applicants to high level
administrative positions can often display traits that can impress interviewers
but often do not illustrate the true core values that comprise their integrity.
A careful examination into what a candidate believes and the values he or she
holds should be conducted. The programs of a leader who has strong beliefs and
values gain better support from the public, are more effective, and last longer.
Ethics and integrity can help determine how a person will behave and perform.
The future leaders of police agencies need to possess the ethical qualities that will
help to reshape policing and the public problems it faces (Plummer, 1995). Official
obligations and moral duties are dependent upon each other. It can become
problematic to place individuals into administrative positions that must choose
between personal morals and organizational responsibility. These positions
may require the incumbent to choose between their morals and values and the
institutional obligations (Burke, 1989). This is why a greater importance should
be placed on selecting the right administrator. To retain the trust of the people,
the administration should not be in conflict with the mission and goals of a public
organization. The administration should then be able to convey these goals and
ethical concerns to all personnel.

Promoting good ethical culture requires good ethical officers in those management
positions that have the greatest influence. This is done through the promotion
process, which can be a barrier to change in an organization. As officers advance
through the ranks of an agency, their attitudes and organizational beliefs are molded
by their experience and environment. Their commitment to the organization can
be affected by the promotional opportunities available (Jaramillo, Nixon, & Sams,
2005). The practice of promoting those who would make the best managers is often
wrought with favoritism and partiality. Barker (1999) suggests that many officers
believe that the process is not by merit but by political grounds that encourage
minority and female promotions. Bolton’s (2003) qualitative analysis rejects the idea
that minorities are favored over whites. From a minority’s perspective, promotion
in an organization is made more difficult. Whetstone (2001) also concludes that
the promotional system itself eliminates many from upward mobility. His study
showed that minorities and women were encouraged more than white males, but
even this was minimal. Whetstone also found that unfair testing processes, biased
administration, and lack of openings were organizational reasons for individuals
not to participate in the promotional process. Conflicting feelings about the
promotional process and lack of encouragement from management can create
problems and an unhealthy organizational culture. Suspicions of the intentions of
managers and loss of confidence by subordinates can result in lower morale and
distrust in management. These feelings can then affect an officer’s attitudes and
behaviors.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 55

The promotion process is used to select those officers who will ultimately establish
the goals of the agency. Those who seek promotion should be in it for the work
itself, not just the economic gain (Scarborough, Tubergen, Gaine, & Whitlow,
1999). Those who attempt to promote, whether line officers or managers, do it for
certain reasons. Studies have shown that personal reasons account for attempting
to promote and that increased pay does not play a major role (Scarborough et al.,
1999; Whetstone, 2001). Management’s role in the selection may be biased in that
those who are promoted most likely share the same personal views and opinions
of the managers responsible for the promotion. This may result in a command
structure with attitudes and behaviors that leave very little room for diversity of
thought. When this occurs, having the wrong type of officers in administrative
positions can have a detrimental effect on the organization.

Cultural Influence
Organizational culture plays an important role in the development of new officers.
Wilson (1989) defines organizational culture as “a persistent, patterned way of
thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization”
(p. 91). It is a combination of factors such as environment, attitudes, feelings,
beliefs, morals, and values that exist within the people and the organization. This
“culture” has been cited as a cause of problems (Bolton, 2003; Johnson & Cox, 2005;
Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, & Haberfeld, 2000; Trautman, 2000). Organizations
can often encourage unethical behavior by introducing the behavior that it expects
from its new recruits. Even the paramilitary methods used in training can influence
a new officer to accept the ethical views of the organization over his or her own
(Johnson & Cox, 2005).

Organizational culture works upon a person’s behavior by pressuring human

emotions such as acceptance, fear, pride, and ambition. Through formal and
informal groups, the behaviors of new officers can often be altered to “fit in” in
a new environment. If this environment is corrupt or unstable, it could result in
unacceptable officer performance and difficulty in decisionmaking. The lines
between what is right and wrong can become distorted. Right and wrong may
now be defined as what is good or bad for the organization as opposed to what is
good or bad for the public.

According to Klockars et al. (2000), “Corruption is the abuse of police authority

for gain” (p. 1). Until recently, police agencies handled corruption through the
administration/individual approach or “bad apple” approach. This approach
views corruption as a moral defect in an individual, not the system or agency.
The ethical dilemmas faced by law enforcement officers can be influenced by not
only the officer but also the environment in which the officer operates. Minimizing
the role of the organization in ethics places the responsibility on the individual.
This does little to solve the problems associated with ethical behaviors and agency
integrity. The administrative/individual approach views police integrity as a
system that expels and prevents “bad apples” from polluting the system (Klockars
et al., 2000). Stopping corrupt individuals from entering the system prevents
corruption from occurring.

Today, a different approach focuses on the environment and culture of the

organization and its relationship to the training and behaviors of law enforcement

56 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

officers. An organizational/occupational approach views police integrity as a
system in which an organizational culture does not tolerate unethical behaviors.
Klockars et al. (2000) concluded that the integrity of police agencies varies within
the United States. Officers must know their individual agency’s policy for behavior
as well as the penalties of breaking such policy. Officers must know the seriousness
of misconduct and the level of punishment as well as the agency’s intolerance of
the code of silence (Klockars et al, 2000).

Organizational culture that can lead to corruption is influenced by the separation

from the public, a strong dependence upon each other, and the resistance to
change. A lack of training in ethics and a stronger focus on the organization and its
beliefs influences one’s thinking (Johnson & Cox, 2005). Within law enforcement
agencies, a difference in cultures between line officers and management can create
an untrusting atmosphere.

Wilson (1989) describes the street cop/management cop cultures that often pit line
officers against management. Line officers want the assurance that management
will support them at any cost. Management must protect the entire agency at any
cost. This may mean disciplining officers and setting examples of those who do
misdeeds. Line officers can form distrust towards management when they believe
that management has “sold out” to the political side (Wilson, 1989). This division
between street work and administrative work can result in an agency that is
susceptible to problems or corruption from either side.

Organizational culture that tolerates corruption can lead to an atmosphere in

which a “code of silence” thrives and is used to cover up unethical actions by both
line officers and the organization. This code of silence is one of the four dimensions
that lead to corruption according to Klockars et al. (2000). Trautman (2000) found
that 79% of police academy recruits surveyed acknowledged that a code of silence
exists and is fairly common. This code, often denied by administrators and
officers, is a direct result of unethical organizational culture. Combating the code
of silence includes ethics training, consistent accountability, open communication
between officers and leaders, an anonymous reporting system, and whistleblower
protection. Field training officers and line supervisors have the most ability to
prevent a code of silence (Trautman, 2000). The use of such a code casts doubts
by the public on the integrity and truthfulness of the organization. Not only does
this damage the reputation of the agency, but it damages the reputation of the
profession.

The practice of law enforcement suffers as a result of unethical behaviors by

individuals and organizations. According to Cooper (1987), organizations can
corrupt a practice by pursuing external goods such as power, status, money, or
prestige. An organization must possess virtues that support the ethical principles
of the organization and the citizens it serves. The virtues of the administrators or
officers must be consistent with the internal goods of the practice. No virtues set
forth by the practice and supported by the organization should ever be violated
to advance the well-being of that organization. Individuals have a duty to their
colleagues to abstain from subverting the virtues held by their practice. Each
colleague then expects the same from each other. It is this expectation that keeps
the practice respectable. Lack of virtues by an individual damages the entire
practice (Cooper, 1987).

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 57

It is the organizational approach that must be addressed and changed so that the
problem of corruption can be fixed. The old transactional style of leadership in which
one leader controls the organization needs to be replaced with a transformational
style in which changes are made through the cooperation and input of all the
members. If positive changes are to be made, therefore, it will take the consensus of
the entire organization from the bottom to the top (Johnson & Cox, 2005).

The overall results of law enforcement organizations lacking ethical behaviors

are public mistrust and loss of support. As governmental organizations, law
enforcement agencies must demonstrate their ability to retain the trust of the
citizens they protect. Gaining public trust requires an organization and public
administrators to demonstrate trustworthy behaviors. Ethical behaviors that
lead to public trust include integrity, openness, loyalty, ethical competence, and
consistency. The more ethical a government is, the more public trust it gains. The
more a government does to improve its ethical state, the more support and trust it
receives. The behaviors of individuals within a government can strongly influence
public trust. Management must act as role models to subordinates; this helps to
create a more ethical environment, which increases public trust. Openness by
employees should be encouraged. Increased openness among employees leads to
increased public trust (Feldheim & Wang, 2004).

Analysis and Methodology of the Survey Questions

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) conducted a study on the integrity of 30 law
enforcement agencies. This study consisted of 11 hypothetical scenarios used to
measure police misconduct and corruption. The scenarios varied in seriousness
and were rated by the participants. Less serious scenarios included running a
security business during off hours, accepting unsolicited meals and small value
items from merchants on a beat, receiving holiday gifts of food and liquor, and
covering up an officer involved in a DUI. Moderately serious scenarios included
excessive force after a foot pursuit, a supervisor giving a subordinate time off in
return for mechanical work on the supervisor’s personal car, exchange of free
drinks for ignoring a bar that is open too late, and receipt of a kickback from a
towing company. The most serious of scenarios involved stealing a watch from a
crime scene, taking money from a found wallet, and accepting a bribe in exchange
for not issuing a traffic citation. The responses to the questions about each scenario
suggest the ethical attitudes and behaviors exhibited by the participants and,
collectively, the agency they represent (Klockars et al., 2000) (See Appendix I).

The responses to the survey were used to measure officers’ knowledge of their
own policies regarding the actions, their opinions of the seriousness of the offense,
how others view the seriousness of the offense, the level of discipline that should
be invoked, the level of discipline that would probably be invoked, whether the
officer would report another officer engaged in the behavior, and whether other
officers would report others engaged in the behavior (Klockars et al., 2000) (See
Appendix II).

The behaviors suggested by the NIJ survey give an indication of the organizational
culture that exists within each agency. This culture, as mentioned earlier, is a
culmination of all the attitudes and beliefs of all personnel as well as the policies
and views of the organization. To investigate this further, this article focuses on

58 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

just one scenario. Case 7 of the survey—a supervisor allows a subordinate time
off during a holiday in return for mechanical work on the supervisor’s personal
car—will be examined to determine whether there is a significant difference in the
responses of line officers and supervisors. This scenario is the only one of the 11
that was designed to evaluate the ethical behaviors of supervisors. By using this
scenario, one can investigate the ethical behaviors of officers and different levels of
management. This will be done by analyzing the responses of those who indicated
rank. An “unknown” or “other” response to the question of rank resulted in the
respondent’s disqualification.

Analyzing Case 7 can illustrate ethical disparities that could exist between different
levels of management and their impact on officers. By examining this, one may be
able to determine the ethical attitudes and even predict the ethical behaviors that
exist within a law enforcement organization. It is hypothesized that . . .

Hypothesis 1 – An officer’s attitude towards supervisor misconduct is

positively associated with the officer’s attitude regarding peer attitudes
towards supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies prohibiting
the supervisor misconduct, supervisory position, length of service, and the
size of the agency.

Hypothesis 2 – An officer’s attitude towards punishing supervisor

misconduct is positively associated with the officer’s attitude regarding peer
attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies
prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory
position, length of service, and the size of the agency.

Hypothesis 3 – An officer’s willingness to report supervisor misconduct is

positively associated with the officer’s attitude regarding peer willingness
to report misconduct, the officer’s attitude regarding peer attitudes towards
supervisor misconduct, the officer’s attitude regarding punishing supervisor
misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor
misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory position, length of service, and
the size of the agency.

This study focuses on the attitudes of officers and managers towards Case 7 of the
NIJ survey. The responses to three questions concerning Case 7 will be analyzed to
determine any inconsistencies between the three different levels of management
and the attitudes and behaviors of officers towards supervisor misconduct. The
first question, “How serious do you consider this behavior to be?” is answered
using a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all serious” to “Very serious.”
The second question, “If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was
discovered doing so, what, if any, discipline do you think should follow?” uses the
ordinal list of choices “None,” “Verbal reprimand,” “Written reprimand,” “Period
of suspension without pay,” “Demotion in rank,” and “Dismissal.” The third
question, “Do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in
this behavior?” again uses a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Definitely not”
to “Definitely yes.” The first and second questions reveal attitudes one would have
toward the situation; whereas, the third question is an indication of behavioral
action. These particular questions will be used to investigate the different levels of
management and officer attitudes.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 59

The different ranks of officers used in this survey are constructed by combining
the indicated ranks the officers provided when answering the survey question
regarding their rank. For this analysis, five ranks of officers are used. These ranks
are officers that include recruits, line officers, deputies, and corporals who are not
supervisors; detectives; first-line supervisors comprised of sergeants and corporals
who are supervisors; mid-level managers that include lieutenants and captains;
and senior-level managers consisting of majors, colonels, and chiefs.

The three levels of management (first-line, mid-level, and senior-level) and officer
attitudes will be the focus of this study. By separating these levels of management,
we will be able to acquire a better understanding of how management views
certain ethical situations and their impact on officer attitudes.

Validity
Thirty police agencies were contacted in which 3,235 officers from all of the
contacted agencies responded. This resulted in an overall response rate of 55.5%.
Due to confidentiality, the exact types of police agencies contacted were not
revealed; however, the types of agencies did not include any state agencies and
only one sheriff’s agency (Klockars et al., 2000). There is also selection bias of the
surveyed agencies as they were not randomly chosen. The sample taken from
law enforcement agencies was done as a convenience sample; hence, there is an
increased threat to external validity. The conclusions of this article are, therefore,
only representative of the agencies who participated in the NIJ study.

Results
Analysis of the data collected by the NIJ survey regarding Case 7 has been compiled
in the following tables. The first illustrates basic statistics of the groups that were
analyzed; the other three are regression models that could be used to address the
attitudes and behaviors of officers and management. The regression models are
based upon the independent variables listed in the tables; the dependent variable
is the response of officers. Using these different variables in each situation will
provide indicators for determining what factors influence an officer’s decision-
making process.

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and variances of officers and
the three levels of management studied in regards to the three questions of
the scenario. These responses were based upon the individual’s attitudes and
behaviors towards the misconduct. One noteworthy item of interest here is that
there is a slight increase in the mean scores of the three levels of management as
rank increases. While there is a slight increase, the difference in means among
management levels is very small in comparison to the difference in means between
officers and managers. Also, standard deviations and variances are higher for
discipline and willingness to report. These results suggest that managers have
similar responses in attitudes towards the seriousness of the misconduct but are
not as cohesive in their attitudes about how to punish and whether or not to report
supervisory misconduct.

60 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Variances of the Three Levels of
Management
Seriousness Discipline of Supervisor Willingness to
of Supervisor Misconduct Report Supervisor
Misconduct 1 = None Misconduct
1 = Not at all serious 2 = Verbal reprimand 1 = Definitely no
2 3 = Written reprimand 2
3 4 = Suspension w/out pay 3
Level of 4 5 = Demotion 4
Management 5 = Very serious 6 = Dismissal 5 = Definitely yes
Officers Mean 4.06 3.47 3.19
Standard Deviation 1.100 1.246 1.467
Variance 1.210 1.553 2.152
N 2,085 2,082 2,080
First-Line Mean 4.53 3.90 4.22
Managers Standard Deviation .762 1.055 1.072
Variance .581 1.113 1.149
N 376 376 377
Mid-Level Mean 4.61 3.90 4.33
Managers Standard Deviation .619 .949 1.057
Variance .384 .900 1.118
N 167 166 166
Senior-Level Mean 4.63 4.20 4.46
Managers Standard Deviation .771 1.135 1.087
Variance .594 1.288 1.181
N 57 56 57

Table 2. Results of Regression Analysis of Officers’ Own Attitudes Towards

the Seriousness of Supervisor Misconduct
Attitudes Towards Seriousness
Independent Variables B Standard Error Beta
First-Line Managers .194** .037 .061
Mid-Level Managers .306** .053 .067
Senior-Level Managers .132** .084 .017
Length of Service .018* .007 .029
Size of Agency .009 .010 .010
Violation of Policy .222** .014 .206
Others’ Views of Seriousness .627** .012 .661
R² = .648 * p< .05
F = 791.747 ** p< .001

Table 2 represents the regression analysis observed from the attitudes of the
respondents towards the seriousness of a supervisor’s misconduct in the scenario.
The results show that although all three levels of management are significant, no
level of management has much of an impact on an officer’s attitude towards the
seriousness of supervisor misconduct (b =.061, .067, .017, respectively). Of all three
levels, mid-level managers have the highest beta weights. The same is true for length
of service (b =.029) and the size of the agency (b =.010). The results partially support
Hypothesis 1, which states that officers’ attitudes towards supervisor misconduct
is positively associated with the officer’s attitude regarding peer attitudes towards
supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor
misconduct, supervisor position, length of service, and the size of the agency. The
impact of supervisory position, although small, does lend some support to this
hypothesis; whereas, the size of the agency, which is not significant, does not.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 61

What does have a much stronger impact is officers’ attitude about the way others
view the seriousness of the misconduct (b = .661) and to a lesser extent, the
possibility of it being a violation of policy (b = .206). This supports Hypothesis 1,
that the attitudes of others towards the seriousness of supervisor misconduct does
affect an officer’s attitude and is partially supported by whether the offense is
a violation of policy. An officer’s attitude can be influenced by peer pressure or
doing wrong in the eyes of fellow officers.

If an officer feels that a policy violation is overlooked or does not know if such a
policy exists, then the officer may not view this as serious. This model demonstrates
that a major influence on officer attitudes towards the seriousness of misconduct is
how he or she believes others will feel about the seriousness of the misconduct.

Table 3. Regression Analysis of Officers’ Opinions of What Discipline

Should Follow Supervisor Misconduct

Attitudes Towards Discipline

Independent Variables B Standard Error Beta
First-Line Managers -.094* .042 -.026
Mid-Level Managers -.085 .061 -.016
Senior-Level Managers .090 .097 .010
Length of Service .041** .008 .058
Size of Agency .018 .012 .017
Violation of Policy .079** .017 .064
Others’ Views of Seriousness -.048* .019 -.044
Discipline That Would Follow .585** .012 .598
Own Attitude Toward Seriousness .389** .021 .337
R² = .660 * p< .05
F = 646.290 ** p< .001

The second regression model, Table 3, illustrates an officer’s opinion of what

discipline should be dealt supervisors who engage in misconduct. Here again, we
find that the level of management does not have a crucial impact on attitudes
towards discipline (b = -.026, -.016, .010, respectively). The negative beta weights
indicate that first-line and mid-level managers actually have a negative impact
on an officer’s attitude towards discipline. The strongest negative beta weights
are exhibited by first-line managers while senior-level managers demonstrate the
strongest positive beta weights among the levels of managers. Length of service
(b = .058) and agency size (b = .017) do not play a significant role in officer attitudes.
Even violation of policy (b = .064) and others’ views of the seriousness of the conduct
(b = -.044) has little to do with influencing an officer’s views of punishment. Length
of service and an officer’s awareness of a violation of policy only partially support
Hypothesis 2, which states that officer attitude towards punishing supervisor
misconduct is positively associated with officer attitude regarding peer attitudes
towards supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies prohibiting
the supervisor misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory position, length of
service, and the size of the agency. Supervisory position, agency size, and peer
attitudes towards supervisor misconduct are either insignificant or demonstrate a
negative impact towards an officer’s attitude towards punishment.

62 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

What an officer expects the punishment will be (b = .598) and his or her own
attitude towards the seriousness of the offense (b = .337) does impact an officer’s
opinion about punishment. These two factors support Hypothesis 2. They both
strongly influence the attitudes of officers.

The regression model suggests that the level of punishment an officer feels is
justifiable can be regulated by what he or she believes the real punishment to be.
This affects an officer’s opinion in that the officer knows the possible “range limits”
set by the agency. Punishment cannot be too strict or too lenient. The officer’s own
feelings of how serious the misconduct is will also dictate how much punishment
should be bestowed.

Table 4. Regression Analysis of Officers’ Own Willingness to Report

Supervisor Misconduct

Willingness to Report Misconduct

Independent variables B Standard Error Beta
First-Line Managers .352** .045 .080
Mid-Level Managers .475** .065 .074
Senior-Level Managers .374** .103 .035
Length of Service .028* .009 .033
Size of Agency .060** .013 .045
Discipline That Would Follow .048** .014 .041
Own Attitude Toward Seriousness .484** .022 .346
Others’ Attitude Toward Seriousness -.269** .022 -.203
Violation of Policy .034 .018 .022
Other Officers Reporting .765** .014 .705
R² = .734 * p< .05
F = 827.696 ** p< .001

The last regression model, Table 4, shows the willingness to report supervisor
misconduct. Although the three levels of management are significant, they are
still not very strong predictors of reporting supervisor misconduct (b = .080,
.074, .035, respectively). First-line managers have the strongest impact with mid-
level managers close behind. This third regression model also demonstrates the
trend of senior-level managers to have the weakest impact out of all the levels
of management. Senior-level managers tend to show the weakest beta weights
throughout the three models compared to the other levels of management.

As with the other two models, the length of service (b = .033) and the size of an
agency (b = .045), even though they are significant, still do not impact an officer’s
decision to report supervisor misconduct. Violation of policy (b = .022) and the
possible discipline that is expected (b = .041) showed no indication of being a
strong influence on decisionmaking. Hypothesis 3, which states that an officer’s
willingness to report supervisor misconduct is positively associated with the
officer’s attitude regarding peer willingness to report misconduct, the officer’s
attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer’s
attitude regarding punishing supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of
policies prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory
position, length of service, and the size of the agency, is partially supported by

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 63

these results. All variables lend support to Hypothesis 3, except for an officer’s
awareness of policy violation, due to its insignificance, and an officer’s attitude
regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct because it impacts one’s
willingness to report in a negative way. How serious an officer believes others
think the misconduct is (b = -.203) has a slightly negative impact on an officer
reporting the misconduct. This indicates that the more serious officers think their
peers view the misconduct, the less likely they are to report it. The perception of
peer attitudes towards such behavior can thus result in making decisions based
upon peer pressure rather than on ethical awareness. This is where the possibility
of corruption and unethical behaviors can begin.

The biggest determining factor of whether an officer is willing to report misconduct

is the officer’s perception of whether or not other officers would report this
misconduct (b = .705). The officer’s attitude towards the seriousness of misconduct
also influences the decision to report misconduct (b = .346). Hypothesis 3 is
supported by the influence of others’ willingness to report misconduct. It is
also partially supported by one’s own attitude towards the seriousness of the
misconduct. This behavior of whether to report an incident or not relies deeply on
the actions of others.

No one wants to be a whistleblower and face the possibility of reprisal from fellow
officers or management, but this may also be opposed by a person’s own feelings
of how serious the misconduct is. It is in these situations when the internal pressure
of what to do is eclipsed by the pressures of others. This model illustrates what can
be expected when informal organizations and peer pressures have more influence
than rules and regulations. This can lead to unreported acts of unethical behaviors.
A strong indicator of a person’s willingness to report unethical conduct is how he
or she might perceive others’ willingness to report the same conduct. This could
be helpful in identifying and correcting problems with the “code of silence” within
an organization.

The results of the correlations of attitudes and behaviors as shown in Table 5

help to support all three hypotheses in that the highest correlation in each of
the three categories of own attitude towards seriousness, own attitude towards
punishment, and own willingness to report misconduct is an officer’s perception
of what he or she believes others feel. The presumption of others’ attitude toward
seriousness by an officer shows a very strong positive relationship to an officer’s
own attitude toward seriousness of supervisor misconduct. This again indicates
that an officers’s own feelings and attitudes are influenced by what he or she
believes other officers’ attitudes are. One’s own feelings towards punishment and
seriousness of the offense also show a moderate positive relationship, which can
influence officers’ decisions.

64 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Table 5. Correlations of Attitudes and Behaviors

Correlations
Own
Own Attitude Own Attitude Willingness
Toward Seriousness Toward Punishment to Report
Own Attitude Toward Seriousness N 1 .586** .589**
3083 3074 3075
Others’ Attitudes Toward .778** .522** .522**
Seriousness N 3077 3071 3072
Punishment That Should Follow N .586** 1 .590**
3074 3077 3072
Punishment That Would Follow N .408** .748** .482**
3072 3070 3070
Own Willingness to Report .589** .590** 1
Misconduct N 3075 3072 3078
Others’ Willingness to Report .492** .532** .807**
Misconduct N 3074 3071 3074
Length of Service N .138** .139** .218**
3062 3056 3058
Size of Agency N -.021 .021 .012
3083 3077 3078
Violation of Policy N .554** .509** .424**
3071 3066 3067
First-Line Managers N .126** .098** .201**
3054 3049 3049
Mid-Level Managers N .100** .063** .146**
3054 3049 3049
Senior-Level Managers N .060** .069** .096**
3054 3049 3049
** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Attitudes towards punishment that should follow and punishment that would
follow exhibit a strong positive relationship. An officer’s beliefs about how others
feel towards punishment of supervisor misconduct play a large role in their own
attitudes towards punishment. Not wanting to be too harsh or too lenient on
punishment, officers may develop a consensus of the punishment misconduct
deserves from other coworkers. There is also a moderate relationship to one’s own
attitude towards seriousness and willingness to report, which may affect the level
of punishment for this misconduct.

Moderate positive relationships exist between an officer’s own attitude and

others’ attitudes towards the seriousness of the offense and an officer’s attitude
towards punishment and the willingness to report. Others’ willingness to report
misconduct shows a very high positive correlation to the willingness of one’s
own reporting of such incidents. This is very important because it illustrates and
supports the idea of the “code of silence” and the informal police subculture that
can lead to corruption (Klockars et al., 2000; Pollock, 1998; Trautman, 2000).

There seems to be almost no relationship between level of management and the

three categories examined. Ranging from .060 to .201, these relationships are
significant but show little in regards to strength. The first-line manager, however,
does show a stronger relationship than the mid-level or senior-level managers.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 65

Conclusions
This study explored the ethical attitudes and behaviors between law enforcement
personnel and the different relationships that exist. This study demonstrated
through correlation and regression analysis that strong relationships do exist
between an officer’s own attitudes and behaviors and those he or she believes
that others exhibit. The results show that attitudes and behaviors are influenced
by fellow officers.

The findings indicate that level of management has no major effect on the attitudes
and behaviors that are exhibited by officers. There are slight differences in responses
between first-line, mid-level, and senior-level managers, but these were found to
be insignificant. Even though these management levels do not play an important
role, the dependence upon the perceived notion of what other officers think does
play a significant role.

An officer’s attitude towards the seriousness of supervisor misconduct is affected

by how he or she feels about other officers’ attitudes toward this misconduct.
The officer’s knowledge of the conduct as being a violation of policy or not also
influences his or her decision on seriousness. This demonstrates how an officer’s
judgment toward ethical behavior is molded. The level of management has very
little effect on this ethical decision. The length of service or size of agency also
plays a very small part in the officer’s views. Dependency upon what an officer
thinks others’ attitudes are puts more importance on making sure that all officers
in an organization conform to high ethical standards.

Punishment that an officer believes should follow the supervisor misconduct is

affected by not only his or her attitude towards the seriousness of the offense but,
more importantly, what punishment would be received by the department. This
indicates that officers will judge the punishments for such violations based upon
the organization’s view. This can be advantageous if the agency has a record of
appropriate and consistent penalties for this type of misconduct.

The most important aspect of this study is the examination of an officer’s willingness
to report supervisor misconduct. Level of management, length of service, agency
size, punishment that would follow, and others’ attitudes towards seriousness
play no significant role in the decision to report, but the willingness of others to
report does. This is illustrated by the major dependence upon the willingness of
others to report such misconduct and the smaller influence of one’s own attitude
towards seriousness. With such a strong influence by others on reporting ethical
misconduct, an officer surrenders his or her own beliefs and values to his or her
coworkers. This behavior is then controlled by the “group” or to a larger extent,
the organization. This can also be advantageous to the organization if it maintains
a culture of high expectations of ethical standards. By preserving these standards
throughout the organization, officers will adhere to them more if they believe
others are doing the same. This is why continued ethics training is so important to
the integrity of an organization.

Level of management, in this study, did not seem to have much of an influence
on officer attitudes or behaviors. The limits of this study do not allow for an
in-depth analysis of the varying levels of management. Using only one scenario in

66 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

which supervisor misconduct was evaluated limits the findings to this particular
type of misconduct. Other variables that were not considered in this study could
contribute to the inconsistent managerial views and influence of different levels
of management on the attitudes and behaviors of law enforcement officers. The
effects of differences among levels of management on different peer attitudes and
behaviors could be the subject of future analyses.

As indicated by the regression models, the influence of others has a great power
over those making ethical decisions. This power can often lead to a subverted
culture that can exist within an organization. The peer pressure and perceptions of
what others may think can lead an officer to “go along with the crowd” or “watch
each other’s backs.” This can then develop into lack of integrity or even corruption
(Johnson & Cox, 2005; Klockars et al., 2000). Corrupt or dishonest organizations
are then at risk of losing public trust. Loss of trust, in turn, results in loss of support
(Feldheim & Wang, 2004).

The correlations found between the questions of attitude and behavior also help
to sustain the hypotheses that indicate that the influence of others can influence
one’s own decision-making process. This demonstrates not only that a relationship
exists between the supposed views of others and one’s own views, but it shows
that there is a strong relationship. The strength of this relationship is so strong
that it has been known to corrupt officers and ruin careers. The work of Weisburd,
Hamilton, Williams, Bryant, and Greenspan (2000) supports the idea that going
against another officer can result in social isolation. This work also reports that
most officers agree that not reporting misconduct is not uncommon (Weisburd et
al., 2000). This “code of silence” may often lead officers and management to step
over that boundary of breaking ethical rules and into corruption (Klockars et al.,
2000; Trautman, 2000).

This provides a starting point to determine what ethical problems can exist within
the law enforcement community and what areas need to be addressed during
ethics training. Ethics training needs to be a balance of theoretical and practical
applications. This training needs to address critical thinking, reasoning skills,
and problem-solving abilities. Identifying and defining the virtues that comprise
integrity is the first step in developing officers of integrity (Vicchio, 1997). Ethics
training should not end after the usual short 4-hour courses taught in most police
training academies (IACP, 2001). Instead, it should continue throughout an officer’s
career and into management. The use of ethics in a law enforcement agency is
something that just cannot be taught; it must be integrated into the organizational
culture (Vicchio, 1997).

References
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officers. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Bolton Jr., K. (2003). Shared perceptions: Black officers discuss continuing barriers
in policing. International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 26(3), 386-399.

Burke, J. (1989). Reconciling public administration and democracy: The role of the
responsible administrator. Public Administration Review, 49(2), 180-186.

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Cooper, T. (1987). Hierarchy, virtue, and the practice of public administration:
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survey. Public Integrity, 6(1), 63-75.

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enforcement. Retrieved on February 2, 2006, from www.theiacp.org/documents/
index.cfm?fuseaction=document&document_type_id=1&document_id=99

Jaramillo, F., Nixon, R., & Sams, D. (2005). The effect of law enforcement stress
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Integrity, 7(1), 67-79.

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Steven Klingaman, MPA, is a forensic scientist in drug chemistry with the

Illinois State Police Division of Forensic Services. Prior to this position, he
was employed by Continental/General Tire as a Passenger Tire Builder at
the Mt. Vernon, Illinois, plant during which time he worked full-time and
attended college full-time to earn his bachelor’s degree.

He graduated in 2000 from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale with

a bachelor’s degree in biology with minors in chemistry and environmental
studies. He also earned his MPA in 2006 from SIUC.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 69

Appendix I

Case Scenario Assessment Options

1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?
Not at all serious Very serious
1 2 3 4 5

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this

behavior to be?
Not at all serious Very serious
1 2 3 4 5

3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your

agency?
Definitely Not Definitely Yes
1 2 3 4 5

4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing
so, what, if any, discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow?
1. None
2. Verbal Reprimand
3. Written Reprimand
4. Period of Suspension Without Pay
5. Demotion in Rank
6. Dismissal

5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing
so, what if any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow?
1. None
2. Verbal Reprimand
3. Written Reprimand
4. Period of Suspension Without Pay
5. Demotion in Rank
6. Dismissal

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this
behavior?
Definitely Not Definitely Yes
1 2 3 4 5

7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a

fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?
Definitely Not Definitely Yes
1 2 3 4 5

Source: Klockars et al., 2000, p. 5

70 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Appendix II

Case Scenarios
Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security
devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value
from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the
generosity of those who give gifts to him.

Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal
gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.

Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays, local merchants
and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts
of food and liquor.

Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed,
and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a
watch, worth about 2 days’ pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen
during the burglary.

Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the
owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives
payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.

Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work
during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune
up his supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behavior.

Case 8. At 2:00 am, a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road.
He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the
vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds
that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense, he transports
the driver to his home.

Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its
legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a
couple of free drinks from the owner.

Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an
automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him
by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers
punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money
equivalent to a full day’s pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property but keeps
the money for himself.

Source: Klockars et al., 2000, p. 4

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 71

72 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
Higher Education in the Continuum
of Training and Education and
Keeping Management/Leadership
Training Relevant and Current: From
Supervisor to Chief
Stephen A. Morreale, DPA, Lead Instructor, School of Justice Studies,
Justice System Training & Research Institute, Roger Williams University
Robert W. McKenna, MS, JD, Assistant Dean, School of Justice Studies;
Director, Justice System Training & Research Institute, Roger Williams
University
P. J. Ortmeier, PhD, Coordinator, Administration of Justice Program,
Grossmont College

Introduction
The prevalence of management, leadership, and executive development programs
are evidenced by the literature that reveals a plethora of seminars and courses
delivered by public, private, and nonprofit organizations. There are consulting
companies, journals, consortia, and business schools in existence to specifically
address the development of leaders. Proquest/UMI’s dissertation database (2006)
contains more than 835 studies on leadership in the past 25 years as well as 65
specific studies on leadership development and executive development, but few
studies are aimed at the development of leadership in policing.

According to a meta-analysis of 83 leadership development programs from 1982-

2001, Collins (2002) determined that the most effective leadership development
programs included the following elements:

• The organization’s strategic framework leads to the content of the program.

• Participants in the program are of mixed levels of responsibility.
• Multiple training techniques and knowledge and expertise outcome measures
are used.
• The program focuses on the leadership requirements of today and the future.

The importance of executive development programs is immeasurable. Current

practice, the overlap in programs, course content coverage, and the vacuum in
these training efforts are all topics that need to be frequently examined. This article
focuses on the efforts of programs in both New England and California. These
programs are delivered in collaboration with institutions of higher education.

With the serious human capital issue (recruiting and retention) facing police
organizations related to impending retirements, succession planning, development,
and enrichment of future leaders is of paramount importance. Expectations have
been heightened for law enforcement and other public safety organizations. As they
undertake those efforts, there is the need for external awareness and outreach.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 73

Bennis (1989) provides a passage describing the contrast between management
and leadership:

The manager administers; the leader innovates. The manager is a copy;

the leader is an original. The manager maintains; the leader develops. The
manager focuses on systems and structure; the leader focuses on people. The
manager relies on control; the leader inspires trust.

The manager has a short-range view; the leader has a long-range perspective.
The manager asks how and when; the leader asks what and why. The manager
has his eye always on the bottom line; the leader has his eye on the horizon.
The manager imitates; the leader originates.

The manager accepts the status quo; the leader challenges it. The manager
is the classic good soldier; the leader is his own person. The manager does
things right; the leader does the right thing. Effective performance by
supervisors and managers require an understanding and application of both
management and leadership skills. (p. 45)

While these contrasts may seem simplistic, upon close examination, the
comparisons show distinct differences in management and leader behaviors.
Clearly, leaders exercise several of the constructs laid out by Bennis (1989). In the
current climate of policing, police supervision and management is better served
by those with an ability to exercise both management and leadership skills at the
appropriate moments.

Dean (2006) discusses the introduction of an educational mindset instead

of a training mindset for police through the encouragement of establishing
critical thinking skills. He defends the importance of weaving critical thinking
opportunities in both the content and “process” of teaching. Dean references a
similar delivery approach of an educational model in international policing for the
Singapore Police Force, utilizing a hybrid paradigm model of online delivery and
intensive face-to-face seminars.

In the 1990s, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) undertook a fundamental
review of all its training, with the objective of introducing problem solving and the
continuous learning approach, which is essential to community policing (Himelfarb,
1997). Himelfarb further asserted that the RCMP training evolved into a learner-
centered approach rather than an instructor-centered model, leading to a paradigm
shift in which the impetus became more learning than training.

Consistent with Knowles’ (1984a, 1984b) principles of adult learning, an adult-

centered approach is preferred to help open dialogue as a means of accessing the
experience and encouraging reflection of the students. Birzer and Tannehill (2001)
suggest that the theory of andragogy is effective in police education. In addition,
Birzer and Tannehill assert . . .

Andragogy, with its emphasis on self-directed and continuous learning, past

experience of the learner and others, and trainer as facilitator of knowledge, is one
effective means to re-engineer police training and align with the changes required
for the community policing philosophy. The central fea­tures of andragogy have

74 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

 the potential to meet organizational demands for cost-effectiveness and value,
as well as police officers’ demands for rele­vance and autonomy.

Birzer and Tannehill (2001) recognized changes in the approach to training with the
RCMP as a means to deal with the challenges of policing.

Another salient feature of the RCMP approach is the client-centered design of training.
For example, the police assess and define problems through understanding the needs
and expectations of their client base. The RCMP has placed increased emphasis on
self-directed learning and continuous learning. All members of the RCMP are now
expected to accept increased responsibility for their own development. This is in
stark contrast to many police agencies in which commanders or supervisors pick the
classes that their personnel will attend and the officer has minimal say in the type of
training he or she desires or needs to attend (Birzer & Tannehill, 2001).

There are a number of trainers that stress the importance of including the concept of
customer service in contemporary police training. This concept is being reinforced
in training sessions for management and executive development in New England
and California through the course content delivery model.

Pedagogy v. Andragogy
Facilitated discussions, led by skilled instructors, are aimed to encourage sharing,
enhance reflection, and encourage critical thinking skills. Knowles (1970) defined
andragogy as the “art and science of helping adults learn.” Knowles argued that
adults must be taught differently than children because the learning process of
adults is drastically distinct when compared to that of children or the traditional
pedagogical approach.

Adult learning models have called for a participant-driven, facilitator-led

approach. According to Knowles (1984), andragogy was premised on several
crucial assumptions about adult learners differing from assumptions about child
learners on which traditional pedagogy is premised:

• Self-concept – As a person matures, his or her self-concept moves from one

of being a dependent personality toward one of being a self-directed human
being.
• Experience – As a person matures, he or she accumulates a growing reservoir of
experience that becomes an increasing resource for learning.
• Readiness to learn – As a person matures, his or her readiness to learn becomes
oriented increasingly to the developmental tasks of his or her social roles.
• Orientation to learning – As a person matures, his or her time perspective
changes from one of postponed application of knowledge to immediacy of
application, and accordingly, his or her orientation toward learning shifts from
one of subject-centeredness to one of problem centeredness.
• Motivation to learn – As a person matures, the motivation to learn is internal.
(Knowles, 1984, p. 12)

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 75

Birzer (2004) adapted Knowles’ (1970) work and described some of the distinctions
between the learning styles of adults:

• Adults need to know why they need to learn something before undertaking to
learn it.
• Adults have a self-concept of being responsible for their own lives.
• Adults come into an educational activity with both a greater volume and a
different quality of experience from youths.
• Adults become ready to learn those things they need to know or to cope
effectively with their real-life situations.
• In contrast to children’s and youths’ subject-centered orientation, adults are
task-centered or problem-centered in their orientation to learning.
• While adults are responsive to some extrinsic motivators (e.g., better jobs,
promotions, salary increases), the more potent motivators are intrinsic
motivators (desire for increased self-esteem, quality of life, responsibility, job
satisfaction). (Adapted from Birzer, 2004)

Birzer (2004) worked to apply the benefits of Knowles’ Theory of Andragogy in the
discipline of criminal justice education. Birzer believes that there are advantages to
the adragogical application including that it draws on students’ past experience,
treats students as adults, adapts to the diverse needs and expectations of students,
and develops critical thinking skills, judgment, and creativity in the learner.
Oblinger (2005) likewise focuses on the importance of creating learning spaces
designed to encourage an active, collaborative teaching and learning style.

Executive Development Efforts at the Institute

In recent times, executive development programs have shifted from teacher-
centered to learner-centered delivery (Myrsiades, 2001). Many programs have used
a case study approach with scenarios taken from real organizational situations
focusing on the development of critical analysis skills.

An approach taken in New England at the Roger Williams University Justice

System Training and Research Institute in Rhode Island is to allow the students to
explore issues through experience, reflection, and contemplation while developing
or enhancing their critical and strategic thinking and analysis skills. The Command
Training Series focus of the First Line Supervisor’s Course (FLSC), Mid-Manager
Course (MMC), and Executive Development Course (EDC) is on facilitation rather
than lecture. A conscious effort has been made to design a conceptual continuum
of leadership and management training through a paradigm that facilitates career
development of police officials utilizing the adult learning model. This is beneficial
because participants in the noncredit-bearing courses are tenured and seasoned
practitioners of diverse educational backgrounds.

At the Institute, the conceptual continuum begins with the Command Training
Series: FLSC, which is intended to focus on the development of officers who are
responsible for the day-to-day immediate supervision of individual police officers.
Although most first-line supervisors are typically at the corporal or sergeant
rank, the curriculum and its presentation are delivered with role responsibility,
rather than rank title in mind. FLSC considers the difficulties of an employee

76 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

transitioning from a subordinate role to that of a supervisor, as well as issues
related to decisionmaking in a supervisory and leadership relationship.

The Command Training Series: MMC, the second tier of the continuum, recognizes
the scope of responsibility of a police official, typically a lieutenant, who oversees
the function of a unit comprised of subordinate supervisors and police officers
over whom he or she exercises authority. At the mid-manager level, at which
sworn officers become responsible for larger groups of people, it is important to
recognize the need to develop interpersonal and administrative skills as a means
of accomplishing agency goals and objectives.

At the apex of the three-tiered continuum is the Command Training Series:

EDC. The focus of this component is the role of administrators within a police
agency, normally of the rank of captain, major, deputy chief, or chief, who have
policymaking responsibilities in an agency. Conceptual knowledge and practical
skill development are fostered as a means of advancing the formulation of goals
and objectives in an agency.

There are unique approaches and dynamics for each component of the continuum,
dependent upon the role and responsibility of the audience, with each level
designed as a stand alone course. Course topics can be found in Appendix A.
In the FLSC and MMC, case studies are introduced for problem identification
and group process problem-solving exercises. At the EDC level, real-life issues
are presented by students. Through collaboration, they identify the problems,
potential stakeholders, and possible alternatives along with recommendations for
action, implementation, and evaluation.

Enrollment for the EDC is typically limited to 20 students to ensure a low

instructor-to-student ratio. The most recent iterations of the course at the Institute
were conducted using a hybrid delivery model involving an initial introduction on
a web-based distance learning platform preceding three days of classroom work.
It is followed by one month of web-based distance learning, culminating with
a return to the classroom for a three-day period. Course content is thoughtfully
developed within the classroom through the web-based group discussion forums
and application in student-selected project advancement. Critical thinking skills
for “real-world” problems are reinforced as attendees confer with experienced
law enforcement practitioners and academicians delivering the curriculum
interactively.

Classroom participation is enhanced using web-based activities. This methodology

facilitated students from a wide geographic range to post and share ideas and
concepts relating to the course subject matter of Organizational Culture and Change
Management, Leadership and Management Principles for the Law Enforcement
Executive, Communications, Planning and Data Analysis for Decision-Making,
Legal Issues, and Community and Political Environment Issues.

Focus is placed on self-evaluation and self-awareness through the application

of Executive Core Qualifications (ECQ). The ECQ include Leading Change,
Leading People, Driving Results, Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions/
Communications (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 1994, 1998; Morreale &
Ortmeier, 2004). These elements are used to identify and develop senior executive

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 77

service personnel in the federal government. Likewise, they have relevance to those
aspiring for executive positions in law enforcement and public safety. (Morreale
& Ortmeier, 2004).

The careful selection of course faculty is deemed to be of critical importance in

accomplishing those objectives. The backgrounds of the selected faculty reflect
focus group and survey research results utilized for program development. Birzer
(2004) suggests that instructors should establish the climate, involve learners in
mutual planning, involve learners in diagnosing their learning needs, encourage
learners to formulate their learning objectives, encourage learners to identify
resources and devise strategies for using such resources to accomplish their
objectives, and involve learners in evaluating their learning.

During focus group research conducted by the Institute, New England regional
police executives and training officials indicated that courses should be taught
by instructors with extensive “real-world” experience and strong academic
credentials. In that regard, faculty has been drawn primarily from throughout the
New England law enforcement community, representing various sized agencies
and jurisdictional responsibilities. Faculty typically hold, at a minimum, a master’s
degree while a significant number hold doctoral degrees in public administration,
law, criminal justice, and education.

Jurkanin and Sergevnin (2003) analyzed current national programs that focus on
police executive development. This research expanded on past research by Heck
(1990) in which police executive development programs were defined as being
“specifically designed to develop the skills of upper-level police administrators.”

Heck (1990) identified 10 topics as principal areas for focus in executive development
training. Jurkanin and Sergevnin (2003) found that only six topics appeared in
50% or more of recent programs, including personnel management, executive role
in management, strategic planning, legal issues, budget management, and media
relations. Additional topics were found in newer programs, including leadership,
organizational theory and culture, ethics, communication, and forecasting issues.

The comparison of executive development programs allows researchers and

practitioners to identify those topics believed to be most vital in management
development and executive development programs.

Course Content Development at the Institute

In order to identify the roles and responsibilities of police executives in New
England, focus group and survey research was conducted in the states of
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
The results from focus group discussions indicated that role responsibilities of
police executives are similar throughout the six New England states and included
personnel issues, media relations, community relations, recruitment strategies,
disciplinary matters, stress management, budgeting, crisis management, and
operating in the political landscape. These topics served as the basis for the
development of course content at the Institute.

78 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Following the initial focus group questionnaires, a group of 28 chiefs representing
each of the six New England states was asked to participate in a survey while
attending the fall 2004 meeting of the New England Association of Chiefs of
Police. In an effort to identify the needs of active chiefs in New England, survey
participants were asked to identify program areas concerning management, self-
enrichment, and specialized topics. The questionnaire utilized a five-part Likert
scale with ratings from undesirable, somewhat desirable, desirable, or very
desirable. The results found that chiefs were interested in developing capacity
for executive management (64.3%), mid-level management (71.4%), and first-line
supervisor (60.7%). The question pertaining to self-enrichment programs found
the topic of leadership rated as very desirable by the majority of chiefs at (53.6%).
Clearly, there is a clamor from the law enforcement community for the provision
of training that develops conceptual, critical thinking, and leadership skills.

California-Based Initiatives: California POST

For the past three years, the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards
and Training (POST) has spearheaded a massive revision of the basic police
academy curriculum. Among POST’s efforts was a major initiative to integrate
leadership, ethics, and community policing concepts and skill development
exercises throughout all of the 41 learning domains (subjects/courses) of the
state’s basic police academy. Hundreds of law enforcement personnel and subject
matter experts were involved in the project.

Effective January 2006, all police academy recruits in California are now exposed
to leadership, ethics, and community problem-solving skill development in the
basic academy. The concepts are reinforced throughout the basic academy. Since
POST academy graduates are employed by California’s 600-plus local, county,
and state agencies, all new officers are receiving leadership development training.
Furthermore, most of the state’s 81 academies are affiliated with community
colleges; thus, basic academy recruits earn college credit for the academy
experience.

California Public Safety Leadership and Ethics Program (CPSLEP)

In California, a program aimed at developing presupervisory public safety
professionals into leaders for tomorrow was conceived. Using a humanities-
based leadership development program with proven success in higher education
at the undergraduate and graduate levels, a program originally created by Phi
Theta Kappa Leadership Development Studies has taken shape. The California
Public Safety Leadership and Ethics Program (CPSLEP) is administered by Phi
Theta Kappa (PTK), an international honor society of 2-year colleges and the
International Public Safety Leadership and Ethics Institute.

The CPSLEP incorporated the unique curriculum and approaches to leadership

studies of Phi Theta Kappa Leadership Development Studies to create an
innovative and leading edge program for the professional development of industry
professionals in the disciplines of law enforcement, fire service, and corrections.

In 2001, a grant served as the impetus for convening a curriculum development

committee of 12 representing all three public safety disciplines. The intention of the

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 79

CPSLEP is to prepare members early in their careers to contribute at higher levels
of leadership roles and responsibilities within their personal, community, and
professional lives. To achieve this vision, the California Public Safety Leadership
Program attempts to do the following:

• Provide participants with the opportunity to develop and enhance a personal

philosophy of leadership that focuses on self, others, the organization, and a
larger community.
• Provide participants the opportunity to gain a variety of leadership
experiences.
• Utilize a variety of leadership development techniques, theories, and models.
• Help participants develop the ability to initiate and lead organizational
change.
• Assist the participants toward greater levels of leadership complexity,
integration, and proficiency.
• Provide the participants with opportunities to develop professional networks
of public safety personnel from a variety of disciplines including fire, law, and
corrections. (Program Materials CPSLEP, 2004)

The curriculum team designed a four-course, 160-hour program and field tested
each course three times, revising and refining them based on feedback from
professionals participating in the pilot courses.

This curriculum focuses on facilitated adult learning. It was designed to be an

interactive participant-based program with a focus on learning activities in which
the participant is an active player.

Program and Course Objectives

The basic premise of the curriculum is to ensure that participants receive a guided
personal journey of leadership development with an emphasis on ethics. The
program objectives, along with the individual course objectives, were developed
and reviewed by a large number of industry professionals for relevance and target
goals. Subsequent to development, the objectives were given consideration by
Academic Review Boards at several community colleges for consistency with
current methods for preparation of adult learning objectives. The objectives
were then reviewed by PTK for consistency with leadership learning objectives
within the PTK program, as well as from their broad based knowledge of
leadership development programs around the United States and the international
community.

Program Overview
The target audience for the CPSLEP includes a primary audience of presupervisory
successor development. Preservice personnel are the secondary audience along
with journey level/supervisory members of police, fire, and corrections. The
courses include Developing a Personal Philosophy of Leadership, Leading Others,
Organization Leadership, as well as Ethics and the Challenge of Leadership.
Course descriptions can be found in Appendix B. Each course is intended to build
on the other. The facilitator guide for each course is generally set up for 8-hour
days but may be modified for shorter segments as necessary to meet local needs.

80 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

There are two specific approaches to presenting this program. The first is to conduct
the program over a 2-semester period. Most community colleges utilize a 16-week
semester. This provides for a total of 32 weeks over 2 semesters in which to present
19, 8-hour sessions. The second approach is to conduct an intensified program
in which each course is presented in 4 or 5 straight days. With this approach, it
is highly recommended that there be a minimum of 3 to 4 weeks between each
course. An additional option for an intensified program is to conduct it in an “in
residence” manner at an appropriate offsite location that provides a unique retreat
type setting.

The components include Interactive Learning Processes with measurable

objectives, courses developed by industry and academic professionals, instructors
certified by Phi Theta Kappa, course delivery facilitated for interactive leadership
development, and academic credit awarded with community college delivery. The
CPSLEP uses survey instruments and assessments, which include the Leadership
Practices Inventory (2nd ed., Self with Workbook), Thomas-Kilman Conflict Mode
Instrument (1997), Leader Behavior Analysis II (1999), and the Ethics Awareness
Inventory (4th ed., 1999).

Personal Leadership Development Journal

The Personal Leadership Development Journal was designed to enhance the
participants’ learning opportunities by providing guidance and consistency across
all four courses. The journal is an important part of the participant being actively
involved in their own learning. It was designed to provide guidance while allowing
freedom of expression, thought, and development. The guiding questions for each
activity are simply guides, and not specific mandates.

Individual facilitators or participants may choose to modify, add, or delete questions

to fit the individual need. The journal is also intended to be a lifelong document
for participants to use as a measure of growth and direction for their continual
learning. The activities in the Journal correspond with certain presentation points
in the program. While not all program activities and subjects are in the journal,
the activities do reflect the major areas of learning. Additionally, certain journal
activities support of the Personal Leadership Development Plan (LDP).

Personal Leadership Development Plan

The LDP is designed to serve as the capstone evaluation process for the program.
It serves two specific functions. First, it meets academic need for an evaluation
process. In addition, it serves to provide the participant with an opportunity to
demonstrate developed knowledge and competencies to a third-party review
and subsequently receive a certificate of achievement in Applied Leadership
Development issued by PTK and the CPSLEP. The LDP is an action plan. It requires
that participants do certain activities in conjunction with their participation in the
CPSLEP Program. The LDP specifically supports the overall design that the adult
be an active participant in his or her learning.

To this point, several hundred students have participated in this program. The
program is administered through community colleges and universities, as well as
public safety agencies.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 81

Conclusion
Although conceived independently of each other, the two programs described
above share similarities in their approach to attempt to enlighten current
and future police executives. At the core of these management and executive
instructive courses is the engagement of policing professionals and scholars at
institutions of higher learning in the development and delivery of the curriculum.
When the initiation of courses is preceded by a needs assessment involving police
practitioners, the collaboration between academician and practitioner enhances
the end product and fulfills the needs of adult students through role responsibility
relevant knowledge.

Additionally, the cooperation between practitioner and academician encourages

the closing of the philosophical approach gap between concept and application.
In both programs, there is recognition of Knowles’ principle that adult learner
orientation is toward the immediate and practical, complemented by the inherent
value of conceptual learning as a means of enhancing critical thinking skills.

The programs in both venues are structured as continuums of learning. Internalized

motivation to learn, another of Knowles’ principles, can be satisfied through the
range of course content designed for adults who recognize the relevancy to their
respective employment situation as well as the opportunity to increase their
knowledge relationally as their roles change.

Through the utilization of facilitated discussion delivery in the two locations, the
adult learners are engaged in self-directed learning. This interactive methodology,
which appreciates the reservoir of knowledge intrinsic in the life experiences of the
students, serves as an increasing resource for learning consistent with Knowles’
beliefs and hopefully creates a desire for lifelong learning.

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Steve Morreale, DPA, serves as lead instructor in the Command Training

Series: Executive Development Course at Roger Williams University, Bristol,
Rhode Island and teaches at Walden University and Worcester State College.
Dr. Morreale served in law enforcement for 30 years, recently retiring as
an assistant special agent in charge for the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of Investigations, Inspector General. Previously,
he served with DEA, the U.S. Army Military Police Corps, and the Dover
(New Hampshire) Police Department. Dr. Morreale’s area of research interest
focuses on leadership and management, strategic planning, healthcare fraud,
drug crimes, white collar crime, and ethics.

Robert W. McKenna, MS, JD, is an assistant dean and the director of the
Justice System Training & Research Institute in the School of Justice Studies
at Roger Williams University in Bristol, Rhode Island. Prior to his tenure at
Roger Williams University, Assistant Dean McKenna served with the East
Providence, Rhode Island, police department in a number of supervisory
and management positions, and at the time of his retirement, he was the
lieutenant in command of the Planning and Training Unit.

P. J. Ortmeier, PhD, is the coordinator of the Administration of Justice

Program at Grossmont College in El Cajon, California. He is a U.S. Army
veteran and a former police officer. He is also the author of Introduction to
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice; Policing the Community: A Guide for Patrol
Operations; Public Safety and Security Administration; and Security Management:
An Introduction, as well as a co-author of Leadership, Ethics, and Policing.
Dr. Ortmeier’s publications focus on law enforcement, career education,
management, leadership, community policing and security administration.

86 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Appendix A
Following is a listing of topics/sessions covered in the Command Training Series
conceptual continuum at the Roger Williams University Justice Systems Training
and Research Institute.

Command Training Series

FLSC Topics
• Exploring Leadership and Communication Styles
• Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator: Leadership, Management and Transitions
• Leadership and Management for the First Line Supervisor
• Situational and Crisis Leadership
• Communication: Interpersonal and Organizational
• Problem Solving and Data Analysis
• Planning
• Ethical Decisionmaking
• Discipline, Labor Relations, and Labor Law
• Performance Evaluation
• Community Policing, Leadership and Management
• Action Planning – Bringing It All Together
• New England Police Chiefs’ Roundtable

Mid-Managers’ Topics
• Emotional Intelligence
• Leadership, Coaching, and Mentoring
• Communications: Internal and External
• Problem Employees and Conflict Management
• Labor Issues and Legal Research
• Data Analysis, Planning, and Project Management
• Organizational Culture and Change Management
• Budgeting: Understanding the Process
• Management from a Systems Perspective
• Contemporary and Critical Issues
• New England Police Chiefs’ Roundtable

Executive Leadership
• Leadership
• Change Management
• Generational Issues
• Budgeting
• The Political Landscape
• Legal Issues for Executives
• Personality Self-assessment Survey
• Executive Core Qualifications
• Action Plan

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 87

Appendix B

Course Descriptions for California Public Safety Leadership and Ethics

Program

Course One: Developing a Personal Philosophy of Leadership

This course will introduce the California Public Safety Leadership Certificate
Program, providing the participant with a deepened understanding of self as it
relates to leadership philosophies, knowledge, skills, and abilities. Each participant
will explore his or her own core values and begin to develop a personal philosophy
of leadership. Through course presentations, dialogue and learning activities, the
participant will identify his or her leadership roles in the community to include
self, family, professional, and social, as well as define the difference between leaders
and managers. The participant will complete self-assessments to gain insights into
his or her personal leadership style and characteristics and participate in video and
written case studies to further explore his or her understanding of leadership.

Course Two: Leading Others

This course is designed to provide the participant with the knowledge, skills, and
abilities to effectively lead others. The participant will explore the various roles of
leadership as they relate to being a team builder, delegator, conflict manager, coach,
or mentor, as well as interpersonal leader-follower relationships. The participant
will gain an understanding of the communication process, empowering others,
conflict resolution methods, leading in a diverse environment, and facilitating
change. Case studies, video analysis, and other interactive learning processes will
be used to explore the dynamic relationship of leaders and followers.

Course Three: Organization Leadership

This course provides the participant with an opportunity to explore the leadership
process within organizational settings. The leader-follower relationship is
discussed, as well as the influence of organizational culture on leadership
effectiveness. The participant will gain an understanding of the components and
processes of a learning organization and gain insights into the concept of defensive
reasoning within organizations. Case studies, video analysis, selected readings,
and group activities will be used to help the participant further understand the
theories and principles of organizational leadership.

Course Four: Ethics and the Challenge of Leadership Presentation

In this course, the participant will explore the theories and practices of ethical
leadership including the use of ethical decision-making models. The participant
will use a variety of learning modalities including case studies, video analysis,
and critical thinking scenarios to explore ethical dilemmas. Presentation and
class dialogue will define the challenges facing a leader in today’s diverse and
dynamic organizations. Personal action plans including practical opportunities for
leadership will be reviewed.

88 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Validating Higher Order Thinking
in a Problem-Based Learning
Environment: A Strategy for Law
Enforcement Training and Evaluation
Wayne R. Carlson, Training Analyst, Career Development Section,
Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards

Contemporary recruitment efforts in law enforcement are characterized by a rising

concern on the part of departmental administrators regarding the apparent lack of
critical thinking and decision-making skills of those entering the policing profession.
Law enforcement is not alone in its thinking. Those in disciplines other than criminal
justice are increasingly looking for candidates who possess higher thinking skills,
particularly generic problem-solving capabilities (LeGault, 2006). Doolittle and
Camp (1999) explain, “Preparation of workers for entry into and advancement in
the workplace of the next decade requires an educational program that provides not
only job skills . . . but also higher order thinking, problem solving, and collaborative
work skills” (p. 17). Thomas Friedman (2006), the best selling author, argues that
those entering the “flat world” of the 21st century will need to possess higher
thinking skills just to remain competitive in a global economy.

In law enforcement, the research suggests that proper decisionmaking on the job
can be fostered, in part, through the promulgation of sound policies at the agency
command level, which can translate into appropriate patterns of practice on the
street by incumbent officers (Becknell, Mays, & Giever, 1999; Brown, 1979; Walker,
1999; Wilson, 1970). The research further suggests that basic recruit training can
play a fundamental and significant role in preparing law enforcement trainees
to properly and ethically handle the intricacies of contemporary policing prior to
working the street (Baker & Carter, 1994; Vander Kooi, 2006).

In a practical sense, law enforcement officers are faced with a number of decisions
during a typical tour of duty. They are required to successfully, and quite often
independently, handle situations that range from the most serious and complex to
the most mundane and routine. The outer limits of discretionary authority may be
shaped by departmental policies and court precedent, but individual choices are
influenced by a variety of situational factors (Bittner, 1990; Brown, 1979). Recruit
training must produce quality decisionmaking skills, and, as Brown (1979) points
out, we should probably be less concerned “. . . with worrying about how much
discretion patrolmen have and searching for ways to eliminate it, than with trying
to enlarge their qualities of judgment and making them responsive to the people
they serve” (p. 31). Those in law enforcement training must continually look for
learning approaches that will improve their effectiveness in developing the very
competencies that may ultimately influence officer behavior in a positive way.

Law enforcement training practitioners are exploring the adult learning

methodology known as problem-based learning (PBL) as one approach (Post, 1992).
PBL moves away from the conventional, lecture-based training models and toward

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 89

active learning approaches characterized by group work, facilitated learning, and
problem solving (Post, 1992; Vander Kooi, 2006; Weinblatt, 1999). As a result, the
validity of teaching higher thinking skills and the demonstration of those skills as
introduced in the classroom must be maintained, as well (Cherryholmes, 1988).

This article offers one approach to validity. Higher thinking skills can be identified
through sound job task analyses, which form the basis for content validity. Job tasks
can be linked to the learning domain, which in turn, can be linked to basic training
objectives, which are delivered during training. Test measures must be reliable as
well, or more accurately, the inferences one makes from test performance must be
valid and reliable. As discussed in this article, the Rasch statistical methodology of
measurement is one option that may be used to ensure the validity of testing and
assessment in the academy setting.

Problem-Based Learning
In a theoretical context, decisionmaking is based on Bloom’s (1984) taxonomy
of higher learning and consists of three major components: (1) identifying a
problem, (2) blending newly acquired information with existing information for
an appropriate resolution, and (3) evaluating outcomes, both immediate and long
term (Bittner, 1990; Boostrom, 1992; Brown, 1979; Ruggiero, 1991). Bloom (1984)
and others refer to these higher thinking components as analysis, synthesis, and
evaluation (Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, 1956). The challenge for
law enforcement training, then, is to identify viable learning and educational
methodologies that will best develop higher order thinking at the recruit level.

Currently, most basic training academies are tooled for lecture-based delivery
platforms (Post, 1992). Students typically listen to lectures, take notes, and then
apply their newly acquired knowledge to contrived situations. The idea that
student-centered pedagogies, specifically PBL, however, seems to be gaining
popularity, and may be potentially productive strategies to improve the quality
of learning and develop higher order thinking in the basic training environment
(Knowles, 1984; Mager, 1973; Vander Kooi, 2006; Woods, 1994).

PBL is grounded in the constructivist theoretical model (Eggen & Kauchak, 1999).
Constructivist thinking is an overarching theory of human learning posited by
psychological and philosophical theorists (Fosnot, 1996; Piaget, 1950). Those
concerned with law enforcement education and training are now seriously
exploring the efficacy of cognitive and social constructivism to serve as the
primary training theory for building modern policing competencies and higher
order thinking. The several dimensions of constructionist theory typically become
operational in the classroom through practical approaches such as problem-based
learning and interactive teaching (Brookfield, 1986; Sims, 2006).

PBL is a learning methodology that can be defined as knowledge acquisition through

the resolution of real-world problems. In addition to improving the quality of
learning, the approach calls for instructors to challenge the students, foster critical
thinking and decisionmaking skills, and generate appropriate problem-solving
competencies. Problem-based learning requires instructors to be facilitators,
rather than lecturers, and requires them to engage the students interactively in
the classroom where both knowledge acquisition and the development of higher

90 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

order thinking can take place simultaneously. In a more general context, the
proponents of problem-based learning maintain that contextual learning and
situational awareness can foster discretionary decisionmaking (Eggen & Kauchak,
1999; Hmelo-Silver, 2004)

From this perspective, learning occurs when students resolve real problems that
simulate work-related situations, problems that force the students to synthesize
information from a variety of sources. The advocates of PBL argue that by working
through problem situations, often in peer groups, the students will not only
acquire new skills (knowledge) but will do so contextually while building generic
problem-solving and critical thinking competencies. The focus is on experiential
(contextual) learning (De Lint, 2002).

It is important to emphasize that PBL is not an approach intended to completely

replace traditional teaching methodologies. Instead, PBL is designed to make the
acquisition of knowledge more meaningful and create a lifelong learning model
for continuous professional development. The concept of knowledge acquisition
should not be lost in the enthusiasm for problem-based learning. True problem
solving is based on the ability to use information to resolve real-life issues, and in
fact, mastering complex concepts independent of fundamental knowledge may not
be possible. The shift is essentially from knowledge to knowing (Poikela, 2004).

Validity
By most estimates, the PBL approach is gaining momentum in law enforcement
training. Its popularity is growing, and an increasing number of states are showing
genuine interest in the model for recruit training; however, as intuitively pleasing
as the approach seems to be, one must ask about the evidence that supports the
validity of teaching critical thinking and problem-solving skills at the recruit level.
If state regulatory agencies encourage their training delivery systems to place an
increasing emphasis on teaching higher order thinking, as they seem to be doing,
it is essential that those same agencies identify ways to establish the supportive
validity of those approaches.

In the law enforcement context, validity refers to the concept that standards and
evaluation must be based on the essential job tasks performed by patrol officers
working in the profession. Data must be collected that supports the job-relatedness
of statewide standards. Determining minimum competency for a profession, as
state regulatory agencies are required to do, is a high stakes endeavor. Ultimately, it
is essential to satisfactorily maintain not only the job-relatedness of the training and
educational standards, but also the validity of classroom testing and measurement
(Cherryholmes, 1988).

The American Educational Research Association, the American Psychological

Association, and the National Council on Measurements Used in Education
collaborated on a conventional definition of validity. The Standards for Educational
and Psychological Testing (1999) accepts three general forms of validity evidence:
(1) content-, (2) construct-, and (3) criterion-related evidence. Although the
Standards refer primarily to the inferences one makes from testing or assessment,
the definitions are relevant to the validation structure necessary to ensure minimum
competency in law enforcement recruit training.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 91

Content validity refers to training objectives and testing instruments that are
“representative of some defined universe or domain of content” (AERA/APA/
NCME, 1999; Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). The learning domain, and the training
and testing that emerge from such domains, must be representative of the actual
job performed by incumbent law enforcement officers. Curriculum developers and
test developers work from the specifications contained in the learning domain.
Nationally, the job task analysis (JTA) is the formal tool used to empirically measure
the tasks performed by active law enforcement officers and identify the essential
job functions of the position of a patrol officer. A formal JTA creates the foundation
upon which training and employment standards are set by state regulatory
agencies. The process establishes content validity and ensures that what is taught
and subsequently tested in the training environment is job-related and essential
for functioning as a minimally competent law enforcement officer.

Construct validity can be envisioned in two ways. First, a construct is a theoretical

attribute. It is a quality, trait, or characteristic that is intuitively understood and is
not directly measurable through observation (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999; Baker,
2001; Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). In law enforcement, underlying traits such
as reading ability, writing ability, physical fitness, intelligence, creativity, and
leadership are generally measured indirectly by “constructing” the appropriate
variables and indices. Psychometricians refer to construct validity as one’s ability
to identify and measure latent traits.

Construct validity also refers to the fidelity of the measuring instruments

themselves, whether they consist of questions on a written exam or the criteria
used to evaluate student performance in a role-play scenario. Testing instruments
designed to measure underlying constructs must contain criteria that adequately
represent the construct of interest (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999); however, this
distinction is quite often ignored in practice (Baker, 2001; Bond & Fox, 2001).
Testing experts typically use conventional statistical techniques to evaluate testing
outcomes and make certain inferences based on an analysis of their statistics. What
is perhaps overlooked in practice is why less care is taken in operationalizing
the scale of measurement in the first place. Bond and Fox (2001) put it this way,
“. . . interpretations of analyses can only be as good as the quality of the measures.
Why then are students and researchers seemingly unconcerned about how they
measure those constructs?” (p. xvi).

Criterion validity refers to measurements structured on a stated set of criteria or

to one’s ability to predict some future performance based on the criteria (AERA/
APA/NCME, 1999; Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). The distinction rests on when
the observations are made. Ultimately, the purpose of any training delivery
methodology is to positively influence behavior on the job. In training and education,
for example, criterion validity involves conducting the necessary research to make
statistically sound predictions by uncovering meaningful relationships between
the underlying theoretical pedagogy and positive job performance.

Unfortunately, high-quality predictive research is limited in the PBL literature

and practically nonexistent in the law enforcement research (Albanese & Mitchell,
1993; Colliver, 2000). Much of the research focuses on student reactions to the
methodology, the amount of knowledge residue generated through problem-
based learning, or its impact on student learning and motivation (Albanese &

92 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Mitchell, 1993; Sims, 2006). Although the problem-based learning approach
seems plausible, its translation into improved behavior on the job remains largely
unproved. The lack of such research in law enforcement is perhaps due, in part, to
the difficulty in capturing accurate data and identifying appropriate work-related
criterion measures. In a practical sense, the existence of so many extraneous and
intervening variables that influence the working personality of an officer, either
positively or negatively, may result in confusing and contradictory interpretations
of the research. Identifying any type of statistically significant relationship between
the dependent and independent variables is problematic and challenging.

Creating a Validation Strategy

How can a state law enforcement regulatory agency best establish the validity
of teaching higher order thinking at the recruit training level? State agencies
are empowered to mandate minimum competencies for the position of patrol
officer and subsequently license or certify only those who satisfactorily meet the
standards. These high stakes determinations require states to ensure the validity of
their training and testing. Moreover, if the state determines that certain candidates
may not be allowed into a profession, the adequacy of those types of decisions
must withstand strict legal scrutiny.

The validation strategies outlined in this article are based on content and construct
evidence of validity. It is the process used by the Michigan Commission on Law
Enforcement Standards (MCOLES), the law enforcement regulatory agency in the
state of Michigan, to establish and maintain the validity of its employment and
training standards. To maintain content validity, a strategy can be structured for
higher order thinking in the same manner as for any other training objective in the
learning domain. It need not deviate from processes already in place. What may
be of particular interest, however, is Michigan’s approach to construct validity for
testing and measurement and how such validity can best be maintained in the PBL
environment. The approach suggested in this article is based on a statistical model
known in the measurement literature as Rasch measurement, which is a relatively
recent innovation in psychometric theory. This article suggests its potential as
a viable strategy for establishing the validity of evaluation in the PBL training
environment.

MCOLES is the state agency that sets statewide standards for the selection,
employment, training, and retention of law enforcement officers. More specifically,
MCOLES’ statutory responsibilities include the authority to promulgate medical
and nonmedical standards (e.g., education, hearing, vision, physical fitness,
reading ability, good moral character, and training). The current governing body
of MCOLES consists of 15 members who are appointed by the governor. The
membership is diverse. It consists of representatives from police agencies, sheriff’s
departments, labor organizations, prosecution, and defense. MCOLES serves a
diverse population and oversees 23 basic recruit academies statewide.

Michigan’s formal validation strategy starts with a review of job information

(i.e., a review of the tasks and activities performed by patrol officers including
the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other underlying characteristics required for
minimum competency as a law enforcement officer). Essential job tasks become
part of the learning domain for law enforcement training. One of the most

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 93

rigorous methods used to define job content is a JTA through which officers’
tasks are measured in terms of their frequency and criticality. Michigan’s JTA
was initiated in 1979, updated in 1996, and then updated again in 2006. These
updates ensure that the resulting job description is comprehensive, current, and
useful for defining performance standards for entry into the profession, as well
as for continuing education initiatives. Detailed information regarding the design
and development of the JTAs, and the adherence of these efforts to professionally
accepted guidelines, can be found in their respective project reports (MCOLES &
Performance Based Selection, Ltd., 1996, 2006; MLEOTC & Personnel Research
Consultants, 1979).

The MCOLES basic training objectives are job-related in the sense that they
represent the essential job tasks of a patrol officer as identified in the JTA. As is the
case nationally, this one-to-one correspondence between the learning domain and
what is taught in the classroom forms the foundation upon which the validation
strategy is structured. It should be pointed out that the state’s training objectives are
not written in terms of basic knowledge or comprehension. Instead, the objectives
and subobjectives are written as behavioral outcomes, and student performance
becomes the demonstration of learned competencies. If a law enforcement training
curriculum is to have content validity, job-relatedness, and a logical structure,
those responsible for its creation must initially identify and document the requisite
competencies and skills that lead to appropriate behavioral outcomes in real-life
situations.

Content validity is established and maintained by empirically and conceptually

connecting the job task statements; the learning domain; the training curriculum,
and ultimately, the test items on the state licensing examination. For example,
in the 2006 JTA, the task entitled “inform suspects of their rights” is considered
an essential task across all agency sizes and types in the sample. Accordingly,
informing suspects of their rights, understanding 5th Amendment implications,
and understanding the Miranda decision are all part of the basic training learning
domain. Such information is then placed in the curriculum as training objectives
and then finally as items on the licensing examination.

Similarly, higher order thinking (often manifested as decisionmaking) emerges

as an essential underlying construct in the 2006 JTA, either implicitly in the job
task statements themselves or explicitly based on the responses to questions about
recruit training. For example, MCOLES asked officers what they thought was
the single most important concept or characteristic for effective job performance
as a line officer. Twenty-seven percent indicated communication skills, 26%
indicated decisionmaking, and another 9% indicated problem solving (MCOLES
& Performance Based Selection, Ltd., 2006). Moreover, the job tasks themselves
imply the need for higher order thinking. Consider “design crime reducing
programs for the community,” “investigate crimes against persons,” and “plan
strategies for conducting searches” as examples. Decisionmaking is an underlying
construct of policing, and its job-relatedness can be validated in the same manner
as other essential job tasks through a scientifically sound job task analysis.

94 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Testing and Measurement
What seems to be lacking in the PBL research, however, are comprehensive
discussions about higher order testing and measurement (Ziska, Crabtree, &
Roberts, 1998), although some in the academic environment are now making
assessment a high priority (Sims, 2006). Thus, a sound validation strategy must
include valid and reliable interpretation of student behavior, particularly in the
PBL environment. Students will be required to demonstrate not only knowledge
acquisition but minimum competency in higher order thinking as well. Here, the
discussion shifts from concern about content validity to concern about construct
validity. Evaluation takes many forms in an academy setting. For example,
multiple-choice tests and quizzes, marksmanship on a firearms range, performance
in reality-based scenarios, or successful written performance on a state licensing
examination are used to gauge student competency. Pass-fail determinations are
not always the goal. Instead, evaluation is often used to measure student progress,
which helps the instructors understand the depth of their knowledge.

If instructors use PBL methodology and the training environment gradually shifts
from traditional pedagogies to the PBL approach, however, it will be necessary
for the measurement of student competency to shift, as well. Paper-and-pencil,
multiple-choice tests have their place in the training environment and should never
be eliminated. They are useful tools to measure knowledge, comprehension, and
application, but if the students are taught higher order thinking, as suggested by
the PBL model, conventional evaluation may no longer be adequate. Practitioners
must consider alternative assessment methodologies when evaluating higher order
thinking. As with other types of assessment, PBL evaluation need not be restricted
to pass-fail determinations. Rather, outcome-based assessments should be used as
diagnostic instruments, as well as a way for the instructional cadre to monitor and
evaluate students as they make their way through the PBL environment.

Practitioners recommend a variety of innovative approaches for the assessment

of higher thinking skills. Theoretically, such approaches can yield much deeper
understanding of the students’ abilities and competencies. For example, instructors
can use categorization exercises, pro and con activities, writing assignments
(e.g., journaling), or model policy exercises to measure analytic capability (Angelo
& Cross, 1993). Synthesis can be measured using concept maps (Kane & Trochim,
2006) or one-sentence summaries. Evaluation can be measured through problem
recognition exercises, tabletop scenarios, or articulated summaries (Angelo &
Cross, 1993).

Perhaps the most powerful assessment methodology in a training environment

is the observation of performances in real-life scenarios, since behavior is the true
demonstration of acquired competency (Poikela, 2004). The real-life scenario is
an excellent tool that can be used to assess behavioral outcomes of newly learned
knowledge and abilities, particularly higher order thinking (Murray, 2004).
Scenarios with role players are expensive and time consuming, but they have been
used in law enforcement training for decades. In the PBL training environment,
there needs to be a process that shifts the nature of the evaluation from a quantitative
observation of specific tasks to a more qualitative evaluation based on objectively
observed behavior in which student competencies can emerge and be explored.
Essentially, an evaluation instrument is needed that can measure higher order

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 95

thinking in a real-world context. Evaluating basic knowledge using traditional
assessment instruments must continue, but the demonstration of competency
through behaviorally based performance is needed to complement conventional
evaluation methodologies (Poikela, 2004).

If students are taught higher order thinking, they will ultimately be required to
demonstrate knowledge by performing or behaving in a minimally acceptable
manner. In other words, students will be required to apply their knowledge and
skill within the context of a real-world situation. Measurements must be reliable.
Similarly, the inferences made from the observed behaviors in the PBL environment
must be valid, and the testing instruments themselves must be well grounded in
content and construct validity.

Creating a Working Prototype

With PBL as a backdrop, MCOLES embarked on a project to create an evaluation
instrument for behaviorally based student evaluations in situational roleplays.
The intent is to create a model that will enable the evaluator to effectively observe
and measure not only student knowledge and ability, but also competency in
higher order thinking in a training environment. Accordingly, a stated set of
performance criteria were identified so higher order thinking could be observed
based on acquired skills and knowledge. The distinction between the experimental
model and conventional measurements in live scenarios is perhaps a subtle one.
The demonstration of true competency is based on all thinking levels, not just
the higher ones. Accordingly, what is needed is a model that measures behavioral
outcomes in a holistic sense in which student performance is grounded on
previously acquired skills and knowledge.

Staff first closely examined the existing job task analysis to ensure content validity.
Then, using an interactive group process, staff obtained input from a panel of
subject matter experts (SMEs). It was believed that the model should include
direction and input from those in the law enforcement profession who possessed
the requisite experience, expertise, and insight regarding acceptable recruit
performance. Eventually a working prototype was created for measuring behavior
in a domestic violence situation. Experimentation at selected academies statewide
is ongoing.

As the recruits work through the prototype, they are required to reach reasonable
outcomes, maintain officer safety, ensure constitutional protections, behave
ethically, perform consistently with policies and procedures, and make reasonable
decisions. In addition, the model requires evaluators to use objective, declarative
sentences to document recruit behavior. The evaluators are essentially being asked
to assess as if they were the student’s supervisor on the job, rather than as part of the
instructional cadre. In that manner, the model assumes a more qualitative nature
as it shifts from the use of observational checklists of tasks to written observations
of actual behavior. Since PBL teaches the recruits to think holistically when faced
with a situation for which several possible outcomes may be acceptable, the use
of qualitative assessment is better suited to measure such behaviors. Bond &
Fox (2001) state that when summarizing human attributes, there is “the need for
augmentation by some qualifying descriptive data” (p. 197).

96 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

The model also calls for the recruits to articulate their thinking to the evaluators
during a structured debriefing at the conclusion of the scenario. Initial results from
the pilot testing seem to reveal that articulation can yield valuable information
about the nature of a recruit’s thinking process. Such information may have
remained hidden using conventional scenario checklists. Articulation also
enhances the process of reflection and self-assessment as students are required
to provide their own feedback, at least initially (Poikela, 2004). Interestingly,
some evaluators also require the students to produce written accounts of their
experiences as part of their debriefing exercises in the form of journaling or report
writing. In essence, the model requires the recruits to behave as they would on
the job. In the domestic violence scenario, for example, recruits are measured on
their ability to produce a reasonable outcome but also on their ability to operate a
vehicle, communicate with dispatchers, recognize assailant and victim behaviors,
perform safely, maintain legal principles, reach objectively reasonable conclusions,
make arrests, transport subjects to lockup, and explore long-term solutions. Such a
model provides a mechanism to measure higher thinking skills and immerses the
recruit into a real-life experience, as well. Using such a model, evaluators are really
being asked to think about assessments in a different way.

MCOLES will continue experimenting with the prototype and continue to collect
data regarding its efficacy and utility. On an intuitive level, such a model seems
to be a more meaningful way to assess the higher thinking skills. Bond and Fox
(2001) point out, “This at least recognizes the inherent subjectivity involved in
collecting information about any human condition” (p. 66).

A Rationale for Rasch Measurement

As with any type of evaluation or measurement, maintaining the validity of the
inferences made from observation is essential. Typically, testing practitioners
establish validity using conventional statistical procedures that are grounded
in classical test theory (Bond & Fox, 2001; Smith, 1991; Wright & Masters, 1982;
Wright & Stone, 1979). For example, they analyze multiple-choice tests in order to
determine the test’s suitability for making pass-fail decisions and whether the items
are fair and unbiased (Bond & Fox, 2001; Wright & Stone, 1979). In addition, the
reliability of the measurements is often determined by using the Kuder Richardson,
split-half, or coefficient alpha formulas (Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984; Smith, 1991).
In a similar manner, item difficulties, point biserial coefficients, and average test
difficulties are computed using conventional statistical packages. Such analyses
are intended to establish the validity of the interpretation of the student test scores
(Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). Using such mechanical, stepwise procedures, as
plausible as they may seem, may not be suitable for measuring the complexities of
human behavior, particularly if such behaviors are measured on ordinal scales. In
fact, some analysts argue that it may be mathematically inappropriate to analyze
test data in the traditional way (Bond & Fox, 2001).

Accordingly, some believe that the Rasch measurement represents an improved

way to interpret test outcomes and may offer a more rigorous approach for validity
and reliability, whether measuring outcomes on a written exam or behaviors in a
reality-based scenario. For a complete discussion of the utility of the Rasch model,
see Applying the Rasch Model by Trevor Bond and Christine Fox (2001).

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 97

It may be useful to briefly discuss the Rasch measurement model and its connection
to construct validity for both written examinations and performance assessments.
This particular model is based on the work of Danish mathematician Georg Rasch
in the 1960s. Proponents believe it represents an improved way to establish and
maintain construct validity and reliability in testing and measurement (Bond &
Fox, 2001; Wright & Masters, 1982; Wright & Stone, 1979).

At its core, the Rasch dichotomous model analyzes nonlinear test scores using log-
odds probabilities that are independent of the sample. Furthermore, both person
ability and item difficulty are measured using a single interval metric. Using
log-odds probabilities transforms nonlinear test data into interval data suitable
for linear measurements and interpretation. In the Rasch model, the logarithmic
transformation of test results is really a natural log of the ratio of correct responses
to incorrect responses, or the natural log of the probability of getting an item
correct. Rasch produces output that indicates how well a set of test items fits the
model’s expectations (probabilities), the reliability of both persons and items in
terms of ability and difficulty, and a display of items and persons measured on
a single equal-interval scale (Bond & Fox, 2001; Michell, 2003; Wright & Masters,
1982; Wright & Stone, 1979).

According to the Rasch dichotomous model, the probability of a person

responding correctly to a particular item is a function of the difference between a
person’s ability and the item’s difficulty. These probabilities are expressed as logit
measures. A logit with a value of zero is set at the midpoint of the item difficulty
estimates. Higher logit values indicate greater item difficulty and greater person
ability (Smith, 1991; Wright & Masters, 1982; Wright & Stone, 1979). Baker (2001)
states that when plotted on a graph, a characteristic “S-shaped curve describes
the relationship between the probability of a correct response to an item and the
ability scale” (p. 7).

Using the Rasch Model

This article suggests that statistical analyses based on the Rasch model can be
used to provide evidence of construct validity when evaluating behavior in a
reality-based scenario. Although the foregoing discussion describes the Rasch
dichotomous model, its principles can be extended to polytomous data, as well
(Andrich, 1988; Bond & Fox, 2001; Smith, 2001). An ordinal scale is a common form
of polytomous measurement in behavioral research. Extending the Rasch model to
include performances measured on an ordinal scale can be accomplished, although
the mathematical formulas may be more complex (Wright & Masters, 1982).
Interestingly, the Rasch measurement techniques can be extended to partial credit
models, which may be more suitable for performance assessments and models
that measure inter-rater reliability in qualitative judgments as well (Bond & Fox,
2001). The example described later in this article outlines how the polytomous
model was used to establish the validity of a four-event physical fitness test in
Michigan.

As discussed by Bond and Fox (2001), the Rasch model addresses several
measurement principles that are central to construct validity: unidimensionality,
item to model fit, difficulty and ability estimations, and reliability of inferences
made from scores. Taken as a whole, the resolution of these issues can help

98 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

establish the validity of the testing instrument. Analysts need to be assured that
performance criteria are constructed in a valid manner (Bond & Fox, 2001).

Unidimensionality requires the analyst to measure only one characteristic of an

individual or a variable of interest at a time. For example, Michigan’s licensing
examination for law enforcement officers is intended to measure minimum
competency as an entry-level patrol officer. As confirmed through Rasch analytical
techniques, all items on the test contribute in some way to an understanding of
minimum competence as a patrol officer. In a similar manner, performance criteria
used for, say, a domestic violence scenario, should contribute to one’s understanding
of competency to handle a domestic violence call. In both instances, it is important
that the testing instruments maintain the concept of unidimensionality.

Item-to-model fit refers to the ability of the examination questions, or performance

criteria, to measure what they intend to measure. The Rasch model can provide
the analyst with a deeper understanding of how the criteria work. For example,
when constructing a list of criteria for a performance evaluation, the evaluator
must resolve certain issues. Which items contribute the most to an understanding
of the construct under consideration? Do all items contribute equally? If not,
what are the conceptual differences between items? Which items are difficult, and
which are easy? Are all items working as intended? Is there a correct order? If the
selected items or measuring criteria satisfactorily fit the Rasch model, the analyst
has confidence that such issues are resolved to a level of statistical significance and
that the items contain appropriate psychometric properties.

In the Rasch model, item difficulty and person ability estimations are measured in
terms of logits and are placed on a common interval scale for evaluation. The logit
scale positions both items and persons. As Bond and Fox (2001) point out, “Each
item and person is located along the logit scale according to its estimated value:
more positive (higher) persons are more able and more positive (higher) items are
more difficult” (p. 34). The evaluator can then determine which items and persons
fit the model’s expectations.

Ultimately, the evaluator must arrive at certain conclusions regarding the

performance of the students and make inferences regarding their scores, either
positively or negatively. Bond and Fox (2001) emphasize that . . .

. . . the role of the investigator is to identify an appropriate construct or latent

trait, and to use that construct as a guide in deciding which observable aspects
of the human condition should be operationalized as part of a data collection
device. The investigator’s understanding of the construct will allow for the
prediction of the measurement outcomes to a considerable extent. Given
that the measurement of the construct is the first goal, the investigator will
ensure that the test items, prompts, observational checklist, or the like both
validly represent the theoretical construct and meet the requirements for
fundamental measurement. (p. 192)

MCOLES has been using the dichotomous Rasch model for its licensing examination
since the late 1980s. Similarly, the partial credit model for polytomous data can be
used for performance-based assessments.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 99

An Illustrative Profile
To demonstrate the practical utility of the Rasch model for performance assessments,
consider the following example. In 2004, MCOLES initiated a project to redesign
its existing physical fitness test in order to better measure the underlying construct
of “fitness.” The JTA reveals that law enforcement officers perform a variety of
physical tasks on the job, including running, jumping, climbing, and pushing. As
a whole, these individual tasks require a certain level of physical fitness. Although
great care was taken to identify specific testing events that would measure fitness
and maintain content validity, staff also wanted to discover the extent to which
each event contributed to the theoretical construct. The four events are push-ups,
sit-ups, a vertical jump and a ½ -mile shuttle run. Although it made intuitive sense
that such events would, in fact, lead to an accurate understanding of fitness, staff
hoped to confirm their thinking through empirical analyses.

During the design phase, staff asked several fundamental questions. First,
how confident can one be in making inferences about those taking the test? In
other words, how well does the test discriminate among test takers (examinee
separation)? Secondly, do the four events create a well-defined construct called
“fitness” (item reliability)? In addition, to what extent and in what manner do
the four events contribute to an understanding of the underlying construct?
Do the events contribute in an equal way, or are there varying degrees in their
contributions? Finally, where along a common hierarchical continuum would the
events be distributed?

In order to address these questions, MCOLES used the Rasch rating scale model
for polytomous data (Bond & Fox, 2001; Wright & Masters, 1982). Staff selected
a convenience sample of 81 examinees from Grand Rapids Community College
and the Flint Police Academy and subjected their physical performances to Rasch
statistical procedures. Staff then examined person and item reliability estimates,
standard errors in measurement, difficulty levels, person abilities, and model fit
statistics based on the Rasch estimations.

The reliability statistics for both persons and events was 0.75 and 0.82 respectively.
The person reliability of 0.75 indicated that the measurement scale discriminated
relatively well among the test takers (person separation). Thus, staff was confident
in making inferences about the examinees’ abilities from their performances.
Similarly, the item reliability of 0.82 demonstrated that the events created a well-
defined construct. That is, the items were unique and distinct, yet measured one
competency (item separation). Table 1 displays the Rasch output. The outfit mean
square statistics indicated that the events fit the Rasch estimations well, as do the
ZSTD statistics. Outfit measurements are unweighted estimates of the degree of
fit to the model estimations and are expressed in terms standardized z or t scores.
Outfit statistics are sensitive to unexpected extremes; whereas, infit statistics are
weighted estimates that give more value to on-target observations. For model
fit, the analyst looks for outfit and infit mean square statistics near 1 and ZSTD
statistics near 0. The logit measures indicate how close the events are to one
another in terms of their contribution to the construct. The outfit statistics in Table
1 indicate that all four events fit the Rasch expectations and are therefore suitable
as measures of fitness.

100 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Table 1. Fit Statistics

Entry
No. Logit Error Outfit MNSQ Infit MNSQ Outfit ZSTD Infit ZSTD Items
1 -.25 .15 .97 .98 -.2 -.1 Jump
2 .08 .15 .99 .95 -.1 -.3 Sit-Ups
3 .55 .15 .95 1.01 -.3 .1 Push-Ups
4 -.38 .15 .96 1.03 -.2 .2 Run

Table 2 displays the comparison of the examinees and the events on a common
hierarchical scale represented in logits. The examinees are plotted to the left of
center, and the events are located to the right of center. The better performing
examinees appear toward the higher end of the continuum, and the lesser
performing examinees appear toward the lower end of the continuum. Each “X”
symbol represents two examinees and each “#” represents one examinee (N = 81).
Similarly, events that contribute less to an understanding of fitness are located
toward the higher end of the continuum. That is, it is more difficult to determine
its contribution to the underlying construct and therefore less likely to be endorsed
by staff. The Rasch model establishes the midpoint logit values at zero (M+M)
along the measurement scale. S and Q are one and two standard deviations from
the mean respectively.

Table 2. Map of Persons and Items for Physical Fitness Events

Persons Items
3 X
#XX
2
XXX
XX Q
1 #XX
XXX
#XXX S
Push-ups
0 XXXXXXXX M+M Sit-Ups
XXXX S Jump Run
-1 XXXXX
Q
#XX
-2
#X
-3
X
-4
X
-5

In examining Table 2, one can see that all events are located in close proximity in
terms of their contributions to an understanding of the construct. Push-ups and
sit-ups contribute slightly less, and the shuttle run and jump contribute slightly
more. It can also be seen that the push-ups differentiate among those of higher

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 101

ability slightly better than the sit-ups, jump, or shuttle run. The run and jump
perhaps differentiate among the lesser performing examinees better than the
push-ups. The sit-ups work best in the midrange of student ability. The examinee
abilities, are spread rather evenly across all levels but resemble the characteristic
bell curve. The four events are located near the mid-range of the examinees’
abilities so the test is not beyond the ability of the examinees. The four events have
slightly different degrees of contribution to the construct but all are quite close
together on the scale.

A validation strategy based on the above example can be adapted for a

performance assessment in most any topic area in a training academy. The four
physical fitness events, of course, would be replaced by criteria that relate to
minimally competent performance in a particular subject area, as observed by
the evaluators. Student performances could be recorded on an ordinal scale and
then subjected to Rasch analyses. The results of the analyses can tell the evaluator
whether the items selected to measure minimum competency in the topic area are
acceptable measures of performance. Items that fail to fit the model’s expectations
could be reworked or perhaps discarded entirely and others substituted, although
the analyst must still ensure content validity. The analyst should continue this
refinement process, if necessary, until the instrument is useful. Then, not only can
the inferences made from the performances in the scenario be considered valid to
a statistically significant level, the measurement criteria can be considered reliably
constructed, as well.

Conclusion
Construct validity can be established by linking the learning domain with the
job tasks performed by incumbent officers as identified through a sound job task
analysis. Blueprinting what is taught in training to what officers actually do on
the street ensures the job-relatedness of the process. When considering the efficacy
of testing instruments, however, the discussion essentially shifts from issues
concerning content validity to issues concerning construct validity. Evaluation
instruments must be constructed in such a manner that individual items on a
written test, or the individual components of a behaviorally based performance
assessment, are validly constructed and provide reliable inferences based on
scores. The Rasch family of measurements can provide the evaluator with viable
options for maintaining such validity and can be beneficial when used properly in
the testing environment. Equally important, adequately structured performance
assessments, together with the conceptualizations of Rasch measurement, can assist
state regulatory agencies in maintaining the evidence of validity for higher order
thinking. It should be noted that the recommended use of Rasch measurement
models is not intended to replace standard statistical analyses. Instead, the models
can by used by the analyst to complement the more conventional statistical
methodologies.

This article offers a validation strategy for the PBL training environment and
examines the feasibility of using a statistical methodology known as Rasch
measurement to establish and maintain the validity and reliability of assessment
in such an environment. It suggests a methodology and demonstrates an approach
that can be used in the development of sound validation practices for both training
and testing. Although no measurement is perfectly accurate and all contain some

102 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

level of subjectivity, evaluators must continually strive for accuracy in their
observations.

Ultimately, the purpose of a state regulatory agency, such as MCOLES, is to ensure

the safety of its citizens by licensing only those who possess a certain level of
competency. Maintaining the validity and reliability of both training and testing
can ensure that the system for producing such candidates functions as intended.

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Woods, D. (1994). Problem-based learning: How to gain the most from PBL. Hamilton,
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Wright, D., & Stone, M. (1979). Best test design. Chicago: MESA Press.

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Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 105

 Wayne R. Carlson is a training analyst with the Michigan Commission on Law
Enforcement Standards in Lansing, Michigan. His responsibilities include
maintaining the validity and reliability of the basic training curriculum and
the licensing examination for law enforcement officers. He holds a bachelor’s
degree in criminal justice from Michigan State University and a master’s
degree in the administration of justice from Virginia Commonwealth
University. He has over 30 years of experience in law enforcement, including
work in patrol, crime prevention, crime analysis, training, and criminal justice
education and testing. His research interests include training methodologies
and behavioral measurement.

106 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Criminal Justice Career Fairs:
Addressing Recruiting Challenges
Through Practitioner and Academic
Collaboration
Gregory B. Morrison, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Criminal
Justice and Criminology, Ball State University
Bryan D. Byers, PhD, Professor, Department of Criminal Justice and
Criminology, Ball State University

Introduction
Conducting an annual criminal justice career fair since 2000 has convinced us of the
value of a discipline-specific event that brings students majoring in criminal justice
into direct conversations with criminal justice agency recruiters over employment
and career possibilities. We have been the two chairs of our Department of
Criminal Justice and Criminology career fair at Ball State University these past
6 years. The dearth of academic and professional literature offering practical and
empirical insights comprises the major catalyst for this article, which provides us
an opportunity to . . .

• Share our rationale for a discipline-specific, criminal justice career fair in place of
the more typical university-wide event in the best interests of students, program
utility, and the high quality of public safety service offered by agencies.
• Encourage practitioners to approach academic criminal justice departments at
their local and regional universities about the prospect of holding a discipline-
specific career fair.
• Provide key information to academic departments concerning how to
successfully hold a career fair, including what we have found through experience
to be useful caveats.
• Present some supporting student survey and recruiter evaluation findings
emphasizing the value of such an event as an effective collaboration among
criminal justice agencies and academic criminal justice departments.

The point of transition from the study of criminal justice to the practice of criminal
justice is critical. Nevertheless, before and after graduation, academicians
typically leave students to grapple with launching their careers despite being
relatively ignorant about how best to accomplish such an important undertaking.
Future success as practitioners is a key component to the lasting impact of a
college education, so we view the hands-off approach to student job-seeking as
unfortunate.

This article appears to be the first of its kind, though very general information can
be found on the subject of career fairs (e.g., tips for jobseekers on how to prepare
for and then participate in a job fair) (“Job Fairs,” 2000; Rindegard, 1999). Students
also can access self-assessments as they ponder possible career paths that suit
their personalities and preferences (Arenofsky, 2001). TypeFocus™ offers a free

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 107

personality assessment aimed at identifying occupational fit, while here at Ball
State University, the Career Center features the Quest career exploration tool (Ball
State University Career Center, 2005b; TypeFocus, 2005). There are many other
helpful academic resources, such as the Journal of Career Planning & Employment,
which has published brief, complementary articles about student expectations of
employers (Roehling & Cavanaugh, 2000), as well as employer expectations of
students (Palomares, 2000).

University career centers are well-known for holding job-seeking workshops,

résumé writing clinics, and maintaining a library of materials on the broad array of
occupational possibilities. In our opinion, however, none of the aforementioned is a
suitable substitute for face-to-face conversations between employer representatives
and prospective employees. Furthermore, we advocate the discipline-specific
career fair. The ability of a student to stand face-to-face with a uniformed officer
or other professionally dressed agency representatives instills within the student
the seriousness of the career search and affords them extremely valuable personal
contact.

Background
The 21st century confronts U.S. employers and employees with some substantial
difficulties, ones that hardly bypass the public sector. Lower tax revenues for local
and state criminal justice agencies and departments have in many cases led to
service reductions, unfilled positions, and delays in capital outlays. The flux in
our local, state, and national economies over the past few years, particularly when
combined with the unprecedented levels of retirement in the law enforcement
field, creates serious hurdles for agencies and departments as they strive to
identify, gain access to, and successfully recruit highly qualified candidates for
critical public safety professions. Technological advances now enable web-based
recruiting efforts, and this can be a useful allied approach. A wholesale shift to
web-recruiting is doubtful, however, because this seems unlikely to provide a
suitable substitute for face-to-face interactions at employment fairs (e.g., Chung,
2003; Hill, 2004; Ligos, 2004; Tyler, 2000). Career fairs, therefore, offer distinct
advantages unlikely to be trumped by the relative convenience of the Internet,
and we consider some of these key advantages below.

As criminal justice professors, we naturally are biased in favor of college-

educated practitioners. There are many good reasons, but a broad (and seemingly
inescapable) one is the sometimes bewildering aspects to the work; the challenge
of negotiating one’s way within complex organizations over several decades and
nurturing professional relationships and the increasing technological demands of
routine police, court, and correctional work. Not only must new employees be
capable of performing satisfactorily in the short term, they must be able to adapt
to pending and future challenges as they pursue professional development across
their careers. Criminal justice occupations will not be less demanding in terms
of knowledge, skills, and attitudes, but, quite to the contrary, these are becoming
more demanding. This makes it difficult to fathom how less education might
emerge as an eligibility requirement or preference. College graduates, therefore,
should have a strong advantage in the criminal justice marketplace as they do
in other markets where organizations that sponsor job fairs specifically target
college graduates as an important segment of their audience (e.g., consider Clark,

108 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

1995; Chang, 2000). Colleges and universities want their graduates to secure
quality entry-level positions for which they should be highly competitive (e.g.,
generally see CareersNow-Online, 2004; “Spring Break,” 2002; for criminal justice
career fairs, consider Ball State University, 2005b; Michigan State University, 2005;
University of Northern Colorado, 2005).

Here at our institution, Ball State University, the Career Center holds a large
employment fair in both the fall and spring semesters (Ball State University Career
Center, 2005a). Because of the relative size of the smaller public sector versus larger
private sector workforces, in combination with needing to satisfy a broad spectrum
of student interests that reflect highly varied disciplinary backgrounds, the vast
majority of recruiters at university-wide job fairs are from the private sector. In
addition, a university-wide event generally maximizes the variety of employers
at the cost of focusing on relatively narrow student subpopulations, such as is the
case of those who aspire to criminal justice and allied positions (e.g., see Payne &
Sumter, 2005). Anecdotally, our university-wide job fair appears to hold limited
interest among our criminal justice and criminology majors since so few seem to
avail themselves of this on-campus event. The solution to the problem that we
perceived in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology in the spring
of 2000 was to bridge the sizeable chasm between being a criminal justice student
and becoming a criminal justice practitioner, something we accomplished through a
discipline-specific career fair (generally, see Payne & Sumter 2005; Zechmeister &
Helkowski, 2001). We discuss this in greater detail in the coming pages, beginning
with our rationale for devoting so much time, energy, and other resources to this
event.

The Importance of Career Fairs for Pre-Professional Planning

The financially meager existence brought by four or more years of college
expenses can tempt students to seize their first job offers. Stretched finances, when
coupled with uninformed and/or unrealistic notions about career possibilities,
can precipitate hasty choices that can have lifelong negative consequences for
graduates and their employers. This is particularly troublesome in the public
sector. In contrast to labor research findings that suggest private sector employees
change jobs approximately seven times during their working years, such mobility
is rare in criminal justice. For example, few students realize how common it is for
their first employer to be their only employer. This heightens the importance of
pre-employment information gathering and decisionmaking, particularly since a
bit of patience can, in the end, bring improved tangible rewards. Employers want
satisfied, productive employees who view their contributions to be important and
find pride in their employment.

Students majoring in criminal justice too often wait until late in their university
studies to begin meaningful pre-professional career planning. This behavior can
seriously hamper students in making smooth and timely transitions from the
college classroom to the workplace. In their own interests, students should develop
the widest possible array of entry-level career choices early in their academic
experiences. This requires considerable initiative on their part, and, frankly, the
message of pre-professional planning can be difficult to impress on them. We
believe our annual career fair provides an important motivational element.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 109

In general, academic department sponsorship of a career fair provides an excellent
means for achieving important goals associated with the education of aspiring
criminal justice practitioners. Students gain an opportunity to explore real
career possibilities and crucial insights into market considerations about which
they otherwise might remain ignorant or misinformed. A career fair facilitates
early conversations with employer representatives who can offer students a
window into what employers seek in their applicants, while giving employers
an opportunity to gauge the current and upcoming crop of interested students.
These conversations provide a valuable professional development opportunity for
students by fostering early career-oriented networking.

The next section covers some of the more compelling reasons to conduct a discipline-
specific career fair. Following this discussion, we share our thoughts on some of
the major considerations in conducting a career fair (i.e., department committee
composition, first-time planning considerations, scheduling and choosing a site
for the event, recruiter mailing list and invitations, registration information, fees
and processing applications, and promoting student involvement). This article
concludes with our empirical findings from an evaluation by participating recruiters
and surveys of CJC majors and minors who did (or did not) attend our recent annual
career fair. Both instruments have been informative, and we share some pertinent
findings to exemplify the value we see in having an empirical foundation—one
absent in the literature to date—for reflecting on past decisionmaking, determining
near-term preferences, and considering enhancements for future criminal justice
career fairs.

Advantages to a Career Fair

Recruiter and Student Convenience

A discipline-specific career fair provides a rare opportunity for interested students
to meet and readily discuss employment opportunities with dozens of recruiters
from public (i.e., police, probation, and corrections) and allied private sector
employers (e.g., asset protection and loss prevention and private correctional
service providers). As mentioned earlier, the Internet admittedly provides a handy
means for initially investigating potential employers, but much of the information
and impressions that students and employers should seek is best pursued through
face-to-face conversations. Importantly, most employers are local as well as
relatively small and therefore often provide only the barest of details through their
websites.

No Commitment Necessary
A discipline-specific career fair brings practitioners and students together in a
neutral setting where questions can be posed from both sides of the table, answers
provided and considered, and preliminary decisions made about suitable fit. This
provides a relatively low-stress setting for both students and recruiters alike where
neither needs to make binding commitments.

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Realistic Career Expectations
The criminal justice labor market constantly changes, and attending a career
fair can lead to a better understanding of the types of positions available at
any particular time, along with likely near-term department needs. As student
advisors or mentors, faculty discussions of employment scenarios too often do not
carry their full weight until reinforced through students’ first-hand contacts with
recruiters. What most criminal justice practitioners actually do for a living is a
crucial component to informed decisionmaking by students and should influence
their evolving interests after commencement.

Despite our best efforts in the classroom, hallways, and office hours, student
perceptions about careers in criminal justice and the allied private sector are
deeply influenced by the bombardment of media images. These perceptions can
fuel rather fantastic notions about the range of choices and the nature of certain
work, along with their relative importance as novice employees at the bottom
of the organizational pyramid. For instance, we have spoken with countless
high school seniors and college underclassmen who, upon graduation with a
bachelor’s degree, anticipate a career in forensic psychology, criminal profiling,
or specialized crime scene investigation. In addition to not recognizing the post-
graduation education and/or training that these specialties typically require,
they often are oblivious to the practical matters such as seniority and relevant
professional experience. Furthermore, many students are surprised to learn that
a stint as a patrol officer is a typical precursor to more specialized assignments,
such as criminal investigations (not to mention carrying a firearm and using force
when reasonably necessary). Being guided closer to reality through interactions
with knowledgeable recruiters as to the types of positions that actually exist and
are open to entry-level employees can be invaluable. Recruiters naturally cast their
general fields and specific employers in a positive light, but the realities about
entry-level opportunities can usefully ground students while simultaneously
sparking greater critical thinking about their priorities. In the process, better
informed decisionmaking can be developed. Both of these outcomes are central
to broad university educational goals associated with lifelong learning. Among
other things, students should carefully examine differences that exist between
starting salaries, shift-work arrangements, and the timing and size of raises; the
range of, and probabilities associated with, particular assignments; promotional
and supervisory opportunities; health insurance plan coverage, deductibles,
and copays; expectations for continuing education and inservice training; and
employer retirement plans and access to supplemental employee-funded options.
Learning about these factors reinforces a broad embrace of lifelong learning among
students. For employers, students who possess a general familiarity with these
matters demonstrate their abilities to probe a problem and gather information,
and this often becomes obvious during conversations at the career fair.

It’s Not Just a Job, It’s a Career

An important function of our career fair event is to socialize students away
from thoughts about a job and toward longer-range planning for their careers.
Surprisingly, few students understand the difference between a job and a career,
and the reason is as simple as it is understandable—if they have been employed
in any capacity by this point in their lives, it has involved finding and holding

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 111

jobs rather than pursuing a career. In guiding students toward a more thorough
and thoughtful examination of potential careers, we hope to advance their
career planning. For example, we encourage students who have a long-term
goal of performing particular law enforcement functions to first examine “law
enforcement” as a career within which they might occupy a variety of positions
within a given department, or with several departments, in route to their ultimate
goal.

Mock Employment Interview Practice

Finally, a valuable feature to our career fair involves mock employment interviews
for interested students on a first-come, first-serve basis. These mock employment
interviews are conducted by working professionals involved in their departments’
hiring processes. We currently hold one panel for law enforcement interviews and
another one for probation. The former has a much longer history and is in fact a
good example of what academic-practitioner collaboration can produce. It was set
in motion by an Indiana police department, whose current chief is a graduate of
our program, that approached us with the idea of augmenting the career fair by
conducting mock interviews.

Over the past 7 years, the mock interview experience has helped many students
prepare for the usually stressful experience of a real panel interview punctuated
by challenging questions—which is not uncommon for law enforcement positions
at the local, state, and federal levels. There is nothing quite like sitting across from
several working professionals in uniform or other professional attire and posing
questions that cannot be completely anticipated. These realistic interviews last
around 20 minutes and conclude with approximately 10 minutes of “debriefing”
during which the panelists offer constructive criticism and practical advice. A trial
run such as this might provide a crucial experience for students whose first real
interview turns out to be with their dream employer.

Planning and Conducting the Career Fair

There are several major considerations to keep in mind when holding a discipline-
specific career fair. While our discussion here is aimed primarily at academic
departments, it also might be useful to those criminal justice executives or their
designees who might consider approaching an academic department about
introducing or starting a career fair. Planning and conducting a career fair is a
time-consuming and demanding undertaking, especially the first one. We
recommend a full year of preparation for the inaugural event. Thereafter, at least
in our experience, a 4-month timeline has worked well. The initial startup will
consume dozens of hours; involve attention to a wide variety of details; and rely
on faculty, staff, student organizations, and other persons. Facility and equipment
needs must be identified; reserved; and, importantly, later reconfirmed. In our
case, we need a room to spaciously accommodate 40, 8-foot tables while providing
wide aisles for easy passage and space for conversations, along with two small
conference or meeting rooms for the two sets of mock employment interviews.

A mailing list of prospective recruiters must be created and then regularly updated,
while announcement and registration forms have to be created or updated, printed,
and mailed. The mixture of public and private employers needed to attract wide

112 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

student participation in a career fair will depend on the faculty’s agreed-upon
goals, curricular emphases, and student interests. We make it a practice to invite
recruiters from among the following groups:

• State and local police, along with specialized federal law enforcement agencies
• Probation, parole, and/or community corrections departments (adult and
juvenile)
• Correctional institutions (adult and juvenile)
• District/prosecuting attorneys’ offices and defense attorneys (public and
private)
• Private sector loss prevention and insurance investigative services
• Private sector contract service providers

Our experience has shown that the majority of the recruiters who represent
agencies at our event come from law enforcement, followed by corrections. More
recently, private sector employers have been increasing their presence, and we
think that this trend will intensify.

Recruiter registration forms and payments must be processed, and confirmations

and receipts (or invoices) return-mailed. Their registration information should be
recorded in an easy-to-use format and include such items as the number and names
of recruiters planning to attend; preferences as to table or floor space for displays;
whether they need electrical access for video and/or computer equipment, wall
space, or a screen for projected images; and the types of positions that they
anticipate having available. We elaborate below on other key considerations.

Committee Composition
We strongly recommend the committee approach to planning, conducting, and
evaluating a career fair due to the shear volume of work necessary for even a
modest event. Our department’s Criminal Justice Career Day Committee (CJCDC)
is comprised of faculty members with complementary backgrounds, interests, and
abilities. Ours is nearly a committee of the whole at seven members, which likely is
a good idea for smaller departments, particularly the first time. Determining how
faculty might best contribute to the event is important. For example, one of our
committee members is the faculty advisor to our student chapter of the National
Criminal Justice Honor Society, Alpha Phi Sigma. This individual’s presence on the
committee provides direct access to student assistance for processing registration
forms and depositing fees, creating a database of recruiter needs for the event, and
mailing receipts/invoices. Another committee member is the faculty advisor to
our student chapter of the American Criminal Justice Association, Lambda Alpha
Epsilon, as well as our internship coordinator. This individual’s presence on the
committee also provides direct access to student assistance, which in this case is
directed towards updating our contact information on agencies and recruiters and
assembling each year’s mailing list. This faculty member’s internship coordination
responsibilities involve constant contact with scores of agencies around Indiana
and contiguous states. This provides specialized knowledge about current needs
and preferences and is a factor in identifying the most beneficial recipients of each
year’s career fair announcement. Several of our committee members have had
experience as law enforcement or probation officers, and this has made it easier

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 113

to identify and secure our mock employment interview panel members based on
personal contacts.

Scheduling
Selecting a time and date for a criminal justice career fair is more complicated
than it might appear. For one, it is important to avoid direct competition with
other major discipline-specific and large-scale university-wide career fairs hosted
in the general area. Recruiters brought this to our attention at our first career fair
because we unwittingly scheduled ours for the same week (but different day,
thankfully) as an already established one here in Indiana. Formal coordination
between institutions can be difficult, so we eventually moved ours several weeks
away so that minor year-to-year fluctuations would be unlikely to create a “this
one or that one” dilemma for recruiters.

Another consideration is strong support from the department chair and one’s
colleagues. If a career fair is a valued component of the overall educational and
preprofessional development of one’s students, then the necessary cooperative
environment likely exists for a highly anticipated, well attended, and successful
event. It is important to gain the cooperation of faculty members whose class times
overlap with the career fair, and early announcement of the date enables faculty
members to accommodate the career fair in their course plans. Although we all
bemoan not having enough contact time in courses to cover all of the material
desired, canceling one of roughly 30 to 45 class periods during a semester seems a
relatively minimal cost for being able to provide students with convenient access
to a large and motivated group of prospective employers. A faculty member who
cancels a class session once a year during the short span of the career fair—perhaps
3 hours or so—might provide the time necessary for students with tight class and/
or work schedules to participate. This form of collegial support can increase student
participation not simply because of the time it frees up, but also because the career
fair looms larger as a matter of high priority for a criminal justice department
and its students. If “covering” classroom contact time remains an issue, consider
assigning students a short response paper about their experiences at the career fair.
This can have the added benefit of generating useful insights that faculty could
pass along to the organizing committee.

A wide range of local, state, and federal departments in Indiana and from contiguous
states attend our career fair. Keeping the combination of recruiters’ commuting
and the career fair close to an 8-hour day in length will earn you their appreciation,
and with it comes greater interest in your future events. Because of travel time, the
vast majority of recruiters favor the early afternoon, and we soon settled on 12:00
to 3:00 pm. The morning is available for commuting to campus from any corner of
the state, setting up displays, and grabbing a quick lunch before the doors open.
The late afternoon and early evening remain for the trip home. (Worth noting here
is our recent experience with providing a refreshment table in a draped-off area of
the room containing small sandwiches, cheese and crackers, and some fruit and
drinks. This was instantly popular with recruiters because finding lunch could be
removed from their to-do list upon arriving.)

As for the day of the week, we prefer Wednesdays because practitioners can avoid
both the very beginning and end of their workweek. For us, this avoids the longer

114 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

75-minute class periods that fall on Tuesdays and Thursdays, which can disincline
faculty from supporting their students’ participation through class cancellation
and/or alternative assignments. The middle of the week also has the advantage
of easily accommodating the day and a half of mock employment interviews that
precede our career fair.

Location
It is important to use an easily accessible campus building for the career fair. A
carpeted room is preferable, and it should allow for wide aisles between the tables.
Vinyl or wood floors create a terribly noisy environment and should be avoided.
Flow is important, and neither students nor recruiters want to find their access to
one another limited by physical inconveniences that the organizers should have
foreseen and, thus, prevented. Recruiter location needs thoughtful consideration,
too. For example, we distribute the local, state, and federal agencies around the
room so as to avoid concentrated pockets of police, probation, and institution-
based corrections recruiters. In this way, we spread student traffic around the
room to maximize flow, and students see a wider variety of employers as they
circulate. This reduces palpable recruiter competition for student attention, too, by
providing a modicum of privacy from one’s most direct competitors. We think that
this also improves comfort and minimizes frustration for all concerned despite the
obvious lack of true privacy. This can be important, as recruiters naturally want
a setting in which they can contrast their departments with others that are just
beyond elbow-rubbing proximity.

Inviting Recruiters
Employer participation in any given year will depend on current hiring needs,
agency budgetary considerations, and the recruiter schedule availability. Our
most consistent year-to-year participation comes from law enforcement agencies.
We work from three general sources: (1) those recruiters who recently participated,
(2) those departments and allied private sector entities that accept our students
as interns, and (3) those that learn of our career fair through word-of-mouth. All
interested entities receive a mailed invitation, but this is preceded by an “early
bird” e-mailing with PDF attachments of the announcement letter and reservation
form to those that participated the previous year. We receive prompt responses in
this fashion from the most interested recruiters.

The Fee
A $25 fee is payable to one of our student organizations that shares responsibility
for conducting the career fair. This nominal fee covers the cost of updating
our advertising banner, tablecloth rental, photocopying/printing forms, and
miscellaneous supplies (e.g., name badges and felt pens). We estimate that our
mean cost per recruiter is around $15, so the remaining $10 serves as a fundraiser
for the two student organizations. The most expensive cost is refreshments, and
the faculty currently covers this expense through a departmental fund. That the
financial benefit goes to the student organizations is clearly communicated in the
invitation letter. While we do encounter the occasional department that would
like us to waive the fee—more importantly, a few are precluded from paying for
access to our students such that we waive it on a case-by-base basis—we maintain

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 115

that its quite modest level is unlikely to stop a genuinely interested employer from
attending. Given recruiters’ salaries and benefits for the typically two to three
personnel who staff a table, their display boards and handout materials, along
with transportation and per diem, we do not think that our $25 fee is a determining
factor in whether an employer participates. In the end, employers are quite open
about the benefits of being at our career fair, which attracts between 150 and 200
interested students every spring.

Promoting Student Involvement

Our department is fortunate to have two active student organizations that provide
vital service to the committee, recruiters, and attending students. When we initiated
our career fair planning in the fall of 1999 in anticipation of our spring 2000 event,
it was, in fact, spearheaded and conducted by Alpha Phi Sigma through its faculty
sponsor (one of our committee members). Given the many tasks associated with
planning and conducting the career fair, the next year, we delegated responsibility
to the CJCDC.

Student assistance has been extremely helpful, and we do not hold the opinion
that students cannot be depended upon to carry out important responsibilities
under faculty supervision. On the day of the event, student helpers handle on-site
check-in, hand out name tags to recruiters, and assist them in locating their tables.
They also help bring in and set up the displays, though this now is rare given the
collapsible, self-contained displays. An added benefit to our student helpers is
the ability to develop personal contacts with agency representatives. To promote
an overall professional appearance to our career fair, we insist that our student
helpers wear appropriate attire and are well-groomed. To clearly identify student
workers to the participating recruiters and fellow students, we provide them with
nametags that feature a “staff” ribbon identical to those worn by department
faculty members.

Evaluating a Career Fair

Methods

The Instruments
We used two instruments to evaluate our criminal justice career fair. First, recruiters
were asked to evaluate various facets of their career fair experiences and provide
related information. At least one anonymous recruiter evaluation form (n = 57)
was collected from each department during a recent career fair. As is typically the
case, the vast majority (77%) of the departments operated at the city or county level
of government. This is consistent with what many criminal justice professors share
with students in that most criminal justice services are found at the local level. The
categorical breakdown for the 33 employers represented by these recruiters was
as follows:

• 17 law enforcement departments

• 7 corrections departments (probation, community, and institutional)
• 5 other departments/agencies (e.g., U.S. Army, the Indiana Police Corps, and
private sector service providers)

116 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

• University units (Career Services, Graduate School, Student Voluntary Services,
and the Master’s in Public Administration w/CJC Emphasis program)

The one-page, 18-item anonymous recruiter evaluation is purposely brief, partly

because recruiters are asked to complete it near the end of the fair. It probes
recruiters’ perceptions of the registration process; assistance at the event; the
general atmosphere; the nature and quality of student contacts; as well as the day,
date, and time of the event. The first seven items utilized a five-point Likert scale
ranging from “poor” to “excellent” in order to collect information on what they
viewed as essential elements of a successful event, along with an overall rating of
their experience. The remaining ten items queried recruiters about such matters as
whether they had adequate space for their booth materials; whether they would
prefer a different site or room arrangement in the future; or whether they would
like to see the fair held during a different season, month, day, and/or time. In
general, and as the findings section further below reveals, there was a uniformly
high degree of satisfaction with these matters among the recruiters, and they
offered few suggestions.

The second instrument anonymously queried students on their perceptions and

experiences regarding the career fair. Knowing that our intent was not only to
assess student experience, but also to disseminate our findings with the criminal
justice academic and practitioner communities, we submitted our survey
instrument and protocols to Ball State University’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB) for its consideration and approval. The IRB approved our two-page, 19-item
student questionnaire, which was then administered to subject volunteers in
the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology’s faculty member classes
during the 2 weeks immediately following the career fair. This instrument’s items
reflected two general themes: (1) for those who attended, what was the nature of
their interaction with vendors and their overall experiences? and (2) among those
who did not attend, what were their reasons?

Our student sample (n = 204) captured approximately 34.6% of our academic

year criminal justice majors, with participation levels by male (53%) and female
(47%) students being very similar to the overall program distribution of 56% and
44%, respectively. Students from all four class levels were represented; the largest
group being comprised of juniors (31.9%) and the smallest group comprised of
freshmen (13.7%). Nearly nine-in-ten (88%) respondents were aged 18 to 22 and
thus of traditional college age. Students were overwhelmingly declared as either
criminal justice majors (73%) or double majors (14%) (e.g., criminal justice and
psychology).

Findings

Recruiter Evaluation
The evaluation forms completed by recruiters indicated a uniformly high degree of
satisfaction (see Table 1). The median rating for six of the seven Likert-scaled items,
as well as the one measuring their overall experience, was “excellent.” Around two-
thirds of the recruiters provided a score of 5 for each item. Only one mean rating,
a 4.25 for “student flow/contact,” dropped below a score of 4.5. Nevertheless,
approximately one-third of the recruiters rated this item as a 5. We came to the

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 117

conclusion that two problems existed as a result of this lower rating when taken
in combination with our own observations. First, a choke-point developed in two
aisles where unusually popular agencies/recruiters attracted large crowds. In
addition, four tables turned out to be situated a bit too far away from the main
group and thus were on the fringe of the flow of students. As a result, some of these
recruiters felt that many students had bypassed them. In response, we revised the
layout for future career fairs to provide wider aisles and prevent isolated pockets of
recruiters. Because recruiters often want to retain their floor location, however, we
made it a point to speak with those who were located in the two problem areas.

Table 1. Criminal Justice Career Day Recruiter Evaluation Results

Median Mean (SD) Percent “5s”

Initial Contact/Correspondence 5.00 4.55 (.64) 62.3%
Reservation Process 5.00 4.63 (.60) 68.6%
Event Cost 5.00 4.51 (.65) 59.2%
General Atmosphere 5.00 4.70 (.63) 76.8%
Student Flow/Contact 4.00 4.25 (.71) 38.6%
Faculty Member Availability/Contact During the 5.00 4.60 (.68) 68.4%
Job Fair
Event Assistance (your needs being met) 5.00 4.73 (.49) 75.0%
Overall Experience 5.00 4.74 (.48) 75.4%
The scale used for these ratings consisted of five levels ranging from 1 = poor to 5 = excellent.

Student Survey
The subsample of students (n = 199; 97.5%) that provided usable surveys was
comprised of 87 (43.7%) who attended the career fair and 112 (56.3%) who did
not (see Table 2). This distribution among those who did and did not attend was
not surprising given that our program consists of over 600 undergraduate majors,
while student career fair attendance hovers around 150. Our initial interest was in
whether gender, class level, or age influenced attendance generally. Neither gender
nor age made a noteworthy difference in attending or not attending, though class
level did make a difference. This latter finding should not be surprising. Freshmen
were the least likely (20.0%) to attend. Sophomores (49.0%) and seniors (54.2%)
attended in very similar numbers, while juniors landed in between (39.1%). The
fact that seniors attended in the greatest numbers is not surprising given that they
are likely to be the most attuned to the pressures brought by the approaching
conclusion to their academic pursuits and their initial forays into the marketplace.
We separately examine the attending and nonattending groups of students below.

Table 2. Crosstabulation of Criminal Justice Career Day Attendance by

Student Class Level

Class Level
Did you attend? Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Total
Yes 5.7% 28.7% 28.7% 36.8% 100.00% (n = 87)
No 17.9 23.2 34.8 24.1 100.00% (n = 112)

118 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Students who attended the career fair were asked to rate its degree of usefulness.
The vast majority (87.9%) reported that it was at least “somewhat” useful to
them, two-thirds (65.8%) of whom indicated that it was “extremely” useful. We
measured overall impressions of their experiences through a five-point Likert scale
consisting of “very disappointing,” “below average,” “average,” “above average,”
and “outstanding.” Impressions generally were positive, with over half (53.8%)
indicating that it was either an outstanding (10.0%) or above average (43.8%)
experience. Another large group (40.0%) found it to be average, while only 6.3%
reported ratings of either below average or very disappointing. We attribute some
of this difference, albeit anecdotally, to the fact that some students have different
expectations concerning which agencies will be represented (they can easily be
dissatisfied if specific departments of interest to them happen not to participate
in a given year), yet this is a valuable lesson for students given that departments’
particular circumstances determine their participation, not student preference.

A series of items sought insights into attendees’ impressions of their interactions

with recruiters, specifically, the printed materials that were available, approaching
and conversing with them, being informative and articulate about their employers,
along with being respectful of students and their interests. Student responses on
each of these five items were highly favorable, with over 90% either agreeing or
strongly agreeing (see Table 3). This is important because it provides additional
evidence that students were satisfied with their interactions. Finally, and
interestingly, while many students aspire to state or federal employment, those
responding to our survey generally were more impressed with recruiters from
local agencies (see Table 4). This finding bodes well for the high proportion of local
law enforcement agencies present at our events.

Table 3. Attitudes of Students Attending Criminal Justice Career Day

Response
Strongly Strongly
Item Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Total
Printed materials were
excellent. 32.9% 61.2% 5.9% 0.0% 100.0% (n = 85)
Recruiters were easy to
approach/talk to. 33.7 51.2 14.0 1.2 100.0 (n = 86)
Recruiters were informative. 37.6 54.1 8.2 0.0 100.0 (n = 85)
Recruiters were articulate. 36.5 55.3 8.2 0.0 100.0 (n = 85)
Vendors respected you and
your interests. 40.0 52.9 7.1 0.0 100.0 (n = 85)

Table 4. Agency Impressions on Students by Level of Government

Response
Item Yes No Total
Federal agency made the best impression on me. 39.1% 60.9% 100.0% (n = 87)
State agency made the best impression on me. 36.8 63.2 100.0 (n = 87)
Local agency made the best impression on me. 52.9 47.1 100.0 (n = 87)

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 119

Also of interest to us was the substance of student-recruiter conversations. To
examine this, we created a list of items that students could select simply by way
of a check mark. This list included an “other” category to capture topics that we
otherwise would have missed (see Table 5). Of the eight forced choices, only three
were selected by more than half of the student attendees as having been included
in their conversations with recruiters. These were types of positions/assignments
available (74.1%), the testing and/or selection process for applicants (65.9%),
and starting salaries (62.4%). There was a relationship between academic class
standing and these three items, with seniors more likely than juniors to report
them as having been part of their conversations.

Table 5. Topics Discussed by Students and Recruiters in Descending Order

(n = 85)

Response
Item Yes No Total
We talked about the types of positions and assignments 74.1% 25.9% 100.00%
available.
We talked about the testing and/or selection process for 65.9 34.1 100.00
becoming an employee.
We talked about starting salary. 62.4 37.6 100.00
We talked about how to submit an employment application. 47.1 52.9 100.00
We talked about work schedules and shift work. 35.3 64.7 100.00
We talked about the salary schedule after the first two years of 34.1 65.9 100.00
employment.
We talked about promotion opportunities. 34.1 65.9 100.00
We talked about retirement/pension programs. 20.0 80.0 100.00
We talked about other issues. 8.2 91.8 100.00

As for other likely topics, not quite half (47.1%) of those students who attended
the career fair reported discussing how to submit an application for employment,
something that understandably was most common among seniors (75%). There
was far less discussion about longer-term employment issues. For example, only
around one-third of attending students reported having discussed issues such
as salary schedules after the first two years of employment (34.1%). For some
unknown reason, this was most common among sophomores, not juniors and
seniors. Overall, discussion of promotion opportunities was a topic among a bit
more than one-third (34.1%) of students, while retirement/pension programs
trailed much further behind (20%). Only slightly more than one-third (35.3%) of
attendees discussed the specifics of work schedules and shift work that might
have serious consequences for their health, family commitments, recreation, and
safety.

Few students among the group that did not attend the career fair (n = 112) reported
missing it for other than class conflicts due to the time of day (35.7%) and/or work
and/or child care responsibilities (39.3%) (see Table 6). Most students appear to
have missed the career fair due to circumstances not easily mitigated and had
little, if any, connection to the quality of the event itself. The next most common
reason was simply not yet feeling ready to talk with recruiters (16.1%), while
the remaining six reasons individually attracted no more than 12.5% of student
responses. Percentages for four of these six items fell well under 10%.

120 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Table 6. Reasons that Student’s Did Not Attend in Descending Order (n = 112)

Response
Item Yes No Total
I had to work/had a child to care for/or other important 39.3% 60.7% 100.00%
responsibility.
I had class at the same time as the event. 35.7 64.3 100.00
I wasn’t ready to talk with recruiters. 16.1 83.9 100.00
I don’t want to work in the criminal justice system. 11.6 88.4 100.00
I wasn’t interested in talking with recruiters about their 8.0 92.0 100.00
departments.
I didn’t know about the criminal justice career day. 7.1 92.9 100.00
I was intimidated about talking with department 6.3 93.8 100.00
representatives.
The agency list for the event didn’t appeal to me. 6.3 93.8 100.00
I did not attend because of some other reason. 12.5 87.5 100.00

Discussion and Conclusions

Our goals for this article have been two-fold: (1) to provide a starting point for
criminal justice departments considering a discipline-specific career fair and (2) to
encourage practitioners to approach academic departments about hosting one. In
support of our position that sponsoring a criminal justice career fair is a highly
valuable endeavor, we have outlined some key benefits, made some suggestions
borne of direct experience, and presented some relevant empirical evidence.
Our assessment efforts suggest that our events have been positive ones from the
perspectives of both students and employer recruiters. The survey of the students
who attended the career fair yielded numerous indications about their positive
experiences, as did the recruiter evaluation with regard to their experiences. Those
students who did not attend indicated that this was due primarily to factors
beyond our control.

On the one hand, holding a career fair demands much effort for faculty already
faced with ever-increasing expectations about scholarly productivity, excellence in
teaching, and service to the university and professional communities. On the other
hand, we find the benefits to a career fair to be compelling. A well-run criminal
justice career fair fills a crucial void within the student-focused criminal justice
department’s range of extracurricular opportunities. We firmly believe that events
along the general lines of ours can be equally successful elsewhere, so we hope that
criminal justice departments that currently do not sponsor a discipline-specific
career fair might take encouragement from our experience and decide to tackle
one. We also hope that criminal justice agencies and private sector employers
might be encouraged to approach academic departments about a career fair. While
our career fair was campus generated, the idea for the law enforcement mock
interviews came from a police department that was interested in our students as
well as willing to provide valuable career-building skills.

Altogether, we think that a discipline-specific career fair holds many benefits for
students, employers, and the faculty. For criminal justice employers, there is not a
suitable substitute for a career fair that offers convenient face-to-face conversations
with a targeted, interested, and motivated pool of potential candidates. For
students, this is an opportunity to gain important career and “market” information,

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 121

learn first-hand lessons about career preparation, and refine their communication
skills through interactions with working professionals. For academic departments,
a career fair helps emphasize to students in a tangible way the importance of
career-planning while simultaneously building important networks among
public and private sector employers who are likely to employ the graduates of
their programs. Thus, career fairs have major benefits for students, employers and
academic departments.

References
Arenofsky, J. (2001). Creating your career path. Career World, 30(1), 6-10.

Ball State University Career Center. (2005b, September). Fall 2005 Job Fair information.
Available online at www.bsu.edu/students/careers/students/events/ociemployers

Ball State University Career Center. (2005a, September). Quest career exploration
Internet tool. Available online at www.bsu.edu/students/careers/quest

CareersNow-Online. (2004). 14th Annual Law Enforcement Diversity Career Fair.

Available online at http://careersnow-online.com/careerfair.html

Chang, J. (2000). Job fair attendance increases. The Johns Hopkins Newsletter.
Retrieved September 14, 2000, from www.jhu.edu/~newslett/09-14-00/news/8.
html

Chung, J. (2003, August 5). Grads seeking public service find few jobs. Wall Street
Journal (Eastern Edition), 242(25), p. B1.

Clark, E. (1995). Job fair helps connect people and employers. Crisis, 102(6), 34.

Criminal Justice & Criminology Department. (2005). Criminal justice career fair.
Available online at http://bsu.edu/cjc/cjccareerfair

Hill, P. (2004, August 27). Graduate fairs lose out to web. Times Higher Education
Supplement, 1655, 8.

Job fairs: So many companies, so little time. (2000, Summer). Occupational Outlook
Quarterly, 19.

Ligos, M. (2004, May 23). Colleges struggle to attract job recruiters to campuses.
New York Times, 1-3.

Michigan State University. (2005). Career fair information. Available online at

www.cj.msu.edu/%7Ecareer/careerfair.html

Palomares, A. (2000). Employer expectations of students attending job fairs. Journal

of Career Planning & Employment, 60(2), 20-24.

Payne, B. K., & Sumter, M. (2005). College students’ perceptions about career fairs:
What they like, what they gain, and what they want to see. College Student Journal
39(2), 269-276.

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Rindegard, J. (1999). How to get the most benefit from a job fair. InfoWorld, 21(40),
102.

Roehling, M. V., & Cavanaugh, M. A. (2000). Student expectations of employers at

job fairs. Journal of Career Planning & Employment, 60(4), 48-52.

Spring break job fair draws a record crowd. (2002). Black Issues in Higher Education,
19(6), 16.

Tyler, M. (2000). Web recruiting is fine, but we like a job fair. Fortune, 141(6), 236.

TypeFocus Internet, Inc. (2005, September). Career exploration Internet tool.

Available online at http://typefocus.com

University of Northern Colorado. (2005). Spring job and internship fair/criminal

justice fair. Available online at www.unco.edu/careers/students/fairs-spring.
htm

Zeckmeister, E. B., & Helkowski, C. (2001). A career course and fair. Teaching of
Sociology, 28(4), 276-278.

Acknowledgement
The authors first thank the many public criminal justice and private sector employers
who participate in our annual fair hosted by the Department of Criminal Justice
and Criminology at Ball State University. Without their interest in our students,
there would be no career fair. We specifically extend our thanks to the students and
recruiters who attend the career fair each year and by doing so reinforce its value
for academicians and practitioners alike. Finally, we appreciate the Department’s
Criminal Justice Career Fair Committee for its efforts throughout the year, as well
as our faculty colleagues, staff members, and student organizations whose support
figures prominently in this routinely successful event.

Gregory B. Morrison, PhD, is an associate professor of criminal justice and

criminology at Ball State University and is chair of the Criminal Justice
Career Day Committee (2003 to 2006). His primary research interests revolve
around the utility of police training, particularly with regard to police use
of force. This and other research has been published in the Law Enforcement
Executive Forum, as well as Police Quarterly, Policing: An International Journal of
Police Management and Strategies, the Journal of Criminal Justice Education, and
Police Chief. He most recently published the results of a study of the firearms
and deadly force training policies, programs, and practices of state and large
municipal and county departments in the United States. Dr. Morrison also
served as a law enforcement officer in the State of Tennessee.

Bryan D. Byers, PhD, is a professor of criminal justice and criminology at Ball

State University. He is past chair of the Criminal Justice Career Day Committee
(1999-2002). His research interests focus on criminal justice pedagogical topics,
bias crime, ethics, and crisis intervention in criminal justice. He is the author
or editor of several books in such areas as crisis intervention, diversity, social

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 123

 psychology, data analysis, and elder abuse and neglect. He is also the author
or co-author of numerous journal articles, which have appeared in the Journal
of Criminal Justice, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Teaching Sociology,
and the Journal of Criminal Justice Education. Dr. Byers has provided training
to law enforcement agencies in crisis intervention and bias crimes and once
served as a prosecutor’s investigator in the state of Indiana.

124 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Law Enforcement Officers: Their
Perception of Personal Safety and
Job Performance
Tony A. Barringer, EdD, Associate Dean, College of Professional Studies;
Chair, Division of Justice Studies, Florida Gulf Coast University
David Thomas, PhD, Assistant Professor, Division of Justice Studies,
Florida Gulf Coast University

Introduction
The purpose of this article is fourfold: (1) to emphasize the role of community
policing as an important faction of society, (2) to examine officers’ perceptions of
their personal safety while performing their daily job/tasks, (3) to explore how
the perceptions of the officers perceivably affect their ability to be effective and
efficient while performing their jobs, and (4) to examine the extent of officer tragedy
taking place in American society. We propose a model that will assist agencies
in providing optimal training that could serve to make officers feel safer while
performing commendable work. Community policing is defined by Meese (1994)
and Moore & Trojanowicz (1988) as the use of sophisticated investigative problem-
solving techniques while interacting cooperatively with community institutions
such as families, schools, neighborhood associations, merchant groups, and
social service agencies to create safe secure communities. Although the primary
responsibility of officers is to serve, protect, and create a safe community, Clarke
and Zak (1999) suggested that in every community in the United States, law
enforcement personnel and firefighters regularly put their lives in harm’s way to
protect the public. The authors went on to suggest that the risk of a fatal incident
for law enforcement personnel and firefighters is three times greater than for all
other workers. Although we are intrigued with officer/community interaction(s),
this work focuses primarily on police safety.

The issue of “police safety” is synonymous with the term officer survival. Law
enforcement agencies, officers, and trainers have been looking for ways to enhance
the skill levels with limited budget and time constraints. This complex problem is
dependent on more than just training. This literature review examines the issues
associated with police safety.

Literature Review
During basic police recruit training, every officer develops an understanding
and foundation of “police/suspect violence.” It is also the place where recruits
develop the necessary skills, which are considered minimal, to control a threat. The
foundation of that training can be found in what is classified under the umbrella
of “high liability training.” These areas are classified as such because this is where
officers and agencies are mostly to be involved in litigation. High liability is an
area in which mistakes can be made and cause serious injury and/or death to
unintended bystanders.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 125

High-liability training is not unique to one state. In fact, an examination of Florida,
New York, California, and Michigan reveals that each has a similar mandate
and training standards for basic recruit training. The courses cover firearms,
defensive tactics, vehicle operations, physical fitness, and traffic stops. The hours
of this training vary from state to state with the following averages: firearms is
75 hours; defensive tactics 64 hours; physical fitness 47 hours; vehicle operations
26 hours; and traffic stops 13 hours. The remainder of time is spent in areas such
as constitutional law, patrol, drug identification, community policing, etc. The
recruits want more, but the budgets are limited, and any other training in the area
of officer safety must be done through inservice training; advanced classes offered
at the local training academy; or most often, accomplished on their own.

To understand a need for advanced and continued training above and beyond
that of the police academy, one need only look at The FBI Uniform Crime Report:
Officers Killed and Assaulted 2005. This document is an annual document that
details who, what, when, where, and how officers are killed and/or assaulted. An
examination of the 2005 statistics offers the following data: 55 officers killed with a
profile of the victim officers as white males, average age 37, and 10 years of service.
The most common situations in which these officers were killed include traffic
stops or pursuits, making an arrest, ambush, disturbance calls, and investigating
suspicious persons. The most dangerous assignment was uniform patrol, and the
most common weapon used to murder an officer was a handgun. The deadliest
months were August and November; the deadliest day of the week was Thursday;
and the deadliest hours were between 10:01 pm and 12:00 am. Finally, the profile of
the suspects was as follows: white male, average age 30, height 5’10”, 175 pounds.
From 1996 through 2005, the numbers are fairly consistent. The number of officers
killed varies, but the circumstances surrounding their deaths, as well as the victim
officers’ average age, race, and years of service have remained consistent over
time.

Petrocelli (2006) identifies what are known as the 10 deadly errors of policing.
These errors are nothing new, as they were identified some 30 years ago by
Detective Pierce Brooks of the Los Angeles Police Department and have remained
a constant today:

1. Failure to maintain proficiency and equipment – Officers fail to maintain

equipment such as handcuffs being rusted and inoperable or firearms not being
cleaned. Also, officers may be unable to qualify with firearms and outdated
defensive tactics skills.
2. Improper search and use of handcuffs – Officers searching before they handcuff
a suspect and poor/no handcuffing technique.
3. Sleepy or asleep – Officers often do not get enough sleep before a shift due to
family, shift work, overtime, and court.
4. Relaxing too soon – Officers make the assumption that a situation or suspect is
under control.
5. Missing the danger signs – Officers may miss hidden weapons during a search
or pat-down. This may occur because of improper preparation and a lack
of proactive supervision. From an administrative perspective, they miss the
warning signs and issues associated with officer suicide and oftentimes fail to
hold officers accountable.

126 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

 6. Taking bad positions – Officers fail to take a position of safety during traffic
stops and field interviews.
7. Failure to watch the suspect’s hands – Observing the suspect’s hands means
more then just being visible and out of the pocket. Many suspects are adept
at cupping weapons in their hands such as knifes or razor blades; seeing the
palms of the hands are essential.
8. Tombstone courage – Many officers believe that because they wear the uniform
that it demands respect. In doing so, they take unnecessary chances.
9. Preoccupation – The number one stressor for police officers is the administration
in relationship to their job. Will the administration support me if I make
a mistake? Other issues associated with this category are a lack of proper
training, failure to be recognized, marital problems, and shift work.
10. Apathy – This contributes to each of the errors in varying degrees. It is hard to
measure because it is a crime of omission, rather than commission.

If you examine the Ten Deadly Errors closely, it is clear that most are associated
with mental errors. Remsberg (1986) supports this with the following statement:
“Your mind is the most dangerous weapon you carry on patrol” (p. 16). When it
comes to officer safety, officers are their own worst enemy and feel a sense of false
security and entitlement. Thomas (2006) examined the development of fitness
standards for inservice law enforcement personnel and noted the following:

In establishing mandatory training standards for inservice law enforcement

personnel, such initiatives will be met with resistance and trepidation. The
anxiety among inservice personnel is that standards would be used as a
punitive measure to discipline or terminate those who cannot meet the
department standard. Inservice personnel are skeptical of anything that
is new or mandated. More importantly, they feel that they have a sense of
entitlement, in as much, as they have been with the agency for a number of
years and should not be forced to participate in such a program. (p. 13)

In fact, officers have made the following statements regarding training and the
implementation of new initiatives (Thomas, 2006):

“I know how to make an arrest so why do we have to do this?”

“The administration has no idea what we do or need.”

“If I can’t qualify then they will fire me.”

“This provides the administration with a tool to deny me a promotion.”

“We never had standards before, so why now?”

“Just leave me alone; I do my job.”

“I’ve been doing this job for 20 years, and I can tell you that training isn’t
important.”

“I am a detective and work inside, and no one is going to attack me.” (p. 14)

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 127

These statements are examples of fear and embody what is known as “destructive
entitlement.” They also coincide with the 10 deadly errors and the concept that
experience breeds confidence. What makes this confidence so alarming is that it is
predicated upon the unknown variable of human behavior, not of the officers, but
the suspect in every encounter.

The one aspect of this complex puzzle that has not been discussed is the loss of
learning without repetition. In essence, certain skills are lost because they are
not utilized. The recruit who graduates from the academy is indoctrinated with
patrol tactics and is eager to apply all of the skills that he or she has learned in the
academy. As an officer gets older, however, his or her duties become routine much
like the assembly line worker, and therein lies the danger—apathy. The Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (1997) explains skill deterioration or loss of
learning without repetition in the following manner: we lose 42% of what we have
learned in 30 minutes; 56% in an hour; 64% in 8 hours; and 75% in a week (p. 7.8).

Methodology
A qualitative research method was used to analyze the nature and contextual
experiences of law enforcement officers who had received training at their agency
or at least at an academy that certified them in the area of law enforcement. A
qualitative method was used in order to provide a rich description of law
enforcement officers’ experiences and their training. Bogdan and Biklen (1992)
defined qualitative research as being “rich in description of people, places, and
conversation, which are not easily handled by statistical procedures,” stating that
“qualitative researchers are concerned with understanding behavior/experiences
from the subject’s own frame of reference” (p. 2). Consequently, analyzing the
training and experiences of the law enforcement officers is more easily understood
utilizing qualitative research because this approach permits the in-depth
exploration of the experiences of a group of people in their own voices.

Participant Selection
The population studied consisted of 90 law enforcement officers who had received
training in the area of law enforcement and 4 training supervisors who led the
training department at each participating agency. The officers represented four
different law enforcement agencies in Florida. Surveys were distributed to officers
through the training office. Once the surveys were completed, they were retrieved
from the respective training officers.

An attempt was made to include a range of experiences and orientations in order

to examine the full spectrum of the nature and contextual factors that condition
the officer’s training experience(s) and the interface of officers and the citizenry in
working through the problems and issues that occur in community policing. This
group included officers representing various ranks within the law enforcement
agencies. The officers participated on a voluntary basis and were not coerced/
forced to complete the survey instrument.

128 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Research Design
Prior to the beginning of the study, the training supervisor in each law enforcement
agency was contacted, given a brief description of the study, and asked to
participate. The supervisors were asked to provide an approximate number
of officers who were currently active and had served on the force for at least 6
months. Once the numbers were given, the researchers attempted to survey at
least one-fifth of the officers at each agency. The one-fifth number was chosen, as it
appeared to be a manageable number, which was agreed upon by the researchers
and the training officers.

Each of the potential participants was briefed by the training officers and told the
purpose of the survey. After explaining the survey, the officers were given time to
complete the survey. The participants were encouraged by both the researchers
and the training officers to be as candid as possible and told that the information
gathered from the surveys would be used to analyze and critique the existing
training program at the respective agencies. The primary method of gathering
data for this study was through open-ended questions on a survey instrument and
a program analysis based on interviews with the training officers/supervisors.
The program analysis consisted of reviewing initiatives/programs geared at law
enforcement safety and having conversation with training officers about their
respective training departments.

The general participants were asked to respond to the 11 open-ended questions

on the survey instrument. The participants were generally asked to describe their
training experiences and share their experiences of working with the community.
The participants were asked to share their views on the level of quality in the
training program(s) in which they had received training prior to and after
becoming a certified officer. As for the training supervisors, they were asked to
describe their view on the importance of training, provide an assessment of the
extent and quality of the training that they had received, and assess the training
provided at their respective agency.

As interviews progressed with the training officers, probes were used to encourage
the officers to illustrate their reflections with specific examples and experiences.
Tangential topics and questions evolved, however, and the investigators pursued
what Spindler and Spindler (1992) refer to as a flexible format, encouraging the
interviewee to speak freely about concerns and, in the process, answering questions
that had not been asked.

The interviews usually lasted about 30 minutes, although some of them were
longer. Notes were taken during the interviews and later served as a means for
data analysis.

Data Analysis
There is a unique relationship between the data and its analysis in a qualitative
study. As the data is collected, “units” emerge that suggest further data needs
to be collected. Categories of information may also emerge. Typically, the data
is coded according to these categories and analyzed to explore meaning and
interrelationships (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 129

Coding
Coding is the process by which data is ordered. Coding occurred simultaneously
with the data collection to permit the researchers to identify relationships among
the variables. There are three forms of coding: (1) open coding, (2) axial coding,
and (3) selective coding.

The line-by-line examination of each transcript to identify emerging concepts

expressed by the study’s participants initially did open coding. Axial coding was
used to review experience areas and hypothesize relationships. Selective coding
for core arenas was conducted systematically to identify codes with a significant
relationship that could be used for additional data collection (Strauss, 1987).

As we analyzed the surveys and reviewed the notes from the interviews, similar
terms, phrases, and experiences emerged. The terms, phrases, and experiences
were carefully examined, resulting in the development of two key experience
areas: (1) social and (2) intellectual. The experience allowed us to gain a sense
of the participants’ situational perspective. Within the social arena, there are
the experiences of the officers interacting with the community, especially the
combative. The intellectual arena includes such experiences as knowledge (the
training process), perception, and reflection.

Results: Community Interaction

In regards to community interaction, 73 of the 90 officers (81%) reported very
negative experiences within the community. The negative experiences ranged
from verbal abuse to physical aggression. The physical aggression was usually
in the form of resisting arrest and the shoving of officers; however, 27 (30%) of
the officers reported situations in which individuals attempted to use nonlethal
weapons against them. Another aspect of community interaction addressed by the
law enforcement officers was community trust. A vast majority of the participants
voiced a concern about the lack of trust exhibited by members of the community
towards them. Officers suggested that the citizens see them as the enemy rather
than as a protection and service agency. The officers voiced the concern that citizens
continue to call them as a last resort, usually after the situation had escalated to a
dangerous/life-threatening level.

Significant Concern
One theme that emerged from the study that stood out more than any other was the
concern that the officers expressed in regards to their interaction with the seriously
mentally ill population. The majority of the officers agreed that responses for
assistance with seriously mentally ill (SMI) persons could change quickly from a
routine call to one that could become either dangerous or life-threatening. The officers
attributed this fact to their lack of training as well as their lack of understanding
about the SMI persons. Eighty-four of the 90 officers (93%) voiced concerns about
the relationship that their department had with social service, especially mental
health agencies. Officers reported a great divide in the agencies knowing the full
range of duties by law enforcement agencies and law enforcement knowing the
full responsibilities of the social service agencies. The officers suggested that there
is still a great deal of stereotypes present in regards to what these different entities

130 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

do. The officers basically see too much separatism between law enforcement and
social service agencies, which hinders the joint success that could be enjoyed. The
officers suggested that an improved relationship could improve their services, as
they would be more aware of what’s available to the citizens that they encounter,
especially the SMI persons. As a remedy to this area of concern, the officers had
to first assess their level of training in the area of dealing with SMI persons. The
majority of the officers reported that they believed they had received inadequate
training for intervening with SMI individuals. Their perception of inadequate
training is based upon the fact that their mental health training was less than one
hour. The officers also reported that mental health training is not required at their
agencies and that inservice training provided by their respective agency deals
mostly with sociological issues not mental illness. All of the officers who expressed
concern with working with the mentally ill stated that dealing with SMI individuals
had become so routine that mental health training should become mandatory and
ongoing. They also proposed that mental health training be considered just as
important to their training as cultural diversity.

Furthermore, the officers also suggested that more emphasis should be given
to improving human relations skills because the ability to listen to people and
respond in a sensitive manner is essential to good police work. Lastly, the officers
suggested that mental health professionals become part of the training process of
law enforcement. The officers advocated a seamless system that would provide
opportunities for social service professionals and law enforcement officers to
become knowledgeable about the services provided by each agency as members
of the same team, not competitors.

General Themes
• On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the safest, the officers were asked how
safe they felt while performing their job. The mode score was 7; the average
score (mean) was 6.5; and the median was 8. This basically tells the reader that
for the most part, officers are feeling somewhat unsafe while performing their
daily duties/tasks. As gleaned from the literature review, this unsafe feeling
can have devastating consequences.

• When asked to what degree officers thought that their agency valued safety,
52 of the officers said “very much,” 30 said “somewhat,” and 8 said “very
little.” This helps the reader appreciate the fact that most of the officers at least
acknowledge that their agency values safety. Perhaps this perception allows
the officer to feel valued by the agency.

• When asked whether or not their respective academies spent adequate time
on officer safety, the majority of the officers answered “no.” These officers
suggested that more time should have been devoted to more realistic
scenarios. These officers also suggested that there should have been less time
in the classroom and more time spent analyzing and responding to realistic
scenarios. Another point that was highlighted by these respondents was the
perceived need for more refresher sessions and mandatory inservice training
involving officer safety. The overall theme for this question was, “too little, too
fast.”

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 131

 • When asked about the part of their job that presented the greatest risk, all of the
concerns were in the area of traffic, domestic violence, domestic disturbances,
and personnel: 33% cited traffic stops, 18% cited domestic violence, 16% driving,
16% lack of back-up, 4% working in traffic, and 10% general encounters with
the public including SMI persons.

• The officers were also asked to relate which aspect of their job made them
feel the safest: 33% suggested that adequate back-up them feel the safest while
another 33% suggested that sufficient training made them feel the safest, 20%
identified proper equipment, and the other 14% were divided into areas such
as time off, vacation, and experience.

• When asked how many officers they knew who were injured over the last
year in the line of duty, and how they were personally affected, the officers, on
average, knew of six other officers who were injured over the past year. These
were accounts within the officers’ own agencies and not knowledge gained from
the mass media. As for how the officers were affected, the majority suggested
that the incidents caused them to be more cautious as well as more aware of
the need for more training in different areas. Again, most of the dialogue was
about policing the SMI population.

• When asked how concerned they were about personal safety when they
applied for the position, interestingly enough, there was a split between two
answers. Approximately half of the officers shared that they were “somewhat
concerned,” and the other half suggested that they were “very concerned.” The
other two possible answers were “not concerned” and “concerned.” None of
the officers chose those responses.

After considering the findings of the study, we offer the following model as a
workable, systems approach to law enforcement personal safety training.

BARTH Model: Five Vital Steps

All law enforcement recruits should receive extensive training based on the BARTH
model while in the academy and once at their respective agency. Based on the
input from the participants of the study, one area of concern would definitely be
in the area of mental illness. The block of training for this subject/topic would be
no less than 8 clock hours. The training would be conducted by qualified mental
health professionals (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, etc.).

In addition to the academy training, all officers will be required to attend refresher
courses on an annual basis. This training will be offered as inservice training
conducted by a trained mental health professional.

Officers, who excel in their training and/or show an extraordinary commitment

to this area, would be allowed to attend additional training and become part of a
crisis team for that agency.

The crisis team would consist of trained law enforcement officers as well as social
service personnel who would be housed at the agency. The crisis team would be
on call 24 hours a day in order to assist officers who need crisis intervention.

132 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

The law enforcement and mental health agency would become involved in
cooperative education, which would allow each agency to become more fully aware
of services available to the public. This initiative would enable law enforcement
personnel to make appropriate decisions in regards to diversion, etc. The mental
health agency would benefit by being able to service individuals who truly need
mental health services.

Both agencies would get the public involved by offering workshops and seminars
(free of charge) to the community and prepare pamphlets and brochures that
would be given to citizens who have mentally ill family members and/or friends.
The literature would explain the process of dealing with the mentally ill and list
numbers for assistance. It is believed that the above effort would help gain the
trust of the citizenry.

Consequently, we suggest that the above model could improve the training of law
enforcement officers who are spending a significant amount of time engaged in
community policing with SMI persons.

As for the BARTH model in general, it can be implemented in the following manner:

B. Beware of officer apathy: This step addresses the issue of being lax and careless.
As was shown in the literature review, apathy decreases the officers’ personal
safety by allowing the officer to perform risky behaviors and/or become less
safety conscious.
A. Allow the officers to be a part of the training curriculum. One point that was
noted from this study was that the officers wanted to have a say on the subject
matter that would be offered by the agency. This gave way to having a special
section on the area of mental illness.
R. Realism in training: The offers suggested that the training department should
duplicate real-life incidents in which the officers had been exposed, thus
allowing for each officer to learn from the experience(s). The majority of the
officers expressed that they lacked realistic training.
T. Tactics: The goal should be to maintain a high proficiency in tactical skills
by providing the most up-to-date skill sets in the profession. This can be
accomplished by the training officer(s) being aware of the most current trends
in the law enforcement field.
H. Hone and refine the skills, thus allowing for the skills to become second nature.
This can be accomplished by offering refresher courses on an ongoing/regular
basis.

The researchers feel that if the BARTH model is implemented, more agencies will
be able to meet the training needs of its officers. It is the belief that most of the tools
and/or resources that are needed in order to implement the model are currently in
place at most agencies. It becomes a matter of grouping and streamlining resources.
The researchers cannot stress enough the importance of allowing the officers to be
a part of designing and implementing the BARTH model. The agency supervisor
will find the officers’ insight to be invaluable.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 133

Conclusion
This study assessed the status of law enforcement officers’ personal safety
in southwest Florida. The study reviewed related issues and examined the
experiences of 94 law enforcement officers. The findings of the study revealed
a number of gaps that included the following: poor community relations, poor
training in mental health, community distrust, and a lack of commitment by the
different agencies to provide adequate personal safety training. The study also
highlighted the perceived dangers that SMI persons present to law enforcement
officers, as well as how important training is in assuring quality service to not only
the SMI individual but to society at large.

Based on the findings that have been shared in this article, it is clear that what is
necessary for officers is meaningful training to address the issues associated with
apathy and routine to keep the officers sharp. This issue needs to be addressed more
fervently as the officers get older and look at the job as routine, understanding that
safety is essential to their survival. Another important aspect of the study was the
call by the officers to be more involved in the development of their training. The
researchers have provided a model that would accommodate such a request.

Bibliography
Bogdan, R. C., & Biklen, S. K. (1992). Qualitative research education: An introduction
to theory and methods. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Clarke, C., & Zak, M. J. (1999). Fatalities to law enforcement officers and firefighters,
1992-1997. Compensation and working conditions. Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor
Statistics.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (2005). The uniform crime reporting program:
Officers killed and assaulted 2005. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

Florida Department of Law Enforcement. (1997). Human diversity training: An

awareness program. Tallahassee, FL: Criminal Justice Standards and Training
Commission.

Glick, L., & Swinger, T. (2002). Safety in the line of duty. Occupational Health and
Safety, 71, 226-227.

Meese, III, E. (1993, January). Community policing and the police officer. U.S.
Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. National Institute of Justice.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Moore, M. H., & Trojanowicz, R. C. (1988). Corporate strategies for policing. U.S.
Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. National Institute of Justice.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Petrocelli, J. (2006). Preventing the 10 deadly errors: 30 years later. FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, 75, 10-20.

134 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Remsberg, C. (1986). The tactical edge: Surviving high-risk patrol. Carrollton, TX:
Calibre Press.

Spindler, G., & Spindler, L. (1992). The handbook of qualitative research in education.
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Strauss, A. L. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. New York: Cambridge
University.

Thomas, D. (2006). Developing fitness standards for police officers. Unpublished

manuscript.

Tony A. Barringer, EdD, currently serves as the associate dean in the College
of Professional Studies at Florida Gulf Coast University. Dr. Barringer also
chairs the Division of Justice Studies and has over 18 years of experience in
the criminal justice field. Dr. Barringer welcomes collaboration on research
projects and has varied interests. Dr. Barringer also serves as director of a
community project that pairs mentors with at-risk youth. The program has
existed for over 5 years and is federally funded.

David Thomas has a PhD in forensic psychology and a master’s of education

in curriculum design and instruction. He retired from Gainesville Police
Department after 20 years of service. His assignments as a police officer were
patrol, detective, community-oriented policing, SWAT, hostage negotiator,
and trainer. He is a certified law enforcement trainer in the state of Florida
with 25 years of experience with his training expertise in firearms, defensive
tactics, driving, human diversity, and general law enforcement topics. He
currently serves as an assistant professor of criminal justice at Florida Gulf
Coast University.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 135

136 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
911 and the Failure of Police Rapid
Response
Peter C. Moskos, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Law and Police
Science, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Now I dialed 911 a long time ago.

Don’t you see how late they’re reactin’?
They don’t care ’cause they stay paid anyway.
Thinkin’ you are first when you really are tenth.
You better wake up and smell the real flavor
Cause 911 is a fake life-saver.
911 is a joke in yo’ town
911 is a joke.
—Public Enemy, 1988

The primary job of the patrol officer is to answer 911 and 311 calls for service. The
problem of misuse and abuse of 911 has been broken down into unintentional calls,
misdials, hang-up calls, and prank calls (Sampson, 2004). This article examines all
dispatched police calls for a period of one year in Baltimore’s Eastern District. While
the Eastern District is by no means a typical police district—98% African American
with high levels of poverty, drugs, crime, and blight—it provides a snapshot into the
world of 911 and rapid response. This study combines a quantitative analysis of 911
and 311 calls for police service with a qualitative analysis of the worthiness of these
calls and the effectiveness, if any, of police response. I served as a uniformed police
officer in the district for the period of the research.

Police departments are committed to responding to every citizen’s call for police
service. More than any tactical strategy or mandate from the police administration,
citizens’ telephone calls control the majority of police services. The emphasis on radio
calls means that in busy districts, officers can do little other than answer dispatched
calls for service. A system allowing all citizens unlimited and equal access to police
services, is, at its core, very democratic. The reality, however, is anything but. Police
service is not unlimited. Access must inevitably be controlled. Police respond to
the most overt manifestation of a problem or to the location at which one citizen,
justified or not, demands repeated police presence (Force, 1972).

The advent of patrol cars, telephones, two-way radios, “scientific” police

management, social migration, and social-science theories on the “causes” of crime
converged in the late 1950s. Before then, police had generally followed a “watchman”
approach: each patrol officer was given the responsibility to police a geographic
area (Wilson, 1968). In the decades after WWII, motorized car patrol replaced foot
patrol as the standard method of urban policing. Improved technology allowed
citizens to call police and have their complaints dispatched to police through two-
way radios in squad cars. Car patrol was promoted over foot patrol as a cost-saving
move justified by increased “efficiency” (Wilson & McLaren, 1972).

Those who viewed police as provocative and hostile to the public applauded
reduced police presence and discretion. Controlled by the central dispatch, police

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 137

could respond to the desires of the community rather than enforce their own
arbitrary concepts of “acceptable” behavior. Police officers, for their part, enjoyed
the comforts of the automobile and the prestige associated with new technology.
Citizens, rather than being encouraged to maintain community standards, were
urged to stay behind locked doors and call 911.

Car patrol eliminated the neighborhood police officer. Police were pulled off
neighborhood beats to fill cars. Levels of motorized patrol—the cornerstone of
urban policing—have no effect on crime rates, victimization, or public satisfaction
(Kelling, Pate, Diekman, & Brown, 1974). Lawrence Sherman (1983) was an early
critic of telephone dispatch and motorized patrol: “The rise of telephone dispatch
transformed both the method and purpose of patrol. Instead of watching to prevent
crime, motorized police patrol became a process of merely waiting to respond to
crime” (p. 149).

A quick response time became an end in itself rather than a means to crime prevention.
In order to respond quickly, police must be available to receive dispatched calls. Police
are pressured to be “in service” as much as possible. Parked alone in the middle of
an empty parking lot—the ominous police car and the long walk discourage pesky
citizens from approaching—a police officer is considered “in service.” When dealing
with people—the essence of the job, some might argue—police are considered “out
of service.” David Bayley (1994) explains this police prime directive:

Despite what police say, the prime directive of patrolling is to be available

rather than to respond adequately to the myriad calls for service. For police
managers, therefore, patrol officers are “working” when they are simply
cruising around. . . . Police forces must store capacity, and they do so in patrol.
For patrol officers as well as for commanders, claims of being busy are a way
of disguising the invisible burden of always being ready. (p. 46)

Because patrol officers spend most of their workday sitting in a police car or driving
around, officers develop a car-centered method of policing their post. Officers learn
most of their knowledge of an area through the window of a patrol car. Even in an
area where most crime occurs on the sidewalk and most residents do not own a
car (much less drive to work), officers are more attuned to pot holes and stoplight
timing than to street crime and quality-of-life issues. The high volume and low
content of 911 calls further discourage any routine nonconfrontational interactions
between the police and the public.

The theory behind car patrol, still taught in today’s police academies and criminal justice
textbooks, is known as the “three Rs.” The first R is “random patrol”: police driving in
nonfixed patterns to create the illusion of police “omnipresence.” This stands in direct
contrast to the older idea of police walking in a fixed and regular beat. As Professor Carl
Klockars (1983) memorably wrote, “It makes about as much sense to have police patrol
routinely in cars to fight crime as it does to have firemen patrol routinely in firetrucks
to fight fire” (p. 130). Gary Cordner and Robert Trojanowicz (1992) summarized the
widely cited Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al., 1974):

During 1972 and 1973, a year-long experiment was conducted in Kansas City,
Missouri, to test the effects of preventive patrol. . . . Fifteen patrol beats were
included in the study: five were control beats with normal levels of preventive

138 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

 patrol; five were proactive beats with 2–3 times the normal levels of patrol; and
five were reactive beats, with no preventative patrol. It is important to realize
that patrol units would enter the reactive beats to answer calls whenever
requested. After handling calls, however, these patrol units would vacate
the reactive beats and do their patrolling in other areas. . . . When the data
were analyzed, no significant differences were found on any of the indicators
between the control, proactive, and reactive beats.

In debunking random patrol and omnipresence, the Kansas City study cast doubt
on the previously unquestioned faith in motorized random patrol as an effective
and essential means of policing. The impact of the Kansas City Report, however,
despite being one of the most heralded scientific police studies, was negligible.

The second of the three Rs is “rapid response,” the theory that a quick police
response to the scene of a crime will result in the greater apprehension of criminals.
For fire trucks and ambulances, the benefit of rapid response is obvious: quick
response saves lives. Rapid police response is not designed to prevent crime,
however, and its failure to do so should come as no surprise. Though it may seem
counterintuitive, rapid police response does not prevent crime and has almost
no effect on the odds that a criminal will be caught. Even instantaneous police
response would be ineffective, as the vast majority of the time, most 911 callers—
whether by necessity, choice, or confusion—wait until a suspect is gone before
reporting a crime (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Spelman & Brown, 1981).

But it is pointless to blame the victim. Even if victims were to respond “correctly” or
a third party calls police while a crime is in progress, dispatch takes time. If police
do not arrive within one minute of a crime, rapid police response has virtually no
effect (Bieck & Kessler, 1977; Spelman & Brown, 1981; Tien, Simon, & Larson, 1978).
The 911 operator must answer the call, gather the relevant information, and enter
it into a computer. This information is then sent to the relevant police dispatcher.
The dispatcher then finds time to dispatch the call to a police officer. More often
than not, even if police just happen to be in the right place at the right time, callers
have been waiting for 5, 10, even 20 minutes.

The illusion of omnipresence and rapid response is usually shattered the moment
one calls with a need for police service, yet despite its basic failure, reactive car-
based policing is popular on many levels. Radio cars provide a means to account
for and control officers; police officers like being sheltered from the street in the
comparative comfort of a car; and police administrators generally find it easier to
focus on response time than crime prevention.

The third of the three Rs is “reactive investigation,” the effective working of the
criminal justice system to “solve” crimes and provide deterrence against future
crimes. While investigation is rightfully a key part of police work in solving crimes,
the public’s beliefs in these techniques is hugely inflated. The O.J. Simpson trial
raised the bar too high for the preservation of chaotic crime scenes, and TV shows,
most notably CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, portray a faith in technology that, when
not absolute fiction, is science-fiction for most police departments. Crimes get
solved because people talk. Call them rats, finks, stoolies, confidential informants,
cooperating witnesses, or good citizens; it’s the good old-fashioned snitch that

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 139

solves crime. Science and technology have a long way to go, and solving a murder
isn’t as important as preventing the crime in the first place.

Legitimacy of Police Calls for Service

This study is based on a breakdown of all dispatched calls in one police district.
This data provides a somewhat crude breakdown that reveals that police are most
often occupied with calls with which they should not be involved or can do very
little about. While most people don’t call 911 once in a year, others call 911 daily.
Police in Baltimore’s Eastern District handled 113,205 calls for service in 2000, or
about 2.5 calls per resident per year. This is roughly four times the national average
(Sampson, 2004). Officers respond formally and informally as back-up for many
more calls. The total number of primary calls is approximately one call per hour
per patrol officer. The frequency of calls per officer increases when other officers
are “detailed,” “out of service,” or otherwise unable to take calls. Call volume is
not evenly dispersed throughout the day­: 12:00 pm to 2:00 am is generally busy
while 3:00 am to 7:00 am is generally slow.

Calls for service have been categorized into three basic categories: (1) requiring a
written report and relate to a crime (26% of dispatched calls), (2) resulting in some
police service, even if very limited in scope (35% of calls), and (3) unnecessary or
illegitimate calls, receiving but not needing any police response (40% of all calls).
As coded by responding officers, 39% of calls have no need for police response.
An additional one-third of calls are minor matters, not needing rapid response.
Just over a quarter of calls involve a crime or require a written report. Drug calls
account for one-fourth of all dispatched calls. Citywide, excluding the Eastern
District, drug calls account for approximately 7.5% of all calls.

A written police report serves as a proxy measure for a “legitimate” call. Any call
involving a crime, victim, injured person, or property damage results in a written
report. Legitimate calls can be major or minor. Examples include a stolen car, a
fire in a vacant building, a person shot, an arrest for drug possession, a window
broken by a thrown rock, or a man who hits his girlfriend. As an indicator for a
legitimate call, written reports tend to overestimate the percentage of legitimate
calls because of the inclusion of all “domestic-related” calls.

In Baltimore, “domestic” calls are defined as all situations involving present or

former sexual partners, indicated by key words such as husband, wife, girlfriend,
ex-boyfriend, or baby’s mother. As there is no specific category for domestic-related
calls, all police calls are classified as either domestic- or nondomestic-related.
Similar to other categories, a large percentage of “domestic” calls are not legitimate.
All “domestic-related” calls, legitimate and illegitimate, require a written report.

140 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Calls for Service in Baltimore’s Eastern District

Percentage (n) of Dispatched Calls with . . .

Category of Category as Crime Committed
Dispatched Call Percentage (n) No Need for Some Police or Requiring a
for Service of All Calls Police Response1 Service2 Written Report3
All Calls for 100% (113,205) 38.9% (44,003) 35.4% (40,093) 25.7% (29,109)
Service
Drugs 25.6% (28,959) 13.9% (4,027) 67.2% (19,462) 18.9% (5,470)
Disorderly 10.5% (11,874) 28.6% (3,398) 64.9% (7,707) 6.5% (769)
“Other” 8.8% (9,953) 39.3% (3,910) 26.0% (2,584) 34.8% (3,459)
Alarms 8.3% (9,353) 94.4% (8,833) 3.7% (346) 1.9% (174)
Common Assault 6.9% (7,865) 41.3% (3,252) 23.7% (1,867) 34.9% (2,746)
911 No Voice 5.6% (6,341) 90.1% (5,764) 7.3% (462) 1.8% (115)
Larceny 3.8% (4,346) 28.0% (1,219) 12.8% (556) 59.2% (2,571)
Family 2.9% (3,277) 25.6% (839) 37.1% (1,216) 37.3% (1,222)
Disturbance
Auto Accident 2.6% (2,990) 23.8% (712) 30.5% (912) 45.7% (1,366)
Burglary 2.3% (2,639) 49.1% (1,297) 12.0% (341) 37.9% (1,001)
Armed Person 1.9% (2,168) 57.9% (1,255) 29.7% (641) 12.5% (272)
Destruction of 1.8% (2,059) 27.9% (575) 14.6% (300) 57.5% (1,184)
Property
Aggravated 1.4% (1,580) 48.0% (759) 20.4% (322) 31.6% (499)
Assault
Selected Other Categories
Gunshots 0.9% (980) 59.4% (582) 32.8% (321) 7.9% (77)
Stolen Auto 0.9% (969) 37.9% (367) 7.4% (72) 54.7% (530)
Assault, Shooting 0.3% (324) 51.9% (168) 1.9% (6) 46.3% (150)
Assault, Cutting 0.3% (312) 29.2% (91) 5.4% (17) 65.4% (204)
Rape 0.1% (120) 39.2% (47) 4.2% (5) 56.7% (68)
Carjacking 0.04% (48) 20.8% (10) 4.2% (2) 75.0% (36)
Not Listed Above 15.1% (17,048) 40.5% (6,898) 17.3% (2,954) 42.2% (7,196)
1
These calls are not legitimate. If no written report is required, police may give a call “oral code.”
There are six oral codes: (A) call unfounded, (B) unable to locate complainant, (C) no such address,
(D) no police services needed, (E) [suspect] gone on arrival, and (F) call abated. For most categories,
codes A through E are included in this column. For the categories “narcotics,” “armed person,” and
“disorderly,” codes A though D are included in this column, and code E is included in the following
column. Gunshot calls coded D are also included in the following column as, by custom, the oral code
for gunshots refers to the presence of a victim rather than the existence of gunshots.
2
These calls are coded “abated,” a catch-all oral code. Some of these calls are legitimate. Calls coded
“abated” may (narcotics) but usually do not (auto accident) involve a crime. While no police report is
written, calls coded “abated” imply some need for or effect from police services, even if minor.
3
A written police report is required for any property damage, injury, victim, arrest, and all “domestic”
calls. A call in any category can be “domestic.” In this column, categories with a large number of
“domestic” calls—“family disturbance,” “larceny,” “destruction of property,” “common assault,” and
“other”—are inflated due to the inclusion of unfounded “domestic” calls.
Source: Baltimore City Police Department, 2001. Data recoded by author.

Four dispatched calls illustrate the concept of an “illegitimate” domestic call. All
of these calls require a written report but lack a crime, victim, injury, or damage.

• A worried man calls police to report that his girlfriend has not yet returned
home from work. Police receive a call for a domestic-related missing person.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 141

 By the time police arrive at the couple’s house, the woman has returned home
safely. She was delayed by public transportation.

• A woman calls police because she believes her baby’s father stole her house
keys. Police receive a call for domestic-related theft. When police arrive, the
woman apologizes because she has found the misplaced keys.

• Police receive a call for domestic-related assault in progress: a woman being

assaulted by her boyfriend. Upon arrival, police find no sign of struggle. A
happily inebriated woman is sprawled on the couch. Her boyfriend is seated
nearby. Both are dressed for bed. She laughs and says she called the police
because her boyfriend put his feet in her hair. The boyfriend apologizes for her,
saying he thought she was joking when she said she was calling the police to
report an assault.

• A resident calls police and reports that a man and his girlfriend are yelling in the
street. Police respond to find two people, casual friends, loudly planning when
they will see each other next.

Illegitimate domestic calls are responsible for increasing the number of written
reports and thus overestimate the number of “legitimate” calls as defined by
a written report. Given the limitations of available data, I could not analyze
domestic calls separately. Approximately one-third to one-half of all written
reports are domestic-related, and a majority of domestic calls—in a ratio similar to
nondomestic calls—are unfounded.

The bias of using written reports as a proxy measure for legitimate calls is not
entirely one way. There is not a written report for every required call. Police officers
do not like writing reports and will avoid doing so if at all possible. The number of
required reports that are not filed, however, is not a large percentage of all reports.
An officer cannot get in trouble for writing an unnecessary report, and officers who
do not write a required report risk severe trouble. Reports are written for some
unfounded calls in order to protect the officer from accusations of mishandling a
call. Outside of the time required to write most reports—five minutes to half an
hour depending on the report—there is little downside to writing a report.

Before the 911 system was introduced, citizens in need of police service found
a police officer or called the local police station. All calls for service required a
written report. After 911 was introduced, requests for police service skyrocketed,
and police were overwhelmed by report writing. The system was changed so that
today only arrests, crimes with victims, and domestic-related incidents require
written reports. If no report is required, officers may “close” a call with one of
six “oral codes”: (1) call unfounded, (2) unable to locate complainant, (3) no such
address, (4) no police services needed, (5) suspect gone on arrival, and (6) call
abated.

Thirty-five percent of calls are coded “abated,” a catch-all oral code that implies
some need for or effect from police services, however minor. While there is not a
great deal of significance as to which oral code a call receives, calls coded “abated”
may, as in the case of drug dealing, involve a victimless crime but usually, as in
an auto accident, do not involve a crime. Some minor crimes without personal

142 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

injury or property damage may be coded “abated.” The following are examples of
“abated” calls, thus requiring no written report:

• A strong wind opens a store’s poorly secured rear door, setting off a burglar
alarm. There is no sign of forced entry, and a search of the building shows no
person present nor any sign of stolen or damaged property. The responding
officer closes the door securely.

• Two cars collide with damage but no injuries. In Baltimore, only accidents with
injury or involving city vehicles require written reports. The majority of “abated”
car accidents are legitimate in that cars did crash, but there is little police can do
other than direct traffic and facilitate the exchange of drivers’ information. To
the frustration of insurance companies, no police report is written.

• An assault call reveals two friends engaged in a loud public discussion. The
men apologize for their noise and go home.

• A man claims he was robbed. Investigation reveals the man to be a drug addict
who freely gave ten dollars for drugs but received nothing in return. This call
could be handled in many ways (including the arrest of the addict), but most
likely the complainant would be dismissed and the call coded “abated.”

• A caller states that boys on a neighboring stoop are selling drugs. When a police
officer approaches, three young men on the stoop disperse.

• A call for a family disturbance reveals a 17-year-old man sitting on the stoop.
He says he called the police because his mom locked him out and he wants to
go back inside. His mother, inside the home, says she kicked him out because
he’s out of control and disrespectful and called her a “bitch.” The son is given a
stern lecture, but the mother is told in private that she can’t kick her son out of
the house until he turns 18.

Based on the broad range in the “abated” category, it is not possible to dichotomize
these calls as either legitimate or undeserving of police response. A majority of
“abated” calls are minor but legitimate in that police perform some function
or service, even if this service could come from agencies other than the police.
“Abated” calls are grouped in their own middle-ground category of “some
police service” required, however minor. One-third of dispatched calls fall in this
category.

Along with all calls coded “abated,” the oral code “suspect gone on arrival”
indicates “some police service” for drug calls, armed person calls, and disorderly
calls (see the “Calls for Service” table). While including all these calls as legitimate
overestimates the legitimacy of these categories, it acknowledges that many calls
are irrelevant by the time police arrive but were legitimate when they were first
made. Gunshot calls coded “no police services needed” are also included in this
category. By custom, the oral code for gun discharge refers to the presence of a
victim rather than the existence of gunshots. If a gunshot victim is found, the call
is reclassified as an “assault by shooting,” and a report is written. Most calls for
gunshots do, in fact, reflect actual gunshots. The remainder are prank calls or loud
firecrackers.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 143

Many people falsely assume that police dislike responding to “minor” calls. Police
are often more concerned about the legitimacy of a call than its severity. Police
officers tend to enjoy any call in which they can make a difference or help an
appreciative person. Most officers take particular pride in some category of minor
call for which they believe they give particularly thorough service. Police tend to
take minor calls seriously as long as the situation can be resolved by some police
action that is not available to the calling citizen. While officers frequently complain
that some people call the police too much, police also believe that many people are
too hesitant to call police about “minor” but very real issues. As one officer said,
“If they don’t let us know about a problem, we can’t do anything to fix it.”

Thirty-nine percent of calls to which police respond require no police response

(see the “Calls for Service” table). Calls coded “unfounded,” “unable to locate
complainant,” “no such address,” “no police services needed” (except for
gun discharges) and “suspect gone on arrival” (except for the aforementioned
categories), are all indicative of a call with little or no legitimacy. Police call these
unfounded calls “bogus” or “bullshit.” While the definition of a “bullshit” call is
somewhat flexible, one officer defined a “bullshit call” as follows:

Something we shouldn’t be there for. “Bullshit” is people call police, but then
get mad that you show up. Or when you show up, and they make shit up.
Bullshit is any junkie who wastes my time because they got burnt [ripped-off
on a drug deal] and say, “I was robbed.” Or some bitch who don’t get paid and
says, “I was raped!” Everything out here is bullshit. Half the CDS [drug] calls
are bullshit . . . What can we do about it? People want their rights. People
here just want their drugs, their “hair-ron” [heroin], some malt liquor, and
a “little some’m’ some’m’” [something something, i.e., sex]. We just get in the
way.

While all unfounded calls are considered “bullshit,” not all “bullshit” calls are
unfounded. Legitimate but minor calls most often achieve their bovine descriptive
because of an uncooperative victim or the inability of the officer to “do anything.”
Many victims of even violent crime are uncooperative with police due to fear of
or friendship with the suspect. Other victims simply—and sometimes wisely, if
they are wanted—choose to avoid interaction with an ineffective criminal justice
system. It is not unusual for crime victims to be uncooperative and, for example,
not even reveal their name.

Illegitimate calls stem from a variety of sources. A large percentage of calls are
simply fictitious: people use 911 to harass enemies, draw police away from an
area, and make prank phone calls. Calls that require no police response include a
complainant who cannot be located; a location that does not exist; a call reporting
that an unarmed stranger at a bus stop is armed; a burglary at a location at which
there is no building; a false report of a man shot; and a person, usually a child,
who dials 911 and hangs up. As a category, 90% of these “911 hangups”—6% of all
dispatched calls—are unfounded.

In general, officers can determine the validity of a call from the sparse information
given by the dispatcher. One officer said, . . .

144 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

 There’s lots of clues, even when they [dispatchers] barely tell us anything.
First, there’s the location. Small-time robberies or rapes at drug corners are
bullshit. People getting burnt [ripped-off by drug dealers] and what not. A real
shooting will get lots of calls. If you’re harassing drug dealers and one call
comes in for a shooting a few blocks away, you know it’s bullshit. Other
calls you know are legit. There aren’t too many fake cuttings. If you get a
call for a cutting, good chance you’re going to see some blood. Assaults
are usually bullshit. [Calls for] burglaries, destruction of properties, stolen
autos—well, not always stolen cars—but in general, they’re legit. You just
have to remember that nobody out here tells the complete truth. Everybody
is out to get theirs . . . Other times you get information from the dispatcher
and know there’s nothing you can do. Or should do. Somebody can’t raise
their kid? What the hell am I supposed to do? I ain’t baby’s father.

The same officer expressed frustration with the 911 system:

I don’t know why they have us responding to calls we can’t do anything

about. “He said, she said” [type of calls]. All we do is tell them to go to a court
commissioner. We can’t do shit if we didn’t see it, but they still send an officer.
That way it’s on us [the patrol officer] and not on them [the department].

Drug Calls
Drug calls, usually anonymous, don’t help police officers. Police already know the
hot drug corners:

What’s the point of telling us there’s CDS [drugs] on 700 Port, or Madeira and
Chase, or Wolfe and Eager? No shit. Either you let us jack everybody up [stop
and search people on the street], lock everybody up just for being there, or you
live with it.

We’re not going to stop drug dealing. Look at all the junkies around. They’re
gonna buy! But people call 911 and we drive by. Ninety percent of this job
is clearing corners, harassing junkies, and paperwork. What’s left? I got to
eat lunch and take a dump, too. How much worse would the city be if I just
turned off the radio and did my job? I guarantee you I could do a better job if
it weren’t for [the dispatcher] always shouting in my ear.

We can’t get shit done because call are always coming in. How many are
really “in progress”? Five percent? How many are innocent victims? None.

As police must appear at each call request, the quality of these responses plummets
as the quantity increases. Temporary dispersal of drug suspects is usually the best
that can be achieved.

In part because of police officers’ inability to solve the drug problem, however,
officers generally welcome drug calls as “easy calls.” Drug calls are less likely to
require a written report than other calls, and as most drug calls are anonymous,
there is no victim or complainant to placate. There is a modus operandi to police
response to an active drug corner. When a police car approaches, drug activity
stops and people—dealers, friends, addicts, lookouts, and any “innocents” who

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 145

happen to be walking by—will slowly walk away. Most often, the suspects will
go for a brief walk around the block and then, after police leave, reconvene on the
same or a nearby stoop. Dispersing without being asked is considered a sign of
criminal activity, or perhaps an outstanding warrant, but police also view quick
and unprompted departure—walking, not running—as a sign of respect and a
satisfactory resolution to most problems. This interaction is so ritualized that it
resembles a dance.

When a police officer approaches a group of suspected or known dealers, the officer
will slow his or her car down in front of the individuals. This tells the suspects
that the officer is there for them and not just passing through on the way to other
business. If a group of suspects does not disperse when an officer “rolls up,” the
officer will stop the car and look at the group. The mutual stare, known to police as
“eye fucking,” serves a dual purpose: the police officer scans for contraband and
weapons but also declares his or her dominance over the turf. Police officers assert
their right to control public space. Every drug call to which police respond—indeed
all police dealings with criminal or social misbehavior—will result in a suspect’s
arrest, departure, or deference, but usually there is little long-term impact.

A drug call can be resolved in a few seconds or, with surveillance and investigation,
can take upwards of an hour. Such a range gives patrol officers the ability to “sit
on the call,” remain “out of service,” and not receive other dispatched calls. With
this block of time, officers may finish paperwork, go to the bathroom, eat an
uninterrupted lunch, or avoiding answering “bad” calls for another officer who
is also trying to avoid taking calls. “Bad” calls, such as suspected child abuse or
DOA (dead body), involve more time commitment, paperwork, or unforgettably
horrible smells. When “sitting on a call,” conscientious officers will come back “in
service” for any call on their post, an ideal, believed to be disappearing, known
as “post integrity.” If no officer is “in service” (available to answer calls), the
dispatcher may assign the call to their sergeant. This is a sure way to get officers
back “in service” because sergeants are not supposed to answer calls for service.

Discussion
This study quantifies the level and misuse of police resources in the majority
of dispatched calls for service. More than half of all dispatched calls for police
service are fictitious, involve no crime, or peacefully resolve themselves before
police arrive. In Baltimore’s Eastern District, the majority of 911 calls are for drug
dealing, prank calls, and noncrime-related calls­. The fact that drug dealing persists
is perhaps the best example of the failure of police patrol based on rapid response.
The high call volume of dispatched calls virtually precludes any form of patrol
focused on crime prevention.

The impact of rapid response goes beyond the single quantifiable misuse of police
resources. During slow periods, the possibility of receiving a dispatched call
prevents officers from doing foot patrol, in-depth investigations, or any activity
that may cause an officer to stray too far from the patrol car and the false promise
of rapid response. Formally, police officers have no discretion over the calls to
which they must respond. Informally, officers go through great effort to control
their time and labor. In a throwback to old days when the dispatcher placed index
cards in a police officer’s box, officers ask for backed-up calls on their post to be

146 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

put in their “box.” In the precomputer days, the calls could wait until the officer
was free to deal with them. Computers and “improved 911,” however, have taken
discretion away from the dispatcher and police officer. The perverse internal logic
of rapid response demands that even nonemergency calls be quickly assigned to
any available officer, even if that officer lacks knowledge and experience with the
address or people involved.

Police isolated in squad cars will not know the community. An officer with over 30
years of experience talked about the greater knowledge he had before patrol was
car-based and dispatch-controlled:

Back in the old days [the late 1960s and 1970s], there was such a thing as post
integrity. You were out there walking around and people knew you. Things
were different. You [police] could get away with anything . . . But that’s just
the way things were. We had a lot of fun. But we also knew what was going
on. People talked to us and trusted us. Well, some of them.

There is an inherent conflict between rapid response and knowing the community.
There are not enough patrol resources to emphasize both rapid response and
an alternative to a reactive, car-based patrol. The public that most needs police
protection is already aware of the failure of 911 and police response; the rest of
the public—the more influential and prominent citizens that generally defend the
status quo and do not call for the police—need to be “unsold” on the necessity and
inevitability of the reactive patrol.

Even with fewer cars and a de-emphasis of rapid response, police officers would
better respond to all citizens’ needs. Free from the tyranny of dispatch, officers
could focus on quality rather than quantity of response. A better system would
require police dispatchers or police officers to exercise professional judgment
and separate legitimate from illegitimate calls for police service. Such a system
would need to affirm current legal protection for good-faith police errors. Freeing
these police resources would make rapid response more consistent and reliable for
the very rare serious crime in progress. By not promising (and usually failing to
deliver) rapid response to all calls, patrol officers could be free to focus on crime-
enabling problems and community concerns on their post.

Such a system would not be perfect, but it could be demonstrably better than the
status quo. It could be tested in an area as small as one sector covered by the dozen
or so police officers under the command of one sergeant. Experienced patrol officers
would respond to all calls on their post. These officers would be free to walk their
beat and use their discretion to solve local criminal problems. Nonemergency
calls could be kept on an appointment basis. These officers, perhaps ironically,
would still need access to rapid police response for backup. Inexperienced and
lazy officers could be placed in patrol cars to learn the ropes, respond to legitimate
emergency calls in progress, and provide officer back-up.

No police officer is ever promoted to beat cop. Foot patrol is most often a form of
punishment. While the public generally favors increased foot patrol, the opposition
to foot patrol in the police organization is strong. A car is comfortable; your feet
don’t get tired; you can listen to the radio; you can talk to your partner in private;
you stay warm and dry; and it’s easier to avoid problem people until after they

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 147

commit a serious crime. Then, you simply arrest them. Yet dealing with problem
people before they commit a crime, though perhaps undesirable, is a police officer’s
job. Recognizing the failures and limitations of the status quo is the first step to
better patrol: 911 calls dominate police far more than rapid response impacts
crime.

Bibliography
Bayley, D. H. (1994). Police for the future. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bieck, W., & Kessler, D. A. (1977). Response team analysis. Kansas City, MO: Board
of Police Commissioners.

Cordner, G. W., & Trojanowicz, R. C. (1992). Patrol. In G. W. Cordner & D. C. Hale

(Eds.), What works in policing?: Operations and administration examined (pp. 3-18).
Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.

Force, R. (1972). Decriminalization of breach of the peace statutes: A nonpenal

approach to order maintenance. Tulane Law Review, 46, 367-493.

Kelling, G. L. (1985). Order maintenance, the quality of urban life, and police:
A line of argument. In W. A. Geller (Ed.), Police leadership in America (pp. 296-308).
Chicago: American Bar Foundation; New York: Praeger Publishers.

Kelling, G. L., & Coles, L. M. (1996). Fixing broken windows. New York: The Free
Press.

Kelling, G. L., Pate, T., Diekman, D., & Brown, C. E. (1974). The Kansas City Preventive
Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report. Washington, DC: The Police Foundation.

Klockars, C. B. (1983). Thinking about police. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Klockars, C. B., & Mastrofski, S. D. (Eds.). (1991). Thinking about police: Contemporary
readings (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Morris, P., & Heal, K. (1981). Crime control and the police: A review of research. London:
Home Office, Research Study 67.

Sampson, R. (2004). Misuse of abuse of 911. Problem-oriented guides for police. Problem-
specific guides series. Guide No. 19. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

Sherman, L. W. (1983). Patrol strategies for police. In J. Q. Wilson (Ed.), Crime and
public policy (pp. 145-163). San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

Spelman, W., & Brown, D. K. (1981). Calling the police: Citizen reporting of serious
crime. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Tien, J. M., Simon, J. W., & Larson, R. C. (1978). An alternative approach in police
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Wilson, J. Q. (1968). Varieties of police behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University
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Wilson, O. W., & McLaren, R. (1972). Police administration (3rd ed.). New York:
McGraw-Hill.

Peter C. Moskos, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of Law

and Police Science at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York
City. His first book will be published by Princeton University Press: Cop’s
in the ’Hood: Policing Prohibition (forthcoming). Professor Moskos was
born in Chicago and attended public high school (Evanston), Princeton
University (Sociology, BA, 1994) and Harvard University (Sociology, MA,
PhD, 2004). He worked as a Baltimore City police officer from 1999 to 2001,
patrolling midnight shift in Baltimore’s high-crime and high-drug Eastern
District. His research focuses on urban crime prevention and police-specific
variables linking drug laws to high levels of African American violence and
imprisonment. Professor Moskos specializes in police culture, police patrol
and crime prevention, drug violence, community policing, police/minority
relations, and qualitative methods. Professor Moskos has published op-eds in
the Washington Post, the Baltimore Sun, and the New York Post. He has spoken
to academic, professional, and civic groups on diverse topics including police
tactics, urban crime prevention, policing ghettos, drug legalization, police-
community relations, and needle exchange programs.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 149

150 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
Re-Examining the Perceived
Relations Between Police Officers
and Security Personnel
Christopher L. Copeland, MA, Founder, CLC Research
Rhonda R. Dobbs, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology
and Criminal Justice, The University of Texas at Arlington
Alejandro del Carmen, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of
Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of Texas at Arlington

Introduction
Private security is one of the largest industries in the United States and shares
many of the same missions as public law enforcement, including protection of
property and crime prevention. The private security industry is almost triple the
size of public law enforcement in terms of the number of officers employed (Joh,
2004). While employment in private security was on the rise prior to September
11, 2001, since the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center
(WTC), increased focus has been given to private security as part of the first line of
defense against future terrorist attacks.

Much of the capability for prevention, crisis response, and crisis management
lies in private hands. . . . And many of the targets of terrorist attacks may
be privately owned—banks, businesses, suppliers of transportation and
communications infrastructure, shopping malls, and major building . . . like
the World Trade Center in NYC. The first person to discover an actual attack
against the homeland is likely to be a private security guard. (McIntyre, 2006,
paragraph 23)

Indeed, the first responders to the attacks on the WTC were private security
staff of the WTC and surrounding buildings, who helped to save thousands of
people before the towers collapsed (Hall, 2003; Morabito & Greenberg, 2005). In
its final report, the 9/11 Commission (2004) recommended private preparedness
as a means of protecting against and preparing for another terrorist attack: “ . . .
unless a terrorist’s target is a military or other secure government facility, the ‘first’
responders will almost certainly be civilians. Homeland security and national
preparedness, therefore, often begins with the private sector” (9/11 Commission,
2004, p. 398).

Research conducted prior to September 11, 2001, indicated that the relationship
between private security professionals and law enforcement personnel could
most aptly be described as a lack of mutual respect between the two groups, with
neither group reporting high levels of trust or cooperation with the other (Calder,
1980; Nalla & Hummer, 1999). Putatively, there have been many changes to law
enforcement and private security since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is possible
that the perceptions of each group towards the other might have changed due to
appeals for increased cooperation between the groups since the start of the war on

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 151

terror. It is the goal of this article to begin to assess the attitudes of law enforcement
and security personnel towards each other in the post-9/11 era.

Police-Security Cooperation and Partnerships

Research regarding the police-security relationship takes two forms. One is to
identify the partnerships that do exist between the public police and private
security. This branch of research also attempts to identify reasons why there are
not more partnerships, as well as suggest factors that can make cooperation either
more or less likely. The other form of research in this area directly examines the
attitudes of public police and private security personnel towards one another. Most
of the academic research regarding the relationship has been of the first sort, with
relatively little attention given to the attitudes of police and security personnel.

To speak of private security as a monolithic enterprise is somewhat misleading

(Morabito & Greenberg, 2005). Instead, private security encompasses many
different occupations and enterprises. Although different in their form, many
private security enterprises are somewhat similar in their focus on proactively
preventing criminal losses to a company’s assets. These assets include, but are
not limited to, personnel, intellectual property, confidential information, physical
property, and profits. The efforts of public law enforcement agencies are, by their
very nature, often the exact opposite in scope. Law enforcement agencies are often
reactive in their nature, arriving after a criminal act has been committed. Despite
the general differences between public police and private security, there is at least
one area of overlap between the two groups—they both seek to protect the people
and the property of the United States (IACP, 2004). Bradford and Simonsen (1998)
argue that “while the interests of the public and private sector are not identical,
they can easily be viewed as complementary . . . there is a public and private
interest ‘overlap,’ especially in cases where there is an overwhelming public
interest” (p. 165). Arguably, the attacks of September 11 created a situation of
overwhelming public interest in the prevention of future terrorist attacks in the
United States.

While there has been increased attention to cooperation between private security
and public police since 9/11, this attention is nothing new. During the 1970s,
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) chartered the Private
Security Advisory Council “to improve the crime prevention capabilities of
private security and reduce crime in public and private places by reviewing
the relationship between private security systems and public law enforcement
agencies, and by developing programs and policies regarding private protection
services that are appropriate and consistent with the public interest” (Private
Security Advisory Council to the LEAA, 1977, p. ii). The Advisory Council to the
LEAA published reports on the regulation of security services, crime prevention,
ethics for security managers, prevention of terrorism, legal authority of security
employees, and training curriculum. One of these reports outlined guidelines for
the establishment of advisory councils at the state level. The report concluded,
“Law enforcement must learn to respect and utilize the role of private security
in crime prevention and reduction, and private security must be willing to earn
that respect by substantially upgrading the quality of its personnel and services
. . . councils can meet this challenge by providing a mechanism to combine the
resources of private security and law enforcement” (Private Security Advisory

152 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Council to the LEAA, 1977, p. 17). In addition, the Private Security Advisory
Council to the LEAA outlined issues between law enforcement and private
security that could harm efforts in cooperation, including lack of mutual respect,
lack of communication, lack of cooperation, lack of law enforcement knowledge of
private security, perceived competition, lack of standards and training in security,
and perceived corruption from law enforcement and private security groups
(Private Security Advisory Council to the LEAA, 1977).

The Private Security Council to the LEAA is not the only group to highlight these
conflicts. A 1971 study by the Rand Corporation had previously outlined the same
issues as the Private Security Council did a few years later. Kakalik and Wildhorn
(1972) stated that “there should be a predetermined, clear-cut policy for public/
private police interaction” (p. 22). In 1977, the National Advisory Committee
of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals formed a task force to examine private
security. Their report called for improvement in the relationship between law
enforcement and private security. “Effective interaction between the private
security industry and law enforcement agencies is imperative for successful crime
prevention and depends to a large extent on published clear and understandable
policies developed by their administrators” (National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Task Force on Private Security, 1977, p. 205).

The first Hallcrest report in 1985 showed that there was a mutual lack of respect
between law enforcement and private security, with law enforcement officers and
administrators rating private security as only somewhat effective. In addition,
both administrators and officers viewed private security as a “junior or silent
partner” rather than an equal in crime control and prevention (Cunningham &
Taylor, 1985, p. 189). To be fair, it is not only law enforcement personnel that tend to
view private security in this manner, with terms like “rent-a-cops” being common
descriptors of private security personnel (Greene & Seamon, 1995, p. 5). Private
security is viewed by both the general public and law enforcement to be less
trained, less confident, and less professional than their respective law enforcement
counterparts. This perceived lack of training on the part of private security leads to
a general conception that private security personnel are less adequate in handling
a situation as compared to law enforcement. Certainly, there are still concerns over
the training, or lack thereof, of private security personnel. According to the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) (2006), there are no federal regulations of
the industry, and 31 states require no training for private security personnel. In
addition, 21 states do not require private security officers to be licensed, and in
16 states, criminal background checks are not required for employment in private
security. Mangan and Shanahan (1990) point out that the perception of private
security as lacking in training has served to make cooperation between law
enforcement and private security less likely.

This is not to say that there is a complete lack of cooperation between these two
entities. The Hallcrest Report II emphasizes that cooperation between private
security and law enforcement has improved, including state and federal sponsored
partnerships as well as more local partnerships between law enforcement and
private security. Mangan and Shanahan (1990) note that on two occasions there
were summits held by the boards of the American Society for Industrial Security,
the State Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Institute of Justice. In
addition, due to the increasingly national and international nature of security, the

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 153

FBI has taken a leadership role in coordinating cooperative efforts of government
agencies and corporations (Mangan & Shanahan, 1990). Some specific state
and national partnerships include the California High Tech Crime Advisory
Committee, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FTLETC) Operation
Partnership, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), the Virginia Police
and Private Security Alliance, and the Washington Law Enforcement Executive
Forum (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999). These partnership programs foster
mutual communication, training, and publicity through the use of forums, monthly
meetings, and better role understanding between the two groups.

Cooperative efforts also include partnerships at the local level. The Bureau
of Justice Statistics (1999) published a document called Operation Cooperation,
which lists partnerships between private security and local law enforcement.
These partnerships include the Austin Metro High Tech Foundation, Dallas
Law Enforcement and Private Security (LEAPS), Miami Association for Security
Administration Professionals, New York Area Police/Private Security Liaison,
the Law Enforcement and Private Security Council of Northeast Florida, the
Philadelphia City Center District, and the Southfield Michigan Pooling Resources
in Defense of our Environment (PRIDE) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999).

Given that there are cooperative efforts between law enforcement and private
security, it is surprising to find very little in the academic literature systematically
evaluating these partnerships. The need to evaluate the level of cooperation, its
effectiveness, and avenues for enhancement are necessary if law enforcement and
private security wish to improve cooperative efforts. Although academia has shown
little interest in evaluation of these cooperative efforts, there are some instances of
empirical and exploratory research on the police-security relationship.

Police-Security Attitudes
Morley and Fong (1995) surveyed top administrators of police agencies and owners
of security organizations in California regarding their opinions of what causes
strained relationships between public police and private security. They found that
a majority of respondent law enforcement officers reported that the largest cause
of their mistrust of private security was the lack of training in the security industry.
In addition, law enforcement respondents reported that a respective lack of
understanding of the roles of each organization as well as security’s understanding
of the legal consequences of their actions also contributed to the poor relationship
between the two entities (Morley & Fong, 1995). Security respondents, on the other
hand, reported that the main reason for strain was the lack of communication
between police and security. They did, however, also feel that a lack of training of
security personnel, as did the law enforcement respondents, contributed to strain
between the two entities (Morley & Fong, 1995). Certainly, examining the attitudes
of administrators in both public police and private security is important and
useful as this is where partnerships and cooperation are likely forged; however,
it is generally in the lower ranks that cooperation and partnerships must play
out. Administrators can create partnerships and call for cooperation, but this
does not guarantee success. Successful cooperation must also rely on the attitudes
and actions of the people expected to collaborate. In these public police-private
security partnerships, this is often the rank-and-file personnel. For this reason, it

154 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

is important to understand their attitudes towards cooperation and towards one
another in general.

Nalla and Hummer (1999) observed the perceptions between law enforcement
and private security professionals in a Midwestern state. They found that security
professionals and police professionals generally believe that there is cooperation
between the two groups. The police officers in their sample, however, rated their
relationship with security more positively than did the private security personnel,
who tended to view the relationship as not positive and even adversarial. In
addition, police were less likely than security personnel to report that the two groups
were equal partners in crime prevention. Both groups reported that they could do
more to improve the relationship between the two. Two factors differentiated the
opinions of police and security personnel from one another. For police officers,
time on the job influenced their view of the relationship, with officers working less
than 10 years having a more positive view of the relationship than those working
over 10 years. For security personnel, previous experience in law enforcement was
a key factor in the overall opinion of the relationship. More specifically, security
personnel with no prior police experience view the relationship more positively
than do those with prior police experience.

Police-Security Relations Post-9/11

Cooperative efforts between law enforcement and public security have been viewed
as increasingly critical since 9/11. The majority (85%) of the nation’s infrastructure
is owned and protected by the private sector, yet it is public law enforcement
that generally has threat information regarding potential attacks against this
infrastructure (9/11 Commission, 2004). Cooperation and partnerships, then, are
vital to effectively protect our infrastructure from attack (Morabito & Greenberg,
2005). Morabito and Greenberg (2005) argue that “neither law enforcement nor
private security can protect the nation’s infrastructure alone; law enforcement-
private security partnerships are essential” in effectively protecting our nation’s
infrastructure from future terrorist attacks (p. 1).

In his historical analysis of private security, Albanese (1986) notes that the private
security industry has, at various points in time, prospered due to major social or
technological change, which brought about forms of crime to which public law
enforcement was slow to respond. While terrorist attacks are not a new form of
crime for many parts of the world, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were new to the
United States. Certainly, there has been a response by public law enforcement,
including the passage of legislation such as the Patriot Act and the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security. Due to the ownership of the infrastructure and
the vast numbers of people employed, private security has also, however, stepped
up to take its place in the prevention of terrorism much as it did in the early 1900s
with labor unrest, in the 1960s with urban riots and anti-war demonstrations,
and in the 1970s with the advent of the screening of airline passengers (Albanese,
1986).

Sarre and Prenzler (2000) argue that there are at least two factors that have led to
the growth of private security. Public disillusionment with public policing, they
argue, may create an atmosphere in which private security can flourish. As the
police are criticized as being insensitive to victims, overzealous with criminals,

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 155

and corrupt, private security can step in with a legitimacy that may be lost by
some police agencies. Secondly, Sarre and Prenzler (2000) argue that perceptions
of an increased threat of crime, real or imagined, can lead to increases in private
security. Certainly, 9/11 created an increase in the perception of the threat of crime
in the form of terrorism. Not only did the attacks themselves serve to create this
perception of threat, but it could also be argued that continued media attention to
the attacks as well as the following anthrax attacks and subsequent legislative and
policy changes (e.g., the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the
advent of the color-coded threat level system) also served to amplify feelings of
insecurity. In this type of charged environment, private security is more in demand
by a worried public, as well as by private enterprise.

In addition, it is possible that another factor is also partially responsible for the
growth of private security after 9/11. The attacks added to the responsibilities of
public law enforcement at all levels. Not only are local, county, and state agencies
responsible for the crime-fighting duties entrusted to them prior to 9/11, they are
now expected to be active participants in the protection of the homeland. This
additional obligation has the potential to overburden the existing resources of
public police. This, then, may create more opportunity for private police to step in
and perform some of the duties historically reserved for public police. A related
example can be seen in the protection of army facilities in the United States.
After the terrorist attacks, the Department of Defense (DOD) increased security
requirements at domestic military installations. At the same time, both active duty
and reserve military personnel were deployed overseas to fight in the war on
terror, leaving a shortage of military personnel to protect domestic installations. As
a result, Congress has allowed the DOD to temporarily use private security guards
to provide security, which it has done. As of April 2006, private security guards
were being used at 57 Army installations in the United States (GAO, 2006).

The Present Study

The focus of this article is to further the academic body of knowledge concerning
the relationship between law enforcement and private security by incorporating
the impact of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Members of the North Texas Chapter
of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) served as the population of
security personnel. Police officers involved in the study came from three police
agencies, all located in North Texas. These three departments were chosen based
on both availability and willingness to participate and were not selected to be
representative of agencies in the United States or even in the state of Texas. In
each police department, the chiefs encouraged participation but left the individual
decision to participate completely voluntary.

The survey was made available to both samples via a web portal. In order to
maintain anonymity, the heads of ASIS and each of the police departments were
sent an e-mail message with the appropriate website through which their staff
or members could participate in the survey. The primary e-mails were sent out
on November 22, 2004. The survey expired on November 29, 2004. Each of the
police departments chosen provides Internet access to all officers for each shift,
making the instrument readily available to possible respondents at the police
departments.

156 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Of the three police departments, the total number of subjects receiving information
regarding availability of the instrument was 219, while the total number of ASIS
members receiving information regarding the survey was 850. The total number of
respondents was 182. Of these, 59 were police respondents, and 123 were security
respondents. Although there were a smaller number of police respondents, the
response rate for police was higher (27%) than was the response rate for security
(14.5%).

The instrument we used relied heavily on the survey device implemented by

Nalla and Hummer (1999). Several items were drawn directly from this survey
instrument, in hopes that some comparisons could be drawn between that study
and this one. In addition, three items were added to the survey instrument that
specifically address issues relevant to the 9/11 attacks. Consistent with Nalla
and Hummer (1999), one survey was generated for private security personnel,
and another similar survey was generated for police officers. The questionnaire
consisted of 10 items regarding the respondent’s opinion of various aspects of the
police-security relationship, measured on a five-point scale, with 1 being strongly
disagree and 5 being strongly agree. The first seven items were drawn from the
questionnaire used by Nalla and Hummer (1999), and the last three were added
to assess what impact, if any, the respondents perceived 9/11 to have had on the
police-security relationship.

Findings

Description of the Sample

Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of the sample divided into the
police and security groups. There were 59 police respondents and 123 security
respondents. For both groups, the sample was predominantly male and
overwhelmingly white. There were differences across the two groups in terms of
age, with 50% of the police sample falling within the 31-40 age range and over 50%
of the security sample falling between the ages of 41-60. In addition, none of the
police group was over the age of 61; whereas, almost 9% of the security group was
between the ages of 61-70. In terms of education, police officers were more likely to
have an associate’s or bachelor’s degree (52%), but security personnel were more
likely to have both post-graduate education (20.8%) and a master’s degree (15.1%)
than were police officers. In terms of years in their present field, 59% of the police
sample had 11 or more years in policing; whereas, 71.1% of security personnel
reported 11 or more years in the security profession. Security personnel were more
likely to report previous military experience (46.7%) than were police officers
(32.2%). The majority of the security sample (59.8%) reported previous experience
in law enforcement, but only 31% of police officers reported prior experience in
the security profession.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 157

Table 1. Description of Sample

Variable Police (%) (n = 59) Security (%) (n = 123)

Gender
Male 93 93.1
Female 7 6.9
Race/Ethnicity
White 84.7 91.6
African American 0 1.9
Hispanic 1.9 6.5
Other 3.8 0
Age
20-30 12 5
31-40 50 17.8
41-50 26 39.6
51-60 12 28.7
61-70 0 8.9
Education
High School Diploma 9.6 4.7
Some College 25 21.7
Associate’s Degree 13.5 8.5
Bachelor’s Degree 38.5 29.2
Post Graduate 9.6 20.8
Master’s Degree 3.8 15.1
Years in Field
0-10 41.1 28.8
11-20 39.3 28.8
21-30 16.1 33.9
31-40 3.6 5.9
41-50 0 2.5
Prior Military Experience
Yes 32.2 46.7
No 67.8 53.3
Prior Experience in Security/Law Enforcement
Yes 31 59.8
No 69 40.2

Opinions Regarding the Police-Security Relationship

The findings regarding the respondents’ opinions of the police-security
relationship are presented in Table 2. A response of 1 indicates that the respondent
strongly disagreed with the statement; whereas, a response of 5 indicates that the
respondent strongly agreed with the statement. The F test for mean difference was
used to discover any statistically significant results between the two groups. This
test was chosen to be consistent with Nalla and Hummer’s (1999) analysis. The first
statistically significant difference is the questions regarding the overall view of the
other group. Consistent with Nalla and Hummer (1999), security personnel had
a more positive view (4.12) of police than police (2.98) did of them. When asked
whether they believed the police-security relationship to be strong, both groups
tended to disagree; however, the difference between the means was statistically
significant, with security (2.65) in slightly less disagreement with this statement
than police officers (2.14). Similarly, both groups tended to disagree that police

158 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

and security carry equal weight in crime prevention activities, with the security
group (2.57) disagreeing slightly less than the police group (2.14). The difference
was statistically significant at the .05 level, however.

Table 2. Respondent Perceptions of Police/Security Relationship

Security Police
Item (n = 59) (n = 123) F
1. Security personnel generally have a positive opinion of police
officers. ---- 3.51 (1.09) .611
Police officers generally have a positive opinion of security
personnel. 2.55 (1.03) ----
2. My view of security personnel is positive. ---- 2.98 (1.11) 16.29**
My view of police officers is positive. 4.12 (1.02) ----
3. I characterize the relationship between police and private
security as strong. 2.65 (1.23) 2.14 (0.94) 28.21**
4. In my view, security personnel generally cooperate with
police officers in most crime prevention activities. ---- 3.41 (1.23) .215
In my view, police officers generally cooperate with security
personnel in most crime prevention activities. 3.20 (1.29) ----
5. In my view, police officers share information with security
personnel on matters related to professional interest. 2.34 (1.21) 2.24 (1.09) 1.60
6. In my view, police officers excel in promoting working
relationships with security agencies. ---- 1.90 (1.19) 3.12
In my view, security personnel excel in promoting working
relationships with police agencies. 2.04 (1.00) ----
7. Police and security personnel carry equal weight in crime
prevention activities. 2.57 (1.28) 2.14 (1.21) 3.90*
8. Terrorism has affected the relationship between police officers
and private security. 3.60 (1.22) 2.08 (1.39) .03
9. Homeland security funding has affected the relationship
between police officers and private security. 2.69 (1.61) 1.53 (1.21) 18.91**
10. I believe the relationship between police officers and private
security is stronger now than before the World Trade Center
attacks of September 11, 2001. 3.44 (1.22) 1.97 (1.23) 4.09*
Mean scores are reported (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree)
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
**p<.01; *p<.05

Opinions Regarding the Impact of 9/11

One goal of this study was to assess whether the events of 9/11 impacted the
views of either police or security personnel towards each other. We asked both
groups whether they felt that terrorism had affected the relationship between
police officers and security. Security personnel did tend to agree more with this
statement (3.60) than police did (2.08); however, the difference was not statistically
significant. Both police (1.53) and security personnel (2.69) generally disagreed
with the notion that Homeland Security funding had affected the relationship
between police and private security. The attitudes of the police were significantly
more negative regarding this matter. When asked whether the relationship
between police and private security is stronger after the attacks of 9/11, police
generally responded negatively (1.97); whereas, security personnel tended to
respond positively (3.44).

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 159

Discussion and Conclusion
The findings of this study are generally consistent with the existing literature
regarding the police-security relationship. Police officers typically did not have
an overly positive opinion of security professionals but did believe that security
professionals typically had very positive opinions of them. Security professionals
did hold positive opinions of police officers and were generally aware of the
negative perceptions held by law enforcement towards them. Police did, however,
generally have a more positive opinion of security than they perceived them to
have.

In regards to the calls for more cooperation and the sharing of information since
9/11, it is interesting to note that there were no significant differences between
the two groups regarding the promotion of working relationships or the sharing
of information, with both groups tending to disagree with these statements. Both
police (1.90) and security (2.04) personnel generally disagreed that the other excels
in promoting working relationships between the two. Also, both police (2.24)
and security (2.34) tended to disagree that police officers share information with
security personnel on matters related to professional interest. Both groups did,
however, generally agree that the other cooperates in crime prevention activities.
This is consistent with Nalla and Hummer’s (1999) findings, the only difference
being that their mean differences were statistically significant for this item while
ours were not. Given that both groups tended to agree with this statement prior to
9/11, the terrorist attacks and the subsequent calls for increased cooperation do not
seem to have impacted the opinions of either group in regards to cooperation.

Security personnel were more likely than police to agree that terrorism, Homeland
Security funding, and the attack on the WTC had impacted the police-security
relationship. Given such differences of opinions, it is perhaps the case that the
primary first defenders of a unified America against terrorism are, in fact, not
entirely unified. Given that private security personnel putatively secure the
majority of the nation’s infrastructure and it is public law enforcement that is
most likely to advance knowledge of impending attacks, the lack of perceived
cooperation is somewhat troubling. Perhaps now more than ever, education of
both the public law enforcement and the private security communities about
the duties and importance of the other as well as the necessity for cooperation
and partnerships is warranted and, in fact, essential to the future security of our
nation’s infrastructure.

References
9/11 Commission. (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company.

Albanese, J. S. (1986). The future of policing: A private concern? Police Studies, 9(2),
86-91.

Bradford, C. A., & Simonsen, C. E. (1998). The need for cooperative efforts between
private security and public law enforcement in the prevention, investigation, and
prosecution of fraud-related criminal activity. Security Journal, 10, 161-168.

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Bureau of Justice Statistics. (1999). Operation Cooperation: A literature review of
cooperation and partnerships between law enforcement and private security organizations.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Calder, J. D. (1980). The security-criminal justice connection: Toward the elimination

of separate but equal status. Journal of Security Administration, 2(1-2), 13-29.

Cunningham, W. C., Strauchs, J. J., & Van Meter, C. (1990). The Hallcrest Report II:
Private security trends, 1970-2000. Stoneham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Cunningham, W. C., & Taylor, T. H. (1985). Private security and police in America: The
Hallcrest Report I. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Greene, J. R., & Seamon, T. M. (1995). Merging public and private security for
collective benefit: Philadelphia’s Center City District. American Journal of the
Police, 14(2), 3-20.

Government Accounting Office (GAO). (2006). Contract security guards: Army’s

guard program requires greater oversight and reassessment of acquisition approach
(GAO-06-284). Available online at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06284.pdf

Hall, M. (2003). Private security guards are homeland’s weak link. USA Today,
Retrieved January 22, 2003, from www.usatoday.com

International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2004). National policy summit: Building

private security/public policing partnerships to prevent and respond to terrorism and
public disorder. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

Joh, E. E. (2004). The paradox of private policing. Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology, 95(1), 49-131.

Kakalik, J. S., & Wildhorn, S. (1972). Private police in the United States: Findings
and recommendations (DOJ R-869). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.

Mangan, T. J., & Shanahan, M. G. (1990). Public law enforcement/private security:

A new partnership. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 59(1), 18-22.

McIntyre, D. (2006). What is to be done?: The complexity of homeland security. ANSER

Institute for Homeland Security. Available online at www.homelandsecurity.
org/bulletin/ActionPlan_WhatbeDone.htm

Morabito, A., & Greenberg, S. (2005). Engaging the private sector to promote homeland
security: Law enforcement-private security partnerships (NCJ 210678). Washington,
DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Morley, H. N., & Fong, R. S. (1995). Can we all get along? A study of why strained
relations continue to exist between sworn law enforcement and private security.
Security Journal, 6, 85-92.

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Nalla, M. K., & Hummer, D. (1999). Relations between police officers and security
professionals: A study of perceptions. Security Journal, 12(3), 31-40.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. (1977).

Private security: Report of the task force on private security. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice.

Private Security Advisory Council to the Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration. (1977). Guidelines for the establishment of local and state private
security advisory councils. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Sarre, R., & Prenzler, T. (2000). The relationship between police and private
security: Models and future directions. International Journal of Comparative and
Applied Criminal Justice, 24(1), 91-113.

Service Employees International Union (SEIU). (2006). About the industry. Available
online www.seiu.org/property/security/about_industry/index.cfm

Christopher L. Copeland, MA, earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees

in criminology and criminal justice from the University of Texas at Arlington.
He founded CLC Research, a Texas-based software research company to
assist law enforcement in profiling and information security.

Rhonda R. Dobbs, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of

Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Texas at Arlington. She
has presented research at numerous national professional conferences. Dr.
Dobbs earned her PhD in criminology and criminal justice from Florida State
University. Her current research interests include gender and sentencing,
fear of crime, and punitive attitudes.

Alejandro del Carmen, PhD, is an associate professor and chair of the

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Texas
at Arlington. Dr. del Carmen has published 3 books and over 15 academic
manuscripts in nationally and internationally recognized journals. He has
served as editor of ACJS TODAY, the official newsletter of the Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences. Dr. del Carmen is an editorial board member of the
Journal of Criminal Justice Education.

162 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

In the Wake of Political Turmoil:
The Cherokee Nation Marshal Service
Michael R. Wilds, JD, Associate Professor, Northeastern State University
William Heck, PhD, Associate Professor, Northeastern State University

The Cherokee Nation Marshal Service: A Brief History

The Cherokee Nation Marshal Service was created in 1991 in response to Ross v.
Neff, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which ruled that Oklahoma peace
officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest an Indian on tribal land. In Ross, the Court held
that state jurisdiction was limited to only those crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians and victimless crimes committed by non-Indians. The only
exceptions would be when the tribe consented to jurisdiction or when Congress
had expressly granted jurisdiction to the state.

Ross stemmed from an incident in which an Adair County deputy sheriff

responded to a disorderly conduct report occurring on a ballpark and playground
located on Cherokee tribal lands. During an ensuing struggle, the deputy shot
Ronnie Ross, a Cherokee tribal member, in the leg. As a result, Ronnie’s leg had
to be amputated below the knee. With neither tribal consent nor a congressional
grant of jurisdiction,1 the Adair County deputy lacked jurisdiction to arrest Ronnie
Ross on tribal land. The Tenth Circuit decision had an immediate effect on law
enforcement in all 14 Oklahoma counties that comprise the Cherokee Nation. It
ended the traditional practice of emergent law enforcement by county and state
agencies and left a significant portion of northeast Oklahoma with almost no police
protection (Heck, Keen, & Wilds, 2001).

Recognizing the severity of this situation, Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller

enlisted two tribal administrators, Pat Ragsdale and Chadwick Smith, with the
task of rapidly establishing a law enforcement presence in the Cherokee Nation.
Their goal was to build a police force in consultation with the FBI, the BIA, and
law enforcement agencies throughout the Oklahoma counties where jurisdiction
might be shared. They vigorously solicited applicants who had law enforcement
experience and were accredited through a law enforcement academy. Once initial
hiring was completed, cross-deputization agreements2 were signed with other
jurisdictions, and the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service, so named in honor of
deputy U.S. marshals who worked alongside the “Light-Horsemen” in Indian
Territory during the 1800s, was officially established. Pat Ragsdale served as its
first director (Heck et al., 2001).

The cross-deputization agreements mutually empowered county law enforcement

officers with law enforcement jurisdiction on Cherokee lands and Cherokee
marshals with law enforcement jurisdiction on county lands. Two years after the
Neff decision, the Cherokee Nation had successfully established cross-deputization
agreements with 12 Oklahoma counties and had established a full complement of
law enforcement presence on Cherokee tribal lands.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 163

Since the Cherokees modeled their code after the Oklahoma Criminal Code,
Director Pat Ragsdale required all Cherokee Nation marshals to complete an
accredited law enforcement academy as well as the Indian Police Academy in
Artesia, New Mexico. This enabled the Cherokee marshals cross-deputization
with the U.S. Marshal Service as well as county law enforcement agencies, thereby
affording them enormous dual law enforcement jurisdiction within the state.
It also gave the Cherokee Nation the strongest law enforcement presence in its
history (Heck et al., 2001).

In spite of this strong start, serious problems loomed over the horizon; the marshal
service would almost be destroyed within a few years of its creation due to
political fallout caused by internal fighting among the governing branches of the
Cherokee Nation. This article will focus on the rebuilding of the Cherokee Nation
Marshal Service in the aftermath of that political turmoil. It will address the
Nation’s struggle to once again obtain cross-deputization agreements with local
and state agencies, examine data revealing the nature of calls and arrests made
by the Cherokee Nation, and address jurisdictional issues currently confronting
Cherokee Marshals.

The Embattled Byrd Administration

On August 14, 1995, Joe Byrd became principal chief of the Cherokee Nation by
default when it was discovered several days before the runoff election that his
only opponent, George Bearpaw, had once pleaded guilty to a felony. Although
Bearpaw had received a deferred sentence and the felony conviction was later
expunged, tribal law (i.e., Cherokee Nation Constitution) provided that persons
convicted of or having plead guilty to a felony were ineligible to hold any elected
office within the Nation. Consequently, amid intense protest and calls for a new
election, the court ordered the tribal election commission not to tally any votes
cast for Bearpaw. Byrd’s administration would thus be haunted by unprecedented
political factionalism from the start (Gamallo, 1995).

Then, in February 1997, accusations arose against Byrd’s administration for

misappropriation of tribal funds. When Byrd refused to release tribal records
pertinent to the ensuing investigation, a search warrant was issued directing the
Cherokee Nation Marshal Service to retrieve the records from his office. Executing
the search warrant, Director Pat Ragsdale and Lieutenant Sharon Wright, along
with a dozen marshals, began searching the W. W. Keeler Complex south of
Tahlequah on February 25.

Principal Chief Byrd arrived and ordered them to stand down. When Ragsdale
refused to comply, Chief Byrd placed him and Wright on administrative leave.
Ragsdale immediately made emergency application to the Judicial Appeals
Tribunal, and both he and Lieutenant Wright were reinstated the following day
by ex parte order. In issuing the order, Chief Justice Dwight Birdwell cautioned
that any further interference with the investigation would constitute contempt
of court. In response, Chief Byrd fired the entire marshal service and announced
that any further orders of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal pertaining to the marshals
would be ignored (Mouser, 1998/1999).

164 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Byrd was subsequently charged with obstruction of justice; however, eight
members of the tribal council along with Byrd’s attorneys initiated a movement
to impeach all three justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal. In response, the
six remaining council members began boycotting council meetings to prevent a
quorum, which required ten members. Since the executive branch was deadlocked
and the legislative branch was unable to obtain a quorum, the Cherokee Nation
government effectively ceased to function (Mouser, 1998/1999).

In the mix of political confusion, Byrd created a new marshal service on March 21;
however, many of the original marshals refused to stand down and remained on
duty without pay. The original marshals were now acting under the authority of
the judicial branch and stationed themselves in the Cherokee Nation Courthouse.
The Byrd marshals were acting under the authority of the executive branch and
remained at the W. W. Keeler Complex. Realizing his inability to maintain control
over a split judicial and law enforcement agency, Chief Byrd solicited the BIA
to assume law enforcement responsibilities in the Cherokee Nation (Mouser,
1998/1999).

In the early morning hours of June 20, Byrd’s marshal service with the assistance
of the BIA stormed the Cherokee Nation Courthouse in downtown Tahlequah.
The BIA, with the assistance of the FBI, seized all court records and locked down
the building. Chief Byrd then sent a certified letter of termination to the only
remaining tribal prosecutor (Romano, 1997, p. B1).

The Judicial Appeals Tribunal had continued to operate from the basement of
the chief justice’s home. They retaliated by immediately issuing a writ ordering
Byrd to reopen the courthouse. When Ragsdale and several remaining original
marshals attempted to serve the papers on Byrd’s marshals, violence erupted. In
the aftermath, six people were injured, and three, including Pat Ragsdale, were
arrested (Gibbons & Glen, 1997).

In response to the melee, the U.S. federal government and the Tribal Council
set up an independent commission, the Massad Commission, to mediate and
attempt to resolve the conflict. After conducting several public hearings and
interviewing numerous tribal officials over several weeks, the three-member
Massad Commission submitted its findings and recommendations to the Tribal
Council. All three branches received some degree of criticism, but ultimately
the Massad Commission held that Byrd’s attempt to impeach the justices of the
tribunal was clearly in violation of the Cherokee Constitution and therefore void
ab initio (Massad, Layden, & Gibbons, 1997, p. 381). Under considerable pressure
from the BIA and the Justice Department, Byrd finally agreed to abide by the
commission’s recommendations and relinquished control of the courthouse to the
judicial branch.

Rebuilding the Marshal Service3

Prior to the Massad Commission’s decision, Principal Chief Byrd solicited assistance
of the BIA and thus relinquished control of its law enforcement authority to the
BIA for the first time in history in September 1998. Although Byrd’s 10 marshals
remained active until the end of his administration, they operated without any

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 165

formal law enforcement authority. As such, jurisdiction and legal authority of the
Marshal’s Service remained in a very precarious state of affairs.

Subsequently, Chief Joe Byrd was defeated at the polls by Chad Smith in the
summer of 1999. Because they had no formal authority and had to function for
so long without pay, most of the original marshals were forced to abandon their
jobs. Only a few dedicated souls remained throughout the conflict. Consequently,
when Principal Chief Chad Smith assumed power, rebuilding the Cherokee Nation
Marshal Service to its original strength became a priority.

By November of 1999, Chief Smith was able to re-assume law enforcement

jurisdiction from the BIA, and eight of the original marshals returned to service.
He assigned Pat Ragsdale to work with the Tribal Council in an effort to rebuild
the marshal service to its original strength of 14 officers. The council approved the
requested marshal’s budget in July 2000, and Chief Smith appointed David Roberts,
a former Tulsa County Deputy and ATF agent, as the new director. Director Roberts
hired Sharon Wright to assist with administrative duties and promoted her to
captain in December of 2000. He also hired four former Cherokee Nation Housing
Authority officers who had exercised limited law enforcement authority during
the Byrd administration. By the end of December 2000, the Cherokee Marshal’s
Service numbered 16 officers, two more than when it collapsed in 1998.

In an effort to demonstrate unity to the Cherokee people, Chief Chad Smith worked
closely with the Tribal Council and was able to double the budget by 2002. Hiring
resumed, and the department increased to its current force of 30 regular marshals
and two contract officers who serve as special investigators for the Cherokee
Nation casinos.

Reestablishing Jurisdiction
In 1992, Cherokee Nation Marshals were cross-deputized with both county
officers and the U. S. Marshal Service. Cross-deputized officers enjoyed full
interjurisdictional law enforcement authority; however, when the BIA assumed
law enforcement responsibilities in 1997, the Marshal Service was abolished and
cross-deputization agreements ceased in practice. Interestingly, Delaware was
the only county that formally withdrew its agreement. Other counties merely
assumed that the agreements were no longer in force and stopped providing law
enforcement on Indian lands.

The absence of these agreements presented a special problem because of the

checkerboard jurisdiction that resulted from the allotment of Oklahoma Indian
land and forced assimilation that peaked during the early 1900s. For example, in
counties and towns that had no cross-deputization agreements, law enforcement
officers had no authority over Indians on housing lots or acreage classified as Indian
land. Consequently, if a serious problem emerged, local officers would stand by
to contain the situation, but a Cherokee Nation Marshal had to be dispatched to
work the call. Because of the vast area covered by the Cherokee Nation, a marshal
sometimes had to travel halfway across the state to work a call. Thus, when the
Cherokee Nation finally resumed responsibility for law enforcement, regaining
cross-deputization agreements became a primary goal for the Nation’s General
Council, Julian Fite. Nowata became the first county to resume cross-deputization

166 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

with the nation; Cherokee, Adair, Delaware, and Macintoch Counties were the
last. By December 2006, agreements with all but one of the 14 effected counties
were reached. The final county is pending agreement as of this writing.

Another casualty suffered by the marshal service was the loss of cross-deputization
with the U. S. Marshal Service. Although it has not been renewed, 13 of 31 marshals
still have federal jurisdiction through Special Law Enforcement Commissions
(SLEC) with the BIA. In order to acquire SLEC certification, marshals must have
either completed the Indian Police Academy or completed the BIA’s Indian Country
Jurisdiction Course within the past 2 years. Certification can be renewed for two
terms, or a total of 6 years. After that time, the course must be retaken to retain
certification. Of particular interest, Oklahoma counties can now approach the tribe
and request the same certification. Upon completing the required training, county
law enforcement officers would be granted the same SLEC jurisdiction on tribal
lands.

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 limits tribal punishment for any crime to one
year in prison and/or a fine of $5,000; therefore, the Cherokee Nation notifies the
FBI and the U.S. Attorneys office of major crimes. The FBI either investigates the
case jointly with the Cherokee Marshals Service or merely delegates the case to
the Cherokee Marshals to investigate. Then, the U.S. Attorney’s Office determines
whether the case should be prosecuted in federal court, tribal court, or both.

The Cherokee Marshal Service Today

Today, the Cherokee Marshal Service remains at full capacity and is expected to
grow considerably in the near future. Minimum qualifications to become a marshal
include being at least 21 years of age with at least a high school diploma and no
criminal record. Applicants undergo a background check and must be sufficiently
physically fit to complete both the 16-week CLEET academy and the 18-week
Indian Police Academy. By policy, all new hires must carry both commissions.
Preference is given to those with prior law enforcement experience or some college
education. Currently, 13 marshals (almost half of the department) have a college
degree, while five others have some college. Two of the marshals are female, and
three of the male officers are non-Indian.

Sharon Wright became acting director in January 2004 and was permanently
appointed to the position in May 2005. A captain works directly under her and
helps oversee the agency’s four major divisions: (1) investigation, (2) patrol,
(3) operations, and (4) security. The investigative division includes one chief
investigator and eight investigators. Patrol includes 20 marshals under the
supervision of one lieutenant. The Operations Department is run by an operations
manager who supervises dispatch and records personnel. Security is directed
by a lieutenant who oversees 13 security personnel and promotes community
policing.

In addition to the four major divisions, the department has several specialized
units. Fourteen marshals serve on a special operations team that primarily assists
county officers serving high-risk warrants. The Cherokee Marshal’s Service also
maintains a four-member narcotics division, a two-member DARE unit, and a six-
person underwater dive recovery team.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 167

As is the case with any police agency, the marshal service performs a wide
range of tasks associated with law enforcement, order maintenance, and service
(see Appendix). During 2004, Cherokee marshals responded to 2,114 calls. Of
these, 1,830 (86.5%) were order maintenance calls, 120 (5.6%) were minor crimes
(domestic, trespassing, and vandalism), and 154 (7.2%) were property crimes
(burglary, robbery, larceny, and auto theft). Of the property crimes, 100 (4.7%) were
for larceny (see Appendix, Figure 4). During the same year, Cherokee marshals
made 455 arrests and issued 89 citations. Of these arrests, 82 (18%) were for drug-
related charges, and of the 82 drug arrests, 64 (78%) were successfully prosecuted
(see Appendix, Figure 6).

Because the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1964 limits tribal punishment to a maximum
incarceration of one year, most major crimes are prosecuted by the federal district
court in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. During 2004, this court prosecuted seven
major crimes cases while the Nation prosecuted only two such major crimes.

The Future of the Cherokee Marshal’s Service

The advent of Las Vegas-style gambling and entertainment in Cherokee Nation
casinos may create an enormous shift in jurisdictional issues. Since 2004, massive
numbers of non-Indians and non-Cherokee Indians have invaded Cherokee casinos.
With this invasion of money-laden visitors naturally flows an exponential increase
in theft, robbery, drug trafficking, gang activity, and domestic violence. Previously,
infrequent crimes such as corruption, money laundering, loan sharking, fraud,
federal conspiracy, and violations of RICO and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
are expected to increase.4

This explosion in both the number and nature of crimes presents the Cherokee
marshals with a complex maze of jurisdictional issues. The Cherokee marshals
must consider the following:

• Is the offender Indian or non-Indian?5

• Is the victim an Indian or a non-Indian, or is the crime victimless?
• Has a federal crime been committed?

The split-second nature of law enforcement encounters makes absolute resolution

of this jurisdictional maze virtually impossible, but, without attempting to resolve
jurisdictional issues, the Cherokee marshals are without an adequate foundation
to determine authority to resolve the issues raised by Ross and determine who has
authority to arrest and where the offender should be transported for jurisdictional
prosecution.6 As exemplified by the following table, resolution of such jurisdictional
authority is extremely complex.

168 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Jurisdictional Chart for Indian Territory

Perpetrator Victim Crime Jurisdiction Jurisdictional Authority

Non-Indian Non-Indian All Exclusive State State Authorities
No federal or tribal United States v. McBratney,
104 U.S. 621 (1881)
Non-Indian Victimless7 Exclusive State State Authorities
Non-Indian Indian All Federal (exclusive) FBI for all crimes
No state or tribal8 General Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 11529
Indian Non-Indian Major Concurrent federal FBI or Tribal Police for major crimes
Crimes10 or tribal Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
No state jurisdiction
Indian Non-Indian Minor Crimes Exclusive Tribal Tribal for minor crimes*
No state jurisdiction General Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1152
Indian Victimless Tribal jurisdiction Tribal for minor crimes*
Indian Indian 11
Major Crimes Concurrent federal FBI or Tribal for major crimes
or tribal Major Crimes Act,
No state jurisdiction12 18 U.S.C. § 1153
Indian Indian Minor Crimes Exclusive Tribal Tribal for minor crimes*
No state jurisdiction Indian Civil Rights Act of 196813
* Although the tribes may investigate major crimes (the 14 named crimes made subject to federal
jurisdiction by the Major Crimes Act), their judicial authority to punish for any crime is a sentence not
exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding $5,000 under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
Similarly, the U.S. Attorney’s Office determines whether a major crime will be prosecuted in federal
court. If the matter is declined for federal prosecution, tribal law enforcement, the tribal prosecutor,
and the District Attorney’s Office (if applicable) must be notified in writing.
The federal government also has jurisdiction to arrest for violations of federal statutes. These general
federal crimes include RICO violations, drug crimes, conspiracy, and a felon in possession of a firearm.

Understandably, differentiating the tribal status of either the perpetrator or

the victim with merely visual observation is virtually impossible. Similarly,
differentiating the nature of the crime and determining whether it is tribal, state,
or federal is often equally impossible.

Such complexity almost mandates the equivalent of a law degree for every
Cherokee marshal. Otherwise, the officer might overstep jurisdictional authority
and expose both him- or herself and the Marshal’s Service to civil and criminal
liability. Understandably, the obvious solution is cross-deputization among all
city, county, and state law enforcement officials, but even this seemingly simple
solution has complex ramifications. Once the Cherokee marshal is involved in the
arrest of a non-Indian, the officer acquires an additional duty of testifying in a non-
Indian court. With limited resources and manpower, appearing at depositions and
preliminary hearings and being called as a witness in court could prove to be an
incredible drain of time and money.

The apparent solution might be to simply exclude non-Indian offenders from tribal
lands and casinos, thereby turning a blind eye to non-Indian offenses such as petit
larceny, minor drug offenses, and simple domestic disorders. Such nonfeasance,
however, might expose the Cherokee marshal or the tribe to both civil and criminal

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 169

liability. For example, consider a situation in which a mother slaps her child for
crying while she left that child unattended in the tribal casino parking lot while
grabbing coffee and taking a few quick pulls on the slot machine. Failure of the
Cherokee marshal to make a timely report of this or any child abuse, whether the
child is Indian or non-Indian, constitutes the commission of a federal felony under
18 U.S.C. § 2258.

Similarly, tribal officers may act as state, county, or federal officers when cross-
deputized. By consenting to cross-deputization agreements, the Cherokee Nation
may well be consenting to all state and federal laws associated with carrying a
state or federal badge. As such, any Cherokee marshal who commits nonfeasance,
malfeasance, or misfeasance while acting in the capacity and under color of law
of a county or federal officer may well be subjecting both him- or herself and the
Marshal’s Service to civil tort liability.

As such, Cherokee marshals must become elite, well educated law enforcement
officials, highly trained not only in tribal law, but also in state and federal law.
The Cherokee marshal must be trained on how to diffuse conflict arising among
diverse and varying cultures, arrests of Indians as well as non-Indians, and a
quagmire of jurisdictional issues. In essence, the Cherokee Nation marshal faces
some of the most extensive and complex multijurisdictional training requirements
in the nation.

To address that need, the FBI’s Indian Country Unit has integrated training with
the FBI and the Bureau of Indian Affairs – Office of Law Enforcement Services
(BIA – OLES) as well as tribal, local, state, and county law enforcement agencies.
The FBI provides training on Indian Country Basics, Law Enforcement Training
for Safety and Survival, Crime Scene Management, Crime Scene Processing, Child
Sexual Abuse, Physical Abuse Training, Child Homicide, Stress Management,
Indian Gaming Investigation, Interviewing and Interrogation, First Responder
Course, Forensic Interviewing, Critical Incident Training, and local training as
requested.14

In addition, Northeastern State University, strategically located a few miles from

the Cherokee Nation’s headquarters, has incorporated in their collegiate studies
courses dealing with tribal studies, Indian law, criminal justice, American courts,
homeland security, paralegal studies, and the Cherokee language. Through this
partnership, the Cherokee marshal is adequately armed with legal resources
sufficient to navigate this unfamiliar jurisdictional territory.

Conclusion
The aftermath of Ross v. Neff has forced the Cherokee Nation’s Marshal Service to
evolve from the frontier day Light-Horseman into a modern-day law enforcement
expert. The Cherokee marshal must be well versed in tribal, state, and federal law
in order to properly handle the vast array of jurisdictional issues that might be
encountered on tribal lands. Otherwise, the marshal may find him- or herself in a
high-tension situation making untrained, unwise, and potentially incorrect arrest
decisions. To overcome this particularly complex jurisdictional mine field, Director
Sharon Wright is taking a proactive stance by providing Cherokee marshals with
education and training geared to diffuse those land mines before they explode.

170 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Endnotes
1
The Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 88‑280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) provided the
state’s permission to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over any “Indian
Country” within the borders of the state. Under this public law, Oklahoma could
have, without the consent of the effected Indians, assumed jurisdiction over any
Indian country in the state by constitutional amendment; however, Oklahoma
did not take such action. Today, Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1321‑1326 (1970), requires the consent of the effected Indians before the State is
permitted to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over “Indian Country. . . .”
2
Cross-deputization agreements are also known as mutual aid agreements.
3
Much of the information contained in the remainder of the article was gathered
from on-site visits to the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service and personal
interviews with Director Sharon Wright.
4
The FBI has federal criminal jurisdiction over acts directly related to casino
gaming in Indian Country by virtue of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C.A. § 2710 et. seq.
5
To complicate matters, Congress has not provided a statutory definition of
the term “Indian.” The federal court did, however, create a two-prong test to
resolve the issue: (1) Is the individual of Indian descent or have a quantum of
Indian blood? and (2) Is the tribe federally recognized by the U.S. Government?
25 U.S.C. § 479.
6
The Cherokee Nation is self-governing with their own marshal’s service,
not under the direct control of BIA Law Enforcement Officers (who have the
authority to enforce both tribal and federal laws).
7
Even the term “victimless” has yet to be defined, especially when considering
drunk driving or speeding offenses; however, adultery, vagrancy, drug
possession, prostitution, disorderly conduct, and public drunkenness are
generally considered victimless crimes.
8
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
9
The general crime extends, through the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13,
most state criminal law and makes it a federal crime if committed by a non-
Indian on Indian lands (a.k.a. the Federal Enclaves Act and the Indian Country
Crimes Act).
10
The Indian Major Crimes Act provides that exclusive federal jurisdiction applies
when any Indian commits specific crimes against the person or property of
another Indian or other person within Indian country (18 U.S.C.A. § 1151, 1153).
The enumerated crimes in § 1153 (b) include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 190A 18 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. (e.g., certain
sexual offenses including rape and sexual abuse, incest, assault with intent to
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 171

 bodily injury, an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of
16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and theft).
11
Congress specifically declared that tribes have jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians (nontribal members who are Indian) under 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), thus
overturning Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 686 (1990).
12
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
13
The state of Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction over criminal offense
committed by one Creek Indian against another in Indian country [Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, § 401, 404, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1321, 1324, Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S.
713, 103 S. Ct. 3291 U.S. (1983).
14
See Indian Country Crime. Retrieved July 26, 2006, from www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/
indian/about.htm

Bibliography
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).

Cherokee Nation. (2004). Cherokee Nation Marshal service program summary.

Tahlequah, OK: Cherokee Nation Press.

Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696‑97, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990).

Gamallo, M. (1995, August 15). Cherokee chief sworn in. Tulsa World, p. 7.

General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).

Gibbons, B., & Glenn, E. (1997, August 14). Violence erupts at tribal courthouse.
Tahlequah Daily Press, p. 1.

Heck, B., Keen, R., & Wilds, M. (2001). Structuring the Cherokee Nation justice
system: The history and function of the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service.
Criminal Justice Policy Review, 12(1), 26‑42.

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136‑37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).

Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 401, 404, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1321, 1324 (2006).

Indian Country Crime. (2005). Retrieved November 15, 2005, from www.fbi.gov/
hq/cid/indian/about.htm

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (2006).

Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).

Massad, A., Layden, R., & Gibbens, D. (1997). The Massad Commission Report to
the Tribal Council of the Resignation Initiative Committee. Norman: University of
Oklahoma.

172 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Mouser, D. (1998/1999). A nation in crisis: The government of the Cherokee Nation
struggles to survive. American Indian Law Review, 23, 359.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).

Public Law No. 88‑280, 67 Stat. 588 (Act of August 15, 1953).

Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 103 S. Ct. 3291 U.S. (1983).

Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (1990).

Romano, L., (1997). A nation divided: The Cherokee government is in crisis and
tribal leaders say Chief Joe Byrd is to blame. The Washington Post, p. B1.

Strate v. A‑1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 n. 11 (1997).

United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).

18 U.S.C.A. § 1151.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1153.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (2).

18 U.S.C.A. § 2241 et seq.

18 U.S.C.A. § 2258.

25 U.S.C.A. § 479.

25 U.S.C.A. § 1321.

25 U.S.C.A. § 1324.

Michael R. Wilds, JD, is an associate professor at Northeastern State

University. Mike has his MCJA and JD from Oklahoma City University
School of Law and has studied law at Queens College, Oxford, England. He
is the immediate past chairman for the Criminal Law Section of the OBA and
Director of Publications for the OCDLA.

William Heck earned his PhD from Sam Houston University in 1990. He
has been a police officer in Louisiana and Texas and is currently an associate
professor of criminal justice, legal studies, and homeland security at
Northeastern State University.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 173

Appendix: Crime, Arrest, and Court Records for 2004

Figure 1: Minor Crimes in 2004

Disturbance Domestic Trespass Vandalism Environmental

January 6 2 0 4 2
February 1 1 3 1 0
March 3 7 1 4 0
April 9 9 1 2 0
May 2 3 5 0 0
June 3 1 3 2 0
July 0 3 2 1 0
August 3 1 3 2 0
September 0 4 2 4 0
October 1 2 3 3 0
November 1 2 4 2 0
December 0 0 1 1 0
Total 29 35 28 26 2
Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 2: Serious Property Crimes in 2004

Burglary Robbery Larceny Auto Theft

January 5 0 11 1
February 2 1 9 0
March 3 1 9 1
April 4 0 5 1
May 4 0 9 0
June 0 0 7 1
July 5 0 4 2
August 3 0 8 0
September 4 0 10 0
October 1 3 8 2
November 3 1 11 4
December 0 0 9 2
Total 34 6 100 14
Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

174 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Figure 3: Order Maintenance Activities in 2004

SOT Missing/ Natural Auto ICW Assist Assist Other

Call Out Alarm Runaway Death Accidents Juveniles Agencies
January 0 10 2 2 1 2 95
February 0 4 2 1 3 5 75
March 0 6 0 0 3 5 94
April 0 7 0 1 3 2 117
May 0 2 2 1 3 0 249
June 0 7 1 0 0 7 209
July 0 0 0 0 3 20 177
August 0 7 1 0 0 2 165
September 0 0 0 0 0 5 170
October 0 0 0 0 1 4 156
November 0 0 1 2 4 3 85
December 1 2 0 2 1 0 106
Total 1 45 9 9 22 56 1,698
Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 4: Service Activities in 2004

Civil/Court Citizen Community Other/

Process Assist Function Information
January 1 15 0 17
February 6 12 1 7
March 2 13 1 10
April 4 14 3 8
May 0 13 2 3
June 0 23 0 3
July 0 23 1 2
August 0 20 0 3
September 0 22 1 9
October 2 17 4 22
November 2 13 1 15
December 2 15 0 26
Total 19 200 14 125
Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 175

Figure 5: Arrests/Citations in 2004

Arrests Traffic Citations

January 35 4
February 20 0
March 43 10
April 50 2
May 44 5
June 35 10
July 42 5
August 35 10
September 43 12
October 38 10
November 35 10
December 35 11
Total 455 89
Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 6: Disposition of Cases Filed by Narcotics Unit in 2004

Total Successful Not Referred

Arrests Prosecutions for Prosecution
January 9 7 2
February 8 6 2
March 5 2 3
April 9 7 2
May 8 6 2
June 13 9 4
July 7 6 1
August 6 5 1
September 0 0 0
October 8 8 0
November 9 8 1
December 0 0 0
Total 82 64 18
Source: Marshal Service Narcotics Unit

176 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Figure 7: Disposition of Felony Cases in 2004

Crime Date Filed Court Filed Disposition

Domestic Violence 6-15-04 U.S. Eastern District 7 Years Federal
Assault & Battery with
Dangerous Weapon 6-18-04 U.S. Eastern District 6 Years Federal
Assault & Battery 6-18-04 U.S. Eastern District 4 Years Federal
Homicide 7-20-03 U.S. Eastern District 5 Years Federal
Child Sexual Abuse 8-06-04 Cherokee Nation Prosecuted in Cherokee Nation
District Court District Court
Destruction of Private 8-07-04 Cherokee Nation Prosecuted in Cherokee Nation
Property District Court District Court
Assault & Battery with
Dangerous Weapon 9-14-04 U.S. District Court Prosecuted in Federal District Court
First Degree Rape 11-12-04 U.S. Eastern District 14 Years Federal
Assault & Battery with
Dangerous Weapon 12-07-04 U.S. Eastern District 6 Months Federal Plea Bargain
Source: Marshal Service Investigative Division

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 177

178 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)
Translational Research: Bridging the
Gap Between Theory and Practice
William Crawley, PhD, Assistant Director, Grants Coordinator, School of
Criminal Justice, Grand Valley State University
Frank Hughes, PhD, Associate Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Grand
Valley State University
Lisa Dopke, BS, Litigation Support Specialist
Harry Dolan, MS, Chief of Police, City of Grand Rapids, Michigan

Introduction
In a perfect world, the observations and conclusions derived from research would
move practice toward the development of insightful ideas used to create more
effective strategies for addressing social issues. Logically, it seems as though
research and practice would easily complement one another; however, while this
is an appealing notion, each currently plays a minimal role in the formation or
improvement of the other.

In many social science disciplines, there remains a divide separating policy

makers, practitioners, and researchers. The field of criminal justice has been no
exception to this reality, as both policy and practice remain relatively uninformed
by existing empirical research, resulting in a current gap between research and
practices. Furthermore, practice activities are likewise not apt to inform the agenda
of researchers, so those to whom research findings might be most useful (i.e.,
practitioners) often unintentionally overlook their value. This may occur for any
number of reasons including public demands, differing paradigms, or political
pressures.

Both sides of this partnership, researchers and practitioners, have often recognized
this apparent gap, but solutions to the dilemma have yet to be thoroughly addressed.
Incentives for change are, however, beginning to shift previous paradigms relating
to the relationship between research and policy/practice. For example, in recent
years, federally sponsored programs have begun to require a significant percentage
of funds to be allocated toward the assessment of respective program goals and
objectives (typically 10%) (Lane, Turner, & Flores, 2004; Murphy & Dienemann,
1999; Tilley & Laycock, 2000; Welsh & Farrington, 2005). Consequently, “as funders
require programs and interventions to be evidence-based and expect outcome
evaluations to be conducted, clinicians, administrators/policy makers, and
researchers/educators will more likely participate in the integration of research to
practice” (Campbell, Daood, Catlin, & Abelson, 2005, p. 12).

Presently, evaluations conducted under these new requirements generally employ

applied research strategies. More specifically, applied research might be understood
as a strategy in which academics draw from the current scientific literature to
identify “best practices” for informing or addressing practitioner inquiries and/
or issues emerging from the field. While applied research provides a means for
researchers to promptly respond to practitioner questions relating to pressing
problems, it rarely produces the comprehensive solution that practitioners are

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 179

ultimately seeking. Instead, it may offer a short-term solution, or one that is
less than effective, as lessons from the literature are rarely on-point or directly
applicable to the issue(s) at hand (i.e., not site specific). When this occurs, the
practitioner has little recourse. In other words, the reason that the solution fails
is not readily apparent, leaving many questions unanswered, and the practitioner
back where he or she started. While this approach has produced a limited number
of effective results, it has also quite often exacerbated the gap currently separating
research and practice.

In an effort to assist vested parties in bridging this gap, we suggest that greater benefit
could be derived if those attempting to address common issues developed more
dynamic and reciprocal relationships utilizing the concepts of translational research.
Originating in the medical field, translational research offers vested parties (i.e.,
researchers, practitioners, policy makers, and community leaders) the opportunity
to work together in an effort to develop a more thorough understanding of the
intricacies of a particular problem, as opposed to simply looking to the literature
for solutions others have used to address similar problems.

As previously implied, differentiation between applied and translational research

is an important one. Applied research is limited to drawing “generic” solutions
from the literature to address some immediate problem; whereas, translational
research involves dynamic interactions across multiple agency/organizational
actors in addressing the issues at hand. In addition, such interactions are best
characterized by an openness to considering others’ perspectives, dedication, and
leadership among those vested, in an effort to reach mutual goals for addressing
such issues. Through this process, parties are able to share a variety of perspectives
and ideas, which will likely lead to more efficacious outcomes.

To date, there have been few initiatives throughout the criminal system that have
actively employed the concepts of a translational paradigm. For this reason, we
have reviewed studies from a number of other disciplines with some history of
effectively utilizing such concepts in an effort to promote a “model” of best practices
that might be used in appropriate future criminal justice-oriented endeavors. The
underlying issues that lead to the gap between research and practice inform these
practices. It is important to acknowledge and adjust for these existing limitations if
those vested are to begin shifting their current paradigms toward more evidence-
based policies and intelligence-led criminal justice strategies.

The Gap
In exploring issues that have typically fostered the gap between research and
practice, it became evident that several variables have traditionally contributed to
the manner in which the relevant parties related to one another. The factor that has
perhaps demonstrated the greatest impact was that these parties often worked in
organizations with very divergent paradigms. This can spur a resistance to change
among parties, fueled by negative attitudes and stereotypes, making it difficult for
them to consider the perspectives and ideas of those outside their familiar venue.
Because working successfully in partnership essentially requires some adjustment
on the part of each group member, it was fitting to explore this element of the gap
by considering the differing demands placed on researchers and practitioners.

180 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

While researchers tend to feel they have the luxury to ponder, advancing research
at a slow pace, the public demands swift action on the part of practitioners when
problems arise. Police, judges, and corrections officials often experience constant
pressure to solve crime problems today, rather than in the near future. This likely
happens for a number of reasons including round-the-clock media coverage of
violent crime and its devastating effect on victims and communities, demands by
citizen groups to keep their neighborhoods safer, and visual images of improper
use of force by police officers.

Due to this variation in pace, practitioners looking to researchers for an immediate

answer likely feel that the researchers have dropped the ball; however, this is
rarely the case. The real problem stems back to the fact that the parties influencing
our system of justice have differing priorities and agendas, which impacts the gap,
as it causes them to perceive problems and solutions very differently.

Another factor that has impacted the gap is that, “much research by social scientists
can be rather unhelpful to policy-makers and practitioners” (Tilley & Laycock,
2000, p. 215). While research findings are meant to provide knowledge and
support for the activities utilized in practice, they are typically not disseminated
in a manner conducive to a general audience (i.e., scholarly publications, academic
conferences, etc.). Moreover, the language common to this mode of dissemination
is not readily accessible to non-science-based audiences. This has tended to be
particularly problematic for practitioners as they have attempted to interpret and
apply research findings.

Taken together, these factors result in the lack of a common agenda as well as precise,
rigorously tested interventions (i.e., a gap between research and practice). Often,
when an intervention appears effective, the “why” necessary for reproduction of
the positive outcome is likely based more on speculation rather than concrete,
empirically grounded evidence.

As the criminal justice discipline advances, a means for bridging the gap between
research and practice is necessary for vested parties to best meet the needs of
those served. Hence, improving strategies requires understanding of two primary
considerations: (1) research questions and endeavors must be grounded in, and
continuously informed by, the practices and/or issues realized from the field
(i.e., the “practitioner reality”) and (2) field policies and related strategies are
implemented based on empirically driven information.

Origins of Translational Research

To advance criminal justice solutions/interventions over an extended period of time
requires the development of a strategy or paradigm facilitating the encouragement
of vested parties looking to one another for knowledge and insight. As briefly
discussed in the introduction, a proposed strategy in addressing this seemingly
difficult task is the practice of translational research, a term first initiated in the
medical field.

In the 1998 article entitled, Bridging the Gap Between Practice and Research, the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) called on scholars and clinicians to begin addressing the needs of the
public through “research to practice” (Lamb et al. as cited in Campbell et al., 2005). In

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 181

answering this call, the conceptual framework for translational research was established.
The concept, translational research, refers to the practice of scientists sharing innovation
and data produced in a laboratory setting with clinicians in order to refine it into a
legitimate remedy as dictated by their practice. Moreover, the remedy then becomes
immediately applicable in the treatment of disease.

Within this framework, the initial research itself was, and continues to be, informed
by the dynamics of the field as it creates a cooperative venue for applying what
is learned in the empirical world to the treatments and interventions needed by
practitioners. The fact that the field is determining the applicable and necessary
solutions creates a reciprocal relationship among the various stakeholders,
offering the necessary venue for developing a “shared dialogue.” Here, a mutual
understanding of the problem facilitates the formation of common goals and a
sense of partnership among participants. This is an important concept, as the
goal of translational research is to promote circumstances in which all parties at
the table feel they have a voice and are benefiting in some capacity. Moreover, a
combined effort offers a higher likelihood that the resulting solution will be more
efficacious than if one group or the other attempted to perform the task alone.

Since its inception in the medical field, the utilization of translational concepts
has been effectively illustrated in areas such as cancer research, cardiovascular
disease, and gene therapy (Hudgins & Allen-Meares, 2000). Attempts at combining
research and practice have also proven valuable in other contexts including
social work (Allen-Meares, Hudgins, Engberg, & Lessnau, 2005; Berg-Weger
et al., 2004), public health education (Roe & Lancaster, 2005) and occupational
health (Kramer & Wells, 2005), where collaborative endeavors of this nature have
joined researchers, practitioners, and policy makers in efforts to develop a shared
dialogue about widespread problems. Moreover, applying these concepts within a
criminal justice context will also likely provide successful results. While this seems
like common sense, the reality can be both time-consuming and difficult (Tilley &
Laycock, 2000).

For this reason, few cooperative projects of this nature have been initiated to date;
however, some projects in criminal justice contexts have been conducted using a
collaborative model conceptually similar to that of translational research. These
efforts have been published in the area of substance abuse treatment (Campbell
et al., 2005), juvenile probation (Lane et al., 2004), evaluation research (Tilley &
Laycock, 2000), and abuser intervention programs (Murphy & Dienemann, 1999;
see Table 1). In addition, two authors in the area of corrections have offered insight
and guidelines as to how mutual partnerships between agencies and academics
might be created and fostered (Smith, Tewksbury, & Potter, 2005; Gentry-Sperber,
Henderson-Hurley, & Hanley, 2005; see Table 2).

Reviewing the discussions related to these studies has indicated that a number of
the authors agree that the incorporation of a “research to practice” philosophy is
both necessary and inevitable in the area of criminal justice but that it has yet to
be fully realized. While the project documentation shows that the collaborative
process has not been completely refined within a criminal justice context, it does
offer insight as to how future efforts can best employ the translational model.
Additionally, these studies have allowed the authors to address some of the
practical needs and obstacles inherent to projects of this nature (e.g., necessary

182 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

levels of commitment, goal setting, regular assessments informed by the field
providing real-time feedback, etc.), which will also be helpful to those planning
future endeavors.

Table 1

Examples of Translational Research Efforts in Selected Areas of Criminal Justice

Authors and Year Area Translational Concepts Applied
Campbell, Daood, Substance Two statewide conferences were held in 2000 from which focus
Catlin, & Abelson Abuse groups were organized in an effort to explore the issues faced when
(2005) Treatment combining research and practice in this area. In identifying these
issues, the authors were able to build on the body of knowledge
related to the undertaking of this type of collaboration. In addition,
they identified how those issues might be addressed in future
initiatives.
Lane, Turner, & Juvenile The authors discussed their own experiences with a juvenile
Flores (2004) Probation probation project that required collaboration between researchers
and practitioners. They outlined the importance of combining
research and practice, as well as offered insight as to building and
maintaining those relationships beyond the initial project.
Tilley & Laycock Program The authors discussed various strategies that can be employed
(2000) Evaluation in order to develop more comprehensive solutions to crime
problems, including a discussion of limitations as to what makes
some interventions more successful than others, as well as issues
to consider when combining research and practice in future
assessments.
Murphy & Abuser A collaborative research task force held organized discussions in an
Dienemann (1999) Intervention effort to develop common research agendas, which would benefit
Programs the wide range of stakeholders. These discussions resulted in a
number of promising research initiatives in which the translational
principles would be applied.
Crawley, Hughes, Juvenile The city of Grand Rapids formed a partnership with Michigan
& Dopke (2006) Intervention State University and Grand Valley State University to pioneer a
Strategies progressive approach in responding to juvenile crime; a paradigm
shift that involved studying a problem first before launching a
responsive program. After the analytical research based work was
completed, a comprehensive new approach to juvenile crime was
developed and implemented by the police department and juvenile
courts.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 183

Table 2

Best Practice for Using Translational Research in Criminal Justice

Guideline Brief Explanation
Designated Leaders Designating leaders at the outset of the project increases the chance of a
successful collaboration in that leaders provide other members with motivation,
direction, and assistance with communication between organizations.
Bring the “Right” Each agency will bring separate but significant qualities to the table that include
Parties to the Table a unique perspective of the issues, willingness to compromise, and the ability
to assess and/or allocate resources. Things to consider with respect to choosing
who to include are the compatibility of personalities, openness to considering
others’ perspectives, and the capacity to overcome biases. Each of these
respective strengths builds on the cohesiveness of the group by ensuring that
every member agency has a “voice” in the process.
Mutual Goals Shared “vision” achieves buy-in, levels expectations, and provides incentive that
& Agenda each party will benefit in some capacity. Moreover, this will provide parties with
a sense of ownership of the project.
Open This creates a true sense of partnership by building a sense of trust between
Communication members. It also affords them the opportunity to hold open dialogue sessions
during which critical insights can be shared and a sense of shared responsibility
can be maintained.
Timeliness The nature of the project will determine the timeliness with which the group
is able to address the issues—all group members must be willing to adjust
priorities and expectations within reason in order to accomplish the group’s
goals.
Presentation of The group must be mindful to communicate as to the specificity of the findings
Findings so that expectations can be adjusted accordingly. It is also pertinent that findings
are reported to each agency at various points throughout the process so that each
is able to witness progress. In accordance with this, it may serve stakeholders to
develop “talking points,” in an effort to share the findings beyond the group.
Dedication Collaborations of this nature require concentrated effort for a continuous period
of time, which includes persevering when inevitable disagreements arise.

Based on a review of these initial studies, translational research within the context
of criminal justice is grounded in a spirit of collaboration and ongoing reciprocity.
It involves building an alliance among individuals linked by a common problem in
order to develop a viable solution for addressing that problem. With this in mind,
issues to consider at the outset of a project might include the type(s) of problem(s)
that need to be addressed, the resources an agency can offer, the expertise and
experience of the researchers, the time frame in which the group must operate, the
degree of control over the process each party wants, and expectations for the final
outcome of the project (Smith et al., 2005).

It is important to consider these issues in deciding who is “brought to the table,”

as an underlying philosophy of translational research demands some degree of
adaptation in how each represented organization/agency views the role of the
other. Moreover, all of these issues will likely impact the ability of the group to
move forward in developing a satisfactory solution to the problem.

184 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Relevant Parties
The benefit and importance of involving all relevant parties in the process of
enhancing and/or generating more effective policies, programs, and interventions
cannot be overemphasized. As indicated by Weisbord & Janoff (1995) in their
Integral Organizational Change Process Model, this is a critical element. The
model emphasizes that organizational change in criminal justice agencies requires
a complex, systematic transformation, as no agency operates in isolation. The
inclusion of various system stakeholders is, therefore, critical to the success of any
change effort. Here, such paradigm “shifts” are certainly facilitated through the
utilization of translational research practices.

Moreover, a significant number of stakeholders beyond the researchers and

practitioners likely exist within this context. For example, this might include
program administrators, educators, policy makers, citizens, and community
leaders (Campbell et al., 2005). Having these parties present allows each group
to take ownership of their past, present, and future; confirm their mutual values;
and commit to action plans grounded in reality. Regardless of who is at the table,
however, all parties must be vested in the success of the project, as numerous
stakeholders, each with differing perspectives and strategies, have the potential to
result in competing rather than common agendas (Campbell et al., 2005).

Logically, the first, and perhaps most important step in this process, is assembling
the right combination of representative individuals. These individuals must
possess strong leadership and communication skills, as successful collaboration
requires active leadership on many levels. Moreover, it may be prudent to appoint
leaders from each representative organization/agency who possess a solid
understanding of the problem and what outcomes are feasible in order to better
facilitate communication among the group.

Here, leaders can encourage participants to accommodate the needs of the group as
a whole by promoting a sense of understanding for all perspectives and ensuring
that the concerns of every participant are adequately addressed. Designating
leaders who are able to assist the group with communication may increase the
likelihood of the group’s ability to effectively address the issues.

Once the initial interactions have established a cohesive group, individual

members can begin discussing their unique knowledge and experiences relating to
the problem, thus building a collective understanding of how best to proceed. As
the work progresses, the group will begin to develop “talking points” to share their
successes. Talking points are a way of communicating the action and progress in
understandable bits to the public and other interested parties via media coverage.
“Bringing the information into the public arena through the media in ways that
maintain the integrity of the findings and conveys the information in an accessible
fashion is the key” (Petronio, 1999, p. 90).

In addition, this helps facilitate the ongoing conversations necessary for successful
advancement of the issues (Lane et al., 2004) in that positive exposure can be
used in this way to encourage collaboration by emphasizing the benefits of
translational research. It may also guide those who have not previously embraced
these principles, toward considering it a viable possibility. What’s more, talking

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 185

points encourage the growth of these practices beyond the initial collaboration,
as participants from the various venues network and move toward a collective
purpose.

The Benefits and Advantages

Employing a conceptual framework such as that utilized in translational research
presents several benefits. Briefly, these advantages might include more viable
and effective interventions; however, the advantages likely extend beyond these
obvious benefits, as an established relationship between university researchers,
community leaders, and criminal justice practitioners potentially serves each
in a separate but significant way. Most notably, public concerns can be more
readily addressed with combined efforts through improved communication and
information sharing.

From a practitioner’s perspective, translational research provides a law enforcement

agency with a unique opportunity to work with academics also actively
involved in the community. This partnership should then lead to a cooperative
identification of best practices and approaches to solving problems chronically
plaguing their shared community. To clarify, working collaboratively, community
and law enforcement leaders can partner to nominate a unique problem in need
of attention. Academics are then poised to help the group identify, explore, and/
or describe underlying correlates/causes of a unique problem, and subsequently
help implement and assess proactive problem-solving strategies.

Serving the community in this capacity offers university researchers an opportunity

to meaningfully fulfill their role of civic duty through research agendas driven
by community need. Translational research has the capacity to assist practitioners
in addressing problems more expediently from an empirical perspective. To
this end, a university gains rapport with the community and agencies, while
community/agency relations also improve. In addition, criminal justice agencies
will often gain access to a wider range of funding options, which is an important
benefit as agencies often lack funding for special emphasis projects. Partnering
with university researchers toward a specific end can bring in funding from new
sources such as grants.

Additionally, but perhaps less formally, projects of this nature might inform
changes to curriculum, incorporating innovative ideas through service learning.
These opportunities can enrich the course of study by offering students aspiring
to work as practitioners the chance to gain relevant work experience and network
with the agencies. Agencies benefit from this practice as well by gaining access to
“up and coming” practitioners. This likely guarantees that translational research
practices will perpetuate beyond the scope of immediate projects as the concepts
are instilled as part of the educational process.

Successful use of the concepts and practices of translational research potentially

constructs a set of circumstances in which all vested parties benefit from the end
result. For this reason, serious consideration should be given to what might be
accomplished in bridging the gap between research and practice by employing
such methods.

186 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Limitations
While the advantages are numerous, the pitfalls that exist with respect to the use
of research in guiding policy and practice must also be considered. It is helpful to
consider these potential limitations prior to project initiation, as these difficulties
can reduce the feasibility of this type of collaboration from the outset (Allen-
Meares et al., 2005).

The first issue that might be considered a limitation is that the translational
process can be arduous and challenging in nature. Specifically, the process may
be particularly time-consuming for those involved (Allen-Meares et al., 2005).
For instance, requiring practitioners to read through research that may or may
not offer meaningful suggestions or relevant ideas is not practical—other job
requirements likely take precedence over reading literature written in “technical”
terms (Campbell et al., 2005).

Another illustration of this point may come in how the group communicates
regarding the findings of the research. In particular, practitioners may find that
“researchers often have, at best, rather vague answers . . . to pressing questions,
with many caveats, qualifications, and admonitions for more research to be
done” (Murphy & Dienemann, 1999, p. 1322). Without adequately addressing
this limitation, solutions to problems can result in knee-jerk reactions by criminal
justice leaders, rather than well thought out strategies based on sound research,
input from relevant parties, and program evaluation.

A second limitation that would present a concern for the researchers is that
organizations might unintentionally abuse the findings of the research. This
occurs when an organization generalizes the findings beyond the original scope of
the project. While inference can be fine when the facts are placed within context,
the results must be used with caution, lest the entire process be delegitimatized.
“Most policy decisions are taken in a political context” (Tilley & Laycock, 2000,
p. 221), and maintaining a position may be difficult given political pressures. With
this in mind, it becomes important to closely guard the integrity of the project from
anyone who might use the findings to fulfill a personal or political agenda.

A final limitation that must be guarded against is a lack of rigorous assessments

failing to answer the “real” questions—lacking scientific validity. The limitation
here lies not in applying translational research practices, but rather that it is easier
to fall back to using old applied research models. In doing so, assessments may
follow the rules but not the true spirit of what the vested parties strive to do
(i.e., serving those in need).

When the group identifies and discusses these potential limitations at the outset
of a project, they can effectively address the limitations in a number of different
ways. Recognizing the limitations also requires vested parties to be aware of
the idea that “translation is more dynamic than simply applying our research to
problems” (Petronio, 1999, p. 88) and that it requires a group effort in developing
ways of negotiating a strategy toward a practice that satisfies all parties to some
degree (Lane et al., 2004).

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 187

Future Agenda
In furthering the development of evidence-based policies and the advancement
of intelligence-led policing strategies, the field of criminal justice is shifting in
the way leaders think about existing problems. This shift will likely result in the
development of new and perhaps more effective approaches, which can be further
promoted through the utilization of translational research concepts and practices.

With respect to the relationship between researchers and practitioners, the

discovery of a common dialogue is necessary in order to push the field beyond
what currently exists. As success stories resulting from the use of translational
research come to be recognized, it is likely that this practice will be utilized more
frequently in developing stronger, more effective interventions. If research is to
impact policies and practices in a meaningful way, stakeholders will likely need to
rely upon communication in promoting a new culture of cooperation among the
various participants.

In an effort to address the current research/practitioner gap, we propose that

researchers and practitioners alike consider the potential benefits that collaboration
and advancement of a deeper understanding could have for the criminal justice
field. A collaboration of this magnitude no doubt takes a great deal of effort and
organization on the front half but is something that could be truly beneficial well
beyond those involved in the initial process.

References
Allen-Meares, P., Hudgins, C., Engberg, M., & Lessnau, B. (2005). Using a
collaboratory model to translate social work research into practice and policy.
Research on Social Work Practice, 15(1), 29-40.

Berg-Weger, Tebb, S., Loveland Cook, C., Gallagher, M. B., Flory, B., & Cruce, A.
(2004). The Collaborative Research Education Partnership: Community, faculty,
and student partnerships in practice evaluation. Journal of Community Practice,
12(3/4), 141-162.

Campbell, T. C., Daood, C., Catlin, L., & Abelson, A. (2005). Integration of research

and practice in substance use disorder treatment: Findings from focus groups of
clinicians, researchers, educators, administrators, and policy makers. Journal of
Addictions & Offender Counseling, 26(1), 4-14.

Crawley, W., Hughes, F., & Dopke, L. (2006, October). Research utilization in criminal
justice. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Criminal Justice
Association, Chicago, IL.

Ferguson, J. (2002). Putting the “what works” research into practice. Criminal
Justice and Behavior, 29(4), 472-492.

Gentry-Sperber, K., Henderson-Hurley, M., & Hanley, D. (2005). Bridging the gap
between theory and practice: A call to action. Federal Probation, 69(1), 3-6.

188 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

Hudgins, C. A., & Allen-Meares, P. (2000). Translational research: A new solution
to an old problem? Journal of Social Work Education, 36(1), 2-5.

Kaufman, R. (2004). A university-community partnership to change public policy:

Pre-conditions and processes. Journal of Community Practice, 12(3/4), 163-180.

Kramer, D., & Wells, R. (2005). Achieving buy-in, building networks to facilitate
knowledge transfer. Science Communication, 26(4), 428-444.

Lane, J., Turner, S., & Flores, C. (2004). Researcher-practitioner collaboration

in community corrections: Overcoming hurdles for successful partnerships.
Criminal Justice Review, 29(1), 97-114.

Murphy, C. M., & Dienemann, J. A. (1999). Informing the research agenda on

domestic abuser intervention through practitioner-researcher dialogues. Journal
of Interpersonal Violence, 14(12), 1314-1326.

Petronio, S. (1999). Translating scholarship into practice: An alternative metaphor.

Journal of Applied Communication Research, 27(1), 87-91.

Roe, K., & Lancaster, B. (2005). Mind the gap! Insight from the first 5 years of the
circle of research and practice. Health Promotion Practice, 6(2), 129-133.

Smith, L., Tewksbury, R., & Potter, R. H. (2005). Practitioner-researcher partnerships:

Partnering for productivity. Corrections Today, 67(4), 106-107.

Tilley, N., & Laycock, G. (2000). Joining up research, policy and practice about
crime. Policy Studies, 21(3), 213-226.

Weisbord, M. R., & Janoff, S. (1995). Future search. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
Publishers.

Welsh, B., & Farrington, D. (2005). Evidence-based crime prevention: Conclusions

and directions for a safer society. Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal
Justice, 47(2), 337-354.

William Crawley, PhD, is currently the assistant director and grants

coordinator for the School of Criminal Justice at Grand Valley State
University. Dr. Crawley’s prior research has involved the examination of
drug market intelligence, need for treatment in criminal populations, and
comparative criminal justice. He has authored numerous research studies for
both private and government organizations including needs assessments,
process appraisals, and outcome evaluations. In addition, he has acted as
a consultant for the Department of Justice for 7 years and currently serves
as an advisor to a Project Safe Neighborhoods Federal Task Force on gun
violence.

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4) 189

 Frank Hughes, PhD, is currently an associate professor in the School of
Criminal Justice at Grand Valley State University. Prior to joining the
faculty at GVSU in the fall of 2002, he taught in the Master’s in Science and
Administration Program at Central Michigan University, College of Extended
Learning. Dr. Hughes completed 25 years of service with the Michigan
Department of State Police, completing his career as post commander of the
Mt. Pleasant post. Dr. Hughes is a 1995 graduate of the FBI National Academy
and is actively involved in leadership and management inservice training for
law enforcement personnel.

Lisa Dopke, BS, completed her bachelor’s degree in legal studies in 2005.
Currently, she is working for a large Michigan-based law firm as a litigation
support specialist, while completing her MS in criminal justice at Grand
Valley State University. Her area of research focus involves communications
with and throughout the criminal justice system.

Harry Dolan, MS, is currently the chief of police for the city of Grand
Rapids, Michigan. Prior to this appointment, he served as the chief of
police in Lumberton, North Carolina, and the chief of police for the North
Carolina Department of Human Resources Police Department located in
Black Mountain. Chief Dolan received his BS degree in criminal justice from
Western Carolina University and his MS degree in organizational leadership
and management at the University of North Carolina in Pembroke. In
addition, he is a certified public manager through the National Certified
Public Managers Consortium, North Carolina Office of State Personnel, and
has attended the Police Executive Development Program at the University of
North Carolina in Chapel Hill.

190 Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2007 • 7(4)

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Law Enforcement Unions – March 2005 _________
Generational Conflict and Diversity – May 2005 _________
Undercover Policing – July 2005 _________
Public Relations, Media and Political Affairs – September 2005 _________
Homeland Security – November 2005 _________
Racial Profiling: Special Edition – January 2006 _________
Best Practices in Recruitment and Retention – February 2006 _________
Gangs, Drugs, and Violence Prevention – March 2006 _________
Mental Health – May 2006 _________
Integrity-Based Policing – July 2006 _________
Police Resource Management: Patrol, Investigation, Scheduling – September 2006 _________
Interagency Cooperation – November 2006 _________
Critical Issues in Police Civil Liability – January 2007 _________
Special Edition – February 2007 _________
Police Officer Safety – March 2007 _________
Police Administration – May 2007 _________
Total Ordered _________

Topics for Next Year’s Subscribers (Topics Subject to Change)

Financial Management in Law Enforcement................................................................................................................... July 2007
Police Training: Investigations.............................................................................................................................. September 2007
Community Policing: Immigration......................................................................................................................... November 2007
FBI: 100 Years of Cooperation: Special Edition........................................................................................................ January 2008
The Impact of New Technology...................................................................................................................................March 2008
New Wave of Crime and Police Response..................................................................................................................... May 2008
Less Lethal Use of Force................................................................................................................................................ July 2008

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 Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive Institute
Law Enforcement Executive Forum
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