MACAILING vs.
ANDRADA
G.R. No. L-21607 January 30, 1970
FACTS:
A dispute over four (4) parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato, arose between plaintiffs, settlers
thereon occupying four hectares each, and Salvador Andrada, sales applicant of a bigger parcel, which
includes the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor.
The Director of Lands, however, reversed, declared that the portions adjudged to the four plaintiffs shall
be restored to the heirs (of Salvador Andrada) who should include them proportionately in the new
application to be filed by them respectively.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on October 27, 1956, reversed the Director
of Lands by awarding to plaintiffs the lands they claimed. Defendants sought reconsideration. On May 30,
1957, the Secretary denied. Defendants moved once more to reconsider. On September 12, 1957, the
Secretary rejected the reconsideration. The Secretary ruled that the Office has no more jurisdiction to
entertain the said motion. The Secretary categorically stated that the case was considered a closed
matter insofar as this Office is concerned.
On October 23, 1957, defendants appealed to the Office of the President. Assistant Executive
Secretary Enrique C. Quema, by authority of the President reversed the decision of the Secretary and
declared that the lands involved should be restored to the heirs of Andrada to be included in their
individual applications.
Plaintiffs started the present suit in the Cotabato court. They raised the issue of finality of the
decision of the Secretary.
Defendants appealed direct to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality of the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
RULING:
No. In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for
such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review
is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ
of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute,
the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available. Therefore, the
plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have jurisdiction over the Corporation, Board,
Officer or person whose acts are in question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the doctrines
invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable. Here the sole point in issue is whether
the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits
of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of
first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts
of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being
enforced."
The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof
provides:
12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.—The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (now Agriculture and Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case
shall become final, unless otherwise specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
the date of its receipt by the interested parties.
Section 13 following reads:
13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.—After a decision or order of the Secretary of
Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands has become final,
no motion or petition for reconsideration of such decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be
entertained by the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under Secretary or the Director
of Lands, as the case may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.
And Section 14 is to this effect:
"Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the
Under Secretary or the Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a decision,
order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or
excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time but in no case
exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or proceeding was taken."
Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27, 1956
within 30 days from their receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They
merely contend that their appeal was but 9 days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants received the
September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denying their second motion for reconsideration. That ruling, it
must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary's decision "had long become final and
executory." By reason of which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more jurisdiction
to entertain the said motion."
