Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs.

Elvin Chan,
G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

FACTS:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon)
with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v.
Eduardo Simon.

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal
amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment,
which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan
vehicle of Simon.

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application
to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent motion to
dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. The MTC
cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that the case for sum of money is one based
on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is
required

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC. On
the CA, Chan's appeal was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded
check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.

RULING:
NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the
issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).

This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed."

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding
civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized."

Lee PueLiong a.k.a. Paul Lee vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013

Josephine M. Sanchez vs. Far East Bank & Trust Company,

G.R. No. 155309, November 15, 2005

The original criminal action involves the prosecution of Sanchez for estafa or
swindling through falsification of commercial documents Kai Chin is the director and
representative of Chemical Bank. Its subsidiary, Chemical International Finance
Limited is an investor in Far East Bank and Trust Co.

To represent CIFL, Chin was made a director and senior VP of FEBTC and
Josephine Sanchez is Chins secretary FEBTC says that Sanchez made unauthorized
withdrawals from the account of CIFL in FEBTC using forged/falsified applications for
cashiers checks that would be deposited into her account and, once credited, would
be withdrawn by Sanchez to be misappropriated, for her personal benefit to the
damage of FEBTC Sanchez allegedly employed 3 different modes in the perpetration
of the crime that each involved some kind of forgery of Chins signatures
Sanchez then confessed to Chin that she tampered with the CIFL account and
Chin referred the matter to the FEBTC audit division.

All checks and the applications for their issuance were sent to the PNP Crime
Lab for examination: found all Chins signatures were good forgeries FEBTC had to
reimburse the CIFL account with P3,787,530.86 Sanchez denied the forgeries,
asserting that the deposit into her account was with the authority and under the
instructions of Chin and that she withdrew the money but turned the same over to
Chin Chin denied giving Sanchez authority, saying that she signed the documents but
he did not rebut the alleged turnover of the proceeds

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Procedural: Did the judgment of conviction already become final when the
MR of the civil aspect of the case was filed by FEBTC? NO: The time for filing the
same should be counted from FEBTCs receipt of the decisions
2. What is the civil liability of Sanchez, if any, in light of her acquittal?
Art. 100, RPC: every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except
when no actual damage like espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to enemy
country, crime against popular representation Extinction of criminal liability does not
always carry with it the extinction of civil liability Art. 29, NCC: When the accused is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence
An action for the recovery of civil liability is necessarily included in the criminal
proceedings unless:
o Express waiver
o Reservation
o Civil filed before criminal
Because none of the exceptions exist, the civil action was also prosecuted in the
criminal case so there can be no more separate civil action
CONSEQUENCES OF ACQUITTAL ON CIVIL LIABILITY: There are two kinds of acquittal
1. Acquittal because the accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of No civil liability for the person found not to be the perpetrator of the
crime. Acquitted never be held liable for it: there being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question Civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of
2. Acquittal because guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
Even if guilt not satisfactorily proven, no exemption from civil liability, which is
proven only by preponderance of evidence. This is what is contemplated under Art.
29: the same act or omission
Acquittal doesnt prevent judgment on civil aspect where:
1. Acquittal on reasonable doubt
2. Court declared accused liable civilly
3. Civil liability not based on crime for which accused was acquitted Civil action based
on delict is extinguished if there is a finding that the act or omission from which civil
liability may arise did not exist or accused didnt commit the imputed acts or
omissions.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on
the civil aspect, prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal or else
double jeopardy

Aggrieved/offended or accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect if the case within the period therefor ONLY in the cases of 1, 2, 3 above
Because Sanchez was found not to have committed the crime imputed, her acquittal
extinguished the action for civil liability

There was no evidence on record that the money never turned over to
Kai Chan Sanchez consistently claimed that she acted with authority, that even if
deposited in her account, she withdrew and turned value over the
Chin Records dont show that she ever appropriated the money for her personal gain
Kai Chin didnt rebut the statement as to turnover Records show that Kai Chin did in
fact give Sanchez authority

The issue of forgery wasnt successfully proven RULE 111, SEC. 2(B) ROC: A finding in a
final judgment that the fact from which civil liability may arise does not exist carries
with it the extinction of the civil liability Was the civil liability of Sanchez duly
established? NO Sanchez was acquitted based on the fact that she hadnt committed
the offense imputed to her she cant be held civilly liable

Jose Burgos, Jr., vs. Spouses Eladio, SJ,

G.R. No. 219468, June 8, 2016

It is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in an
appeal on the criminal aspect of a case. If there is a dismissal of a criminal case by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may
bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale
therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the
criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining
witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in
interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.

FACTS: BURGOS filed an Information against SPOUSES ELADIO AND ARLINA NAVAL
AND
THEIR DAUGHTER, AMALIA NAVAL (SPS NAVAL ET AL.) of the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents.

The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Aggrieved, BURGOS
moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Thus, BURGOS elevated the matter to
the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138203.

In a Resolution dated March 5, 2015, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of
BURGOS to join the People in his certiorari petition as required by the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Unstirred, BURGOS moved for reconsideration, 26 which was likewise denied. The CA
observed that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has not consented to the filing
of the certiorari petition hence, this petition before the Court.

ISSUE:
Is the authorization of the OSG needed in filing a petition for certiorari in relation to
the criminal aspect of the case?

HELD:
It is necessary that the same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law,
is the proper representative of the People, the real party in interest in the criminal
proceedings.

In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of
the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is perforce
dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even
without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in
the civil aspect of the case.
In this case, records show that BURGOS's petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No.
138203 sought for the reinstatement of the Information and/or a ruling that the
crime has not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the same was not intended to merely
preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the case. Thus, as his certiorari petition was
filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the criminal aspect of the case, it is necessary
that the same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law, is the proper
representative of the People, the real party in interest in the criminal proceedings.

Q: BURGOS filed Information against SPOUSES ELADIO AND ARLINA NAVAL AND
THEIR DAUGHTER, AMALIA NAVAL (SPS. NAVAL ET AL.) of the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription. Aggrieved, BURGOS moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Thus,
BURGOS elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 138203. In a Resolution dated March 5, 2015, the CA dismissed the
petition for failure of BURGOS to join the People in his certiorari petition as required
by the Administrative Code of 1987. Unstirred, BURGOS moved for reconsideration,
which was likewise denied. The CA observed that the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) has not consented to the filing of the certiorari petition hence, this petition
before the Court. Is the CA correct in denying BURGOS motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the OSG has not consented to the filing of the certiorari petition?

A: Yes, In this case, records show that BURGOS petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No.
138203 sought for the reinstatement of the Information and/or a ruling that the
crime has not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the same was not intended to merely
preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the case. Thus, as his certiorari petition was
filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the criminal aspect of the case, it is necessary
that the same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law, is the proper
representative of the People, the real party in interest in the criminal proceedings. As
the CA aptly noted, "[t]o this date, the [OSG] as appellant's counsel of the [People]
has not consented to the filing of the present suit." There being no authorization
given - as his request to the OSG filed on April 10, 2015 was not shown to have been
granted - the certiorari petition was rightfully dismissed.

It must, however, be clarified that the CA's dismissal of BURGOS certiorari petition is
without prejudice to his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the
civil aspect of the Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents case, provided
that the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied
with.
People vs. Gerry Lipata
G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016

Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder and subsequently found guilty as
charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appellants appeal and affirmed the RTCs decision. The PAO
filed a notice of appeal on behalf of appellant. During the pendency of the appeal to
the Supreme Court, the appellant dies. In view of appellants death prior to the
promulgation of the CAs decision the Supreme Court issued a Resolution which
ordered the PAO "to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the
deceased appellant as party; and to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant. In its
Manifestation, the PAO stated that: Considering that the civil liability in the instant
case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, the same does not
survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, the death of the latter pending
appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon and this being so, it respectfully submitted that the necessity to
substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not
arise.

Decision:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c)
Quasi-contracts d) x x x e) Quasi-delicts

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases
supplied)

Elizalde S. Co vs. Munoz, Jr.,

G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013

FACTS
Muoz was charged for perjury. Suspecting that Co was responsible for said charge,
Muoz stated in several radio station interviews that Co: Influenced the City
Prosecutor to expedite the issuance of the warrant of arrest against Muoz;
Manipulated the results of the government bidding for the Masarawag-San Francisco
dredging project; and Received P2M from Muoz on the condition that he will
sub-contract Muoz for the project, but did not fulfill said condition.

Co charged Muoz for 3 counts of libel. He did not waive/institute/reserve his right to
file a separate civil action arising from the libelous statements.

Muoz: Co is a public figure and the statements were of public interest; hence, these
statements are protected by the rules on privileged communication, which dispenses
of the presumption of malice and shifts the burden of proving the same to the
plaintiff.
RTC: Guilty + ordered Muoz to pay:
CA: Acquitted Muoz + extinguished his civil liability ex delicto (meaning: arising from
a crime).
Co appealed the civil aspect of the case.[1]

Co: As for the possibility of Muoz to still be held civilly liable despite acquittal:
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC) states that the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
As for why Muoz should be held liable: The statements of Muoz are not privileged
communication because Co is not a public figure. Although he is known in his
community, this community only comprises of his business associates.

Muoz: The title of Section 2 is When separate civil action is suspended; thus, it only
applies when the civil action is instituted separately from the criminal action. The
civil action for damages arising from libel in this case, however, was instituted along
with the criminal complaint for libel because Co did not waive or reserve his right to
file a separate civil action. Since Section 2 cannot apply if the civil action was
instituted along with the criminal action, the extinction of the penal action had
already carried with it the extinction of the civil action.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the civil action still subsists despite the acquittal of Muoz (i.e. W/N
Muoz MAY STILL
BE HELD liable for damages)?
2. Whether or not Muoz IS ACTUALLY liable for damages?

HELD
1. YES. Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC states that a judgment of acquittal shall
determine if the act/omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

If one were to follow the theory of Muoz:

- Suppose a civil action arising from a crime was filed along with the criminal action;
Muoz says that the acquittal of the accused automatically carries with it the
extinguishment of his civil liability.
- This interpretation renders useless the mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 to
determine the existence of the act/omission which gave rise to the civil liability,
because civil liability is deemed already extinguished. Thus, this interpretation
cannot be accepted.
2. NO. Although malice is generally presumed in a libelous statement, jurisprudence
provides for exceptions, such as:
- Remarks directed against a public figure (Guingguing v. CA)
- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest (Borjal v. CA) The statements of
Muoz fall under both exceptions.
- Co is a public figure. To reverse this factual finding of the CA is beyond the
jurisdiction of the SC.
- The subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of
the statements of Muoz were fair comments.

Thus, the statements of Muoz are exempt from the rule on presumption of malice.
Since Co was not able to prove malice, he cannot be entitled to moral damages.

[1] He admitted that he cannot appeal the criminal aspect of the case, since it would
result to double jeopardy.

NOTES
Modes of enforcing a civil liability ex delicto:
1. Through a civil action deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action;
2. Through a civil action filed separately, either:
a. Before the criminal action; or
b. After, upon reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal action.
The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action

Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Rufo Aviles and Josephine Aviles,

G.R. No. 86062, June 6, 1990

The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by its nature
the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been
challenged at the proper time.

Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally

offered, and not when the particular document is marked is identified and marked as
an exhibit.

Facts:
Rufo and Josephine Aviles were charged with the crime of estafa. The information
alleged alleged that being then sub-agents of Interpacific Transit, Inc. and as such
enjoying its trust and confidence, the Aviles collected from its various clients
payments for airway bills in the amount of P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it
to their principal, they unlawfully converted to their own personal use and benefit.
In the course of the direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses, the
prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills which the Aviles had not
rendered proper accounting. The defense objected to their presentation, invoking
the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills
in due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed the marking of the said
documents as Exhibits "B" to "OO." The prosecution did not submit the original
airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondary
evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally
were offered in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.

The trial court acquitted the Aviles, ruling that the certified photocopies of the
airway by were not admissible.

Issue:
Whether or not the certified photocopies of the airway bills are admissible in
evidence

Held:
Yes. In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined themselves to the best
evidence rule and the nature of the documents being presented, which they held did
not come under any of the exceptions to the rule. There is no question that the
photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless there
was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other exceptions
allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble is that in rejecting these copies under
Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent court disregarded an equally important principle
long observed in our trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.

The rule is that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is
premature.

It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between identification of

documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the
course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence an an exhibit.
The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact
that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it
will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide
to formally offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may
decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, the trial court is, under Rule 132,
Section 35, not authorized to consider it.

Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally

offered, not earlier. The identification of the document before it is marked as an
exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the
party presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is
not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence.
What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally
offered as an exhibit.

In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private
respondents as secondary evidence only when they were being identified for
marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the
promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later. It is true that the
originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did
not object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence.
And these were subsequently admitted by the trial court.

The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bills while they were
being identified and marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection it should
have made when the exhibits were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.
No valid and timely objection was made at that time. And it is no argument to say
that the earlier objection should be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37
of Rule 132, for that provision obviously refers to a single objection to a class of
evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to
encompass the rest of the evidence. The presumption is, of course, that there was an
offer and a seasonable objection thereto. But, to repeat, no objection was really
made in the case before us because it was not made at the proper time.

It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this
time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did
not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits was made in
writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to the photocopies but
to all the other exhibits of the prosecution.

The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected to is
deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its
judgment. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would
have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper.

People vs. Alfredo Morales, G.R. No. 206832, January 21, 2015;

People vs. Benjie Consorte, G.R. No. 194068, November 26, 2014

People vs. Victoria R. Arambulo,

G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015;

FACTS:

respondent Victoria Arambulo (Victoria), Gungab, Reynaldo, Domingo Reyes, that

question pertaining to the authority of Buban to demand remittance may only

Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes are the heirs of Sps Pedro Reyes and Anastacia be
considered as a defense in the estafa case and not as a ground to suspend the
Reyes. Anaped Estate, Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate
proceedings.

planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and A

prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
in behalf of his heirs. antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to

(Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate, Inc. (Anaped),

another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
led a complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr.
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
(Miguel) before the O ce of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped. prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
 Respondents filed MR to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial

raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.

question in view of the pendency of the two intra-corporate cases pending before

the RTC QC and Makati.

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial

o SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is a petition led by Victoria's brother Oscar for question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
sale, injunction, receivership and damages resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition led by
Victoria and her brothers proceed.
Reynaldo and Domingo questioning the authority of their elder sibling

Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be

Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab, &Anaped Board of Directors considered

prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
and officers, including private complainant Buban to act for and in behalf
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves
of the corporation. facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be

In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution

based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt
of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the issues of whether of the group of or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction
Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether to
try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
they are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would necessarily result

SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal

in their acquittal in the criminal case. TC granted motion. Set aside its order, and case
for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of
set the case for pre-trial. Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and
damages. Even if said

Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to file case

will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged free from
Comment/Opposition to the MR and that pre-trial be held in abeyance. TC Denied.
criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of
corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets

Respondents appealed to CA, granted.

o CA concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found to be would result in

the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.

defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for SEC

Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that a
estafa cannot prosper. MR denied. prejudicial question exists. The Complaint in SEC
Case No. 03- 99-6259 prays for

the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban.

ISSUE: W/N there is a prejudicial question? Yes, in the 2nd SEC Case. Essentially, the
issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf
of the corporation.

HELD/RATIO:

On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to whether respondents

Petitioner argues that any decision of the trial court in the SEC cases with respect

committed estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other
to the question of who are the lawful officers or directors of Anaped is not
determinative of the liability of respondents to remit the rental collections in favor
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that
such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender
 The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance to the validity or

invalidity of the authority of Anaped directors and officers.

It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315,

paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proves

misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of
the Information.

In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of

misappropriation or conversion. The phrase, "to misappropriate to one's own

use" has been said to include "not only conversion to one's personal advantage,
but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right." In
this case, the resolution of the issue of misappropriation by respondents depends
upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC case that the
present Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent
Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the
essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this case.

SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition led by Victoria and her brothers Domingo

and Reynaldo questioning the very authority of their elder siblings Rodrigo and
Emerenciana, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and Officers, including
Buban to act for and in behalf of the corporation. We find this issue consonant with
the provisions of the Corporation Code Sec 23.

From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case

No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in behalf of
Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot
demand remittance of the rentals on the property and Victoria does not have the
obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban. D

Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt

of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.

Romeo S. Chua vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 79021, May 17, 1993
Private respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying for the nullification of the foregoing orders. Meanwhile, a case
for Carnapping entitled "Alex De Leon, Complainant,
vs. Romeo Chua, Respondent" pending preliminary investigation was
provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo Chua with the following
reservation: "without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership
is resolved".

CA reversed the RTC decision, and nullified the questioned orders. The appellate
court ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that possession of
the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy. Thus, petitioner filed this appeal by
certiorari.

FACTS:

Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the RTC Cebu City (Branch XIII), after examining
2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2) other witnesses, issued a search warrant
directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction and the
seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon
of the same date, respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took
custody thereof.

A civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same
Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John
Doe" in the RTC Cebu (Branch VIII) presided by Judge Leonardo B. Caares alleging
among other things, petitioner's lawful ownership and possession of the subject
vehicle; that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor
carnapped it, and that he has never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any
other crime for that matter.

Further, petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the subject vehicle on the strength of the aforesaid search warrant.
On the same date, Judge Caares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the
posting of a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). The
writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized
by Deputy Sheriff.

Respondent Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
quashal of the writ of replevin, which the court denied. Motion for
Recon also denied.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the remedy of replevin was proper notwithstanding that the
personal property (Isuzu dump truck) was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant?
(2) Whether or not the remedy of replevin was proper notwithstanding the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case?

RULING:
(1) No, replevin was not proper. Thesubject property was placed under
custodia legis. Replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia
legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ . The reason
posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with
the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process
under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or
attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer under a valid
process, although after the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie.

(2) No, replevin was not proper since the criminal case, having been provisionally
dismissed, a probability exists that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a
criminal action.

RULES set by the court:

Where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to
believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal case,
the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, and if there are conflicting
claims over the seized property, an interpleader may be filed in proper court, not
necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant;

Where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a
criminal action, or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed,
and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized,
the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court
which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court. In the case at bar, RTC
Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the property
seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have
dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal of the carnapping
case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in
jurisdiction could still arise.

San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Perez,

G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc.
2,130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque. The
transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering
the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San
Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land purchased
under the third deed of sale, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties. On its
part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of
land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to
be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being
meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17,
1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20
TCTs despite demands. Thus, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charging respondent directors and
officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in
relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the same time, San
Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying
to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor. San Miguel Properties
filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, citing the pendency
of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes
opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated
BF Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel
Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition
coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to
the intervening termination of the receivership. The OCP Las Piñas rendered its
resolution, dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on several grounds, one of which was that there
existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action
until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB.

ISSUE: Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery
of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal
complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the
ground of a prejudicial question

RULING: YES. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises

in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. The determination of
whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial
question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the
specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal
complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the
resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of
guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved
is thus necessary. An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand
the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or
according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.
Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must
first be a breach of the contract. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957
is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of
the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and
amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators. Conformably with the foregoing, the action
for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San
Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining
20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’
directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The
resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20
TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in
the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for
the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957
would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the
prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet
presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its
case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Manolo P. Samson,

G.R. No. 205972, November 9, 2016 and G.R. No. 164352, November 9, 2016

Facts:
Petitioner filed a criminal case against the respondent for unfair competition.
Subsequently, petitioner also commenced a civil action against respondent and his
business entities, with the IPO as a nominal party. Respondent filed a Motion to
Suspend Arraignment in Criminal Cases in the RTC citing that the resolution of the
civil case in the IPO will determine the outcome of the instant criminal cases. The RTC
suspend the arraignment of the said criminal case which the Petitioner appealed.
The Appeal was denied. Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the action of the Petitioner can be tried as a separated Civil action and not
subject to suspension due to Prejudicial Question.

Held:
Yes, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair
competition, damages and cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases were the
criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair competition. A common element of all
such cases for unfair competition – civil and criminal – was fraud. Under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Secondly, a civil action for
damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial question
by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair competition. A
prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issues to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear
not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.