Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.

104768, July 21, 2003

Case Facts:

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued ​ Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") and created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG")​. EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG
to recover all ill-gotten wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, ​ his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.

EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order."
Accordingly, the PCGG created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate
reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP
Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendations on the reported unexplained
wealth of Ramas.

On 3 March 1986​, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search
warrant captioned “Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” ​The raiding team seized
the items detailed in the seizure receipt ​together with other items not included in the
search warrant.​ ​The raiding team seized firearms, jewelry, and land titles.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
(“RA No. 1379”) against Ramas. The complaint was amended to include Elizabeth Dimaano, the
alleged mistress of Ramas, as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.” The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.

Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because
there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated, among others.

Hence, this appeal.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution​. Petitioner contends
that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. ​Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Issue:
Whether or not the search at Dimaano’s home was legal.

Ruling:
The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT legal.

Rationale:

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was ​“​done in defiance
of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.​“​ The resulting government was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government.​ Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by
mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

The protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained
in effect during the interregnum.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.”

The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the UDHR did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only a UDHR, the Court has interpreted the UDHR
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus,
the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the UDHR.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations
under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another matter and is not the issue here. ​Suffice it to say that
the Court considers the UDHR as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as
human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the ICCPR. The
fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the same way
it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government
could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations
under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law
that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.​ ​The Provisional Constitution served
as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers
entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,
and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from
the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.