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SECOND DIVISION

FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION G.R. No. 216574

BUREAU (FFIB) - OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR Members:
THE MILITARY AND OTHER
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICES, CARPIO, Chairperson
Petitioner, PERLAS-BERNABE,
CAGUIOA,
- versus - J. REYES, JR., and
LAZARO-JAVIER,

RENATO P. MIRANDA,
Respondent. Promulgated:

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

THE CASE

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to reverse and set aside
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 127459
entitled "Renato P. Miranda v. Office of the Ombudsman-Office ofthe Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices and Fact-
Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB-OMB-MOLEO)":

1. Decision3 dated July 30, 2014 which reversed and set aside respondent's
1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanez with Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and Associate
Justice Carmelita S. Manahan, concurring.
3 Rollo, pp. 31-39.

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Decision 2 G.R. No. 216574

dismissal from the service as decreed by petitioner Office of the Deputy

Ombudsman-MOLEO in OMB-P-A-06-0106-A; 4

2. Resolution 5 dated January 13, 2015 which denied petitioner's motion

for reconsideration. 6

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Sometime in April 2000, the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC)

earmarked and released P36,768,028.95 as Combat Clothing Allowance and
Individual Equipment Allowance (CCIE) for its enlisted personnel for CY
1999. Each enlisted employee was to get PS,381.25 as Combat Clothing
Allowance and P6,337.80 as Individual Equipment Allowance, or a total of
Pl4,719.05. The disbursements were released through nineteen (19) checks in
various amounts. PMC Commanding Officer and Deputized Disbursing
Officer Major Felicisimo C. Millado and PMC Commandant BGen. Percival
M. Subala signed the checks payable to Deputized Disbursing Officer Major
Millado. 7

Acting on the records forwarded by the Commission on Audit (COA),

FFIB-OMB-MOLEO initiated an investigation of subject disbursements. On
basis thereof, FFIB-MOLEO charged respondents MGen. Renato P. Miranda
(Formerly Col. Miranda, SG 26), BGen. Percival M. Subala (SG 27), Lt. Col.
Jeson P. Cabatbat (SG 25), Maj. Adelo B. Jandayan (SG 24), Capt. Felicisimo
C. Millado (SG 23), Capt. Edmundo D. Yurong (SG 23), and Carolyn L.
Bontolo (SG 15) with malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents, violation of COA Rules and Regulations, and violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The case was docketed 0MB P-A-06-00106-A. 8

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY

OMBUDSMAN-MO LEO

In its Affidavit-Complaint9 dated January 13, 2006, FFIB-OMB-

MOLEO alleged that through "random sampling" of liquidation payrolls,
COA discovered that some PMC personnel did not receive the Pl4,719.05
CCIE allowance supposedly intended for each of them. These PMC personnel
disowned the signatures appearing on the payrolls and even denied

4 Decision dated February 27, 2009 penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Jamila R. Cruz-
Sarga, concurred in by Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, and approved by Acting Ombudsman Orlando C.
Casimiro, rollo, pp. 50-57.
5 ld.at41-42.
6 Id. at 43-49.
7 Id. at 50-51.

a Id.
9
CA rollo, pp. 40-46.

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Decision 3 G.R. No. 216574

authorizing any representative to receive these allowances on their behalf. 10

They also pointed out that the liquidation payrolls were prepared following
the payrolls system based on rank. This new payroll system meant that the
payroll shall be routed to all marine personnel in different locations all over
the country. This sharply deviated from the standard procedure of preparing
payrolls according to unit assignment to facilitate its release by the liaison
officer to the PMC personnel concerned. The PMC personnel further
disclosed that they had already been receiving clothing allowance of P200.00
each sincee long before; but they never received the supposed additional
clothing allowance of PS,381.25. 11

As for respondent MGen. Renato Miranda, FFIB-OMB-MOLEO found

that he did not have the authority to approve the grant of the CCIE. It was the
head of office, PMC Commandant BGen. Subala who had such authority
conformably with Section 168, Volume 1 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual. 12

Respondent's Defense

In refutation, respondent argued that it was BGen. Subala who

authorized him to approve the corresponding disbursement vouchers. He
maintained that when all the conditions and requirements for approval of the
disbursement vouchers were present, he had no discretion but to approve the
same. 13

As regards the other respondent officers, they, too, argued that they
signed the checks as part of their •ministerial duty considering that the
requirements for approval of the disbursements were all complied with. 14

RULING OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN-

MOLEO (ODO-MOLEO)

By Decision 15 dated February 27, 2009, the ODO-MOLEO found five

(5) respondent officers, including MGen. Renato P. Miranda, guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty. They were ordered dismissed from the service. As
for Maj. Adelo Jandayan, in view of his retirement from the service, his
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, were ordered forfeited, with
prejudice against re-employment with the government. With respect to BGen.
Percival Subala and Carolyn Bontolo, the cases against them were dismissed.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads, viz:
t
10 Id. at 40-42.
11 Id. at 42-43.
12 Id. at 43.
13 Id. at 50-52.
14 Id. at 51-52.
15 Rollo, pp. 50-57.

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Decision 4 G.R. No. 216574

WHEREFORE, finding substantial evidence, this

Office finds respondents COL. RENATO P. MIRANDA,
LT. COL. JESON P. CABATBAT, MAJ. AD.ELO B.
JANDAYAN, CAPT. FELICISIMO C. MILLADO, and
CAPT. EDMUNDO D. YURONG GUILTY of Grave
Misconduct and Dishonesty pursuant to Section 19 in
relation to Section 25, RA 6770 otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, and are hereby meted out the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service effective
immediately with forfeiture of all the benefits, except
accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or service of the government
including government owned and controlled corporations.

With respect to respondent MAJ. ADELO B.

JANDAYAN, since he had already retired from the service,
the forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, is hereby ORDERED, and his reemployment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations is
PROSCRIBED.

With respect to respondents BGEN. PERCIVAL M.

SUBALA and CAROLYN L. BONTOLO, this case is
hereby DISMISSED.

XXX

In its Joint Order 16 dated November 25, 2011, the ODO-MOLEO

denied the respective motions for reconsideration of herein respondent MGen.
Miranda, (Ret.) Capt. Millado, and Lt. Col. Cabatbat.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS

On respondent's petition for review, he faulted the ODO-MOLEO for

finding him guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and ordering his
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties. He insisted that he
approved the CCIE disbursement as part of his ministerial duty. He also
rejected the ODO-MOLEO's finding that he conspi}ed with his co-
respondents below.

In its Comment 17 dated January 18, 2013, petitioner FFIB-OMB-

MOLEO asserted that the ODO-MOLEO did not err when it found
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. 18

16 Id. at 58-65, penned by GIPO Kathryn Rose A. Hitalia-Baliatan, and reviewed by Director Dennis L.
Garcia and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales.
17 CA rollo, pp. 278-306.
18 Id. at 291.

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Decision 5 G.R. No. 216574

Under Decision 19 dated July 30, 2014, the Court of Appeals reversed,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

The assailed Decision dated 27 February 2009 and the Joint
Order dated 25 November 2011 issued by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law
Enforcement Officers are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
with respect to petitioner Renato P. Miranda. Accordingly,
Renato P. Miranda is EXONERATED from the
administrative charges against him for lack of substantial
evidence.

SO ORDERED. 20

The Court of Appeals found that no substantial evidence was presented

showing that respondent actively participated in the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government. The documents signed by petitioner only showed he
approved the release of subject funds upon certification by subordinate
officers in charge of evaluating the proposed disbursement that the same was
in order and that funds were available for the purpose. The mere fact of signing
the documents in question did not make respondent liable for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, conformably with the Court's pronouncement in
Albert v. Gangan. 21

Under Resolution22 dated January 13, 2015, FFIB-OMB-MOLEO's

motion for reconsideration was denied.

THE PRESENT PETITION

Petitioner FFIB-OMB-MOLEO, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, represented by then Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay,
Assistant Solicitor General Marissa Macariag-Guillen, and Senior State
Solicitor Karen A. Ong, now implores the Court to exercise its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction to reverse and set aside the assailed Decision dated July
30, 2014 and Resolution dated January 13, 2015.

Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: ( 1) ruling that respondent

cannot be held administratively liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty in
the absence of direct evidence of conspiracy with other PMC officers in the
release of more than P36 Million in clothing and equipment allowances; and
(2) dismissing the complaint in OMB-P-A-06-00106-A on the strength of

19 Id. at 463-470.
20 Id. at 470.
21
406 Phil. 231, 242 (200 I).
22 CA rollo, pp. 509-510.

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Decision 6 G.R. No. 216574

Albert v. Gangan 23 which authorizes officers to rely on the certifications,

recommendations, and memoranda of subordinate officers or staff, before
giving their own seal of approval on official documents or transactions.

According to petitioner, respondent together with other PMC personnel

clearly participated in the web of conspiracy to defraud the government of a
substantial amount through the fictitious grant of CCIE allowances to
supposed enlisted PMC personnel who vigorously denied having received the
same. Respondent performed the following specific acts which are allegedly
indispensable to the consummation of the fraud, viz:

ONE. Through a document captioned Funds Entrusted to Agent

Officer/Teller, he authorized Maj. Jandayan to receive the P36,768,028.95
CCIE funds, albeit, the latter was not the duly authorized disbursement
officer; and

TWO. Although claiming that the CCIE funds were used to purchase
clothing and equipment for PMC enlisted personnel, he submitted payroll
copies showing that the supposed beneficiaries received checks, not anything
in kind. One hundred forty-five (45) of these supposed beneficiaries, however,
attested that they did not receive these funds in full or in part.

Petitioner also rejects respondent's invocation of Arias and Gangan.

Being a mere subordinate officer in the hierarchy of the PMC, respondent
cannot validly excuse himself from the duty of thoroughly reviewing the
documents which are routed to him in the regular course of the PMC's
operations.

Respondent counters, 24 in the main:

FIRST. No evidence was adduced to prove the elements of corruption

nor his clear intent to violate the law and established rules. Neither was it
established that he had a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud the
govemment. 25 The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the documents
on record did not on their face show any irregularity which could have
prompted him to doubt before affixing his signature of approval. 26

SECOND. He relied on the presumption that the reviewing and

approving officers who processed the documents had done so in a regular
manner. After all, these officers below had already performed the process of
verification, ensuring that the acquisition of supplies or equipment was
necessary, the funds therefor were available, and disbursement and
distribution of the checks were actually done. 27

23
Supra Note 21.
24 Comment dated July 21, 2015, rollo, pp. 85-90.
25 Rollo, p. 85.
26 Id. at 85-86.
27 Id. at 86-87.

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Decision 7 G.R. No. 216574

THIRD. The element of corruption is absent in this case. Records do

not show that he unlawfully appropriated for himself any amount from the
CCIE allowances. 28 He was not even involved in the distribution or
safekeeping of these funds. 29 Verily, the extent of his participation in
approving the release of the CCIE allowances cannot be equated with grave
misconduct and dishonesty.

FOURTH. Lt. Col. Dammang presented evidence showing that

payments were actually made to the suppliers of the uniform and equipment.
means that the CCIE funds were appropriated according to their This simply
purpose and the government did not suffer any injury by reason thereof. 30

Petitioner, thus, presents the following issues for our resolution:

1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it ruled that in the absence of direct
evidence of conspiracy, respondent cannot be held liable for grave misconduct
and dishonesty?

2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly rely on Gangan and similar cases
to support a decree of exoneration in respondent's favor?

RULING

To hegin with, the Court clarifies that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. 31 Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides, thus:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party

desiring to appeal by ce11iorari from a judgment, final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and
shall raise only questions oflaw, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies
by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at
any time during its pendency. (As amended by A.M. No. 7-
12-07-SC)

Jurisprudence, however, has laid down exceptions. 32 The presence of

28 Id. at 88.
29 Id. at 87.
30 Id. at 89.
31 Rule 45, Sec. 1, Rules of Court.
32 The general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits exceptions, to wit: (I) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is

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Decision 8 G.R. No. 216574

any one of these exceptions compels the Court to review all over again the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Here, the Court is constrained to
take a second look at the factual milieu of the case and re-evaluate if the Court
of Appeals committed reversible error in absolving respondent of his
administrative liability under the law, in the face of evidence on record
supporting a different conclusion.

Existence of Conspiracy

Bahilidad v. People defines conspiracy, in this wise, viz:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to

an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the
physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, all taken
together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to
show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to
exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to
commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of
intentionality on the pmi of the cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed
some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the
execution of the crime committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his
co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any
active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes
of conviction. 33

To prove conspiracy, it is not always necessary that direct evidence be

presented to establish its existence. That the conspirators came to an
agreement to pursue a common evil design may be inferred from the overt
acts of the conspirators themselves. The act of every conspirator must be
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial comi; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact 'of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. (Miano v.
Manila Electric Company, 800 Phil. 118, 123 (2016.)
33
629 Phil. 567, 575 (2010).

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Decision 9 G.R. No. 216574

shown to have been done to contribute to the realization of a common

unlawful goal. In Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, 34 the Court ordained:
(1

xxx In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two

forms. The first is the express form, which requires proof of
an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to
commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always
shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have
the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied
conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to
have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied
conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime
indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action
and a community of interest. xxx

Here, respondent was accused of being a co-conspirator in an alleged

grand design to steal money from government coffers under the guise of
supposed disbursements for clothing and equipment of enlisted PMC
personnel. Respondent's purported participation in the alleged conspiracy was
his act of signing the disbursement vouchers and authorizing the transfer of
funds to Maj. Jandayan who was not duly authorized to receive, nay, disburse
these funds.

Respondent asserts that his acts and those of the other accused did not
show a concerted effort toward achieving a common criminal goal. For they
simply acted in the performance of their ministerial duty of approving the
documents relative to the proposed disbursements in light of a clear showing
that these documents had already passed the hands of several subordinate
officers who had carefully reviewed and certified them to be correct.
Respondent also asserts that his only pmiicipation in the questioned
transaction 'was signing the disbursement vouchers for the CCIE allowances
in his capa~ity as duly authorized representative of the head of office.

Respondent's argument does not persuade.

Respondent's culpability did not arise solely because he signed the

disbursement vouchers. His culpability rather was hinged on his act of
authorizing Maj. Jandayan to receive the CCIE funds, albeit, the latter did not
have the requisite authority to receive, much less, disburse these funds.

34 790 Phil. 367, 419-420 (2016) (citations omitted).

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Decision 10 G.R. No. 216574

Entrusting funds to an
unauthorized officer

Respondent cannot validly claim that signing the disbursement

vouchers was part of his ministerial duty. Notably, what gave rise to his
liability was his entrusting a large amount of public funds to an officer who
did not have the authority to receive, let alone, disburse the funds. And as it
turned out, the funds which respondent entrusted to Maj. :Jandayan were not
disbursed to their supposed beneficiaries. No one could, account for these
funds anymore, not even Maj. Jandayan himself.

It is indubitable that Maj. Jandayan came into the picture only when
respondent out of nowhere and without any valid designation or authority
possessed by Maj. Jandayan suddenly brought the latter in as recipient and
disburser of the funds. It was truly the final operative act which caused first
the release, then the misappropriation, and finally the total loss of the funds
which to date, have remained unaccounted for.

In Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, 35 the Court recognized the importance

of the individual acts performed by each conspirator which may at first seem
to be an independent act but which, if taken together, would demonstrate the
common criminal goal of the conspirators. The Court ordained:

"xxx no doubt the defraudation of the government would not have

been possible were it not for the cooperation respectively extended
by all the accused, including herein petitioner. The scheme
involved both officials and employees from the Regional Office.
Some made the falsifications, others worked to cover-up the same
to consummate the crime charged. Petitioner's role was indubitably
an essential ingredient especially so because it was he who issued
the false LAAs, which as previously mentioned, initiated the
commission of the crime. When the defendants by their acts aimed
at the same object, one performing one part, and the other
performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently
independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in concluding
that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy xxx"

The Comi keenly notes that from day one up until now, respondent has
not produced the authority of Maj. Jandayan, if any, to receive and disburse
the funds in question. Too, respondent up until now has not directly or
indirectly responded to the core issue against him, albeit, he alleged lot of
things in his pleadings before the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court of
Appeals and this Court. Nowhere in any of these pleadings did respondent

35
231 Phil. 429, 435-436 (1987).

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Decision 11 G.R. No. 216574

ever give a direct response to, let alone, refutation of, the damaging evidence
against him.

Respondent's disturbing silence on the singular cause of his indictment

could only be inferred as an implied admission of the veracity of these
accusations. Judge Noel-Bertulfo v. Nunez is apropos:

The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an

unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is
totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and
say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence
in such cases is almost always construed as implied
admission of the truth thereof. 36

Inapplicability of Gangan
'
t

Respondent invokes the ruling in Albert v. Gangan 37 which essentially

ordains that a head of office may rely on the certifications, recommendations,
and memoranda of his subordinates who have presumably performed their
duty of reviewing, examining, evaluating, scrutinizing, inquring, and probing
all the documents relative to a transaction, before presenting them to the head
of office for approval.

FFIB-OMB-MOLEO rejects the application of Gangan here allegedly

because respondent was not a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, department head, or chief of office. Since respondent
did not occupy an equivalent post, Gangan, according to FFIB-OMB-
MOLEO is not available to him as a defense.

The Court opines that this is not the appropriate case for an extended
discourse on Gangan. For in the first place, Gangan is not even applicable
herein.

In any event, to emphasize anew, respondent is not faulted for relying,

or at least believing that he had the right to rely, on the documents he claims
to have already been thoroughly processed and reviewed by his subordinates.

Respondent's liability hinges on this question: Why did he designate

Maj. Jandayan as recipient and disburser of the CCIE funds, albeit, the latter
was not the duly authorized disbursing officer nor the duly designated official
authorized to act in the absence of the regular disbursing officer?

It is clear as day that not a single piece of document routed to him by

his subordinates ever named Maj. Jandayan as the duly authorized person to
36 Judge Noel-Bertulfo v. Nunez, 625 Phil. 111, 121 (2010).
37 See Supra Note 21.

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Decision 12 G.R. No. 216574

receive and disburse the funds in question. As stated, it was respondent alone
who toward the end of the documents processing brought for the first time
named Maj. Jandayan as recipient and disburser of the funds, albeit, the latter
was not clothed with the proper authority.

Respondent is guilty of
grave misconduct and
serious dishonesty

Office of the Ombudsman, et al v. PS/Supt. Espina defines grave

misconduct and serious dishonesty, in this wise:

Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or

unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. It is intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior
and to constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct
should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer. It is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
a public officer. xxx

On the other hand, dishonesty, which is defined as the

"disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity," is classified in three (3)
gradations, namely: serious, less serious, and simple.
Serious dishonesty comprises dishonest acts: (a) aausing
serious damage and grave prejudice to the government; (b)
directly involving property, accountable forms or mohey for
which respondent is directly accountable and the respondent
shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and
corruption; (c) exhibiting moral depravity on the part of the
respondent; (d) involving a Civil Service examination,
irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not
limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets; (e)
committed several times or in various occasions; (f)
committed with grave abuse of authority; (g) committed with
fraud and/or falsification of official documents relating to
respondent's employment; and (h) other analogous
circumstances. 38 ( emphasis supplied)

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer. As an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public

38 Office of the Ombudsman, et al v. PS/Supt. Espina, 807 Phil. 529, 540-542 (2017) (citations omitted).

11·
Decision 13 G.R. No. 216574

officer. 39 It is considered grave where the elements of corruption and clear

intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. 40

To repeat, respondent violated the rule that whoever holds custody of

official funds in trust must bear the requisite authority. Respondent was in
charge of affirming the grant, release, and disbursement of millions of pesos
in PMC funds. It was upon his directive alone through the document captioned
Funds Entrusted to Agent Officer/Teller, that the funds were ordered released
to Maj. Jandayan. Respondent cannot explain why he entrusted the CCIE
funds to Maj. Jandayan, albeit, the latter did not have the requisite authority
to hold and disburse the same for the PMC.

In addition, respondent knowingly, nay, unlawfully named Maj.

Jandayan trustee of the funds at least twelve (12) times 41 in several millions
of pesos. As it was, the intended beneficiaries did not receive the funds.
Respondent again could not explain why it was so. Verily, he is guilty of grave
misconduct.

Respondent's culpability for dishonesty, on the other hand, is rooted in

his actions indicating his predisposition to lie for the purpose of defrauding
the government in huge amounts of public funds. He diverted the CCIE
allowances of marine personnel, entrusting them to one not duly authorized to
receive, let alone, disburse the same to their supposed beneficiaries. As it
turned out, the beneficiaries did not receive even a single centavo of these
public million funds. And it was respondent's irresponsible, nay, unlawful
action which directly caused serious damage and prejudice to the government.
For public funds were dissipated and lost beyond recovery.

The Court notes that respondent presented receipts supposedly issued

by suppliers for clothing and equipment claimed to have been purchased using
the CCIE funds and stock cards. He was trying to establish that these supplies
were actually delivered to the PMC personnel concerned.

We are not persuaded. The so called receipts were produced too late in
the day; only after respondent and the PMC officials had already been charged
with ghost disbursement of funds. The lie becomes more evident considering
that per official records, the intended beneficiaries were supposed to receive
cash and not anything in kind like clothing or equipment supplies.

At any rate, the existence of receipts of purchase is one thing, the actual
receipt of the merchandise or items themselves is another. The supposed
beneficiaries denied receipt of these items.

39 See Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, et al v. Mary Ann Castro, 759 Phil. 68, 79 (2015) (citation
omitted).
40 See Vertudes v. Buenajlor, 514 Phil. 399, 424 (2005).
41 CA rollo, pp. 340-358.

t
Decision 14 G.R. No. 216574

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial

evidence. 42 It is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable
might conceivably opine differently. 43 The evidence adduced here,
specifically, the repeated, yet, unexplained authorization extended to Maj.
Jandayan to receive and disburse the CCIE funds speak for themselves. Had
respondent not done it, public funds would not have been dissipated and lost.
What respondent did was truly indispensable to the consummation of the
unlawful disbursement of public funds which caused prejudice to the
government.

The Constitution ordains: "[p]ublic office is a public trust [and] [p ]ublic

officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." This Constitutional standard of
conduct is not intended to be a mere rhetoric, and should not be taken lightly.
For those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard
or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. 44

All told, the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it exonerated

respondent from the charges of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty.
There is in fact compelling evidence on record showing that respondent did
commit these offenses.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated

July 30, 2014 and Resolution dated January 13, 2015 of the Court of Appeals,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Decision dated February 27, 2009 and Joint Order dated November
25, 2011 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-P-A-06-0106-A are
REINSTATED. Major General Renato P. Miranda is found guilty of grave
misconduct and serious dishonesty. He is ordered DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave benefits, if any.
He is perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any branch or service
of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

A M Y / ~ - JAVIER
Associate Justice

42 Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602,604 (201 I).
43 See Fajardo v. Corral, G.R. No. 212641, July 5, 2017, 830 SCRA 161, 168 (citation omitted).
44 Field Investigation Office ofthe Office of the Ombudsman v. Castillo, 794 Phil. 53, 65 (2016), citing Amit
vs. Commission on Audit, et al., 699 Phil 9, 25 (2012).
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 216574

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

JI),~
ESTELA M'."fERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

f,k,_,
SE C. REks;.ra.
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

I)
Decision 16 G.R. No. 216574

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the above
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.